ML19325D485: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
 
(StriderTol Bot change)
 
(One intermediate revision by the same user not shown)
Line 23: Line 23:
             '        1  Rout 3 C1. Box 84
             '        1  Rout 3 C1. Box 84
     *-    . G'      Braceville, Illinois 63407                                                            I
     *-    . G'      Braceville, Illinois 63407                                                            I
         .  .            Telephone 815/458-2801                                                                1
         .  .            Telephone 815/458-2801                                                                1 1
                                                                                                                ,
1 I
1 1
l l
I l
l
-
October 12,1989                                  1 BW/89-1199                                        -
October 12,1989                                  1 BW/89-1199                                        -
i
i i                                                                                                              '
:
a U. S. Nuclear Regtilatory Commis:lon Document Control Desk                                                                          ,
i                                                                                                              '
a
,
U. S. Nuclear Regtilatory Commis:lon
'
Document Control Desk                                                                          ,
Washington, D.C. 20555                                                                        :
Washington, D.C. 20555                                                                        :
,


==Dear Sir:==
==Dear Sir:==
Line 51: Line 41:
[ Station Manager Braidwood Nuclear Station                        -
[ Station Manager Braidwood Nuclear Station                        -
REQ /AJS/jfe (7126z)
REQ /AJS/jfe (7126z)
                                                                                                              .


==Enclosure:==
==Enclosure:==
Line 57: Line 46:
cc:    NRC Region III Administrator                                                            '
cc:    NRC Region III Administrator                                                            '
NRC Resident Inspector INPO Record Center
NRC Resident Inspector INPO Record Center
;                    CECO Dietribution 1;st
;                    CECO Dietribution 1;st t
;
i i
t i
i
.
P f
P f
       ,  8910240246 891013 PDR    ADOCK 05000456 S                      PDC                                                  ,
       ,  8910240246 891013 PDR    ADOCK 05000456 S                      PDC                                                  ,
ll i                                                                                                            l
ll i                                                                                                            l
:.
'
                             ..                .  . - .    . . _ .        __            _-_._....L . . ,
                             ..                .  . - .    . . _ .        __            _-_._....L . . ,


