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| NRC f"ORM 366 .. .S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 (5-92) EXPIRES 5/31 /95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block) MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503. | | NRC f"ORM 366 .. .S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 (5-92) EXPIRES 5/31 /95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block) MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503. |
| FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE (3) | | FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE (3) |
| Salem Generating Station - Unit 1 05000272 1 OF7 | | Salem Generating Station - Unit 1 05000272 1 OF7 TITLE (4) Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 Entry; Both Trains of the Solid State Protection Svstem (SSPS) Bein2: Inonerable EVENT DATE (5l LEA NUMBER C6 REPORT NUMBER 17\ OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER SEQUENTIAL REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NUMBER 05000 FACILITY NAME 02 01 95 95 -- 001 -- 00 03 02 95 DOCKET NUMBER 05000 OPERATING 1 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more (11 MODE (9) 20.402(b) 20.405(c) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 73.71 (b) |
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| TITLE (4) Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 Entry; Both Trains of the Solid State Protection Svstem (SSPS) Bein2: Inonerable EVENT DATE (5l LEA NUMBER C6 REPORT NUMBER 17\ OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER SEQUENTIAL REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NUMBER 05000 FACILITY NAME 02 01 95 95 -- 001 -- 00 03 02 95 DOCKET NUMBER 05000 OPERATING 1 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more (11 MODE (9) 20.402(b) 20.405(c) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 73.71 (b) | |
| POWER 20.405 (a)(1 )(i) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 73.71(c) | | POWER 20.405 (a)(1 )(i) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 73.71(c) |
| * LEVEL (10) 100% 20.405(a)(1 )(ii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a) (2) (vii) OTHER 20.405 (a) (1) (iii) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a) (2) (viii) (A) (Specify in Abslract below and in Text, NRG 20.405(a)(1)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50. 73 (a)(2)(viii)(B) | | * LEVEL (10) 100% 20.405(a)(1 )(ii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a) (2) (vii) OTHER 20.405 (a) (1) (iii) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a) (2) (viii) (A) (Specify in Abslract below and in Text, NRG 20.405(a)(1)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50. 73 (a)(2)(viii)(B) |
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| I . 20.405 (a)(1 )(v) 50.73(a) (2) (iii) | | I . 20.405 (a)(1 )(v) 50.73(a) (2) (iii) |
| LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER 12l | | LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER 12l |
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| On 2/1/95, Unit 1 and 2 entered TS 3.0.3 when both Solid State Protection ' System (SSPS) trains were declared inoperable after discovery that the AC power distribution within the SSPS is susceptible to a common mode failure. The NRC granted discretionary enforcement allowing 4 days to implement design changes to modify the power distribution arrangement-within SSPS. During Unit 1 implementation of the design changes, a number of power supply related problems were encountered. On 2/3/95, Unit 1 initiated a shutdown in accordance with TS 3.3.3.1 for exceeding reactor trip bypass breaker closure time in support of SSPS design changes. Unit 2 entered TS 3.0.3 on 2/3/95, for both SSPS trains being inoperable, NRC rescinded discretionary enforcement at time of TS 3.0.3 entry. | | On 2/1/95, Unit 1 and 2 entered TS 3.0.3 when both Solid State Protection ' System (SSPS) trains were declared inoperable after discovery that the AC power distribution within the SSPS is susceptible to a common mode failure. The NRC granted discretionary enforcement allowing 4 days to implement design changes to modify the power distribution arrangement-within SSPS. During Unit 1 implementation of the design changes, a number of power supply related problems were encountered. On 2/3/95, Unit 1 initiated a shutdown in accordance with TS 3.3.3.1 for exceeding reactor trip bypass breaker closure time in support of SSPS design changes. Unit 2 entered TS 3.0.3 on 2/3/95, for both SSPS trains being inoperable, NRC rescinded discretionary enforcement at time of TS 3.0.3 entry. |
| This occurred as a result of original design of the SSPS. The apparent cause of the SSPS power supply failures has been attributed to aged components and the lack of preventive maintenance. Design changes have been completed to rewire the SSPS power supply leads. New power supplies were installed and additional power supplies were-cleaned, tested and returned to service. Evaluation is on going to determine appropriate action concerning preventive and predictive testing requirements for SSPS power supplies. Event discovery followed original identification of this issue by Diablo Canyon. | | This occurred as a result of original design of the SSPS. The apparent cause of the SSPS power supply failures has been attributed to aged components and the lack of preventive maintenance. Design changes have been completed to rewire the SSPS power supply leads. New power supplies were installed and additional power supplies were-cleaned, tested and returned to service. Evaluation is on going to determine appropriate action concerning preventive and predictive testing requirements for SSPS power supplies. Event discovery followed original identification of this issue by Diablo Canyon. |
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| NRG FORM 366 (5-92) | | NRG FORM 366 (5-92) |
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| A condition in which a fault in the circuitry for the turbine stop valve limit switches, autostop oil pressure switches or reactor coolant pump breaker position could possibly render the solid state protection system (SSPS) trains inoperable was identified at a plant of similar design. The review concluded that a single initiating event | | A condition in which a fault in the circuitry for the turbine stop valve limit switches, autostop oil pressure switches or reactor coolant pump breaker position could possibly render the solid state protection system (SSPS) trains inoperable was identified at a plant of similar design. The review concluded that a single initiating event |
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| ., Salem Generating Station Unit # I Docket Number 50-272 LER Number 95-001-00 | | ., Salem Generating Station Unit # I Docket Number 50-272 LER Number 95-001-00 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Page 4 of 7 Analysis of Occurrence: (cont'd) |
| * LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Page 4 of 7 Analysis of Occurrence: (cont'd)
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| (e.g., main steam line break or seismic event), could possibly render one or both trains of SSPS inoperable. | | (e.g., main steam line break or seismic event), could possibly render one or both trains of SSPS inoperable. |
| The postulated failure can compromise the SSPS power supplies, due to the location of the 15 AMP fuses within the input bays. This would result in a loss of power to the SSPS power supplies and subsequent loss of power to the SSPS logic and master relays (note that loss of the 48 volt power supply will cause a reactor trip) . | | The postulated failure can compromise the SSPS power supplies, due to the location of the 15 AMP fuses within the input bays. This would result in a loss of power to the SSPS power supplies and subsequent loss of power to the SSPS logic and master relays (note that loss of the 48 volt power supply will cause a reactor trip) . |
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| During the design modification, only one train at a time was rendered inoperable. During the modifications the redundant train was maintained operable, as well as the reactor trip function from SSPS. In support of this extension the following accident initiators were considered to be | | During the design modification, only one train at a time was rendered inoperable. During the modifications the redundant train was maintained operable, as well as the reactor trip function from SSPS. In support of this extension the following accident initiators were considered to be |
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| e Salem Generating Station Docket Number LER Number | | e Salem Generating Station Docket Number LER Number LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Page 5 of 7 Unit# 1 50-272 95-001-00 Analysis of Occurrence: (cont'd) applicable: 1) seismic (alone); 2) seismic event resulting in a loss of off-site power; 3) seismic resulting in a steam line break in the affected area; 4) fire; and 5) steam line break. |
| * LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Page 5 of 7 Unit# 1 50-272 95-001-00 Analysis of Occurrence: (cont'd) applicable: 1) seismic (alone); 2) seismic event resulting in a loss of off-site power; 3) seismic resulting in a steam line break in the affected area; 4) fire; and 5) steam line break.
