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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20217G9961999-10-14014 October 1999 SER Accepting First 10-year Interval Inservice Insp Requests for Relief for Plant,Units 1 & ML20212A7441999-09-10010 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Alternatives Contained in Relief Request 12R-07 Provide Acceptable Level of Quality & Safety ML20210U8111999-08-0404 August 1999 SER Granting Licensee Relief Requests VR-1,VR-3 & Portion of VR-2 Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(ii).Relief Request VR-4 Does Not Require Explicit NRC Approval Because Relief Applies to Valves Not Required by 10CFR50.55a ML20210K9861999-07-30030 July 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee 60-day Response to GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Movs ML20207B6481999-05-25025 May 1999 SER Accepting Revised SGTR Analysis for Byron & Braidwood Stations.Revised Analysis Was Submitted to Support SG Replacement at Unit 1 of Each Station ML20205C5101999-03-21021 March 1999 Revised Safety Evaluation Supporting Improved TS Amends Issued by NRC on 981222 to FOLs NPF-37,NPF-66,NPF-72 & NPF-77.Revised Pages Include Editorial Corrections ML20155B6711998-10-26026 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Requests for Relief Associated with Second 10-yr Interval ISI Program Plan ML20154D4401998-10-0202 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Second 10-yr Interval ISI Program Request for Relief 12R-30 for Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20238F3281998-08-31031 August 1998 SER Approving Second 10-year Interval Inservice Insp Program Request for Relief 12R-14 for Braidwood Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20217K6331998-04-20020 April 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Methodology & Criteria Used in Generating Flaw Evaluation Charts for RPV of Braidwood IAW Section XI of ASME Code ML20216F4921998-03-11011 March 1998 Correction to Safety Evaluation Re Revised SG Tube Rapture Analysis ML20197B7531998-03-0404 March 1998 SER Accepting License Request for Relief from Immediate Implementation of Amended Requirements of 10CFR50.55a for Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20199G2591998-01-28028 January 1998 Safety Evaluation Rept Accepting Revised SG Tube Rupture Analysis ML20199H0031998-01-21021 January 1998 SER Accepting Pressure Temp Limits Rept & Methodology for Relocation of Reactor Coolant Sys pressure-temp Limit Curves & Low Temp Overpressure Protection Sys Limits for Byron Station,Units 1 & 2 & Braidwood Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20199C1401998-01-16016 January 1998 SER Accepting Request to Integrate Reactor Vessel Weld Metal Surveillance Program for Byron,Units 1 & 2 & Braidwood,Units 1 & 2 Per 10CFR50 ML20197G0041997-12-11011 December 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting First 10-yr Interval Insp Program Plan,Rev 4 & Associated Requests for Relief for Plant ML20198R3061997-10-27027 October 1997 Staff Evaluation Rept Concluding That Licensee IPE Complete Wrt Info Requested by GL 88-20 & Process Meets Intent of Subj GL ML20217C1681997-09-22022 September 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting Request for Relief from ASME Code,Section Iii,Div 2 for Repair of Damaged Concrete Reinforcement Steel NUREG-1335, Staff Evaluation Rept Concluding That Licensee IPE Complete Wrt Info Requested by GL 88-20 & Associated Guidance, NUREG-13351997-08-28028 August 1997 Staff Evaluation Rept Concluding That Licensee IPE Complete Wrt Info Requested by GL 88-20 & Associated Guidance, NUREG-1335 ML20141L9321997-05-29029 May 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting Use of ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Section Ix,Code Cases 2142-1 & 2143-1 for Reactor Coolant Sys for Plants ML20141B5551997-05-13013 May 1997 SE Accepting First 10-yr Interval Inservice Insp Program Plan Request for Relief NR-29 for Braidwood Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20140H8871997-05-0808 May 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Request for Relief from ASME Code Repair Requirements for ASME Code Class 3 Piping Ceco ML20129F9101996-10-25025 October 1996 Safety Evaluation Accepting Request to Apply LBB Analyses to Eliminate Large Primary Loop Pipe Rupture from Structural Design Basis for Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20059E2871993-12-30030 December 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 