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[bMb ppwanh DATE ISSUED: 2/16/86 ACRS MEETING MINUTES ON THE MEETING OF THE QUALIFICATION PROGRAM FOR SAFETV-RELATED EQUIPMENT JANUARY 15, 1986 WASHINGTON, DC The ACRS Subcommittee on the Qualification Program for Safety-Related Equipment met on January 15, 1986 at 1717 H Street, NW, Washington, DC.
The purpose of this meeting was to discuss the resolution and implemen-tation of USI A-46, the Industry views on USI A-46, the Seismic Quali-fication Utility Group's (SQUG) evaluation of equipment performance during the recent Chilean and Mexican earthquakes, and the RES work on equipment qualification. The proposed resolution of USI A-46 is antic-ipated to be discussed by the full Comittee in the May-June 1986 timeframe. The Subcommittee heard presentations from representatives of NRR, RES, AIF, and SQUG. The meeting begun at 8:30 am and was adjourned at approximately 6:00 pm. The discussions on RES on the equipment qualification work were held between 3:15 pm and 6:00 pm and were held in closed session. The remainder of the meeting was open to the public.
The principle attendees for the Subcommittee meeting were:
ACRS                          NRC                    Industry C. Wylie, Chairman            R. Bosnak, NRR        J. Thomas, SQUG G. Reed, Pember              N. Anderson, NRR      N. Smith, SQUG l
l J. Ebersole, & mber          P. Y. Chen, NRR        R. Schaffstall, KMC C. P. Siess, Member          T. Y. Chang, NRR      P. Yanev, SQUG D. Ward, Member              D. Su?livan, RES      A. Roby, AIF l    A. Cappucci, Staff            B. Morris, RES R. Savio, Staff              J. Vora, RES l
l W. Lipinski, Consultant      W. Farmer, RES R. Feit, RES l
1 060 &
 
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QPSRE Meeting Minutes                                January 15, 1986 Highlights
: 1. T. Y. Chang summarized the status of NRR's development of the resolution for USI A-46. A' proposed resolution was reviewed by CRGR in July 1985 and has been issued for public comment. Public comments have been received and are currently being evaluated. It is expected that the NRC Staff's revised proposal for the resolu-tion of USI A-46 will be ready for ACRS review in the May-June 1986 timeframe. The public comment received addressed a variety of topics. The most significant of these were:
(a) A number of commenters stated that they believed that the new Backfit Rule should be applied to the resolution of USI A-46 and that, under this rule, the equipment reviews proposed by the NRC Staff need to be evaluated by Cost / Benefit Analysis.
The NRC Staff believes that while the experience does show that equipment is inherently rugged but that there are still technical issues that are not resolved. The NRC Staff believes that equipment anchorage, the functional capability of relays, and the need to look for seismic design outliers (i.e., seismic design deficiencies such as long-shaft pumps and valves or poorly supported water tanks) have been identified as cost effective areas for review. SQUG appears to be in agreement.
(b) There were a number of comments as to how the review of relays should be performed. It appears that procedures are being developed which will take into consideration these comments and will be consistent with the findings of the SQUG work.
(c) The commenters in a number of cases took issue with scope of the walk-through inspections proposed as part of the resolu-tion of USI A-46. Some commenters disagreed with the NRC Staff as to the degree to which past inspections and sampling techniques could be used to establish design and construction
 
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QPSRE Meeting Minutes                              January 15, 1986 adequacy. Some comenters want to use drawings rather than an inspection of the p1 ant as the basis for detennining the adequacy of the seismic design. These comenters would treat drawings not being representative of the as built plant as a QA issue and out of the scope of USI A-46. This ap1 roach has been flatly rejected by the NRC Staff.
The NRC Staff viewgriphs sumarizing the public comment are in-cluded as Attachment A.
: 2. J. Thomas sumarized the SQUG coments on the NRC Staff's proposed resolution of USI A-46. SQUG is in general in agreement with the approach proposed by the NRC Staff but believes that any work performed under USI A-46 should be justified under the NRC Backfit Rule. SQUG intends to work with the NRC Staff in developing a cost effective way of achieving the NRC objectives.
: 3. J. Thomas sumarized the status of the SQUG programs. The original SQUG data base has been expanded to include additional classes of equipment and data from recently large earthquakes (most notably the1985ChileanandMexicanearthquakes). EPRI has programs which are nearing completion which will produce equipment anchorage guidelines and a categorization of available seismic test data by equipment class. SQUG is developing generic implementation proce-dures for plant-specific reviews and a plan for the evaluation of      ,
the seismic operability of essential relays. Mr. Thomas stated that this work would be available to all SQUG members. SQUG is currently developing a methodology for identifying essential relays and evaluating the consequence of relay chatter. The methodology will be tested on BWR and PWR pilot plants in 1986. The earthquake experience reviewed by SQUG has identified protection relays as a potential problem source. The relay evaluation procedure will look
 
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QPSRE Meeting Minutes                              January 15, 1986 at relay chatter (i.e., spurious actuation of systems) and relay fragility for all essential (to achieving hot shutdown) systems.
: 4. SQUG believes that the earthquake experience demonstrates that the equipment and structures used in commercial nuclear power plants have a high generic seismic ruggedness. Equipment of the type used in these plants has performed well in earthquakes and fragility testing programs have demonstrated ruggedness at even higher acceleration levels. Equipment anchorage, relay chatter, and the existence of possible seismic design outliers have been identified as areas which should be evaluated under USI A-46. There was some discussion as to the applicability of the relay performance data obtained in the SQUG evaluation of earthquake experience. The consequence of relay chatter is related to the circuit and system designs in which these relays are used. Systems in nuclear power plants are often more complex and may be more vulnerable to system interaction effects. It was also noted that non-essential systems can interact with essential safety systems. An example given was the practice of connecting non-essential loads to the power source for essential equipment. It was also noted that long shaft pumps had been identified as a seismic design outlier in the Zion SSMRP and PRA evaluations. Other plants have not been reviewed to see if similar pumps were used in essential system.
: 5. P. Yanev presented a summary of the SQUG evaluation of the effects of the 1985 Chilean and Mexican earthquakes. The Chilean earth-quake was a Magnitude 7.8 with a number of aftershocks, the largest of which was a Magnitude 7.2. The Mexican earthquake was a Magni-tude 8.1, again with a number of aftershocks, the largest of' which was a Magnitudr 7.5. Both earthquakes atiected a large area (about 20,000 square miles). The damage to engineered structures were much higher in the Mexican earthquake, due to the dry lake bed soil conditions in Mexico City and to what were probably the not as I
 
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QPSRE Neeting Minutes                            January 15, 1986 well designed and constructed Mexican structures. The duration of both earthquakes were long (M45 seconds at accelerations of 0.lg orgreater). The representative NRC Regulatory Guide 1.60 spectral peak ground acceleration was 0.409 for the Chilean earthquake and 0.179 for the Mexican earthquake, near the earthquake epicenters.
The performance of equipment in engineered buildings on go I soil was good and consistent with the previous SQUG evaluation of 'ther earthquakes. Failures of protective (i.e., latching) relays ar.d some types of fluid containing tanks was observed. A number of of the photographs taken of affected equipment and structures were shown. Copies are in the ACRS files.
: 6. A Roby summarized the AIF position on the resolution of USI A-46.
AIF became involved with the resolution of this issue in 1980 with the establishment of a Working Group. An AIF position paper on USI A-46 was issued in November 1983. Mr. Roby stated that the AIF believes that the nuclear industry has always given careful consideration to seismic design. (The NRC Staff is not in agreement.) AIF believes the equipment used in nuclear power plants is seismically rugged and that plant systems, (except for the emphasis on redundancy) are similar to what is used in non-nuclear applications. AIF believes that the implementation of USI A-46 should be done under the Backfit Rule and that the equip-ment review should be based on drawings rather than plant walk-thoughs.
The following are highlights from discussions conducted in closed session.
: 7. The Subcommittee discussed the RES electrical equipment qualifi-cation and plant aging work with D. Sullivan, William Famer, Vora, R. Feit, and B. Morris. A summary of the programs and the proposed FY 1987 fundings is given in Attachment B. NRR has
 
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QPSRE Meeting Minutes                                January 15, 1986 proposed that this work b,e terminated by FY 1987 and RES has agreed. The major topic's which were to be addressted by this work are as follows:
(1)  Equipment survival in a hydrogen burn in support of large dry PWR and BWR Mark III licensing questions.
(2) Selected cable and gasket qualifications issues.
(3) Effect of aging on the seismic fragility of batteries.
(4) The understanding of selected synergistic phenomena and the impact of synergistic effects on the adequacy of current qualification testing practices.
(5) Generic aspects of the performance of electrical penetration assemblies under severe accident conditions.
(6) Generic identification of aging and service wear effects which might impact on safety.
The electrical equipment qualification work (excluding fire protec-tion) has been eliminated for FY 1987. The aging work is budgeted for $7.8 million. The work is being conducted with a number of contractors to gain maximum advantage from existing equipment and experience. It was budgeted for $2.2 million in FY 1987 prior to the cut.
NOTE:      Additional meeting details can be obtained from a transcript of this meeting available in the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC, or can be purchased from ACE-Federal Reporters, 444 North Capitol Street, Washington, DC 20001. (202) 347-3700.
 