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| Other events such as turbine building crane operation, handling and/or dropping of heavy loads, missile generation, and tornado were considered as potential initiators, however, consequences were less severe or comparable to that of the seismic event. | | Other events such as turbine building crane operation, handling and/or dropping of heavy loads, missile generation, and tornado were considered as potential initiators, however, consequences were less severe or comparable to that of the seismic event. |
| The power supply issues identified during SSPS design change implementation were due to age related component failures (i.e. capacitors, transistors) and the lack of preventive maintenance. Power supplies were found with an excessive accumulation of dust. In addition, the following were identified: a wire was shorted to the rear mounted heat sink, a ground had propagated from the conductive circuit board stand-offs (the other power supplies utilize non-conductive standoffs) . | | The power supply issues identified during SSPS design change implementation were due to age related component failures (i.e. capacitors, transistors) and the lack of preventive maintenance. Power supplies were found with an excessive accumulation of dust. In addition, the following were identified: a wire was shorted to the rear mounted heat sink, a ground had propagated from the conductive circuit board stand-offs (the other power supplies utilize non-conductive standoffs) . |
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| New power supplies were installed in Unit 2 and one new power supply was installed in Unit 1. Three power supplies were cleaned and bench tested satisfactorily for return to service in Unit 1. | | New power supplies were installed in Unit 2 and one new power supply was installed in Unit 1. Three power supplies were cleaned and bench tested satisfactorily for return to service in Unit 1. |
| Evaluation is ongoing to determine appropriate action | | Evaluation is ongoing to determine appropriate action |
| * Salem Generating Station Unit# 1 Docket Number 50-272 LER Number 95-001-00 | | * Salem Generating Station Unit# 1 Docket Number 50-272 LER Number 95-001-00 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Page 7 of 7 Corrective Action: (cont'd) concerning preventive and predictive testing_ requirements for SSPS power supplies. |
| * LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Page 7 of 7 Corrective Action: (cont'd) concerning preventive and predictive testing_ requirements for SSPS power supplies.
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| J. C. Summers General Manager - | | J. C. Summers General Manager - |
| Salem Operations FHW:vs REF: SORC Mtg. 95-026}} | | Salem Operations FHW:vs REF: SORC Mtg. 95-026}} |
Similar Documents at Salem |
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Category:LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML18107A5031999-08-26026 August 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990729,determined That SG Blowdown RMs Setpoint Was non-conservative.Caused by Inadequate ACs for Incorporating Original Plant Licensing Data Into Plant Procedures.Blowdown Will Be Restricted.With 990826 Ltr ML18107A4691999-07-28028 July 1999 LER 99-008-00:on 990714,determined That Limit Switch Cables Were Subject to Multiple Hot Shorts in Same Fire Area.Caused by Inadequate Original Post Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis.All Limit Switch Cables for MOVs Were Reviewed.With 990728 Ltr ML18107A4441999-07-0606 July 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990605,surveillance for Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) Was Missed.Caused by Human Error.Qptr Calculation Was Performed & Personnel Involved Have Been Held Accountable IAW Pse&G Policies.With 990706 Ltr ML18107A4211999-07-0202 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990605,11 Containment Declared Inoperable. Caused by Valves 11SW72 & 11SW223 Both Leaking.Procedure S1.OP-ST.SW-0010(Q) Was Enhanced to Provide Specific Instructions to Ensure Proper Sequencing.With 990702 Ltr ML18107A4321999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-006-01:on 990501,determined That There Was No Flow in One of Four Injection Legs.Caused by Sticking of Valve in Safety Injection Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve Was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A4331999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-002-01:on 990405,determined That 2SA118 Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Found in 2SA118 valve.2SA118 Valve Was Cycled Several Times & Seat Area Was Air Blown in Order to Displace Foreign Matl.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A3951999-06-17017 June 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990520,reactor Tripped from 100% Power,Due to Negative Flux Trip Signal from Nuclear Instrumentation. Cause Has Not Been Determined.Discoloration Was Identified on One of Penetrations.With 990617 Ltr ML18107A3661999-06-0909 June 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990513,unplanned Entry Into TS 3.0.3 Was Made.Caused by Human error.Re-positioned Creacs Supply Fan Selector Switches & Revised Procedures S1 & S2.OP-ST.SSP-0001(Q).With 990609 Ltr ML18107A3551999-06-0202 June 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990504,failure to Meet TS Action Statement Requirements for High Oxygen Concentration in Waste Gas Holdup Sys Occurred.Caused by Inability of Operators. Existing Procedures Will Be Evaluated.With 990602 Ltr ML18107A3541999-06-0101 June 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990501,HHSI Flow Balance Discrepancy Was Noted During Surveillance.Caused by Sticking of Check Valve in SI Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve 21SJ17,was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990601 Ltr ML18107A2931999-05-12012 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990413,determined That Number 12 Auxiliary Bldg Exhaust Fan Was Rotating Backwards.Caused by mis-wiring of Motor Due to Human Error by Maint technician.Mis-wiring Was Corrected & Fan Was Returned to Svc.With 990512 Ltr ML18107A2781999-05-10010 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990411,automatic Actuation of ESF Occurred During Reactor Vessel Head Removal in Support of Refueling Operations.Caused by High Radiation Condition.Containment Atmosphere Was Monitored.With 990505 Ltr ML18107A2791999-05-0404 May 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990406,all Salem Unit 2 Chillers Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Human Error.Lessons Learned from Event Were Communicated to All Operators by Including Them in Night Orders.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A2741999-05-0303 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990405,determined That Containment Isolation Valve Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Blocking Valves from Closing.Check Valve Mechanically Agitated.