IR 05000400/2004002

IR 05000400-04-002, on 12/28/03 Through 03/27/04, for Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1, New Hill, Nc; Routine Integrated Report

ML041140475
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	04/23/2004
From:	Fredrickson P NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB4
To:	Scarola J Carolina Power & Light Co
References
IR-04-002
Download: ML041140475 (22)

Text

ril 23, 2004

SUBJECT:

SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000400/2004002

Dear Mr. Scarola:

On March 27, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Shearon Harris reactor facility. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on April 12, with you and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified. However, a licensee-identified violation, which was determined to be of very low safety significance, is listed in Section 40A7 of this report. If you contest this non-cited violation, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Shearon Harris facility.

CP&L 2 In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) components of NRCs document system (ADAMS).

ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Paul E. Fredrickson, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No.: 50-400 License No.: NPF-63

Enclosure:

NRC Inspection Report 05000400/2004004-02 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION II==

Docket No: 50-400 License No: NPF-63 Report No: 05000400/2004002 Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company Facility: Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 Location: 5413 Shearon Harris Road New Hill, NC 27562 Dates: December 28, 2003 - March 27, 2004 Inspectors: R. Musser, Senior Resident Inspector P. OBryan, Resident Inspector G. MacDonald, Senior Project Engineer, (Sections 1R12 and 1R15)

Approved by: P. Fredrickson, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000400/2004-002; 12/28/2003 - 03/27/2004; Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1; routine integrated report.

The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and a senior project engineer. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.

A. Inspector-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings None

Licensee-Identified Violations

A violation of very low safety significance, which was identified by the licensee has been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensees corrective action program. This violation is listed in Section 40A7.

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

The unit began the inspection period at rated thermal power, and operated at or near rated power for the entire inspection period.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

a. Inspection Scope

After the licensee completed preparations for seasonal low temperature, the inspectors walked down the emergency service water system, the emergency AC diesel generator systems, and the emergency AC diesel generator fuel oil storage system on January 10 and 17, 2004 (1 preparation sample of 3 systems). These systems were selected because their safety related functions could be affected by adverse weather. The inspectors reviewed Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Sections 9.4.0 and 9.4.5, Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.7.5, and the documents listed in the Attachment. The inspectors also observed plant conditions, and evaluated those conditions using criteria documented in Procedure AP-301, Adverse Weather.

The inspectors reviewed the following action requests (ARs) associated with this area to verify that the licensee identified and implemented appropriate corrective actions:

• 81940 ESW Electric Unit Heaters

• 81979 EDG, ESW, ESWIS, and DFOS Low Temperature Limits

• 99607 AP-301 Freeze Protection Improvement

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

a. Inspection Scope

Partial System Walkdowns:

The inspectors performed the following three partial system walkdowns, while the indicated SSCs were out-of-service (OOS) for maintenance and testing:

• A train of the auxiliary feed water system following restoration of the system after maintenance on January 5, 2004

• B train of the residual heat removal system with the A train of the residual heat removal system OOS on January 14, 2004

• A emergency diesel generator with B emergency diesel generator OOS on February 18, 2004 To evaluate the operability of the selected trains or systems under these conditions, the inspectors reviewed valve and power alignments by comparing observed positions of valves, switches, and electrical power breakers to the procedures and drawings listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

For the seven areas identified below, the inspectors reviewed the licensees control of transient combustible material and ignition sources, fire detection and suppression capabilities, fire barriers, and any related compensatory measures, to verify that those items were consistent with FSAR Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection System, and FSAR Appendix 9.5.A, Fire Hazards

Analysis.

The inspectors walked down accessible portions of each area to verify that conditions in these areas were consistent with descriptions of the areas in the FSAR. Documents reviewed are listed in the

.