yj                      sy,
yj                      sy, u.-                          ,
                                                                                                                              -
u.-                          ,
: e.              ,, ,        ,  %          3, 7    ,m;          .  ,
: e.              ,, ,        ,  %          3, 7    ,m;          .  ,
                                                                                                                      -
p 1        '
p 1        '
g,#,
g,#,
    **                                                                                                                                                              , ,, ,
                                     .        c LICENSEE EVDif REPORT (LER)                                              ,_
                                     .        c LICENSEE EVDif REPORT (LER)                                              ,_
    '
Docket Number (2)                    pam d) rc,cility hame (1) ersidwood i                                                                                                  el st 01010141 s16                1lerlel4 "tle (4) Reverse Operation of Hydrogen Analy;er Containment Isolation Valve due to a Preservice Wire Labeling Frror.
Docket Number (2)                    pam d) rc,cility hame (1) ersidwood i                                                                                                  el st 01010141 s16                1lerlel4 "tle (4) Reverse Operation of Hydrogen Analy;er Containment Isolation Valve due to a Preservice Wire Labeling Frror.
Event Date (5)                        LER Humber (6)                              ammart Data (7)            Other Facilities involved (8)
Event Date (5)                        LER Humber (6)                              ammart Data (7)            Other Facilities involved (8)
Line 85: Line 64:
                                                 /jj/j/                //jj/
                                                 /jj/j/                //jj/
f
f
;                                                /      Number ,,,__ ///      "^r
;                                                /      Number ,,,__ ///      "^r u.a.            01 si el el el i1
'
u.a.            01 si el el el i1
!      _01 9        '_' s el 9        al 9
!      _01 9        '_' s el 9        al 9
                                                 ~
                                                 ~
0l110
0l110
                                                                       ~
                                                                       ~
01 0        110      11 3  al 9                          01 $1 Cl el el l l
01 0        110      11 3  al 9                          01 $1 Cl el el l l THIS RE*0RT IS SUOMITTED PURSUAhT TO THE REQUIREENTS OF 10CFR 0
!                      .
THIS RE*0RT IS SUOMITTED PURSUAhT TO THE REQUIREENTS OF 10CFR 0
l                                              (Check one.ar more of the followinal (11) 5            !20.402(b)                  __  20.405(c)          _    50.73(a)(2)(lv)          _          73.71(b)
l                                              (Check one.ar more of the followinal (11) 5            !20.402(b)                  __  20.405(c)          _    50.73(a)(2)(lv)          _          73.71(b)
POWER                                    __  20.405(a)(1)(1)          _      50.36(c)(1)        _    50.73(a)(2)(v)          _          73.71(c) l                                                                                                                                                    Other (Specify LEVEL                      g        ,___    20.405(a)(1)(ll)          _      50.36(c)(2)        _    50.73(a)(2)(vil)        _
POWER                                    __  20.405(a)(1)(1)          _      50.36(c)(1)        _    50.73(a)(2)(v)          _          73.71(c) l                                                                                                                                                    Other (Specify LEVEL                      g        ,___    20.405(a)(1)(ll)          _      50.36(c)(2)        _    50.73(a)(2)(vil)        _
Line 100: Line 75:
20,405(a)(1)(lit)              _ 50.73(a)(2)(1)        __ 50.73(a)(2)(vill)(A) 20.405(a)(1)(iv) J_ 50.73(a)(2)(li)                      50.73(a)(2)(vill)(8)              below and in
20,405(a)(1)(lit)              _ 50.73(a)(2)(1)        __ 50.73(a)(2)(vill)(A) 20.405(a)(1)(iv) J_ 50.73(a)(2)(li)                      50.73(a)(2)(vill)(8)              below and in
         ////////,////,////,//////,////            __
         ////////,////,////,//////,////            __
                                                                                                            ,_
Text)
Text)
         ///////'j////j///}/////j/////
         ///////'j////j///}/////j/////
                   /          /                  _      20.405(a)(1)(v)          _      50.73(a)(2)(li t ) __,_  50.73(a)(2)(x)
                   /          /                  _      20.405(a)(1)(v)          _      50.73(a)(2)(li t ) __,_  50.73(a)(2)(x)
'
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR TH1$ LER f12)
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR TH1$ LER f12)
TELEPHONE Hlimik Name AREA CODE Jary_ Ba1. Technical Staf f Group Leader                                                    Ext. 2245                8l1l5        dl 5181 l 2181 Of COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EAEH C0ff'ONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)
TELEPHONE Hlimik Name AREA CODE Jary_ Ba1. Technical Staf f Group Leader                                                    Ext. 2245                8l1l5        dl 5181 l 2181 Of COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EAEH C0ff'ONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)
MANUFAC-        REPORTABLE                  CAUSE    SYSTEM    COMPONENT      MANUFAC-          REPORTABLE CAUSE        SYSTEM      C0rtPONENT
MANUFAC-        REPORTABLE                  CAUSE    SYSTEM    COMPONENT      MANUFAC-          REPORTABLE CAUSE        SYSTEM      C0rtPONENT TURER          TO NPRDS                                                      TURER              TO NPRDS j      ,,,_.]L      KlN        _11 $1 VI            VI 01 31 0              Y~
'
TURER          TO NPRDS                                                      TURER              TO NPRDS j      ,,,_.]L      KlN        _11 $1 VI            VI 01 31 0              Y~
                                                                                      '
I        l 1    l-  1 l l l        l l 1                I I    t'                                            I        I I l        i I I l
I        l 1    l-  1 l l l        l l 1                I I    t'                                            I        I I l        i I I l
SUPPLEMENTAL REIORT EXPECTED (14)                                                          Expected        tinnth l Dav l Yeat l
SUPPLEMENTAL REIORT EXPECTED (14)                                                          Expected        tinnth l Dav l Yeat l
Line 117: Line 87:
ABSTRACT (Limit te 1400 spaces, i.e, approximately fif teen single-space typewritten ilncs) (16)
ABSTRACT (Limit te 1400 spaces, i.e, approximately fif teen single-space typewritten ilncs) (16)
At 04'JO on September 15, 1989, the Leakage Rate Survelliance (LLRT) for 1PS2298, 08 Hydrogen Analyzer Centalnn.ent Isolation Valve, was initiated. The measured leakrate was larger with the valve indicating closed. 'The correct valve stem travel could not be asG4 by direct observatten because the valve;and cell assembly are encapsulated. Several additional LLRTs were performed on the valve. Ea:h time the results                                                        ,
At 04'JO on September 15, 1989, the Leakage Rate Survelliance (LLRT) for 1PS2298, 08 Hydrogen Analyzer Centalnn.ent Isolation Valve, was initiated. The measured leakrate was larger with the valve indicating closed. 'The correct valve stem travel could not be asG4 by direct observatten because the valve;and cell assembly are encapsulated. Several additional LLRTs were performed on the valve. Ea:h time the results                                                        ,
indicated reverse operett . . but were inconclusive. The wiring was checked and found to be correct. The valve was removed and bene. tested. The leads from the encapsulated coil were found to be improperly Itbeled. The valve also drif ted to mid-position when the closed cell was deewergized. No work activities were identified that would have required re-labeling. The labels on the leads were compared to a new coli assembly. The new labels were steller but had a plastic coating which IPS2298 did not heve. The failure of the valve to remain in the closed position when the closing cell was deenergized made detection of the error virtually impossible during normal operation. An f r.vestigation to fetermine the mode of failure and when the
indicated reverse operett . . but were inconclusive. The wiring was checked and found to be correct. The valve was removed and bene. tested. The leads from the encapsulated coil were found to be improperly Itbeled. The valve also drif ted to mid-position when the closed cell was deewergized. No work activities were identified that would have required re-labeling. The labels on the leads were compared to a new coli assembly. The new labels were steller but had a plastic coating which IPS2298 did not heve. The failure of the valve to remain in the closed position when the closing cell was deenergized made detection of the error virtually impossible during normal operation. An f r.vestigation to fetermine the mode of failure and when the cis-labeling occurred la still in progress. IPS229B is being replaced with a dif ferent model valve i,hlen will be tested in accordance with the Station modification program. There have been no previous occurrences.
,
cis-labeling occurred la still in progress. IPS229B is being replaced with a dif ferent model valve i,hlen will be tested in accordance with the Station modification program. There have been no previous occurrences.
                                                                             =.
                                                                             =.
                                                                                                                                       .b 2885m(131289)/2 b_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ _              __                            ._                                                                ,      _, _                  ,
                                                                                                                                       .b 2885m(131289)/2 b_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ _              __                            ._                                                                ,      _, _                  ,


