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| issue date = 08/13/1987
| issue date = 08/13/1987
| title = LER 87-007-00:on 870714,ESF Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Undervoltage of Reactor Coolant Buses.Caused by Failure of Main Generator Voltage Control Sys.Failed & Suspected Components of Sys replaced.W/870813 Ltr
| title = LER 87-007-00:on 870714,ESF Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Undervoltage of Reactor Coolant Buses.Caused by Failure of Main Generator Voltage Control Sys.Failed & Suspected Components of Sys replaced.W/870813 Ltr
| author name = SAMPSON J R, SMITH W G
| author name = Sampson J, Smith W
| author affiliation = AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORP., INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
| author affiliation = AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORP., INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  
Line 16: Line 16:


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:REGULAYINFORNATION DISTRIBUTIO SYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:8708180184 DOC.DATE:87/08/13NOTARIZED:
{{#Wiki_filter:REGULA      Y  INFORNATION DISTRIBUTIO       SYSTEM   (RIDS)
NODOCKETFAGIL:50-316DonaldC.CookNuclearPoeerPlant'nit2iIndiana&05000316AUTH.MANEAUTHORAFFILIATION SAMPSONeJ.R.Indiana&MichiganElectricCo.SMITHS'.G.Indiana&MichiganElectricCo.RECIP.NAMERECIPIENTAFFILIATION
ACCESSION NBR: 8708180184         DOC. DATE: 87/08/13    NOTARIZED:   NO        DOCKET FAG IL: 50-316  Donald  C. Cook Nuc  lear Poeer AFFILIATION P lant'nit      2i Indiana  & 05000316 AUTH. MANE          AUTHOR SAMPSONe J. R.       Indiana   & Michigan Electric    Co.
SMITHS'. G.         Indiana   & Michigan Electric    Co.
REC IP. NAME        REC IP IENT AFFILIATION