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A2351999-04-23023 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990330,MSSV Failed Lift Set Test.Caused by Setpoint Variance Which Is Result of Aging.Valves Were Adjusted & Retested to Ensure TS Tolerance.With 990423 Ltr ML18106B1471999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990228,reactor Scram Was Noted as Result of Turbine Trip.Caused by Operator Error.Lesson Plans Revised to Explicitly Demonstrate Manner in Which Valve Functions. with 990329 Ltr ML18106B0701999-02-16016 February 1999 LER 98-015-00:on 981208,inadvertent Discharge Through RHR Relief Valve During Startup Was Noted.Caused by Operator Performing Too Many Tasks Simultaneously.Appropriate Actions Have Been Taken IAW Policies & Procedures.With 990216 Ltr ML18106B0491999-01-28028 January 1999 LER 98-007-01:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Caused by Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking.Replaced Affected Tubing.With 990128 Ltr ML18106B0401999-01-18018 January 1999 LER 98-016-00:on 981219,ECCS Leakage Was Outside of Design Value.Caused by Leakage Past Seat of 21RH34 Manual Drain. Valve 21RH34 Was Reseated.With 990118 Ltr ML18106B0081998-12-24024 December 1998 LER 97-001-01:on 970215,failure to Perform TS Surveillance of Component Cooling Water Sys Check Valves Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Communication Between EOP Group & IST Reviewers.Procedure Revised.With 981224 Ltr ML18106B0021998-12-17017 December 1998 LER 98-015-01:on 980924,improper Installation of Test Equipment to RPS Occurred.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Reviews During Past Revs.Revised Procedures. with 981217 Ltr ML18106A9551998-11-0303 November 1998 LER 96-013-01:on 960711,concluded That Current Gain & Bias Settings Had Rendered Overtemperature Delta Temp Protection Channels Inoperable.Caused by Scaling Error.Licensee Will Revise Scaling Calculations.With 981105 Ltr ML18106A9451998-10-30030 October 1998 LER 97-004-01:on 970408,failure to Comply with TS Action Statement,Dg Start & Inadequate Surveillance Testing,Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Tracking of Inoperable Equipment. Discussed Event & Lessons Learned.With 981022 Ltr ML18106A9491998-10-22022 October 1998 LER 98-015-00:on 980924,identified Improper Installation of Test Equipment to Rps.Cause Indeterminate.Procedures for Installation of Test Equipment for Collection of State Point Data Were Placed on Administrative Hold.With 981022 Ltr ML18106A9301998-10-21021 October 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980725,noted Improper Calibr of Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line Radiation Monitor.Caused by Inattention to Detail by Maint Personnel.Channel Calibr Was Successfully Performed on 1R18 on 980821.With 981019 Ltr ML18106A9071998-10-0101 October 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980918,discovered That Fire Barrier Matl for HVAC Ducts Does Not Meet Required Level of Fire Resistance.Cause Indeterminate.Established Appropriate Compensatory Actions for Fire Barriers.With 981001 Ltr ML18106A8951998-09-28028 September 1998 LER 98-012-01:on 980725,noted That Afs Was Operated with Less than Required Number of Operable AFW Pumps.Caused by Improper Procedure Implementation.Runout Protection Pressure Device for 22 AFW Pumps Was Returned to Svc.With 980928 Ltr ML18106A8821998-09-21021 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980820,noted Surveillance of Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Devices Missed.Caused by Human Error.Satisfactorily Tested Apprpriate Breakers & Disciplined Involved Personnel.With 980921 Ltr ML18106A8791998-09-16016 September 1998 LER 96-006-01:on 960717,determined That non-radioactive Liquid Basin Radwaste Monitor Inoperable During Low Head Conditions.Caused by Inadequate Design Change Package.Design Change 1EC3663-01 Has Been Installed.With 980916 Ltr ML18106A8801998-09-0808 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980806,operation with TS Required Equipment OOS Was Noted.Caused by Human Error.Reviewed Processes & Practices Re Safety Sys Status Control,Procedure Rev & Extra Training.With 980908 Ltr ML18106A8531998-08-27027 August 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Cause of Event Has Not Yet Been Determined.Assembled Root Cause Team & Replaced Affected tubing.W/980827 Ltr ML18106A8521998-08-27027 August 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980803,ESFA During a 4KV Automatic Transfer Test Was Noted.Caused by Premature Release of Control Console Pushbutton Due to Inadequate Procedural Step.Revised procedure.W/980827 Ltr ML18106A8421998-08-24024 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980725,discovered That Plant Had Operated in Modes 1 & 2 w/twenty-two AFW Pumps Inoperable.Caused by Failure to Restore Pump Runout Protection Pressure Device to Svc.Returned Subject Device to svc.W/980824 Ltr ML18106A8431998-08-24024 August 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980810,failure to Post Continuous Firewatch as Required by Fire Protection Plan Noted.Caused by Failure to Recognize Concurrent Conditions.Continuous Firewatch Was Posted Immediately & Repaired Smoke detectors.W/980824 Ltr ML18106A8141998-08-13013 August 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 980714,determined That Leakage from Boron Injection Tank Exceeded Max Allowable ECCS Leakage from Sources Outside Containment.Caused by Leaking 2SJ404 Manual Sample valve.2SJ404 Valve repaired.W/980813 Ltr ML18106A8201998-08-13013 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980715,potential to Exceed Rating of Piping Due to Isolation of Overpressure Protection Line Was Noted. Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Appropriate Operations Dept Procedures Have Been revised.W/980813 Ltr ML18106A6931998-06-29029 June 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980122,inappropriate Plugging of Tubes R9C60 & R10C60 in Salem Unit 2 Sg,Was Performed.Caused by Failure of Qualification,Verification & Validation Process. Tubes Reviewed to Verify No Others Inappropriately Plugged ML18106A6471998-06-0404 June 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980505,improper Isolation of Single Cell Battery Charger from 125 Vdc Battery Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Review.Placed Procedure SC.MD-CM.ZZ-0024(Q) on Administrative hold.W/980604 Ltr ML18106A6421998-06-0101 June 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 931019,reactor Pressure Vessel Insp Plugs Were Out of Configuration,Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Proper Configuration Was Restored Shortly After Discovery Prior to Entering Mode 2.W/980601 Ltr ML18106A6431998-05-29029 May 1998 LER 98-006-01:on 980227,determined Incorrect Scaling Error of First Stage Pressure Transmitter Existed.Caused by Human Error.Revised Setpoint Calculation SC-MS002-01 & Revised Associated Instrument Calibr Database info.W/980529 Ltr ML18106A6141998-05-18018 May 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 970814,failure to Test 21 & 22 AF 40 Valves in Closed Direction as Required by TS 4.0.5 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Design Mod Process.Motor Driven 21/22 AF 40 Valves Were Tested IAW Revised procedure.W/980518 Ltr ML18106A5901998-05-0101 May 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980405,epoxy Missing from Terminals of H Analyzer Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Development of Procedure.H Analyzers Were Repaired & Review of Other Safety Related