• Switchgear room A (1-A SWBRA)

• Switchgear room B (1-A-SWGRB)

• Computer room, process instrument control cabinets, and control-rod-drive circuit cabinets (12-A-CRC1)

• 236' auxiliary feedwater and component cooling water pump area (1-A-3-PB)

• 261' chiller area (1-A-4-CHLR)

• Emergency diesel generator room A (1-D-DGA)

• Emergency diesel generator room B (1-D-DGB)

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification

a. Inspection Scope

On March 2, 2004, the inspectors observed licensed-operator performance during requalification simulator examination, to verify that operator performance was consistent with expected operator performance, as described in Licensed Operator Continuing Training Simulator Examination Scenario DSS-038. This examination tested the operators ability to respond to the failure of a nuclear instrumentation channel, the loss of a feedwater train, grid instability, and the loss of all feedwater. The inspectors focused on clarity and formality of communication, the use of procedures, alarm response, control board manipulations, group dynamics and supervisory oversight.

The inspectors reviewed the post-exercise critique, to verify that the licensee identified deficiencies and discrepancies that occurred during the simulator examination. The inspectors also reviewed AR 120192120192Simulator Training Materials Using Wrong Malfunction, to verify that the licensee had entered the deficency into the corrective action program.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed two degraded structures, systems or components (SSC) /

functional performance problems or conditions, to verify the licensees handling of these performance deficiencies in accordance with 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, and 10CFR50.65, Maintenance Rule. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

• Intermittent grounds in the 125 VDC electrical distribution systems.

• A residual heat removal (RHR) pump breaker failure The inspectors focused on the following attributes:

• Appropriate work practices

• Identifying and addressing common cause failures

• Scoping in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(b)

• Characterizing reliability issues (performance)

• Charging unavailability (performance)

• Trending key parameters (condition monitoring)

• 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2) classification and reclassification, and

• Appropriateness of performance criteria for SSCs/functions classified (a)(2)and/or appropriateness and adequacy of goals and corrective actions for SSCs/functions classified (a)(1)

The inspectors reviewed the following ARs associated with this area to verify that the licensee had identified and implemented appropriate corrective actions:

• AR 109745109745 125 VDC Safety Bus 1A-SA Ground

• AR 94803, Ground on the 125 VDC NNS System

• AR 115432115432 A RHR Pump Breaker Failure

• AR 103705103705480 VAC Distribution System Failure Monitoring

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees risk assessments and the risk management actions used by the licensee to manage risk for the plant configurations associated with the four activities listed below. The inspectors verified that the licensee performed adequate risk assessments, and implemented appropriate risk management actions when required by 10CFR50.65(a)(4). For emergent work, the inspectors also verified that any increase in risk was promptly assessed, and that appropriate risk management actions were promptly implemented.

• The failure of the A emergency services chilled water unit with the C air compressor OOS for maintenance

• The failure of the C air compressor with the A emergency services chilled water unit OOS for corrective maintenance

• The emergent corrective maintenance on the safety inverter number 1

• The work week of March 15, including having the C air compressor OOS for maintenance.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R14 Operator Performance During Non-Routine Evolutions and Events

a. Inspection Scope

During the non-routine evolutions identified below, the inspectors observed plant instruments and operator performance to verify that the operators performed in accordance with the associated procedures and training.

• On February 24, during the de-energization of vital bus 1

• On February 24, during the re-energization of vital bus 1

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed three operability determinations addressed in the ARs listed below. The inspectors assessed the accuracy of the evaluations, the use and control of any necessary compensatory measures, and compliance with the TS. The inspectors verified that the operability determinations were made as specified by procedure AP-618, "Operability Determinations." Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

The inspectors compared the justifications made in the determination to the requirements from the TS, the FSAR, and associated design-basis documents, to verify that operability was properly justified and the subject component or system remained available, such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred:

• ARs 115156 and 115772, A ESCW chiller after failures of the VMS-2 limit switch on 1/16/03 and 1/19/03

• AR 113051113051 EDG A overspeed trip governor

• AR 108272108272 S1 safety inverter output slowly drifting high The inspectors reviewed the following ARs associated with this area to verify that the licensee identified and implemented appropriate corrective actions:

• 114010: A ESCW chiller inoperable due to VMS-2

• 80506: A ESCW inoperable with hot gas bypass valve full open

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

For the seven post-maintenance tests listed below, the inspectors witnessed the test and/or reviewed the test data to verify that test results adequately demonstrated restoration of the affected safety functions described in the FSAR and TS.