==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
LER87-007-00:
LER  87-007-00: on 870714'SF reactor trip occurred due to undervoltage of reactor coolant busses. Caused bg failure of main generator voltage control sos. Failed & suspected components of sos replaced. W/870813 ltr.
on870714'SF reactortripoccurredduetoundervoltage ofreactorcoolantbusses.Causedbgfailureofmaingenerator voltagecontrolsos.Failed&suspected components ofsosreplaced.
DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR              ENCL        SIZE:
W/870813ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE:IE22DCOPIESRECEIVED:
TITLE: 50. 73 Licensee Event Report (LER)> Incident Rpti etc.
LTRENCLSIZE:TITLE:50.73LicenseeEventReport(LER)>IncidentRptietc.NOTES:RECIPIENT IDCODE/NANE PD3-3LAWIGGINGTON DCOPIESLTTRENCL1111RECIPIENT IDCODE/NANE PD3-3PDCOPIESLTTRENCL11INTERNAL:
NOTES:
ACRSNICHELSON AEOD/DOAAEOD/DSP/PQAB DEDRONRR/DEST/ADS NRR/DEST/ELB NRR/DEST/MEB NRR/DEST/PSB NRR/DEST/SGB NRR/DLPG/GAB NRR/DREP/RAB NRR/PMAS/ILRB RESDEPYGIRES/DE/EIB EXTERNAL:
RECIPIENT          COPIES            RECIPIENT           COPIES ID CODE/NANE        LTTR ENCL      ID CODE/NANE         LTTR ENCL PD3-3 LA                1    1    PD3-3 PD                  1    1 WIGGINGTON D            1    1 INTERNAL: ACRS NICHELSON            1          ACRS NOELLER              2    2 AEOD/DOA                      1    AEOD/DSP/NAS              1    1 AEOD/DSP/PQAB           2    2    AEOD/DSP/TPAB              1 DEDRO                    1      1    NRR/DEST/ADE              1    0 NRR/DEST/ADS            1    0    NRR/DEST/CEB              1    1 NRR/DEST/ELB                  1    NRR/DEST/ ICSB                  1 NRR/DEST/MEB            1    1    NRR/DEST/NTB            '1    1 NRR/DEST/PSB            1    1    NRR/DEBT/RSB              1 NRR/DEST/SGB            1      1    NRR/DLPG/HFB                    1-NRR/DLPG/GAB            1    1    NRR/DOEA/EAB                    1 NRR/DREP/RAB            1    1      RlhhDRE    PB          2    2 NRR/PMAS/ILRB                  1        G  FILE      02      1 RES DEPY GI              1    1    R        FORDS J          1    1 RES/DE/EIB              1      1    RGN3      FILE    01      1    1 EXTERNAL: EG&G GROf<i N              5    5    H ST LOBBY WARD            1 LPDR                    1          NRC PDR                    1 NSIC HARRIS'             1      1    NSIC MAYST'               1    1 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:         LTTR    44    ENCL    42
EG&GGROf<iNLPDRNSICHARRIS'11221110111111111111111155111ACRSNOELLERAEOD/DSP/NAS AEOD/DSP/TPAB NRR/DEST/ADE NRR/DEST/CEB NRR/DEST/
: r. ~
ICSBNRR/DEST/NTB NRR/DEBT/RSB NRR/DLPG/HFB NRR/DOEA/EAB RlhhDREPBGFILE02RFORDSJRGN3FILE01HSTLOBBYWARDNRCPDRNSICMAYST'2211110111'1111-122111111111TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:
NRC FOrm 3dd                                                                                                                                              U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION (943)
LTTR44ENCL42 r.~NRCFOrm3dd(943)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)U.S.NUCLEARREOULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEDOMBNO.31504104EXPIRES:SI31lddFACILITYNAMEPID.C.CookNuclearPlant,Unit2DOCKETNUMBER(2)PAE3l050003161oFESFActuation (ReactorTrip)DuetoUndervoltage oftheReactorCoolantPumBussesasaResultofCEVENTDATE(5)LERNUMBER(5)REPORTDATE(7)OTHERFACILITIES INVOLVED(5)MONTHDAY'9EARYEARSEOUENTrAI NUMBEtlf<<r<<<<REVISION
APPROVED OMB NO. 31504104 EXPIRES: SI31ldd LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
.>>TdNUMBERMONTHOAYYEARFACILITYNAMESDOCKETNUMBER(El 050000714878700700138705000OPERATINO MODE(9)POWERLEYEL080$<<@$.PgP.Exnan)pr)Q<<R;
FACILITY NAME PI                                                                                                                                DOCKET NUMBER (2)                          PA E 3l D. C. Cook                    Nuclear Plant, Unit 2                                                                                     0 5 0 0 0 3 1 61 oF ESF      Actuation (Reactor Trip) Due to Undervoltage of the Reactor Coolant Pum        Busses as a Result of C EVENT DATE (5)                       LER NUMBER (5)                             REPORT DATE (7)                               OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (5)
<<r<<rr20.402(B) 20.406(s)
MONTH      DAY      '9EAR    YEAR            SEOUENTrAI f<<r<<<<REVISION MONTH                OAY              YEAR            FACILITYNAMES                        DOCKET NUMBER(El NUMBEtl    .>>Td NUMBER 0  5    0    0    0 0    7    1    4    8    7  8      7          0      0 7          0    0                1      3 8 7                                                            0  5    0    0    0 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT T 0 THE AEOUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR II: IChecfr one or more of the follory'np) (11 OPERATINO MODE (9)                     20.402(B)                                   20.405(c)                                  60.73(s) (2) (iv)                           73.71(B)
(1)(i)20.405(sI(1I(6)20.405(s)
POWER                            20.406(s) (1)(i)                             50M(c)(1)                                   50.73(s)(2 I (v)                             73.71(c)
(I)(ill)20.405(sI(I)IIv)20.405(s)
LEYEL 0    8    0        20.405(s I (1 I (6)                         50.35 (c) (2)                               50.73(s) (2) (rd)                            OTHER ISpeclfy ln Aprtrect INfow end In Text, NIIC form
(1I(v)20.405(c) 50M(c)(1) 50.35(c)(2)60.73(s)(2)(I)50.73(s)(2)(Q) 60.73(s)(2)(ill)LICENSEECONTACTFORTHISLER(12)60.73(s)(2)(iv)50.73(s)(2 I(v)50.73(s)(2)(rd)50,73(s)(2)(vill)IA)50.73(s)(2)(rlii)(BI 60.73(s)(2)(x)
      $<<@$ .PgP
THISREPORTISSUBMITTED PURSUANTT0THEAEOUIREMENTS OF10CFRII:IChecfroneormoreofthefollory'np)
              <<r  . E xnan)pr)Q<<R;      20.405(s) (I ) (ill)                         60.73(s) (2) (I)                           50,73(s) (2) (vill)IA)                       366AI
(1173.71(B)73.71(c)OTHERISpeclfylnAprtrectINfowendInText,NIICform366AINAMEJ.R.Sampson-Safet6Assessment SuerinteTELEPHONE NUMBERAREACODE616465-590 COMPLETEONELINEFOREACHCOMPONENT FAILUREOESCRIBEO INTHISREPORT(13ICAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENT MANUFAC.TURERREPORTABLE
                                  <<      20.405(s I (I) I Iv)                         50.73(s)(2)(Q)                             50.73(s) (2)(rlii)(BI rr                            20.405(s) (1I(v)                             60.7 3(s) (2) (ill)                         60.73(s)(2)(x)
'@'P,CAUSESYSTEMx>gjcQ.yg<<>S>>rTONPROSr.',<<,rrrrCOMPONENT MANUFAC.TUREREPORTABLETONPADSXEXELUJX34553%@$i"'6"4CR3455NrrMArXEL773455N3455N'.je~P~Nx4+>>~~KKM SUPPLEMENTAL REPORTEXPFCTED(14)YESIlfyer,complereEXPECTEDS(fphtlSSION OATEIXNoABSTRACTILlmittote00rpecer,Ie.,epproxlmerely llfteentlnplespecstypevrritren finer)(15)EXPECTEDSUBMISSIONDATE(15)MONTHDAYYEAROnJuly14,1987,at0707hours,anEngineered SafetyFeaturesActuation (ReactorTrip)occurredduetoundervoltage ofthereactorcoolantpumpbusses.Theundervoltage condition wastheresultofthefailureofthemaingenerator voltagecontrolsystem.TheUnitwasstabilized inMode3(HotStandby)atapproximately 0755hours,July14,1987.Noabnormalreactortripsequenceresponses werenoted.TheNRCwasnotifiedoftheeventviatheENSat0815hours,July14,1987.Post-event testingofthevoltagecontrolsystemcomponents revealedtwofailedpowersupplies(automatic andmanual),andsixfailedSCRModules.Allfailed/suspected components werereplaced.
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
Investigation regarding industryexperience withBrownBoverivoltagecontrolsystemsindicates thatthefailureswhichoccurredareconsistent withthoseexperienced atotherplantsandisnotaresultofoperatorerrororlackofmaintenance.
NAME                                                                                                                                                                TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE J. R. Sampson                       Safet              6    Assessment                        Su        erinte COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE OESCRIBEO IN THIS REPORT (13I 616465-590 x>gjc P,
Evaluation astothenecessity fortheredesignofthevoltagecontrolsystem,viathePlantModification progra'm, continues however,nospecificpreventive measureshavebeenidentified todate.8708180184 870813PDRADOCI(r0500031(EI 8PDRNRCForm3dd(9d3)
Q.yg       <<>S>>r CAUSE    SYSTEM                            MANUFAC.         REPORTABLE '@                                                                          MANUFAC.          EPORTAB LE COMPONENT                                TO NPROS                                      CAUSE SYSTEM  COMPONENT TURER                                                    r                                            TURER            TO NPADS
NRCForm366A(()4)3)LICENSEEETREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUAU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEDOMBNO.3150-0104 EXPIRES:8/31/88FACILITYNAME(1)DOCKETNUMBER(2)LERNUMBER(6)YEAR8'jets'EGUENTIAL 4.NUMSE4REVISIONNOMEE4PAGE(3)D.C.CookNuclearPlant,Unit2ppppp31TEXT/FIINvoEPEcoirroqoiaEoooaANPenelHRCForm355AB/((1)870070002oF0Conditions PriortoOccurrence Unit2inMode1(poweroperations) at80percentReactorThermalPower.DescritionofEventOnJuly14,1987,at0707hours,anEngineered Actuation (ReactorTripSequence) occurreddueofthereactorcoolantpumpbusses(EIIS/EA).
                                                                                                      <<,   rrrr.',
condition wastheresultofthefailureofthevoltage.controlsystem(EIIS/EL)
X      E              U  J    X 3 4 5 5                        rr      MAr      i "'6 "4 X    E L              7 7 3          4    5 5        N je~P~
.SafetyFeaturestoundervoltage Theundervoltage maingenerator Atapproximately 0637hours,July14,1987,theincomingUnit,Supervisor (Utility-Licensed Operator) noticedthattheoutputfromthemaingenerator automatic voltageregulator (EIIS/EL-RG) wasnotnulledwiththemanualvoltageregulator (EIIS/EL-RG).
Nx4+>>~~KKM X      E    L              CR3455N                                          3%@$
Theautomatic regulator wascurrently inserviceandhadbeenoperating atthelowestvalueofthevoltagebandthroughout thepreviousshift.WhentheUnitSupervisor adjustedthemanualregulator tomatchtheautomatic
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPFCTED              (14) 3  4      5 5        N MONTH      DAY      YEAR EXPECTED SUB M I SS ION DATE (15)
: setpoint, themaingenerator voltageandexcitercurrentindication dippedmomentarily andreturnedtonormal[theadjustment.
YES Ilfyer, complere  EXPECTED S(fphtlSSION OATEI X      No ABSTRACT ILlmit to te00 rpecer,   I e., epproxlmerely llfteen tlnple specs typevrritren finer) (15)
shouldhavehadnoeffectonthemaingenerator (EIIS/EL-GEN)].
On July 14, 1987, at 0707 hours, an Engineered Safety Features Actuation (Reactor Trip) occurred due to undervoltage of the reactor coolant pump busses. The undervoltage condition was the result of the failure of the main generator voltage control system.
Hethenrequested thataReactorOperator(RO)(Utility-Licensed Operator) bepostedat.theregulator tomonitortheindication.
The Unit was stabilized in Mode 3 (Hot Standby)                                                                                   at approximately 0755 hours, July 14, 1987.                                                 No abnormal reactor                                    trip sequence responses were noted. The NRC was notified of                                                                                  the event via the ENS at 0815 hours, July 14, 1987.
TheROreviewedthegenerator panelstatuswiththeincomingUnit,Supervisor andnoticedthat.thegenerator outputvoltagewasslightlybelowtheminimumoftheoperating band.TheROincreased theautomatic regulator torestorethegenerator outputvoltagetothebottomoftheoperating band.Fortheremaining periodpriortothetripsequence, thevolt-amps
Post-event testing of the voltage control system components revealed two failed power supplies (automatic and manual), and six failed SCR Modules. All failed/suspected components were replaced. Investigation regarding industry experience with Brown Boveri voltage control systems indicates that the failures which occurred are consistent with those experienced at other plants and is not a result of operator error or lack of maintenance.
: reactive, generator fieldtemperature, andtoalesserdegreethegenerator outputvoltageindication showedunstablebehavior.
Evaluation as to the necessity for the redesign of the voltage control system, via the Plant Modification progra'm, continues however, no specific preventive measures have been identified to date.
Noalarmsoccurreduntilsecondsbeforethetripsequence.
8708180184 870813 PDR          ADOCI(r 0500031(EI 8                                        PDR NRC Form 3dd (9d3)
Following thetripsequence[openingofthereactortripbreakers(EIIS/JE-BKR),
insertion ofthereactorcontrolrods(EIIS/AA-ROD),
feedwater isolation (EIIS/JB),
automatic startingofthemotor-drivenandturbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps(EIIS/BA-P)]
operations personnel immediately implemented thespecialEmergency Operating Procedure, 1OHP-4023.E-O, toverifyproperresponseoftheautomatic protection system(EIIS/JC) andtoassessplantconditions forinitiating appropriate recoveryactions.Therewasnoautomatic ormanualactuation oftheintermediate headsafetyinjection system(EIIS/BQ)
.NACFOAM366A(84)3)oU.S.GPO:1988 0.824538/455


