ML20210U811
| ML20210U811 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Braidwood  |
| Issue date: | 08/04/1999 |
| From: | NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20210U809 | List: |
| References | |
| GL-89-04, NUDOCS 9908200217 | |
| Download: ML20210U811 (10) | |
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f NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. SOASNm01
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM SECOND 10-YEAR INTERVAL COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY BRAIDWOOD STATION. UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. STN 50-456 AND STN 50-457
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The Code of Federal Regulations,10 CFR 50.55a, requires that inservice testing (IST) of certain American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (Code) Class 1,2, and 3 pumps and valves are performed in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Code and applicable addenda, except where attematives have been authorized or relief has been requested by the licensee and granted by the Commission pursuant to Sections (a)(3)(i), (a)(3)(ii), or (f)(6)(i) of 10 CFR 50.55a. In proposing attematives or requesting relief, the licensee must demonstrate that: (1) the proposed attematives provide an acceptable level of quality and safety; (2) compliance would result in hardship or unusual difficulty without a compensating increase in the level of quality and safety; or (3) conformance is impractical for its facility. NRC guidance contained in Generic Letter (GL) 89-04, Guidance on Developing Acceptable inservice Testing Programs, provides attematives to the Code requirements determined to be acceptable to the staff. Further guidance was given in GL 89-04, Supplement L 1, and NUREG-1482, " Guidelines for Testing at Nuclear Power Plants." Attematives that conform with the guidance in GL 89-04 may be implemented prior to receiving NRC approval, but should be included as relief requests for review by the staff. When attematives are implemented in accordance with the relevant position in the GL, the staff has determined that relief should be granted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(f)(6)(i) on the grounds that it is authorized by law, will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security, and is otherwise j in the public interest. In making this determination, the staff considers the burden on the !
licensee that would result if the requirements were imposed 10 CFR 50.55a authorizes the Commission to approve attematives and to grant relief from i
, ASME Code requirements upon making the necessary findings. The NRC staff's findings with L respect to authorizing altematives and granting or not granting the relief requested as part of i
the licensee'- lST program are contained in this Safety Evaluation (SE).
l By letter dated April 16,1998, Commonwealth Edison Company (Comed, the licensee) submitted Revision 0 of their IST Program Plan for pump and valves for the Braidwood Station, '
Units 1 and 2. Comed based the Braidwood Station IST program on the requirements of the i 1989 Edition of the ASME Code,Section XI, Subsections IWP and IWV, which is incorporated ,
by reference in 10 CFR 50.55a. ASME Operations and Maintenance (OM) Standard, Part 6, for !
IST of pumps is referenced by Subsection lWP and OM Standard, Part 10, for IST of valves is referenced by Subsection IWV. The licensee's submittal included four relief requests (VR-1,
$TM[5o p PDR 56 ENCLOSURE
r VR-2, VR-3, and VR-4). The relief requests were reviewed against the requirements of the 1989 Edition of the ASME Code,Section XI, for pumps and valves. Braidwood's 10-year interval began on July 29,1998, and ends on July 28,2008. '
2.0 g. VALUATION The NRC staff, with technical assistance from Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), has reviewed the information conceming IST program requests for relief submitted for the second 10-year interval for the Braidwood Station in a letter dated April 16, '
1998. A summary of the NRC's action on each relief request is provided in Attachment 1.
IneerS Technical Evaluation Report (TER) is included as Attachment 2. The test deferrals for valves which are in accordance with Part 10 have been reviewed and are summarized in Appendix C of the TER.
The staff adopts the evaluations and recommendations for authorizing alternatives contained in the TER prepared by INEEL for VR-1 and VR-3. !
2.1 Relief Reauest VR-2 The staff adopts the evaluations and recommendations for authorizing altematives contained in the TER prepared by INEEL for VR-2 with the two exceptions discussed below.