57,57,45,45,93,77,152 & 140 to Licenses NPF-37,NPF-66,NPF-72,NPF-77,NPF-11,NPF-18, DPR-39 & DPR-48 Respectively ML20058L9961990-08-0606 August 1990 Safety Evaluation Denying Licensee Response to Station Blackout Rule.Staff Recommends That Licensee Reevaluate Areas of Concern Identified in SER ML20247D1471989-07-18018 July 1989 SER Supporting Util Proposed Implementation of ATWS Design, Per 10CFR50.62 Requirements ML20155F1591988-10-0606 October 1988 Safety Evaluation Re Mixed Greases W/Greater than 5% Unqualified Contaminant in Limitorque Valve Operators. Insufficient Info Presented to Draw Conclusions ML20236L2001987-10-30030 October 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 11 to Licenses NPF-37 & NPF-66,respectively & Amend 1 to License NPF-72 ML20210R2061987-02-0606 February 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util 850517,0802,0823,1211 & 860429 Submittals Re Environ Effects of High Energy Line Breaks in Auxiliary Steam or Steam Generator Blowdown Sys. Design of Blowdown Sys Acceptable ML20210T2571987-02-0606 February 1987 SER Re Util 850802 Submittal Describing Design Details of Steam Generator Blowdown & Auxiliary Steam Sys to Detect & Isolate High Energy Line Breaks.Sys Design Acceptable, However,Two Deviations from IEEE-STD-297 Criteria Apparent ML20209C3571987-01-23023 January 1987 SER Supporting Facility Design,Per Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 4.5.2, Reactor Trip Sys Reliability,On-Line Testing ML20207Q2211987-01-16016 January 1987 SER Accepting Util 861117 Submittal on Utilization of Charcoal Absorber Matl in Safety & nonsafety-grade Air Filtration Units ML20211J7141986-11-0505 November 1986 Reevaluation & Affirmation of No Significant Change Finding Pursuant to Braidwood Station Unit 1 OL Antitrust Review ML20215D7341986-10-0101 October 1986 Safety Evaluation Re Util 860623 Request That One Startup Test Be Modified & Five Startup Tests Be Eliminated.Mod to Rod Drop Measurement Test & Elimination of Certain Other Startup Tests Acceptable ML20214N7201986-09-0909 September 1986 Safety Evaluation Conditionally Supporting Rod Swap Technique & Util Nuclear Analysis Methods for Control Rod Worth Measurements ML20206R0521986-06-25025 June 1986 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util 840229 & 860421 Responses to Generic Ltr 83-28,Items 3.2.1 & 3.2.2 Re post-maint Testing (All Other safety-related Components) ML20199K4021986-06-25025 June 1986 Safety Evaluation of Applicant 831105 & 840601 Responses to 830708 Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 2.1 (Part 1),requiring Identification of Reactor Trip Sys Components as safety- Related.Licensee Program Approved ML20197D5661986-05-0505 May 1986 SER Accepting Util Responses to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 1.2, Post-Trip Review - Data & Info Capabilities IR 05000456/19840441986-02-25025 February 1986 Supplemental SER Re Electrical Separation Deficiencies Revealed During Const Appraisal Team Insps 50-456/84-44 & 50-457/84-40 ML20154C3641986-02-25025 February 1986 Suppl to Safety Evaluation Supporting Results of Tests Conducted by Wyle Labs Contained in Test Rept 17769-01 to Justify Less Separation Between Class 1E & non-Class 1E Cables than Required by Reg Guide 1.75 ML20209J1091985-11-0505 November 1985 SER Supporting Licensee Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Items 3.1.3 & 3.2.3 Re post-maint Test Requirements That May Degrade Rather than Enhance Safety ML20138A8711985-10-0707 October 1985 Sser Supporting Util 850725 Proposed FSAR Change, Incorporating Nuclear Const Issues Group Rev 2 to Visual Weld Acceptance Criteria for Structural Welding at Nuclear Power Plants Into FSAR Table 3.8-2 & Section 3.10.3.2.2 ML20209G6381985-09-17017 September 1985 SER Supporting Util 831105 & 850215 Responses to Generic Ltr 83-28,Items 3.1.1 & 3.1.2, Post-Maint Testing Verification... & 4.1 & 4.5.1, Reactor Trip Sys Reliability.... Proposed Programs Meet Requirements ML20129H9071985-07-11011 July 1985 SER Accepting 850605 Submittal Re Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 1.1 on post-trip Review Program & Procedures ML20128M9391985-05-17017 May 1985 SER Based on Util 831105 Response to Generic Ltr 83-28, Item 1.1 Re post-trip Review Program Description & Procedure 1999-09-10