NRCForm366A(94)31LICENSEEETREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUAU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEDOMBNO.3150&104EXPIRES:8/31/88FACILITYNAME(I)DOCKETNUMBER(2)YEARLERNUMBER(6)WSEOUENTIAL NUMEERNUMBERPAGE(3)D.C.CookNuclearPlant,Unit20s00031687TEXT/SmoteEPooo)rnrqrr)or/,
NRC Form 366A                                                                                                        U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
rroo/Ar/orro/HRC Forrrr35549/(IT)-007-003oF05Thevoltagetransient wasalsodetectedbytheT21Dsafeguards bus(train"A")undervoltage relays(EIIS/EA-27) whichstartedtheCDemergency dieselgenerator (EIIS/EK-DG) andinitiated loadsheddingofthe"A"trainsafeguards busses.TheRB"trainbusseswereapproximately 70to100voltshigherthanthe"A"trainbussesimmediately priortothetrip-consequently theloadsheddingactuation logicforthe"BRtrainwasnotsatisfied, andtheABemergency dieselgenerator didnot,automatically start.TheEastcentrifugal chargingpump(EIIS/CB-P) hadbeenoperating andwasnotrestoredduringblackoutloadsequencing (asperdesign).Operators manuallystartedtheWestcentrifugal chargingpumptorestorereactorcoolantpumpsealinjection (EIIS/CB) andopenedIM0-911,chargingpumpsuctionfromtherefueling waterstoragetank(EIIS/CB-TK),
(()4)3)
torestorepressurizer levelandtocleartheletdownisolation (whichoccurred, asdesigned, duetothelossoftheEastcentrifugal chargingpump).Theloadshedalsode-energized thelightingtransformers (EIIS/FF-XFMR),
LICENSEE E                T REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUA                              APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME (1)                                                        DOCKET NUMBER (2)              LER NUMBER (6)                        PAGE (3)
isolating plantlightingandoutlets(EIIS/FF-OUT).
YEAR 8'jets'EGUENTIAL        REVISION 4  . NUMSE4        NOME E 4 D.C. Cook Nuclear                          Plant, Unit            2  p  p  p  p    p  3 1  8  7        0  0 7          0 0      0  2oF0 TEXT /F IINvo EPEco ir roqoiaE ooo aANPenel HRC Form 355AB/ ((1)
Otherlightingtransformer loadslostincluded; theanalogrodpositionindication (EIIS/AA-XF) andtherodbottomlights(EIIS/AA-IL),
Conditions Prior to Occurrence Unit          2  in    Mode        1    (power operations)              at  80 percent Reactor Thermal Power.
chartdrivesforthenarrowrangeandwiderangereactorcoolanttemperature recorder(EIIS/JC-TR),
Descri tion of Event On July 14, 1987, at 0707 hours, an Engineered Safety Features Actuation (Reactor Trip Sequence) occurred due to undervoltage of the reactor coolant pump busses (EIIS/EA). The undervoltage condition was the result of the failure of the main generator voltage. control system (EIIS/EL) .
maingenerator megawattrecorderchartdrive(EIIS/EL-XR),
At approximately 0637 hours, July 14, 1987, the incoming Unit, Supervisor (Utility-Licensed Operator) noticed that the output from the main generator automatic voltage regulator (EIIS/EL-RG) was not nulled with the manual voltage regulator (EIIS/EL-RG).
normalcontrolroomlighting(EIIS/FF)E andtheABemergency dieselgenerator recorderchartdrive(EIIS/EK-XR).
The automatic regulator was currently in service and had been operating at the lowest value of the voltage band throughout the previous shift. When the Unit Supervisor adjusted the manual regulator to match the automatic setpoint, the main generator voltage and exciter current indication dipped momentarily and returned to normal [the adjustment. should have had no effect on the main generator (EIIS/EL-GEN)]. He then requested that a Reactor Operator (RO) (Utility-Licensed Operator) be posted at.
Theloadsheddingsequenceexperienced wasinaccordance withundervoltage protection system(EIIS/EA)design.
the regulator to monitor the indication. The RO reviewed the generator panel status with the incoming Unit, Supervisor and noticed that. the generator output voltage was slightly below the minimum of the operating band.                                      The RO increased the automatic regulator to restore the generator output voltage to the bottom of the operating band. For the remaining period prior to the trip sequence, the volt-amps reactive, generator                                          field temperature, and to a lesser degree the generator output voltage indication showed unstable behavior.                                  No alarms occurred until seconds before the trip sequence.
Powerwasmanuallly restoredtothelightingtransformers within30minutes.TheABemergency dieselgenerator wasmanuallystarted45secondsafterthetrip,butwasneverloaded.Bothemergency dieselsweresecuredafteroffsitepowerwasestablished tothe"A"trainsafeguards busses.TheUnitwasstabilized inMode3(hotstandby)atapproximately 0755hours,July14,1987.TheNRCwasnotifiedoftheeventviatheENSat0815hours,July14,1987.Withtheexception ofthefailureofthemaingenerator voltagecontrolsystem,therewerenoinoperative structures, components, orsystemsthatcontributed tothisevent.CauseofEventThecauseoftheeventwasdetermined tobethefailureofthemaingenerator automatic voltageregulator powersupplyconcurrent withthefailureofthemanualvoltageregulator powersupply.Post-event testingofvoltagecontrolsystemcomponents revealedsixfailedSCRmodules,inadditiontothetwofailedpowersupplies(automatic and.manual).Intermittent failuresofthemaingenerator automatic voltageregulator pulseamplifier andpulsedrivercircuitboardsaretheprobablecauseoftheSCRmodulefailures.
Following the trip sequence [opening of the reactor trip breakers (EIIS/JE-BKR), insertion of the reactor control rods (EIIS/AA-ROD),
NRCFORM366A(94)3)*U.S.GPO:1986-0.824 538/455 NRCForm3BBA(94)3)LICENSEEETREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUAT JU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEOOMBNO.3150-0104 EXPIRES:8/31/88FACILITYNAME(1)DOCKETNUMBER(2)LERNUMBER(8)SEQUENTIAL NUMBERREVISIONNUMBERPAGE(3)D.C.CookNuclearPlant,Unit2TEXT//Fmoro<<>>oo/4Er)U)or/,
feedwater isolation (EIIS/JB), automatic starting of the motor-driven and turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps (EIIS/BA-P)]
I>>o////or>>/NRC
operations personnel immediately implemented the special Emergency Operating Procedure, 1 OHP -4023.E-O, to verify proper response of the automatic protection system (EIIS/JC) and to assess plant conditions for initiating appropriate recovery actions. There was no automatic or manual actuation of the intermediate head safety injection                system (EIIS/BQ)                .
%%drm3654'4/(17)050003180070004"05AnalsisofEventThisEngineered SafetyFeaturesActuation, whichresultedinareactortripsequence, isreportable pursuant.
NAC FOAM 366A                                                                                                                    o U.S.GPO:1988 0.824 538/455 (84)3)
to10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).TheOperations SequenceMonitorfunctioned asdesigned.
 