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PROPOSED RESOLUTI0i; 0F PUBLIC COMMENTS                -
ON USI A 16 -7.v.d#4fd 4
PP0 POSED. RESOLUTION PACKAGE REVIEWED BY CRGR ON JULY 8, 1985.
ISSUED FOR PUBLIC COMMENT ON 9/13/85.
PUBLIC COMMENTS DUE 11/15/85.
PROPOSED RESOLUTION OF COMMENTS COMPLETE.
NRC MANAGEMENT HAS NOT YET REVIEWED COMMENIS, 1
 
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ORIGINATORS OF PUBLIC Ct1MMENTS 8    UTILITIES:      7 SOUG MEMBERS 2    INDUCTRY GROUPS:      - SQUG
                                      - NUCLEAR UTILITY GROUP ON EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION 1    NATIONAL LAB 0PATORY:    - SANDIA EPRI AIF e
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ORIGINATORS OF PUBLIC COMMENTS 7 S0llG MEMBERS 8    UTILITIES:                '
                                          - SOUG                              \'
2    INDUSTRY GROUPS:
                                          - NUCLEAR UTILITY GROUP ON EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION
                                                  - SANDIA 1    NATIONAL LAB 0PATORY:
EPRI        .
AIF 9
9
 
CATEGORIZATION OF COMMENTS                  ,
APPLICABILITY OF BACKF1T RULE JUSTIFICATION FOP A-46 REVIEW >(10 COMMENTS)
IMPLEMENIAIION SCHEDULE (12)
RELAY REVIEW GUIDELINES (10)
SCOPE OF REVIEW (10)
SCOPE OF WALK-THROUGH INSPECTION (8)
RE0VIREMENT FOR JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION (5)
COST ESTIMATE (5)
GUIDELINES FOR REPLACEMENT EQUIPMENT (4)
SAFE SHUTDOWN REQUIREMENT (4)
EQUIPMENT SEISMIC DEMAND AND SEISMIC CAPACITY (6)
MAKE-UP 0F WALK-THROUGH INSPECTION TEAM (4)
EXPANSION OF SEISMIC EXPERIENCE DATA BASE (3)
 
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POLE OF SOUG IN GENERIC IMPLEMENTATION (3)
ACCESSIBILITY OF SOUG RESilLTS TO NON-SOUG MEMBERS (2)
PLANT SPECIFIC SERS (2I APPLICABTLITY OF A-46 TO NEW PLANTS /NEW EQUIPMENT (1)
APPLICABILITY OF A-46 TO SPECIFIC PLANTS (2) 0 0
 
APPLICABILITY OF_BACKFIT BULE AND JUSTIFICATION FOR A-46 REVIEW (10)
COMMENTS:
(1)    1HE'NEW BACKFIT RULE SHOULD BE APPLIED TO THE RESOLUTION OF A-46, (2)    REGULATORY ANALYSIS DOES NOT PROPERLY Of) ANT 1FY COST BENEFIT.
(3)    EARTH 0VAKE EXPERIENCE SHOWS THAT EQUIPMENT IS INHERENTLY RUGGED THEREFORE NO NEED TO D0 REVIEW,
      . RESPONSE:
(1), (2) - THE,BACKFIT RULE REQUIRES:      " SYSTEMATIC AND DOCUMENTED ANALYSIS....FOR BACKFITS WHICH IT (NRC) SEEKS TO IMPOSE". ANALYSIS CAN BE QUALITATIVE.
                        - QUANTITATIVE PRA ANALYSIS TO EVALUATE RISK REDUCTION FROM SEISMICALLY CUALIFYING E00!PMENT HAS HlGH UNCERTAINTY, HIGHLY DEPENDENT ON ASSUMPTIONS, (3)        - ACKNOWLEDGE EQUIPMENT IS INHERENTLY RUGGED, STILL HAVE AREAS OF CONCERN:
(A)  E00iPMENT ANCH08 AGE                                '
(B)  FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITY OF ESSENTJAL RELAYS (C)  OUTLIERS                                            .
WE.BELIEVE SOUG IN AGREEMENT.
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I iMPLEMEFTATION SCHEDULE (12)                      .'
COMMENTS:
(I)  IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE SHOULD BE NEGOTI ATED ON INDIVIDUAL UTILITY BASIS, CONSIDERING LIV!NG SCHEDULE FOR PLANT MODIFICATION.
(2)  PROPOSED COMPLETION SCHEDULE "N0 LATER THAN 28 MONTHS" FROM DATE OF ISSUAb'CE SHOULD BE CHANGED, (3)  SCHEDULES SHOULD PERMIT IMPLEMENTATION AN.0 EODIFICATIONS DURING PLANNED OUTAGES,                        ,
(4)  Walk-THROUGH INSPECTION SHOULD NOT BE R$0VIRED UNTIL EPRI/RES TEST DATA AND SOUG EFFORTS TO ADDRESS PE-MAININGCLA$SE30FEQUIPMENTISCOMPLETE4 (5)  GENERIC GROUP GIVEN 90 DAYS TO RESPOND TO REQUIREMENT, INDIVIDUAL UTILITIES GIVEN 45 DAYS, P.ESPONSE:
(1)  AGREE,  WILL MODIFY TEXT, (2), (3), (4)      28 MONTHS IS A GENERAL GUIDELINE. TEXT WILL BE CLARIFIED, ACTUAL IEPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE WILL BE NEGOTIATED WITH INDIVIDUAL UTILITIES.
(5)  SQUG AND INDIVIDUAL UTILITIES GIVEN 60 DAYS TO RESPOND, t    .
 
l RELAY REVIEW GillDELINES (10)                      ,l COMMENTS:              ,,
(1)  RELA,Y CHATTER IN CERTAIN CASES IS INCONSEQUENTIAL.
(2)  CREDIT SHOULD BE GIVEN FOR OPERATOR ACTION TO RESTORE SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT AFTER EARTHOUAKE.
(3)  EQUIPMENT FUNCTIONALITY SHOULD BE RESTRICTED TO
                " RELAYS" ONLY, (4)  REQUIREMENT FOR REVIEW 0F ELECTRICAL RELAYS SHOULD BE REVISED, IN VIEW 0F SOUG WORK ON RELAY REVIEW PROCEDURE,
 
===RESPONSE===
(1, (4)    AGREE WITH COMMENT. THE REQUIREMENT FOR RELAY REVIEW WILL BE REVISED.
(2) WE AGREE IF PROCEDURES ARE AVAILABLE AND THERE IS SUFFICIENT TIME.
(3) AGREE,
 
e SCOPE OF REVIEW (10)                        ,
(1) C:    THE SCOPE OF,,A-46 REVIEW SHOULD REFLECT THE MINOR SIGNIFICANCE OF ANY REMAINING A-46 ISSUES
                    ,IN VIEW 0F THE SEISMIC EXPERIENCE AND TEST EXPERIENCE DATA.
R:  SCOPE ALREADY NARROWED DOWN T0: - > ' =        s'*
                      - E0lilPMENT ANCHORAGES
                      - FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITY OF RELAYS ~
                      - CAVEATS AND OUTLIERS (2) C:    ASSUMPTION THAT SSE DOES NOT CAUSE LOCA SHOULD BE EXTENDED TO INCLUDE HELB AND SLBA.
R:    AGREE. THIS IS BASED ON:
                      - SEISMIC EXPERIENCE DATA.
                      - IE, BULLETIN 79-02, 79-07, 79-14 REVIEW 0F SAFETY RELATED PIPING.
(3) C:    ACCIDENT MITIGATION SYSTEM PIPING IS NOT INCLUDED IN THE SCOPE BECAUSE OF EXTENSIVE PIPING SYSTEM DESIGN MARGINS. IT SHOULD BE STATED THAT SUCH PIPING MARGINS EXIST IN ALL SYSTEMS INCLUDING THE RC SYSTEM.
R:    AGREE. SAME REASON AS IN (3).
 
(4) C:            TYPICAL EQUIPMENT LIST IN REGULATORY ANALYSIS SHOULD STATE "THIS LIST IS BASED ON SQUG POLLS 0F MEMBER UTILITIES AND IS EXPECTED TO INCLUDE ALL OF THE TYPES OF SAFE SHUTDOWF EQUIPMENT IN NUCLEAR POWEE PLANTS: PLANT-SPECIFIC LISTS ARE EXPECTED TO BE SHORTER,"                                                                    :
R:          AGREE.
(5) C:            NOT ALL PORV'S SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS EQUIPMENT UNIOUE TO NUCLEAR PLANTS, R:          AGREE, (G) C:            ELECTRICAL PENETRATION ASSEMBLIES AND NEUTPON                                                '
DETECTORS SHOULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN SCOPE OF A-46 SINCE THEY ARE PASSIVE, R:          AGREE. HOWEVER SEISMIC ADEQUACY CAN BE VERIFIED FOR BOTH BY EXPERIENCE DATA OR TEST DATA. NRC HAS NO OBJECTION TO THEIR INCLUSION.
(7) C:            ANCHORAGE REVIEW OF TANKS AND HEAT EXCHANGERS HAS NOT BEEN JUSTIFIED, R:          TANK AND HEAT EXCHANGER ANCHORAGE IMPORTANT TO SHUTDOWN.          EXPERIENCE DATA SHOWS ANCHORAGE IMPORTANT, 1
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(8) C: IT IS NOT JUSTIFIED TO DOCUMENT SEISMIC ADE00ACY OF EQUIPMENT BEYOND THE ORIGINAL EIGHT CLASSES SINCE SEISMIC EXPERIENCE DEMONSTRATES THAT EQUIPMENT IS INHEkENTLY RUGGED, R: CAVEATS AND EXCLUSIONS, AS WELL AS APPROPRIATE B0llNDING SPECTRA HAVE TO BE IDENTIFIED FOR ALL EQUIPMENT CLASSES, 0
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SCOPE OF WALK-THROUGH INSPECTION (8)
COMMENTS:
(1)  STATISTICAL SAMPLING SHOULD BE USED FOR ANCHORAGE INSPECTION, FULL REVIEW NEEDED ONLY IF SAMPLING SHOWS ANOMALIES.
(2)  CREDIT SHOULD BE GIVEN FOR PREVIOUS WALK-THROUGHS OR AVAILABLE ENGINEERING DOCUMENTS ON ANCHORAGE.
(3)  EQUIPMENT ANCHORAGE ALREADY ADDRESSED BY IE BULLETINS 79-02, 79-14 AND IE INFORMATION NOTICE 80-21.
 
