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Request for Authorization to Extend the Third 10-Year ISI Interval for Reactor Vessel Weld Examination
	ML062650255
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades
Issue date:	09/15/2006
From:	Harden P; Nuclear Management Co
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	Download: ML062650255 (229)
	v • d • e

NMC Commited to Nuclear Excellen~c Palisades Nuclear Plant Operated by Nuclear Management Company, LLC September 15, 2006 10 CFR 50.55a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Palisades Nuclear Plant Docket 50-255 License No. DPR-20 Request for Authorization to Extend the Third 10-Year ISI Interval for Reactor Vessel Weld Examination

References:

1) Westinghouse Owners Group Topical Report, WCAP-16168-NP, "Risk-InformedExtension of Reactor Vessel Inservice Inspection Interval," dated October2003

2) Letter from Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Westinghouse Electric Company, "Summaryof Teleconference with the Westinghouse Owners Group RegardingPotentialOne Cycle Relief of Reactor Pressure Vessel Shell Weld Inspections at Pressurized Water Reactors Related to WCAP-16168-NP, "Risk Informed Extension of Reactor Vessel In-Service Inspection Intervals," dated January27, 2005

3) Letter from NMC to NRC, "Requestfor Authorization to Extend the Third 10-Year ISI Interval for Reactor Vessel Weld Examination,"

dated March 31, 2005

4) Letter from NMC to NRC, "Response to Request for Additional Information Related to Request to Extend the Third 10-Year ISI Interval for Reactor Vessel Weld Examination,"dated October 11, 2005

5) Letter from NRC to NMC, "PalisadesNuclearPlant - Request for Authorization to Extend the Third Inservice Inspection Interval for Reactor Vessel Weld Examination (TAC NO. MC6547)" dated November 29, 2005

6) Letter from NRC to NMC "PalisadesNuclear Plant- Corrected Page for Request for Authorization to Extend the Third Inservice Inspection Interval for Reactor Vessel Weld Examination(TAC NO.

MC6547)"dated December 14, 2005 AC)4.

27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway e Covert, Michigan 49043-9530 Telephone: 269.764.2000 AX '.15

Page 2 Document Control Desk Per reference 3, NMC submitted a relief request to extend the ISI interval for reactor vessel weld exams by one refueling cycle. The relief request was approved by the NRC by letters dated November 29, 2005 and December 14, 2005 (References 5 and 6).

Due to the current status of Reference 1, NMC is requesting approval of the relief request for an additional refueling cycle.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(i), Nuclear Management Company, LLC (NMC) is requesting Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approval for the use of an alternative to the requirements of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI, paragraph IWB-2412, Inspection Program B, for the Palisades Nuclear Plant. NMC is submitting this relief request because the Westinghouse Owners Group Topical Report (Reference 1) is currently being reviewed by the NRC and not yet approved.

Palisades third inspection interval began on May 12, 1995, and considering the ASME Code-allowed extensions, will end on December 12, 2006. The examination of the reactor vessel welds (Category B-A), the nozzle-to-vessel welds and inner radius sections (Category B-D), and reactor vessel nozzle-to-piping welds (Category B-J), for the third interval is currently scheduled for the fall 2007 refueling outage, as allowed by the previously approved relief request (Reference 5 and 6). As a result of the adoption of a Risk Informed Inservice Inspection Program at Palisades, the Category B-J welds are presently included in the augmented inspection program as defense-in-depth exams.

NRC approval is requested to extend the third inspection interval for the Category B-A, B-D, and B-J welds for one additional refueling cycle for the subject examinations. The technical justification for this request is consistent with the guidance provided in Reference 2. The extension of the inspection interval for these examinations will still provide for an acceptable level of quality and safety, as described in the enclosed request. NMC requests approval by September 1, 2007.

Summary of Commitments Tcontains no new commitments and no revisions to existing commitments.

Paul A. Harden Site Vice President, Palisades Nuclear Plant Nuclear Management Company, LLC Enclosures (1)

Attachments (5)

CC Administrator, Region III, USNRC Project Manager, Palisades, USNRC Resident Inspector, Palisades, USNRC

ENCLOSURE 1 REQUEST FOR AUTHORIZATION TO EXTEND THE THIRD 10-YEAR INSERVICE INSPECTION INTERVAL FOR REACTOR VESSEL WELD EXAMINATION PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT 1.0 ASME Code Component(s) Affected The affected component is the Palisades Nuclear Plant reactor vessel (RV), specifically, the following American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel (BPV) Code,Section XI examination categories and item numbers covering examinations of the RV. These examination categories and item numbers are from IWB-2500 and Table IWB-2500-1 of the ASME BPV Code,Section XI.

Examination Category Item No. Description B-A BI1.11 Circumferential Shell Welds B-A B1.12 Longitudinal Shell Welds B-A B13.21 Circumferential Head Welds B-A B1.22 Meridional Head Welds B-A B1.30 Shell-to-Flange Weld B-D B3.90 Nozzle-to-Vessel Welds B-D B3.100 Nozzle Inner Radius Areas B-J* B9.11 Circumferential Welds in Piping

As a result of the adoption of a Risk Informed Inservice Inspection Program at Palisades, the Category B-J welds are presently included in the augmented inspection program as defense-in-depth exams.

(Throughout this request, the above examination categories are referred to as "the subject examinations," and the ASME BPV Code,Section XI, is referred to as "the Code.")

2.0 Applicable Code Edition and Addenda The Palisades Nuclear Plant third interval Inservice Inspection (ISI) Program Plan is prepared to the 1989 Edition of the Code.

3.0 Applicable Code Requirement IWB-2412, Inspection Program B, requires volumetric examination of essentially 100%

of RV pressure retaining welds identified in Table IWB-2500-1, once each ten-year interval. In accordance with IWA-2430(d) and IWA-2430(e), Palisades third inspection interval is currently scheduled to conclude on December 12, 2006. However, the interval has been extended until the fall 2007 refueling outage for the subject examinations as allowed by a previously approved relief request (references 12 & 13).

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4.0 Reason for Request An alternative is requested from the requirement of IWA-2412, Inspection Program B, that volumetric examination of essentially 100% of RV pressure retaining welds, examination categories B-A, B-D and B-J, be performed once each ten-year interval.

Extension of the inspection interval, for examination category B-A, B-D and B-J, by an additional refueling cycle beyond the currently scheduled inspection is requested for the subject examinations.

The intent of the requested additional refueling cycle extension is to allow for deferment of the subject examinations to allow time for NRC review of industry efforts to extend the ISI interval for the subject examinations from 10 to 20 years. These efforts use ASME Section XI, Code Case N-691 (Reference 4), as a basis for using risk-informed insights to show that extending the inspection interval from 10 to 20 years results in a change in RV failure frequency that satisfies the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.174 (Reference 7). Following NRC approval of these efforts, NMC intends to submit a separate request to extend the current 10-year interval for Palisades Nuclear Plant to 20 years.

5.0 Proposed Alternative and Basis for Use The third inspection interval for Palisades started on May 12, 1995, and will end on December 12, 2006. This inspection interval includes credit for the IWA-2430(d) allowed one-year extension and the IWA-2430(e) allowed 215-day extension, due to the 2001 extended maintenance outage. The subject examinations are currently scheduled during the fall 2007 refueling outage, as allowed by the previous relief request that was approved by letters dated November 29, 2005, and December 14, 2005 (References 12

& 13). The proposed inspection date is two refueling cycles beyond the Code-allowed inspection interval. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(i), this interval extension is requested on the basis that the current inspection interval can be extended, while providing an acceptable level of quality and safety.

The requirements for a technical basis to extend the 10-year RV ISI interval by one refueling cycle are contained in a letter to the Westinghouse Owners Group, dated January 27, 2005 (Reference 3). This letter provides the basis for the one refueling cycle extension of the 10-year inspection interval for the subject examinations. This justification continues to be applicable as a basis for extending the inspection interval for the subject inspections by two refueling outages.

The technical justification for the extension of the inspection interval for the subject examinations was developed based on the guidance provided in Reference 3. The technical justification consists of five areas. These are:

5.1 Plant specific RV ISI history 5.2 Fleetwide RV ISI history 5.3 Degradation mechanisms in the RV 5.4 Material condition of the RV relative to embrittlement 5.5 Operational experience relative to RV structural integrity challenging events Page 2 of 8

5.1 Palisades Reactor Vessel Inservice Inspection History Palisades is in its third ISI interval for the RV. Two inservice inspections have been performed on the Category B-A, B-D and B-J welds to date. In summary, these inspections have been performed in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.150 (Reference 8), and have achieved acceptable coverage, with no reportable indications found. Based on the examination method and coverage obtained, it is reasonable to conclude that the examinations were of sufficient quality to detect any significant flaws that would challenge RV integrity. A detailed inspection history of the subject examinations is contained in Attachment 1.

The welds connecting the primary coolant system hot and cold leg loop piping to the RV nozzles are classified as Category B-J welds, in accordance with the ASME Code,Section XI, 1989 Edition. However, as a result of the adoption of a Risk Informed Inservice Inspection Program at Palisades, these welds are presently included in the augmented inspection program as defense-in-depth exams. These welds were last inspected in 1995, and the results of these exams are included in . By letter dated March 1, 2002 (Reference 9), Palisades submitted to the NRC the Risk Informed Inservice Inspection Program. In that submittal, Palisades committed to continue to inspect these welds as part of the ASME Code,Section XI, RV inspection program. By letter dated May 19, 2003 (Reference 11),

the NRC issued the safety evaluation approving the Risk Informed Inspection Program. The inspection of these welds is tied to the inspection interval associated with the B-A and B-D welds. Therefore, these welds are included in this relief request The segments connecting the primary coolant system hot and cold leg loop piping to the RV nozzles were ranked as low safety significant by the expert panel as part of the risk ranking process. Additionally, these segments contributed less than 0.01 %

of the system total piping segment core damage frequency. Therefore, the impact on the delta risk evaluation was inconsequential. Changing the inspection interval for these welds would have no effect on the conclusions in the analyses. These welds will be inspected during the next mechanized RV examination.

5.2 Fleetwide Reactor Vessel Inservice Inspection History As part of the technical basis for ASME Code Case N-691, a survey of RV ISI history for 14 pressurized water reactors (PWRs) was performed. These 14 plants represented 301 total years of service, and included RVs fabricated by various vendors. These plants reported that no reportable findings had been discovered during examinations of their RVs category B-A, B-D, and B-J welds.

It is widely recognized in the fracture mechanics community that fatigue crack growth of embedded flaws is substantially smaller than that of surface breaking flaws. Surface breaking flaws in the RV cladding are typically a result of lack of fusion defects between bands of cladding. In studies performed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory for the NRC Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS) Risk Page 3 of 8

Reevaluation, it was determined that in plants with multi-pass cladding, for a flaw to exist through the cladding, two flaws would have to be aligned on top of one another.

The probability of this occurring is very low (<.0001). The Palisades RV is constructed with multi-pass cladding, and therefore, has a low probability of containing through-cladding surface-breaking flaws.

All PWR plants, except one, have performed their first 10-year ISI of the subject examinations. No surface-breaking or near-surface flaws of any significance have been found in any of these inspections performed per the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.150 or ASME Section Xl, Appendix VIII.

5.3 Degradation Mechanisms in the Reactor Vessel The welds for which the subject examinations are conducted are similar metal low alloy steel welds. The only currently known degradation mechanism for this type of weld is fatigue due to thermal and mechanical cycling from operational transients.

Studies have shown that while flaw growth of simulated flaws in a RV would be small, the operational transient which has the greatest contribution to flaw growth is the cooldown transient. The cooldown transient is a low frequency transient, and is not expected to occur more than once during the requested inspection extension period. Therefore, any flaw growth during the requested deferral period will be inherently small.

The fatigue usage factors for the welds in the subject examinations are much less than the ASME Code design limit of 1.0 after 40 years of operation. These usage factors are calculated using a very conservative design duty cycle. It is very unlikely that more than a few of these events (e.g. heatup or cooldown) would actually occur during the extension period of this proposed alternative.

It is important to note that this request does not apply to any dissimilar metal welds, including Alloy 600 basemetal, or Alloy 82/182 weld material where primary water stress corrosion cracking is a concern.

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5.4 Material Condition of the Reactor Vessel Relative to Embrittlement The RV beltline is the limiting area in terms of embrittlement for the subject examinations. The composition of each material in the RV beltline, along with fluence and embrittlement data, can be found in the NRC RV Integrity Database (RVID). This information is provided for Palisades in the table below.

Palisades-Specific Material Values Drawn from the RVID Major Material Region Description cu Ni P Un-Irradiated RTNDT RTPTs

Type ID Location [wt%] [wt%] [wt%] ['F] Method @EOL 1 Axial Weld 3-112A lower 0.213 1.010 0.019 - 56 Generic 268.6 2 Axial Weld 3-112B lower 0.213 1.010 0.019 -56 Generic 268.6 3 Axial Weld 3-112C lower 0.213 1.010 0.019 -56 Generic 268.6 4 Axial Weld 2-112A upper 0.213 1.010 0.019 -56 Generic 268.6 5 AxialWeld 2-112B upper 0.213 1.010 0.019 -56 Generic 268.6 6 Axial Weld 2-112C upper 0.213 1.010 0.019 -56 Generic 268.6 7 Circ Weld 9-112 intermediate 0.203 1.018 0.013 -56 Generic 281.5 8 Plate D3804-1 lower 0.190 0.480 0.016 0 ASME NB-2331 187.3 9 Plate D3804-2 lower 0.190 0.500 0.015 -30 MTEB 5-2 159.9 10 Plate D3804-3 lower 0.120 0.550 0.010 -25 MTEB 5-2 106.6 11 Plate D3803-1 upper 0.240 0.510 0.009 -5 ASME NB-2331 194.4 12 Plate D3803-2 upper 0.240 0.520 0.010 -30 MTEB 5-2 194.9 13 Plate D3803-3 upper 0.240 0.500 0.011 -5 ASME NB-2331 194.4 10 CFR 50.61 currently provides PTS screening criteria of RTpTs equal to 270°F for plates and axial welds, and RTpTs equal to 300OF for circumferential welds. For Palisades, the axial welds are the limiting material, and their RTPTS value at end of life (EOL) approaches the current PTS screening criteria. However, it is recognized by the NRC and industry that a large amount of conservatism exists in the current PTS screening criteria. In the NRC PTS Risk Re-evaluation, results have shown that it may be possible to remove an amount of conservatism equivalent to reducing a plant's RTpTs value by at least 700 F. While the exact amount of conservatism that will be removed has not been determined, it is clear that Palisades will be below the current PTS screening criteria during the extension period, and further below the potential revised PTS screening criteria.

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5.5 Operational Experience Relative to Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity Challenging Events It is widely recognized that the greatest possible challenge to RV integrity for a PWR is PTS. A PTS event can be generally described as a rapid cooling of the RV followed by late repressurization. Plants have taken steps such as implementing emergency operating procedures (EOPs) and operator training to lower the likelihood of a PTS event occurring. Due to the implementation of such measures, the number of occurrences of PTS events fleetwide is very small. When considered over the combined fleetwide PWR operating history, the frequency of PTS events is very small. When considering the frequency of PTS events, and the length of the requested extension, the probability of a PTS event occurring during the requested extension is also very low. Combining the low probability of a PTS event with the low probability of a flaw existing in the RV, the probability of RV failure due to PTS is very small.

Palisades has implemented EOPs and operator training to prevent the occurrence of PTS events. Palisades EOPs include caution statements at critical locations warning the operator of the potential for causing PTS.

Palisades has not performed an analysis in accordance with the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.154 (Reference 10). Palisades minimizes the amount of neutron fluence accumulated at the RV beltline using a low leakage core, to keep the RV below the PTS screening criterion, obviating the need to perform this analysis.

There is a significant reduction in risk ifthe safety injection water temperature is increased. In an effort to minimize plant risk, a Palisades system operating procedure was revised stating the "...preferred [safety injection refueling water tank]

SIRWT temperature band is 85 0 F to 90 0F," and "...the SIRWT should be maintained greater than or equal to 80°F whenever the PCS is in Mode 1, 2, 3, or 4."

Additionally, Palisades has performed an assessment of the operating characteristics of the plant that assure that the likelihood of a severe PTS event over the next operating cycle, which could challenge the integrity of the RPV if a flaw were present is very low for the various accident sequences. This assessment is contained in Attachment 1.

The current requirements for inspection of RV pressure-containing welds have been in effect since the 1989 Edition of the Code. The industry has expended significant cost and man-rem exposure that have shown no service-induced flaws in the RV for ASME Section XI, Category B-A, B-D, or B-J, RV welds. ASME Section XI Code Case N-691 and industry efforts have shown that risk-insights can be used to extend the RV inservice inspection interval from 10 to 20 years. This extension satisfies the change in risk requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.174, and in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(3)(i), maintains an acceptable level of quality and safety. Based on these efforts having shown that the risk of vessel failure with a 10-year inspection interval extension is low and achieves an acceptable level of quality and safety, it is reasonable to conclude that a two refueling cycle extension will also achieve an acceptable level of quality and safety. Furthermore, Section 5 provides a qualitative Page 6 of 8

basis that the risk associated with extending the inspection interval by one refueling cycle is small. Therefore, NMC considers the proposed alternative for the subject examinations at Palisades to provide an acceptable level of quality and safety in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(3)(i).

6.0 Duration of Proposed Alternative The alternative is requested to extend the third ISI interval by two refueling cycles beyond the ASME Code required 10-year inspection interval, the Code-allowed twelve month extension, and the Code-allowed 215-day extension. This request is applicable to the third inspection interval only. Ifthis relief request is approved, the third ISI interval for the subject exams will end at the conclusion of the spring 2009 refueling outage.

7.0 Precedent By letters dated March 31, 2005, and October 11, 2005, NMC submitted this same relief request for Palisades Nuclear Plant. By letters dated November 29, 2005 (TAC NO.

MC6547), and December 14, 2005 (TAC NO. MC6547) (References 12 and 13), the NRC approved the relief request for PNP. NMC is resubmitting the same relief request, for an additional one refueling cycle, updated with the information provided by letter dated October 11, 2005 (Ref 14).

8.0 References

1. WCAP-1 6168-NP, "Risk-Informed Extension of Reactor Vessel In-Service Inspection Interval," October 2003.

2. NRC to WOG, 'WOG Request for the Staff Review of Topical Report WCAP-16168-NP "Risk-Informed Extension of Reactor Vessel In-Service Inspection Intervals," August 18, 2004.

3. NRC to WOG, "Summary of Teleconference with the Westinghouse Owners Group Regarding Potential One Cycle Relief of Reactor Pressure Vessel Shell Weld Inspections at Pressurized Water Reactors Related to WCAP-16168-NP, "Risk-Informed Extension of Reactor Vessel In-Service Inspection Intervals,"

January 27, 2005.

4. ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Code Case N-691, "Application of Risk Informed Insights to Increase the Inspection Interval for Pressurized Water Reactor Vessels,"Section XI, Division 1, November 2003.

5. NRC Memorandum, Thadani to Collins, 'Technical Basis for Revision of the Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS) Screening Criteria in the PTS Rule (10CFR50.61)," December 31, 2002.

6. NRC Reactor Vessel Integrity Database, Version 2.0.1, July 6, 2000.

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7. Regulatory Guide 1.174, "An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis,"

dated November 2002.

8. Regulatory Guide 1.150, "Ultrasonic Testing of Reactor Vessel Welds During Preservice and Inservice Examinations," dated February 1983.

9. NMC to NRC, "Relief Request: Alternate ASME Code,Section XI, Risk-Informed Inservice inspection Program," dated March 1, 2002.

10. Regulatory Guide 1.154, "Format and Content of Plant-Specific Pressurized Thermal Shock Safety Analysis Reports for Pressurized Water Reactors," dated January 1987.

11. NRC to NMC,"Palisades Plant - Risk-Informed Inservice Inspection Program (TAC NO. MB4420)," dated May 19, 2003.

12. Letter from NRC to NMC "Palisades Nuclear Plant - Request for Authorization to Extend the Third Inservice Inspection Interval for Reactor Vessel Weld Examination (TAC NO. MC6547)" dated November 29, 2005

13. Letter from NRC to NMC "Palisades Nuclear Plant - Corrected Page for Request for Authorization to Extend the Third Inservice Inspection Interval for Reactor Vessel Weld Examination (TAC NO. MC6547)" dated December 14, 2005

14. Letter from NMC to NRC, "Response to Request for Additional Information Related to Request to Extend the Third 10-Year ISI Interval for Reactor Vessel Weld Examination," dated October 11, 2005 Page 8 of 8

Attachment 1 PALISADES PTS ASSESSMENT The Palisades Nuclear Plant (PNP) has design characteristics that assure the likelihood of a severe PTS event over the next operating cycle, which would challenge the integrity of the RPV if a flaw is present, is very low for the following accident sequences. The PNP high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pump's design shutoff head is low, which limits the pressure challenge in the described sequences below. In addition, the PNP nominal pressurizer operating design value of 2060 psia is about 150 psi less than other operating pressurized water reactors (PWRs). Therefore, the likelihood of challenging a pressurizer safety relief valve (SRV) is less than that for other PWRs. Furthermore, the PNP pressure and temperature curves are based on Appendix G pressure and temperature limits and utilize a 200 degree subcooling limit. The 200 degree subcooling curve provides extra margin in regard to PTS.

The PNP has operating procedures that assure the likelihood of a severe PTS event over the next operating cycle, which would challenge the integrity of the RPV if a flaw is present, is very low for the following accident sequences. The PNP operator response to each of the listed sequences would be in accordance with the PNP Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs). The EOPs are based on the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) CEN-1 52, "Emergency Procedure Guidelines," for Combustion Engineering (CE) nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) plants.

Sequence 1 This event is characterized as a vapor space loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). Upon receipt of a reactor trip, the operators would implement EOP-1.0, "Standard Post Trip Actions," provided as Attachment 2, followed by entry into EOP-4.0, "Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery," provided as Attachment 3.

In order to minimize the risk for a PTS event, the operators control PCS temperature, and PCS pressure within the limits of EOP Supplement 1, "Pressure Temperature Limit Curves," provided as Attachment 5.

PCS temperature is controlled by steaming the steam generators in accordance with EOP-4.0, Step 4.23. This removes energy from the PCS that could potentially cause PCS pressure to raise leading to a PTS event.

Parameters are continuously monitored to determine if safety injection (SI) and charging pump flow can be throttled or stopped. EOP-4.0, Step 4.26 (a continuously applicable step) provides SI throttle criteria. Step 4.34 provides the instructions for throttling SI and controlling charging and letdown. If HPSI pumps and charging pumps were started by an SI actuation signal, then this step is used to reduce or stop HPSI or charging flow to reduce the chances of over pressurizing the PCS and low temperature stressing of the reactor vessel.

Once the pressurizer SRV closes, and the SI throttle criteria is verified, EOP-4.0 provides several steps to control primary coolant system (PCS) inventory in order to prevent a PTS event.

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Step 4.33 re-establishes letdown if it was isolated in order to control PCS inventory.

The control of letdown in a solid condition provides the operator a method to control PCS pressure within EOP Supplement 1 limits.

Step 4.35 (a continuously applicable step) provides contingency actions to address over-subcooling or pressurizer pressure greater than the limits of EOP Supplement 1 The concern for PTS is minimized by staying below the upper subcooled limits shown in EOP Supplement 1.

Step 4.71 provides contingency actions should the subsequent closing of the SRV result in water solid conditions in the PCS. The goal of this step is to maintain the PCS within the limits of EOP Supplement 1, by controlling PCS temperature and pressure with the steam generators, and by controlling HPSI, charging, and letdown flow.

Sequence 2 This event is characterized as an excess steam demand event (ESDE.) Upon receipt of a reactor trip, the operators would implement EOP-1.0, "Standard Post Trip Actions,"

(SPTA) followed by entry into EOP-6.0, "Excess Steam Demand Event," provided as .

During performance of the SPTA, PCS heat removal safety function acceptance criteria are evaluated in Step 4.8. Contingency action, Step 4.8.a.3, requires that, if a steam generator (SG) has an indication of an ESDE, feedwater flow to the affected SG be secured. This supports the strategy outlined in CEN-1 52, that the operator should not feed a suspected faulted steam generator. Upon entering EOP-6.0, identification and isolation of the affected SG is again addressed in steps 13, 14, and 15. Feedwater is isolated to the affected SG to limit the inventory available to boil off, thus limiting or stopping uncontrolled plant cooldown and stabilizing the plant.

The SI throttle criteria are verified in EOP-6.0, Step 4.17 (a continuously applicable step) and throttling is addressed in Step 4.18. If HPSI pumps and charging pumps were started by an SI actuation signal, then this step is used to limit or stop HPSI or charging flow to reduce the chances of over pressurizing the PCS and low temperature stressing the reactor vessel.

As outlined in Step 4.23 (a continuously applicable step) PCS pressure is maintained within the limits of EOP Supplement 1. The concern for PTS is minimized by staying below the upper subcooled limits shown in EOP Supplement 1. Contingency actions listed in Step 4.23.1, address over-subcooled conditions in the PCS. These include controlling HPSI, charging, and letdown flows, reducing PCS pressure, and controlling PCS cooldown rate in order to restore PCS temperature and pressure within the limits of EOP Supplement 1, thereby minimizing PTS concerns.

Sequence 3 A LOCA is an accident which is caused by a break in the PCS pressure boundary. The break can be as large as a double ended guillotine break in the hot leg, or as small as a Page 2 of 3

break which results in a loss of PCS fluid at a rate that is just in excess of the available charging capacity of the plant.

Small and large break LOCAs differ in their effect on the post-LOCA PCS heat removal process. For a large break LOCA, the only path necessary for PCS heat removal, in both the short and long term, is the break flow with core boil off. For small breaks, heat removal via the flow out the break is not sufficient to provide cooling and, therefore, SG heat removal is required. The emergency procedure guidelines take this into account with the decisions that must be made. Although distinct small and large break LOCA information is contained in the bases section of EOP-4.0, the action steps to be used during the actual emergency do not require the operator to distinguish between break sizes.