   + y .-.m e y p.m_ps%<.i.p py w.:-w w. g w w -9 y .,$ s y g v ~                                  ++      ~
   + y .-.m e y p.m_ps%<.i.p py w.:-w w. g w w -9 y .,$ s y g v ~                                  ++      ~
m3A,u
m3A,u q            ?
                                                                                                                                -
q            ?
     -g -          g 4 3 . 4. c  +    . >      + . <    a,    u .. ,    s , .3 i . yy
     -g -          g 4 3 . 4. c  +    . >      + . <    a,    u .. ,    s , .3 i . yy
* T                    i    %~  +
* T                    i    %~  +
    '
                                                                                                                                                      ,
tn.---    rwur apear atrai ramt .-. -      nas                                r. ns n.e            (
tn.---    rwur apear atrai ramt .-. -      nas                                r. ns n.e            (
* 00CKF,T 14BSER (2)            LER I m 16)                                    Paan (31 FACILITY IWE (1)
00CKF,T 14BSER (2)            LER I m 16)                                    Paan (31 FACILITY IWE (1)
Year    /// Sequer.tlal ff//j
Year    /// Sequer.tlal ff//j
                                                                                                           /    Revision fff
                                                                                                           /    Revision fff
                                                                                       ///    theser    ///      "^r                                    {
                                                                                       ///    theser    ///      "^r                                    {
!
l        .oraidweed i                          e i s I e i e I e 1 41 s1 6 319        -  ei11e        -      e i e I el i      cr      el 4        )
l        .oraidweed i                          e i s I e i e I e 1 41 s1 6 319        -  ei11e        -      e i e I el i      cr      el 4        )
I
I TEXT        Energy Industry Identificetten System (E!!$) codes are identified in the text as (KK) 1 J
'
TEXT        Energy Industry Identificetten System (E!!$) codes are identified in the text as (KK)
                                                                                                                                                      !
1 J
3 A. PLANT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT:
3 A. PLANT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT:
:,
f i
f i
Unit: Braidwood 1:                        Event Date: September 15, 1969;        Event Time: 0400;                                        l
Unit: Braidwood 1:                        Event Date: September 15, 1969;        Event Time: 0400;                                        l Mode: 5 - Cold Shutdown;                  Rx Power 01; 4
,,
Mode: 5 - Cold Shutdown;                  Rx Power 01; 4
!                                                                                                                                                    t RCS (AB) Temperature / Pressure: Ambient l                                                                                                                                          ..        l 1
!                                                                                                                                                    t RCS (AB) Temperature / Pressure: Ambient l                                                                                                                                          ..        l 1
'
: 8. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:
: 8. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:
1 i
1 i
There were no systems or components inoperable at the beginning of the event which contributed to the severity of i            the event.                                                                                                                              ;
There were no systems or components inoperable at the beginning of the event which contributed to the severity of i            the event.                                                                                                                              ;
                                                                                                                                                      ,
j Lccal Leakrate Testing (LLRT) surveillance on the Process Sampilng Containment Isolation Valves (PS) (KN] in                            ,
j Lccal Leakrate Testing (LLRT) surveillance on the Process Sampilng Containment Isolation Valves (PS) (KN] in                            ,
I            a:cordance with Braldwood Technical Staff Surveillance Procedure,19wV$ 6.1.2.d-1.6 was in progress.
I            a:cordance with Braldwood Technical Staff Surveillance Procedure,19wV$ 6.1.2.d-1.6 was in progress.
Line 161: Line 115:
r                            .                                      ., . c .m .. . .    . . ,    9 l                                  ~
r                            .                                      ., . c .m .. . .    . . ,    9 l                                  ~
At appro Imately 0400 the surveillance' for IPS2296, 08 Hydrogen Analyzer Containment Isolation Valve; was~~                            +
At appro Imately 0400 the surveillance' for IPS2296, 08 Hydrogen Analyzer Containment Isolation Valve; was~~                            +
                                                                                                                                                      '
initiated. During the performance of this surveillance, it was noted that the valve appeared to be operating improperly. The measured leakrate was larger with the valve Indicating closed than with it Indicating open.                              g j            The discrepancy was discussed with the Technical Staff Engineer (STE) (non-Itcensed) in charge of LLRT. It was                          t determined that the surveillance was properly performed. Based on this inforestion, the appropriate NRC l            notification via the ENS phone system was made at 1522 pursuant to 10CFR54.72(b)(2)(1).                                                  ,
initiated. During the performance of this surveillance, it was noted that the valve appeared to be operating improperly. The measured leakrate was larger with the valve Indicating closed than with it Indicating open.                              g j            The discrepancy was discussed with the Technical Staff Engineer (STE) (non-Itcensed) in charge of LLRT. It was                          t determined that the surveillance was properly performed. Based on this inforestion, the appropriate NRC l            notification via the ENS phone system was made at 1522 pursuant to 10CFR54.72(b)(2)(1).                                                  ,
l 5:ptembsr 19 to October 9,1989:
l 5:ptembsr 19 to October 9,1989:
                                                                                                                            ..
,
Due to the design of the valN, correct valve stem travel could not be made by direct observation. The valve is                          a l
Due to the design of the valN, correct valve stem travel could not be made by direct observation. The valve is                          a l
operated by electro-magnetic cells and both the stem and the coi?s are encapsulated. Several additional LLRTs j            were performed on the valve. Each time the results tended to indicate reverse operation, but were not                                    ,
operated by electro-magnetic cells and both the stem and the coi?s are encapsulated. Several additional LLRTs j            were performed on the valve. Each time the results tended to indicate reverse operation, but were not                                    ,
Line 172: Line 123:
I            The valve was removed and bench tested in the maintenance shop. The test ladicated that the leads from the
I            The valve was removed and bench tested in the maintenance shop. The test ladicated that the leads from the
;            encapsulated cell were lepropeely labeled. This caused 15e valve to operate in reverse. The valve passed air i            freely when the closing coll (leads labeled I and 2) were energlied. hn the opening coil was energised. (leads                            ,
;            encapsulated cell were lepropeely labeled. This caused 15e valve to operate in reverse. The valve passed air i            freely when the closing coll (leads labeled I and 2) were energlied. hn the opening coil was energised. (leads                            ,
j            labeled 3 and 4) the valve seemed to isolate flow. Wn the opening cold was deenerglied, air flow increased
j            labeled 3 and 4) the valve seemed to isolate flow. Wn the opening cold was deenerglied, air flow increased significantly but reesined less than amount allowed when the closing cell was energized. In normal
'
'
significantly but reesined less than amount allowed when the closing cell was energized. In normal
* service the
* service the
                                                                                                                                   ~
                                                                                                                                   ~
Line 187: Line 135:
                                                                                                                                                                 .yg,n,q yp
                                                                                                                                                                 .yg,n,q yp
   -.          ,wwa.                  .            .    .
   -.          ,wwa.                  .            .    .
                                                                      ,
                                                                                   , a v.w w v ,                  ,    .n      ,n      n ,. n        ma.g m., ,            9 Lseemese euunrr arcant atant fruf taurt==rsam                                                                  ra m anw 2.s        ;