Equipment in Containment Was performed.W/980501 Ltr ML18106A5611998-04-20020 April 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980323,inadequate Testing of Salem Unit 1 Containment Air Locks Resulted in Entering TS 3.0.3.Caused by less-than-adequate Work Practices During Replacement of Equalizing Valve.Salem Unit 2 Airlocks Were Inspected ML18106A6061998-04-0101 April 1998 Corrected LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Comply W/Tss 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Have Been Taken to Correctly Document Safety Factors.Corrects Prior Similar Occurrences ML18106A4451998-04-0101 April 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Perform TS 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Were Taken to Correctly Document Safety factors.W/980401 Ltr ML18106A4351998-03-30030 March 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980227,incorrect Scaling of First Stage Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitters Noted.Cause Indeterminate.Implemented Procedure Changes & re-scaled Affected Turbine Impulse Pressure transmitters.W/980330 Ltr ML18106A3961998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of Twelve EDG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (FOTP) Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Installed Correct off-auto-manual Switch & Verified Operability of Twelve FOTP.W/980320 Ltr ML18106A5781998-03-20020 March 1998 Corrected LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of 12 Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (Fotp),Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Field Insp Performed to Verify Configuration of Switches for 11,21 & 22 FOTPs ML18106A4021998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980218,failure to Establish Containment Integrity (Closure) Prior to Fuel Movement Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Identify & Include Condensate Pot Vent in Appropriate Valve Lineup.Valves identified.W/980320 Ltr ML18106A4031998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980221,ESF Actuation of 11 & 12 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Occurred.Caused by Human Error.Operators Promptly Established Feedwater to All SG & Restored Proper Water levels.W/980320 Ltr 1999-08-26
[Table view] Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML18107A5031999-08-26026 August 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990729,determined That SG Blowdown RMs Setpoint Was non-conservative.Caused by Inadequate ACs for Incorporating Original Plant Licensing Data Into Plant Procedures.Blowdown Will Be Restricted.With 990826 Ltr ML18107A4691999-07-28028 July 1999 LER 99-008-00:on 990714,determined That Limit Switch Cables Were Subject to Multiple Hot Shorts in Same Fire Area.Caused by Inadequate Original Post Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis.All Limit Switch Cables for MOVs Were Reviewed.With 990728 Ltr ML18107A4441999-07-0606 July 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990605,surveillance for Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) Was Missed.Caused by Human Error.Qptr Calculation Was Performed & Personnel Involved Have Been Held Accountable IAW Pse&G Policies.With 990706 Ltr ML18107A4211999-07-0202 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990605,11 Containment Declared Inoperable. Caused by Valves 11SW72 & 11SW223 Both Leaking.Procedure S1.OP-ST.SW-0010(Q) Was Enhanced to Provide Specific Instructions to Ensure Proper Sequencing.With 990702 Ltr ML18107A4321999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-006-01:on 990501,determined That There Was No Flow in One of Four Injection Legs.Caused by Sticking of Valve in Safety Injection Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve Was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A4331999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-002-01:on 990405,determined That 2SA118 Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Found in 2SA118 valve.2SA118 Valve Was Cycled Several Times & Seat Area Was Air Blown in Order to Displace Foreign Matl.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A3951999-06-17017 June 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990520,reactor Tripped from 100% Power,Due to Negative Flux Trip Signal from Nuclear Instrumentation. Cause Has Not Been Determined.Discoloration Was Identified on One of Penetrations.With 990617 Ltr ML18107A3661999-06-0909 June 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990513,unplanned Entry Into TS 3.0.3 Was Made.Caused by Human error.Re-positioned Creacs Supply Fan Selector Switches & Revised Procedures S1 & S2.OP-ST.SSP-0001(Q).With 990609 Ltr ML18107A3551999-06-0202 June 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990504,failure to Meet TS Action Statement Requirements for High Oxygen Concentration in Waste Gas Holdup Sys Occurred.Caused by Inability of Operators. Existing Procedures Will Be Evaluated.With 990602 Ltr ML18107A3541999-06-0101 June 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990501,HHSI Flow Balance Discrepancy Was Noted During Surveillance.Caused by Sticking of Check Valve in SI Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve 21SJ17,was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990601 Ltr ML18107A2931999-05-12012 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990413,determined That Number 12 Auxiliary Bldg Exhaust Fan Was Rotating Backwards.Caused by mis-wiring of Motor Due to Human Error by Maint technician.Mis-wiring Was Corrected & Fan Was Returned to Svc.With 990512 Ltr ML18107A2781999-05-10010 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990411,automatic Actuation of ESF Occurred During Reactor Vessel Head Removal in Support of Refueling Operations.Caused by High Radiation Condition.Containment Atmosphere Was Monitored.With 990505 Ltr ML18107A2791999-05-0404 May 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990406,all Salem Unit 2 Chillers Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Human Error.Lessons Learned from Event Were Communicated to All Operators by Including Them in Night Orders.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A2741999-05-0303 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990405,determined That Containment Isolation Valve Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Blocking Valves from Closing.Check Valve Mechanically Agitated.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A2351999-04-23023 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990330,MSSV Failed Lift Set Test.Caused by Setpoint Variance Which Is Result of Aging.Valves Were Adjusted & Retested to Ensure TS Tolerance.With 990423 Ltr ML18106B1471999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990228,reactor Scram Was Noted as Result of Turbine Trip.Caused by Operator Error.Lesson Plans Revised to Explicitly Demonstrate Manner in Which Valve Functions. with 990329 Ltr ML18106B0701999-02-16016 February 1999 LER 98-015-00:on 981208,inadvertent Discharge Through RHR Relief Valve During Startup Was Noted.Caused by Operator Performing Too Many Tasks Simultaneously.Appropriate Actions Have Been Taken IAW Policies & Procedures.With 990216 Ltr ML18106B0491999-01-28028 January 1999 LER 98-007-01:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Caused by Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking.Replaced Affected Tubing.With 990128 Ltr ML18106B0401999-01-18018 January 1999 LER 98-016-00:on 981219,ECCS Leakage Was Outside of Design Value.Caused by Leakage Past Seat of 21RH34 Manual Drain. Valve 21RH34 Was Reseated.With 990118 Ltr ML18106B0081998-12-24024 December 1998 LER 97-001-01:on 970215,failure to Perform TS Surveillance of Component Cooling Water Sys Check Valves Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Communication Between EOP Group & IST Reviewers.Procedure Revised.With 981224 Ltr ML18106B0021998-12-17017 December 1998 LER 98-015-01:on 980924,improper Installation of Test Equipment to RPS Occurred.