There are two paths initially available for PCS heat removal: heat transfer to the secondary side via the SGs, and heat transfer via the fluid flowing out the break. Large break LOCAs have sufficient fluid flowing out the break to provide adequate heat removal without relying on the SGs. Small break LOCAs do not have sufficient fluid flowing out of the break to provide adequate heat removal. Therefore, SG heat removal is required in addition to break flow for adequate heat removal. Because the LOCA EOP does not distinguish between large and small break LOCAs, SG heat removal capability is required at all times during a LOCA (EOP-4.0, Step 4.23). Steaming the SGs removes energy from the PCS that could potentially cause PCS pressure to raise leading to a PTS event.

Parameters are continuously monitored to determine if SI and charging pump flow can be throttled or stopped. EOP-4.0, Step 4.26 (a continuously applicable step) provides SI throttle criteria. Step 4.34 provides the instructions for throttling SI and controlling charging and letdown. If HPSI pumps and charging pumps were started by an SI actuation signal, then this step is used to reduce or stop HPSI or charging flow to reduce the chances of over pressurizing the PCS and low temperature stressing of the reactor vessel.

Step 4.35 (a continuously applicable step) provides contingency actions to address over-subcooling or pressurizer pressure greater than the limits of EOP Supplement 1.

The concern for PTS is minimized by staying below the upper subcooled limits shown in EOP Supplement 1. Contingency actions listed in Step 4.35.1 address over-subcooled conditions in the PCS, including throttling SI flows.

A break location in the pressurizer surge line could impact the ability of the operator to determine if SI throttle criteria are met due to either the inability to refill the pressurizer or lack of PCS pressure indication. If SI throttle criteria cannot be verified, then the operator would continue to maintain full SI flow, while aggressively steaming the SGs to remove heat from the PCS (EOP-4.0, Step 4.23).

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ATTACHMENT 2 EOP-1, "STANDARD POST TRIP ACTIONS" 25 Pages Follow (Procedure Attachments not included)

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-1.D taimmEnd EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 12 NUCLaAR PLANT PROCEDURE Issued Date 2/11/02 STANDARD POST-TRIP ACTIONS Procedure Sponsor Date GGPalmisano / 1/2/02 Technical Reviewer Date G ser R1/1r01 UWSlee User Reviewer Date

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-1.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 12 WIP PROCEDURE Page 1 of 24 TITLE: STANDARD POST-TRIP ACTIONS USERALERT CONTINUOUS USE PROCEDURE Read each step of the procedure prior to performing that step. When sign-offs are required, sign off each step as complete before proceeding to the next step.

1.0 PURPOSE This procedure provides the immediate actions which must be accomplished after a Reactor trip has occurred or should have occurred. These actions are necessary to ensure that the plant is placed in a stable, safe condition or that the plant is configured to respond to a continuing emergency.

End of Section 1.0

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-1.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 12 PROCEDURE Page 2 of 24 TITLE: STANDARD POST-TRIP ACTIONS 2.0 ENTRY CONDITIONS Standard Post Trip Actions may be entered when ANY of the following symptom(s) of a Reactor Trip exist:

1. Reactor Trip alarm (EK-0972).

2. Control Rod bottom lights on.

3. Rapid reduction of Reactor power.

4. Red trip lights lit on Clutch Power Supplies 1 through 4.

5. RPS trip logic lights on.

6. RPS trip setpoint(s) exceeded.

7. Licensed operator evaluation indicates conditions warrant a Reactor trip.

End of Section 2.0

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-1.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 12 PROCEDURE Page 3 of 24 TITLE: STANDARD POST-TRIP ACTIONS 3.0 EXIT CONDITIONS SPTAs may be exited when ANY of the following conditions exist:

1. IEALL safety function acceptance criteria are met, AND NO contingency actions were performed, THEN GO TO EOP-2.0 "Reactor Trip Recovery."

2. IF ANY safety function acceptance criteria are NOT met, OB ANY contingency action was taken, THEN GO TO Attachment 1, "Event Diagnostic Flow Chart" to diagnose the event.

End of Section 3.0

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-1.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 12 PROCEDURE Page 4 of 24 TITLE: STANDARD POST-TRIP ACTIONS 4.0 IMMEDIATE ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS Record Time of Reactor Trip

1. DETERMINE that Reactivity Control acceptance criteria met:

a. VERIFY Reactor power IU a.1. PERFORM ANY of the following:

lowering.

PUSH BOTH REACTOR TRIP pushbuttons on EC-02 and EC-06.

OPEN CRD Clutch Power Feeder Breakers 42-1 RPS and 42-2RPS.

0 PLACE ALL CRD clutch power toggle switches to CLUTCH OFF.

b. VERIFY negative startup rate.

U c. VERIFY a maximum of one full U c.1. COMMENCE emergency boration.

length Control Rod NOT fully inserted.

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-1.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 12 PROCEDURE Page 5 of 24 TITLE: STANDARD POST-TRIP ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

2. DETERMINE that Main Turbine-Generator acceptance criteria are met:

a. VERIFY Main Turbine is t- a.1. IEplant was operating at power tripped. AND the MSIVs are open, THEN PERFORM ANY of the following:

1) MANUALLY TRIP Main Turbine at Control Panel C-01 (preferred).

2) CLOSE BOTH MSIVs.

" CV-0510 ('A' S/G)

CV-0501 ('B' S/G)

b. VERIFY that the Main U b.1. PERFORM ANY of the following:

Generator is disconnected from grid by ANY of the 1) OPEN Main Generator Output following: Breakers at Control Panel C-01.

Main Generator Output

25F7 Breakers open. " 25H9 o 25F7 2) CONNECT jumper between

" 25H9 terminals 1 and 10 on Relay 487U (Y Phase) inside Panel C-04.

MOD 26H5 open.

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-1.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 12

.UcLEA. PLANPROCEDURE Page 6 of 24 TITLE: STANDARD POST-TRIP ACTIONS WL INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

3. CONTROL the Feedwater System as follows:

a. PLACE ALL operating Main Feed Pump Individual Speed Controllers to MAN.

S HIC-0526 S HIC-0529 U b. IEBOTH Main Feed Pumps U b.1. IF a Main Feed Pump's speed can are operating, NOT be lowered, THEN RAMP ONE Main Feed THEN TRIP the Main Feed Pump.

Pump to minimum speed.

c. WHEN TAVE lowers towards Lk c.1. IF a Main Feed Pump's speed can 5250 F (5350 F preferred), NOT be lowered, THEN RAMP the remaining THEN TRIP the Main Feed Pump.

Main Feed Pump to minimum speed.

d. ENSURE CLOSED ALL Main L d.1. IF ALL Main Feed Regulating Valves Feed Regulating Valves and AND ALL Bypass Feed Regulating ALL Bypass Feed Regulating Valves can NOT be closed, Valves for BOTH S/Gs: THEN TRIP the operating Main Feed Pumps.

0 CV-0701 ('A' S/G) 0 CV-0735 ('A' S/G)

CV-0703 ('B' S/G)

CV-0734 ('B' S/G)

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-1.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 12 PROCEDURE Page 7 of 24 TITLE: STANDARD POST-TRIP ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

4. DETERMINE that Vital Auxiliaries-Electric acceptance criteria are met:

a. VERIFY that station loads have transferred to offsite electrical power such that ALL of the following conditions exist:

1) Buses 1C and 1D energized. UI 1.1) ENSURE D/G started for bus NOT energized.

1-1 D/G (Bus 1C) a 1-2 D/G (Bus 1D)

U 1.2) ENSURE associated D/G output breaker closed (one attempt only)

Bus 1C (D/G 1-1): 152-107

Bus ID (D/G 1-2): 152-213 U 2) IE SIAS is NOT actuated, THEN Bus 1E is energized.

U 3) Buses 1A and 1B are energized.

U 4) Y01 is energized.

(continue)

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-1.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 12 PROCEDURE Page 8 of 24 TITLE: STANDARD POST-TRIP ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

4. (continued)

NOTE: The following indications can be used for status of DC power:

Bus DC Indication D11A P-8A Control Power D11-1 CV-0510 MSIV D1l1-2 K-7A Trip Power D21 A P-8C Control Power D21-1 CV-0501 MSIV D21-2 K-7B Trio Power

5) ALL of the following DC Buses are energized:

a Left Channel DC Buses o D1lA O D11-1 o D11-2 4 Right Channel DC Buses o D21A o D21-1 O D21-2

6) At least 3 of 4 Preferred AC Buses are energized.

6 Y10 6 Y20 Y30 S Y40

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-1.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 12 NucLEAPLAN PROCEDURE Page 9 of 24 TITLE: STANDARD POST-TRIP ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

5. DETERMINE that PCS Inventory U3 5.1. IE PLCS does NOT respond, Control acceptance criteria are THEN RESTORE AND MAINTAIN met: PZR level between 42% and 57%:

a. VERIFY BOTH of the following a. OPERATE PZR Level Control conditions exist: System (PLCS).

" Pressurizer (PZR) level b. MANUALLY OPERATE Charging between 20% and 85% and Letdown.

" PZR level trending to between 42% and 57%

NOTE: Determine PCS subcooling using TH with forced circulation and the Average of Qualified CETs with natural circulation.

b. VERIFY PCS at least 25 0 F subcooled.

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-1.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 12 PROCEDURE Page 10 of 24 TITLE: STANDARD POST-TRIP ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS Ul 6. DETERMINE that PCS Pressure Lk 6.1. IE PPCS is NOT operating properly, Control acceptance criteria are THEN RESTORE AND MAINTAIN met by verifying that BOTH of the PZR pressure within the limits of following conditions exist: EOP Supplement 1:

0 PZR pressure between 1650 a. OPERATE PZR Pressure and 2185 psia Control System.

0 PZR pressure trending toward b. MANUALLY OPERATE PZR 2010 and 2100 psia heaters and PZR spray.

U 6.2. IE PZR pressure is less than 1605 psia, THEN PERFORM the following:

a. VERIFY SIAS initiated ("SAFETY INJ INITIATED" EK-1 342 in alarm)

OR PUSH left and right INJECTION INITIATE pushbuttons on EC-13.

S PB1-1 S PB1-2

b. ENSURE ALL available HPSI and LPSI pumps operating with the associated loop isolation valves open.

U 6.3. IF PZR pressure is less than 1300 psia, THEN STOP PCPs as needed to establish one PCP operating in each loop.

U 6.4. IE PZR pressure is less than minimum PCP operation limits of EOP Supplement 1, THEN STOP ALL PCPs.

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-1.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 12 oC RPROCEDURE Page 11 of 24 TITLE: STANDARD POST-TRIP ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

7. DETERMINE that Core Heat Removal acceptance criteria are met:

a. VERIFY at least one PCP is operating.

b. VERIFY Loop AT (TH-Tc) is less than 100 F.

NOTE: Determine PCS subcooling using TH with forced circulation and average of qualified CETs with natural circulation.

L1 c. VERIFY PCS at least 25 0 F subcooled.

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-1.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 12 PROCEDURE Page 12 of 24 TITLE: STANDARD POST-TRIP ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

8. DETERMINE that PCS Heat Removal acceptance criteria are met:

a. VERIFY at least one S/G has

" a.1. For low level, ENSURE at least one BOTH of the following: S/G has feedwater flow of at least 165 gpm.

Level between 5% and 70%

" a.2. For high level, REDUCE feedwater a Feedwater available to flow to the affected S/G.

maintain S/G level

" a.3. IF one S/G has indication of an ESDE or SGTR, THEN SECURE feedwater flow to the affected S/G.

b. VERIFY that TAVE is between U3 b.1. IF TAVE is greater than 5400F, 5250 F and 5400 F. THEN RESTORE TAVE to between 5250F and 540°F using ANY of the following:

Turbine Bypass Valve (preferred)

Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves (continue) (continue)

(continue) (continue)

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-1.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 12 oA PTPROCEDURE Page 13 of 24 TITLE: STANDARD POST-TRIP ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

8. (continued) (continued)

Ll b.2. IETAVr is less than 5250 F, THEN PERFORM BOTH of the following:

1) ENSURE Feedwater flow is NOT excessive.

2) RESTORE TAVE to between 5250F and 5400F using ANY of the following:

Turbine Bypass Valve (preferred)

Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves

c. VERIFY BOTH S/G pressures U c.1. IE either S/G pressure is greater than are between 800 psia and 970 psia, 970 psia. THEN RESTORE S/G pressure to less than 970 psia using ANY of the following:

S Turbine Bypass Valve (preferred)

S Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves (continue) (continue)

(continue) (continue)

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-1.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 12 PROCEDURE Page 14 of 24 TITLE: STANDARD POST-TRIP ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS l CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

8. (continued) (continued)

" c.2. IF either S/G pressure is less than 800 psia, THEN PERFORM ALL of the following:

1) ENSURE that the Turbine Bypass Valve is closed.

2) ENSURE that the Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves are closed.

3) CLOSE BOTH MSIVs.

CV-0510 ('A' S/G)

CV-0501 ('B' S/G) 1 c.3. IF either S/G pressure is less than 500 psia, THEN ENSURE CLOSED the following valves:

1) BOTH MSIVs.

a CV-0510 ('A' S/G) a CV-0501 ('B' S/G)

2) Main Feed Regulating Valve and Bypass Feed Regulating Valve on affected S/G only:

CV-0701 ('A' S/G)

CV-0735 ('A' S/G) a CV-0703 ('B' S/G) a CV-0734 ('B' S/G)

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-1.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 12 PROCEDURE Page 15 of 24 TITLE: STANDARD POST-TRIP ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

9. DETERMINE that Containment Isolation acceptance criteria are met:

a. VERIFY containment pressure U a.1. IE Containment pressure is greater less than 0.85 psig. than or equal to 4.0 psig, THEN PERFORM ALL of the S PIA-1814 following:

S PIA-1815

1) VERIFY Containment Isolation Signal initiated ("CIS INITIATED" EK-1126 in alarm)

QB PUSH left and right HIGH RADIATION INITIATE pushbuttons on EC-13.

a CHRL-CS

CHRR-CS

2) ENSURE CLOSED the following:

" BOTH MSIVs:

o CV-0510 ('A' S/G) o CV-0501 ('B' S/G)

" Main Feed Reg Valves:

o CV-0701 ('A' S/G) o CV-0703 ('B' S/G)

Bypass Feed Reg Valves:

o CV-0735 ('A' S/G)

" CV-0734 ('B' S/G)

(continue) (continue)

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-1.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 12 PROCEDURE Page 16 of 24 TITLE: STANDARD POST-TRIP ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

9. (continued) (continued)

CCW Isolation Valves:

o CV-0910, (KEY: 337) o CV-091 1, (KEY: 338) o CV-0940, (KEY: 336)

3) ENSURE SIAS initiated by performing the following:

a. VERIFY "SAFETY INJ INITIATED" EK-1342 alarmed OB PUSH left and right INJECTION INITIATE pushbuttons on EC-13.

S PB1-1 S PB1-2

b. ENSURE ALL available HPSI and LPSI pumps operating with the associated loop isolation valves open.

(continue)

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-1.0 I T EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 12 PROCEDURE Page 17 of 24 TITLE: STANDARD POST-TRIP ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

9. (continued)

b. VERIFY Containment Area LI b.1. IEContainment radiation level is Monitor alarms clear greater than 1 x 101 R/hr on ANY and NO unexplained rise. Containment Area Monitor, THEN PERFORM BOTH of the 0 RIA-1 805 following:

S RIA-1 806 S RIA-1 807 1) VERIFY Containment Isolation 0 RIA-1808 Signal initiated ("CIS INITIATED" EK-1 126 in alarm)

OR PUSH left and right HIGH RADIATION INITIATE pushbuttons on EC-13.

" CHRL-CS

" CHRR-CS

2) CORROBORATE Containment Area Monitor readings by comparing to Containment High Range Monitor readings.

a RIA-2321 a RIA-2322 U c. VERIFY Condenser Off Gas Monitor RIA-0631 alarm clear and NO unexplained rise.

d. VERIFY Main Steam Line Monitor alarms clear and NO unexplained rise.

RIA-2323

RIA-2324

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-1.0

EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 12 PROCEDURE Page 18 of 24 TITLE: STANDARD POST-TRIP ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

10. DETERMINE that Containment U 10.1. ENSURE the Containment Air Atmosphere acceptance criteria Coolers are in operation as follows:

are met:

a. IESIAS is NOT present, QJ a. VERIFY Containment THEN ENSURE OPERATING temperature less than 1250 F. ALL available Containment Air Cooler fans.

b. VERIFY Containment pressure less than 0.85 psig. " V-lAandV-1B

" V-2A and V-2B S PIA-1814 " V-3A and V-3B 6 PIA-1815

V-4A and V-4B

b. OPEN Containment Air Cooler high capacity outlet valves as Service Water System capacity permits:

CV-0867 O

" CV-0861

CV-0864

" CV-0873 0 10.2. IF Containment pressure is greater than or equal to 4.0 psig, THEN PERFORM ALL of the following:

a. ENSURE OPERATING ALL available Containment Air Cooler 'A' fans.

a V-1A

V-2A

V-3A

V-4A (continue) (continue)

CV-0869 VHX-4 Inlet Valve will be closed ifa SIAS has occurred

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-1.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 12 PROCEDURE Page 19 of 24 TITLE: STANDARD POST-TRIP ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

10. (continued) (continued)

b. ENSURE OPEN ALL available Containment Spray Valves.

c. ENSURE ALL available Containment Spray Pumps are operating.

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-1.0

EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 12 NA PPROCEDURE Page 20 of 24 TITLE: STANDARD POST-TRIP ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

11. DETERMINE that Vital Auxiliaries-Water acceptance criteria met by performing ALL of the following:

a. VERIFY at least two Service " a.1. START available Service Water Water Pumps operating. Pumps.

b. VERIFY BOTH Critical SW " b.1. START available Service Water Headers in operation with Pumps.

pressures greater than 42 psig.

" b.2. IF SW Header pressure is less than 42 psig, AND SIAS is NOT present, THEN PERFORM BOTH of the following:

1) ENSURE CLOSED Containment Air Cooler high capacity valves as necessary to raise SW Header pressure greater than 42 psig.

CV-0867

CV-0861

" CV-0864

" CV-0873

2) IF SW Header pressure is less than 42 psig following the closing of containment Air Cooler high capacity valves, THEN ENSURE CLOSED Non-critical SW Isolation valve CV- 1359.

c. VERIFY OPERATING at least L c.1. START available CCW Pumps.

one CCW Pump.

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-1.0 EOPs EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 12 PT PROCEDURE Page 21 of 24 TITLE: STANDARD POST-TRIP ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS U 12. DETERMINE that Vital U 12.1. START available Instrument Air Auxiliaries-Air acceptance criteria Compressors as necessary.

met by verifying Instrument Air pressure greater than 85 psig. U 12.2. IE Feedwater Purity Building Air supply is available, THEN OPEN FWP Air Cross-tie Valve, CV-1221 as necessary.

End of Section 4.0

PAUSADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-1.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 12 PROCEDURE Page 22 of 24 TITLE: STANDARD POST-TRIP ACTIONS 5.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

1. WHEN SIRWT level is less than or equal to 25%,

THEN:

U2 a. Prior to RAS, PERFORM Pre-RAS actions. Refer to EOP Supplement 42.

U b. IF RAS occurs, THEN PERFORM Post-RAS actions. Refer to EOP Supplement 42.

CAUTION Each D/G is limited to a 2500 KW continuous load rating and a 2750 KW two-hour load rating. Operation of VC-10 (VC-1 1) will draw approximately 44 KW.

U 2. ENSURE CR HVAC is aligned for Emergency Mode Operation within 20 minutes of the time of the Reactor Trip by performing the following:

a. ENSURE at least one Air Filter Unit Fan associated with an operating train is ON:

" V-26A

V-26B

b. ENSURE OFF the following fans:

V-94 Purge Fan

V-47 Switchgear Exhaust Fan

PA'LSADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-1.0 EPs EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 12 PROCEDURE Page 23 of 24 TITLE: STANDARD POST-TRIP ACTIONS 5.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS la INSTRUCTIONS iff CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

3. VERIFY BOTH of the following:

U a. At least one Condensate Pump Lk 3.1. CLOSE BOTH MSIVs.

operating.

a CV-0510 U b. At least one Cooling Tower

CV-0501 Pump operating.

U 4. IF an SIAS has initiated, THEN PERFORM EOP Supplement 5 "Checklist for Safeguards Equipment Following SIAS."

U) 5. IEa CHP or CHR has initiated, THEN PERFORM EOP Supplement 6 "Checklist for Containment Isolation and CCW Restoration to Containment."

U 6. COMMENCE Emergency Shutdown Checklist. Refer to GOP-1 0, "Balance of Plant Actions Following a Reactor Trip."

Uk 7. if Reactor trip was due to Equipment Fire, THEN REFER TO ONP-25.1, "Fire Which Threatens Safety Related Equipment."

U 8. IF the MSIV AND MSIV bypass valves are closed, THEN ENSURE TRIPPED BOTH Main Feed Pumps.

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-1.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 12 PROCEDURE Page 24 of 24 TITLE: STANDARD POST-TRIP ACTIONS 5.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS la CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

9. IF ALL of the following conditions exist:

ALL safety function acceptance criteria met

" No contingency action was taken

Control Room is habitable, THEN GO TO EOP-2.0, "Reactor Trip Recovery."

10. IF ANY of the following conditions exist:

0 ANY safety function acceptance criteria NOT met a ANY contingency action was taken

Control Room is NOT habitable, THEN REFER TO Attachment 1, "Event Diagnostic Flow Chart" ANM DIAGNOSE the event.

End of Section 5.0

ATTACHMENT 3 EOP-4, "LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY' 112 Pages Follow (Procedure Attachments not included)

I PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision EOP-4,0 17 F

F:

PROCEDURE Issued Date1 2/15/05 LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY RLTucker 112/13/05 Procedure Sponsor Date VLUocei 1 112B/05

/..

Technical Reviewer Date DSCampbel 3 1 !o.!./.4Lq5 User Reviewer Date

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 PROCEDURE Page 1 Of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY USER ALERT CONTINUOUS USE PROCEDURE Read each step of the procedure prior to performing that step. When sign-offs are required, sign off each step as complete before proceeding to the next step.

1.0 PURPOSE This procedure provides operator actions which must be accomplished in the event of a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) when the Shutdown Cooling System is NOT initially in service. These actions are necessary to ensure that the Plant is placed in a stable condition. The goals of this procedure are to mitigate the effects of a LOCA, isolate the break (if possible), and to establish long term cooling using the Safety Injection System or the Shutdown Cooling System. This procedure achieves these goals while maintaining adequate core cooling and minimizing radiological releases to the environment.

End of Section 1.0

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17

,UCLR*A, PROCEDURE Page 2 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY 2.0 ENTRY CONDITIONS 1 EOP-1.0, "Standard Post Trip Actions," has been performed.

OR The event initiated from a lower mode when the Shutdown Cooling System is NOT initially in service.

2. Plant conditions indicate that a LOCA has occurred as indicated by ANY of the following:

a. Abnormal Pressurizer level change (low or high)

b. Pressurizer pressure low for existing plant conditions

c. SIAS automatically activated

d. Standby Charging Pumps start

e. CHP or CHR alarms

f. Containment pressure, temperature or humidity high

g. Containment Sump level rising

h. Quench Tank level, temperature, or pressure high I. Volume Control Tank level dropping End of Section 2.0

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 t EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 EOPs NuCARPLANT PROCEDURE Page 3 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY 3.0 EXIT CONDITIONS

1. The diagnosis of a LOCA is NOT confirmed.

OR

2. ANY of the Safety Function Status Check Sheet acceptance criteria are NOT satisfied AND corrective actions to restore the safety function are NOT effective.

OR

3. The Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery procedure has accomplished its purpose by satisfying ALL of the following:

a. ALL Safety Function Status Check Sheet acceptance criteria are being satisfied

b. Shutdown Cooling entry conditions are satisfied OR The break has been isolated OR The PCS is in long term cooling

c. An appropriate approved plant procedure can be implemented End of Section 3.0

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 wI"2.ýJ PROCEDURE Page 4 of III TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION During degraded Containment conditions, the operator should not rely on any single instrument indication due to large instrument errors. Alternate/additional instrumentation should be used to confirm trending of PCS conditions.

I

by performing ALL of the following:

EOP-1.0, "Standard Post Trip

a. VERIFY Attachment 1, "Safety Actions," Attachment 1, "Event Function Status Check Sheet" Diagnostic Flowchart" AND acceptance criteria: RE-DIAGNOSE the event.

For events initiated from a lower

1) Are satisfied at intervals of approximately fifteen mode, GO TO the EOP minutes. considered appropriate by the Shift Supervisor.

OR

EOP-9.0, "Functional Recovery Procedure."

2) Corrective actions to restore Attachment 1, "Safety Function Status Check Sheet," acceptance criteria are effective.

(continue)

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17

.9L,,. PROCEDURE Page 5 of III TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

1. (continued)

b. IF ALL of the following conditions exist:

" Steam Generator Blowdown Monitor, RIA-0707, has NOT alarmed

SIAS has NOT occurred OR has been reset

CHP and CHR signals are NOT present, THEN SAMPLE S/Gs for activity and Lithium AND VERIFY sample results do NOT indicate a SGTR.

c. Observation of NO abnormal S/G level rise (NOT attributable to feed flow or swell).

3. OPEN the placekeeper AND RECORD the time of EOP entry.

4. IF PZR pressure is less than or 4.1. PUSH BOTH left and right equal to 1605 psia INJECTION INITIATE pushbuttons QR Containment pressure is on EC-13.

greater than or equal to 4.0 psig, THEN VERIFY "SAFETY INJ

PBI-1 INITIATED" (EK-1342) is alarmed. " PBI-2

@ = Continuously awlicable a lical steD ser rod t= Hold Point on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 NCAPITPROCEDURE Page 6of III TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

5. IF SIAS is present, THEN PERFORM ALL of the following:

a. ENSURE available safeguards equipment operated or operating. Refer to EOP Supplement 5.

b. VERIFY at least minimum SI b.1. IF SI flow is NOT within the limits of flow. Refer to EOP Supplement EOP Supplement 4,

4. THEN PERFORM ANY of the following to restore SI flow:

1) ENSURE electrical power available to SI pumps and valves.