Atimestudyofparameters monitored concluded thatallautomatic protection systemresponses; reactortrip,andresulting actuations, functioned properlyasaresultoftheEngineered SafetyFeaturesactuation.
NRC Form 366A                                                                                                        U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (94)31 LICENSEE          E        T REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUA                          APPROVED OMB NO. 3150&104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME (I)                                                           DOCKET NUMBER (2)             LER NUMBER (6)                     PAGE (3)
Basedontheabove,itisconcluded thattheeventdidnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59(a)(2),nordiditadversely impacthealthandsafety.Corrective ActionsImmediate corrective actioninvolvedoperations personnel implementing plantprocedures toverifyproperresponseoftheautomatic protection systemandtoassessplantconditions forinitiating appropriate recoveryactions.Allfailed/suspected components werereplaced(automatic andmanualvoltageregulator powersupplies, sixSCRmodules,twopulsegenerator circuitboardsandtwopulseamplifier circuit.boards).Investigation regarding industryexperience withBrownboverivoltagecontrolsystemsindicates thatthefailureswhichoccurredareconsistent withthoseexperienced atotherplantsandisnot.theresultofoperatorerrororlackofmaintenance.
YEAR W SEOUENTIAL NUMEER        NUMBER D.C. Cook Nuclear                            Plant, Unit              2  0  s  0  0    0 3 1 6 8  7 0    0  7    0      0        3oF 0 5 TEXT /Smote  EPooo )r nrqrr)or/, rroo/Ar/orro/HRC Forrrr 35549/ (IT)
Evaluation astothenecessity fortheredesignofthevoltagecontrolsystem,viathePlantModification program,continues
The        voltage transient was also detected by the T21D safeguards bus (train "A") undervoltage relays (EIIS/EA-27) which started the CD emergency diesel generator (EIIS/EK-DG) and initiated load shedding of the "A" train safeguards busses. The RB" train                                                busses were approximately 70 to 100 volts higher than the "A" train busses immediately prior to the trip  consequently the load shedding actuation logic for the "BR train was not satisfied, and the AB emergency diesel generator did not, automatically start. The East centrifugal charging pump (EIIS/CB-P) had been operating and was not restored during blackout load sequencing (as per design).
-however,nospecificpreventive measureshavebeenidentified todate.NRCFORMSSEA(94)3)rrU.S.GPO;198B 0-B24538/455 NRCForm3BSA(843)LICENSEETREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUAU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEOOM8NO.3150-0I04 EXPIRES:8/31/88FACILITYNAMEll)DOCKETNUMBER(2)YEARLFRNUMBER(8)SEOUENTIAL NUMBER'.RSREVISIONNUMBERPAGE(3)D.C.CookNuclearPlant,Unit2TExT///'oroBPoco/Br/v/rorEIrroo//I/mr/NRc%%drrrr3()343/lIT)050003]870070005OF05FailedComonentIdentification PlantDescription:
Operators manually started the West centrifugal charging pump to restore reactor coolant pump seal injection (EIIS/CB) and opened IM0-911, charging pump suction from the refueling water storage tank (EIIS/CB-TK), to restore pressurizer level and to clear the letdown isolation (which occurred, as designed, due to the loss of the East centrifugal charging pump). The load shed also de-energized the lighting transformers (EIIS/FF-XFMR), isolating plant lighting and outlets (EIIS/FF-OUT). Other lighting transformer loads lost included; the analog rod position indication (EIIS/AA-XF) and the rod bottom lights (EIIS/AA-IL),
Manufacturer:
chart drives for the narrow range and wide range reactor coolant temperature recorder (EIIS/JC-TR), main generator megawatt recorder chart drive (EIIS/EL-XR), normal control room lighting (EIIS/FF)E and the AB emergency diesel generator recorder chart drive (EIIS/EK-XR). The load shedding sequence experienced was in accordance with undervoltage protection system (EIIS/EA)design.
Manufacturer IDNumber:EIISCode:Numberreplaced:
Power was manuallly restored to the lighting transformers within 30 minutes.                       The AB emergency diesel generator was manually started 45 seconds after the trip, but was never loaded. Both emergency diesels were secured after offsite power was established to the "A" train safeguards busses. The Unit was stabilized in Mode 3 (hot standby) at approximately 0755 hours, July 14, 1987.
MainGenerator VoltageRegulator PowerSuppliesBrownBoveriVRCE1R39287116 AR103963R1 ND-'501BEL-UJX2PlantDescription:
The NRC was notified of the event via the ENS at 0815 hours, July 14, 1987.
Manufacturer:
With the exception of the failure of the main generator voltage control system, there were no inoperative structures, components, or systems that contributed to this event.
Manufacturer IDnumber:EIISCode:NumberReplaced:
Cause of Event The cause of the event was determined to be the failure of the main generator automatic voltage regulator power supply concurrent with the failure of the manual voltage regulator power supply. Post-event testing of voltage control system components revealed six failed SCR modules, in addition to the two failed power supplies (automatic and.
MainGenerator VoltageRegulator SCR(Thyristor Insert)ModuleBrownBoveri07060GR90075/4 GR0053P1EL-SCR6PlantDescription:
manual). Intermittent failures of the main generator automatic voltage regulator pulse amplifier and pulse driver circuit boards are the probable cause of the SCR module failures.
Manufacturer:
NRC FORM 366A                                                                                                                    *U.S.GPO:1986-0.824 538/455 (94)3)
Manufacturer IDNumber:EIISCode:NumberReplaced:
 