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217G9961999-10-14014 October 1999 SER Accepting First 10-year Interval Inservice Insp Requests for Relief for Plant,Units 1 & BW990066, Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Braidwood Station, Units 1 & 2.With1999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Braidwood Station, Units 1 & 2.With ML20217P6351999-09-29029 September 1999 Non-proprietary Rev 6 to HI-982083, Licensing Rept for Spent Fuel Rack Installation at Byron & Braidwood Nuclear Stations ML20217A1691999-09-22022 September 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Engine Sys,Inc Controllers,Manufactured Between Dec 1997 & May 1999,that May Have Questionable Soldering Workmanship.Caused by Inadequate Personnel Training.Sent Rept to All Nuclear Customers ML20212A7441999-09-10010 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Alternatives Contained in Relief Request 12R-07 Provide Acceptable Level of Quality & Safety BW990056, Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Braidwood Station, Units 1 & 2.With1999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Braidwood Station, Units 1 & 2.With ML20210R6421999-08-13013 August 1999 ISI Outage Rept for A2R07 ML20210U8111999-08-0404 August 1999 SER Granting Licensee Relief Requests VR-1,VR-3 & Portion of VR-2 Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(ii).Relief Request VR-4 Does Not Require Explicit NRC Approval Because Relief Applies to Valves Not Required by 10CFR50.55a BW990048, Monthly Operating Repts for Jul 1999 for Braidwood Station, Units 1 & 2.With1999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Jul 1999 for Braidwood Station, Units 1 & 2.With ML20210K9861999-07-30030 July 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee 60-day Response to GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Movs ML20216D3841999-07-12012 July 1999 Revised NFM9900022, Braidwood Unit 2 Cycle 8 COLR in ITS Format & W(Z) Function M990002, Revised NFM9900022, Braidwood Unit 2 Cycle 8 COLR in ITS Format & W(Z) Function1999-07-12012 July 1999 Revised NFM9900022, Braidwood Unit 2 Cycle 8 COLR in ITS Format & W(Z) Function BW990038, Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Braidwood Station, Units 1 & 2.With1999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Braidwood Station, Units 1 & 2.With BW990029, Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Braidwood Stations, Units 1 & 2.With1999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Braidwood Stations, Units 1 & 2.With ML20209H7481999-05-31031 May 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Braidwood Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20207B6481999-05-25025 May 1999 SER Accepting Revised SGTR Analysis for Byron & Braidwood Stations.Revised Analysis Was Submitted to Support SG Replacement at Unit 1 of Each Station ML20195B2591999-05-19019 May 1999 Rev 66a to CE-1-A,consisting of Proposed Changes to QAP for Dnps,Qcs,Znps,Lcs,Byron & Braidwood Stations BW990021, Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Braidwood Station, Units 1 & 2.With1999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Braidwood Station, Units 1 & 2.With BW990016, Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Braidwood Generating Station,Units 1 & 2.With1999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Braidwood Generating Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20205C5101999-03-21021 March 1999 Revised Safety Evaluation Supporting Improved TS Amends Issued by NRC on 981222 to FOLs NPF-37,NPF-66,NPF-72 & NPF-77.Revised Pages Include Editorial Corrections ML20196A0721999-03-16016 March 1999 Cycle 8 COLR in ITS Format & W(Z) Function ML20207J4371999-03-0808 March 1999 ISI Outage Rept for A1R07 ML20204H9941999-03-0303 March 1999 Non-proprietary Rev 4 to HI-982083, Licensing Rept for Spent Fuel Rack Installation at Byron & Braidwood Nuclear Stations BW990010, Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Braidwood Generating Station,Units 1 & 2.With1999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Braidwood Generating Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20206U9011999-02-15015 February 1999 COLR for Braidwood Unit 2 Cycle 7. Page 1 0f 13 of Incoming Submittal Was Not Included BW990004, Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1999 for Braidwood Generating Station,Units 1 & 2.With1999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1999 for Braidwood Generating Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20205M7061998-12-31031 December 1998 Unicom Corp 1998 Summary Annual Rept. with BW990001, Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Braidwood Generating Station,Units 1 & 2.With1998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Braidwood