===RESPONSE===
(1)  ISSUE WILL BE CONSIDERED AFTER SSRAP RECOMMENDATION.
(2)  DISAGREE.        THERE IS EVIDENCE PROBLEMS STILL EXIST.
                    - PPEVIOUS WALK-THROUGH DON'T ADDRESS ALL CONCERNS IN THE ANCHORAGE GUIDELINES / WALK-THROUGH PROCE-DUREr' UNDER  s  y -'  DEVELOPMENT.-
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                    - ENGINEERING DOCUMENTS MAY NOT REFLECT AS BUILT CON-DITION. DEFECTS IN INSTALLATION CAN ONLY BE DETECTED BY A WALK-THROUGH INSPECTION,
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                    - IE INFORMATION NOTICE 80-21 WAS FOR ANCHORAGE OF CLASS 1E ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT ONLY.
                    - IE BULLETINS 79-02, 79-14 WERE FOR PIPING ONLY.
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REQUIREMENT TO SUBMIT JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED
* OPERATION (JCO) (5)
COMMENTS:
(1)  THE' REQUIREMENT FOR JC0 NOT WARRANTED,
              - REPORTING REQUIREMENTS EXIST IN 10 CFR 50,72/10 CFR 50,73.
(2)  INSTEAD OF JCO:
              - UTILITIES COMMIT TO RESOLVE DEFICIENCY BY A CERTAIN DATE.
              - JC0 KEPT IN LICENSEE'S FILE INSTEAD OF SUBMITTING TO NRC,
              - DEFICIENCPES REPORTED. BY USING 10 CFR 50.72 OR 10 CFR 50,73.
(3)  MOST DEFICIENCIES WILL NOT PRESENT A SERIOUS SAFETY C0h'CERN AND THEREFORE SHOULD NOT REQUIRE JC0'S,
 
===RESPONSE===
        - DEFINITION OF DEFICIENCY CLARIFIED.
        - JC0 WILL BE REQUIRED FOR PROVEN DEFICIENCIES IF NOT CORRECTED WITHIN 30 DAYS,
 
COST ESTIMATE (5)                            ,
COMMENTS:              ,,
(1)  COST,S MAY BE LOW BY FACTOR OF 2 DUE TO LOW LABOR ESTIMATE.
(2)  SEP EXPERIENCE INDICATES THAT EQUIPMENT REVIEW 2 TO 3 TIMES HIGHER THAN A-46 ESTIMATES.
nr  s' RESPONSE:                                            r,#.' ''
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(1)  EXTENSIVE ANALYSIS AND GUIDELINE DEVELOPED "UP FRONT" WHICH SHOULD REDUCE LABOR COST.
                            ~
(2)  DISAGREE.
                - SEP PLANTS ARE TYPICALLY OLDER. EQUIPMENT AND ANCHORAGE IN LATER PLANTS HAVE BETTER SEISMIC CAPABILITY.
                - A-46 APPROACH IS FOR ANALYSIS BEFORE REVIEW. GUIDE-LINES AND PROCEDURES WILL MINIMIZE REVIEW TIME AND COST.
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GUIDELINES FOR REPLACEMENT EQUIPMENT (4)            ,
COMMENTS:              ,,
SUGGEST THAT A U6 CRITERIA ARE ACCEPTABLE TO SEISMICALLY OVALIFY REPLACEMENT EQUIPMENT REGARDLESS OF REASON OF REPLACEMENT,
 
===RESPONSE===
AGREE,  REGULATORY ANALYSIS WILL BE REVISED, O
 
SAFE SHUTDOWN REQUIREMENT (4)                  ,
(1) C:        A-46 SHOULD P,ERMIT TIMELY OPERATOR ACTIONS TO DEMONSTRATE THE ACHIEVEMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF
                      , HOT SHUTDOWN.
R:        WE AGREE IF PROCEDURES ARE AVAILABLE AND THERE IS SUFFICIENT TIME.
(2) C:        THE ASSUMPTION OF A NON-SEISMICALLY RELATED SINGLE RANDOM COMPONENT FAILURE SHOULD BE ELIMINATED. SINGLE TRAIN OF SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT WOULD PROVIDE ASSUPANCE PLANT CAN BE SHUTDOWN SAFELY, BECAUSE OF LOW EARTHOUAKE PROBABILITY AND INHERENT RUGGEDNESS OF EQUIPMENT.
R:        DISAGREE.
(3) C:        REGULATORY ANALYSIS APPEARS TO REFER TO PASSIVE NOT ACTIVE COMPONENTS IN (2) AB0VE.
P. :      INTENTION IS TO INCLUDE ONLY ACTIVE COMPONENTS IN THIS STATEMENT. TEXT WILL BE CORRECTED.
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(4) C:    ONE OF THE 4 FUNCTIONS REQUIRED TO BE PERFORMED FOR HOT SHUTDOWN IN CONJUNCTION WITH A SSE IS "T0 PROVIDE AC AND DC CURRENT EMERGENCY POWER",
THIS IS NOT NEEDED, SINCE THE NEED FOR AC AND/0R DC EMERGENCY POWER TO MEET THE OTHER THREE FUNCTIONS IS A PLANT-SPECIFIC CONSIDERATION, R:  THIS SENTENCE WILL BE REVISED TO READ " PROVIDE AC AND/0R DC EMERGENCY POWER AS NEEDED ON A PLANT-SPECIFIC BASIS",
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EQUIPMENT SEISMIC DEMAND AND SEISMIC CAPACITY (6)
(1) C:  WHEN WILL GENERIC BOUNDING SPECTRA FOR EQUIPMENT OTHER THAN 8' CLASSES BE AVAILABLE?
IF NOT AVAILABLE, CAN TYPE A BOUNDING SPECTRA BE USED?
R:  APPROPRIATE GENERIC B0UNDING SPECTRA FOR EQUIPMENT OTHER THAN 8 CLASSES WILL BE AVAILABLE EAPLY PART OF 1987 FOR USE IN IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM.
(2) C:  FOR VEPIFICATION OF ANCHORAGE, CAN FLOOR SPECTRA BE USED TO OBTAIN THE EQUIPMENT SPECTRAL          -
ACCELERATION?
R:  YES. ,
(3) C:  UTILITIES SHOULD NOT HAVE TO AD0PT THE " GENERIC FLOOR RESPONSE SPECTRA" IF THEY CAN SHOW THAT THEIR OWN~ SPECTRA APE LESS.
R:  AGREE.
 
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(4) C:    SOUG IS CONSIDERING EXTENDING SSRAP BOUNDING SPECTRA TO EQUIPMENT HIGHER THAN 40 FEET AB0VE      '.
GRADE BY THE USE OF APPROPRIATE AMPLIFICATION FACTORS. TH,I.S APPROACH SHOULD BE PERMITTED FOR EQUIPMENT HIGHER THAN 40 FEET AB0VE GRADE WITH
                    ,SSRAP/NRC APPROVAL.
R:  NRC WILL LOOK AT SOUG PROPOSAL AND WITH SSPAP RECOMMENDATION. IT IS PREMATURE TO INCLUDE THIS IN TEXT, (5) C:    THE DEGREE OF RIGIDITY OF COMPONENT SUPPORT SHOULD NOT HAVE TO BE ANALYZED, SINCE EFFORT TO DETERMINE ANY POSSIBLE AMPLIFICATION OF RESPONSE SPECTRA WON'T PROVIDE MEANINGFUL INFORMATION SINCE COMPONENT THEY SUPPORT ARE QUALIFIED BY SEISMIC EXPERIENCE.
R:  AGREE. THERE IS NO NEED TO ANALYZE THE RIGIDITY (FREQUENCY) 0F EACH COMPONENT SUPPORT, DURING WALK-THROUGH INSPECTION OBVIOUSLY WEAK SUPPORTS WILL BE IDENTIFIED.
(6) C:  THE STATEMENT THAT (FOR EQUIPMENT OTHER THAN 8 CLASSES) "THESE GENERIC BOUNDING SPECTRA WILL NOT EXCEED THE TYPE A B0UNDING SPECTRA" SHOULD BE JUSTIFIED.
R:    IF ONLY SEISMIC EXPERIENCE DATA IS USED. TYPE A B0UNDING SPECTRA ARE THE UPPER LIMIT. LIMIT MAY BE RAISED BY TEST DATA.
 