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Reviews During Past Revs.Revised Procedures. with 981217 Ltr ML18106A9551998-11-0303 November 1998 LER 96-013-01:on 960711,concluded That Current Gain & Bias Settings Had Rendered Overtemperature Delta Temp Protection Channels Inoperable.Caused by Scaling Error.Licensee Will Revise Scaling Calculations.With 981105 Ltr ML18106A9451998-10-30030 October 1998 LER 97-004-01:on 970408,failure to Comply with TS Action Statement,Dg Start & Inadequate Surveillance Testing,Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Tracking of Inoperable Equipment. Discussed Event & Lessons Learned.With 981022 Ltr ML18106A9491998-10-22022 October 1998 LER 98-015-00:on 980924,identified Improper Installation of Test Equipment to Rps.Cause Indeterminate.Procedures for Installation of Test Equipment for Collection of State Point Data Were Placed on Administrative Hold.With 981022 Ltr ML18106A9301998-10-21021 October 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980725,noted Improper Calibr of Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line Radiation Monitor.Caused by Inattention to Detail by Maint Personnel.Channel Calibr Was Successfully Performed on 1R18 on 980821.With 981019 Ltr ML18106A9071998-10-0101 October 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980918,discovered That Fire Barrier Matl for HVAC Ducts Does Not Meet Required Level of Fire Resistance.Cause Indeterminate.Established Appropriate Compensatory Actions for Fire Barriers.With 981001 Ltr ML18106A8951998-09-28028 September 1998 LER 98-012-01:on 980725,noted That Afs Was Operated with Less than Required Number of Operable AFW Pumps.Caused by Improper Procedure Implementation.Runout Protection Pressure Device for 22 AFW Pumps Was Returned to Svc.With 980928 Ltr ML18106A8821998-09-21021 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980820,noted Surveillance of Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Devices Missed.Caused by Human Error.Satisfactorily Tested Apprpriate Breakers & Disciplined Involved Personnel.With 980921 Ltr ML18106A8791998-09-16016 September 1998 LER 96-006-01:on 960717,determined That non-radioactive Liquid Basin Radwaste Monitor Inoperable During Low Head Conditions.Caused by Inadequate Design Change Package.Design Change 1EC3663-01 Has Been Installed.With 980916 Ltr ML18106A8801998-09-0808 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980806,operation with TS Required Equipment OOS Was Noted.Caused by Human Error.Reviewed Processes & Practices Re Safety Sys Status Control,Procedure Rev & Extra Training.With 980908 Ltr ML18106A8531998-08-27027 August 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Cause of Event Has Not Yet Been Determined.Assembled Root Cause Team & Replaced Affected tubing.W/980827 Ltr ML18106A8521998-08-27027 August 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980803,ESFA During a 4KV Automatic Transfer Test Was Noted.Caused by Premature Release of Control Console Pushbutton Due to Inadequate Procedural Step.Revised procedure.W/980827 Ltr ML18106A8421998-08-24024 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980725,discovered That Plant Had Operated in Modes 1 & 2 w/twenty-two AFW Pumps Inoperable.Caused by Failure to Restore Pump Runout Protection Pressure Device to Svc.Returned Subject Device to svc.W/980824 Ltr ML18106A8431998-08-24024 August 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980810,failure to Post Continuous Firewatch as Required by Fire Protection Plan Noted.Caused by Failure to Recognize Concurrent Conditions.Continuous Firewatch Was Posted Immediately & Repaired Smoke detectors.W/980824 Ltr ML18106A8141998-08-13013 August 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 980714,determined That Leakage from Boron Injection Tank Exceeded Max Allowable ECCS Leakage from Sources Outside Containment.Caused by Leaking 2SJ404 Manual Sample valve.2SJ404 Valve repaired.W/980813 Ltr ML18106A8201998-08-13013 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980715,potential to Exceed Rating of Piping Due to Isolation of Overpressure Protection Line Was Noted. Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Appropriate Operations Dept Procedures Have Been revised.W/980813 Ltr ML18106A6931998-06-29029 June 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980122,inappropriate Plugging of Tubes R9C60 & R10C60 in Salem Unit 2 Sg,Was Performed.Caused by Failure of Qualification,Verification & Validation Process. Tubes Reviewed to Verify No Others Inappropriately Plugged ML18106A6471998-06-0404 June 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980505,improper Isolation of Single Cell Battery Charger from 125 Vdc Battery Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Review.Placed Procedure SC.MD-CM.ZZ-0024(Q) on Administrative hold.W/980604 Ltr ML18106A6421998-06-0101 June 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 931019,reactor Pressure Vessel Insp Plugs Were Out of Configuration,Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Proper Configuration Was Restored Shortly After Discovery Prior to Entering Mode 2.W/980601 Ltr ML18106A6431998-05-29029 May 1998 LER 98-006-01:on 980227,determined Incorrect Scaling Error of First Stage Pressure Transmitter Existed.Caused by Human Error.Revised Setpoint Calculation SC-MS002-01 & Revised Associated Instrument Calibr Database info.W/980529 Ltr ML18106A6141998-05-18018 May 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 970814,failure to Test 21 & 22 AF 40 Valves in Closed Direction as Required by TS 4.0.5 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Design Mod Process.Motor Driven 21/22 AF 40 Valves Were Tested IAW Revised procedure.W/980518 Ltr ML18106A5901998-05-0101 May 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980405,epoxy Missing from Terminals of H Analyzer Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Development of Procedure.H Analyzers Were Repaired & Review of Other Safety Related Equipment in Containment Was performed.W/980501 Ltr ML18106A5611998-04-20020 April 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980323,inadequate Testing of Salem Unit 1 Containment Air Locks Resulted in Entering TS 3.0.3.Caused by less-than-adequate Work Practices During Replacement of Equalizing Valve.Salem Unit 2 Airlocks Were Inspected ML18106A6061998-04-0101 April 1998 Corrected LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Comply W/Tss 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Have Been Taken to Correctly Document Safety Factors.Corrects Prior Similar Occurrences ML18106A4451998-04-0101 April 