Generating Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20206B4001998-12-31031 December 1998 Annual & 30-Day Rept of ECCS Evaluation Model Changes & Errors for Byron & Braidwood Stations ML20206U9081998-12-17017 December 1998 Cycle 8 COLR in ITS Format & W(Z) Function BW980076, Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Braidwood Generating Station,Units 1 & 2.With1998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Braidwood Generating Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20196A4191998-11-19019 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting QA TR CE-1-A,Rev 66 Re Changes in Independent & Onsite Review Organization by Creating NSRB ML20195D3561998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Braidwood Generating Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20155B6711998-10-26026 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Requests for Relief Associated with Second 10-yr Interval ISI Program Plan ML20207H7671998-10-0505 October 1998 Rv Weld Chemistry & Initial Rt Ndt ML20154D4401998-10-0202 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Second 10-yr Interval ISI Program Request for Relief 12R-30 for Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20155C2601998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1998 for Braidwood Generating Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20195F5911998-09-11011 September 1998 Special Rept:On 980812,addl Unseated Wires Were Discovered. Cause Is Unknown at Present Time.Util Evaluated Number of Unseated/Ineffective Wires & Determined Effect on Containment Structural Integrity.Commitments,Encl ML20196B3711998-09-0808 September 1998 Cycle 8 Operating Limits Rept (Olr) ML20151X6671998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1998 for Braidwood Generating Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20238F3281998-08-31031 August 1998 SER Approving Second 10-year Interval Inservice Insp Program Request for Relief 12R-14 for Braidwood Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20237E2331998-08-21021 August 1998 Revised Pages of Section 20 of Rev 66 to CE-1-A, QA Topical Rept ML20237A1091998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1998 for Braidwood Generating Station,Unit 1 & 2 ML20236N7001998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1998 for Braidwood Generating Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20198A0151998-06-18018 June 1998 10CFR50.59 Summary Rept 960619 Through 980618, Vols I & Ii,Consisting of Descriptions & SE Summaries for Changes to Procedural UFSAR Changes,Tests & Experiments & FP Rept.Without Fp,Rept ML20249A5451998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1998 for Braidwood Generating Station Units 1 & 2 ML20247F7711998-05-0808 May 1998 Special Rept:On 980403 & 980503 Seismic Monitoring Sys Was Declared Inoperable.Caused by 5-volt Power Supply & Regulator Card Failure.Imd & Sys Engineering Are Continuing to Identify & Resolve Problems So Sys Can Be Operable ML20247L7591998-04-30030 April 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1998 for Braidwood Generating Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20217K6331998-04-20020 April 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Methodology & Criteria Used in Generating Flaw Evaluation Charts for RPV of Braidwood IAW Section XI of ASME Code ML20216C6621998-03-31031 March 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1998 for Braidwood Generating Station,Units 1 & 2 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
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f TEr p k UNITED STATES j
2 j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20666-0001
. . . . . ,o SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO THE SECOND 10-YEAR INTERVAL INSERVICE INSPECTION PROGRAM PLAN REQUEST FOR RELIEF NO.12R-30 COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY BRAIDWOOD STATION. UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. STN 50-456 AND STN 50-457
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The Technical Specifications for the Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, states that the Inservice inspection of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Class 1,2, and 3 components shall be performed in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable addenda as required by 10 CFR 50.55a(g), except where specific written relief has been granted by the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(i).