MAKE-UP OF WALK-THROUGH INSPECTION TEAM (4)            d COMMENTS:
(1)  NO NEED TO HAVE AN OPERATIONS SUPERVISOR /SR0 ON THE TEAM. HE WILL BE USEFUL IN GENEPATING LIST OF REQUIRED EQUIPMENT.
(2)  TEAM MEMBERS SHOUL. NOT BE RESTRICTED TO DEGREED ENGINEERS AS LONG AS THEY HAVE RELEVANT KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE.
(3)  ALL MEMBERS OF INSPECTION TEAM SHOULD NOT BE REQUIRED FOR ALL PARTS OF THE WALK-THROUGH.
RESPONSE:                                                        ,
(1)  AGREE. HOWEVER THEY SHOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR CONSULTATION BEFORE AND DURING WALK-THROUGH PROCESS.      ,
(2)  THERE IS NO ATTEMPT TO RESTRICT TEAM MEMPERS TO DEGREED ENGINEERS. THE EMPHASIS IS ON " RELEVANT EXPERIENCE."
(3)  AGREE. HOWEVER APPROPRIATE TECHNICAL EXPERTISE SHOULD BE INCLUDED FOR EACH REVIEW AREA.
 
r.. .
EXPANSION OF SEISMIC EXPERIENCE DATA BASE (3)
                                                                            .f, COMMENTS:                ,
(1)  SOUG,HAS INCREASED THE DATABASE FROM 8 CLASSES TO 21.
ARE 21 CLASSES NOW SUFFICIENT TO C0VER EVERYTHING?
(2)  THE CAVEATS IN NUPEG-1030 MOST LIKELY WILL BE RELAXED DUE TO INVESTIGATION OF CHILEAN EARTHOUAKE. ( 'g * / " 0 (3)  NUREG-1030 IMPLIES THAT SCOPE OF EQUIPMENT COVERED BY EXPERIENCE DATA BASE IS LIMITED TO ORIGINAL 8 CLASSES.
THIS SHOULD BE CLAP 1FIED.
 
===RESPONSE===
(1)  YES. EXCEPT POSSIBLY FOR OUTLIERS.
(2) AGPEE. A STATEMENT OF THAT EFFECT WILL BE ADDED IN THE TEXT, (3) AGREE. TEXT WILL BE CHANGED TO REFLECT THIS.
 
1 .. ,
ROLE OF SOUG IN GENERIC IMPLEMENTATION (3)
                                                                                        .t (1) C:    SOUG SHOULD NOT BE IN THE POSITION TO ENFORCE THE REQUIREME'NT OF A-46 POSITION, RATHER, IT SHOULD Bt IN A POSITION TO PROVIDE IMPLEMENTATION CRITERIA AND ASSISTANCE.
R:    AGREE, (2) C:    - SQUG SHOULD NOT ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR IMPLEMENTATION          ON INDIVIDUAL PLANTS.'?> P'" ' ' f ''
                                              . . . - , . <; v s                          ,
                                . .c....  ..
                        - SUGGEST SOUG DEVELOP GENERIC IMFLEMENTATION PROCEDURES AND SUBMIT TO NRC A GENERIC SCHEDULE FOR DEVELOPMENT OF IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURES AND FOR TRAINING SEMINARS FOR PARTICIPATING UTILLTIES.
                        - EACH INDIVIDUAL UTILITY (SQUG MEMBER OR NOT)
WITH NRC.      SOUG WILL NOT SUBMIT GENERIC IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE TO NRC.
R:    AGREE.      EACH UTILITY SHOULD NEGOTIATE IMPLEMEN-TATION SCHEDULE WITH NRC.
 
    < .o .
.~
(3) C:  - SOUG SHOULD NOT CERTIFY CCMPLETION OF              ,
WALK-THROUGH INSPECTION BY INDIVIDUAL            .
UTILITIES.
                    -SOUGSHOULbPROVIDERESULTSOFAUDITSPERFORMED.
                  ~
                    - SSRAP SHOULD NOT ENDORSE SQUG AUDITS BUT REPORT RESULTS OF REVIEWS AND AUDITS PERFORMED BY THEM.
R:  ACCEPTABLE. AS LONG AS SOUG AND SSRAP REPORT ON THEIR REVIEWS AND AUDITS, O
t
 
t .. .
l ACCESSIBILITY OF SOUG PESULTS TO NON-SOUG MEMBERS (2)      ,
COMMENTS:                ..
(1)    A SOUG MEMBER SUGGEST THAT RESULTS OF SOUG AND EPRI STUDY SHOULD NOT BE ACCESSIBLE TO ALL UTILITIES.
THEY SHOULD ONLY BE AVAILABLE TO SQUG MEMBERS.
(2)    SOUG COMMENTED THAT GENERIC IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURES WILL LIKELY NOT BE AVAILABLE TO NON-MEMBER UTILITIES.
 
===RESPONSE===
(1), (2) WILL REVISE TEXT IN REGULATORY ANALYSIS TO
        -  REFLECT THIS,      NRC/RES SPONSORED WORK IS PUBLICLY
                                ~
AVAILABLE.
 
                . c. .
,                                                                                      PLANT SPECIFIC SER'S (2)                      ,
t~
COMMENTS:                                            ..
WILL THE.NRC PREPARE PLANT-SPECIFIC SER'S TO CLOSE0VT A f46?
 
===RESPONSE===
i YES, i
e t
g i
                                                                                                                                          ?
4
                                                                                                                                          )
l e
A g          y  m,-g    v,e        r ,=~.-g----.,.~,,      - - - - - - . - - , .        w- -- ,- , -                    ,
 
1
  , . . .                                                                  1 APPLICABILITY OF A-46 TO NEW PLANTS /NEW EQUIPMENT (1)    ,
COMMENTS:              . .
SUGGEST NRC STATE THAT A-46 METHODOLOGY IS AN ACCEPTABLE METHOD OF COMPLYING WITH CURRENT LICENSING REQUIREMENT ON      ,
EQUIPMENT SEISMIC QUALIFICATION,
 
===RESPONSE===
IN PROPOSED CHANGE TO IEEE STANDARD 344/75, A SECTION IS ADDED ON USE OF SEISMIC EXPERIENCE DATA FOR SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT, NRC MAY ACCEPT THROUGH END0PSEMENT OF THE STANDARD. A-46 DOES NOT        ,
ADDRESS CHANGES TO CURRENT REQUIREMENTS.
                              ~
O
(
 
      , c. .
APPLICABILITY OF A-46 T0_ SPECIFIC PLANTS (2)
COMMENTS:
(1)  PLANTS LOCATED IN A RELATIVELY ASEISMIC AREA SUCH AS FLORIDA SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM CONSIDERATION IN THE RESOLUTION OF ANY SEISMIC RISK ISSUE.
(2)  McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION SHOULD NOT BE REQUIRED TO PERF0PM AN A-46 REVIEW SINCE IT WAS EVALUATED TO CURRENT LICENSING REQUIREMENTS (IEEE 344-]975/ REG.
GUIDE 1.100) AND FOUND TO BE IN COMPLIANCE.
 
===RESPONSE===
(1)    DISAGREE. SEISMIC DESIGN BASES NOT EVALUATED BY A-46.
(2)    IF EVIDENCE IS PRESENTED, McGUIRE WILL BE REMOVED, a, , _ _ a ;. , . r, w /be-~~ ~?'+,A              d'l6-
                              , , r p :    /. - -    Si''w-k e
 
Ql QUALIFICATION TESTING EVALUATION (FIN A1051)
OBJECTIVE:
: 1. Independent evaluation of envirpnmental electrical equipment qualification testing methods used by industry.
: 2. Technical basis for implementing the provisions of the equipment .                              ,
qualification rule.
: 3. Technical basis for developing regulatory guides and industry standands.
: 4. Support to IE and NRR in resolving equipment qualification issues                                ,
identified in vendor inspections and the licensing review of equipment qualification submittals by utilities and manufacturers.                          ,,            ,
Office:                Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research PROJECT TITLE:    ,
Qualification Testing ' Evaluation                                  .          ,
FIN N0(s):              A-1051 5
TYPE OF CONTRACT:        Interagency Agreement with DOE CONTRACTOR:              Sandia National Laboratory                                    -
FY BUDGET ($K):                    , FY S4        FY 85      FY 86              FY 87        FY 88 PRIOR:                          2130        1600 OPERATING:                                              1255                1600 FOLLOW-ON:                                                                              1450 l
4 PREPARED FOR INTERNAL COMMITTEE USE
                                                                                                              ##ac4meef 6
 
l L        ,
EQUIPMENT SURVI' VAL IN A HYDROGEN BURN (FINA1270)
DEJECTIVE:
: 1. Provide analyses and tests for equipment survival in large, dry' PWR containments to support a staff decision to be made in 1986 on whether to require hydrogen control for large, dry PWR containments in the hydrogen control rule 10CFR50.44.
: 2. Provide data to support licensing assessments of equipment survival for' a hydrogen burn in BWR MARK III Hydrogen Control Owners Group (HCOG) containments by testing the response and function of representative equipment to a simulated BWR Mark III standing hydrogen flame thermal environment, s
Office:                  NRC/RES, B&R Number 601910 PROJECT TITLE:          Equipment Survival in a Hydrogen Burn                                    ,
FIN N0(s):              A-1270 TYPE OF CONTRACT:        DOE CONTRACTOR:              Sandia National Laboratory FY BUDGET ($K):          FY 83    FY 84        FY 85                FY 86              FY 87 PRIOR:                      409          78                                                      .
OPERATING:                                                      360                200
 
ELECTRICAL PENETRATION ASSEMBLY SEVERE ACCIDENT TEST                        '
(FINA1364)
                                                                                                                                                                    ~
OBJECTIVE:                                          ,.
: 1. Evaluate the containment integrity and steam leakage through electrical penetration assemblies (EPA) for the three principal reactor containment                                                                  '
types (PWR, Mark I. BWR ..
                                                                                      ~
                                                                                          -    . and MKIIIBWR) when exposed to severe accident environments. These tests will provide data for assessing the                                                                    '
radiological risk to the public from severe accidents.                                                                                  1 1
: 2. Determine the electrical functional capability of the electrical penetration assemblies and associated cables and connectors during and following exposure to severe accident conditions. This will provide data
                                  -            for assessing the potential availability of instrumentation,' control and -
power circuits needed for operator response to mitigate and monitor severe accidents.                                                                                  ..              ..        _            _
Office:                    Office of Nuclear Regulatory Rese. arch PROJECT TITLE:              Electrical Penetration Assemblies FIN N0(s):                  A-1364 TYPE OF CONTRACT:          Interagency Agreement with DOE CONTRACTOR:                Sandia National Laboratory FY BUDGET ($K):                          FY 83          FY 84            FY 85  FY 86      FY 87 PRIOR:                              300            723              187 OPERATING:
250        100 e
  - - . _ _ - - - _ _ - - - - - -                      ---        -- --            ,                                w                              - - - - --
a}}

