ML20006B208

LER 89-019-00:on 891219,discovered That Procedure Did Not Adequately Test Response Times for High Steamline Pressure Rate Steamline Isolation Signal.Caused by Deficient Procedure.Procedures Re Response Time revised.W/900112 Ltr

ML20006B208
Person / Time
Site:	Braidwood
Issue date:	01/12/1990
From:	Querio R, Stanczak P COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
BW-90-0051, LER-89-019-04, NUDOCS 9002010095
Download: ML20006B208 (4)

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7 Commonwealth Edison Craldwood Nuclitt Pow 3r St: tion Rout 3 01, Box 84 Braceville, Illinois 60407 Telephone 815/458-2801

1 January 12,1990 BW/90-0051 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Dc;x

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Washington, D.C. 20555 i

Dear Sir:

The enclosed Licensee Event Report from Braidwood Generating Station is being transmitted to you in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(1) which requires a 30-day written report.

This report is number 89 =0t$-00; Docket No. 50-456.-

oli Very truly yours, h.

R. E, Querlo 4 )>

Station Manager Braidwood Nuclear Station l

REQ /JDW/jfe (7126z)

Enclosure:

Licensee Event Report No. 89-016-00 cc: NRC Region III Administrator NRC Resident Inspector -

INPO Record Center CECO Distribution List L nemamshise e

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scaldwood 1 of El el el el di 11 s 1lmflel3 Title (4)

Failure to Adequately Test High $teamline Pressure Rate $tynal Response flee Due to a Deficient Procedure Event Dale ($) LER %sbar (6) Ranort Date (7) Other Facilities Involved (B)

Month Day Year Year /// Sequential /j/j/ Revision Month Day Year Facility Names Dettet Numberft) fff f

/// %mber /// %mber staidwood 2 01 s1 01 01 141s17

_11 2 11 9 el 9 81 9 0l1l9

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01 0 0l1 11 2 91 0 01 $1 01 01 01 l l THl$ REPori !$ $UBMITTED PUR$UANT TO THE REQUIRCMENi$ OF 10CFR OPEWE (Chet> one er more of the fellowinoi fil) 1 20.402(b) __ 20.405(c) _ 50.73(a)(2)(iv) __ 73.7)(b)

POWER .__., 20.405(a)(1)(1) _ 50.36(c)(1) __._ 50.73(a)(2)(v) _._ 73.7)(c)

LEVEL __ 20.405(s)(1)(ti) ____ 50.36(c)(2) _ $0.73(a)(2)(vii) ,_ Other (Specify

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( 0 l5l 0 __._ 20.40$(a)(1)(i44) J._ 50.73(a)(2)(t) ___ 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) in Abstract

/ / //,// / / / / //,/,/ /,//,//,/,/ / / // / _ 20.405(a)(1)(iv) _ 50.73(a)(2)(li) __._ 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) below and in

///j// ///// / /j//,/

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// _,__ 20 .405 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( v ) __ 50.73(a)(2)(tii) _._ 50.73(a)(2)(x) Text)

LICENSEE CONIACT FOR THIS LER (12)

Name TELEPHONr NUseER AREA CODE Paul Stantrak. Technical Staf f Enoineer Ext. 2486 f81115 41El81 l2181el COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMn0NEN FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAU$E S $ TEM COMPOWENT MANUFAC- REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC- REPORTABLE TURER TO WPRDS TURER TO NPRDS I l l l l l l l l l 1 I I I

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I I I l l 1 l l 1 l1 I I I l SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) Expected Month l Dav l Year Submission lyes (If vts. tomriete EXPEC1Ep,_$(md111QiLDATE) X l NO l ll ll ABS?RACT (Lielt to 1400 spaces, i.e. approximately fif teen single-spce typewritten lines) (16)

I On December 19, 1989 during a review of procedure IBwVS 3.2.2-1. a Systee Test Engineer ($TC) discovered that I the procedure did not adequately test response times for the High $teamline Pressure Rate Steamline Isolation l signal. This Steamline Isolation function is only required in Mode 3 when RCS pressure is below the  !

Perwissive 11(P-11) setpoint of 1930 psig and the Low $teamline Pressure signal has been blocked. The STE i identified that placing the Solid State Protectico System output mode selector switch in the test position I bypassed the P 11 permissive. As a result performance of the procedure would have measured the response time j of the Low Steamline Pressure circuitry instead. A review of the Pre-operational Tests has idertified that I the testing of the circuitry was properly perf erwed for both Units. A review of the performante history of l i procedure 16<VS 3.2.2-1 and its Ur.it 2 counter part 2BwV$ 3.2.2-1 has identified that 1BwV$ 3.2.2-1 was l perf ormed on F ebruary 28,19BB and November 28, 1999. 2BwV$ 3.2.2-1 was performed on February 22. 1989. The i cause of this event was procedural deficiency. The procedures will be revised. The response times for the l High $teamline Pressure Rate Steamline Isolation Signal will be tested at the next outage of opportunity. A I roeiew of response time testing procedures will be conducted. There have been no previous occurrences.