2) ENSURE correct SI valve lineup.

3) ENSURE adequate SI pump seal cooling.

4) START additional SI pumps as needed until Sl flow is within the limits of EOP Supplement 4.

c. IELetdown Orifice Stop Valves are closed, THEN PLACE handswitches in the CLOSE position:

HS-2003

HS-2004

HS-2005

@ = Continuously applicable step Hold Point on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 NULPAT PROCEDURE Page 7 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE: P-50A and P-50B shall not be operated simultaneously when Tc is less than 300 0 F.

6. IF PZR pressure lowers to less than 1300 psia AND SIAS is initiated, THEN PERFORM BOTH of the following:

a. ENSURE one PCP is stopped in each loop.

b. IF PCS is less than 25 0 F subcooled, THEN ENSURE ALL PCPs stopped.

7. WHEN PCS temperature lowers, THEN ENSURE PCPs configured as follows:

MAXIMUM PCS Tc OPERATING PCPs

<450'F 3

<300, F 2

8. IEPCPs are operating, 8.1. STOP PCPs which do NOT satisfy THEN VERIFY PCP operating PCP operating limits.

limits are satisfied. Refer to EOP Supplement 1.

@ = Continuously applicable step !ý= Hold Point on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 UIURI-S-1J PROCEDURE Page 8of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

9. IF open, THEN CLOSE CWRTs Vent Valves:

CV-1064

CV-1065

10. ISOLATE the LOCA by performing ALL of the following:

a. IF PZR pressure is less than a.1. CLOSE the PORV block valves:

2100 psia, THEN VERIFY BOTH PORVs 0 MO-1 042A are closed. a MO-1043A

b. ENSURE CLOSED Letdown Stop Valves:

a CV-2001

CV-2009

c. ENSURE CLOSED PCS Sample Isolation Valves:

CV-1910

" CV-1911

d. ENSURE CLOSED Reactor Vessel and PZR Vent Valves on C-11A:

a PRV-1067

PRV-1068

PRV-1069 a PRV-1070 (continue)

@ = Continuously applicable step Hold Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 MuoW,., PROCEDURE Page 9 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

10. (continued)

e. VERIFY BOTH of the following e.1. IF PCS to CCW leak is evident, conditions exist: THEN PERFORM ALL of the following:

0 CCW Radiation Monitor, RIA-0915, alarm clear 1) LOCATE the leak. Refer to ONP-23.1, "Primary Coolant

, "COMPONENT CLG Leak."

SURGE TANK T-3 HI-LO LEVEL" (EK-1 172) is clear 2) ISOLATE the leak. Refer to ONP-23.1, "Primary Coolant Leak."

3) IF CCW was isolated to any operating PCP, THEN SECURE the affected PCP(s).

f. VERIFY PZR Relief Valve(s) f.1. REDUCE PCS pressure to less NOT lifting by the following: than 1800 psia.

" Observation of Acoustic Monitor Panel indications on C-11A

PZR Relief Valve Discharge Temperature indicators on C-12

Observation of Quench Tank temperature, pressure and level

@ = Continuously applicable step se I'Y= Hold od on Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17

, PROCEDURE Page 10 Of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

11. IF LOCA is outside of containment as indicated by ANY of the following:

" Abnormal rise in Auxiliary Building Area Monitors.

Abnormal rise in East or West ESS Room Sump levels.

Abnormal rise in Dirty Waste Drain Tanks level THEN PERFORM ALL of the following:

a. LOCATE AND ISOLATE the leak.

b. ENSURE applicable areas of the Auxiliary Building are isolated by performing the following:

1) IE any of the following alarms have annunciated,

" EK-1364, Gaseous Waste Monitoring Hi Radiation

" EK-1366, Plant Area Monitoring Hi Radiation (continue)

C = Continuously applicable step t- = Hold Point od on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 PROCEDURE Page 11 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

11. (continued)

THEN REFER TO ARP-8, "Safeguards Safety Injection and Isolation Scheme EK-1 3 (EC-13)" AND PERFORM Corrective Actions for any alarming monitors listed.

2) NOTIFY plant personnel to stay clear of the affected areas of the Auxiliary Building.

c. INITIATE actions to makeup to the SIRWT. Refer to one of the following:

" SOP-2A, "Chemical &

Volume Control System Charging & Letdown"

SOP-17A, "Clean Radioactive Waste System"

d. MANUALLY INITIATE CIS by pushing left or right HIGH RADIATION INITIATE pushbuttons on EC-13 AND PERFORM EOP Supplement 6.

CHRL-CS

CHRR-CS

e. NOTIFY the TSC.

@= ©Continuouslv aDDlicable

=Cotiuosl apical ie steD t- = Hold odionPoint

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 NUCI2,LI, PROCEDURE Page 12 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

12. PLACE at least one Hydrogen Monitor in operation, ensuring the appropriate Key Switch in the "ACCI" position. Refer to SOP-38, "Gaseous Process Monitoring System."

13. IF ANY of the following conditions exist:

" Containment pressure is greater than or equal to 4.0 psig

Any operable Containment Radiation Monitor rises to 1 x 10' R/hr, THEN PERFORM ALL of the following:

a. VERIFY "CIS INITIATED" a.1. MANUALLY INITIATE CIS by (EK-1 126) is alarmed, pushing left or right HIGH RADIATION INITIATE pushbutton on EC-13.

CHRL-CS

CHRR-CS

b. VERIFY Containment Isolation. b.1. CLOSE valves that failed to Refer to EOP Supplement 6. automatically operate.

@ = Continuously applicable step f'-=Hl Hold Point on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 NT PROCEDURE Page 13 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

14. IF Containment pressure is greater than or equal to 4.0 psig, THEN PERFORM ALL of the following:

a. VERIFY Containment Spray a.1. OPEN available Containment Spray alignment valves to obtain required AND at least minimal configuration and at least minimum acceptable spray flow per flow.

following table:

CV-3001

CV-3002 NUMBER. I OF I NUMBEROF CS FLOW RUNNING OPEN CS.' MUST BE AT AND CS PUMPS [VALVES j LEAST:

START available Containment

________ RAS NOT Present Spray pumps 1_at least 1 2185 gpm total S

P-54A 2 or 3 2 2940 gpm total S P-54B P-54C I

RAS Present S

[1 1525 gpm 2 or 3 2 3100 gpm total

b. ENSURE at least one Containment Air Cooler Accident Fan operating.

" V-IA

" V-2A

V-3A

" V-4A

@ = Continuously applicable step t- Hold Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 NT PROCEDURE Page 14 of Ili TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION Operation of PCPs should be minimized when seal cooling is NOT present or controlled bleedoff is isolated.

15. IF PCP seal cooling is unavailable, THEN PERFORM ALL of the following:

a. CLOSE PCP Controlled Bleedoff valves:

S CV-2083 0 CV-2099

b. CLOSE PCP Controlled Bleedoff Relief Stop, CV-2191.

c. RESTORE PCP seal cooling.

Refer to ONP-6.2, "Loss of Component Cooling."

C = Continuously applicable step ti= Hold Point od on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 W PROCEDURE Page 15 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

conditions are satisfied:

a. All available Containment Spray 0

RAS has NOT actuated Pumps operating. Refer to EOP S Containment Pressure less than Supplement 42 for starting 33 psia additional spray pumps.

P1-1805 b. All available Containment Air P1-1812 Coolers operating in accident mode (Refer to SFSC Table

Containment Air Coolers CA.)

operating in accident mode (Refer to SFSC Table CA)

SIS Actuated with flow within the requirements of EOP Supplement 4 THEN PERFORM the following:

a. IF three Containment Spray Pumps are operating, THEN STOP one of the following Containment Spray pumps.

P-54B

P-54C

b. IF two Containment Spray Pumps are operating, THEN PERFORM the following:

1) CLOSE one Containment Spray Valve as follows:

(Continue)

Q = ©Continuousiv aDDlicable

=Cotiuosl a ical steD seI Iod t-= Hold Point on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17

%uc,6,.T PROCEDURE Page 16 of III TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

16. (Continued) a) PLACE one CHP Bypass Switch to BYPASS:

" HS-3001C, CV-3001 (Preferred, Key: 397)

HS-3002C, CV-3002 (Key: 396) b) ENSURE CLOSED associated Containment Spray Valve:

CV-3001 (preferred)

" CV-3002 c) STOP one of the following Containment Spray Pumps:

P-54B

" P-54C

c. VERIFY Containment pressure maintained less than 70 psia.

P1-1805 P1-1812

@ = Continuously applicable step sep fj= Hold Hl Point on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 PROCEDURE Page 17 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION Continued operation of the sprays after pressure has been reduced to an acceptable level increases the possibility of wetting electrical connectors (which may result in electrical grounds, shorts and other malfunctions) and containment sump screen clogging.

© 17. IF any Containment Spray Pumps 17.1. IF Containment Pressure rises to operating, greater than 3 psig AND ALL of the following AND no Containment Spray Pump conditions are satisfied: operating, THEN Parameter Condition Containment less than 3 psig 1) OPEN one Containment Spray pressure Valve.

NOT required for CTMT ambient cooling

2) START one Containment Spray NOT required for HPSI subcooling Pump.

NOTE: These conditions must be met prior to securing the last Containment Spray pump.

Containment NOT needed for iodine removal Spray as determined by Chemistry operation OR ALL of the following:

" Containment high range Gamma monitors read less than 1800 RPHr

" Containment isolated per EOP Supplement 6

" less than one hour has elapsed since reactor trip (Continue)

S=

Continuously applicable stepH f/-= Hold Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 N IPROCEDURE Page 18 of III TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

17. (Continued)

THEN STOP spray pumps one at a time, waiting to see the effect of reduced spray flow as follows:

a. IF three Containment Spray Pumps are operating, THEN STOP one Containment Spray Pump as directed by the CRS.

b. IF Containment pressure is less than 3 psig, AND two Containment Spray Pumps are operating, THEN PERFORM the following as directed by the CRS:

1) CLOSE one Containment Spray Valve as follows:

a) PLACE one CHP Bypass Switch to BYPASS:

" HS-3001C, CV-3001 (Preferred, Key: 397)

" HS-3002C, CV-3002 (Key : 396) b) ENSURE CLOSED associated Containment Spray Valve:

" CV-3001 (Preferred)

" CV-3002 (Continue) 0 = Continuously applicable step se It-= Hold Point od on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17

,uor*,, PROCEDURE Page 19 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

17. (Continued)

2) STOP one Containment Spray Pump.

c. IF Containment pressure is less than 3 psig AND one Containment Spray Pump is operating, THEN STOP the Containment Spray Pump as directed by the CRS.

d. WHEN ALL Containment Spray Pumps have been stopped, THEN ENSURE CLOSED BOTH Containment Spray Valves.

1) ENSURE BOTH CHP Bypass Switches in BYPASS:

" HS-3001C, CV-3001 Bypass (Key: 397)

HS-3002C, CV-3002 Bypass (Key: 396)

2) ENSURE CLOSED BOTH Conatinment Spray Valves:

CV-3001

CV-3002 C = Continuouslv ar)Dlicable appical ster) tp lHl tl'-= Hold Point on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 PROCEDURE Page 20 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

18. WHEN all Containment Spray Pumps have been stopped, THEN PERFORM ALL of the following:

a. LF MFW or Condensate pumps are operating AND feedwater from these sources is NOT desired, THEN PLACE ALL of the following controllers in MANUAL AND CLOSE:

1) Feedwater Regulating Valves

LIC-0701 ('A' S/G)

" LIC-0703 ('B' S/G)

2) Feedwater Regulating Bypass Valves

" LIC-0735 ('A' SIG)

" LIC-0734 ('B' S/G)

b. IECCW to containment has NOT been restored, THEN PLACE the following CCW valve keyswitches to CLOSE:

CCW, Valve Keyswitch Key CV-0910 HS-0910 337 CV-0911 HS-0911 338 CV-0940 HS-0940 336 (Continue) 0 = Continuously applicable steo 't-=

t~>= Hold Hold Point Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 MUCLRPLANT PROCEDURE Page 21 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

18. (Continued)

NOTE: Automatic reinitiation of spray will not occur until after SIAS has been reset.

c. RESET CHP circuits by pushing left and right HIGH PRESSURE RESET pushbuttons on C-13 S CHPL - Reset 0 CHPR - Reset

d. WHEN CHP has been reset, THEN ENSURE both Containment Spray Valve CHP Bypass Keyswitches are in NORMAL:

" HS-3001C

HS-3002C

@= Continuouslv aDDlicable steD t- Hold Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 Lt~ll- PROCEDURE Page 22 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

19. VERIFY BOTH of the following: 19.1. ENSURE CLOSED BOTH MSIVs:

" At least one Cooling Tower

CV-0510 ('A' S/G)

Pump operating

CV-0501 ('B' S/G) o P-39A 19.2. ENSURE CLOSED from the Control o P-39B Room BOTH MSIV Bypass valves:

" At least one Condensate Pump

MO-0510 ('A' S/G) operating

MO-0501 ('B' S/G) 0 P-2A a. IF ANY MSIV Bypass valves 0 P-2B were open when power/position indication was lost, THEN LOCALLY CLOSE ANY open MSIV Bypass valve.

b. ENSURE CLOSED ALL S/G Blowdown Valves:

'A' SIG 3'B' SIG CV-0739 CV-0738 CV-0771 CV-0770 CV-0767 CV-0768

20. IF the LOCA is isolated, THEN GO TO Step 65.

C = Continuouslv applicable steD sei=

tl- Hold odionPoint

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 I ,2LJ PROCEDURE Page 23 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION Each DIG is limited to a 2500 KW continuous load rating and a 2750 KW two-hour load rating. Operation of VC-10 (VC-11) will draw approximately 44 KW.

21. ENSURE at least one train of CR HVAC in Emergency Mode. Refer to SOP-24, "Ventilation and Air Conditioning System."

NOTE: IF emergency boration is in progress, THEN cooldown may commence/continue while the required shutdown margin value is calculated.

© 22. VERIFY PCS boron concentration 22.1. IF PCS boron concentration is less greater than or equal to required than required boron concentration, boron concentration as verified by THEN PERFORM BOTH of the sample or hand calculation. Refer following:

to EOP Supplement 35.

a. ENSURE emergency boration is

a. IE Emergency boration is in in progress.

progress AND PCS boron concentration b. WHEN required boron is greater than or equal to concentration is reached, required boron concentration, THEN SECURE emergency THEN SECURE emergency boration. Refer to EOP boration. Refer to EOP Supplement 40.

Supplement 40.

@ = Continuously applicable step t- = Hold Point od on Cninoul

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 PROCEDURE Page 24 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION A maximum PZR cooldown rate of 200°F/Hr and a maximum PZR Spray AT (PZR vapor temp - spray temp) of 350TF should be observed to prevent damage to the PZR or Spray Nozzle.

NOTE: PZR level indication decalibration will occur during cooldown. Correction curves in EOP Supplement 9, "Pressurizer Level Corrections Hot Calibrated" or EOP Supplement 10, "Pressurizer Level Corrections Cold Calibrated" should be used.

NOTE: S/G level indication decalibration will occur during cooldown. Correction curves in EOP Supplement 11, "SIG Level Correction" should be used.

NOTE: Steam flow through two of the four Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves should be adequate to establish an initial cooldown rate of 750F/hr.

NQTE: P-50A and P-50B shall not be operated simultaneously when Tc is less than 300 0 F.

(continue)

@ = Continuously applicable step se ti= Hold Point HodPon

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 u ,2!pEr PROCEDURE Page 25 of ill TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

23. (continued)

23. COMMENCE steaming S/Gs as follows:

a. REFER TO the following:

" EOP Supplement 1, Pressure and Temperature Limit Curves

" EOP Supplement 33, PCS Heatup/Cooldown Rate Data

b. IF safety injection flow is b.1. OPERATE Atmospheric Steam causing a cooldown in excess Dump Valves.

of required limits, THEN OPERATE the Turbine Bypass 1) IF desired to enhance Valve to maintain all of the temperature control, THEN following as applicable: ISOLATE two Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves. Refer to

S/Gs within 50 psi of Psat Table 23-1.

for Average of Qualified CETs

" As required to establish or support natural circulation

" As required to establish or support two phase natural circulation (Continue)

@ = Continuousiv armlicable stei) t= Hold Point

~= Hold Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 NT PROCEDURE Page 26 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

23. (Continued)

c. WHEN PCS cooldown rate can c.1. OPERATE Atmospheric Steam be controlled within required Dump Valves.

limits, THEN OPERATE the Turbine Bypass Valve to 1) !E desired to enhance cooldown at the maximum temperature control, THEN allowed rate. ISOLATE two Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves. Refer to Table 23-1.

Table 23-1

'A' S/G MV-MS101, ASDV CV-0782 Inlet MV-CA782, A/S to CV-0782 MV-MS103, ASDV CV-0781 Inlet OR MV-CA781, ANS to CV-0781

'B' S/G MV-MS102, ASDV CV-0779 Inlet OR MV-CA779, A/S to CV-0779 MV-MS104, ASDV CV-0780 Inlet Ct MV-CA780, A/S to CV-0780 CAUTION Operating P-50A and P-50B simultaneously when T, is less than 300OF is prohibited by Techncial Specifications.

d. ENSURE not more than two PCPs operating (preferably one in each loop.)

I C = Continuousiv aDDlicable step ti= Hold Point Hold Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17

,C.p ,T PROCEDURE Page 27 of III TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

24. IF BOTH of the following conditions exist for each S/G:

" At least three of four S/G pressure sigmas indicate between 510 and 550 psia (indicators between alarm flags)

" A controlled cooldown is in progress THEN BLOCK MSIS for the S/G meeting the above conditions by performing ALL the following:

a. BLOCK MSIV closure signal for the applicable S/G by pushing the appropriate pushbutton on Control Panel C-01:

HS/LPE-50A ('A' S/G)

HS/LPE-50B ('B' S/G)

b. VERIFY "STEAM GEN VALVES ISOLATION LOCKOUT" (EK-0970) is alarmed.

c. ENSURE CLOSED BOTH Main Feed Reg Valves:

CV-0701 ('A' S/G)

" CV-0703 ('B' S/G)

d. ENSURE CLOSED BOTH Bypass Feed Reg Valves:

CV-0735 ('A' S/G)

CV-0734 ('B' S/G) 0 = Continuously applicable step f/-= Hold Point HodPon Cninoul

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 WoIF,ýIT PROCEDURE Page 28 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE: Use the following instruments to determine spray nozzle AT:

PZR Vapor Phase Temperature, TI-0101

Spray line temperature, TIA-0103 or TIA-0104 (use the lowest temperature if using main sprays)

Charging line temperature, TI-0212 (if using Auxiliary Spray)

@ = Continuously applicable step ti= Hold Point Hold Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 PROCEDURE Page 29 of III TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE: Use ANY of the following to determine Average of Qualified CETs:

PPC point "KCETA" (Average of Qualified CETs)

PPC Incore Qualified CET Map (PPC page 313)

Manual calculation. Refer to SOP-34, "Plant Process Computer (PPC) System."

© 26. VERIFY SI Pump throttling criteria 26.1. IF ANY of the Sl Pump throttling are satisfied by ALL of the criteria can NOT be maintained, following: THEN RAISE HPSI flow AND START HPSI Pumps as necessary.

a. Based on the Average of Qualified CETs, PCS PUMP [ VALVE subcooling meets ONE of the - [NUMBER DESCRIPTION following: Train I

At least 25°F subcooled for MO-3009 HPSI Train 1 to Loop 1B non-degraded Containment P-66B

[ MO-3011 HPSI Train 1 to Loop 2A I

conditions MO-3007 I HPSI Train 1 to Loop IA

-[MO-3013 jHPSI Train I to Loop 2B

Greater than the minimum Train 2 subcooling curve on EOP MO-3066 HPSI Train 2 to Loop I B Supplement 1 for degraded Containment conditions P-66A

[ MO-3064 HPSI Train 2 to Loop 2A I

MO-3068 I HPSI Train 2 to Loop IA

___.MO-3062 jHPSI Train 2 to Loop 2B

b. Corrected PZR level is greater than 20% (40% for degraded Containment) and controlled.

REFER TO EOP Supplements 9 and 10.

(continue) 0 = Continuously applicable step t- Hold Hold Point Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 TUCIPIT:O PROCEDURE Page 30Cof III TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

26. (continued)

c. At least one S/G is available for PCS heat removal with corrected level being maintained or being restored to between 60% and 70%.

REFER TO EOP Supplement 11.

d. Operable RVLMS channels indicate greater than 102 inches above the bottom of fuel alignment plate (621' 8").

NOTE: Reactor Vessel Upper Head voiding resulting from controlled PCS pressure reductions is not expected to result in safety functions being jeopardized.

a. OPERATE PZR heaters and Main or Auxiliary PZR sprays.

b. IESI Pump throttling criteria are met, THEN PERFORM ANY of the following:

1) CONTROL Charging and Letdown.

2) THROTTLE HPSI flow.

C = Continuously applicable step ti= Hold Point od on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17

, PROCEDURE Page 31 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

28. IF ALL of the following conditions exist:

PZR pressure is less than 1687 psia

SIAS is NOT actuated or blocked

"Safety Injection Signal Block Permit" (EK-1369) is alarmed

A controlled cooldown and/or controlled depressurization is in progress, THEN BLOCK SIAS by performing ALL of the following:

a. PLACE AND HOLD SIAS block handswitch PB3-1 to BLOCK.

1) VERIFY the following annunciator in alarm:

"SAFETY INJ BLOCK RELAY SI-1" (EK-1337)

2) RELEASE SIAS block handswitch PB3-1.

(continue)

@= ContinuousIv aDDlicable a1 Ical steD t 1 ti- Hold ol Point on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 PROCEDURE Page 32 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

28. (continued)

b. PLACE AND HOLD SIAS block handswitch PB3-2 to BLOCK.

1) VERIFY the following annunciators in alarm:

"SAFETY INJ BLOCK RELAY SI-2" (EK-1338)

"SAFETY INJ BLOCKED" (EK-1339)

2) RELEASE SIAS block handswitch PB3-2.

29. IE HPSI Pumps are operating AND SI Pump throttling criteria are satisfied, THEN THROTTLE HPSI flow MR STOP one HPSI Pump at a time.

PUMP JVALVE

- NUMBER! DESCRIPTION

-' - Train I MO-3009 HPSI Train 1 to Loop 1B P-66B I MO-3011 HPSI Train 1 to Loop 2A T

MO-3007 HPSI Train 1 to Loop 2A MO-3013 HPSI Train I to Loop 2B Train 2 MO-3066 HPSI Train 2 to Loop 1B MO-3064 HPSI Train 2 to Loop 2A MO-3068 HPSI Train 2 to Loop 1A

.I___ IMO-3062 HPSI Train 2 to Loop 2B

@ = Continuously applicable step ti= Hold Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 PROCEDURE Page 33 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

30. IELPSI Pumps are operating AND PZR pressure is being controlled greater than 200 psia, THEN PERFORM BOTH of the following:

a. STOP the operating LPSI Pumps:

P-67A

" P-67B

b. CLOSE the LPSI injection valves:

MO-3008 LPSI Loop 1A

MO-3010 LPSI Loop 1B

" MO-3012 LPSI Loop 2A

MO-3014 LPSI Loop 2B

31. IF PZR pressure lowers to less than 200 psia AND LPSI pumps have been stopped, THEN PERFORM BOTH of the following:

a. ENSURE OPERATING ALL available LPSl pumps:

P-67A

P-67B

b. ENSURE OPEN LPSI injection valves:

MO-3008 LPSl Loop 1A 0 MO-3010 LPSI Loop 1B

MO-3012 LPSI Loop 2A

MO-3014 LPSI Loop 2B C = Continuously applicable step seI Iod t= Hold Point on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 TITLE:ILOSSPROCEDURE Page 34 of ill TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

a. Post-RAS injection from Spent Fuel Pool. Refer to EOP Supplement 44.

b. Refill of SIRW Post-RAS. Refer to EOP Supplement 43.

33. IE Letdown is isolated AND BOTH of the following conditions exist:

SI Pump throttling criteria are met

Letdown is needed or desired, THEN RESTORE Letdown. Refer to EOP Supplement 27.

@ = Continuously applicable step f-;= Hold Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0

EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 NUCLeARP IT PROCEDURE Page 35 of III TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE: PZR level instrument de-calibration occurs due to PCS pressure and containment temperature changes. Level correction is per EOP Supplements 9 and 10.

NOTE: IF the PCS is in a water solid condition for PCS Pressure Control, THEN the PZR level limit of 85% may be exceeded.

NOTE: PZR level should be maintained greater than 36% (40% for degraded Containment) to have continued availability of PZR Heaters.

34. IF Sl Pump throttling criteria are met, THEN MAINTAIN corrected PZR level between 20% and 85% (42%

to 57% preferred) by performing ANY of the following:

a. THROTTLE HPSI flow.

b. CONTROL Charging and Letdown.

(continue)

C = Continuously applicable step t-= Hold Point Hold Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 TIT2LELOST PROCEDURE Page 36 of III TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

34. (continued)

NOTE: IF an interruption in boration via Charging Pump to HPSI Train 2 occurs, THEN a different SI cold leg injection nozzle should be used when restoring flow.

1) ENSURE normal charging 1.1) LFthe normal charging path is NOT path aligned as follows: available AND HPSI Train 2 is available, a) OPEN Charging Line THEN CHARGE to the PCS via the Stop Valve, CV-21 11. HPSI header by performing ALL of the following:

b) OPEN at least one Charging Stop Valve: 1) STOP ALL Charging Pumps.

" CV-2113 2) CLOSE Charging Line Stop

" CV-2115 Valve, CV-2111.

c) IE BOTH Charging Stop 3) CLOSE Letdown Orifice Stop Valves fail to open THEN Valves:

ENSURE greater than 33 gpm flow through " CV-2003 CK-CVC2112. " CV-2004

CV-2005

4) CLOSE Letdown Containment Isolation Valve CV-2009.