Latest revision as of 01:00, 17 December 2020

Summary of ACRS Subcommittee on Qualification Program for Safety-Related Equipment 860115 Meeting in Washington,Dc to Discuss Resolution & Implementation of USI A-46.Viewgraphs Encl
ML20195B249
Person / Time
Issue date: 02/16/1986
From:
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
To:
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
References
REF-GTECI-A-46, REF-GTECI-SC, TASK-A-46, TASK-OR ACRS-2389, NUDOCS 8605290152
Download: ML20195B249 (36)
v • d • e


Text

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[bMb ppwanh DATE ISSUED: 2/16/86 ACRS MEETING MINUTES ON THE MEETING OF THE QUALIFICATION PROGRAM FOR SAFETV-RELATED EQUIPMENT JANUARY 15, 1986 WASHINGTON, DC The ACRS Subcommittee on the Qualification Program for Safety-Related Equipment met on January 15, 1986 at 1717 H Street, NW, Washington, DC.

The purpose of this meeting was to discuss the resolution and implemen-tation of USI A-46, the Industry views on USI A-46, the Seismic Quali-fication Utility Group's (SQUG) evaluation of equipment performance during the recent Chilean and Mexican earthquakes, and the RES work on equipment qualification. The proposed resolution of USI A-46 is antic-ipated to be discussed by the full Comittee in the May-June 1986 timeframe. The Subcommittee heard presentations from representatives of NRR, RES, AIF, and SQUG. The meeting begun at 8:30 am and was adjourned at approximately 6:00 pm. The discussions on RES on the equipment qualification work were held between 3:15 pm and 6:00 pm and were held in closed session. The remainder of the meeting was open to the public.

The principle attendees for the Subcommittee meeting were:

ACRS NRC Industry C. Wylie, Chairman R. Bosnak, NRR J. Thomas, SQUG G. Reed, Pember N. Anderson, NRR N. Smith, SQUG l

l J. Ebersole, & mber P. Y. Chen, NRR R. Schaffstall, KMC C. P. Siess, Member T. Y. Chang, NRR P. Yanev, SQUG D. Ward, Member D. Su?livan, RES A. Roby, AIF l A. Cappucci, Staff B. Morris, RES R. Savio, Staff J. Vora, RES l

l W. Lipinski, Consultant W. Farmer, RES R. Feit, RES l

1 060 &

r o .

QPSRE Meeting Minutes January 15, 1986 Highlights

1. T. Y. Chang summarized the status of NRR's development of the resolution for USI A-46. A' proposed resolution was reviewed by CRGR in July 1985 and has been issued for public comment. Public comments have been received and are currently being evaluated. It is expected that the NRC Staff's revised proposal for the resolu-tion of USI A-46 will be ready for ACRS review in the May-June 1986 timeframe. The public comment received addressed a variety of topics. The most significant of these were:

(a) A number of commenters stated that they believed that the new Backfit Rule should be applied to the resolution of USI A-46 and that, under this rule, the equipment reviews proposed by the NRC Staff need to be evaluated by Cost / Benefit Analysis.

The NRC Staff believes that while the experience does show that equipment is inherently rugged but that there are still technical issues that are not resolved. The NRC Staff believes that equipment anchorage, the functional capability of relays, and the need to look for seismic design outliers (i.e., seismic design deficiencies such as long-shaft pumps and valves or poorly supported water tanks) have been identified as cost effective areas for review. SQUG appears to be in agreement.

(b) There were a number of comments as to how the review of relays should be performed. It appears that procedures are being developed which will take into consideration these comments and will be consistent with the findings of the SQUG work.

(c) The commenters in a number of cases took issue with scope of the walk-through inspections proposed as part of the resolu-tion of USI A-46. Some commenters disagreed with the NRC Staff as to the degree to which past inspections and sampling techniques could be used to establish design and construction

r e .

QPSRE Meeting Minutes January 15, 1986 adequacy. Some comenters want to use drawings rather than an inspection of the p1 ant as the basis for detennining the adequacy of the seismic design. These comenters would treat drawings not being representative of the as built plant as a QA issue and out of the scope of USI A-46. This ap1 roach has been flatly rejected by the NRC Staff.

The NRC Staff viewgriphs sumarizing the public comment are in-cluded as Attachment A.

2. J. Thomas sumarized the SQUG coments on the NRC Staff's proposed resolution of USI A-46. SQUG is in general in agreement with the approach proposed by the NRC Staff but believes that any work performed under USI A-46 should be justified under the NRC Backfit Rule. SQUG intends to work with the NRC Staff in developing a cost effective way of achieving the NRC objectives.
3. J. Thomas sumarized the status of the SQUG programs. The original SQUG data base has been expanded to include additional classes of equipment and data from recently large earthquakes (most notably the1985ChileanandMexicanearthquakes). EPRI has programs which are nearing completion which will produce equipment anchorage guidelines and a categorization of available seismic test data by equipment class. SQUG is developing generic implementation proce-dures for plant-specific reviews and a plan for the evaluation of ,

the seismic operability of essential relays. Mr. Thomas stated that this work would be available to all SQUG members. SQUG is currently developing a methodology for identifying essential relays and evaluating the consequence of relay chatter. The methodology will be tested on BWR and PWR pilot plants in 1986. The earthquake experience reviewed by SQUG has identified protection relays as a potential problem source. The relay evaluation procedure will look

r ,

QPSRE Meeting Minutes January 15, 1986 at relay chatter (i.e., spurious actuation of systems) and relay fragility for all essential (to achieving hot shutdown) systems.

4. SQUG believes that the earthquake experience demonstrates that the equipment and structures used in commercial nuclear power plants have a high generic seismic ruggedness. Equipment of the type used in these plants has performed well in earthquakes and fragility testing programs have demonstrated ruggedness at even higher acceleration levels. Equipment anchorage, relay chatter, and the existence of possible seismic design outliers have been identified as areas which should be evaluated under USI A-46. There was some discussion as to the applicability of the relay performance data obtained in the SQUG evaluation of earthquake experience. The consequence of relay chatter is related to the circuit and system designs in which these relays are used. Systems in nuclear power plants are often more complex and may be more vulnerable to system interaction effects. It was also noted that non-essential systems can interact with essential safety systems. An example given was the practice of connecting non-essential loads to the power source for essential equipment. It was also noted that long shaft pumps had been identified as a seismic design outlier in the Zion SSMRP and PRA evaluations. Other plants have not been reviewed to see if similar pumps were used in essential system.
5. P. Yanev presented a summary of the SQUG evaluation of the effects of the 1985 Chilean and Mexican earthquakes. The Chilean earth-quake was a Magnitude 7.8 with a number of aftershocks, the largest of which was a Magnitude 7.2. The Mexican earthquake was a Magni-tude 8.1, again with a number of aftershocks, the largest of' which was a Magnitudr 7.5. Both earthquakes atiected a large area (about 20,000 square miles). The damage to engineered structures were much higher in the Mexican earthquake, due to the dry lake bed soil conditions in Mexico City and to what were probably the not as I

r ,

QPSRE Neeting Minutes January 15, 1986 well designed and constructed Mexican structures. The duration of both earthquakes were long (M45 seconds at accelerations of 0.lg orgreater). The representative NRC Regulatory Guide 1.60 spectral peak ground acceleration was 0.409 for the Chilean earthquake and 0.179 for the Mexican earthquake, near the earthquake epicenters.

The performance of equipment in engineered buildings on go I soil was good and consistent with the previous SQUG evaluation of 'ther earthquakes. Failures of protective (i.e., latching) relays ar.d some types of fluid containing tanks was observed. A number of of the photographs taken of affected equipment and structures were shown. Copies are in the ACRS files.

6. A Roby summarized the AIF position on the resolution of USI A-46.

AIF became involved with the resolution of this issue in 1980 with the establishment of a Working Group. An AIF position paper on USI A-46 was issued in November 1983. Mr. Roby stated that the AIF believes that the nuclear industry has always given careful consideration to seismic design. (The NRC Staff is not in agreement.) AIF believes the equipment used in nuclear power plants is seismically rugged and that plant systems, (except for the emphasis on redundancy) are similar to what is used in non-nuclear applications. AIF believes that the implementation of USI A-46 should be done under the Backfit Rule and that the equip-ment review should be based on drawings rather than plant walk-thoughs.

The following are highlights from discussions conducted in closed session.

7. The Subcommittee discussed the RES electrical equipment qualifi-cation and plant aging work with D. Sullivan, William Famer, Vora, R. Feit, and B. Morris. A summary of the programs and the proposed FY 1987 fundings is given in Attachment B. NRR has

0 y -

QPSRE Meeting Minutes January 15, 1986 proposed that this work b,e terminated by FY 1987 and RES has agreed. The major topic's which were to be addressted by this work are as follows:

(1) Equipment survival in a hydrogen burn in support of large dry PWR and BWR Mark III licensing questions.

(2) Selected cable and gasket qualifications issues.

(3) Effect of aging on the seismic fragility of batteries.

(4) The understanding of selected synergistic phenomena and the impact of synergistic effects on the adequacy of current qualification testing practices.