                                                                                   , a v.w w v ,                  ,    .n      ,n      n ,. n        ma.g m., ,            9
FACILITY leME (1)                      900dT IRBSER (2)                            LER "- - M1                                                      Pama (L Year      ///  Seguentist          //j/      Revision                                .
      .
Lseemese euunrr arcant atant fruf taurt==rsam                                                                  ra m anw 2.s        ;
* FACILITY leME (1)                      900dT IRBSER (2)                            LER "- - M1                                                      Pama (L
                                                                                                                                                                    '
                          '
Year      ///  Seguentist          //j/      Revision                                .
fff    ""~                ff                                                '
fff    ""~                ff                                                '
                                                                                                           ///                      ///        Number.
                                                                                                           ///                      ///        Number.
tral "i                                e i s I e I e I e i di s16 e19                      -  a11Ie                  -        eIe lal2                    or el d l            TEXT          Energy Industry Identification System (E!IS) codes are identified in the test as (KK)
tral "i                                e i s I e I e I e i di s16 e19                      -  a11Ie                  -        eIe lal2                    or el d l            TEXT          Energy Industry Identification System (E!IS) codes are identified in the test as (KK)
: 9. DESCRIPTION Of EVENT: (Continued)                                                                                                                                    ,
: 9. DESCRIPTION Of EVENT: (Continued)                                                                                                                                    ,
                                                                                                                                                                                      '
October 9, 1989:
October 9, 1989:
l                The manufacturer provided the station with expected resistance values for the coils. The colts were tsumediately tested with the following results:                                                                                                                                  ;
l                The manufacturer provided the station with expected resistance values for the coils. The colts were tsumediately tested with the following results:                                                                                                                                  ;
                                                                                                                                                                                      ,
As tabeled                          Expected                                          As Found I-2 (close)                      160 to 170 ohms-                                  146.8 olas I
As tabeled                          Expected                                          As Found I-2 (close)                      160 to 170 ohms-                                  146.8 olas I
3-4 (open)                        145 to 155 ohms                                    162.4 ohns Based on the results of the numerous tests the following have been concluded                                                                                        r
3-4 (open)                        145 to 155 ohms                                    162.4 ohns Based on the results of the numerous tests the following have been concluded                                                                                        r
Line 208: Line 148:
: 2. The charga in valve position when the closing coil was desnergized is a component failure. This failure made detection of the error virtually' lepossible In' normal service.
: 2. The charga in valve position when the closing coil was desnergized is a component failure. This failure made detection of the error virtually' lepossible In' normal service.
p        .-          ,                                                                                      .w.        . -._ , , ,                    , . .      . . , .
p        .-          ,                                                                                      .w.        . -._ , , ,                    , . .      . . , .
                                                                                                                                                                          .
l Operator actions neither increased nor decreased the severit*; of the' event eti plant conditions remained stable.                                                  ,
l Operator actions neither increased nor decreased the severit*; of the' event eti plant conditions remained stable.                                                  ,
This event is being reported pursuant to 10CFh50.73(a)(2)(II) - Any event .,r condition that resulted in                                              the condition of the nuclear power plant, incInding its principal saaty barriers being seriously degraded.
This event is being reported pursuant to 10CFh50.73(a)(2)(II) - Any event .,r condition that resulted in                                              the condition of the nuclear power plant, incInding its principal saaty barriers being seriously degraded.
                                                                                                                                                                                      -
                                                                                                                                                                    '
1 C. CAUSE OF EVENT:
1 C. CAUSE OF EVENT:
The cause of this event was a preservice error. The cells were improperly labeled either during manufacturing or                                                    i l                  Installation. A review of the work roguest history for tl.e IPS229B did notJdentify any work activities that wee %d have required re-labeling the leads. The labels on the leads were compared to a new cell assembly in the _
The cause of this event was a preservice error. The cells were improperly labeled either during manufacturing or                                                    i l                  Installation. A review of the work roguest history for tl.e IPS229B did notJdentify any work activities that wee %d have required re-labeling the leads. The labels on the leads were compared to a new cell assembly in the _
Oraldwood Storeroom. The labels looked steller however, upon closer inspection, it was determined that the labels en the new assembly had a plastic co-ting. The labels on the 1pS2298 did not have a plastic coating. The investigatten to determine where and when the mis-labeling occurred is still in progress.
Oraldwood Storeroom. The labels looked steller however, upon closer inspection, it was determined that the labels en the new assembly had a plastic co-ting. The labels on the 1pS2298 did not have a plastic coating. The investigatten to determine where and when the mis-labeling occurred is still in progress.
l
l Contributing to this event was component failure. The failure of the valve to remain in the closed position when the closing coil was doenerglaed made detectlen of the error virtually impossible during normal operation. An investigation to determine th6 mode of failure is in progress.                                                                                                        1
                                                                                                                                                                                      '
Contributing to this event was component failure. The failure of the valve to remain in the closed position when the closing coil was doenerglaed made detectlen of the error virtually impossible during normal operation. An investigation to determine th6 mode of failure is in progress.                                                                                                        1
: 0. SAFETY ANALYSISI                                                                                        _
: 0. SAFETY ANALYSISI                                                                                        _
                                                                                                                            -
                              ,
This event had no effect on tne safety of the plant or the public. The 08 Hydrogsn Analyzer piping is a closed                                                        (
This event had no effect on tne safety of the plant or the public. The 08 Hydrogsn Analyzer piping is a closed                                                        (
loop that provides a flowpeth to the analyzer from containment and discharges back to the containment.                                                                l
loop that provides a flowpeth to the analyzer from containment and discharges back to the containment.                                                                l l
.
ll
' .
l ll
                                                               ^
                                                               ^
                                              *-
2sese(101289)/d        ,                                                                                                                                                    j l
2sese(101289)/d        ,                                                                                                                                                    j l
    .          . ---                    _ ..        . _ ._ . __ _ . . _ . . .            _ . _ _          . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ - . . _ . . _ , , _ _ . _ . _