2.1.1 Evaluation of Attemative Frecuency for VR-2 Re/lef Request: The licensee requests relief from the full stroke exercising requirements of OM-10, paragraph 4.3.2 for specific containment spray valves and proposes to included these valves in sample disassembly and inspection groups and to disassemble and inspect one valve from each group every refueling outage on a rotating basis.
Pmposed Attemative: The licensee has proposed to establish a grouping of valves and to use a sampling plan for disassembling and inspecting one valve per group on an 18-month interval during any plant mode, except that; (1) valves 1/2CS008A/B will remain on a refueling outage frequency meeting the guidance of Position 2 of GL 89-04, and (2) a technical specification required, once every five years, full flow test for valves 1/2CS011 A/B and 1/2CS020A/B may be'used in lieu of disassembly and inspection if the schedule permits. Such a schedule is not necessarily based directly on the GL 89-04 or OM-10 interval of " refueling outage," but is based on comparable length of time. The proposed schedules could allow disassembly and inspection to occur during power operations rather than during refueling outages. The following issues affect the proposed schedule for the valves that could be disassembled and inspected during power operations:
e acceptability of the refueling outage interval frequency, e acceptability of entering a technical specification limiting condition for operation (LCO) action statement to perform regularly scheduled maintenance similar to preventative maintenance (PM), and
.- j' 3-e appropriate corrective actions if a problem is identified during the disassembly and inspection, both for the specific valve'and for the valves in the group.
GL 89-02, Position 2, indicates that for sample disassembly and inspection a "different valve of each group is required to be disassembled, inspected, and manually full-stroke exercised at each successive refueling outage." The reasons that the generic letter specified that the activity be performed during refueling outages were the personnel hazards involved and the system operating restrictions. In many cases where disassembly and inspection is used in lieu of testing, there are reasons that the disassembly and inspection is performed during an extended outage (e.g., the reactor coolant system must be depressurized, the reactor vessel must be drained to mid-loop, or the activity requires an entire safety system to be removed from service). However, where valves can be safely and practically disassembled and
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j inspected during power operation, doing so on an interval related to the refueling outage (e.g., I once every 18 months) could provide an adequate level of assurance of the operational readiness of the valves. As noted by the licensee, the possibility of establishing such a q schedule was discussed in NUREG-1482, but with the added caution that entry into an LCO J
may not be acceptable.
In implementing an alternate schedule; (1) the same constraints for corrective actions related
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to the remaining valves in the group must be applied, and (2) the assessment of the risk and other operability issues in removing a train of the system from service for performance of a maintenance activity must be considered.
Remaining Valves in the Group: The licensee has requested that, when disassembling a valve during any plant mode indicates a problem, the licensee will evaluate the operability status of the remaining valve in the group. Expanding the sample to the _other valve in the group will be determined from the guidance in GL 89-04.
If a valve disassembled during power operation is found to be failed or excessively degraded, theilicensee should immediately (generally before the end of the shift during which the failure is discovered) analyze the valve failure to determine the degradation mechanism and the likelihood that the other grouped valves are affected significantly by this mechanism. If the i licensee's evaluation indicates that the operability of the remaining valves can be justified !
(based on past examinations, measurements, etc.), the valves need not be immediately declared inoperable. However, all grouped valves should be disassembled and inspected or have their continued operability justified or verified by testing within the TS action statement 3
time specified for one train of the safety system being inoperable. If there is no associated ;
LCO, then the maximum time period before completing the disassembly and inspection of the i remaining valves must be determined by the analysis of the cause of degradation.
Entry into a Umiting Condition for Operation (LCO) Action Statement: The NRC's guidance did not indicate the acceptability of entering into an LCO to perform disassembly and inspection of ;
check valves and has not recommended that licensees pursue this course of action; however, !
the licensee's request has been considered and is evaluated herein.