10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3) states that attematives to the requirements of paragraph (g) may be used, when authorized by the NRC, if (i) the proposed alternatives would provide an acceptable level of quality and safety or (ii) compliance with the specified requirements would result in hardship or unusual difficulty without a compensating increase in the level of quality and safety.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(4), ASME Code Class 1,2, and 3 components (including supports) shall meet the requirements, except the design and access provisions and the preservice examination requirements, set forth in the ASME Code,Section XI, " Rules for Inservice inspection of Nuclear Power Plant Components," to the extent practical within the limitations of design, geometry, and materials of construction of the components. The regulations require that inservice examination of components and system pressure tests conducted during the first 10-year interval and subsequent intervals comply with the requirements in the latest edition and addenda of Section XI of the ASME Code incorporated t'y reference in 10 CFR 50.55a(b) 12 months prior to the start of the 120-month interval, subject to the limitations and modifications listed therein. The applicable edition of Section XI of the ASME Code for Braidwood Station's second 10-year Inservice inspection (ISI)intervalis the 1989 Edition.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(i), if the licensee determines that conformance with the requirements is impractical, information shall be submitted to the Commission in support of that determination and a request made for relief from the ASME Code requirement. After evaluation of the determination, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(i), the Commission may grant relief and may impose alternative requirements that are determined to be authorized by law, will not endanger life, property, or the common defense and security, and are otherwise in the public 9810070221 981002 PDR ADOCK 05000456 P PDR
interest, giving due. consideration to the burden upon the licensee that could result if the requirements were imposed on the facility.
The licensee, Commonwealth Edison Company (Comed), submitted Relief Request 12R-30 for the second 10-year interval inservice inspection plan at Braidwood Station by letter dated April 17,1998, as supplemented by letter dated August 3,1998, 2.0 EVALUATION The information provided by the licensee in support of the relief request has been evaluated and the bases for disposition are documented below.
Relief Request 12R-30, IWA-5242(a), System Pressure Tests for insulated Bolted Connections Code Reauirement: IWA-5242(a) states that for systems borated for the purpose of controlling reactivity, insulation shall be removed from pressure-retaining bolted connections for a direct VT-2 visual examination.
Licensee's Code Relief Reauest: The licensee requested relief from the Code-required removal of insulation for VT-2 visual examinations of bolted connections in borated systems for valve numbers 1(2)Sl8948A-D,1(2)Sl8949A-D,1(2)RC8001 A-D,1(2)RH8701 A-B, 1(2)RC8002A-D,1(2)RC8003A-D, and 1(2)RH8702A-B for the second 10 year interval currently scheduled to commence July 29,1998, and to be completed July 28,2008,
+/- 1-year interval extension as allowed by paragraph (d) of IWA-2430.
Licensee's Basis for Reauestina Relief (as stated):
- Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(i), relief is requested on the basis that the proposed alternative would provide an acceptable level of quality and safety. Specifically, relief is requested from the requirement to remove insulation for the Class 1 components listed above for VT-2 on the frequency specified in Tables IWB-2500, Category B-P (each refueling outage). The following supports a reduced inspection frequency:
- 1) ASME Section XI paragraph IWA-5242(a) requires the removal of insulation from pressure retaining bolted connections for VT-2 examinations when the system is borated for the purpose of controlling reactivity. Paragraph IWA-5242(a) requires this for all bolting, regardless of material type, when the system is borated for the purpose of controlling reactivity. For all materials of construction, when the system is not borated for the purpose of controlling reactivity, insulation removalis not required by paragraph IWA-5242(1) for VT-2 examinations.
Comed believes that by the Code only requiring insulation removal for borated systems, the intent of this requirement is to address early detection of boric acid wastage of the botting materials. In either borated or non-borated systems, if leakage results in wetting of the botting material, the required VT-2 visual
examinations would not be effective at detection of incipient stress corrosion cracking if it occurs; only the volumetric examinations of IWB-2500 Categories B-G-1 would be effective. For this reason, if the bolting material of construction is resistant to boric acid wastage, there is no reduction in margin of safety if the required VT-2 visual examinations are performed without insulation removal each refueling outage as they would be for other Class 1 non-borated systems. The proposed alternative provision of inspecting these components on a once per year 10 year interval basis will provide sufficient assurance that these highly corrosion resistant components have not degraded.