5) ENSURE CLOSED HPSI Pump B Discharge to Train 2, CV-3018.

(continue) (continue)

C = Continuousiv aDDlicable steD tl- Hold Hold Point Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0

_ EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 NUCLEARPLANT PROCEDURE Page 37 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

34. (continued) (continued)

6) OPEN ONE HPSI Train 2 Injection Valve:

S MO-3062 6 MO-3064 0 MO-3066 0 MO-3068

7) PLACE SIT Pressure Indicating Controller associated with valve opened above to MANUAL AND CLOSE:

S PIC-0338, MO-3062 0 PIC-0347, MO-3064 S PIC-0346, MO-3066 0

PIC-0342, MO-3068

8) OPEN Charging Pump Discharge to Train 2, MO-3072.

9) START Charging pumps as necessary to control PZR level.

C = Continuously applicable stepse f;,= Hold Point

=HodPon

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 TITLE:,LOSSPROCEDURE Page 38AofT Il TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

© 35. MAINTAIN PCS pressure within the 35.1. IF the PCS is oversubcooled limits of EOP Supplement 1 by QR PZR pressure is greater than performing ANY of the following: the maximum limits of EOP Supplement 1,

a. CONTROL the following: THEN PERFORM ANY of the following to restore subcooling or 0 PZR heaters PCS pressure to within the 0 Main Spray appropriate limit:

S Auxiliary Spray (Supplement 37) a. OPERATE available S/G(s) to stop the cooldown

b. IF SI Pump throttling criteria are AND STABILIZE Qualified CET met, temperatures and Loop Tcs.

THEN CONTROL HPSI, Charging, and Letdown flows. b. OPERATE the following to lower PZR pressure within allowable limits:

Main Spray

Auxiliary Spray (Supplement 37)

c. IE SI Pump throttling criteria are met, THEN CONTROL HPSI, Charging, and Letdown flows.

35.2. IEPCS cooldown rate exceeds Technical Specification limits, THEN PERFORM ANY of the following to restore the cooldown rate to within Technical Specification limits:

a. OPERATE available S/G(s) to stop the cooldown AND STABILIZE Qualified CET temperatures and Loop Tcs.

(continue) (continue)

@ = Continuously applicable step f'/= Hold Point i~" Hold Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 PROCEDURE Page 39 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

35. (continued) (continued)

b. OPERATE the following to maintain PZR pressure within limits of EOP Supplement 1:

" PZR heaters

Main Spray

" Auxiliary Spray (Supplement 37)

° Letdown

c. As directed by the Shift Supervisor, CONTINUE the PCS cooldown at less than or equal to Technical Specification limits. Refer to EOP Supplement 33.

@=©Continuousiv Cninoul aDDlicable steD aIcaleseDHodPon

't-= Hold Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 T PROCEDURE Page 40 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

a. CALCULATE minimum PCS cooldown rate. Refer to EOP Supplement 2.

b. VERIFY BOTH of the following: b.1. IF additional sources of inventory which allow the requirements to be The calculated cooldown met are NOT available, rate does NOT exceed THEN GO TO EOP-9.0, Technical Specification "Functional Recovery Procedure."

limits.

The calculated cooldown rate is achievable with the existing PCS heat removal path.

@ = Continuously applicable step t= Hold Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 I PROCEDURE Page 41 of III PLANT TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY TUCLESO O INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

Indicated Charging and Letdown flows do NOT correspond to PZR level trend.

PZR level rising significantly faster than trend expected from Auxiliary Spray flow.

Core AT (Average of Qualified CETs - Tc ) or Loop AT (TH - Tc) rising for same secondary steaming and Auxiliary Feed rates.

" Any operable PCS temperature indication is less than 25"F subcooled.

" Operable RVLMS indicates voiding in the Reactor Vessel.

39. IF PCS voiding is indicated AND ANY of the following exist:

PCS pressure reduction is inhibited

PCS heat removal is inhibited

" The Shift Supervisor directs void elimination, THEN PERFORM void elimination actions. Refer to EOP Supplement 26.

0 = ©Continuousiv

=Cotiuosl aDDlicable aD ical steD tD lHl f,-= Hold Point on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 MUCITAT PROCEDURE Page 42 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

40. IF ANY of the following AC or DC 40.1. IF Bus 1D and Bus IE are NOT buses are NOT energized, energized, THEN RESTORE power to the THEN as resources permit, affected buses. Refer to the PROVIDE power to PZR Heaters following applicable procedure: from Bus 1C. Refer to ONP-2.1, "Loss of AC Power," Attachment 1.

BUS!: PROCEDURE lC or 1D EOP Supplement 29 1E with No SIAS EOP Supplement 29 1E with SIAS SOP-30 Y10 ONP-24.1, "Loss of Preferred AC Bus Y10" Y20 ONP-24.2, "Loss of Preferred AC Bus Y20" Y30 ONP-24.3, "Loss of Preferred AC Bus Y30" Y40 ONP-24.4, "Loss of Preferred AC Bus Y40" YO1 ONP-24.5, "Loss of Instrument AC Bus Y01" Any DC Bus ONP-2.3, "Loss of DC Power" C = Continuously applicable step f';ý= Hold Point

©Cninoul apicalesepHodPon

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 TITELOSSPROCEDURE Page 43Rof1Ill TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

41. IF offsite power was lost AND offsite power is available, THEN RESTORE power to plant equipment by performing ALL of the following:

a. IF NONE of the following are energized:

" 'R' Bus

'F' Bus

Cook 1 Line, THEN INITIATE actions to restore power to 'F' or 'R' Bus, as available. Refer to EOP Supplement 21.

b. WHEN ANY of the following are energized:

" 'R' Bus

'F' Bus

Cook 1 Line, THEN INITIATE actions to restore Plant power. Refer to EOP Supplement 29.

(continue) 0 = Continuously applicable step f- Hold Point t=HodPon Cninoul

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 PROCEDURE Page 44 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

41. (continued)

c. RESTORE power to the affected bus(es). Refer to the following applicable procedure:

BUS PROCEDURE 1E1E)

(without SiS) EOP Supplement 29 1E h1)

ESOP-30 (with SS 1A or IB ONP-2.1, "Loss of I__AC Power"

d. RESTART plant equipment as desired.

0 = Continuousiv applicable step seI Iod ti= Hold Point on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 W2,.j., PROCEDURE Page 45 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION Each D/G is limited to the following load rating:

2500 KW continuous 2750 KW two hours per 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months period

42. WHEN 2400V Bus lC or Bus 1D is 42.1. IF equipment needed to maintain energized, Safety Functions is available from THEN as resources permit, a de-energized 2400V Vital Bus ENERGIZE Plant buses by AND a power supply is available, performing ALL of the following: THEN ENERGIZE the bus AND RESTORE the needed equipment.

a. IF Bus I C is energized, THE.N PERFORM ALL of the following:

1) ENSURE CLOSED the following breakers:

152-115(BuslCto Transformers 11 and 19) 0 152-108 (Bus1C to Transformer 13)

(continue)

@ = Continuously applicable step f;;= Hold Hold Point Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17

,uar",,, PROCEDURE Page 46 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

42. (continued)

2) ENSURE 480V MCCs are energized as appropriate:

" MCC 1: 52-1906 (Bus 19)

MCC 3: 52-1301 (Bus 13)

MCC 7: 52-1103 (Bus 11)

b. IEBus 1D is energized, THEN PERFORM the following:

1) ENSURE CLOSED 152-201 (Bus 1D to Transformers 12 and 20)

2) ENSURE 480V MCCs energized as appropriate:

" MCC 2: 52-2006 (Bus 20)

MCC 8: 52-1201 (Bus 12)

(continue)

C = Continuousiv awlicable aplcal steD se!Iod t- Hold Point on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 TITLELLOS PROCEDURE PagIe RECOVERY TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

42. (continued)

NQTE: IF only one MCC is available (MCC 1 or MCC 2),

THEN BOTH vital DC Buses should be powered from the two Battery Chargers supplied by the same energized MCC.

c. ENSURE CLOSED Battery Charger Feeder Breakers from available MCCs:

1) MCC 1 Charger No 1 Feeder 52-146

Charger No 4 Feeder 52-186

2) MCC 2

Charger No 2 Feeder 52-225

Charger No 3 Feeder 52-285

d. VERIFY 125V DC Buses D10 d.1. PLACE Battery Chargers in and D20 are powered by a operation. Refer to SOP-30, Battery Charger. "Station Power."

C = Continuously applicable step 1!-;= Hold Point od on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17

,ucAPI,,, PROCEDURE Page 48 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

43. IEALL PCPs are stopped, 43.1. ENSURE proper control of S/G THEN VERIFY natural circulation feeding and steaming rates.

flow in at least one PCS loop by ALL of the following:

Core AT less than 50°F (Average of Qualified CETs minus Tc)

Loop THs and Loop Tcs constant or lowering

Average of Qualified CETs at least 25°F subcooled

° Difference between Loop TH and Average of Qualified CETs is less than or equal to 15°F

44. IF ALL PCPs are stopped, AND natural circulation criteria are NOT satisfied, THEN ENSURE ALL of the following conditions exist:

All available Charging pumps are operating

SI flow is within the limits of EOP Supplement 4

" At least one S/G is available for removing heat from PCS with level being maintained or restored to between 60%

and 70%

" Average of Qualified CETs is less than superheated 0 = Continuously applicable step se f';i= Hold Point od on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 NoCP

'T PROCEDURE Page 49 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

45. WHEN BOTH of the following conditions exist:

" PZR Pressure within limits of EOP Supplement 1

PCS Cooldown rate is within required limits THEN PLACE LTOP in service as follows:

a. ENSURE OPEN PORV Isolation Valves. Refer to SOP-1 B, "Primary Coolant System Cooldown," Attachment 6.

b. PLACE BOTH of the following PORV LTOP enable keyswitches to ENABLE:

HS-0105A (Key: 1)

HS-0105B (Key: 4)

c. PLACE BOTH of the following PORV Handswitches to AUTO:

HS-1042B

HS-1043B

d. MAINTAIN PZR pressure within limits of EOP Supplement 1.

46. WHEN PCP restart is desired, THEN RESTART desired PCPs.

Refer to EOP Supplement 3.

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17

.,o,,..A, PROCEDURE Page 50 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

47. WHEN required shutdown boron concentration has been established (approximately 30 to 45 minutes using all charging pumps),

THEN ALIGN Charging Pump suction to SIRWT. Refer to EOP Supplement 40.

a. CONFIRM the LOCA is outside containment.

b. INITIATE actions to makeup to the SIRWT. Refer to one of the following:

" SOP-2A, "Chemical &

Volume Control System Charging & Letdown"

SOP-17A, "Clean Radioactive Waste System"

c. IE"CIS INITIATED" (EK-1 126) is clear, THEN MANUALLY INITIATE CIS by pushing left or right HIGH RADIATION INITIATE pushbuttons on EC-13 AND PERFORM EOP Supplement 6.

CHRL-CS

CHRR-CS

d. NOTIFY the TSC.

C = Continuouslv applicable steD sel lod t, = Hold Point on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 JoAWL,.PLT PROCEDURE Page 51 of III TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

49. WHEN SIRWT level less than or equal to 25%,

THEN prior to RAS, PERFORM Pre-RAS Actions. Refer to EOP Supplement 42.

CAUTION Each D/G is limited to a 2500 KW continuous load rating and a 2750 KW two-hour load rating. Operation of VC-10 (VC-1 1) will draw approximately 44 KW.

50. IF Control Room HVAC Compressor VC-1 0 or VC-1 1 tripped on high temperature due to low SW flow, THEN RESET AND START VC-10 or VC-11.

@ = Continuously applicable step seI Iod t = Hold Point on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 PROCEDURE Page 52 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE: Subsequent to the actions in Step 51, the TSC must approve closure of ANY of the failed open valves.

51. WHEN Containment water level approaches the level specified below, THEN ENSURE OPEN the following valves AND OPEN associated breakers:

Cntmt Valve Water Level Number Bkr Description

......:MCC No. I MO-3008 52-141 LPSI Loop 1A MO-3010 52-147 LPSI Loop 1B 595' 9" 595'9 MCC No. 2 MO-3012 52-247 LPSI Loop 2A MO-3014 52-251 LPSI Loop 2B

______ MCC No. 1 MO-30091 52-197 HPSITrain Ito Loop 1B MO-3011 52-157 HPSI Train Ito Loop 2A MO-3007 52-137 HPSI Train 1 to Loop 1A MO-3013 52-151 HPSITrain 1 to Loop 2B 596' 4" .. ... MCC No. 2 MO-3066 152-2571 HPSI Train 2 to Loop 1B MO-3064 52-237 HPSI Train 2 to Loop 2A MO-3068 52-261 HPSI Train 2 to Loop 1A

__MO-02 52-241 HPSI Train 2 to Loop 2B C = Continuously applicable step seI 1HodPon f/'-= Hold Point

©=Cotiuosl apIcal

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 PROCEDURE Page 53 of Ili TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION Premature initiation of RAS can lead to insufficient Containment Sump inventory for SI Pump operation. Minimum Containment Water level of 593' 6" is necessary for adequate ESS pump NPSH.

52. WHEN BOTH of the following conditions exist:

LOCA inside Containment

° SIRWT level lowers to less than 2%

THEN REFER TO EOP Supplement 42 AND PERFORM the following:

a. Post-RAS actions

b. MONITOR for indications of sump screen clogging.

53. IEContainment Water level is less than 593' 6" following a RAS, THEN PERFORM the following:

a. NOTIFY TSC.

b. INVESTIGATE cause of low containment water level.

c. MONITOR for indications of inadequate ESS pump NPSH.

@ = Continuously applicable step t- Hold Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17

" PROCEDURE Page 54 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

54. IERAS is initiated, THEN PERFORM the following:

a. IF BOTH HPSI Pumps are a.1. IF total HPSI Pump flow less than operating, 100 gpm, THEN VERIFY total HPSI Pump THEN PERFORM ALL of the flow greater than 100 gpm. following:

1) STOP ALL Charging Pumps.

Refer to EOP Supplement 39, "Alternate Methods of Reducing PCS Pressure," as needed to control PZR pressure.

2) IF total HPSI Pump still has flow less than 100 gpm, THEN STOP one HPSI Pump.

b. IF one HPSI Pump is operating, b.1. IF the operating HPSI Pump has THEN VERIFY the operating flow less than 50 gpm, HPSI Pump has flow greater THEN PERFORM ALL of the than 50 gpm. following:

1) STOP ALL Charging Pumps.

Refer to EOP Supplement 39, "Alternate Methods of Reducing PCS Pressure," as needed to control PZR pressure.

2) IF the operating HPSI Pump still has flow less than 50 gpm, THEN STOP the HPSI Pump.

3) CONSULT with the TSC for further guidance.

0 = Continuously applicable step ti= Hold Point HodPon

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 TITLE:LOSSPROCEDURE JCPage 55Rof II TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

a. IF 3 Containment Spray Pumps are operating, THEN STOP one Containment Spray Pump (P-54B or P-54C preferred.)

b. THROTTLE HPSI flow to b.1. IF HPSI loop isolation valves are achieve 200 to 250 gpm flow to de-energized, each operating train using THEN PERFORM the following:

either Option 1 or Option 2:

1) STOP one HPSI pump.

2) ENERGIZE and CLOSE two HPSI loop isolation valves associated with the operating HPSI pump (Refer to Option 1 or 2).

(Continue) (Continue)

@ = Continuously applicable step t,7= Hold Hold Point Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 PROCEDURE Page 56 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

55. (Continued) (Continued)

OPTION i OPTION I POSITION NUMBER DESCRIPTION BKR NUMBER DESCRIPTION

________ Train I (P-66B)

Train i (P-66B)

Closed MO-3009 HPSI Tm Ito Loop 1B Closed MO-3013 HPSI Trn to Loop 2B 52-197 MO-3009 HPSI Tm 1 to Loop 1B Throttled MO-3011 HPSI Trn 1 to Loop 2A 52-151 MO-3013 HPSI Tm 1 to Loop 2B Throttled MO-3007 HPSI Tm I to Loop 1A _ Train 2 (P-66A)

______ *Train 2 (P-66A)52-237 MO-3064 _HPSI Tm 2 to Loop 2A Closed MO-3064 HPSI Trn 2 to Loop 2A Closed MO-3068 HPSI Tm 2 to Loop 1A 52-261 MO-3068 JHPSI Tm 2 to Loop 1A Throttled MO-3066 HPSI Tm 2 to Loop 1B Throttled MO-3062 HPSI Tm 2 to Loop 2B OPTION 2 3KR NUMBER DESCRIPTION

_______ OPTION 2 I (P-66B)

______ :Train POsITION NUMBER 1; DESCRIPTION 52-157 MO-3011 HPSI Trn 1 to Loop 2A

_______ Train I (P-66B)

Closed MO-3011 IHPSI Tm 1 to Loop 2A 52-137 MO-3007 HPSI Tm 1 to Loop 1A Closed MO-3007 JHPSI Tm 1 to Loop 1A _______ Train 2 (P-66A)

Throttled MO-3009 IHPSI TIto LoopIB 52-257 MO-3066 IHPSI Trn 2 to Loop 1B Throttled MO-3013 IHPSI Trn 1 to Loop 2B 52-24 1 MO-3062 IHPSI Tm 2to Loop 2B

____.... : Train 2 (P-66A)

Closed MO-3066 HPS Tm 2 to Loop 1B Closed MO-3062 HPSI Tm 2 to Loop 2B Throttled MO-3064 HPSI Trn 2 to Loop 2A Throttled MO-3068 HPSI Tm 2 to Loop 1A (Continue)

@ = ContinuousIV applicable step 't- Hold Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 TIT PROCEDURE Page 57 of 111V TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

55. (Continued)

c. STOP remaining operating Containment Spray Pumps as follows:

1) IF containment pressure greater than 4 psig OR CHP NOT reset, THEN CLOSE one containment spray valve.

a) PLACE one CHP Bypass Switch to BYPASS:

" HS-3001C, CV-3001 (Key: 397)

HS-3002C, CV-3002 (Key: 396) b) ENSURE CLOSED associated Containment Spray Valve:

CV-3001 0

CV-3002

2) STOP all Containment Spray Pumps.

0 P-54A 0

P-54B 0

P-54C (Continue)

C = Continuously applicable step 't-= Hold Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 PROCEDURE Page 58 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

55. (Continued)

3) ENSURE BOTH CHP Bypass Switches in BYPASS.

HS-3001C, CV-3001 (Key: 397)

" HS-3002C, CV-3002 (Key: 396)

4) ENSURE CLOSED BOTH Containment Spray Valves:

" CV-3001

CV-3002

d. MONITOR HPSI pump for d.1. IF HPSI pump performance does improved or stable NOT improve, performance. THEN PERFORM the following:

1) IF HPSI loop isolation valves are energized, THEN THROTTLE HPSI flow to 50 to 100 gpm on each operating train (low in the band preferred.)

2) IE HPSI pump performance is NOT improved, THEN STOP HPSI pump.

3) IF HPSI pump performance improves, THEN RAISE flow to a point where stable pump performance can be maintained.

(Continue)

C = Continuously applicable step t- =HodPon Hold Point

©Cninoul apical se1

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 NUCLRPLIT PROCEDURE Page 59 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

55. (Continued)

e. NOTIFY TSC to begin monitoring for SAMG entry conditions.

f. GO TO EOP-9.0

56. PLACE the following ESS Room Sump Pump handswitches in OFF AND CAUTION TAG "Do Not Use LOCA in Progress":

East P-72A (42-165ASS)

S East P-72B (42-165BSS)

S West P-73A (42-155ASS) 0 West P-73B (42-155BSS)

57. IF Charging Pump suction is aligned to the SIRWT AND RAS has initiated, THEN PERFORM ALL of the following:

a. STOP ALL Charging Pumps:

P-55A S P-55B P-55C

b. RACK OUT ALL Charging Pump breakers:

CHARGING BREAKER PUMP ____......

P-55A 52-1205 P-55B 52-1308 52-1206 P-55C 52-1105 (continue)

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 up"r,9 PROCEDURE Page 60 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

57. (continued)

c. PLACE a Caution Tag on their handswitches that reads "Do NOT Use - No suction source available"

52-1205CS

52-1206CS

52-1105CS

58. IF ALL operable Containment Area Radiation Monitors indicate less than 1 x 101 R/hr AND Containment pressure is less than 3.0 psig, THEN RESET CHR by pushing the following:

The RESET pushbutton on each Containment Area Radiation Monitor.

" BOTH left and right HIGH RADIATION RESET pushbuttons on C-13.

@ = Continuousiv awlicable steD af ca! seI=

f/-= Hold od Point on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17

%U&, T PROCEDURE Page 61 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE: Failure of Instrument Air to containment will prevent venting the SITs.

59. IF PZR pressure is between 59.1. IF ANY SIT could NOT be isolated, 350 psia and 300 psia as read on THEN VENT the unisolated SIT PI-0104 (NR) or PR-0125 and using ONE of the following:

controlled AND a controlled cooldown is in a. VENT to containment as progress, follows:

THEN ISOLATE SITs as follows:

1) ENSURE CLOSED CWRT

a. UNLOCK AND CLOSE the Vent Isolation Valves:

following breakers:

CV-1064

CV-1065 BREAKER OUTLET VALVE:.,

SIT 52-2129 MO-3041 T-82A 2) VENT each unisolated SIT 52-2329 MO-3045 T-82B one tank at a time by 52-2229 MO-3049 T-82C opening the Vent Valve and 52-2429 MO-3052 T-82D closing when tank is vented.

KEY: 190 SIT VENT VALVE T-82A CV-3067

b. CLOSE the following SIT Outlet T-82B CV-3065 Valves: T-82C CV-3063 T-82D CV-3051

BREAKER OUTLET KEY

..... ___ VALVE 52-2129 MO-3041 98 52-2329 MO-3045 99 52-2229 MO-3049 100 52-2429 MO-3052 101 (c nti ue) (continue)

@ = Continuously applicable step lt-ý= Hold Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 WUCII PROCEDURE Page 62 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

59. (continued) (continued)

3) WHEN ALL the following conditions are met:

" Unisolated SITs are vented and their associated vent valve closed

Plant conditions allow venting containment THEN OPEN CWRT Vent Isolation Valves:

CV-1064

" CV-1065

b. VENT unisolated SITs via Clean Waste Receiver Tank Header per SOP-3, "Safety Injection and Shutdown Cooling System."

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 1ECEPNT PROCEDURE Page 63 of III TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

60. IF the elapsed time from event 60.1. IF hot leg injection can NOT be initiation (EOP Entry) is 5.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months established via the normal path, AND Shutdown Cooling will NOT THEN INITIATE hot leg injection be in service prior to 6.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months after via HPSI flow through the PZR.

event initiation (EOP Entry) Refer to EOP Supplement 20.

AND ANY of the following conditions are satisfied:

Based on the Average of Qualified CETs, PCS subcooling meets ONE of the following:

o Less than 25°F subcooled for non-degraded Containment conditions o Less than the minimum subcooling curve on EOP Supplement 1 for degraded Containment conditions

" Corrected PZR level is less than 20% (40% for degraded Containment) (Refer to EOP Supplements 9 and 10)

Operable RVLMS channels indicate less than 102 inches above the bottom of fuel alignment plate, THEN ESTABLISH simultaneous hot and cold leg injection by performing ALL of the following in the order listed:

(continue)

@ = Continuously applicable step se t- = Hold Point od on

©Cninoul apical

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 EOUCLAPs,.T PROCEDURE Page 64of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

60. (continued)

a. CLOSE HPSI Train 2 to Cold Leg Valve, MO-3080.

(KEY: 117)

b. OPEN HPSI Train 2 to Hot Leg Valve, MO-3082.

(KEY: 118)

c. CLOSE HPSI Train 1 to Cold Leg Valve, MO-3081.

(KEY: 115)

d. OPEN HPSI Train 1 to Hot Leg Valve, MO-3083.

(KEY: 116)

e. IE HPSI Train 2 is in operation, THEN VERIFY HPSI flow to Loop 1 hot leg on FI-0316A.

f. IF HPSI Train 1 is in operation, THEN VERIFY HPSI flow to Loop I hot leg on FI-0317A.

g. OBSERVE HPSI flow to PCS cold legs on the following indicators:

S FI-0308A S

FI-0310A S FI-0312A S FI-0313A (continue) t;=

t~= Hold Point

@ = Continuously applicable step

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 PROCEDURE Page 65 of III TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

60. (continued)

h. VERIFY total HPSI flow to Loop 1 hot leg is approximately equal to total HPSI flow to cold legs.

FI-0316A

FI-0317A

i. VERIFY the following:

" Total HPSI flow is within acceptable limits. Refer to EOP Supplement 4.

" Containment spray flow is within acceptable limits.

Refer to SFSC, Table CA.

0 = Continuouslv amlicable ster) aplialesep=HodPon fý= Hold Point

©=Cotiuosl

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 MuLcO2A PROCEDURE Page 66 of Ili TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

61. IF measured Containment hydrogen concentration is between 1% and 3%,

THEN PERFORM ALL the following:

a. CONTACT TSC. I

b. OPEN MCC 9 Feeder Breaker, 52-1304.

LOCATION: On Bus 13

62. IF SI Pump Throttling criteria are satisfied, THEN RESET SIAS. Refer to SOP-3, "Safety Injection and Shutdown Cooling System,"

Attachment 4.

C = Continuously applicable step f;,= Hold odlon Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 PROCEDURE Page 67 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

63. WHEN ALL of the following Shutdown Cooling System entry conditions are met:

PCS parameters are acceptable for existing Containment conditions:

Containment Containment Greater Than or Less Than Equal To 1750F 175F AND OR Greater Less Than Than or Equal 3 pslg at all To 3 psig at any times during the time during the Parameter event event PCS Pressure Less Than REFER TO EOP 270 psia Supplement 1 PZR Level Greater than 36% Greater than 40%

and controlled and controlled Avg of Qualified Greater than REFER TO EOP CETs Subcooling 251F Supplement 1 PAvg of Qualified Less than 300°F REFER TO EOP CETs and Loop Supplement 1 r.s TemperatureII

TSC has determined that PCS activity is acceptable for circulation outside Containment.

