ML20005E856

LER 89-018-00:on 891215,as Lead on volt-ohm Meter Landed, Containment Bldg Fuel Handling Incident Area Radiation Monitor Went Into Alert Alarm & Interlock Actuation.Caused by Procedure Deficiency.Signal reset.W/900102 Ltr

ML20005E856
Person / Time
Site:	Braidwood
Issue date:	01/02/1990
From:	Holland P, Querio R COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
BW-89-3224, LER-89-018-04, LER-89-18-4, NUDOCS 9001110186
Download: ML20005E856 (4)

Text

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L ....9 .i e u "' Commonwealth Edison  !

it Crcidwood Nuclear Power St: tion  !

, Rout]C1, Box 64

. Bracoville, Illinois 60407 1 4

Telephone 815/456-2801 l l

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January 2,1990 1 l1 BW/89-3224 y

i L i d

i.,

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk  ;

Washington, D.C. 20555 -

Dear Sir:

The enclosed Licensee Event Report from Braidwood Generating .

Station is being transmitted to you in accordance with the requirements of

'10CFR50.73(a)(2)(lv) which requires a 30-day written report.  ;

This report is number 89-018-00; Docket No. 50-456.

Very truly yours, A&

5 R. E. Querlo Station Manager .

Braidwood Nuclear Station REQ /JDW/jfe ,

(7126z)

Enclosure:

Licensee Event Report No. 89-018-00 cc: NRC Region III Administrator -

NRC Resident inspector .

INPO Record Center CECO Distribution List n

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LICtWSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) 7,m ,,v , ,

factitty'Name (1) Docket %mber (2) Pane (3) trait r f 1 01 El el el el 41 El 6 1 ! ef! 0 l 3 Title (4) f Cantainment Ventilation laelattan Slanal Due in Survalliance Prettdure Deficionev Event Date ($) LER Waber (6) Resort Date (7) OtSer Factitties Involnd (B)  ;

Month Day Year Year /// Sequential /// Revision Month Day Year Facili*v Names Det6et haberf s) l

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/// Laber Nort 01 51 01 el 01 l l 11 2 11 s al 9 al 9 0I1Ie 010 011 of 2 91 0 01 El 01 01 01 l 1 THIS REPORT !$ $UBMITTED PUR$UANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR OPERATING (Check one er more of the followine) (111 1 -

20.402(b) 20.405(c) ,l_ 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 73.71(b)

POWER _ 20.405(a)(1)(i) 50.36(c)(1)

__ 50.73(a)(2)(v) _ 73.7)(c) trVEL 20.405(a)(1)(ti) 50.36(c)(2) . , , , . 50.73(a)(2)(vii) Other (Specify

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(101 0 I1 IB .,_,.,. 20.405(a)(1)(iii) _ 50.73(a)(2)(t) __ 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) in Abstract

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/ // / ////,//,/,///// __ 20.405(a)(1)(iv) _ 50.73(a)(2)(ii) _ 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) below and in

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/ / __ 20.405(a)(1)(v) ,_ 50.73(a)(2)(lit) _,_ 50.73(a)(2)(x) Text) i LICENSEE CONTACT FOR TH1$ LER (12)

Name TELEPJjQ!iUMBER AREA CODE P. G. Holland. Reaulaterv Angrance Ext. 2364 8l1l$ Al El Bl l 21 81 01 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COM ON N FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THl$ REPORT (13)

CAUSE COMPONENT MANUFAC- REPORTABLE CAUSE $YSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC- REPORTABLE

$Y$ TEM j TURER TO NPRDS TURER TO NPRD5 l l l l l l l l l l l l l i___ [,.]l l l l l l . l l l l l l l SUPPLEMENTAL REPf"tf EXPECTED (14) Expected Month l Day I Yeg.t Submission lye s (ILrg . o cognAltitlXPECTEDSUBC$1101] ATE) X l NO l l_j l ABSTRACT himit to 1400 spaces i.e. approximately fif teen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

Surveillance IBwVS 3.3.1-2. Monthly Digital Channel Operations 1 Test of Area Radiation Monitors 1RT-AR011 and 1RT-AR012 was in progress. The procedure required a lead to be lifted, contacts verified open or closed several times using a Volt-Ohm Meter (VOM), and the lead landed. At 1318 on December 15, 1989, as the lead was being landed the Containment Building fuel Handling Incident Area Radiation Monitor 1Rt AR011 (AR)(!L) vent into alert alarm and interlock actuation. The interlock function of monitor 1RT AR011 initiated a Train A Containment Ventilation isolation $ignal. No components were repositioned as the associated containment isolation valves were already closed. The root cause of this event was a deficient procedure. The procedure f ailed to direct removal of the V0M prior to landing the lead. This allowed a spike to occur as the lead was landed. The containment isolation signal was reset following verification that it we due to the performance of the surveillance. IBwVS 3.3.1-2 will be revised to include a step for removal of ',V VOM Prior to landing the lead. The other Technical Staf f radiation monitor surveillance procedures that have a potential for an Engineered $afety Feature actuation will be reviewed to ensure that the same deficiency does not exist. The procedures will be revised as necessary. Previous corrective actions are not applicable to this event.