(5) Generic aspects of the performance of electrical penetration assemblies under severe accident conditions.

(6) Generic identification of aging and service wear effects which might impact on safety.

The electrical equipment qualification work (excluding fire protec-tion) has been eliminated for FY 1987. The aging work is budgeted for $7.8 million. The work is being conducted with a number of contractors to gain maximum advantage from existing equipment and experience. It was budgeted for $2.2 million in FY 1987 prior to the cut.

NOTE: Additional meeting details can be obtained from a transcript of this meeting available in the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC, or can be purchased from ACE-Federal Reporters, 444 North Capitol Street, Washington, DC 20001. (202) 347-3700.

- k' ' 0 r , .

PROPOSED RESOLUTI0i; 0F PUBLIC COMMENTS -

ON USI A 16 -7.v.d#4fd 4

PP0 POSED. RESOLUTION PACKAGE REVIEWED BY CRGR ON JULY 8, 1985.

ISSUED FOR PUBLIC COMMENT ON 9/13/85.

PUBLIC COMMENTS DUE 11/15/85.

PROPOSED RESOLUTION OF COMMENTS COMPLETE.

NRC MANAGEMENT HAS NOT YET REVIEWED COMMENIS, 1

r >

ORIGINATORS OF PUBLIC Ct1MMENTS 8 UTILITIES: 7 SOUG MEMBERS 2 INDUCTRY GROUPS: - SQUG

- NUCLEAR UTILITY GROUP ON EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION 1 NATIONAL LAB 0PATORY: - SANDIA EPRI AIF e

e

/

  • _J

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ORIGINATORS OF PUBLIC COMMENTS 7 S0llG MEMBERS 8 UTILITIES: '

- SOUG \'

2 INDUSTRY GROUPS:

- NUCLEAR UTILITY GROUP ON EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION

- SANDIA 1 NATIONAL LAB 0PATORY:

EPRI .

AIF 9

9

CATEGORIZATION OF COMMENTS ,

APPLICABILITY OF BACKF1T RULE JUSTIFICATION FOP A-46 REVIEW >(10 COMMENTS)

IMPLEMENIAIION SCHEDULE (12)

RELAY REVIEW GUIDELINES (10)

SCOPE OF REVIEW (10)

SCOPE OF WALK-THROUGH INSPECTION (8)

RE0VIREMENT FOR JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION (5)

COST ESTIMATE (5)

GUIDELINES FOR REPLACEMENT EQUIPMENT (4)

SAFE SHUTDOWN REQUIREMENT (4)

EQUIPMENT SEISMIC DEMAND AND SEISMIC CAPACITY (6)

MAKE-UP 0F WALK-THROUGH INSPECTION TEAM (4)

EXPANSION OF SEISMIC EXPERIENCE DATA BASE (3)

.. ~, ,

POLE OF SOUG IN GENERIC IMPLEMENTATION (3)

ACCESSIBILITY OF SOUG RESilLTS TO NON-SOUG MEMBERS (2)

PLANT SPECIFIC SERS (2I APPLICABTLITY OF A-46 TO NEW PLANTS /NEW EQUIPMENT (1)

APPLICABILITY OF A-46 TO SPECIFIC PLANTS (2) 0 0

APPLICABILITY OF_BACKFIT BULE AND JUSTIFICATION FOR A-46 REVIEW (10)

COMMENTS:

(1) 1HE'NEW BACKFIT RULE SHOULD BE APPLIED TO THE RESOLUTION OF A-46, (2) REGULATORY ANALYSIS DOES NOT PROPERLY Of) ANT 1FY COST BENEFIT.

(3) EARTH 0VAKE EXPERIENCE SHOWS THAT EQUIPMENT IS INHERENTLY RUGGED THEREFORE NO NEED TO D0 REVIEW,

. RESPONSE:

(1), (2) - THE,BACKFIT RULE REQUIRES: " SYSTEMATIC AND DOCUMENTED ANALYSIS....FOR BACKFITS WHICH IT (NRC) SEEKS TO IMPOSE". ANALYSIS CAN BE QUALITATIVE.

- QUANTITATIVE PRA ANALYSIS TO EVALUATE RISK REDUCTION FROM SEISMICALLY CUALIFYING E00!PMENT HAS HlGH UNCERTAINTY, HIGHLY DEPENDENT ON ASSUMPTIONS, (3) - ACKNOWLEDGE EQUIPMENT IS INHERENTLY RUGGED, STILL HAVE AREAS OF CONCERN:

(A) E00iPMENT ANCH08 AGE '

(B) FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITY OF ESSENTJAL RELAYS (C) OUTLIERS .

WE.BELIEVE SOUG IN AGREEMENT.

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I iMPLEMEFTATION SCHEDULE (12) .'

COMMENTS:

(I) IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE SHOULD BE NEGOTI ATED ON INDIVIDUAL UTILITY BASIS, CONSIDERING LIV!NG SCHEDULE FOR PLANT MODIFICATION.

(2) PROPOSED COMPLETION SCHEDULE "N0 LATER THAN 28 MONTHS" FROM DATE OF ISSUAb'CE SHOULD BE CHANGED, (3) SCHEDULES SHOULD PERMIT IMPLEMENTATION AN.0 EODIFICATIONS DURING PLANNED OUTAGES, ,

(4) Walk-THROUGH INSPECTION SHOULD NOT BE R$0VIRED UNTIL EPRI/RES TEST DATA AND SOUG EFFORTS TO ADDRESS PE-MAININGCLA$SE30FEQUIPMENTISCOMPLETE4 (5) GENERIC GROUP GIVEN 90 DAYS TO RESPOND TO REQUIREMENT, INDIVIDUAL UTILITIES GIVEN 45 DAYS, P.ESPONSE:

(1) AGREE, WILL MODIFY TEXT, (2), (3), (4) 28 MONTHS IS A GENERAL GUIDELINE. TEXT WILL BE CLARIFIED, ACTUAL IEPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE WILL BE NEGOTIATED WITH INDIVIDUAL UTILITIES.

(5) SQUG AND INDIVIDUAL UTILITIES GIVEN 60 DAYS TO RESPOND, t .

l RELAY REVIEW GillDELINES (10) ,l COMMENTS: ,,

(1) RELA,Y CHATTER IN CERTAIN CASES IS INCONSEQUENTIAL.

(2) CREDIT SHOULD BE GIVEN FOR OPERATOR ACTION TO RESTORE SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT AFTER EARTHOUAKE.

(3) EQUIPMENT FUNCTIONALITY SHOULD BE RESTRICTED TO

" RELAYS" ONLY, (4) REQUIREMENT FOR REVIEW 0F ELECTRICAL RELAYS SHOULD BE REVISED, IN VIEW 0F SOUG WORK ON RELAY REVIEW PROCEDURE,

RESPONSE

(1, (4) AGREE WITH COMMENT. THE REQUIREMENT FOR RELAY REVIEW WILL BE REVISED.

(2) WE AGREE IF PROCEDURES ARE AVAILABLE AND THERE IS SUFFICIENT TIME.

(3) AGREE,

e SCOPE OF REVIEW (10) ,

(1) C: THE SCOPE OF,,A-46 REVIEW SHOULD REFLECT THE MINOR SIGNIFICANCE OF ANY REMAINING A-46 ISSUES

,IN VIEW 0F THE SEISMIC EXPERIENCE AND TEST EXPERIENCE DATA.

R: SCOPE ALREADY NARROWED DOWN T0: - > ' = s'*

- E0lilPMENT ANCHORAGES

- FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITY OF RELAYS ~

- CAVEATS AND OUTLIERS (2) C: ASSUMPTION THAT SSE DOES NOT CAUSE LOCA SHOULD BE EXTENDED TO INCLUDE HELB AND SLBA.

R: AGREE. THIS IS BASED ON:

- SEISMIC EXPERIENCE DATA.

- IE, BULLETIN 79-02, 79-07, 79-14 REVIEW 0F SAFETY RELATED PIPING.

(3) C: ACCIDENT MITIGATION SYSTEM PIPING IS NOT INCLUDED IN THE SCOPE BECAUSE OF EXTENSIVE PIPING SYSTEM DESIGN MARGINS. IT SHOULD BE STATED THAT SUCH PIPING MARGINS EXIST IN ALL SYSTEMS INCLUDING THE RC SYSTEM.

R: AGREE. SAME REASON AS IN (3).

(4) C: TYPICAL EQUIPMENT LIST IN REGULATORY ANALYSIS SHOULD STATE "THIS LIST IS BASED ON SQUG POLLS 0F MEMBER UTILITIES AND IS EXPECTED TO INCLUDE ALL OF THE TYPES OF SAFE SHUTDOWF EQUIPMENT IN NUCLEAR POWEE PLANTS: PLANT-SPECIFIC LISTS ARE EXPECTED TO BE SHORTER,"  :

R: AGREE.

(5) C: NOT ALL PORV'S SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS EQUIPMENT UNIOUE TO NUCLEAR PLANTS, R: AGREE, (G) C: ELECTRICAL PENETRATION ASSEMBLIES AND NEUTPON '

DETECTORS SHOULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN SCOPE OF A-46 SINCE THEY ARE PASSIVE, R: AGREE. HOWEVER SEISMIC ADEQUACY CAN BE VERIFIED FOR BOTH BY EXPERIENCE DATA OR TEST DATA. NRC HAS NO OBJECTION TO THEIR INCLUSION.

(7) C: ANCHORAGE REVIEW OF TANKS AND HEAT EXCHANGERS HAS NOT BEEN JUSTIFIED, R: TANK AND HEAT EXCHANGER ANCHORAGE IMPORTANT TO SHUTDOWN. EXPERIENCE DATA SHOWS ANCHORAGE IMPORTANT, 1

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- . . _ . . _ . ~ . . _ _ . . _ _ . . _ _ _. ._ , . _ . .