- 2) For valves listed above both the stud / bolt material and the closure nut material utilize SA-453 Grade 660, Class B. Also known as alloy A-286, the nominal composition of this ferrous alloy is 25Ni-15Cr-2Ti-Al. According to Reference 1, (" Materials Handbook for Nuclear Plant Pressure Boundary Applications," EPRI TR-109668-SI, WO4382-01, Final Report, Revision 0, December 1997), the *high chromium content of alloy A-286 gives it similar resistance to general corrosion in boric acid as possessed by stainless steel, which is essentially immune to wastage or erosion-corrosion problems." Reference 1 determines that for A-286 material stress corrosion cracking is only a concern if bolting material is loaded to 100 ksi or higher.
For the valves listed above, review of the installation procedures shows that none of the bolting is loaded to more than 65 ksi. Therefore, stress corrosion cracking is not a concern. Also, Reference 1 states that a review of the available NRC Public Documentation revealed no reports of failures of alloy A-286 used for external reactor vessel bolting service in B&W units over a service period of greater tha[n]
20 years.
- 3) The valves listed above are among the highest radiation level components in the Borated bolting Inspection Program. Insulation removal combined with scaffolding erection and inspection time are expected to contribute significantly (approximately 1.5 person-rem) to the overall dose received. As discussed above, there is no significant increase in plant safety to be gained by performing VT-2 inspection of these materials on an every refueling outage frequency.
The following Braidwood Station bolting examination commitments and material control programs in conjunction with the Proposed Altemative Provisions provide an acceptable level of safety and quality for bolted connections in systems borated for the purpose of controlling reactivity.
In response to NRC Generic Letter 88-05, Braidwood has established a program for Engineering to inspect all boric acid leaks discovered in the containment building and to evaluate the impact of those leaks on carbon steel or low alloy steel components. Any evidence of leakage, including dry boric acid crystals or residue, is inspected and evaluated regardless of whether the leak was discovered at power or during an outage. Issues such as the following are considered in the inspection and evaluation:
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- 1) Evidence of corrosion or metal degradation
- 2) Effect the leak may have on the pressure boundary -l
- 3) Possibility of boric acid traveling along the inside of insulation on piping, and
- 4) Possibility of dripping or spraying on other components. Based on this evaluation, Braidwood Engineering initiates appropriate corrective actions to i
prevent reoccurrence of the leak and to repair, if necessary, any degraded l materials or components. l For systems borated for the purpose of controlling reactivity, when the bolting i material is SA-453 Grade 660 and therefore immune to boric acid corrosion, :
I Comed requests relief from the requirement of ASME Section XI paragraph IWA-5242(a) that insulation shall be removed from pressure retaining bolted ,
connections for VT-2 visual examination. Volumetric examinations as applicable '
to IWB-2500 Categories B-G-1 will continue to be performed. I Licensee's Procosed Altemative: )
For ASME Class I systems borated for the purpose of controlling reactivity, a system Inservice leakage test shall be performed in accordance with the frequency required in table IWA-2500 (each refueling outage) without removal of insulation from the bolted connections.
The requirements for Inservice leak tests shall be augmented with a minimum 4-hour hold time at system normal operating pressure prior to the VT-2 visual examination to allow for leakage propagation from the insulation. If evidence of leakage is detected, either by discovery of active leakage or evidence of boric acid crystals, the insulation shall be removed and the bolted connection shall be reexamined and, if necessary, evaluated in accordance with the corrective measures of Subarticle IWA-5250 (as modified for Braidwood by pending Relief Request 12R-13).