[y ,
[y ,
T[$DY[fffLW@X${Tf@Tff3VW
T[$DY[fffLW@X${Tf@Tff3VW j , .r        . ,-
          ,
j , .r        . ,-
                                         ; y. g . .,A y .#.,,g ,9        ,
                                         ; y. g . .,A y .#.,,g ,9        ,
g, 3 ; , y , _, 7 gg,          ,g,.,,,                  , g ,,    g ,9., ,,    ,ggg ifronsase gueur 'N f LER) ftXT re88f 8'****RM                                                        Fasm Raw 2.8
g, 3 ; , y , _, 7 gg,          ,g,.,,,                  , g ,,    g ,9., ,,    ,ggg ifronsase gueur 'N f LER) ftXT re88f 8'****RM                                                        Fasm Raw 2.8 00CRET IRDBER (2)                    LER ~ - 161                                                Pama (Si FACILITV NAfE (1)
            *
* 00CRET IRDBER (2)                    LER ~ - 161                                                Pama (Si FACILITV NAfE (1)
                              '
                    ',
                            '
Year  //j/ Sequentiel ff      "-
Year  //j/ Sequentiel ff      "-
                                                                                                                                     //j ff
                                                                                                                                     //j ff
Line 250: Line 172:
l aral? " i                            e I s i e I e i e 141 si al eie              -      eii1e                    -      eia        el 4 or    el 4 TEXT        Energy Industry Identification System (E!!$) codes are identified in the text as (XX) l l
l aral? " i                            e I s i e I e i e 141 si al eie              -      eii1e                    -      eia        el 4 or    el 4 TEXT        Energy Industry Identification System (E!!$) codes are identified in the text as (XX) l l
2 E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:
2 E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:
                                                                                                                                                                                ,
Aa investigation to determine where and when the mis-labeling occurred is still in progress. The investigation trill be tracked to completion by action ites 456-200-89-14901_. Should any additional information concerning where cad /or when the mis-labeling occurred be determined, as well as any additional corrective actions, it will be dicumented in a supplement to this report.
Aa investigation to determine where and when the mis-labeling occurred is still in progress. The investigation trill be tracked to completion by action ites 456-200-89-14901_. Should any additional information concerning where cad /or when the mis-labeling occurred be determined, as well as any additional corrective actions, it will be dicumented in a supplement to this report.
As investigation to determine the failure mode of the valve is in progress. The investigation will be tracked to completion ey action item 456-200-09-14902. Shov1d any additional information concerning the mode of failure be determined, as well as any additional corrective actions, it will be documented in a supplement to this report.
As investigation to determine the failure mode of the valve is in progress. The investigation will be tracked to completion ey action item 456-200-09-14902. Shov1d any additional information concerning the mode of failure be determined, as well as any additional corrective actions, it will be documented in a supplement to this report.
                                                                                                                                                                               ]
                                                                                                                                                                               ]
_
                                                                                                                                                                              "
The IPS2298 is being replaced with a different model valve during the current refueling outage. The 'tplacement valve will be tested in accordance with the Station modification program. There are five steller Hydrogen Analyser Containment Isolation Valves on Unit 1. These valves are also being replaced . This will be tracked to eempletion by action itse 456-200-89-14903.
The IPS2298 is being replaced with a different model valve during the current refueling outage. The 'tplacement valve will be tested in accordance with the Station modification program. There are five steller Hydrogen Analyser Containment Isolation Valves on Unit 1. These valves are also being replaced . This will be tracked to eempletion by action itse 456-200-89-14903.
l                    These are six sieller Hydrogen Analyzer Containment Isolation Valves on Unit 2. The LLRT's for these valves were reviewed. . Based i,n this review it has been concluded that these valves are operating correctly. These valves
l                    These are six sieller Hydrogen Analyzer Containment Isolation Valves on Unit 2. The LLRT's for these valves were reviewed. . Based i,n this review it has been concluded that these valves are operating correctly. These valves will be ' replaced as part of a modification curMntly' scheduled'for the' first refuel outage. This wlil be tracked to completion by action item 456-200-49-14904.                                                                                                --
  ,
              '
will be ' replaced as part of a modification curMntly' scheduled'for the' first refuel outage. This wlil be tracked
                                                                                  '
  '
to completion by action item 456-200-49-14904.                                                                                                --
F. PREVIOU$ OCCURRENCES:
F. PREVIOU$ OCCURRENCES:
    ;
a Mone.                                                                                                                                                  a_
a Mone.                                                                                                                                                  a_
i          G. COWOMDif FAILURE DATA:
i          G. COWOMDif FAILURE DATA:
Manufacturer                    Nomenclature            w    Model Number                  MFG Part Number
Manufacturer                    Nomenclature            w    Model Number                  MFG Part Number Valcor Eng Corp                Isolation valve              V526-5395-1                    183160001 1
                                            &
Valcor Eng Corp                Isolation valve              V526-5395-1                    183160001 1
l l
l l
                                                                    .
46 1
46 1
1P N
1P N
Line 280: Line 189:
i
i
         !        1885m(191289)/5
         !        1885m(191289)/5
* 7't 'i
* 7't 'i p    ,.      - - . . _ _ . . . .            ..,,}}
                                                                                          .
p    ,.      - - . . _ _ . . . .            ..,,}}