• OP-156.02, AC Electrical Distribution: testing of circuit breaker 101 after replacement on January 13, 2004.

• OST-1008, 1A-SA RHR Pump Operability Quarterly Interval Modes 1-2-3: testing following preventive maintenance on the A RHR pump breaker,

• OPT-1512, Essential Chilled Water Turbopak Units Quarterly Inspection/Checks Modes 1-6: testing of A ESCW chiller after replacement of VMS-2 switch on January 20,

• OP-156.02, AC Electrical Distribution: following replacement of synchronization switch121/127 following replacement on January 23,

• OST 1073, 1B-SB Emergency Diesel Generator Operability Test Monthly Interval Modes 1-2-3-4-5-6: for functional testing of B Fuel Oil Day Tank level switch after replacement on February 18.

• OP-104, Rod Control System: functional testing of the A reactor trip bypass breaker following replacement of the breaker on February 10,

• CM-E0020, Replace Oil Filled and Electrolytic Capacitors and/or Ferro-Resonant Transformer Assembly and Tune Westinghouse 7.5 kVA Static Inverters:

following maintenance on the S1 inverter.

The inspectors reviewed ARs 115156 and 115772 (A ESCW Chiller failures resulting exceeding maintenance rule performance goals) associated with this area to verify that the licensee identified and implemented appropriate corrective actions.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

For the four surveillance tests identified below, the inspectors witnessed testing and/or reviewed test data, to verify that the systems, structures, and components involved in these tests satisfied the requirements described in the TS and the FSAR, and that the tests demonstrated that the SSCs were capable of performing their intended safety functions.

• OST-1211*, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1A-SA Operability Test Quarterly Interval Modes 1-4

• OST-1411, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1X-SAB Operability Test Quarterly Interval Modes 1, 2, 3

• OST-1073, 1B-SB Emergency Diesel Generator Operability Test Monthly Interval Modes 1,2,3,4,5,6

• EPT-033, Emergency Safeguards Sequencer System Test

• This procedure included inservice testing requirements.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed an operations simulator examination conducted on March 9 to verify licensee self-assessment of classification, notification, and protective action recommendation development in accordance with 10CFR50, Appendix E.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

a. Inspection Scope

For the performance indicators (PIs) listed below, the inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the period from January 1, 2003 through January 1, 2004. To verify the accuracy of the PI data reported during that period, the inspectors compared the licensees basis in reporting each data element to the PI definitions and guidance contained in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline, Rev. 2.

Mitigating Systems Cornerstone

• Safety System Unavailability, High Pressure Safety Injection

• Safety System Unavailability, Residual Heat Removal The inspectors reviewed operators logs, licensee event reports, records of inoperable equipment, and Maintenance Rule records to verify that the licensee had adequately accounted for unavailability hours that the subject systems had experienced during the previous four quarters. The inspectors also reviewed the number of hours those systems were required to be available and the licensees basis for identifying unavailability hours. In addition, the inspectors interviewed licensee personnel associated with the PI data collection, evaluation, and distribution.

Barrier Integrity Cornerstone

• For the Reactor Coolant System Specific Activity PI, the inspectors observed licensee sampling and analysis of reactor coolant system samples, and compared the licensee-reported PI data with records developed by the licensee while analyzing previous samples.