(8) C: IT IS NOT JUSTIFIED TO DOCUMENT SEISMIC ADE00ACY OF EQUIPMENT BEYOND THE ORIGINAL EIGHT CLASSES SINCE SEISMIC EXPERIENCE DEMONSTRATES THAT EQUIPMENT IS INHEkENTLY RUGGED, R: CAVEATS AND EXCLUSIONS, AS WELL AS APPROPRIATE B0llNDING SPECTRA HAVE TO BE IDENTIFIED FOR ALL EQUIPMENT CLASSES, 0

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SCOPE OF WALK-THROUGH INSPECTION (8)

COMMENTS:

(1) STATISTICAL SAMPLING SHOULD BE USED FOR ANCHORAGE INSPECTION, FULL REVIEW NEEDED ONLY IF SAMPLING SHOWS ANOMALIES.

(2) CREDIT SHOULD BE GIVEN FOR PREVIOUS WALK-THROUGHS OR AVAILABLE ENGINEERING DOCUMENTS ON ANCHORAGE.

(3) EQUIPMENT ANCHORAGE ALREADY ADDRESSED BY IE BULLETINS 79-02, 79-14 AND IE INFORMATION NOTICE 80-21.

RESPONSE

(1) ISSUE WILL BE CONSIDERED AFTER SSRAP RECOMMENDATION.

(2) DISAGREE. THERE IS EVIDENCE PROBLEMS STILL EXIST.

- PPEVIOUS WALK-THROUGH DON'T ADDRESS ALL CONCERNS IN THE ANCHORAGE GUIDELINES / WALK-THROUGH PROCE-DUREr' UNDER s y -' DEVELOPMENT.-

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- ENGINEERING DOCUMENTS MAY NOT REFLECT AS BUILT CON-DITION. DEFECTS IN INSTALLATION CAN ONLY BE DETECTED BY A WALK-THROUGH INSPECTION,

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p.<' << L w ,S w ~ **/' ] ' ' 4 (3) DISAGREE.

- IE INFORMATION NOTICE 80-21 WAS FOR ANCHORAGE OF CLASS 1E ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT ONLY.

- IE BULLETINS 79-02, 79-14 WERE FOR PIPING ONLY.

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REQUIREMENT TO SUBMIT JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED

  • OPERATION (JCO) (5)

COMMENTS:

(1) THE' REQUIREMENT FOR JC0 NOT WARRANTED,

- REPORTING REQUIREMENTS EXIST IN 10 CFR 50,72/10 CFR 50,73.

(2) INSTEAD OF JCO:

- UTILITIES COMMIT TO RESOLVE DEFICIENCY BY A CERTAIN DATE.

- JC0 KEPT IN LICENSEE'S FILE INSTEAD OF SUBMITTING TO NRC,

- DEFICIENCPES REPORTED. BY USING 10 CFR 50.72 OR 10 CFR 50,73.

(3) MOST DEFICIENCIES WILL NOT PRESENT A SERIOUS SAFETY C0h'CERN AND THEREFORE SHOULD NOT REQUIRE JC0'S,

RESPONSE

- DEFINITION OF DEFICIENCY CLARIFIED.

- JC0 WILL BE REQUIRED FOR PROVEN DEFICIENCIES IF NOT CORRECTED WITHIN 30 DAYS,

COST ESTIMATE (5) ,

COMMENTS: ,,

(1) COST,S MAY BE LOW BY FACTOR OF 2 DUE TO LOW LABOR ESTIMATE.

(2) SEP EXPERIENCE INDICATES THAT EQUIPMENT REVIEW 2 TO 3 TIMES HIGHER THAN A-46 ESTIMATES.

nr s' RESPONSE: r,#.'

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(1) EXTENSIVE ANALYSIS AND GUIDELINE DEVELOPED "UP FRONT" WHICH SHOULD REDUCE LABOR COST.

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(2) DISAGREE.

- SEP PLANTS ARE TYPICALLY OLDER. EQUIPMENT AND ANCHORAGE IN LATER PLANTS HAVE BETTER SEISMIC CAPABILITY.

- A-46 APPROACH IS FOR ANALYSIS BEFORE REVIEW. GUIDE-LINES AND PROCEDURES WILL MINIMIZE REVIEW TIME AND COST.

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GUIDELINES FOR REPLACEMENT EQUIPMENT (4) ,

COMMENTS: ,,

SUGGEST THAT A U6 CRITERIA ARE ACCEPTABLE TO SEISMICALLY OVALIFY REPLACEMENT EQUIPMENT REGARDLESS OF REASON OF REPLACEMENT,

RESPONSE

AGREE, REGULATORY ANALYSIS WILL BE REVISED, O

SAFE SHUTDOWN REQUIREMENT (4) ,

(1) C: A-46 SHOULD P,ERMIT TIMELY OPERATOR ACTIONS TO DEMONSTRATE THE ACHIEVEMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF

, HOT SHUTDOWN.

R: WE AGREE IF PROCEDURES ARE AVAILABLE AND THERE IS SUFFICIENT TIME.

(2) C: THE ASSUMPTION OF A NON-SEISMICALLY RELATED SINGLE RANDOM COMPONENT FAILURE SHOULD BE ELIMINATED. SINGLE TRAIN OF SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT WOULD PROVIDE ASSUPANCE PLANT CAN BE SHUTDOWN SAFELY, BECAUSE OF LOW EARTHOUAKE PROBABILITY AND INHERENT RUGGEDNESS OF EQUIPMENT.

R: DISAGREE.

(3) C: REGULATORY ANALYSIS APPEARS TO REFER TO PASSIVE NOT ACTIVE COMPONENTS IN (2) AB0VE.

P. : INTENTION IS TO INCLUDE ONLY ACTIVE COMPONENTS IN THIS STATEMENT. TEXT WILL BE CORRECTED.

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(4) C: ONE OF THE 4 FUNCTIONS REQUIRED TO BE PERFORMED FOR HOT SHUTDOWN IN CONJUNCTION WITH A SSE IS "T0 PROVIDE AC AND DC CURRENT EMERGENCY POWER",

THIS IS NOT NEEDED, SINCE THE NEED FOR AC AND/0R DC EMERGENCY POWER TO MEET THE OTHER THREE FUNCTIONS IS A PLANT-SPECIFIC CONSIDERATION, R: THIS SENTENCE WILL BE REVISED TO READ " PROVIDE AC AND/0R DC EMERGENCY POWER AS NEEDED ON A PLANT-SPECIFIC BASIS",

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EQUIPMENT SEISMIC DEMAND AND SEISMIC CAPACITY (6)

(1) C: WHEN WILL GENERIC BOUNDING SPECTRA FOR EQUIPMENT OTHER THAN 8' CLASSES BE AVAILABLE?

IF NOT AVAILABLE, CAN TYPE A BOUNDING SPECTRA BE USED?

R: APPROPRIATE GENERIC B0UNDING SPECTRA FOR EQUIPMENT OTHER THAN 8 CLASSES WILL BE AVAILABLE EAPLY PART OF 1987 FOR USE IN IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM.

(2) C: FOR VEPIFICATION OF ANCHORAGE, CAN FLOOR SPECTRA BE USED TO OBTAIN THE EQUIPMENT SPECTRAL -

ACCELERATION?

R: YES. ,

(3) C: UTILITIES SHOULD NOT HAVE TO AD0PT THE " GENERIC FLOOR RESPONSE SPECTRA" IF THEY CAN SHOW THAT THEIR OWN~ SPECTRA APE LESS.

R: AGREE.

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(4) C: SOUG IS CONSIDERING EXTENDING SSRAP BOUNDING SPECTRA TO EQUIPMENT HIGHER THAN 40 FEET AB0VE '.

GRADE BY THE USE OF APPROPRIATE AMPLIFICATION FACTORS. TH,I.S APPROACH SHOULD BE PERMITTED FOR EQUIPMENT HIGHER THAN 40 FEET AB0VE GRADE WITH

,SSRAP/NRC APPROVAL.

R: NRC WILL LOOK AT SOUG PROPOSAL AND WITH SSPAP RECOMMENDATION. IT IS PREMATURE TO INCLUDE THIS IN TEXT, (5) C: THE DEGREE OF RIGIDITY OF COMPONENT SUPPORT SHOULD NOT HAVE TO BE ANALYZED, SINCE EFFORT TO DETERMINE ANY POSSIBLE AMPLIFICATION OF RESPONSE SPECTRA WON'T PROVIDE MEANINGFUL INFORMATION SINCE COMPONENT THEY SUPPORT ARE QUALIFIED BY SEISMIC EXPERIENCE.

R: AGREE. THERE IS NO NEED TO ANALYZE THE RIGIDITY (FREQUENCY) 0F EACH COMPONENT SUPPORT, DURING WALK-THROUGH INSPECTION OBVIOUSLY WEAK SUPPORTS WILL BE IDENTIFIED.

(6) C: THE STATEMENT THAT (FOR EQUIPMENT OTHER THAN 8 CLASSES) "THESE GENERIC BOUNDING SPECTRA WILL NOT EXCEED THE TYPE A B0UNDING SPECTRA" SHOULD BE JUSTIFIED.

R: IF ONLY SEISMIC EXPERIENCE DATA IS USED. TYPE A B0UNDING SPECTRA ARE THE UPPER LIMIT. LIMIT MAY BE RAISED BY TEST DATA.