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l; .s Disassembly of one of the valves in a group may render the associated safety system train inoperable, which could require entry into a technical specification LCO action statement. NRC inspection Manual, Part 9900, " Technical Guidance, Maintenance - Voluntary Entry into Limiting Conditions for Operation Action Statements to Pe; form Preventative Maintenance,"
gives guidance to NRC inspectors regarding the inspection of licensee preventative maintenance activities (similar to using disassembly and inspection on a regular basis to meet surveillance requirements) when the maintenance requires rendering the affected system or equipment inoperable. The NRC considers check valve disassembly and inspection to be an intrusive maintenance activity and not a test. Even though an LCO action statement can be entered to perform surveillance testing, an action statement should not be entered routinely to perform PM activities unless it is justified in accordance with NRC inspection Manual, Part 9900, guidance. Therefore, if the proposed disassembly and inspection is to be performed during power operation and requires entry into an LCO action statement, the licensee should consider the following guidelines paraphrased from Part 9900:
e There is reasonable expectation that the on-line disassembly and inspection would improve safety by ensuring the operational readiness of the valves. The increase in reliability should exceed the effect of the increase in system unavailability.
e The disassembly and inspection should be carefuliy planned to prevent repeatedly entering and exiting LCO action statements.
.e . Other related equipment should not be removed from service during the performance of the on-line maintenance activity.
e . Maintenance should not be performea on-line unlass confidence in the operability of the redundant subsystem is high, if any equipment is degraded or trending towards a degraded condition in one train of a safety system, the redundant train should not be removed from service to perform on-line disassembly and inspections.
e . While performing an on-line maintenance activity, avoid performing other testing or maintenance that would increase the likelihood of a transient. There should be a reasonable expectation that the facility will continue to operate in a stable manner, in addition,10 CFR Section 50.65, " Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants," became effective July 10,1996. This regulation does not prohibit on-line maintenance activities. However, Paragraph (a)(3) of Section 50.65 states that licensees should asssess the total impact on plant safety before taking plant equipment out-of-service for monitoring or preventive maintenance.
Summary. Based on the determination that compliance with the exercising requirements of the Code would result in hardship without a compensating increase in the level of safety, and considenng that sample disassembly and inspection is an acceptable attemative according to GL 89-04, Position 2, the proposed attemative is authorized pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(ii) to verify the capability of the valves to stroke by sample disassembly and
' inspection.
9 Additionally, for valves 1/2CS011A/B and 1/2CS020A/B, full-flow testing performed to meet technical specifications may be acceptable to satisfy the requirements in lieu of disassembly and inspection with testing once every 5 years, if the schedule can be coordinated, because the testing verifies full-stroke exercising of the valves. Considering that it would be a hardship without a compensating increase in the level of quality and safety to require disassembly and inspection at the same time as the full-flow testing, the altemative is authorized pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(ii).
For performing disassembly and inspection during any plant mode, the altemative schedule is authonzed pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(i) based on the activity ensuring an adequate level of quality and safety provided the licensee considers all the appropriate guidance -
referenced and conditions discussed above, including a determination that the activity can be performed in a manner that does not significantly increase the risk to the plant. However, if the activity indicates a degraded valve, the licensee may be required to take a redundant train out-of-service, rendering an entire system inoperable, possibly requiring a plant shutdown. Such a condition must also be considered in determining the acceptability of performing the activity during power operations rather than during plant shutdowns.
2.1.2 - Evaluation of VR-4
--VR-4 describes an attemative test procedure for verifying the proper operation of the check valves in the air start system for the emergency diesel generators. These valves do not fall under the Code-required IST program, which applies to Code Class 1,2, and 3 systems, but are required to be tested as augmented tests pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(f)(6)(ii). Therefore, staff review is not required before the licensee implements VR-4.