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m LICEN1EE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT EONTINu& TION Fem tev 2.0 FAI.111TY AME (1) DOCKET NUPSER (2) LER NUPRER (6) Pane (3)

Year /// Sequential /// Revision fff ff j//

/// Number / Ntaber Braidwood 1 015101010141516 8l9 - 011l9 - 0l 0 01 2 0F 01 3 TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (E!!$) codes are identified in the text as [XX)

A.

PLANT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT:

l Unit: Braidwood 1; Event Date: December 19.-1989; Event Time: 1615; Mode: 1 - Power Operation; Rx Power: 50%;

1 RC$ [AB) Temperature / Pressure: NOT/NOP Unit: Braidwood 2; Mode: 1 - Power Operation; Rx Power: 100%;

RC$ Temperature / Pressure: NOT/NOP B. DE$CRIPTION OF EVENT:

i There were no systems or components inoperable at the beginning of the event which contributed to the severity of +

the event. 7 On December 19, 1989 during a review of the Unit 1 Engineered $afety Features (JE) Response Time Survelliance, IBwV$ 3.2.2-1, a System Test Engineer ($TC)(non-licensed engineer) discovered that the procedure did not adequately test response times for the High $teamline Pressure Rate signal. The purpose of this signal is to provide for Steamline isolation from a decrease in Main Steam 11ne [$8) pressure of 100'psig in </s a 50 second time interval. This protective function is active in Mode 3 when RC$ pressure .is below the Permissive 11(P-11) {

setpoint of 1930 psig and the Low $teamline Pressure signal of 640 psig has been blocked.

j The $TE identified that placing the Solid State Protection System ($$Ps)[JE] output mode selector switch in the l

test position bypassed the P-11 permissive. The mode selector which was placed in the test position as part of the establishment of initial conditions for the procedure. As a result the section of the procedure that measured' '

the response time of the Steamline Pressure Rate circuitry would have been measuring the response time of the Low f Steamline Pressure circuitry instead.

A review of the Pre-operational Tests has identified that the testing of High $teamline Pressure Rate circuitry cas properly performed for both Unit I and Unit 2. A review of the nerformance history of procedure IDwVS 3.2.2-1 i and its Unit 2 counter part 2BwVS 3.2.2 1 has identified the following.

1. 1BwV$ 3.2.2-1 February 28, 1988 November 28, 1989

2. 2BwV$ 3.2.2-1 February 22, 1989 This event is being reported pursuant to 10CFR$0.73(a)(2)(i) - any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical $pecifications.  !

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• LIEEN1EE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT EONTINuATION Fare Rev 2.0 FACIAJTY' Nbt (1) DOCKET NUS ER (2) LER NUPRER (6) Pane (3)

Year /// Sequential //p/ . Revision  ;

fff ff

/// Wimber /// Number Braideed 1 0 l $ 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 41 El 6 8l9 - 011l9 - 01 0 01 3 0F 01 3 TEXT Energy Industry Identification $ystem (E!!$) codes are identified in the text as (XX)

C. CAU$E OF EVENT:

The root cause of this event was a procedural deficiency. Perfoming the procedure as written failed to.

achieve the objective of measuring the response time of the High Steam 11ne Pressure Rate circuitry.

D. $AFETY ANALYS15: ,

i This event had no ef fect on the safety of the plant or the public. The respor.se times were verified acctptable during pre-operational testing. The typical response time of the circuit in question is less than 20r' mill-seconds. The High $teamline Pressure Rate circuitry is verified capable of perfoming its' isolation -

function on a routine frequency by Cperating Surveillance Procedures. The instruments associated with this circuitry are verified within calibration limits on a routine frequency by Instrument Surveillance Precedures. The Main $teamline Low Pressure $teamline Isolation Signals were Operable with response times ,

within their associated acceptance criteria whenever RC5 Pressure was above the P-11 setpoint except as' prsvided fcr within Technical $pecification Action $tatements. .

Under the worst case condition of an actual Steamline Rupture with the RCS below the P-11 setpoint there w:uld st'll be no ef fect. The circuitry was verified as completely functional by Operating and Instrument Survel116nce Procedures. Any reduction in response time would probably be more than compensate 6 for by the rsduced energy and temperatures contained in the primary and secondary plant when this circuitry is required to be active.  !

E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

l I Precedures 1 and 2BwVS 3.2.2-1 will be revised to provide for adequate response time testing of the High ,

! $tsamline Pressure Rate $teamline Isolation $ignal. These actions will be tracked to completion by action items 456-200-89-20101 and 456-200-89-20102 respectively, j Th3 response times for the High Steamline Pressure Rate Steamline Isolation Signal will be tested at the next cutage of opportunity. These actions will be tracked to completion by action items 456-200-89-20103 and- d 456-200-89-20104 respectively.

A review of response time testing procedures will be conducted to ensure that the specified circuits are '

1 adsquately tested. This action will be ' tracked to completion by action item 456-200-89-20105.

l 1 '

F. PREVIOU$ OCCURRENCES:

1 There have been no previous similar occurrences, i

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA:

This event was not the result of component f ailure, nor did any components f all as a result of this event.

2970m(010989)/4

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