MainGenerator VoltageRegulator PulseGenerator CircuitBoardBrownBoveriGT032ALGV455007P13 EL-772PlantDescription:
NRC Form 3BBA                                                                                                        U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (94)3)
Manufacturer:
LICENSEE E                T REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUAT          J                APPROVEO OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME (1)                                                         DOCKET NUMBER (2)               LER NUMBER (8)                     PAGE (3)
Manufacturer IDNumber:EIISCode:NumberReplaced:
SEQUENTIAL      REVISION NUMBER        NUMBER D.C. Cook Nuclear TEXT //F moro <<>>oo /4 Er)U)or/, I>>o Plant, Unit
MainGenerator VoltageRegulator PulseAmplifier CircuitBoardBrownBoveri07102A139046615RUT/RU10LGV455011P EL-AMP2PreviousSimilarEventsNoneNRCFORMSBBA(()43)*U.S.GPO.10854 524538/455  
                                    ////or>>/NRC %%drm 3654'4/ (17) 2  0  5  0  0    0  3  1  8          0  0  7        0    0    0  4  "     0 5 Anal sis of Event This Engineered Safety Features Actuation, which resulted in                                                          a reactor trip sequence,                                 is reportable      pursuant. to 10        CFR    50.73 (a)
~eileenDIAMICNIGANEIECTDICCDAIEANYDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantP.O.8ox456,8ridgman, Michigan49166August13,1987UnitedStatesNuclearRegulatory Commission DocumentControlDeskWashington, D.C.20555Operating LicenseDPR-74DocketNo.50-316Document.
(2) (iv) .
ControlManager:Inaccordance withthecriteriaestablished by10CFR50.73entitledLicenseeEventReortinSstem,thefollowing reportisbeingsubmitted:
The Operations                      Sequence Monitor functioned as designed.                                 A time study of parameters monitored concluded that all automatic protection system responses; reactor trip, and resulting actuations, functioned properly as a result of the Engineered Safety Features actuation.
87-007-00 Sincerely, W.G.Smith,Jr.PlantManager/afhAttachment cc:JohnE.DolanA.B.Davis,RegionIIIM.P.AlexichR.F.KroegerH.B.BruggerR.W.Jurgensen NRCResidentInspector R.C.CallenG.Charnoff, Esq.D.HahnINPOD.Wigginton, NRCPNSRCA.A.BlindDottieSherman,ANILibraryJ.G.Feinstein/B.
Based on the above,                               it is concluded that the event did not constitute an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59 (a) (2), nor did it adversely impact health and safety.
P.LauzauFileW(PI'll}}
Corrective Actions Immediate corrective action involved operations personnel implementing plant procedures to verify proper response of the automatic protection system and to assess plant conditions for initiating appropriate                                 recovery actions. All failed/suspected components were replaced (automatic and manual voltage regulator power supplies, six SCR modules, two pulse generator circuit boards and two pulse amplifier circuit. boards).                                             Investigation regarding industry experience with                                      Brown      boveri  voltage        control systems indicates that the failures                                      which      occurred    are    consistent with those experienced at other plants and is not. the result of operator error or lack of maintenance. Evaluation as to the necessity for the redesign of the voltage                                            control system, via the Plant          Modification                    program,       continues         however,   no specific preventive                  measures            have    been  identified        to date.
NRC FORM SSEA                                                                                                                    rrU.S.GPO;198B 0-B24 538/455 (94)3)
 