MAKE-UP OF WALK-THROUGH INSPECTION TEAM (4) d COMMENTS:

(1) NO NEED TO HAVE AN OPERATIONS SUPERVISOR /SR0 ON THE TEAM. HE WILL BE USEFUL IN GENEPATING LIST OF REQUIRED EQUIPMENT.

(2) TEAM MEMBERS SHOUL. NOT BE RESTRICTED TO DEGREED ENGINEERS AS LONG AS THEY HAVE RELEVANT KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE.

(3) ALL MEMBERS OF INSPECTION TEAM SHOULD NOT BE REQUIRED FOR ALL PARTS OF THE WALK-THROUGH.

RESPONSE: ,

(1) AGREE. HOWEVER THEY SHOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR CONSULTATION BEFORE AND DURING WALK-THROUGH PROCESS. ,

(2) THERE IS NO ATTEMPT TO RESTRICT TEAM MEMPERS TO DEGREED ENGINEERS. THE EMPHASIS IS ON " RELEVANT EXPERIENCE."

(3) AGREE. HOWEVER APPROPRIATE TECHNICAL EXPERTISE SHOULD BE INCLUDED FOR EACH REVIEW AREA.

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EXPANSION OF SEISMIC EXPERIENCE DATA BASE (3)

.f, COMMENTS: ,

(1) SOUG,HAS INCREASED THE DATABASE FROM 8 CLASSES TO 21.

ARE 21 CLASSES NOW SUFFICIENT TO C0VER EVERYTHING?

(2) THE CAVEATS IN NUPEG-1030 MOST LIKELY WILL BE RELAXED DUE TO INVESTIGATION OF CHILEAN EARTHOUAKE. ( 'g * / " 0 (3) NUREG-1030 IMPLIES THAT SCOPE OF EQUIPMENT COVERED BY EXPERIENCE DATA BASE IS LIMITED TO ORIGINAL 8 CLASSES.

THIS SHOULD BE CLAP 1FIED.

RESPONSE

(1) YES. EXCEPT POSSIBLY FOR OUTLIERS.

(2) AGPEE. A STATEMENT OF THAT EFFECT WILL BE ADDED IN THE TEXT, (3) AGREE. TEXT WILL BE CHANGED TO REFLECT THIS.

1 .. ,

ROLE OF SOUG IN GENERIC IMPLEMENTATION (3)

.t (1) C: SOUG SHOULD NOT BE IN THE POSITION TO ENFORCE THE REQUIREME'NT OF A-46 POSITION, RATHER, IT SHOULD Bt IN A POSITION TO PROVIDE IMPLEMENTATION CRITERIA AND ASSISTANCE.

R: AGREE, (2) C: - SQUG SHOULD NOT ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR IMPLEMENTATION ON INDIVIDUAL PLANTS.'?> P'" ' ' f

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- SUGGEST SOUG DEVELOP GENERIC IMFLEMENTATION PROCEDURES AND SUBMIT TO NRC A GENERIC SCHEDULE FOR DEVELOPMENT OF IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURES AND FOR TRAINING SEMINARS FOR PARTICIPATING UTILLTIES.

- EACH INDIVIDUAL UTILITY (SQUG MEMBER OR NOT)

WITH NRC. SOUG WILL NOT SUBMIT GENERIC IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE TO NRC.

R: AGREE. EACH UTILITY SHOULD NEGOTIATE IMPLEMEN-TATION SCHEDULE WITH NRC.

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(3) C: - SOUG SHOULD NOT CERTIFY CCMPLETION OF ,

WALK-THROUGH INSPECTION BY INDIVIDUAL .

UTILITIES.

-SOUGSHOULbPROVIDERESULTSOFAUDITSPERFORMED.

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- SSRAP SHOULD NOT ENDORSE SQUG AUDITS BUT REPORT RESULTS OF REVIEWS AND AUDITS PERFORMED BY THEM.

R: ACCEPTABLE. AS LONG AS SOUG AND SSRAP REPORT ON THEIR REVIEWS AND AUDITS, O

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l ACCESSIBILITY OF SOUG PESULTS TO NON-SOUG MEMBERS (2) ,

COMMENTS: ..

(1) A SOUG MEMBER SUGGEST THAT RESULTS OF SOUG AND EPRI STUDY SHOULD NOT BE ACCESSIBLE TO ALL UTILITIES.

THEY SHOULD ONLY BE AVAILABLE TO SQUG MEMBERS.

(2) SOUG COMMENTED THAT GENERIC IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURES WILL LIKELY NOT BE AVAILABLE TO NON-MEMBER UTILITIES.

RESPONSE

(1), (2) WILL REVISE TEXT IN REGULATORY ANALYSIS TO

- REFLECT THIS, NRC/RES SPONSORED WORK IS PUBLICLY

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AVAILABLE.

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, PLANT SPECIFIC SER'S (2) ,

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COMMENTS: ..

WILL THE.NRC PREPARE PLANT-SPECIFIC SER'S TO CLOSE0VT A f46?

RESPONSE

i YES, i

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, . . . 1 APPLICABILITY OF A-46 TO NEW PLANTS /NEW EQUIPMENT (1) ,

COMMENTS: . .

SUGGEST NRC STATE THAT A-46 METHODOLOGY IS AN ACCEPTABLE METHOD OF COMPLYING WITH CURRENT LICENSING REQUIREMENT ON ,

EQUIPMENT SEISMIC QUALIFICATION,

RESPONSE

IN PROPOSED CHANGE TO IEEE STANDARD 344/75, A SECTION IS ADDED ON USE OF SEISMIC EXPERIENCE DATA FOR SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT, NRC MAY ACCEPT THROUGH END0PSEMENT OF THE STANDARD. A-46 DOES NOT ,

ADDRESS CHANGES TO CURRENT REQUIREMENTS.

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APPLICABILITY OF A-46 T0_ SPECIFIC PLANTS (2)

COMMENTS:

(1) PLANTS LOCATED IN A RELATIVELY ASEISMIC AREA SUCH AS FLORIDA SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM CONSIDERATION IN THE RESOLUTION OF ANY SEISMIC RISK ISSUE.

(2) McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION SHOULD NOT BE REQUIRED TO PERF0PM AN A-46 REVIEW SINCE IT WAS EVALUATED TO CURRENT LICENSING REQUIREMENTS (IEEE 344-]975/ REG.

GUIDE 1.100) AND FOUND TO BE IN COMPLIANCE.

RESPONSE

(1) DISAGREE. SEISMIC DESIGN BASES NOT EVALUATED BY A-46.

(2) IF EVIDENCE IS PRESENTED, McGUIRE WILL BE REMOVED, a, , _ _ a ;. , . r, w /be-~~ ~?'+,A d'l6-

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Ql QUALIFICATION TESTING EVALUATION (FIN A1051)

OBJECTIVE:

1. Independent evaluation of envirpnmental electrical equipment qualification testing methods used by industry.
2. Technical basis for implementing the provisions of the equipment . ,

qualification rule.

3. Technical basis for developing regulatory guides and industry standands.
4. Support to IE and NRR in resolving equipment qualification issues ,

identified in vendor inspections and the licensing review of equipment qualification submittals by utilities and manufacturers. ,, ,

Office: Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research PROJECT TITLE: ,

Qualification Testing ' Evaluation . ,

FIN N0(s): A-1051 5

TYPE OF CONTRACT: Interagency Agreement with DOE CONTRACTOR: Sandia National Laboratory -

FY BUDGET ($K): , FY S4 FY 85 FY 86 FY 87 FY 88 PRIOR: 2130 1600 OPERATING: 1255 1600 FOLLOW-ON: 1450 l

4 PREPARED FOR INTERNAL COMMITTEE USE

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EQUIPMENT SURVI' VAL IN A HYDROGEN BURN (FINA1270)

DEJECTIVE:

1. Provide analyses and tests for equipment survival in large, dry' PWR containments to support a staff decision to be made in 1986 on whether to require hydrogen control for large, dry PWR containments in the hydrogen control rule 10CFR50.44.
2. Provide data to support licensing assessments of equipment survival for' a hydrogen burn in BWR MARK III Hydrogen Control Owners Group (HCOG) containments by testing the response and function of representative equipment to a simulated BWR Mark III standing hydrogen flame thermal environment, s

Office: NRC/RES, B&R Number 601910 PROJECT TITLE: Equipment Survival in a Hydrogen Burn ,

FIN N0(s): A-1270 TYPE OF CONTRACT: DOE CONTRACTOR: Sandia National Laboratory FY BUDGET ($K): FY 83 FY 84 FY 85 FY 86 FY 87 PRIOR: 409 78 .

OPERATING: 360 200

ELECTRICAL PENETRATION ASSEMBLY SEVERE ACCIDENT TEST '

(FINA1364)

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OBJECTIVE: ,.

1. Evaluate the containment integrity and steam leakage through electrical penetration assemblies (EPA) for the three principal reactor containment '

types (PWR, Mark I. BWR ..

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- . and MKIIIBWR) when exposed to severe accident environments. These tests will provide data for assessing the '

radiological risk to the public from severe accidents. 1 1

2. Determine the electrical functional capability of the electrical penetration assemblies and associated cables and connectors during and following exposure to severe accident conditions. This will provide data

- for assessing the potential availability of instrumentation,' control and -

power circuits needed for operator response to mitigate and monitor severe accidents. .. .. _ _

Office: Office of Nuclear Regulatory Rese. arch PROJECT TITLE: Electrical Penetration Assemblies FIN N0(s): A-1364 TYPE OF CONTRACT: Interagency Agreement with DOE CONTRACTOR: Sandia National Laboratory FY BUDGET ($K): FY 83 FY 84 FY 85 FY 86 FY 87 PRIOR: 300 723 187 OPERATING:

250 100 e

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