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Perform TS 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Were Taken to Correctly Document Safety factors.W/980401 Ltr ML18106A4351998-03-30030 March 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980227,incorrect Scaling of First Stage Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitters Noted.Cause Indeterminate.Implemented Procedure Changes & re-scaled Affected Turbine Impulse Pressure transmitters.W/980330 Ltr ML18106A3961998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of Twelve EDG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (FOTP) Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Installed Correct off-auto-manual Switch & Verified Operability of Twelve FOTP.W/980320 Ltr ML18106A5781998-03-20020 March 1998 Corrected LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of 12 Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (Fotp),Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Field Insp Performed to Verify Configuration of Switches for 11,21 & 22 FOTPs ML18106A4021998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980218,failure to Establish Containment Integrity (Closure) Prior to Fuel Movement Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Identify & Include Condensate Pot Vent in Appropriate Valve Lineup.Valves identified.W/980320 Ltr ML18106A4031998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980221,ESF Actuation of 11 & 12 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Occurred.Caused by Human Error.Operators Promptly Established Feedwater to All SG & Restored Proper Water levels.W/980320 Ltr 1999-08-26
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217A9931999-09-30030 September 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data ML18107A5581999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 991014 Ltr ML18107A5571999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 991014 Ltr ML18107A5301999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990913 Ltr ML18107A5311999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990913 ML18107A5031999-08-26026 August 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990729,determined That SG Blowdown RMs Setpoint Was non-conservative.Caused by Inadequate ACs for Incorporating Original Plant Licensing Data Into Plant Procedures.Blowdown Will Be Restricted.With 990826 Ltr ML18107A5201999-08-12012 August 1999 Rev 0 to Sgs Unit 2 ISI RFO Exam Results (S2RFO#9) Second Interval,Second Period, First Outage (96RF). ML18107A4811999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990813 Ltr ML18107A4821999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990813 Ltr ML18107A4691999-07-28028 July 1999 LER 99-008-00:on 990714,determined That Limit Switch Cables Were Subject to Multiple Hot Shorts in Same Fire Area.Caused by Inadequate Original Post Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis.All Limit Switch Cables for MOVs Were Reviewed.With 990728 Ltr ML18107A4441999-07-0606 July 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990605,surveillance for Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) Was Missed.Caused by Human Error.Qptr Calculation Was Performed & Personnel Involved Have Been Held Accountable IAW Pse&G Policies.With 990706 Ltr ML18107A4211999-07-0202 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990605,11 Containment Declared Inoperable. Caused by Valves 11SW72 & 11SW223 Both Leaking.Procedure S1.OP-ST.SW-0010(Q) Was Enhanced to Provide Specific Instructions to Ensure Proper Sequencing.With 990702 Ltr ML18107A4331999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-002-01:on 990405,determined That 2SA118 Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Found in 2SA118 valve.2SA118 Valve Was Cycled Several Times & Seat Area Was Air Blown in Order to Displace Foreign Matl.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A4321999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-006-01:on 990501,determined That There Was No Flow in One of Four Injection Legs.Caused by Sticking of Valve in Safety Injection Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve Was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A5211999-07-0101 July 1999 Rev 0 to Sgs Unit 2 ISI RFO Exam Results (S2RFO#10) Second Interval,Second Period,Second Outage (99RF). ML18107A4351999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990713 Ltr ML18107A4341999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990713 Ltr ML20196H8621999-06-30030 June 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data, June 1999 Rept ML18107A3951999-06-17017 June 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990520,reactor Tripped from 100% Power,Due to Negative Flux Trip Signal from Nuclear Instrumentation. Cause Has Not Been Determined.Discoloration Was Identified on One of Penetrations.With 990617 Ltr ML18107A3661999-06-0909 June 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990513,unplanned Entry Into TS 3.0.3 Was Made.Caused by Human error.Re-positioned Creacs Supply Fan Selector Switches & Revised Procedures S1 & S2.OP-ST.SSP-0001(Q).With 990609 Ltr ML18107A3551999-06-0202 June 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990504,failure to Meet TS Action Statement Requirements for High Oxygen Concentration in Waste Gas Holdup Sys Occurred.Caused by Inability of Operators. Existing Procedures Will Be Evaluated.With 990602 Ltr ML18107A3441999-06-0101 June 1999 Interim Part 21 Rept Re Premature Over Voltage Protection Actuation in Circuit Specific Application in Dc Power Supply.Testing & Evaluation Activities Will Be Completed on 990716 ML18107A3541999-06-0101 June 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990501,HHSI Flow Balance Discrepancy Was Noted During Surveillance.Caused by Sticking of Check Valve in SI Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve 21SJ17,was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990601 Ltr ML18107A3681999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1.With 990611 Ltr ML18107A3721999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 2.With 990611 Ltr ML18107A2931999-05-12012 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990413,determined That Number 12 Auxiliary Bldg Exhaust Fan Was Rotating Backwards.Caused by mis-wiring of Motor Due to Human Error by Maint technician.Mis-wiring Was Corrected & Fan Was Returned to Svc.With 990512 Ltr ML18107A2781999-05-10010 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990411,automatic Actuation of ESF Occurred During Reactor Vessel Head Removal in Support of Refueling Operations.Caused by High Radiation Condition.Containment Atmosphere Was Monitored.With 990505 Ltr ML18107A2791999-05-0404 May 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990406,all Salem Unit 2 Chillers Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Human Error.Lessons Learned from Event Were Communicated to All Operators by Including Them in Night Orders.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A2741999-05-0303 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990405,determined That Containment Isolation Valve Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Blocking Valves from Closing.Check Valve Mechanically Agitated.