Pending Relief Request 12R-13 proposes an attemative to the requirements in IWA-5250(a)(2), which requires that, if leakage occurs at a bolted connection, the botting shall be removed, VT-3 visually examined for corrosion, and evaluated in accordance with IWA-3000. As an altemative,12R-13 proposes to evaluate the bolting to determine its susceptibility to corrosion, considering, as a minimum, the bolting materials, the corrosive nature of the process fluid, the leakage location and history, the service age of the bolting materials, visual evidence of corrosion at the assembled connection, and plant / industry studies of similar bolting materials in similar environments. In addition, if the initial evaluation indicates the need for further evaluation, the bolt nearest to the source of leakage will be removed, visually examined, and evaluated in accordance with ,
IWA-3100(a). The NRC staff is reviewing 12R-13 under a separate cover. j For the valves listed above, the insulation shall be removed from the bolted connections once per 10-year interval and a VT-2 examination shall be conducted with the system depressurized. These inspections will be d..,tributed throughout the inspection interval. If evidence of leakage is detected, evaluations for corrective measures performed will be ;
performed in accordance with IWA-5250 (as modified for Braidwood by pending Relief 1 n ~ --
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Request 12R-13). These inspections shall be implemented through application of the I Braidwood Station predefined surveillance program to assure they are performed within the !
prescribed time periods.
Regardless of whether a component is scheduled for examination or not, any evidence of leakage will result in evaluations for corrective measures in accordance with IWA-5250 (as
. modified for Braidwood by pending Relief Request 12R-13).
The relief is requested for the second 10-year inspection interval of the Inservice Inspection Program for Braidwood Unit 1 and Unit 2.
Evaluation-
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l The staff has developed a position over the years on the use of A-286 stainless steel l (SA-453 Grade 660). A Brookhaven National Laboratory report," Bolting Applications, 1 NUREG/CR-3604" states that A-286 stainless steel is susceptible to stress corrosion cracking in primary water, particularly if preloaded above 100 ksi. Bengtsson and Korhonen of ASEA-ATOM, Vasteras, Sweden, examined the behavior of A-286 in a BWR environment as reported in the Proceedings of the International Symposium on Environmental Degradation of Materials in Nuclear Power Systems-Water Reactors, August 22-25,1983, Myrtle Beach, South Carolina sponsored by the National Association of Corrosion Engineers, the Metallurgical Society of the AIME, and the American Nuclear Society. They l
found the A-286 in comparison to other test materials, was the most susceptible material they tested to intergranular stress corrosion cracking in BWR water. They also found that A-286 is less likely to crack as the applied stress is reduced. Piascik and Moore from Babcock & Wilcox reported a number of vessel internals bolt failures of A-286 bolts in Nuclear Technology, Vol. 75, December 1986. They correlated the failures with bolt fillet peak stress and found that bolts loaded below 100 ksi showed no failures. For A-286 stainless steel studs, the preload must be verified to be below 10_0 ksi or the thermal )
Insulation must be removed and the joint visually inspected. The licensee stated that for the above valves, none of the bolting materialis loaded to more than 65 ksi; therefore, the proposed alternative is acceptable, EPRI Report TR-102748 includes discussion about A-286 (SA-453) as a superior fastening l material. The superalloy was designed for resistivity to acid corrosion environments due to
- its high nickel and chrome content and the inclusion of molybdenum specifically to inhibit inorganic acids such as boric acid. This material has been further evaluated for resistance l
to boric acid corrosion by material selection expert C.P. Dillon, a subcontractor to Nickel '
Laboratories in a study done for Union Electric. His evaluation concludes that "the !
development of intermediate concentrations of boric acid solution in the flange area (due to minor leaks and evaporation of the water) would not attack the bolting significantly and l would be a marked improvement over low-alloy steel assemblies." Therefore, the proposed alternative will provide reasonable assurance of structuralintegrity of the bolting.
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3.0 GQNCLQSjQN The staff concluded that the licensee's alternative contained in Relief Rec; vest 12R-30 provides j an acceptable level of quality and safety. Therefore, the licensee's alternative conielned in l
Relief 12R-30 is authorized pursualit to 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(i) for the second 10-year interval. l
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Principal contributor: J. Davis i
i Dated: October 2, 1998 l
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