NRC Form 3BSA                                                                                                        U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (843)
LICENSEE                      T REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUA                        APPROVEO OM8 NO. 3150-0I04 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITYNAME ll)                                                               DOCKET NUMBER (2)           LFR NUMBER (8)                     PAGE (3)
YEAR  SEOUENTIAL         REVISION NUMBER   '.RS NUMBER D.C. Cook Nuclear                            Plant, Unit                  2    0  5  0  0    0 3 ] 8  7    0 0 7            0    0    0  5  OF    0  5 TExT ///'oro BPoco /B r/v/rorE Irro o//I/mr/ NRc %%drrrr 3()343/ l IT)
Failed Com onent Identification Plant
 
== Description:==
Main Generator Voltage Regulator Power Supplies Manufacturer:                                                 Brown Boveri Manufacturer ID Number:                                       VRCE1R39287116 AR103963R1 ND-'501B EIIS Code:                                                    EL-UJX Number replaced:                                               2 Plant
 
== Description:==
Main Generator Voltage Regulator                  SCR (Thyristor Insert) Module Manufacturer:                                                  Brown Boveri Manufacturer ID number:                                        07060 GR90075/4 GR0053P1 EIIS Code:                                                    EL-SCR Number Replaced:                                               6 Plant
 
== Description:==
Main Generator Voltage Regulator Pulse Generator Circuit Board Manufacturer:                                                 Brown Boveri Manufacturer ID Number:                                       GT032A LGV455007P13 EIIS Code:                                                     EL-77 Number Replaced:                                               2 Plant
 
== Description:==
Main Generator Voltage Regulator Pulse Amplifier Circuit Board Manufacturer:                                                 Brown Boveri Manufacturer ID Number:                                       07102 A1390466 15 RUT/RU10 LGV455011P EIIS Code:                                                     EL-AMP Number Replaced:                                              2 Previous Similar Events None NRC FORM SBBA                                                                                                                      *U.S.GPO.10854 524 538/455
(()43)
 
~eileen DIA        MICNIGAN EIECTDIC CDAIEANY Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant P.O. 8ox 456, 8ridgman, Michigan 49166 August 13, 1987 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.               20555 Operating License DPR-74 Docket No. 50-316 Document. Control Manager:
In accordance with the criteria established by 10 CFR 50.73 entitled Licensee Event Re ortin S stem, the following report is being submitted:
87-007-00 Sincerely, W. G. Smith,     Jr.
Plant Manager
/afh Attachment cc:   John E. Dolan A. B. Davis, Region M. P. Alexich III R. F. Kroeger H. B. Brugger R. W. Jurgensen NRC  Resident Inspector R. C. Callen G. Charnoff, Esq.
D. Hahn INPO D. Wigginton, NRC PNSRC A. A. Blind Dottie  Sherman, ANI Library J. G. Feinstein/B. P. Lauzau File W(PI
                                                                                'll}}

Latest revision as of 02:21, 4 February 2020

LER 87-007-00:on 870714,ESF Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Undervoltage of Reactor Coolant Buses.Caused by Failure of Main Generator Voltage Control Sys.Failed & Suspected Components of Sys replaced.W/870813 Ltr
ML17325A260
Person / Time
Site: Cook American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 08/13/1987
From: Sampson J, Will Smith
AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORP., INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
To:
NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
LER-87-007-01, LER-87-7-1, NUDOCS 8708180184
Download: ML17325A260 (8)


Text

REGULA Y INFORNATION DISTRIBUTIO SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 8708180184 DOC. DATE: 87/08/13 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FAG IL: 50-316 Donald C. Cook Nuc lear Poeer AFFILIATION P lant'nit 2i Indiana & 05000316 AUTH. MANE AUTHOR SAMPSONe J. R. Indiana & Michigan Electric Co.

SMITHS'. G. Indiana & Michigan Electric Co.

REC IP. NAME REC IP IENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 87-007-00: on 870714'SF reactor trip occurred due to undervoltage of reactor coolant busses. Caused bg failure of main generator voltage control sos. Failed & suspected components of sos replaced. W/870813 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR ENCL SIZE:

TITLE: 50. 73 Licensee Event Report (LER)> Incident Rpti etc.

NOTES:

RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NANE LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NANE LTTR ENCL PD3-3 LA 1 1 PD3-3 PD 1 1 WIGGINGTON D 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS NICHELSON 1 ACRS NOELLER 2 2 AEOD/DOA 1 AEOD/DSP/NAS 1 1 AEOD/DSP/PQAB 2 2 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 DEDRO 1 1 NRR/DEST/ADE 1 0 NRR/DEST/ADS 1 0 NRR/DEST/CEB 1 1 NRR/DEST/ELB 1 NRR/DEST/ ICSB 1 NRR/DEST/MEB 1 1 NRR/DEST/NTB '1 1 NRR/DEST/PSB 1 1 NRR/DEBT/RSB 1 NRR/DEST/SGB 1 1 NRR/DLPG/HFB 1-NRR/DLPG/GAB 1 1 NRR/DOEA/EAB 1 NRR/DREP/RAB 1 1 RlhhDRE PB 2 2 NRR/PMAS/ILRB 1 G FILE 02 1 RES DEPY GI 1 1 R FORDS J 1 1 RES/DE/EIB 1 1 RGN3 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: EG&G GROf<i N 5 5 H ST LOBBY WARD 1 LPDR 1 NRC PDR 1 NSIC HARRIS' 1 1 NSIC MAYST' 1 1 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 44 ENCL 42

r. ~

NRC FOrm 3dd U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION (943)

APPROVED OMB NO. 31504104 EXPIRES: SI31ldd LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME PI DOCKET NUMBER (2) PA E 3l D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 1 61 oF ESF Actuation (Reactor Trip) Due to Undervoltage of the Reactor Coolant Pum Busses as a Result of C EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (5) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (5)