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A3711999-04-30030 April 1999 Corrected Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1 ML18107A3151999-04-30030 April 1999 Submittal-Only Screening Review of Salem Generating Station Individual Plant Exam for External Events (Seismic Portion), Rev 1 ML18107A2991999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Unit 1.With 990514 Ltr ML18107A2971999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Unit 2.With 990514 Ltr ML18107A2351999-04-23023 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990330,MSSV Failed Lift Set Test.Caused by Setpoint Variance Which Is Result of Aging.Valves Were Adjusted & Retested to Ensure TS Tolerance.With 990423 Ltr ML18107A2881999-04-0707 April 1999 Rev 0 to NFS-0174, COLR for Salem Unit 2 Cycle 11. ML18107A1821999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990414 Ltr ML18107A1831999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990414 Ltr ML18106B1471999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990228,reactor Scram Was Noted as Result of Turbine Trip.Caused by Operator Error.Lesson Plans Revised to Explicitly Demonstrate Manner in Which Valve Functions. with 990329 Ltr ML18106B1021999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Salem Unit 2.With 990315 Ltr ML18106B1011999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Salem Unit 1.With 990315 Ltr ML18106B0931999-02-25025 February 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee,Part Number SS-6-T.Caused by Crack Due to Improper Location of Heated Bar.Only One Part Out of 7396 Pieces in Forging Lot Was Found to Be Cracked.Affected Util,Notified ML18106B0701999-02-16016 February 1999 LER 98-015-00:on 981208,inadvertent Discharge Through RHR Relief Valve During Startup Was Noted.Caused by Operator Performing Too Many Tasks Simultaneously.Appropriate Actions Have Been Taken IAW Policies & Procedures.With 990216 Ltr ML18106B0551999-02-0101 February 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Matl Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee,Part Number SS-6-T.Defect Is Crack in Center of Forging.Analysis of Part Is Continuing & Further Details Will Be Provided IAW Ncr Timetables.Drawing of Part,Encl ML18106B0561999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 2.With 990212 Ltr ML18106B0571999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1.With 990212 Ltr ML20205P1671999-01-31031 January 1999 a POST-PLUME Phase, Federal Participation Exercise ML18106B0441999-01-29029 January 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee Part Number SS-6-T.Caused by Crack in Center of Forging. Continuing Analysis of Part & Will Provide Details in Acoordance with NRC Timetables ML18106B0491999-01-28028 January 1999 LER 98-007-01:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Caused by Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking.Replaced Affected Tubing.With 990128 Ltr ML18106B0401999-01-18018 January 1999 LER 98-016-00:on 981219,ECCS Leakage Was Outside of Design Value.Caused by Leakage Past Seat of 21RH34 Manual Drain. Valve 21RH34 Was Reseated.With 990118 Ltr ML18106B0251998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Salem Unit 2.With 990115 Ltr 1999-09-30
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Text
. e 0.PS~G Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 Nuclear Business Unit March 2, 1995 U. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Attn: Document Control Desk SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-70 and DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-272 and 50-311 UNIT NO. 1 and 2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 272/95-001-00 This Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of Code of Federal Regulation 10CFR50. 73 (a) (2) (ii) (B). Issuance of this report is required within thirty (30) days of event discovery.
Sincerely, t J. C. Summers General Manager -
Salem Operations SORC Mtg.95-026 FHW:vs C Distribution LER File 0, \,,)vu::.
cnn 0.. .:1
.J 9503090138 950302 PDR ADOCK 05000272 PDR s
The pmYer is in your hands.
95-2168 REV. 6/94
NRC f"ORM 366 .. .S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 (5-92) EXPIRES 5/31 /95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block) MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.
FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE (3)
Salem Generating Station - Unit 1 05000272 1 OF7 TITLE (4) Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 Entry; Both Trains of the Solid State Protection Svstem (SSPS) Bein2: Inonerable EVENT DATE (5l LEA NUMBER C6 REPORT NUMBER 17\ OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER SEQUENTIAL REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NUMBER 05000 FACILITY NAME 02 01 95 95 -- 001 -- 00 03 02 95 DOCKET NUMBER 05000 OPERATING 1 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more (11 MODE (9) 20.402(b) 20.405(c) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 73.71 (b)
POWER 20.405 (a)(1 )(i) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 73.71(c)
- LEVEL (10) 100% 20.405(a)(1 )(ii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a) (2) (vii) OTHER 20.405 (a) (1) (iii) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a) (2) (viii) (A) (Specify in Abslract below and in Text, NRG 20.405(a)(1)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50. 73 (a)(2)(viii)(B)
I . 20.405 (a)(1 )(v) 50.73(a) (2) (iii)
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER 12l
- 50. 73 (a)(2)(x)
Form 366A)
NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
Frederick Wiltsee, LER. Coordinator 609 339-5163 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13\
REPORTABLE REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER TO NPRDS TO NPRDS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14 EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR I YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) x NO SUBMISSION DATE (15)
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)
On 2/1/95, Unit 1 and 2 entered TS 3.0.3 when both Solid State Protection ' System (SSPS) trains were declared inoperable after discovery that the AC power distribution within the SSPS is susceptible to a common mode failure. The NRC granted discretionary enforcement allowing 4 days to implement design changes to modify the power distribution arrangement-within SSPS. During Unit 1 implementation of the design changes, a number of power supply related problems were encountered. On 2/3/95, Unit 1 initiated a shutdown in accordance with TS 3.3.3.1 for exceeding reactor trip bypass breaker closure time in support of SSPS design changes. Unit 2 entered TS 3.0.3 on 2/3/95, for both SSPS trains being inoperable, NRC rescinded discretionary enforcement at time of TS 3.0.3 entry.
This occurred as a result of original design of the SSPS. The apparent cause of the SSPS power supply failures has been attributed to aged components and the lack of preventive maintenance. Design changes have been completed to rewire the SSPS power supply leads. New power supplies were installed and additional power supplies were-cleaned, tested and returned to service. Evaluation is on going to determine appropriate action concerning preventive and predictive testing requirements for SSPS power supplies. Event discovery followed original identification of this issue by Diablo Canyon.