Latest revision as of 18:12, 18 February 2020

LER 89-010-00:on 890915,measured Leakrate of Hydrogen Analyzer Containment Isolation Valve Was Larger W/Valve Indicating Closed.Caused by Incorrect Labeling of Coil Leads.Valve Replaced W/Different Model valve.W/891012 Ltr
ML19325D485
Person / Time
Site: Braidwood Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 10/13/1989
From: Bal G, Querio R
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
BW-89-1199, LER-89-010-04, LER-89-10-4, NUDOCS 8910240246
Download: ML19325D485 (5)


Text

ry: ,

I 4

Commonwe:lth Edison s

~'" ..

Br:Idwood Nuclair Powsr St: tion i

' 1 Rout 3 C1. Box 84

. . Telephone 815/458-2801 1 1

1 I

l l

October 12,1989 1 BW/89-1199 -

i i '

a U. S. Nuclear Regtilatory Commis:lon Document Control Desk ,

Washington, D.C. 20555  :

Dear Sir:

The enclosed Licensee Event Report from Braidwood Generating '

Station is being transmitted to you in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii) which requires a 30 day written report.  ;

I This report is number 89-010-00; Docket No. 50-456. 7 1

Very truly yours, t e

(

W w R. E. Queri

[ Station Manager Braidwood Nuclear Station -

REQ /AJS/jfe (7126z)

Enclosure:

Licensee Event Report No. 89-010-00 ,

cc: NRC Region III Administrator '

NRC Resident Inspector INPO Record Center

CECO Dietribution 1;st t

i i

P f

, 8910240246 891013 PDR ADOCK 05000456 S PDC ,

ll i l

.. . . - . . . _ . __ _-_._....L . . ,

yj sy, u.- ,

e. ,, , ,  % 3, 7 ,m; . ,

p 1 '

g,#,

. c LICENSEE EVDif REPORT (LER) ,_

Docket Number (2) pam d) rc,cility hame (1) ersidwood i el st 01010141 s16 1lerlel4 "tle (4) Reverse Operation of Hydrogen Analy;er Containment Isolation Valve due to a Preservice Wire Labeling Frror.

Event Date (5) LER Humber (6) ammart Data (7) Other Facilities involved (8)

Year // Sequential Revision Month Day Year Facilliv  % Docket Number (s)

Mo.tth Day Year

/jj/j/ //jj/

f

/ Number ,,,__ /// "^r u.a. 01 si el el el i1

! _01 9 '_' s el 9 al 9

~

0l110

~

01 0 110 11 3 al 9 01 $1 Cl el el l l THIS RE*0RT IS SUOMITTED PURSUAhT TO THE REQUIREENTS OF 10CFR 0

l (Check one.ar more of the followinal (11) 5 !20.402(b) __ 20.405(c) _ 50.73(a)(2)(lv) _ 73.71(b)

POWER __ 20.405(a)(1)(1) _ 50.36(c)(1) _ 50.73(a)(2)(v) _ 73.71(c) l Other (Specify LEVEL g ,___ 20.405(a)(1)(ll) _ 50.36(c)(2) _ 50.73(a)(2)(vil) _