Containment Spray Pumps are NOT in use for Containment Atmosphere safety function.

Shutdown Cooling System monitoring equipment power is available from Y01.

OR (Continue)

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 IUUr1J PROCEDURE Page 68 Of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

63. (Continued)

Alternate measures for loss of Y01 are established. REFER TO ONP-17, "Loss of Shutdown Cooling."

LTOP operable.

Power to the following Shutdown Cooling Return Valves is available:

o MO-3015 (MCC-1) o MO-3016 (MCC-2)

OR Access to Containment is acceptable for manual valve operation.

THtEN PERFORM the following:

(continue)

C = Continuousiv aDDlicable anIcal Ie steDI t- Hold od Point on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 PROCEDURE Page 69 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

63. (continued)

a. IF hot leg injection is in use, THEN SECURE hot leg injection as follows:

1) CLOSE HPSI Train 2 to Hot Leg Valve, MO-3082.

(KEY: 118)

2) OPEN HPSI Train 2 to Cold Leg Valve, MO-3080.

(KEY: 117)

3) CLOSE HPSI Train 1 to Hot Leg Valve, MO-3083.

(KEY: 116)

4) OPEN HPSI Train 1 to Cold Leg Valve, MO-3081.

(KEY: 115)

b. STOP operating HPSI and LPSI Pumps.

c. ENSURE SIAS is reset. Refer to SOP-3, "Safety Injection and Shutdown Cooling System,"

Attachment 4.

d. GO TO GOP-9, "Mode 3

_>525 OF to Mode 4 or Mode 5" or TSC approved procedure.

64. IF SDC entry conditions can NOT be established, THEN MAINTAIN long-term cooling.

C = Continuously applicable step t- = Hold Point od on

©Cninoul apical se

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 L21SPIJ PROCEDURE Page 70 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

65. IF the LOCA is isolated, THEN PERFORM Steps 66 through 97.

NOTE: Use ANY of the following to determine Average of Qualified CETs:

" PPC point "KCETA" (Average of Qualified CETs)

PPC Incore Qualified CET Map (PPC page 313)

Manual calculation. Refer to SOP-34, "Plant Process Computer (PPC) System."

© 66. VERIFY SI Pump throttling criteria 66.1. IF ANY of the SI Pump throttling are satisfied by ALL of the criteria can NOT be maintained, following: THEN RAISE HPSI flow AND START HPSI Pumps as necessary.

a. Based on the Average of Qualified CETs, PCS PUMP... VALVE subcooling meets ONE of the [WIUMBER I DESCRIPTION following:

Train 1

" At least 25 0 F subcooled for MO-3009 HPSI Train Ito Loop 1B non-degraded Containment P-66B MO-3011 HPSI Train 1 to Loop 2A conditions MO-3007 HPSI Train 1 to Loop 1A MO-3013 IHPSI Train I to Loop 2B

Greater than the minimum Train 2 subcooling curve on EOP MO-3066 HPSI Train 2 to Loop 1B Supplement 1 for degraded MO-3064 HPSI Train 2 to Loop 2A Containment conditions MO-3068 HPSI Train 2 to Loop 1A

_MO-3062 HPSI Train 2 to Loop 2B (c ntifue)

@ = Continuously apolicable step 't- Hold Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 Ul.*cAT PROCEDURE Page 71 of III TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

66. (continued)

b. Corrected PZR level is greater than 20% (40% for degraded Containment) and controlled.

REFER TO EOP Supplements 9 and 10.

c. At least one S/G is available for PCS heat removal with corrected level being maintained or being restored to between 60% and 70%.

REFER TO EOP Supplement 11.

d. Operable RVLMS channels indicate greater than 102 inches above the bottom of fuel alignment plate (621' 8").

C = ©Continuouslv awlicable steD aicaI sepHodPon ti= Hold Point Cninoul

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 PROCEDURE Page 72 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

67. IF HPSI Pumps are operating AND SI Pump throttling criteria are satisfied, THEN THROTTLE HPSI flow OR STOP one HPSI Pump at a time.

T . VALVE PUMP NUMBER - DESCRIPTION

- - Train I MO-3009 HPSI Train 1 to Loopi B P-66B MO-3010 HPSI Train 1 to Loop 2A MO-3007 HPSI Train 1 to Loop 1A MO-3013 HPSI Train 1 to Loop 2B Train 2 MO-3066 HPSI Train 2 to Loop I B P MO-3064 HPSI Train 2 to Loop 2A P-66A I. T MO-3068 HPSI Train 2 to Loop IA

____IMO-3062 .1HPSI Train 2 to Loop 28

@ = ContinuousIv applicable steD f',= Hold ol Point on aplicbestp irCotiuosl

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 PROCEDURE Page 73 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

68. IF LPSI Pumps are operating AND PZR pressure is being controlled greater than 200 psia, THEN PERFORM BOTH of the following:

a. STOP the operating LPSI Pumps:

" P-67A

P-67B

b. CLOSE the LPSI injection valves:

" MO-3008 LPSI Loop 1A

MO-3010 LPSI Loop 1B

MO-3012 LPSI Loop 2A

MO-3014 LPSI Loop 2B

69. IF PZR pressure lowers to less than 200 psia AND LPSI pumps have been stopped, THEN PERFORM BOTH of the following:

a. ENSURE OPERATING ALL available LPSI pumps:

P-67A

" P-67B

b. ENSURE OPEN LPSI injection valves:

MO-3008 LPSI Loop 1A

MO-3010 LPSI Loop 1B

MO-3012 LPSI Loop 2A

" MO-3014 LPSI Loop 2B

@ = Continuously applicable step se t,= Hold Point od on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 N PROCEDURE Page 74 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

70. IF Letdown is isolated AND BOTH of the following conditions exist:

" SI Pump throttling criteria are met

" Letdown is needed or desired, THEN RESTORE Letdown. Refer to EOP Supplement 27.

© 71. VERIFY the PCS is NOT in a water 71.1. IF water solid PCS condition is solid condition as indicated by indicated, BOTH of the following: THEN MAINTAIN the PCS within the limits of EOP Supplement 1 by

a. No exaggerated or severe ANY of the following:

pressure response to PCS inventory or temperature a. OPERATE available S/G(s) to changes. control the cooldown AND STABILIZE Qualified CET

b. ANY of the following: temperatures and Loop Tcs.

" Corrected PZR level is less b. IE SI Pump throttling criteria are than 100%. REFER TO met, EOP Supplements 9 and 10 THEN CONTROL HPSI, Charging, and Letdown flows.

RVLMS indicates voiding C = Continuouslv aDDlicable ster) t- Hold Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 T PROCEDURE Page 75 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

72. IF it is desired to draw a bubble in the PZR, THEN PERFORM ALL of the following:

a. ENSURE ENERGIZED ALL available PZR heaters.

b. IF ANY of the following conditions exist:

Both S/G pressures can be maintained below the existing PCS pressure

At least one PCP is operating THEN PERFORM ALL of the following to reduce PCS pressure:

1) IF SI Pump throttling criteria are met, THEN CONTROL Charging, Letdown, and HPSI flow.

2) INITIATE PCS cooldown within Technical Specification limits.

3) MONITOR the PCS cooldown rate using PPC.

Refer to EOP Supplement 33.

(continue)

@ = Continuously applicable step t- = Hold Point od on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 M PROCEDURE Page 76 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

72. (continued)

4) MAINTAIN PCS temperature and pressure within the limits of EOP Supplement 1.

5) MAINTAIN 25°F subcooling.

c. IEa bubble forms in the Reactor Vessel Upper Head region, THEN PERFORM BOTH of the following:

1) CONTROL Charging, Letdown, and HPSI flow to maintain PCS level greater than the 102 inches above the bottom of fuel alignment plate (621' 8").

2) CONTINUE efforts to draw a bubble in the PZR.

73. IF SI Pump throttling criteria are met, THEN MAINTAIN corrected PZR level between 20% and 85% (42%

to 57% preferred) by performing ANY of the following (Refer to EOP Supplements 9 and 10):

a. CONTROL Charging and Letdown.

b. THROTTLE HPSI flow.

C = Continuousiv applicable steD sef lod t= Hold Point on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0

T EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 Nu"L PROCEDURE .Page 77 of III TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

© 74. MAINTAIN PCS pressure within the 74.1. IF the PCS is oversubcooled limits of EOP Supplement I by OR PZR pressure is greater than performing ANY of the following: the maximum limits of EOP Supplement 1,

a. CONTROL the following: THEN PERFORM ANY of the following to restore subcooling or 0

PZR heaters PCS pressure to within the S Main Spray appropriate limit:

Auxiliary Spray (Supplement 37) a. OPERATE available S/G(s) to stop the cooldown

b. IF SI Pump throttling criteria are AND STABILIZE Qualified CET met, temperatures and Loop Tcs.

THEN CONTROL HPSI, Charging, and Letdown flows. b. OPERATE the following to lower PZR pressure within allowable limits:

" Main Spray

" Auxiliary Spray (Supplement 37)

c. IESI Pump throttling criteria are met, THEN CONTROL HPSI, Charging, and Letdown flows.

74.2. IF PCS cooldown rate exceeds Technical Specification limits, THEN PERFORM ANY of the following to restore the cooldown rate to within Technical Specification limits:

a. OPERATE available S/G(s) to stop the cooldown AND STABILIZE Qualified CET temperatures and Loop Tcs.

(continue) (continue)

@= Continuously aDDlicable steD ti= Hold Point Hold Point

Continuously aDplicable sten ~

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17

%"2,PS.T PROCEDURE Page 78 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

74. (continued) (continued)

b. OPERATE the following to maintain PZR pressure within limits of EOP Supplement 1:

PZR heaters

Main Spray

Auxiliary Spray (Supplement 37)

" Letdown

c. As directed by the Shift Supervisor, CONTINUE the PCS cooldown at less than or equal to Technical Specification limits. Refer to EOP Supplement 33.

Q = Continuouslv awlicable steD a 'Ical se ti= Hold Point HodPon

,, Cotnuul

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 TITLE: LOSS OFPROCEDURE Page 79 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

a. CALCULATE minimum PCS cooldown rate. Refer to EOP Supplement 2.

b. Verify BOTH of the following: b.1. IF additional sources of inventory which allow the requirements to be

The calculated cooldown met are NOT available, rate does NOT exceed THEN GO TO EOP-9.0, Technical Specification "Functional Recovery Procedure."

limits.

The calculated cooldown rate is achievable with the existing PCS heat removal path.

77. EVALUATE the need for a plant cooldown based on ALL of the following:

Technical Specifications require plant cooldown

Plant equipment repair requires plant cooldown

Availability of Auxiliary systems

Available Feedwater reserve inventory

The Shift Supervisor deems plant cooldown is necessary

78. IF a plant cooldown is NOT required, THEN GO TO Step 88.

@=©Continuouslv Cninoul aDDlicable step aicalesepHodPon ti= Hold Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 TITLE: PROCEDURE Page 80 of Ill TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE: IF emergency boration is in progress, THEN cooldown may commence/continue while the required shutdown margin value is calculated.

© 79. VERIFY PCS boron concentration 79.1. IF PCS boron concentration is less greater than or equal to required than required boron concentration, boron concentration as verified by THEN PERFORM BOTH of the sample or hand calculation. Refer following:

to EOP Supplement 35.

a. ENSURE emergency boration is

a. IF Emergency boration is in in progress.

progress AND PCS boron concentration b. WHEN required boron is greater than or equal to concentration is reached, required boron concentration, THEN SECURE emergency THEN SECURE emergency boration. Refer to EOP boration. Refer to EOP Supplement 40.

Supplement 40.

C = Continuousiv applicable steDse!Iod f/-= Hold Point on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 TITLE: PROCEDURE Page 81 OfC111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION A maximum PZR cooldown rate of 200°F/Hr and a maximum PZR Spray AT (PZR vapor temp - spray temp) of 3500F should be observed to prevent damage to the PZR or Spray Nozzle.

NOTE: PZR level indication decalibration will occur during cooldown. Correction curves in EOP Supplement 9, "Pressurizer Level Corrections Hot Calibrated" or EOP Supplement 10, "Pressurizer Level Corrections Cold Calibrated" should be used.

NOTE: S/G level indication decalibration will occur during cooldown. Correction curves in EOP Supplement 11, "S/G Level Correction" should be used.

NOTE: Steam flow through two of the four Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves should be adequate to establish an initial cooldown rate of 750 F/hr.

(continue) 0 = ContinuousIv aDDlicable appical steD te t= Hold ol Point on Cninoul

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 II'W'NT PROCEDURE Page 82 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

80. (continued)

a. REFER TO the following:

" EOP Supplement 1, Pressure and Temperature Limit Curves

EOP Supplement 33, PCS Heatup/Cooldown Rate Data

b. IF safety injection flow is b.1. OPERATE Atmospheric Steam causing a cooldown in excess Dump Valves.

of required limits, THEN OPERATE the Turbine Bypass 1) IF desired to enhance Valve to maintain all of the temperature control, THEN ISOLATE two Atmospheric following as applicable:

Steam Dump Valves. Refer to Table 80-1.

" S/Gs within 50 psi of Psat for Average of Qualified CETs

" As required to establish or support natural circulation

As required to establish or support two phase natural circulation (Continue) 0 = Continuously applicable steD t-;= Hold Point

~= Hold Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 RucLF-N.T PROCEDURE Page 83 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

80. (Continued)

c. WHEN PCS cooldown rate can c.1. OPERATE Atmospheric Steam be controlled within required Dump Valves.

limits, THEN OPERATE the Turbine Bypass Valve to 1) IF desired to enhance cooldown at the maximum temperature control, THEN allowed rate. ISOLATE two Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves. Refer to Table 80-1.

Table 80-1

'A' S/G MV-MS101, ASDV CV-0782 Inlet MV-CA782, A/S to CV-0782 MV-MS103, ASDV CV-0781 Inlet OR MV-CA781, A/S to CV-0781

'B' S/G MV-MSI02, ASDV CV-0779 Inlet MV-CA779, A/S to CV-0779 MV-MS104, ASDV CV-0780 Inlet MV-CA780, A/S to CV-0780 CAUTION Operating P-50A and P-50B simultaneously when Tc is less than 300°F is prohibited by Techncial Specifications.

d. ENSURE not more than two PCPs operating (preferably one in each loop.)

@= ©Continuouslv

=Cotiuosl aDDlicable f !ia steD eeDHodPon t = Hold Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 MUoPIAIT PROCEDURE Page 84 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

81. WHEN BOTH of the following conditions exist:

" PZR Pressure within limits of EOP Supplement 1

" PCS Cooldown rate is within required limits THEN PLACE LTOP in service as follows:

a. ENSURE OPEN PORV Isolation Valves. Refer to SOP-1 B, "Primary Coolant System Cooldown," Attachment 6.

b. PLACE BOTH of the following PORV LTOP enable keyswitches to ENABLE:

HS-0105A (Key: 1)

HS-0105B (Key: 4)

c. PLACE BOTH of the following PORV Handswitches to AUTO:

HS-1042B

" HS-1043B

d. MAINTAIN PZR pressure within limits of EOP Supplement 1.

@ = Continuously applicable step tp'IHl t,= Hold Point on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 uc.LLAN, PROCEDURE Page 85 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE: Use the following instruments to determine spray nozzle AT:

PZR Vapor Phase Temperature, TI-0101

" Spray line temperature, TIA-0103 or TIA-0104 (use the lowest temperature if using main sprays)

" Charging line temperature, TI-0212 (if using Auxiliary Spray)

C = ©Continuously

=Cotiuosl applicable step appical tp t= Hold Point

=Hl on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 EOPL PROCEDURE Page 86 of III TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE: Reactor Vessel Upper Head voiding resulting from controlled PCS pressure reductions is not expected to result in safety functions being jeopardized.

a. OPERATE PZR heaters and Main or Auxiliary PZR sprays.

b. IF SI Pump throttling criteria are met, THEN PERFORM ANY of the following:

1) CONTROL Charging and Letdown.

2) THROTTLE HPSI flow.

@ = Continuously awlicable step alical sel=

ti= Hold odIonPoint

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 R&ILIPLAIT PROCEDURE Page 87 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

84. IE BOTH of the following conditions exist for each S/G:

" At least three of four S/G pressure sigmas indicate between 510 and 550 psia (indicators between alarm flags)

A controlled cooldown is in progress THEN BLOCK MSIS for the S/G meeting the above conditions by performing ALL the following:

a. BLOCK MSIV closure signal for the applicable S/G by pushing the appropriate pushbutton on Control Panel C-01:

" HS/LPE-50A ('A' S/G)

" HS/LPE-50B ('B' S/G)

b. VERIFY "STEAM GEN VALVES ISOLATION LOCKOUT" (EK-0970) is alarmed.

c. ENSURE CLOSED BOTH Main Feed Reg Valves:

CV-0701 ('A' S/G)

CV-0703 ('B' S/G)

d. ENSURE CLOSED BOTH Bypass Feed Reg Valves:

CV-0735 ('A' S/G)

" CV-0734 ('B' S/G)

C = Continuousiv aDDlicable steD DHodPon ti= Hold Point

©Cninoul aoIcaeI

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17

%ucIEAR PROCEDURE Page 88 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

85. IF ALL of the following conditions exist:

" PZR pressure is less than 1687 psia

" SIAS is NOT actuated or blocked

"Safety Injection Signal Block Permit" (EK-1369) is alarmed

" A controlled cooldown and/or controlled depressurization is in progress, THEN BLOCK SIAS by performing ALL of the following:

a. PLACE AND HOLD SIAS block handswitch PB3-1 to BLOCK.

1) VERIFY the following annunciator in alarm:

"SAFETY INJ BLOCK RELAY SI-1-" (EK-1337)

2) RELEASE SIAS block handswitch PB3-1.

(continue) 0 = Continuously applicable step tp t- =Hl Hold Point on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY PROCEDURE OPERATING Revision Page 17 89 of III TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

85. (continued)

b. PLACE AND HOLD SIAS block handswitch PB3-2 to BLOCK.

1) VERIFY the following annunciators in alarm:

" "SAFETY INJ BLOCK RELAY SI-2" (EK-1338)

"SAFETY INJ BLOCKED" (EK-1339)

2) RELEASE SIAS block handswitch PB3-2.

C = ContinuousIv applicable step tp 1Hl f-ý= Hold Point on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 PROCEDURE Page 90 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

" Indicated Charging and Letdown flows do NOT correspond to PZR level trend.

" PZR level rising significantly faster than trend expected from Auxiliary Spray flow.

" Core AT (Average of Qualified CETs - Tc ) or Loop AT (TH - Tc) rising for same secondary steaming and Auxiliary Feed rates.

" Any operable PCS temperature indication is less than 25°F subcooled.

Operable RVLMS indicates voiding in the Reactor Vessel.

87. JE PCS voiding is indicated AND ANY of the following exist:

" PCS pressure reduction is inhibited

" PCS heat removal is inhibited

" The Shift Supervisor directs void elimination, THEN PERFORM void elimination actions. Refer to EOP Supplement 26.

0 = Continuously applicable step sel lod t= Hold Point on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 mlT PROCEDURE Page 91 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

88. IF ANY of the following AC or DC 88.1. IF Bus 1D and Bus 1E are NOT buses are NOT energized, energized, THEN RESTORE power to the THEN as resources permit, affected buses. Refer to the PROVIDE power to PZR Heaters following applicable procedure: from Bus 1C. Refer to ONP-2.1, "Loss of AC Power," Attachment 1.

BUS, PROCEDURE 1C or 1D EOP Supplement 29 1E with No SIAS EOP Supplement 29 1E with SIAS SOP-30 Y10 ONP-24.1, "Loss of Preferred AC Bus Y10" Y20 ONP-24.2, "Loss of Preferred AC Bus Y20" Y30 ONP-24.3, "Loss of Preferred AC Bus Y30" Y40 ONP-24.4, "Loss of Preferred AC Bus Y40" Y01 ONP-24.5, "Loss of Instrument AC Bus Y01 Any DC Bus ONP-2.3, "Loss of I_ DC Power"

@ = Continuousiv aDDlicable c!

steD Ise t-,=

' Hold od Point on

= Cntnuosl af

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 TILPS: L S PROCEDURE ACCIDEN 92ECOV TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

89. IF offsite power was lost AND offsite power is available, THEN RESTORE power to plant equipment by performing ALL of the following:

a. IF NONE of the following are energized:

'R' Bus

" 'F' Bus

Cook 1 Line, THEN INITIATE actions to restore power to 'F' or 'R' Bus, as available. Refer to EOP Supplement 21.

b. WHEN ANY of the following are energized:

" 'R' Bus

'F' Bus

" Cook 1 Line, THEN INITIATE actions to restore Plant power. Refer to EOP Supplement 29.

(continue)

@ = Continuously applicable step apical se!lod 1ý= Hold Point on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 oucLEPL,.T PROCEDURE Page 93 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

89. (continued)

c. RESTORE power to the affected bus(es). Refer to the following applicable procedure:

BUS I PROCEDURE 1E (u S EOP Supplement 29 (without SiS) 1E t1)

ESOP-30 (with SIS 1A or 1B ONP-2.1, "Loss of AC Power"

d. RESTART plant equipment as desired.

@ = ContinuousIv aDDlicable steD a IIcal I=

ti= Hold od Point on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 1JCJ"'E-NT PROCEDURE Page 94 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION Each D/G is limited to the following load rating:

2500 KW continuous 2750 KW two hours per 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months period

90. WHEN 2400V Bus lC or Bus ID is 90.1. IF equipment needed to maintain energized, Safety Functions is available from THEN as resources permit, a de-energized 2400V Vital Bus ENERGIZE Plant buses by AND a power supply is available, performing ALL of the following: THEN ENERGIZE the bus AND RESTORE the needed equipment.

a. IF Bus 1C is energized, THEN PERFORM ALL of the following:

1) ENSURE CLOSED the following breakers:

a 152-115 (Bus 1Cto Transformers 11 and 19) 0 152-108 (Bus 1C to Transformer 13)

(continue)

C = Continuously applicable step t-= Hold Point

PAISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 WKI1 PROCEDURE Page 95 of III TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

90. (continued)

2) ENSURE 480V MCCs are energized as appropriate:

MCC 1: 52-1906 (Bus 19)

" MCC 3: 52-1301 (Bus 13)

MCC 7: 52-1103 (Bus 11)

b. IE Bus 1D is energized, THEN PERFORM the following:

1) ENSURE CLOSED 152-201 (Bus 1D to Transformers 12 and 20)

2) ENSURE 480V MCCs energized as appropriate:

MCC 2: 52-2006 (Bus 20)

MCC 8: 52-1201 (Bus 12)

(continue)

C = Continuously applicable step Hold Point i=HodPon

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 R*ePT PROCEDURE E_ Page _96 of TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

90. (continued)

NOTE: IF only one MCC is available (MCC 1 or MCC 2),

THEN BOTH vital DC Buses should be powered from the two Battery Chargers supplied by the same energized MCC.

c. ENSURE CLOSED Battery Charger Feeder Breakers from available MCCs:

1) MCC 1 Charger No 1 Feeder 52-146

Charger No 4 Feeder 52-186

2) MCC 2

" Charger No 2 Feeder 52-225

" Charger No 3 Feeder 52-285

d. VERIFY 125V DC Buses D10 d.1. PLACE Battery Chargers in and D20 are powered by a operation. Refer to SOP-30, Battery Charger. "Station Power."

0 = Continuouslv aDDlicable steD t- Hold Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17

, PROCEDURE Page 97 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

91. IF ALL PCPs are stopped, 91.1. ENSURE proper control of S/G THEN VERIFY natural circulation feeding and steaming rates.

flow in at least one PCS loop by ALL of the following:

" Core AT less than 50°F (Average of Qualified CETs minus Tc)

Loop THs and Loop Tcs constant or lowering

Average of Qualified CETs at least 25 0 F subcooled

" Difference between Loop TH and Average of Qualified CETs is less than or equal to 150 F

92. WHEN PCP restart is desired, THEN RESTART desired PCPs.

Refer to EOP Supplement 3.

93. IF a plant cooldown is NOT in progress, THEN GO TO a TSC approved procedure.

@ = Continuously applicable step It- Hold Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 IUL Li PROCEDURE Page 98 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE: Failure of Instrument Air to containment will prevent venting the SITs.

94. IF PZR pressure is between 94.1. IF ANY SIT could NOT be isolated, 350 psia and 300 psia as read on THEN VENT the unisolated SIT PI-01 04 (NR) or PR-0125 and using ONE of the following:

controlled AND a controlled cooldown is in a. VENT to containment as progress, follows:

THEN ISOLATE SITs as follows:

1) ENSURE CLOSED CWRT

a. UNLOCK AND CLOSE the Vent Isolation Valves:

following breakers:

CV-1064

CV-1065 BREAKER OUTLET SIT BREAKER_ ,VALVE 52-2129 MO-3041 T-82A 2) VENT each unisolated SIT 52-2329 MO-3045 T-82B one tank at a time by 52-2229 MO-3049 T-82C opening the Vent Valve and 52-2429 MO-3052 T-82D closing when tank is vented.

KEY: 190 SIT VENT VALVE T-82A CV-3067

b. CLOSE the following SIT Outlet T-82B CV-3065 Valves: T-82C CV-3063 T-82D CV-3051 BREAKER: OUTLET BREAKER_ VALVE KE 52-2129 MO-3041 98 52-2329 MO-3045 99 52-2229 MO-3049 100 52-2429 MO-3052 101 (continue) (continue)

@ = Continuously applicable steD t=

t~= Hold Point Hold Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 PROCEDURE Page 99 of III TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

94. (continued) (continued)

3) WHEN ALL the following conditions are met:

Unisolated SITs are vented and their associated vent valve closed

Plant conditions allow venting containment THEN OPEN CWRT Vent Isolation Valves:

0 CV-1 064 0 CV-1065

b. VENT unisolated SITs Via Clean Waste Receiver Tank Header per SOP-3, "Safety Injection and Shutdown Cooling System."