MONTH DAY '9EAR YEAR SEOUENTrAI f<<r<<<<REVISION MONTH OAY YEAR FACILITYNAMES DOCKET NUMBER(El NUMBEtl .>>Td NUMBER 0 5 0 0 0 0 7 1 4 8 7 8 7 0 0 7 0 0 1 3 8 7 0 5 0 0 0 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT T 0 THE AEOUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR II: IChecfr one or more of the follory'np) (11 OPERATINO MODE (9) 20.402(B) 20.405(c) 60.73(s) (2) (iv) 73.71(B)

POWER 20.406(s) (1)(i) 50M(c)(1) 50.73(s)(2 I (v) 73.71(c)

LEYEL 0 8 0 20.405(s I (1 I (6) 50.35 (c) (2) 50.73(s) (2) (rd) OTHER ISpeclfy ln Aprtrect INfow end In Text, NIIC form

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LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE J. R. Sampson Safet 6 Assessment Su erinte COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE OESCRIBEO IN THIS REPORT (13I 616465-590 x>gjc P,

Q.yg <<>S>>r CAUSE SYSTEM MANUFAC. REPORTABLE '@ MANUFAC. EPORTAB LE COMPONENT TO NPROS CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT TURER r TURER TO NPADS

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SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPFCTED (14) 3 4 5 5 N MONTH DAY YEAR EXPECTED SUB M I SS ION DATE (15)

YES Ilfyer, complere EXPECTED S(fphtlSSION OATEI X No ABSTRACT ILlmit to te00 rpecer, I e., epproxlmerely llfteen tlnple specs typevrritren finer) (15)

On July 14, 1987, at 0707 hours0.00818 days <br />0.196 hours <br />0.00117 weeks <br />2.690135e-4 months <br />, an Engineered Safety Features Actuation (Reactor Trip) occurred due to undervoltage of the reactor coolant pump busses. The undervoltage condition was the result of the failure of the main generator voltage control system.

The Unit was stabilized in Mode 3 (Hot Standby) at approximately 0755 hours0.00874 days <br />0.21 hours <br />0.00125 weeks <br />2.872775e-4 months <br />, July 14, 1987. No abnormal reactor trip sequence responses were noted. The NRC was notified of the event via the ENS at 0815 hours0.00943 days <br />0.226 hours <br />0.00135 weeks <br />3.101075e-4 months <br />, July 14, 1987.

Post-event testing of the voltage control system components revealed two failed power supplies (automatic and manual), and six failed SCR Modules. All failed/suspected components were replaced. Investigation regarding industry experience with Brown Boveri voltage control systems indicates that the failures which occurred are consistent with those experienced at other plants and is not a result of operator error or lack of maintenance.

Evaluation as to the necessity for the redesign of the voltage control system, via the Plant Modification progra'm, continues however, no specific preventive measures have been identified to date.

8708180184 870813 PDR ADOCI(r 0500031(EI 8 PDR NRC Form 3dd (9d3)

NRC Form 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

(()4)3)

LICENSEE E T REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUA APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

YEAR 8'jets'EGUENTIAL REVISION 4 . NUMSE4 NOME E 4 D.C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 p p p p p 3 1 8 7 0 0 7 0 0 0 2oF0 TEXT /F IINvo EPEco ir roqoiaE ooo aANPenel HRC Form 355AB/ ((1)

Conditions Prior to Occurrence Unit 2 in Mode 1 (power operations) at 80 percent Reactor Thermal Power.

Descri tion of Event On July 14, 1987, at 0707 hours0.00818 days <br />0.196 hours <br />0.00117 weeks <br />2.690135e-4 months <br />, an Engineered Safety Features Actuation (Reactor Trip Sequence) occurred due to undervoltage of the reactor coolant pump busses (EIIS/EA). The undervoltage condition was the result of the failure of the main generator voltage. control system (EIIS/EL) .

At approximately 0637 hours0.00737 days <br />0.177 hours <br />0.00105 weeks <br />2.423785e-4 months <br />, July 14, 1987, the incoming Unit, Supervisor (Utility-Licensed Operator) noticed that the output from the main generator automatic voltage regulator (EIIS/EL-RG) was not nulled with the manual voltage regulator (EIIS/EL-RG).

The automatic regulator was currently in service and had been operating at the lowest value of the voltage band throughout the previous shift. When the Unit Supervisor adjusted the manual regulator to match the automatic setpoint, the main generator voltage and exciter current indication dipped momentarily and returned to normal [the adjustment. should have had no effect on the main generator (EIIS/EL-GEN)]. He then requested that a Reactor Operator (RO) (Utility-Licensed Operator) be posted at.

the regulator to monitor the indication. The RO reviewed the generator panel status with the incoming Unit, Supervisor and noticed that. the generator output voltage was slightly below the minimum of the operating band. The RO increased the automatic regulator to restore the generator output voltage to the bottom of the operating band. For the remaining period prior to the trip sequence, the volt-amps reactive, generator field temperature, and to a lesser degree the generator output voltage indication showed unstable behavior. No alarms occurred until seconds before the trip sequence.

Following the trip sequence [opening of the reactor trip breakers (EIIS/JE-BKR), insertion of the reactor control rods (EIIS/AA-ROD),

feedwater isolation (EIIS/JB), automatic starting of the motor-driven and turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps (EIIS/BA-P)]

operations personnel immediately implemented the special Emergency Operating Procedure, 1 OHP -4023.E-O, to verify proper response of the automatic protection system (EIIS/JC) and to assess plant conditions for initiating appropriate recovery actions. There was no automatic or manual actuation of the intermediate head safety injection system (EIIS/BQ) .

NAC FOAM 366A o U.S.GPO:1988 0.824 538/455 (84)3)

NRC Form 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (94)31 LICENSEE E T REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUA APPROVED OMB NO. 3150&104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME (I) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

YEAR W SEOUENTIAL NUMEER NUMBER D.C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 0 s 0 0 0 3 1 6 8 7 0 0 7 0 0 3oF 0 5 TEXT /Smote EPooo )r nrqrr)or/, rroo/Ar/orro/HRC Forrrr 35549/ (IT)

The voltage transient was also detected by the T21D safeguards bus (train "A") undervoltage relays (EIIS/EA-27) which started the CD emergency diesel generator (EIIS/EK-DG) and initiated load shedding of the "A" train safeguards busses. The RB" train busses were approximately 70 to 100 volts higher than the "A" train busses immediately prior to the trip consequently the load shedding actuation logic for the "BR train was not satisfied, and the AB emergency diesel generator did not, automatically start. The East centrifugal charging pump (EIIS/CB-P) had been operating and was not restored during blackout load sequencing (as per design).