! g in Abstract i101 0 I_ 0 1 0 .__

20,405(a)(1)(lit) _ 50.73(a)(2)(1) __ 50.73(a)(2)(vill)(A) 20.405(a)(1)(iv) J_ 50.73(a)(2)(li) 50.73(a)(2)(vill)(8) below and in

////////,////,////,//////,//// __

Text)

///////'j////j///}/////j/////

/ / _ 20.405(a)(1)(v) _ 50.73(a)(2)(li t ) __,_ 50.73(a)(2)(x)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR TH1$ LER f12)

TELEPHONE Hlimik Name AREA CODE Jary_ Ba1. Technical Staf f Group Leader Ext. 2245 8l1l5 dl 5181 l 2181 Of COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EAEH C0ff'ONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

MANUFAC- REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC- REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM C0rtPONENT TURER TO NPRDS TURER TO NPRDS j ,,,_.]L KlN _11 $1 VI VI 01 31 0 Y~

I l 1 l- 1 l l l l l 1 I I t' I I I l i I I l

SUPPLEMENTAL REIORT EXPECTED (14) Expected tinnth l Dav l Yeat l

' Subalssion X l le Dak m) g l;l;

._..lYes (If vis. cowole6alKPimD SUBMISU0tl DATE)

ABSTRACT (Limit te 1400 spaces, i.e, approximately fif teen single-space typewritten ilncs) (16)

At 04'JO on September 15, 1989, the Leakage Rate Survelliance (LLRT) for 1PS2298, 08 Hydrogen Analyzer Centalnn.ent Isolation Valve, was initiated. The measured leakrate was larger with the valve indicating closed. 'The correct valve stem travel could not be asG4 by direct observatten because the valve;and cell assembly are encapsulated. Several additional LLRTs were performed on the valve. Ea:h time the results ,

indicated reverse operett . . but were inconclusive. The wiring was checked and found to be correct. The valve was removed and bene. tested. The leads from the encapsulated coil were found to be improperly Itbeled. The valve also drif ted to mid-position when the closed cell was deewergized. No work activities were identified that would have required re-labeling. The labels on the leads were compared to a new coli assembly. The new labels were steller but had a plastic coating which IPS2298 did not heve. The failure of the valve to remain in the closed position when the closing cell was deenergized made detection of the error virtually impossible during normal operation. An f r.vestigation to fetermine the mode of failure and when the cis-labeling occurred la still in progress. IPS229B is being replaced with a dif ferent model valve i,hlen will be tested in accordance with the Station modification program. There have been no previous occurrences.

=.

.b 2885m(131289)/2 b_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ _ __ ._ , _, _ ,

+ y .-.m e y p.m_ps%<.i.p py w.:-w w. g w w -9 y .,$ s y g v ~ ++ ~

m3A,u q  ?

-g - g 4 3 . 4. c + . > + . < a, u .. , s , .3 i . yy

  • T i  %~ +

tn.--- rwur apear atrai ramt .-. - nas r. ns n.e (

00CKF,T 14BSER (2) LER I m 16) Paan (31 FACILITY IWE (1)

Year /// Sequer.tlal ff//j

/ Revision fff

/// theser /// "^r {

l .oraidweed i e i s I e i e I e 1 41 s1 6 319 - ei11e - e i e I el i cr el 4 )

I TEXT Energy Industry Identificetten System (E!!$) codes are identified in the text as (KK) 1 J

3 A. PLANT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT:

f i

Unit: Braidwood 1: Event Date: September 15, 1969; Event Time: 0400; l Mode: 5 - Cold Shutdown; Rx Power 01; 4

! t RCS (AB) Temperature / Pressure: Ambient l .. l 1

8. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

1 i

There were no systems or components inoperable at the beginning of the event which contributed to the severity of i the event.  ;

j Lccal Leakrate Testing (LLRT) surveillance on the Process Sampilng Containment Isolation Valves (PS) (KN] in ,

I a:cordance with Braldwood Technical Staff Surveillance Procedure,19wV$ 6.1.2.d-1.6 was in progress.

i

'. . 5:ptomber if 1989: ..-

r . ., . c .m .. . . . . , 9 l ~

At appro Imately 0400 the surveillance' for IPS2296, 08 Hydrogen Analyzer Containment Isolation Valve; was~~ +

initiated. During the performance of this surveillance, it was noted that the valve appeared to be operating improperly. The measured leakrate was larger with the valve Indicating closed than with it Indicating open. g j The discrepancy was discussed with the Technical Staff Engineer (STE) (non-Itcensed) in charge of LLRT. It was t determined that the surveillance was properly performed. Based on this inforestion, the appropriate NRC l notification via the ENS phone system was made at 1522 pursuant to 10CFR54.72(b)(2)(1). ,

l 5:ptembsr 19 to October 9,1989:

Due to the design of the valN, correct valve stem travel could not be made by direct observation. The valve is a l

operated by electro-magnetic cells and both the stem and the coi?s are encapsulated. Several additional LLRTs j were performed on the valve. Each time the results tended to indicate reverse operation, but were not ,

+

c nclusive. The wiring was cisched and found to be correct.