@ = Continuousiv awlicable steD alical seI Iod t = Hold Point on oninoul

=

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 TITLE: PROCEDURE Rof NT[Page I1 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

95. IF a SIAS or CHR signal is actuated AND is no longer needed, THEN RESET the signal as follows:

a. IF SI Pump throttling criteria are satisfied AND Containment pressure is less than 3.0 psig, THEN RESET SIAS. Refer to SOP-3, "Safety Injection and Shutdown Cooling System,"

Attachment 4.

b. IF ALL operable Containment Area Radiation Monitors indicate less than 1 x 101 R/hr THEN RESET CHR by pushing BOTH left and right HIGH RADIATION RESET pushbuttons on C-1 3.

C = Continuously applicable step te W ti= Hold ol Point on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 T PROCEDURE Page 101 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

96. IF ALL of the following conditions are met:

Tcis below325 0 F AND prior to Tcs less than 3000 F

" SI Pump throttling criteria are met

HPSI pumps are NOT required for inventory control

" A cooldown is in progress, THEN DISABLE BOTH HPSI pumps by removing Control Power fuses and fuse holders from the following breakers:

152-207, HP Safety Injection Pump P-66A LOCATION: 'D' Bus 0 152-113, HP Safety Injection Pump P-66B LOCATION: 'C' Bus

@ = Continuously applicable step It;= Hold Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY PROCEDURE OPERATING Revision Page 17 102 of Ill TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

97. WHEN ALL of the following Shutdown Cooling System entry conditions are met:

PCS parameters are acceptable for existing Containment conditions:

Containment Containment Greater Than or Less Than Equal To 1750F 175-F AND QR Greater Less Than Than or Equal 3 pslg at all To 3 psig at any times during time during the Parameter the event event, PCS Pressure Less Than REFER TO EOP 270 psia Supplement I PZR Level Greater Than Greater than (corrected) 36% and 40% and controlled controlled Avg of Qualified Greater Than REFER TO EOP CETs 25'F Supplement 1 Subcooling Avg of Qualified Less Than REFER TO EOP CETs and Loop 300°F Supplement 1 FHs Temperature

" TSC has determined that PCS activity is acceptable for circulation outside Containment.

" Containment Spray Pumps are not in use for Containment Atmosphere safety function.

(continue)

I @ = Continuously aDDlicable ster) 0ff- Hold Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 M , PROCEDURE Page 103 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

97. (continued)

" Shutdown Cooling System monitoring equipment power is available from Y01 OR Alternate measures for loss of Y01 are established per ONP-17, "Loss of Shutdown Cooling."

, LTOP is operable.

" Power to the following Shutdown Cooling Return Valves is available:

o MO-3015 (MCC-1) o MO-3016 (MCC-2)

OR Access to Containment is acceptable for manual valve operation, THEN GO TO GOP-9, "Mode 3>

525OF To Mode 4 or Mode 5" or TSC approved procedure.

End Of Section 4.0 0 = Continuously applicable step fl;, = Hold Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17

, PROCEDURE Page 104 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY 5.0 PLACEKEEPER EOP ENTRY TIME: TIME OF SIAS:

STEP INSTRUCTIONS PAGE START DONE

4. Verify SIAS initiated 5

5. Ensure adequate Sl flow and safeguards 6 equipment status

6. If PZR pressure lowers to less than 1300 psia 7 then establish one PCP per loop or if PCS subcooling is less than 25°F subcooled, then trip all PCPs

7. Ensure proper PCP configuration as PCS 7 temperature lowers

8. Verify operating limits for any running PCP 7

9. If open, then close CWRTs vent valves. 8

10. Isolate the LOCA 8

11. If the LOCA is outside of Containment, isolate 10 the leak and initiate CIS

12. Place Hydrogen Monitor in service 12

13. If the Containment has pressure greater than or 12 equal to 4.0 psig or has high radiation, ensure Containment Isolation signal initiated

14. If the Containment pressure is greater than or 13 equal to 4.0 psig, verify available Containment Spray Pumps running

15. If PCP seal cooling is lost, isolate seal leakoff 14 and restore PCP seal cooling

16. Early Secure Containment Spray 15 ©

17. Secure Containment Spray 17 © 0 =©Continuousiv aaDDlicable

Cotiuosl ical steD se f';ý

=

Hold odlonPoint

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 MCPATPROCEDURE Page 105 of III TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY 5.0 PLACEKEEPER STEP INSTRUCTIONS PAGE START DONE

18. Reset CHP 20

19. Verify condenser cooling or isolate steam to 22 condenser

20. If the LOCA is isolated, go to Step 65 22

21. Ensure at least one train of CR HVAC in 23 Emergency Mode.

22. Verify PCS boron concentration greater than or 23 © equal to required boron concentration.

23. Commence steaming S/G(s) 25

24. When Main Steam pressure is between 510 and 27 550 psia, block MSIS

25. Record each occurrence of PZR spray with AT 28 © greater than 200O F

26. Verify SI Pump throttling criteria are satisfied 29 ©

27. Commence depressurizing the PCS to 270 psia 30 ©

28. When PZR pressure is less than 1687 psia and 31 SIAS is not actuated, BLOCK SIAS

29. If HPSI Pumps are operating and SI Pump 32 throttling criteria are satisfied, throttle HPSI flow or stop pumps

30. If LPSI Pumps are operating and PZR pressure 33 is being controlled greater than 200 psia, stop pumps and close valves

31. If PZR pressure lowers uncontrollably to less 33 than 200 psia and LPSI Pumps have been stopped, restart LPSI pumps and open valves 0 = Continuouslv ar)Dlicable appical steD tp !Hl

't= Hold Point on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 PROCEDURE Page 106 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY 5.0 PLACEKEEPER STEP INSTRUCTIONS PAGE START DONE

32. As resources permit, prepare post-RAS injection 34 © sources.

33. If Letdown is isolated and conditions allow, 34 restore Letdown

34. If SI Pump throttling criteria are met, then 35 maintain PZR level between 20% and 85%

(42% to 57% preferred)

35. Maintain PCS pressure within the limits of EOP 38 © Supplement 1

36. Ensure at least one S/G has corrected level 39 © being maintained or restored to between 60%

and 70%

37. Verify calculated cooldown rate does not 40 © exceed Technical Specification limits and the cooldown is achievable with the existing PCS heat removal path

38. Monitor PCS for void formation 41 ©

39. If PCS voiding is indicated, perform void 41 elimination

40. If any vital AC or DC buses are not energized, 42 restore power to affected buses

41. If offsite power was lost and is available, restore 43 power to plant equipment

42. When 2400V Bus 1C or 1D is energized, then 45 energize Plant buses

43. Verify natural circulation flow in at least one 48 loop

@ = Continuousiv applicable step f/-= Hold Point od on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 TITLE: PROCEDURE NT Rof Page 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY 5.0 PLACEKEEPER STEP INSTRUCTIONS PAGE START DONE

44. Verify two phase natural circulation 48

45. Place LTOP in service 49

46. If desired, restart PCPs 49

47. When cold shutdown boron concentration is 50 established, swap Charging pump suction from the BASTs to the SIRWT

48. Verify Containment Sump level rises as the 50 © SIRWT level drops

49. When SIRWT level less than or equal to 25%, 51 then prior to RAS, perform Pre-RAS Actions.

50. If VC-1 0 or VC-1 1 trip on high temperature due 51 to low SW flow, reset and start VC-1 0 or VC-1 1

51. When Containment water level approaches SI 52 valve elevations, open and disable SI valves 1ý *****

bý1.1

10 RAS STEPS 52 to 57 4444444441<1< < 41 1<<14444

52. When SIRWT level lowers to below 2% and 53 LOCA is inside Containment, then perform Post-RAS Actions.

53. If Containment water level is less than expected 53 post RAS, consult with the TSC for additional guidance

54. If RAS is initiated, ensure adequate HPSI pump 54 flow

55. Actions for when sump screen clogging is 55 © indicated.

56. Place ESS Room Sump Pumps in OFF and add 59 caution tag C = Continuously aDDlicable alIcal steD seI It-=HodPon Hold Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 NUCLPLANT PROCEDURE Page 108 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY 5.0 PLACEKEEPER STEP INSTRUCTIONS PAGE START DONE

57. IfCharging Pump suction is aligned to the 59 SIRWT and RAS has initiated then, disable the Charging Pumps and add caution tag

58. IfContainment Area Radiation Monitors indicate 60 less than 1 x 10' R/hr and Containment pressure is less than 3.0 psig, reset CHR

59. If PZR pressure is between 350 psia and 61 300 psia and a cooldown is in progress, isolate SITs

60. If the elapsed time from the start of the LOCA is 63 5.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months and SDC will not be inservice prior to 6.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months after the LOCA and any HPSI throttle criteria are not met, initiate hot leg injection

61. If Containment hydrogen concentration is 66 between 1% and 3%, notify TSC and open MCC-9 feeder breaker

62. Reset SIAS 66

63. If SDC entry conditions are met, go to GOP-9 67

64. If SDC entry conditions can not be established, 69 maintain long-term cooling N 11

'*,0.* 0 Isolated LOCA steps 65 to 97

65. If the LOCA is isolated, perform Steps 66 70 through 97

66. Verify SI Pump throttling criteria are satisfied 70 ©

67. If HPSI Pumps are operating and SI Pump 72 throttling criteria are satisfied, throttle HPSI flow or stop pumps 0 = ContinuousIV applicable step seI=HodPon

-ej= Hold Point 0=Cotiuosl apical

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 RcURPAIWT PROCEDURE Page 109 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY 5.0 PLACEKEEPER STEP INSTRUCTIONS PAGE START DONE

68. If LPSI Pumps are operating and PZR pressure 73 is being controlled greater than 200 psia, stop pumps and close valves

69. If PZR pressure lowers uncontrollably to less 73 than 200 psia and LPSI Pumps have been stopped, restart LPSI pumps and open valves

70. If Letdown is isolated and conditions allow, 74 restore Letdown

71. Verify the PCS is not in a water solid condition 74 ©

72. If it is desired to draw a bubble in the PZR, 75 perform the actions to draw a bubble in the PZR

73. If SI Pump throttling criteria are met, maintain 76 corrected PZR level between 20% and 85%

using Charging, Letdown and HPSI

74. Maintain PCS pressure within the limits of EOP 77 © Supplement 1

75. Ensure at least one S/G has corrected level 78 © being maintained or restored to between 60%

and 70%

76. Verify calculated cooldown rate does not 79 © exceed Technical Specification limits and the cooldown is achievable with the existing PCS heat removal path

77. Evaluate the need for a plant cooldown 79

78. Routing step if plant cooldown not required 79

79. Verify PCS boron concentration greater than or 80 © equal to cold shutdown boron concentration

@ = ContinuousIv aDDlicable steD sel lod t= Hold Point on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 u PROCEDURE Page 110 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY 5.0 PLACEKEEPER STEP INSTRUCTIONS PAGE START DONE

80. Commence steaming S/G(s) 82 ©

81. When PZR Pressure and PCS cooldown within 84 limits, then place LTOP in service.

82. Record each occurrence of PZR spray with &T 85 © greater than 200O F

83. Commence depressurizing the PCS to 270 psia 86 ©

84. When Main Steam pressure is between 510 and 87 550 psia, block MSIS

85. When PZR pressure is less than 1687 psia and 88 SIAS is not actuated, BLOCK SIAS

86. Monitor PCS for void formation 90 ©

87. If PCS voiding is indicated, perform void 90 elimination

88. If any vital AC or DC buses are not energized, 91 restore power to affected buses

89. If offsite power was lost and is available, restore 92 power to plant equipment

90. When 2400V Bus 1C or 1D is energized, then 94 energize Plant buses

91. Verify natural circulation flow in at least one 97 loop

92. If desired, restart PCPs 97

93. Seek TSC guidance if plant cooldown not in 97 progress C = Continuousiv applicable step t= Hold Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-4.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 17 MUCoA PROCEDURE Page 111 of 111 TITLE: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT RECOVERY 5.0 PLACEKEEPER STEP INSTRUCTIONS PAGE START DONE

94. If PZR pressure is between 350 psia and 98 300 psia and a cooldown is in progress, isolate SITs

95. Reset unnecessary safety actuation signals 100

96. Disable both HPSI pumps when listed 101 conditions are met

97. When all shutdown cooling system entry 102 conditions are met, exit this procedure END OF SECTION 5.0

@= Continuousiv a[)Dlicable steD ser Iod t- Hold Point on

ATTACHMENT 4 EOP-6, "EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT" 70 Pages Follow (Procedure Attachments not included)

PA PALISADES NUCLEAR Proc No EOP-&.O PLANT EMERGENCY Revision Is COPERATING PROCEDURE Issued Date 12!15/05 EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT Z3T.flwk er. 1 /2If 1QW-51 Procedure Sponsor Date Technical Reviewer Date DBCampbell 111/4/05 User Reviewer Date

--- ýWmwmmýWýq -

rr

PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT I roc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 PROCEDURE Page 1 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT USER ALERT CONTINUOUS USE PROCEDURE Read each step of the procedure prior to performing that step. When sign-offs are required, sign off each step as complete before proceeding to the next step.

1.0 PURPOSE This procedure provides operator actions which must be accomplished in the event of an Excess Steam Demand Event (ESDE). These actions are necessary to ensure that the Plant is placed in a safe, stable condition.

The goal of this procedure is to safely establish a plant condition that will allow the implementation of an appropriate existing procedure or a procedure provided by the Plant Technical Support Center for operation of the plant in hot shutdown or below.

End of Section 1.0

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 I .* EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 PROCEDURE Page 2 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT 2.0 ENTRY CONDITIONS

1. EOP 1.0, "Standard Post Trip Actions," has been performed.

OR The event initiated from a lower mode when the Shutdown Cooling System is NOT initially in service.

2. Plant conditions indicate an Excess Steam Demand Event has occurred.

ANY of the following may be present:

a. Loud noise indicative of a high energy steam line break.

b. Lowering PCS TAVE.

C. Steam flow/feed flow mismatch.

d. Rise in feedwater flow.

e. Possible rise in Containment temperature, humidity, and Containment Sump level, with no significant radiation level increase on Containment Hi Range radiation monitors (Containment Area Monitors may fail high due to high temperature and humidity conditions).

f. Low pressure in affected S/G(s) following MSIV closure.

g. Possible rise in reactor power.

End of Section 2.0

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 IEOcS..J PROCEDURE Page 3 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT 3.0 EXIT CONDITIONS

1. The diagnosis of an Excess Steam Demand Event is NOT confirmed.

OR

2. ANY of the Safety Function Status Check Sheet acceptance criteria are NOT satisfied AND corrective actions to restore the safety function are NOT effective.

OR

3. The Excess Steam Demand Event procedure has accomplished its purpose by satisfying ALL of the following:

a. All Safety Function Status Check acceptance criteria are being satisfied.

b. Shutdown Cooling Entry conditions are satisfied or a cooldown is NOT required and maintaining the plant in Hot Shutdown condition is desired.

c. An appropriate, approved procedure to implement exists or has been approved by the plant Technical Support Center.

End of Section 3.0

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15

,ocLa,,AT PROCEDURE Page 4 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION During degraded Containment conditions, the operator should not rely on any single instrument indication due to large instrument errors. Alternate/additional instrumentation should be used to confirm trending of PCS conditions.

by performing ALL of the following:

EOP-1.0, "Standard Post Trip

a. VERIFY Attachment 1, "Safety Actions," Attachment 1, "Event Function Status Check Sheet" Diagnostic Flowchart" AND acceptance criteria: RE-DIAGNOSE the event.

1) Are satisfied at intervals of " For events initiated from a lower approximately fifteen mode, GO TO the EOP minutes. considered appropriate by the Shift Supervisor.

OR

" EOP-9.0, "Functional Recovery

2) Corrective actions to restore Procedure."

Attachment 1, "Safety Function Status Check Sheet," acceptance criteria are effective.

(continue) 0 = Continuously applicable step t= Hold Point Hold Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 RUcAP,,IT PROCEDURE Page 5 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

1. (continued)

b. IF ALL of the following conditions exist:

" Steam Generator Blowdown Monitor, RIA-0707, has NOT alarmed

SIAS has NOT occurred OR has been reset

CHP and CHR signals are NOT present, THEN SAMPLE S/Gs for activity and Lithium ANM VERIFY sample results do NOT indicate a SGTR.

c. Observation of NO abnormal S/G level rise (NOT attributable to feed flow or swell).

3. OPEN the placekeeper ANM RECORD the time of EOP entry.

4. IF PZR pressure is less than or 4.1. PUSH BOTH left and right equal to 1605 psia INJECTION INITIATE pushbuttons OR Containment pressure is on EC-13.

greater than or equal to 4.0 psig, THEN VERIFY "SAFETY INJ " PB1-1 INITIATED" (EK-1342) is alarmed. " PB1-2 0 = ©Continuously applicable alical step se tk=

=

Hold Point od on

=Cotiuosl

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 PROCEDURE Page 6 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

5. iE SIAS is present, THEN PERFORM ALL of the following:

a. ENSURE available safeguards equipment operated or operating. Refer to EOP Supplement 5.

b. VERIFY at least minimum SI b.1. IE SI flow is NOT within the limits of flow. Refer to EOP EOP Supplement 4, Supplement 4. THEN PERFORM ANY of the following to restore SI flow:

1) ENSURE electrical power available to SI pumps and valves.

2) ENSURE correct SI valve lineup.

3) ENSURE adequate SI pump seal cooling.

4) START additional SI pumps as needed until SI flow is within the limits of EOP Supplement 4.

c. if Letdown Orifice Stop Valves are closed, THEN PLACE handswitches in the CLOSE position:

HS-2003 S HS-2004 0 HS-2005 (D= Continuousiv applicable steo tý= Hold Hold Point Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0

EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 NUcLEARPLAN PROCEDURE Page 7 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE: Failure to close MSIV and MSIV bypass valves on the unaffected S/G will result in steaming the unaffected S/G through the break.

6. ENSURE MSIVs and MSIV Bypass Valves are closed:

IG VALVt Dýý00CRIPITION.

CV-0510 MSIV MO-0510 MSIV BYPASS CV-0501 MSIV

.. MO-0501 MSIV BYPASS NOTE: P-50A and P-50B shall not be operated simultaneously when Tc is less than 3000 F.

7. IF PZR pressure lowers to less than 1300 psia AND SIAS is initiated, THEN PERFORM BOTH of the following:

a. ENSURE one PCP is stopped in each loop.

b. IF PCS is less than 250 F subcooled, THEN ENSURE ALL PCPs stopped.

0 = ContinuousIv awlicable steD fý= Hold Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 NL PROCEDURE Page 8 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

8. COMMENCE emergency boration to establish PCS boron concentration greater than or equal to the boron concentration needed for TAVE greater than 5250 F as verified by sample or hand calculation. Refer to EOP Supplement 35.

a. WHEN PCS boron concentration is greater than or equal to the required boron concentration, THEN emergency boration may be secured. REFER TO EOP Supplement 40.

9. WHEN PCS temperature lowers, THEN ENSURE PCPs configured as follows:

......e T0 . pEATG PoPs$

<450'F 3

<300'F 2

10. IE PCPs are operating, 10.1. STOP PCPs which do NOT satisfy THEN VERIFY PCP operating PCP operating limits.

limits are satisfied. Refer to EOP Supplement 1.

0 = Continuously applicable steplHodPon sel t-= Hold Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 NUCeARPLANT PROCEDURE Page 9 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

11. VERIFY BOTH of the following: 11.1. ENSURE CLOSED BOTH MSIVs:

At least one Cooling Tower " CV-0510 ('A' S/G)

Pump operating

CV-0501 ('B' S/G) 0 P-39A 11.2. ENSURE CLOSED from the Control 0 P-39B Room BOTH MSIV Bypass valves:

At least one Condensate Pump

MO-0510 ('A' S/G) operating " MO-0501 ('B' S/G) o P-2A a. IEANY MSIV Bypass valves o P-2B were open when power/position indication was lost, THEN LOCALLY CLOSE ANY open MSIV Bypass valve.

b. ENSURE CLOSED ALL S/G Blowdown Valves:

.A S/G , B S/G.

CV-0739 CV-0738 CV-0771 CV-0770 CV-0767 CV-0768 0 = Continuously applicable step seIIHodPon f/1- Hold Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 uLc, P ,T PROCEDURE Page 10 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION Each D/G is limited to a 2500 KW continuous load rating and a 2750 KW two-hour load rating. Operation of VC-10 (VC-1 1) will draw approximately 44 KW.

12. ENSURE at least one train of CR HVAC in Emergency Mode. Refer to SOP-24, "Ventilation and Air Conditioning System."

High steam flow from S/G

Lowering S/G pressure

" Lowering S/G level

" Lowering Loop T. temperature C = Continuouslv awlicable ster) sel lod ltý= Hold Point on

©Cninoul alical

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 tU PT PROCEDURE Page 11 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE: Maintenance of heat removal via the least affected S/G during dual events (SGTR/SGTR, ESD/ESD, or SGTR/ESD combinations) is preferable to isolation of both S/Gs and going to once-through-cooling.

14. IE MSIS has NOT isolated the leak, THEN ISOLATE the most affected steam generator. Refer to the following applicable EOP supplement:

EOP Supplement 17 ('A' S/G)

" EOP Supplement 18 ('B' S/G) 0 = Continuousiv aDDlicable a IeIcal steD l

tý= Hold od Point on

PAUSADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 IUCeI PROCEDURE Page 12 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

15. VERIFY the correct S/G is isolated 15.1. IF the wrong S/G was isolated, by comparing ALL of the following: THEN PERFORM ALL of the following on the least affected S/G:

" S/G pressures

a. OPEN the Atmospheric Steam

S/G levels Dump Valve air supply valves and manual isolation valves.

PCS Loop Tc temperatures Refer to the following applicable EOP Supplement:

" EOP Supplement 17

('A' S/G)

" EOP Supplement 18

('B' S/G)

b. ESTABLISH Auxiliary Feedwater flow through ANY associated AFW valve:

7S'&G WI W 11 ICV-0737A CV-0749 ICV-0736A I CV-0727 1 15.2. GO TO Step 14 to isolate the affected S/G.

0 = Continuously applicable step seI lHodPon t= Hold Point

©=Cotiuosl apical

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 ELOARPL PROCEDURE Page 13 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION When ALL PCPs are stopped, steaming the least affected S/G must occur prior to dryout of the most affected S/G to prevent lifting PZR Code Safety Valves or Pressurized Thermal Shock rupture of the PCS.

a. MAINTAIN level in the least affected S/G between 60% and 70%.

b. IEthe steam leak is isolated, THEN ESTABLISH steam flow from BOTH S/Gs using the Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves.

(continue) 0 = Continuously applicable step se lrý= Hold Point od on Cninoul

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 NUUAR P NT PROCEDURE Page 14 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

16. (continued)

WARNING IEContainment pressure is higher than the most affected S/G pressure AND the ESDE is inside of containment, THEN opening of the ASDVs on the most affected S/G will provide a direct release path to the environment.

NOTE: Steaming BOTH S/Gs using ASDVs is permitted prior to isolation of the most affected S/G if necessary to control temperature /pressure of the least affected S/G.

c. if the steam leak is NOT isolated, THEN STEAM the le=as affected S/G as necessary to maintain the following, as applicable:

WHEN Tcs in the affected loop are lowering, THEN MAINTAIN the least affected S/G pressure within 50 psid above the most affected S/G pressure

" WHEN Tcs in the affected loop are NOT lowering, THEN STABILIZE PCS Tcs using the least affected S/G 0 = Continuously applicable step te fý= Hold Point

'=HlPon

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 PLATPROCEDURE Page 15 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE: Use ANY of the following to determine Average of Qualified CETs:

PPC point "KCETA" (Average of Qualified CETs)

" PPC Incore Qualified CET Map (PPC page 313)

Manual calculation. Refer to SOP-34, "Plant Process Computer (PPC) System."

© 17. VERIFY SI Pump throttling criteria 17.1. IF ANY of the SI Pump throttling are satisfied by ALL of the criteria can NOT be maintained, following: THEN RAISE HPSI flow AND START HPSI Pumps as necessary.

a. Based on the Average of Qualified CETs, PCS - [ VALVE subcooling meets ONE of the following:

At least 25°F subcooled for MO-3009 HPSI Train 1 to Loop 1 B non-degraded Containment MO-3011 HPSI Train 1 to Loop 2A conditions MO-3007 HPSI Train ito Loop 1A MO-3013 HPSI Train 1 to Loop 21

" Greater than the minimum trig 2 subcooling curve on EOP MO-3066 HPSI Train 2 to Loop 1B Supplement 1 for degraded MO-3064 HPSI Train 2 to Loop 2A Containment conditions P-66A T MO-3068 HPSI Train 2 to Loop 2A

____MO-3062 I.HPSI Train 2 to Loop 2B

b. Corrected PZR level is greater than 20% (40% for degraded Containment) and controlled.

REFER TO EOP Supplements 9 and 10.

(continue)

@ = Continuously applicable step Hold Hold Point Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 NT PROCEDURE Page 16 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

17. (continued)

c. At least one S/G is available for PCS heat removal with corrected level being maintained or being restored to between 60% and 70%.

REFER TO EOP Supplement 11.

d. Operable RVLMS channels indicate greater than 102 inches above the bottom of fuel alignment plate (621' 8").

18. IF HPSI Pumps are operating AND SI Pump throttling criteria are satisfied, THEN THROTTLE HPSI flow OR STOP one HPSI Pump at a time.

PIMP' Train; I MO-3009 HPSI Train 1 to Loop 1B MO-3011 HPSI Train 1 to Loop 2A P-66B MO-3007 HPSI Train I to Loop 2A MO-3013 HPSI Train i to Loop 2B

--i .