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. .* q Llerstrr rytut atP0kT f Ltti TEKf MNTitanatifRf Fem tev 2.e FACILIfY HME (1) DOCKET N M ER (2) Ltt ** *d. ara ( 6 ) Paan (1)

Year /// Sequential /// Revisten lfl lf/

ifi un e iii u-- ~ r nral s:: 1 e I s I e i e I e I al 51 6 aIe - ei1Ia - e1 o el 2 or ei1 j.

TEXT Energy Industry Identificatleti System (Ell $) codes are identified in the text as (KK)

A. Plant Conditions Prior to Event:

Unit: Braidwood 1; Event Date: December 15, 1989 Event Time: 131B; Mode:.1 - Power Operation; Rx Power: 18%; RC$(AB) Temperature / Pressure: NOT/NOP B. Description of Event:

.I There were no systems or components inoperable at the beginning of the event which contributed to the s; verity of the event. Braidwood Technical Staff $vrveillance 19wY$ 3.3.1-2, Monthly Digital Channel Operational Test of 1RT-AR011 and 1RT-AR012 was in progress.

=16wV$ 3.3.1 2 is performed with an Instrument Maintenance (IM) Technician (non-licenced) in the field and a System Test Engineer ($fE) (non-licensed) in the Main Control Room (MCR). The $TE and IM were maintaining cintinuous communications in accordance with the procedure. The $TE read the steps, which included directing the IM to:

1) lif t field lead at TB2 terminal 16,

2) Using a Volt Ohm Meter (V0M), verify contacts at TB2 terminals 16 and 17 are t+en or closed several times, and ,

3). land fleid lead at TB2 te sinal 16.

At 1318 on December 15, 1989, as the IM was landing the field lead at TB2 terminal 16 the Containment Butiding Fuel Handling Incident Area Radiation Monitor 1RT-AR011 (AR)(IL) went into alert alats and interlock actuation. The interlock function of monitor IRT-AR011 initiated a Train A Containment Ventilation Isolation Signal. The signal annunciated an alarm in the MCR. No components repositioned as the associated containment isolation valves were already closed.

Plant conditions remained stable throughout the event. Operator actions neither increased or decreased the ,

s; verity of the event.

At 1349 on December 15. 1989, the appropriate NRC notification via the EN$ phone system was made pursuant to 10CrR50.72(b)(2)(ii).

This event is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) - any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature, including the Reactor protection $ystem.

C. Cause of Event

• l The root cause of this event was a deficient procedure. The procedure failed to direct removal of the V0M prior to landing the field lead at TB2 terminal 16. This allowed the spike to occur as the lead was landed.

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, 2963m(122289)/3

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.._ t Liceutrr tyttti ktPORT f Ltal TEXT Colffinki&Titud Fem Rev 2.0 FACILITI IIM (1) DOCKET IADSER (2) Ltt samara (6) Pane (3)

Year /// Sequential /// Revisten fff fff

/// k+r /// "da r traid_r d 1 e i E 1 e 1 e I e 1 41 El 6 al9 - e11Ia - ei e el 3 or el 3 TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (E!!$) codes are identified in the text as (KX)

D. Safety Analysis:

This event had no effect on the safety of the plant er the public as all systems responded as designed.

l The Containment Purge Isolation valves were already closed at the time of the event. 1RT-AR012 was operable and available for redundant indication and actuation of the Train B Containment Ventilation Isolation $1gnal.

The worst case condition would be a failure of a Containment Fuel handling Incident Radiation Monitor Detector during the purge of the containment. The redundant Fuel Nandling Incident Radiation Monitor would generate a Containment Ventilation Isolation and the purge would be automatically secured as would have been the case in this event. This is enveloped in Section 6 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).

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E. Corrective Actions:

The containment isolation signal was reset following verification that it was due to the performance of the l surveillance.

1/2 Swv5 3.3.12 wl11 be revised to include a step for removal of the V0M prior to landing the fleid lead at TF2 temine) 16. This will be tracked to completion by action item 456-200-89-1980).

The other Technical Staff radiation onnitor surveillance procedures that have a potential for en Engineered Safety Feature actuation will be reviewed to ensure that the same deficiency does not exist. The procedures will be revised as necessary. This will be tracked to completion by action item 456-200-89-19802, r

F. pr$vious Occurrences:

There have been previous occurrences of spurious Containment Isolation Signals. In each case corrective actions were implemented addressing both root and contributing causes. previous corrective actions are not applicable to this event. . ,

i G. Component Failure Data:

This event was not caused by component f ailure, nor did any component f all as a result of this event.

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