Operators manually started the West centrifugal charging pump to restore reactor coolant pump seal injection (EIIS/CB) and opened IM0-911, charging pump suction from the refueling water storage tank (EIIS/CB-TK), to restore pressurizer level and to clear the letdown isolation (which occurred, as designed, due to the loss of the East centrifugal charging pump). The load shed also de-energized the lighting transformers (EIIS/FF-XFMR), isolating plant lighting and outlets (EIIS/FF-OUT). Other lighting transformer loads lost included; the analog rod position indication (EIIS/AA-XF) and the rod bottom lights (EIIS/AA-IL),

chart drives for the narrow range and wide range reactor coolant temperature recorder (EIIS/JC-TR), main generator megawatt recorder chart drive (EIIS/EL-XR), normal control room lighting (EIIS/FF)E and the AB emergency diesel generator recorder chart drive (EIIS/EK-XR). The load shedding sequence experienced was in accordance with undervoltage protection system (EIIS/EA)design.

Power was manuallly restored to the lighting transformers within 30 minutes. The AB emergency diesel generator was manually started 45 seconds after the trip, but was never loaded. Both emergency diesels were secured after offsite power was established to the "A" train safeguards busses. The Unit was stabilized in Mode 3 (hot standby) at approximately 0755 hours0.00874 days <br />0.21 hours <br />0.00125 weeks <br />2.872775e-4 months <br />, July 14, 1987.

The NRC was notified of the event via the ENS at 0815 hours0.00943 days <br />0.226 hours <br />0.00135 weeks <br />3.101075e-4 months <br />, July 14, 1987.

With the exception of the failure of the main generator voltage control system, there were no inoperative structures, components, or systems that contributed to this event.

Cause of Event The cause of the event was determined to be the failure of the main generator automatic voltage regulator power supply concurrent with the failure of the manual voltage regulator power supply. Post-event testing of voltage control system components revealed six failed SCR modules, in addition to the two failed power supplies (automatic and.

manual). Intermittent failures of the main generator automatic voltage regulator pulse amplifier and pulse driver circuit boards are the probable cause of the SCR module failures.

NRC FORM 366A *U.S.GPO:1986-0.824 538/455 (94)3)

NRC Form 3BBA U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (94)3)

LICENSEE E T REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUAT J APPROVEO OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (8) PAGE (3)

SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER D.C. Cook Nuclear TEXT //F moro <<>>oo /4 Er)U)or/, I>>o Plant, Unit

////or>>/NRC %%drm 3654'4/ (17) 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 1 8 0 0 7 0 0 0 4 " 0 5 Anal sis of Event This Engineered Safety Features Actuation, which resulted in a reactor trip sequence, is reportable pursuant. to 10 CFR 50.73 (a)

(2) (iv) .

The Operations Sequence Monitor functioned as designed. A time study of parameters monitored concluded that all automatic protection system responses; reactor trip, and resulting actuations, functioned properly as a result of the Engineered Safety Features actuation.

Based on the above, it is concluded that the event did not constitute an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59 (a) (2), nor did it adversely impact health and safety.

Corrective Actions Immediate corrective action involved operations personnel implementing plant procedures to verify proper response of the automatic protection system and to assess plant conditions for initiating appropriate recovery actions. All failed/suspected components were replaced (automatic and manual voltage regulator power supplies, six SCR modules, two pulse generator circuit boards and two pulse amplifier circuit. boards). Investigation regarding industry experience with Brown boveri voltage control systems indicates that the failures which occurred are consistent with those experienced at other plants and is not. the result of operator error or lack of maintenance. Evaluation as to the necessity for the redesign of the voltage control system, via the Plant Modification program, continues however, no specific preventive measures have been identified to date.

NRC FORM SSEA rrU.S.GPO;198B 0-B24 538/455 (94)3)

NRC Form 3BSA U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (843)

LICENSEE T REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUA APPROVEO OM8 NO. 3150-0I04 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITYNAME ll) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LFR NUMBER (8) PAGE (3)

YEAR SEOUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER '.RS NUMBER D.C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 3 ] 8 7 0 0 7 0 0 0 5 OF 0 5 TExT ///'oro BPoco /B r/v/rorE Irro o//I/mr/ NRc %%drrrr 3()343/ l IT)

Failed Com onent Identification Plant

Description:

Main Generator Voltage Regulator Power Supplies Manufacturer: Brown Boveri Manufacturer ID Number: VRCE1R39287116 AR103963R1 ND-'501B EIIS Code: EL-UJX Number replaced: 2 Plant

Description:

Main Generator Voltage Regulator SCR (Thyristor Insert) Module Manufacturer: Brown Boveri Manufacturer ID number: 07060 GR90075/4 GR0053P1 EIIS Code: EL-SCR Number Replaced: 6 Plant

Description:

Main Generator Voltage Regulator Pulse Generator Circuit Board Manufacturer: Brown Boveri Manufacturer ID Number: GT032A LGV455007P13 EIIS Code: EL-77 Number Replaced: 2 Plant

Description:

Main Generator Voltage Regulator Pulse Amplifier Circuit Board Manufacturer: Brown Boveri Manufacturer ID Number: 07102 A1390466 15 RUT/RU10 LGV455011P EIIS Code: EL-AMP Number Replaced: 2 Previous Similar Events None NRC FORM SBBA *U.S.GPO.10854 524 538/455

(()43)

~eileen DIA MICNIGAN EIECTDIC CDAIEANY Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant P.O. 8ox 456, 8ridgman, Michigan 49166 August 13, 1987 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Operating License DPR-74 Docket No. 50-316 Document. Control Manager:

In accordance with the criteria established by 10 CFR 50.73 entitled Licensee Event Re ortin S stem, the following report is being submitted:

87-007-00 Sincerely, W. G. Smith, Jr.

Plant Manager

/afh Attachment cc: John E. Dolan A. B. Davis, Region M. P. Alexich III R. F. Kroeger H. B. Brugger R. W. Jurgensen NRC Resident Inspector R. C. Callen G. Charnoff, Esq.

D. Hahn INPO D. Wigginton, NRC PNSRC A. A. Blind Dottie Sherman, ANI Library J. G. Feinstein/B. P. Lauzau File W(PI

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