-... ,Tian2 ;

MO-306 A HPSI Train 2 to Loop 2A P-66A MO-3068 t HPSI Train 2 to Loop 1A MO-3062

[MO-3068 HPSI Train 2 to Loop 2B 1A

____.MO-3062 I.HPS1 Train 2 to Loop 28 0 = Continuously applicable step fý= Hold Point

%HodPon

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 LN2*oJ PROCEDURE Page 17 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

19. IE LPSI Pumps are operating AND PZR pressure is being controlled greater than 200 psia, THEN PERFORM BOTH of the following:

a. STOP the operating LPSI Pumps:

P-67A

P-67B

b. CLOSE the LPSI injection valves:

MO-3008 LPSI Loop 1A

MO-3010 LPSI Loop 1B

MO-3012 LPSI Loop 2A

MO-3014 LPSI Loop 2B

20. IF PZR pressure lowers to less than 200 psia AND LPSI pumps have been stopped, THEN PERFORM BOTH of the following:

a. ENSURE OPERATING ALL available LPSI pumps:

P-67A

P-67B

b. ENSURE OPEN LPSI injection valves:

" MO-3008 LPSI Loop 1A

" MO-3010 LPSI Loop 1B

MO-3012 LPSI Loop 2A

MO-3014 LPSI Loop 2B 0 = Continuously applicable step se t= Hold Point od on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 PROCEDURE Page 18 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE: Failure to maintain greater than 100 gpm AFW flow to at least one S/G will result in an automatic start of the next available AFW pump ifthe pump controls are in Auto.

NOTE: Use the following instruments to determine spray nozzle AT:

PZR Vapor Phase Temperature, TI-0101 Spray line temperature, TIA-01 03 or TIA-01 04 (use the lowest temperature if using main sprays)

Charging line temperature, TI-0212 (if using Auxiliary Spray)

0 = Continuousiv awlicable steD t- Hold Point

¶~'= Hold Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 EO T PROCEDURE Page 19 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

© 23. MAINTAIN PCS pressure within the 23.1. IE the PCS is oversubcooled limits of EOP Supplement 1 by OR PZR pressure is greater than performing ANY of the following: the maximum limits of EOP Supplement 1,

a. CONTROL the following: THEN PERFORM ANY of the following to restore subcooling or 0 PZR heaters PCS pressure to within the 0 Main Spray appropriate limit:

S Auxiliary Spray (Supplement 37) a. OPERATE available S/G(s) to stop the cooldown

b. IF SI Pump throttling criteria are AND STABILIZE Qualified CET met, temperatures and Loop Tcs.

THEN CONTROL HPSI, Charging, and Letdown flows. b. OPERATE the following to lower PZR pressure within allowable limits:

S Main Spray S Auxiliary Spray (Supplement 37)

c. IF SI Pump throttling criteria are met, THEN CONTROL HPSI, Charging, and Letdown flows.

(continue) (continue) 0 = Continuouslv armlicable steD lrlk= Hold Point

~= Hold Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 NoUIPL PROCEDURE Page 20 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

23. (continued) (continued)

d. IE ALL of the following conditions are met:

Above actions to lower PCS pressure are NOT effective

" PORVs are required to open to reduce PCS pressure

PZR level is less than 85%

THEN PERFORM BOTH of the following:

1) OPEN PORV Isolation Valves:

MO- 1042A 6 MO-1043A CAUTION Rupture of the Quench Tank rupture disk is likely during any sustained opening of PORVs. This would result in rising Containment atmosphere temperature and pressure. Quench Tank temperature and pressure should be monitored during PORV operation.

2) CYCLE the PORVs as necessary to maintain BOTH of the following:

(continue) (continue)

@ = Continuously applicable step t%/= Hold Point

¶~= Hold Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 IULPLJ PROCEDURE Page 21 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

23. (continued) (continued) a PZR corrected level less than 85% (REFER TO EOP Supplements 9 and 10)

PZR pressure within the limits of EOP Supplement 1.

3) iF ALL of the following PORV closing criteria are met:

PZR pressure is less than 2100 psia

PZR pressure is less than the maximum limits of EOP Supplement 1

PORVs are NOT required open to reduce PZR pressure, THEN CLOSE the PORVs:

PRV-1042B

" PRV-1043B

4) if the PORV closing criteria are met ANM either PORV will NOT close, THEN CLOSE associated PORV Isolation Valve:

° MO-1042A

" MO-1 043A (continue) (continue) 0 = Continuouslv aDDlicable

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 UcR PROCEDURE Page 22 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

23. (continued) (continued)

5) ENSURE started the following containment cooling fans:

a) ALL available Containment Air Cooler 'A' fans for ALL available Containment Air Coolers.

b) IE SIAS not present, THEN ALL available Containment Air Cooler 'B' fans for ALL available Containment Air Coolers.

6) IF ANY of the following conditions exist:

" Containment pressure is greater than or equal to 4.0 psig.

" Any operable CONTAINMENT Radiation Monitor rises to 1 x 101 R/hr, THEN PERFORM ALL of the following:

(continue) (continue) 0 = Continuously applicable step t-= Hold Point

¶~'= Hold Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 PROCEDURE IPage 23 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

23. (continued) (continued) a) VERIFY "CIS INITIATED" (EK-1 126) is alarmed OR MANUALLY INITIATE CIS by pushing left or right HIGH RADIATION INITIATE pushbuttons on EC-13:

CHRL-CS

CHRR-CS b) VERIFY Containment Isolation. Refer to EOP Supplement 6.

7) IF the Pressure Control safety function is still in jeopardy, THEN GO TO EOP-9.0.

23.2. IF PCS cooldown rate exceeds Technical Specification limits, THEN PERFORM ANY of the following to restore the cooldown rate to within Technical Specification limits:

a. OPERATE available S/G(s) to stop the cooldown AND STABILIZE Qualified CET temperatures and Loop Tcs.

(continue) (continue) 0 = Continuously applicable step t-= Hold Point

~= Hold Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 IUL--L, PROCEDURE Page 24 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

23. (continued) (continued)

b. OPERATE the following to maintain PZR pressure within limits of EOP Supplement 1:

0 PZR heaters 0 Main Spray

Auxiliary Spray (Supplement 37) 0 Letdown

c. As directed by the Shift Supervisor, CONTINUE the PCS cooldown at less than or equal to Technical Specification limits.

Refer to EOP Supplement 33.

24. PLACE at least one Hydrogen Monitor in operation, ensuring the appropriate Key Switch in the "ACCI" position. Refer to SOP-38, "Gaseous Process Monitoring System."

=Cotiuosl armlicable aplcal ster) sellHodPon t-= Hold Point

PAUSADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15

,McEOT* PROCEDURE Page 25 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

25. JF ANY of the following conditions exist:

" Containment pressure is greater than or equal to 4.0 psig

" Any operable Containment Radiation Monitor rises to 1 x 101 R/hr, THEN PERFORM ALL of the following:

a. VERIFY "CIS INITIATED" a.1. MANUALLY INITIATE CIS by (EK-1 126) is alarmed. pushing left or right HIGH RADIATION INITIATE pushbutton on EC-13.

CHRL-CS

" CHRR-CS

b. VERIFY Containment Isolation. b.1. CLOSE valves that failed to Refer to EOP Supplement 6. automatically operate.

Cotiuosl aplcal ster) sel

tý= Hold odlon Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 IC2PLI PROCEDURE [Page 26 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

26. IEContainment pressure is greater than or equal to 4.0 psig, THEN PERFORM ALL of the following:

a. VERIFY Containment Spray a.1. OPEN available Containment Spray alignment valves to obtain required AND at least minimal configuration and at least minimum acceptable spray flow per flow.

following table:

CV-3001

CV-3002 OP NUMOER OF I CS, FLOW RUNNING OPMNOS MUST B[ AT AND P'IPS j VALVES . LEAST:

START available Containment

'A*- NOT Present' Spray pumps 1 at least 1 2185 gpm total

P-54A 2 or 3 2 2940 gpm total

P-54B I BAS, Preen P-54C 1 1 1525 gpm 2or3 2 3100 gpm total

b. ENSURE at least one Containment Air Cooler Accident Fan operating.

0 V-lA a V-2A 0

V-3A 0 V-4A C = Continuously aDDlicable steD

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 1UURLJ PROCEDURE Page 27 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

27. IE Containment pressure rises to greater than or equal to 35 psia AND CCW Containment Isolation Valves were opened, THEN PLACE the following CCW Containment Isolation Valve keyswitches to CLOSE:

F 610W S-0Keyswitch 3Key CV-0910 HS-0910 337 CV-0911 HS-0911 338 CV-0940 HS-0940 336 CAUTION Operation of PCPs should be minimized when seal cooling is NOT present or controlled bleedoff is isolated.

28. IF PCP seal cooling is unavailable, THEN PERFORM ALL of the following:

a. CLOSE PCP Controlled Bleedoff valves:

6 CV-2083 6 CV-2099

b. CLOSE PCP Controlled Bleedoff Relief Stop, OV-21 91.

c. RESTORE POP seal cooling.

Refer to ONP-6.2, "MLoss of Component Cooling."

0 = Continuousiv awlicable stev tl,=

t~= Hold Hold Point Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 PROCEDURE Page 28 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

a. INITIATE actions to makeup to the SIRWT. Refer to ONE of the following:

SOP-2A, "Chemical &

Volume Control System Charging & Letdown"

SOP-17A, "Clean Radioactive Waste System"

b. JF "CIS INITIATED" (EK-1126) is clear, THEN MANUALLY INITIATE CIS by pushing left or right HIGH RADIATION INITIATE pushbuttons on EC-13.

30. WHEN SIRWT level less than or equal to 25%,

THEN prior to RAS, PERFORM Pre-RAS Actions. Refer to EOP Supplement 42.

0 = Continuousiv armlicable appical ster) te fý= Hold ol Point on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15

,uI,,2,AI PROCEDURE Page 29 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION Premature initiation of RAS can lead to insufficient Containment Sump inventory for SI Pump operation. Minimum Containment Water level of 593' 6" is necessary for adequate ESS pump I

NPSH.

31. WHEN SIRWT level lowers to below 2%,

THEN PERFORM Post-RAS Actions. Refer to EOP Supplement 42.

0 = Continuouslv applicable step sellHodPon t-= Hold Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 LI2LAN PROCEDURE Page 30 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

32. iE Charging Pump suction is aligned to the SIRWT AND RAS has initiated, THEN PERFORM ALL of the following:

a. STOP ALL Charging Pumps:

0 P-55A 0 P-55B 0 P-55C

b. RACK OUT ALL Charging Pump breakers:

CHARING BREAKER P-55A 52-1205 52-1308 52-1206 P-55C 52-1105

c. PLACE a Caution Tag on their handswitches that reads "Do NOT Use - No suction source available" S 52-1 205CS 6 52-1 206CS S 52-110O5CS

@= Continuously applicable step lfý= Hold Point Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 1WMULo PROCEDURE Page 3,1 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

33. WHEN Containment pressure is less than 3.0 psig, AND CHP has initiated, THEN PERFORM ALL of the following:

a. IF CV-3001, Containment Spray Valve, is open, THEN PLACE HS-3001 A to the OPEN position.

b. 1E CV-3002, Containment Spray Valve, is open, THEN PLACE HS-3002A to the OPEN position.

c. LE MFW or Condensate pumps are operating AND feedwater from these sources is NOT desired, THEN PLACE ALL of the following controllers in MANUAL AND CLOSE:

1) Feedwater Regulating Valves

" LIC-0701 ('A' S/G)

" LIC-0703 ('B' S/G)

2) Feedwater Regulating Bypass Valves

LIC-0735 ('A' S/G)

LIC-0734 ('B' S/G)

(continue) 0 = Continuousiv awlicable aIcaI steD lt=HodPon lfý= Hold Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 PROCEDURE [Page 32 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

33. (continued)

d. IF CCW to containment has NOT been restored, THEN PLACE the following CCW valve keyswitches to CLOSE:

Valve Keyswltch Key CV-0910 HS-0910 337 CV-0911 HS-0911 338 CV-0940 HS-0940 336 NOTE: Automatic reinitiation of spray will not occur until after SIAS has been reset.

e. RESET CHP circuits by pushing left and right HIGH PRESSURE RESET pushbuttons on C-13 6 CHPL - Reset 0 CHPR - Reset Continuously S= applicable stepH lfý= Hold Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 LR24AJ PROCEDURE Page 33 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION Continued operation of the sprays after pressure has been reduced to an acceptable level increases the possibility of wetting electrical connectors which may result in electrical grounds, shorts and other malfunctions.

34. IEthe Containment Spray System is operating, ANM ALL of the following conditions are satisfied:

Parameter Coniditionr Containment less than 3 psig pressure NOT required for CTMT ambient cooling NOT required for HPSI subcooling NOTE: These conditions must be met prior to securing the last Containment Spray pump.

Containment NOT needed for iodine removal Spray as determined by Chemistry operation QR ALL of the following:

" Containment high range Gamma monitors read less than 1800 R/Hr

Containment isolated per EOP Supplement 6

less than one hour has elapsed since reactor trip (continue) 0 = Continuouslv applicable step seI Iod t-= Hold Point on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 UCLPLANT PPage 34 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

34. (continued)

THEN Containment Spray Pumps may be secured by performing the following:

NOTE: Securing spray pumps one at a time and waiting a short period to see the effect of reduced sprays will aid in the determination of the need for continued spray.

a. tE three Containment Spray Pumps are operating, THEN STOP one Containment Spray Pump as directed by the Shift Supervisor.

b. IEtwo Containment Spray Pumps are operating, THEN PERFORM the following as directed by the Shift Supervisor:

1) CLOSE one Containment Spray Valve.

CV-3001

" CV-3002

2) STOP one Containment Spray Pump.

c. IFone Containment Spray Pump is operating, THEN STOP the Containment Spray Pump as directed by the Shift Supervisor.

=Cotiuosl a ical steD se fý= Hold

= odIonPoint

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15

,oc..PL,,, PROCEDURE Page 35 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

34. (continued)

d. WHEN ALL Containment Spray Pumps have been stopped, THEN ENSURE CLOSED BOTH Containment Spray Valves.

" CV-3001

CV-3002

e. IE CHP has been reset, THEN ENSURE both Containment Spray Valve CHP Bypass Keyswitches are in NORMAL:

" HS-3001C

" HS-3002C

35. IE ALL operable Containment Area Radiation Monitors indicate less than 1 x 101 R/hr ANM Containment pressure is less than 3.0 psig, THEN RESET CHR by pushing the following:

The RESET pushbutton on each Containment Area Radiation Monitor.

BOTH left and right HIGH RADIATION RESET pushbuttons on C-13.

0 = ContinuousIv awlicable ster) 16-=

t~'= Hold Hold Point Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 M PROCEDURE Page 36 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE: Subsequent to the actions in Step 36, the TSC must approve closure of ANY of the failed open valves.

36. WHEN Containment water level approaches the level specified below, THEN ENSURE OPEN the following valves ANM OPEN associated breakers:

Li~ii Vlv Levot NUMbe B~kr Description

- J~,MC, Na.

MO-3008 52-141 LPSI Loop 1A MO-3010 52-147 LPSI Loop 1B 595' 9" ,"'. . : ..

MCC No., 2 MO-3012 52-247 LPSI Loop 2A MO-3014 52-251 LPSI Loop 2B MCC No 1 MO-3009 52-197 HPSI Train I to Loop 1B MO-3011 52-157 HPSI Train 1 to Loop 2A MO-3007 52-137 HPSI Train 1 to Loop 1A MO-3013 52-151 HPSI Train 1 to Loop 2B 596' 4" ____ ... MCCNO--2 MO-3066 52-257 HPSI Train 2 to Loop 1B MO-3064 52-237 HPSI Train 2 to Loop 2A MO-3068 52-261 HPSI Train 2 to Loop 1A MO-302 241 HPSI Train 2 to Loo 21B 0 = Continuously applicable step t= Hold Point od on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 IUo*LJ PROCEDURE Page 37 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

37. IE Letdown is isolated AND BOTH of the following conditions exist:

" SI Pump throttling criteria are met

Letdown is needed or desired, THEN RESTORE Letdown. Refer to EOP Supplement 27.

38. if ANY of the following criteria are met:

PCS boron concentration is at the required shutdown boron concentration based on sample or hand calculation. REFER TO EOP Supplement 35.

" "CONCENTRATED BORIC ACID TANK LO-LO LEVEL" (EK-0716 and EK-0722) are alarmed.

THEN ALIGN the Charging Pump suction to the VCT (if Letdown is in service) or SIRWT as directed by the Shift Supervisor. Refer to EOP Supplement 40.

0 = ContinuousIv applicable step se fý= Hold Point t=HodPon

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 WP PROCEDURE Page 38 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

© 39. VERIFY the PCS is NOT in a water 39.1. If water solid PCS condition is solid condition as indicated by indicated, BOTH of the following: THEN MAINTAIN the PCS within the limits of EOP Supplement 1 by

a. No exaggerated or severe ANY of the following:

pressure response to PCS inventory or temperature a. OPERATE available S/G(s) to changes. control the cooldown AND STABILIZE Qualified CET

b. ANY of the following: temperatures and Loop Tcs.

" Corrected PZR level is less b. IF SI Pump throttling criteria are than 100%. REFER TO met, EOP Supplements 9 and 10 THEN CONTROL HPSI, Charging, and Letdown flows.

" RVLMS indicates voiding

40. IF it is desired to draw a bubble in the PZR, THEN PERFORM ALL of the following:

a. ENSURE ENERGIZED ALL available PZR heaters.

b. IF ANY of the following conditions exist:

Both S/G pressures can be maintained below the existing PCS pressure

At least one PCP is operating THEN PERFORM ALL of the following to reduce PCS pressure:

(continue) 0 = Continuously applicable apical step se fý= Hold Point od on

©Cninoul =

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 RPIT PROCEDURE Page 39 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

40. (continued)

1) IF SI Pump throttling criteria are met, THEN CONTROL Charging, Letdown, and HPSI flow.

2) INITIATE PCS cooldown within Technical Specification limits.

3) MONITOR the PCS cooldown rate using PPC.

Refer to EOP Supplement 33.

4) MAINTAIN PCS temperature and pressure within the limits of EOP Supplement 1.

5) MAINTAIN 25 0 F subcooling.

c. IE a bubble forms in the Reactor Vessel Upper Head region, THEN PERFORM BOTH of the following:

1) CONTROL Charging, Letdown, and HPSI flow to maintain PCS level greater than the 102 inches above the bottom of fuel alignment plate (621'8").

2) CONTINUE efforts to draw a bubble in the PZR.

@ = Continuouslv armlicable

te t-= Hold ol Point on

PAUSADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT ] Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 TPROCEDURE JPage 40 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE: PZR level instrument de-calibration occurs due to PCS pressure and containment temperature changes. Level correction is per EOP Supplements 9 and 10.

NOTE: IE the PCS is in a water solid condition for PCS Pressure Control, THEN the PZR level limit of 85% may be exceeded.

NOTE: PZR level should be maintained greater than 36% (40% for degraded Containment) to have continued availability of PZR Heaters.

41. IESI Pump throttling criteria are met, THEN MAINTAIN corrected PZR level between 20% and 85% (42%

to 57% preferred) by performing ANY of the following:

a. THROTTLE HPSI flow.

b. CONTROL Charging and Letdown.

=Cotiuosl aIcal I

steD e

t-=

=

Hold od Point on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 MUC.e..PL,.. PROCEDURE Page 41 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

41. (continued)

NOTE: IF an interruption in boration via Charging Pump to HPSI Train 2 occurs, THEN a different SI cold leg injection nozzle should be used when restoring flow.

1) ENSURE normal charging 1.1) IF the normal charging path is NOT path aligned as follows: available AND HPSI Train 2 is available, a) OPEN Charging Line THEN CHARGE to the PCS via the Stop Valve, CV-21 11. HPSI header by performing ALL of the following:

b) OPEN at least one Charging Stop Valve: 1) STOP ALL Charging Pumps.

S CV-2113 2) CLOSE Charging Line Stop S CV-2115 Valve, CV-2111.

c) IF BOTH Charging Stop 3) CLOSE Letdown Orifice Stop Valves fail to open THEN Valves:

ENSURE greater than 33 gpm flow through

CV-2003 CK-CVC2112.

CV-2004

CV-2005

4) CLOSE Letdown Containment Isolation Valve CV-2009.

5) ENSURE CLOSED HPSI Pump B Discharge to Train 2, CV-3018.

(continue) (continue)

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15

,ucL, PLAIT PROCEDURE Page 42 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

41. (continued) (continued)

6) OPEN ONE HPSI Train 2 Injection Valve:

MO-3062

MO-3064

MO-3066

" MO-3068

7) PLACE SIT Pressure Indicating Controller associated with valve opened above to MANUAL AND CLOSE:

PIC-0338, MO-3062

" PIC-0347, MO-3064

" PIC-0346, MO-3066

" PIC-0342, MO-3068

8) OPEN Charging Pump Discharge to Train 2, MO-3072.

9) START Charging pumps as necessary to control PZR level.

0 = Continuousiv awlicable

PAUSADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 PROCEDURE Page 43 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

42. IEANY of the following AC or DC 42.1. 1E Bus 1D and Bus 1E are NOT buses are NOT energized, energized, THEN RESTORE power to the THEN as resources permit, affected buses. Refer to the PROVIDE power to PZR Heaters following applicable procedure: from Bus 1C. Refer to ONP-2.1, "Loss of AC Power," Attachment 1.

.BUS PROCEDURE 1C or 1D EOP Supplement 29 1E with No SIAS EOP Supplement 29 1E with SIAS SOP-30 Y10 ONP-24.1, "Loss of Preferred AC Bus Y10" Y20 ONP-24.2, "Loss of Preferred AC Bus Y20" Y30 ONP-24.3, "Loss of Preferred AC Bus Y30" Y40 ONP-24.4, "Loss of Preferred AC Bus Y40" Y01 ONP-24.5, "Loss of Instrument AC Bus Y01' Any DC Bus ONP-2.3, "Loss of DC Power" 0 = Continuousiv awlicable a ical ster) seI Iod fý= Hold Point on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 Page 44 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

43. IEoffsite power was lost AND offsite power is available, THEN RESTORE power to plant equipment by performing ALL of the following:

a. IF NONE of the following are energized:

" 'R' Bus

'F' Bus

Cook 1 Line, THEN INITIATE actions to restore power to 'F' or 'R' Bus, as available. Refer to EOP Supplement 21.

b. WHEN ANY of the following are energized:

" 'R' Bus

" 'F' Bus

" Cook 1 Line, THEN INITIATE actions to restore Plant power. Refer to EOP Supplement 29.

(continue) 0 = Continuousiv aDdicable appical ster) tptl=Hl f/ý= Hold Point on

PAUSADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 PROCEDURE Page 45 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

43. (continued)

c. RESTORE power to the affected bus(es). Refer to the following applicable procedure:

-BUS P*IOCEDUtRE lBE (without SIS) wIt SiS SOP-30 1A or 1B ONP-2.1, I~ol *Loss of AC Power"

d. RESTART plant equipment as desired.

0 = Continuouslv awlicable aIcal steD sI I=HodPon Hold Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 MUcLI,,*, PROCEDURE Page 46 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

44. WHEN 2400V Bus 1C or Bus 1D is 44.1. IEequipment needed to maintain energized, Safety Functions is available from a THEN as resources permit, de-energized 2400V Vital Bus ENERGIZE Plant buses by AND a power supply is available, performing ALL of the following: THEN ENERGIZE the bus AND RESTORE the needed equipment.

a. IE Bus 1iCis energized, THEN PERFORM ALL of the following:

1) ENSURE CLOSED the following breakers:

0 152-115(BuslCto Transformers 11 and 19) 0 152-108 (BuslC to Transformer 13)

(continue) 0 = Continuouslv aDDlicable steD steD 1ýk= Hold Point

~= Hold Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 R1,LEJ PROCEDURE ' Page 47 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

44. (continued)

2) ENSURE 480V MCCs are energized as appropriate:

MCC 1: 52-1906 (Bus 19)

MCC 3: 52-1301 (Bus 13)

MCC 7: 52-1103 (Bus 11)

b. IF Bus 1D is energized, THEN PERFORM the following:

1) ENSURE CLOSED 152-201 (Bus 1D to Transformers 12 and 20)

2) ENSURE 480V MCCs energized as appropriate:

MCC 2: 52-2006 (Bus 20)

MCC 8: 52-1201 (Bus 12)

(continue) 0 = Continuousiv awlicable a ical steD sei iHodPon t/= Hold Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EOPs EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 UCEARLAT PROCEDURE Page 48 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

44. (continued)

NOTE: IF only one MCC is available (MCC 1 or MCC 2),

THEN BOTH vital DC Buses should be powered from the two Battery Chargers supplied by the same energized MCC.

c. ENSURE CLOSED Battery Charger Feeder Breakers from available MCCs:

1) MCC 1

" Charger No 1 Feeder 52-146

Charger No 4 Feeder 52-186

2) MCC 2

Charger No 2 Feeder 52-225

Charger No 3 Feeder 52-285

d. VERIFY 125V DC Buses D10 d.1. PLACE Battery Chargers in and D20 are powered by a operation. Refer to SOP-30, Battery Charger. "Station Power."

45. WHEN PCP restart is desired, THEN RESTART desired PCPs.

Refer to EOP Supplement 3.

0 = Continuouslv armlicable aplcal ster) se lný= Hold odlon Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 UCRPIAT PROCEDURE Page 49 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

46. IEALL PCPs are stopped, 46.1. ENSURE proper control of S/G THEN VERIFY natural circulation feeding and steaming rates.

flow in at least one PCS loop by ALL of the following:

Core AT less than 500 F (Average of Qualified CETs minus Tc)

Loop THs and Loop Tcs constant or lowering a Average of Qualified CETs at least 25 0 F subcooled a Difference between Loop TH and Average of Qualified CETs is less than or equal to 150 F

47. I. ALL PCPs are stopped, AND natural circulation criteria are NOT satisfied, THEN ENSURE ALL of the following conditions exist:

All available Charging pumps are operating

SI flow is within the limits of EOP Supplement 4

At least one S/G is available for removing heat from PCS with level being maintained or restored to between 60%

and 70%

Average of Qualified CETs is less than superheated

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision RUCIFAPLANT PROCEDURE Page 50 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

48. IF measured Containment hydrogen concentration is between 1% and 3%,

THEN PERFORM ALL the following:

a. CONTACT TSC. I

b. OPEN MCC 9 Feeder Breaker, 52-1304.