The inspectors reviewed the following ARs associated with this area to verify that the licensee identified and implemented appropriate corrective actions:

• 83589 (ESCW Maintenance Rule Repetitive Failures)

• 82935 (Missed HHSI Unavailability Hours for NRC KPI)

• 104679 (Unplanned LCO Entry, A CSIP)

• 91691 (Corrosion of Decking Material in Recirculating Sumps A and B)

• 92443 (Incorrect Lead Lifted in PIC-19 Disabling RHR FCV)

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA3 Event Followup

(Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000400/2003006-00, Main Control Room Emergency Filtration System Degradation On October 17, 2003, during the performance of TS surveillance testing required by TS 4.7.6.d.3., the licensee was unable to demonstrate that the control room emergency filtration system could maintain the control room at a positive pressure of greater than or equal to 1/8 inch water gauge relative to all adjacent areas during system operation.

Further investigation by the licensee revealed that both trains of the Main Control Room (MCR) Emergency Filtration System were inoperable for greater than the time period allowed by Technical Specification 3.7.6 due to two previously unidentified boundary leakage paths. In 1992, a configuration change created a leak path through the MCR boundary via air recirculation unit drains. The second leak path was identified to be a porous wall within the control pressure boundary adjacent to a pipe chase leading to the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB). Furthermore, operational tests to satisfy Surveillance Requirement 4.7.6.d.3 were inadequate between 1992 and October, 2003 because they did not detect the boundary leakage. Corrective actions included revising the surveillance test and sealing the previously unidentified boundary leakage paths. This finding is greater than minor because it affected the barrier integrity cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers provide protection from radionuclide releases and other hazards caused by accidents or events.

The enforcement aspects of this finding are discussed in Section 4OA7. This LER is closed.

4OA5 Other - Spent Fuel Material Control and Accounting

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed Phase I and Phase II of Temporary Instruction 2515/154, Spent Fuel Material Control and Accounting at Nuclear Power Plants.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

On April 12, 2004, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Scarola and other members of his staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations

The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as a non-cited violation.

TS 4.7.6.d.3. requires that the MCR emergency filtration system maintain the control room at a positive pressure of greater than or equal to 1/8 inch water gauge relative to all adjacent areas during system operation. Contrary to this requirement, both trains of the MCR emergency filtration system were inoperable for greater than the time period allowed by TS 3.7.6 due to two previously unidentified boundary leakage paths.

Furthermore, operational tests to satisfy TS 4.7.6.d.3 were inadequate between 1992 and October 2003, because they did not detect the boundary leakage. In 1992, a configuration change created a leak path through the MCR boundary via air recirculation unit drains. This leakage path was not detected until October 2003. Also, a second leak path was identified through a porous wall adjacent to a pipe chase leading to the RAB. This item is in the licensees corrective action program as AR 108027108027 A phase 3 significance determination process analysis was performed to determine the risk associated with the finding. With the MCR ventilation in certain alignments RAB fires could create a smoke hazard for the MCR. The dominant risk sequences were fully developed RAB fires coupled with failure of RAB ventilation isolation and operator failure to successfully implement MCR smoke purge and failure to evacuate MCR and implement remote shutdown. The risk from the event was determined to be 3E-8, a condition of very low safety significance (Green).

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

D. Braund, Superintendent, Security

J. Briggs, HNP, Superintendent, Environmental and Chemical

J. Caves, Supervisor - Licensing/Regulatory Programs

F. Diya, Manager - Engineering

R. Duncan, Director - Site Operations

W. Gurganious, Manager - Nuclear Assessment

E. McCartney, Training Manager

G. Miller, Maintenance Manager

T. Morton, Manager - Support Services

T. Natale, Manager -Outage and Scheduling

T. Pilo, Supervisor - Emergency Preparedness

J. Scarola, Vice President Harris Plant

G. Simmons, Superintendent - Radiation Control

E. Wills, Operations Manager

B. Waldrep, General Manager Harris Plant

M. Wallace, Licensing Specialist

NRC personnel

P. Fredrickson, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 4

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

None

Closed

05000400/2003006-00 LER Main Control Room Emergency Filtration System Degradation (Section 4OA3)

Discussed

None