2.2 Deferred Test ~ Justifications
. The test deferrais of valves, as allowed by OM-10, were reviewed as part of INEEL's evaluation. A summary of the"diferrals is provided in Appendix C of the TER. Any recommendations for further review by the licensee related to deferred test justifications are addressed in Appendices A and B of the TER. Results of the review of deferred test justifications do not necessarily constitute final apprvo al and are subject to NRC inspection.
2.3 System Revjgg INEEL, using the Braidwood Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), conducted a scope review of the containment spray and feedwater systems against the requirements of Section XI and the regulations. The review revealed items that did not appear to be in compliance with the Code requirements (see Appendix B of the TER). In addition, editorial comments discovered during the system review are also noted in this Appendix. The licensee should review these items, as well as other systems that might contain similar issues, and revise their program and take any necessary actions as appropriate.
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2.4 Relief Reauests in Accordance with GL 89-04 For any relief granted based on following the positions stated in GL 89-04, the staff (with l: . technical assistance from INEEL) has reviewed the information submitted by the licensee to
' . determine whether the proposed altemative testing follows the relevant position in the GL.
New or revised relief requests that meet the positions stated in GL 89-04, Attachment 1, should be submitted to NRC, but may be implemented prior to staff approval provided the
. guidance in GL 89-04, Section D, is followed.
2.5 Action items For several IST program relief requests, the staff identified certain action items for the licensee to complete. These action items are identified in Appendix A of the TER and should be
- addressed within 1 year from the date of this SE or by the end of the next refueling outage, whichever is later. In addition, the licensee should address program scope issues identified in Appendix B of the TER within 1 year from the date of this SE or by the end of the next l- refueling outage, whichever is later. Licensee actions to address the action items in this SE are subject to NRC inspection. The licensee is requested to respond to the NRC within 1 year of the date of this SE describing actions taken, actions in progress, or actions to be taken, to address each of these items.
3.0 CONCLUSION
. The Braidwood IST program requests for relief from the Code requirements have been reviewed by the staff with the assistance of its contractor, INEEL. The TER provides INEEL's ,
technical evaluation of these relief requests. The staff has reviewed the TER and concurs with j the evaluations and recommendations for authorizing attematives for VR-1 and VR-3. The .
staff has reviewed the TER and concurs with the evaluations and recommendations for I authorizing altematives for VR-2, with two exceptions as discussed in Section 2.1 of this SE. A l
summary of the relief request determinations is presented in Attachment 1. The authorizing of j
. altamatives or granting of relief is based upon the fulfillment of any commitments made by the )
licensee in its basis for each relief request and the altomatives proposed. The implementation !
of the IST program and relief requests is subject to inspection by the NRC. -!
- The licensee should refer to Appendices A and B of the TER for a discussion of i
recommendations identified during the review. The licensee should address each j recommendation in accordance with the guidance therein. The action items identified in j Appendices A and B of the TER should be addressed within 1 year of the date of this SE or by '
' the end of the next refueling outage, whichever is later, unless otherwise specified in the TER.
The staff concludes that the relief requests approved by this SE provide reasonable assurance of the operational readiness of the pumps and valves to perform their safety-related functions.
Relief Requests VR-1, VR-3 and a portion of VR-2 are granted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(ii), because the code requirements would result in a hardship or unusual difficulty l- '
l
. ;- l l
l l
j without a compensating increase in quality or safety. The portion of Relief Request VR-2 I which requested relief to perform sample disassembly and inspection of check valves on a l refueling outage frequency, but during power operation, was granted pursuant to 10 CFR
- i 50.55a(a)(3)(i) because the proposed attemative provides an acceptable level of quality and 1 safety, provided the considerations described in Section 2.1.1 of this SE are addressed. Relief
' Request VR-4 does not require explicit NRC approval because it applies to valves that are not required by 10 CFR 50.55a to be included in the licensee's IST program.
Attachments: 1. Table 1, Summary of Relief Requests l
2.TER Principal Contributor Joseph Colaccino Stewart Bailey i I
~ Date: August 4, 1999 e
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