LOCATION: On Bus 13 (D= Continuousiv applicable ster) applicbl sep!HldPon f/ý-= Hold Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 NUcML*PL* PROCEDURE Page 51 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

a. CALCULATE minimum PCS cooldown rate. Refer to EOP Supplement 2.

b. VERIFY BOTH of the following: b.1. IF additional sources of inventory which allow the requirements to be

The calculated cooldown met are NOT available, rate does NOT exceed THEN GO TO EOP-9.0, Technical Specification "Functional Recovery Procedure."

limits.

The calculated cooldown rate is achievable with the existing PCS heat removal path.

50. EVALUATE the need for a plant cooldown based on ALL of the following:

Technical Specifications require plant cooldown

Plant equipment repair requires plant cooldown

" Availability of Auxiliary systems

" Available Feedwater reserve inventory

" The Shift Supervisor deems plant cooldown is necessary 0 = Continuously applicable step se fý= Hold Point od on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 EOPLAIT PROCEDURE Page 52 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

51. IE plant cooldown is NOT desired, THEN PERFORM ANY of the following:

" MAINTAIN the plant in a stabilized condition.

" GO TO an alternate TSC approved procedure.

NOTE: IF emergency boration is in progress, THEN cooldown may commence/continue while the required shutdown margin value is calculated.

© 52. VERIFY PCS boron concentration 52.1. IF PCS boron concentration is less greater than or equal to required than required boron concentration, boron concentration as verified by THEN PERFORM BOTH of the sample or hand calculation. Refer following:

to EOP Supplement 35.

a. ENSURE emergency boration is

a. IF Emergency boration is in in progress.

progress ANQ PCS boron concentration b. WHEN required boron is greater than or equal to concentration is reached, required boron concentration, THEN SECURE emergency THEN SECURE emergency boration. Refer to EOP boration. Refer to EOP Supplement 40.

Supplement 40.

0 = Continuouslv apolicable ster) tel l fý= Hold Point od on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 APROCEDURE jPage 53 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

53. WHEN BOTH of the following conditions exist:

" PZR Pressure within limits of EOP Supplement 1

PCS Cooldown rate is within required limits THEN PLACE LTOP in service as follows:

a. ENSURE OPEN PORV Isolation Valves. Refer to SOP-1iB, "Primary Coolant System Cooldown," Attachment 6.

b. PLACE BOTH of the following PORV LTOP enable keyswitches to ENABLE:

" HS-0105A (Key: 1)

" HS-0105B (Key: 4)

c. PLACE BOTH of the following PORV Handswitches to AUTO:

HS-1042B

HS-1043B

d. MAINTAIN PZR pressure within limits of EOP Supplement 1.

=

Hold Point od on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15

,u1,2IJT PROCEDURE Page 54 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION A maximum PZR cooldown rate of 2000 F/Hr and a maximum PZR Spray AT (PZR vapor temp - spray temp) of 350°F should be observed to prevent damage to the PZR or Spray Nozzle.

NOIE: PZR level indication decalibration will occur during cooldown. Correction curves in EOP Supplement 9, "Pressurizer Level Corrections Hot Calibrated" or EOP Supplement 10, "Pressurizer Level Corrections Cold Calibrated" should be used.

NOTE: Reactor Vessel Upper Head voiding resulting from controlled PCS pressure reductions is not expected to result in safety functions being jeopardized.

NOTE: Steam flow through two of the four Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves should be adequate to establish an initial cooldown rate of 750 F/hr.

54. COOLDOWN by performing the following:

a. DETERMINE the PCS cooldown rate since event initiation using EOP Supplement 33.

(continue)

C = Continuouslv aDDlicable steD fý= Hold Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 NUCeANT PROCEDURE Page 55 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

54. (continued)

b. WHEN the PCS cooldown rate is within required limits, THEN COMMENCE a cooldown within the required limits using the Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves.

NOTE: P-50A and P-50B shall not be operated simultaneously when Tc is less than 3000 F.

c. ENSURE not more than two PCPs operating (preferably one pump in each loop).

d. MONITOR the PCS cooldown rate. Refer to EOP Supplement 33.

55. MAXIMIZE PZR spray flow while controlling PCS pressure by using PZR heaters to equalize PCS and PZR boron concentration.

56. IEthe PCS is to be opened AND PCS activity is acceptable for flow outside of containment, THEN DEGASIFY the PCS. Refer to SOP-2A, "Chemical And Volume Control System Charging And Letdown; Concentrated Boric Acid."

Q = Continuouslv applicable appical ster) tp lHl fý= Hold Point on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 PROCEDURE Page 56 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

57. IF BOTH of the following conditions exist for each S/G:

" At least three of four S/G pressure sigmas indicate between 510 and 550 psia (indicators between alarm flags)

A controlled cooldown is in progress THEN BLOCK MSIS for the S/G meeting the above conditions by performing ALL the following:

a. BLOCK MSIV closure signal for the applicable S/G by pushing the appropriate pushbutton on Control Panel C-01:

HS/LPE-50A ('A' S/G)

HS/LPE-50B ('B' S/G)

b. VERIFY "STEAM GEN VALVES ISOLATION LOCKOUT" (EK-0970) is alarmed.

c. ENSURE CLOSED BOTH Main Feed Reg Valves:

CV-0701 ('A' S/G)

CV-0703 ('B' S/G)

d. ENSURE CLOSED BOTH Bypass Feed Reg Valves:

CV-0735 ('A' S/G) 0 CV-0734 ('B' S/G) 0 = Continuously applicable step se t-= Hold Point od on

PALSADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 RUUIPATPROCEDURE

[Page 57 off6 5 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

58. IE ALL of the following conditions exist:

PZR pressure is less than 1687 psia

SIAS is NOT actuated or blocked

"Safety Injection Signal Block Permit" (EK-1369) is alarmed

A controlled cooldown and/or controlled depressurization is in progress, THEN BLOCK SIAS by performing ALL of the following:

a. PLACE ANM HOLD SIAS block handswitch PB3-1 to BLOCK.

1) VERIFY the following annunciator in alarm:

"SAFETY INJ BLOCK RELAY SI-1" (EK-1 337)

2) RELEASE SIAS block handswitch PB3-1.

(continue)

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 WMULR2 PROCEDURE Page 58 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

58. (continued)

b. PLACE AND HOLD SIAS block handswitch PB3-2 to BLOCK.

1) VERIFY the following annunciators in alarm:

" "SAFETY INJ BLOCK RELAY SI-2" (EK-1338)

"SAFETY INJ BLOCKED" (EK-1339)

2) RELEASE SIAS block handswitch PB3-2.

Indicated Charging and Letdown flows do NOT correspond to PZR level trend.

" PZR level rising significantly faster than trend expected from Auxiliary Spray flow.

Core AT (Average of Qualified CETs - Tc ) or Loop AT (TH - Tc) rising for same secondary steaming and Auxiliary Feed rates.

Any operable PCS temperature indication is less than 25 0 F subcooled.

Operable RVLMS indicates voiding in the Reactor Vessel.

0 = Continuously applicable step appical te 1ý= Hold ol Point on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 ucLR2PL,.T PROCEDURE Page 59 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

60. IEPCS voiding is indicated AND ANY of the following exist:

" PCS pressure reduction is inhibited

PCS heat removal is inhibited

" The Shift Supervisor directs void elimination, THEN PERFORM void elimination actions. Refer to EOP Supplement 26.

Q = Continuouslv applicable step tý= Hold Point

~= Hold Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 PROCEDURE Page 60 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE: Failure of Instrument Air to containment will prevent venting the SITs.

61. IE PZR pressure is between 61.1. IEANY SIT could NOT be isolated, 350 psia and 300 psia as read on THEN VENT the unisolated SIT PI-0104 (NR) or PR-0125 and using ONE of the following:

controlled AND a controlled cooldown is in a. VENT to containment as follows:

progress, THEN ISOLATE SITs as follows: 1) ENSURE CLOSED CWRT Vent Isolation Valves:

a. UNLOCK AMD CLOSE the following breakers:

CV-1064

CV-1065 LBREAKER " OUTLET ,..

________R VALVE SI

2) VENT each unisolated SIT 52-2129 MO-3041 T-82A one tank at a time by opening 52-2329 MO-3045 T-82B the Vent Valve and closing 52-2229 MO-3049 T-82C when tank is vented.

52-2429 MO-3052 T-S2D SIT VENTVALVE KEY: Locked Valve Key T-82A CV-3067 T-82B CV-3065

b. CLOSE the following SIT Outlet T-82C CV-3063 Valves: T-82D CV-3051

3) WHEN ALL the following WEAKER KEYVE conditions are met:

52-2129 MO-3041 98 52-2329 MO-3045 99 Unisolated SITs are 52-2229 MO-3049 100 vented and their 52-2429 MO-3052 101 associated vent valve closed

Plant conditions allow venting containment (continue) (continue)

C = ContinuousIv applicable step tý= Hold t~= Hold Point Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 PROCEDURE Page 61 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

61. (continued) (continued)

THEN OPEN CWRT Vent Isolation Valves:

0 CV-1064 0 CV-1 065

b. VENT unisolated SITs via Clean Waste Receiver Tank Header per SOP-3, "Safety Injection and Shutdown Cooling System."

0 = ContinuousIv applicable alical steD sel=

fý= Hold odlon Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 RUCWIEIAT PROCEDURE Page 62 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

62. IE ALL of the following conditions are met:

" Tc is below325°F AND prior to Tcs less than 3000F

" Sl Pump throttling criteria are met

HPSI pumps are NOT required for inventory control

A cooldown is in progress, THEN DISABLE BOTH HPSI pumps by removing Control Power fuses and fuse holders from the following breakers:

152-207, HP Safety Injection Pump P-66A LOCATION: 'D' Bus

152-113, HP Safety Injection Pump P-66B LOCATION: 'C' Bus

63. IE SI Pump Throttling criteria are satisfied, THEN RESET SIAS. Refer to SOP-3, "Safety Injection and Shutdown Cooling System,"

Attachment 4.

0 = Continuouslv applicable anical step seI IHodPon f/ý-= Hold Point

©Cninoul

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 1CELAT PROCEDURE Page 63 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

64. WHEN ALL of the following Shutdown Cooling System entry conditions are met:

PCS parameters are acceptable for existing Containment conditions:

Containment.

Containment Greater Than or LessThan Equal To 175.F S175°FA* :OGreater Less Than Than or Equal 3 psig at all To 3. pslg at any times during time during the Pa, meter the event event PCS Pressure Less Than REFER TO EOP 270 psia Supplement 1 PZR Level Greater Than Greater than (corrected) 36% and 40% and controlled controlled Avg of Qualified Greater Than REFER TO EOP CETs 25'F Supplement 1 Subcooling

,vg of Qualified Less Than REFER TO EOP CETs and Loop 300*F Supplement 1 temperature TSC has determined that PCS activity is acceptable for circulation outside Containment.

Containment Spray Pumps are not in use for Containment Atmosphere safety function.

Shutdown Cooling System monitoring equipment power is available from Y01 (continue) 0 = Continuously applicable step seI IHodPon tý= Hold Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING E~~~~p Revision 15 PROCEDURE Page 64 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT INTR~UCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

64. (continued)

OR Alternate measures for loss of Y01 are established per ONP-17, "Loss of Shutdown Cooling."

" LTOP is operable.

Power to the following Shutdown Cooling Return Valves is available:

0 MO-3015 (MCC-1) 0 MO-3016 (MCC-2)

Access to Containment is acceptable for manual valve operation, THEN GO TO GOP-9, "Plant Cooldown From Hot Standby/Shutdown" or TSC approved procedure.

End of Section 4.0

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15

__________PROCEDURE___Page 65 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT 5.0 PLACEKEEPER EOP ENTRY TIME:

STEP INSTRUCTIONS PAGE START DONE

4. Verify SIAS initiated 5

5. Ensure adequate SI flow and safeguards 6 equipment status

6. Ensure MSIVs and MSIV Bypass Valves are 7 closed

7. If PZR pressure lowers to less than 1300 psia 7 then establish one PCP per loop or if PCS subcooling is less than 250 F subcooled, then trip all PCPs

8. Determine required margin boron concentration 8

9. Ensure proper PCP configuration as PCS 8 temperature lowers

10. Verify operating limits for any running PCP 8

11. Verify condenser cooling or isolate steam to 9 condenser

12. Ensure at least one train of CR HVAC in 10 Emergency Mode.

14. Isolate the most affected steam generator 11

15. Verify the correct S/G is isolated 12

18. If HPSI Pumps are operating and SI Pump 16 throttling criteria are satisfied, throttle HPSI flow or stop pumps 0 = ©ContinuousIv applicable

=Cotiuosl a lical ster) seI Iod tý= Hold Point on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 NCo L PROCEDURE Page 66 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT 5.0 PLACEKEEPER EOP ENTRY TIME:

STE INSTRUCTIONS PAGE START DONE

19. If LPSI Pumps are operating and PZR pressure 17 is being controlled greater than 200 psia, stop pumps and close valves

20. If PZR pressure lowers uncontrollably to less 17 than 200 psia and LPSI Pumps have been stopped, restart LPSI pumps and open valves

and 70%

24. Place Hydrogen Monitor in service 24

25. Ifthe Containment has pressure greater than or 25 equal to 4.0 psig or has high radiation, ensure Containment Isolation signal initiated

26. If the Containment pressure is greater than or 26 equal to 4.0 psig, verify available Containment Spray Pumps running

27. If Containment pressure rises to greater than or 27 equal to 35 psia, then close the CCW containment isolation valves

28. If PCP seal cooling is lost, isolate seal leakoff 27 and restore PCP seal cooling

29. Verify Containment Sump level rises as the 28 © SIRWT level drops Q = ContinuousIv awlicable steD aplcal se!!HodPon t= Hold Point

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 UcLEA*RP*,A PROCEDURE Page 67 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT 5.0 PLACEKEEPER EOP ENTRY TIME:

STEP INSTRUCTIONS PAGE START DONE

30. When SIRWT level less than or equal to 25%, 28 then prior to RAS, perform Pre-RAS Actions.

31. When SIRWT level lowers to below 2%, then 29 perform Post-RAS Actions.

32. If Charging Pump suction is aligned to the 30 SIRWT and RAS has initiated then, disable the Charging Pumps and add caution tag

33. When Containment pressure is less than 31 3.0 psig and CHP has initiated, align components and reset CHP

34. If Containment Spray System is operating and 33 conditions are satisfied, secure Containment Spray

35. If Containment Area Radiation Monitors indicate 35 less than 1 x 101 R/hr and Containment pressure is less than 3.0 psig, reset CHR

36. When Containment water level approaches SI 36 valve elevations, open and disable SI valves

37. If Letdown is isolated and conditions allow, 37 restore Letdown

38. If requirements are met, then establish charging 37 pump suction from the VCT or SIRWT

40. If it is desired to draw a bubble in the PZR, 38 perform the actions to draw a bubble in the PZR 0 = Continuously applicable step tý= Hold od Point on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 PROCEDURE Page 68 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT 5.0 PLACEKEEPER EOP ENTRY TIME:

STEP INSTRUCTIONS PAGE START DONE

41. If SI Pump throttling criteria are met, then 40 maintain PZR level between 20% and 85%

(42% to 57% preferred)

42. If any vital AC or DC buses are not energized, 43 restore power to affected buses

43. If offsite power was lost and is available, restore 44 power to plant equipment

44. When 2400V Bus 1C or 1D is energized, then 46 energize Plant buses

45. If desired, restart PCPs 48

46. Verify natural circulation flow in at least one 49 loop

47. Verify two phase natural circulation 49

48. If Containment hydrogen concentration is 50 between 1% and 3%, notify TSC and open MCC-9 feeder breaker

49. Verify calculated cooldown rate does not 51 © exceed Technical Specification limits and the cooldown is achievable with the existing PCS heat removal path

50. Evaluate the need for a plant cooldown 51

51. Determine alternatives if plant cooldown is not 52 desired

53. When PZR Pressure and PCS Cooldown rate 53 within required limits, place LTOP in service.

1 0 = ContinuousIv armlicable aplcal ster) sel lod t-= Hold Point on

PALISADES PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Proc No EOP-6.0 EMERGENCY OPERATING Revision 15 NUcLEAR PAN, PROCEDURE Page 69 of 69 TITLE: EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT 5.0 PLACEKEEPER EOP ENTRY TIME:

STEP INSTRUCTIONS PAGE START DONE

54. Commence a PCS cooldown 54

55. Maximize PZR spray flow while controlling PCS 55 pressure by using PZR heaters to equalize PCS and PZR boron concentration

56. If the PCS will be opened and PCS activity 55 allows, then lineup for PCS degasification

57. When Main Steam pressure is between 510 and 56 550 psia, block MSIS

58. When PZR pressure is less than 1687 psia and 57 SIAS is not actuated, BLOCK SIAS

60. If PCS voiding is indicated, perform void 59 elimination

61. If PZR pressure is between 350 psia and 60 300 psia and a cooldown is in progress, isolate SITs

62. Disable both HPSI pumps when listed 62 conditions are met

63. Reset SIAS 62

64. When all shutdown cooling system entry 63 conditions are met, exit this procedure End of Section 5.0

ATTACHMENT 5 EOP SUPPLEMENT 1, "PRESSURE TEMPERATURE LIMIT CURVES" 5 Pages Follow

TT Pressure and Temperature Limit Curves UDDer Portion 2500 tI A 200 0F Subcooling Curve 2/f (Use lowest operable temperature)

Supercedes VLTOP curve if PCS ~ -r 2250 has experienced an uncontrolled 2000 cooldown which causes PCS temperature to go below 500°F or/ I (7 . ,j ,

i . . . . i . . . . i * . .

/;

-I M

m 1750 17..........

I . ..

'iv>, Klt

-U M rn CI) 0 7/ *.1*'*

9.

(D CL1500

/- . - 0M)r> 0

: Use lowest (0 -

0 rn operable T e xcee

. .. ... S;;.;.

0 -0 C,

>o

-1250 C)

. -.-. M mz

.4 1000 Co z

.'.'.i1.*..

.4--.f ;

2:if-i. >)

J4,<r -,

750 - .1~E Z~.,

I - I - I - I -I-I -- I - I

Curves based on highest

... =available temperature 7

,n - . - ,-. -,-

-I- ~0~~*

- -I I

.. reading in PCS including

- -;- -r>25'FSubcoln Avg. Qualified CETs 0 Co -5M 25-----------------------------o-: .............................................. 'a 5. r z0It 250 -

I~~i~i*

j ~ ~. ~--'

N I.............-.-'-

Pressure for PCP Operation

...*minimu um Pressure Use highest operable Tc NON Operating Region m 0

0 'iII 'II1 I'II

~ i i i i ~ i i i

,j**J*~*j*~*j***j***j*J***j****j***j***j***j S i j1*4-J IIII I. Aii P.

I111 Co 300 325 350 375 400 425 450 475 500 525 550 575 600 625 650 V C

Temperature (OF) Note: Use degraded Containment condition curves if Containment condition is or has exceeded 175°F or 3 psig. 0 CA (AlI..

I - I Pressure and Temperature Limit Curves go Z MI Fn ca P p

Lower Portion I M 800 Ss a .......... i

.IN on Operating Regi n ..................... ... .. ..... .. . .... ... . . . . . . . . .!...

Minimum temperature with the reactor vessel head tensioned is 75 OF 700 . ...... I . ......

.................................. . . M L".....:..... ...*...... ....i..... ..... ...... ........! ....... i .... - ..... ...... .. ..i .....i......i ......... i .....i ....*.....*..... ...... /.....-.... M M 600 M

Curves based on highest ...:. V:

...........z ..... : ... : .... :...... ............

. ....available temperature ... ................

reading in PCS including . .. ..... ;....... ...... . . W In M z Cn U) 500 Avg. Qualified CETs I........... .......... ............. ................ X ..........

i

............ I..... 0 0 z 00 ...I....IV LTOP .- 0 Ma M a

..... ......... % { ............. I........... 0 0 OUI r M M a

,.,400 .......... .......... ....................L........... ........................ ........

.......... I ..... : :.......... ;ý. ý'. :'ý` *' *' *:*' ' *' '.'*' ' *: ...*'.' *' *' " ***:.....

.......... I ..... .........

7

...... I I ........................... .... M 300 .. ........ ........ .............. ........... ............ . ....... .......... ............ .......... . .. . ... .. . . .. . . .. . .. . .. .. . . ... . .. . .

......... ...... z r 0 z CL !-;6 ............ . ...................... 4 200 ...... 7, ............

........... Minimum Pressure for PCP Operation rang

...... Curve based on use of PI-0104 narrow OF Subcool+/-ing 0 Vl M CA M

............. ........... Use highest operable Tc ... to CD C 100 .......... I..... ..... ....................... ..... ........... ........... ..... ..... (D z

........................ ................ ....................... .... .................. ................. .................V) 0

............. .......... .................. ..... ..... .................. CD M

........ ........... ..... t......

...... ...... .....Saturation Curve 0 10 0 U)

C 10 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 V Note- Use degraded Containment condition curves if Containment 0 Temperature (OF) is or has exceeded 1750F or 3 psig. ft C1 i _.

CD I

Y-Y Pressure and Temperature Limit Curves Shutdown Cooling Curve 600 ............

.... ..... INon Operating R.gi.n 1 1 .... ..... .....

Minimum temperature with the reactor vessel head tensioned is 7 5 .....

I 9 I.

MI 500 -

I

Curves based on highest available temperature ..... ...... .............................

reading in PCS including ..... ..... ................. "I

... Avg. Qualified CETs ...... ........... .. ... .VLTOP m

Co 0 z

4. 9 400 - .6-.

. . ..... Shutdown Cooling

. ......"....... . .. .... PORV Tr "............ . .

Lutdown Cooling Non 0) 0) z (0

CL -"....... .-..- Overatint Reaion CD rn 0

10. ... ... . ... ......................... .. 0 M Mn a) 3 0 0 rI r"

.... _ _. _..._.. 0o -I

.. . ..i-....

.. . .i ........

- ........ -.....:. .... ........... .... ... ..... M

&.200 cc M-

.............. M inimum Pressure for PCP Operation .. : . ........

...... Curve based on use of PI-0104 narrow range

.C... . -:

. .. .. ... .. . ... . U se highest operable T, .. :............ ..-

100 ....... Saturation.C.ve....

CO) MI 0 CD Co 0 (h CD 0

0 10 M 0 ¶ 2 F 0

50 100 150 200 250 300 M Temperature (OF) Note: Use degraded Containment condition curves if Containment condition is or has exceeded 175 0 F or3 psig.

(D CnI -

01 d-S I -

I I Pressure and Temperature Limit Curves Degraded Containment Conditions _

2500 2500

N n O. R.......... ... ....... ...............

.2Non Operating Reg ....

Note 1:This curve applies whenever Containment ... .. . ........ :.......... . ... ..... I.... M~

has exceeded 75*For3psig.

Note 2:Add Containment pressure (prog) toi...

4

+

'..... U M M indicated pressure to correct to psia. '. . ) M.K C 1500 Note 3:VLTOP curve is more restrictive than : M Z C'

calculated VLTOP setpoint. Use lowest . ....... ........

operable T.......I.....................

/

I........ ......

It...

I MO 21000 ~1~~ 10. 0.: . (Note

VLTOP

: :...... 3) : : :..i . .. .. ..

i ....... ........... .... ... ..

Minimum Pressure for mote 3 P{rimary Coolant Pump - V SaturationCurve

- .... ... ... - ...... :) [

500 . .......... ....... .. o... .... , .. .. .

... . i "..' : :. .

(D

, .:* .:=~ .:...i...t.....*......

~.....

.... ."*. *..... ..,. =. .=.. . I-.-.... ..-., ":.. ............

.. .. ... ........... F,:: a....... : :n: : !..... ! 0 0 n 'I 01 200 250 300 350 400 450

Curves 500based on the 550 600 650 highest available temperature

-p Tem perature (OF) reading in PCS including Avg. Qualified CETs (10 1

Shutdown Cooling Entry Window For Degraded Containment Conditions 225 Note 1 This curve applies whenever Containment.............

has exceeded 175 *F or 3 psig. ............... NON OPERATING REGION Note 2:Add Containment pressure (psig) to Maximum allowed Shutdown Cooling inlet pressure indicated pressure to correct to psia. [_ ______"_" _; "_;___'_._._

200

_ . - I

...:. . . .,. . . . . . . .;. . . . . . . .*................... . .. . .... ., ........ -................ ........ . . . .i.. .I - ........ UI) 00 175

.. . . .. . .. . .. .. .i.. .. . . .. ........... ... ..i........ i........

........ . .. .. .. *........i ...............mm "*........ ........ i ..... ........ IN 0 z

-i

.... .....I" ...!.... . .... ...

......... m 0 C z

C u150 I

-. .... I.u..oo....

m0 rn 00 0-125 '

...-...... ............ . . ... ..... Co l n Tem per atu e -i S ": ,

..... .e.O.4.n...

. E.....R....... ................ ............ 0 i ........... - " " ..... l*m inimum Subcoohng...........

...... ..... ....... ~ .............

i. -- ". ...... :. ..... .:....... ......... .. ... " . . . . . . ....... i

-I

_ :: A:*° : : : : : Maximum Shutdown CD 100 *. .. .. [.. -. : ....- ........... .. ..... .. ..... . Cooling Tem perature ..... i Cn l Note: UsePI.0104 (narrow;range) ORPR-O125 .... ............ .. ."-- ii M0 0)

CD C. C) 0

...........*.. .................... . ..... ...... ............. EG O z0

[]ii[))l~]ii))i)).l~ii~ii~il))~l]i~]ililil]iNEON OPERATING R . .INIi V m

....... .... ..... ..... .. ......... ,, , I 0

75 o Co) 200 225 250 275 300 0

Curves based on the highest available Temperature (OF) temperature reading in PCS including Avg. 0 0.

Qualified CETs all --

I I I 1 .. .-6

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