I The valve was removed and bench tested in the maintenance shop. The test ladicated that the leads from the

encapsulated cell were lepropeely labeled. This caused 15e valve to operate in reverse. The valve passed air i freely when the closing coll (leads labeled I and 2) were energlied. hn the opening coil was energised. (leads ,

j labeled 3 and 4) the valve seemed to isolate flow. Wn the opening cold was deenerglied, air flow increased significantly but reesined less than amount allowed when the closing cell was energized. In normal

  • service the

~

cotis are only energized during actuantes movement.

The manufacturer Valcor Ergineering Corporatten wat :ontacted for assistance.

g.

2685m(101119)/3 i

p; o.mm% in,3&m y ym ygg,y,(yy,y y,.p; - +

p y:,,7 pn , e n,

.yg,n,q yp

-. ,wwa. . . .

, a v.w w v , , .n ,n n ,. n ma.g m., , 9 Lseemese euunrr arcant atant fruf taurt==rsam ra m anw 2.s  ;

FACILITY leME (1) 900dT IRBSER (2) LER "- - M1 Pama (L Year /// Seguentist //j/ Revision .

fff ""~ ff '

/// /// Number.

tral "i e i s I e I e I e i di s16 e19 - a11Ie - eIe lal2 or el d l TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (E!IS) codes are identified in the test as (KK)

9. DESCRIPTION Of EVENT: (Continued) ,

October 9, 1989:

l The manufacturer provided the station with expected resistance values for the coils. The colts were tsumediately tested with the following results:  ;

As tabeled Expected As Found I-2 (close) 160 to 170 ohms- 146.8 olas I

3-4 (open) 145 to 155 ohms 162.4 ohns Based on the results of the numerous tests the following have been concluded r

1. The coil leads were labeled backwards.
2. The charga in valve position when the closing coil was desnergized is a component failure. This failure made detection of the error virtually' lepossible In' normal service.

p .- , .w. . -._ , , , , . . . . , .

l Operator actions neither increased nor decreased the severit*; of the' event eti plant conditions remained stable. ,

This event is being reported pursuant to 10CFh50.73(a)(2)(II) - Any event .,r condition that resulted in the condition of the nuclear power plant, incInding its principal saaty barriers being seriously degraded.

1 C. CAUSE OF EVENT:

The cause of this event was a preservice error. The cells were improperly labeled either during manufacturing or i l Installation. A review of the work roguest history for tl.e IPS229B did notJdentify any work activities that wee %d have required re-labeling the leads. The labels on the leads were compared to a new cell assembly in the _

Oraldwood Storeroom. The labels looked steller however, upon closer inspection, it was determined that the labels en the new assembly had a plastic co-ting. The labels on the 1pS2298 did not have a plastic coating. The investigatten to determine where and when the mis-labeling occurred is still in progress.

l Contributing to this event was component failure. The failure of the valve to remain in the closed position when the closing coil was doenerglaed made detectlen of the error virtually impossible during normal operation. An investigation to determine th6 mode of failure is in progress. 1

0. SAFETY ANALYSISI _

This event had no effect on tne safety of the plant or the public. The 08 Hydrogsn Analyzer piping is a closed (

loop that provides a flowpeth to the analyzer from containment and discharges back to the containment. l l

ll

^

2sese(101289)/d , j l

[y ,

T[$DY[fffLW@X${Tf@Tff3VW j , .r . ,-

y. g . .,A y .#.,,g ,9 ,

g, 3 ; , y , _, 7 gg, ,g,.,,, , g ,, g ,9., ,, ,ggg ifronsase gueur 'N f LER) ftXT re88f 8'****RM Fasm Raw 2.8 00CRET IRDBER (2) LER ~ - 161 Pama (Si FACILITV NAfE (1)

Year //j/ Sequentiel ff "-

//j ff

/ Revisten

"^r I

lil ///

l aral? " i e I s i e I e i e 141 si al eie - eii1e - eia el 4 or el 4 TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (E!!$) codes are identified in the text as (XX) l l

2 E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Aa investigation to determine where and when the mis-labeling occurred is still in progress. The investigation trill be tracked to completion by action ites 456-200-89-14901_. Should any additional information concerning where cad /or when the mis-labeling occurred be determined, as well as any additional corrective actions, it will be dicumented in a supplement to this report.

As investigation to determine the failure mode of the valve is in progress. The investigation will be tracked to completion ey action item 456-200-09-14902. Shov1d any additional information concerning the mode of failure be determined, as well as any additional corrective actions, it will be documented in a supplement to this report.

]

The IPS2298 is being replaced with a different model valve during the current refueling outage. The 'tplacement valve will be tested in accordance with the Station modification program. There are five steller Hydrogen Analyser Containment Isolation Valves on Unit 1. These valves are also being replaced . This will be tracked to eempletion by action itse 456-200-89-14903.

l These are six sieller Hydrogen Analyzer Containment Isolation Valves on Unit 2. The LLRT's for these valves were reviewed. . Based i,n this review it has been concluded that these valves are operating correctly. These valves will be ' replaced as part of a modification curMntly' scheduled'for the' first refuel outage. This wlil be tracked to completion by action item 456-200-49-14904. --

F. PREVIOU$ OCCURRENCES:

a Mone. a_

i G. COWOMDif FAILURE DATA:

Manufacturer Nomenclature w Model Number MFG Part Number Valcor Eng Corp Isolation valve V526-5395-1 183160001 1

l l

46 1

1P N

I n

t i

I l

i

! 1885m(191289)/5

  • 7't 'i p ,. - - . . _ _ . . . . ..,,