NRG FORM 366 (5-92)
e e LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Sa!em Generating Station Docket Number LER Number Page 2 of 7 Unit# 1 50-272 95-001-00 Plant and System Identification:
Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes appear in the text as {xx}
Identification of Occurrence:
Technical Specification(TS) 3.0.3 Entry; Both Trains of the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) Inoperable Event Date: 2/1/95 and 2/3/95 Report Date: 3/2/95 This report was initiated by Incident Report No.95-066, 95-073, and 95-075.
Conditions Prior to Occurrence:
Unit 1 Mode 1 Reactor Power 100 %
Unit Load 1151 MWe Unit 2 Mode 2 Reactor Power lOE--08 amps Unit Load 0 MWe Description of Occurrence:
On February 1, 1995, Unit 1 and 2 entered TS 3.0.3 when both SSPS trains were declared inoperable after discovery that the AC power distribution within SSPS {JC} is susceptible to a common mode failure. SSPS input signals which originate in the turbine building (auto stop oil, stop valve limit switches, and reactor coolant pump breaker position signals) were susceptible to failure (short circuits), due to the consequential effects of design basis accidents, including earthquake, and environmental effects of pipe ruptures. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) granted discretionary
e e LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Docket Number LER Number Page 3 of7 Unit# I 50-272 95-001-00 Description of Occurrence: (cont'd) enforcement allowing 4 days to implement design changes to modify the power distribution arrangement within SSPS and change fuse sizes.
This concern is due to the location of equipment, wiring, and junction boxes with respect to high energy lines and the non-seismic design of the turbine building which feeds the 15 and 48 volt power supplies and field contacts powered from the SSPS input bays.
Event discovery followed original identification of this issue by Diablo Canyon.
During Unit 1 implementation of the design changes, a number of power supply related problems were encountered. On February 3, 1995 at 1100 hours0.0127 days <br />0.306 hours <br />0.00182 weeks <br />4.1855e-4 months <br /> (hrs), a shutdown was initiated in accordance with TS 3.3.3.1 Action 1 due to exceeding time for having reactor trip bypass breaker closed in support of SSPS design changes. Unit 1 entered Mode 3 at 1700 hrs, entered TS 3.0.3 both SSPS trains being inoperable, and exited discretionary enforcement. On February 4, 1995 at 2230 hrs, the Unit was placed in Mode 5 for the completion of SSPS design changes.
Unit 2 entered TS 3.0.3 on February 3, 1995 at 1640 hrs, for both SSPS trains being inoperable, NRC Region I rescinded discretionary enforcement at time of TS 3.0.3 entry. At 1730 hrs (same day), a Unit shutdown from Mode 2 was initiated and Mode 3 was entered at 1820 hrs (same day). On February 4, 1995 at 0004 hrs, Mode 4 was entered and Mode 5 was entered on February 5, 1995, at 0431 hrs, for completion of SSPS design changes. The NRC was notified of the shutdown initiation, in accordance with Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR50. 72 (b) (1) (ii) (b).
Analysis of Occurrence:
A condition in which a fault in the circuitry for the turbine stop valve limit switches, autostop oil pressure switches or reactor coolant pump breaker position could possibly render the solid state protection system (SSPS) trains inoperable was identified at a plant of similar design. The review concluded that a single initiating event
., Salem Generating Station Unit # I Docket Number 50-272 LER Number 95-001-00 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Page 4 of 7 Analysis of Occurrence: (cont'd)
(e.g., main steam line break or seismic event), could possibly render one or both trains of SSPS inoperable.
The postulated failure can compromise the SSPS power supplies, due to the location of the 15 AMP fuses within the input bays. This would result in a loss of power to the SSPS power supplies and subsequent loss of power to the SSPS logic and master relays (note that loss of the 48 volt power supply will cause a reactor trip) .
Electrical terminal boxes contain two SSPS instrument channels for turbine stop valve position indication while another terminal box contains the auto stop oil input to SSPS. These channels are non-safety related (non lE) inpu~s to SSPS and are not electrically isolated from the safety related (lE) portion of the SSPS.
If the steam jet from the faulted main steam line was to strike one of the electrical terminal boxes, or if a seismic event affected the terminal boxes, short circuits in the non lE inputs to the SSPS could result. Since the non lE channels are not electrically isolated from the SSPS, the short would cause the fuses for the associated lE channels to open. The opening of the fuses for the lE channels would result in the deenergizing of the power supplies for the logic circuitry of one or both trains of SSPS. Assuming the credible failure of a short to ground, the SSPS 15 and 48 VDC power supplies would deenergize from the short circuit.
At 0230 hrs on February 2, 1994, the NRC granted verbal enforcement discretion allowing 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br /> to restore operability of both SSPS trains. PSE&G committed to a formal written request on February 3, 1995. This allowed restoration of one train of SSPS to operable status and termination of TS 3.0.3. The requested duration of the enforcement discretion was from 0230 hrs on February 2, 1995 until 0230 hrs on February 6, 1995, or completion of modifications.
Throughout this period, both trains would remain functional.
During the design modification, only one train at a time was rendered inoperable. During the modifications the redundant train was maintained operable, as well as the reactor trip function from SSPS. In support of this extension the following accident initiators were considered to be
e Salem Generating Station Docket Number LER Number LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Page 5 of 7 Unit# 1 50-272 95-001-00 Analysis of Occurrence: (cont'd) applicable: 1) seismic (alone); 2) seismic event resulting in a loss of off-site power; 3) seismic resulting in a steam line break in the affected area; 4) fire; and 5) steam line break.
Other events such as turbine building crane operation, handling and/or dropping of heavy loads, missile generation, and tornado were considered as potential initiators, however, consequences were less severe or comparable to that of the seismic event.
The power supply issues identified during SSPS design change implementation were due to age related component failures (i.e. capacitors, transistors) and the lack of preventive maintenance. Power supplies were found with an excessive accumulation of dust. In addition, the following were identified: a wire was shorted to the rear mounted heat sink, a ground had propagated from the conductive circuit board stand-offs (the other power supplies utilize non-conductive standoffs) .
Apparent Cause of Occurrence:
The cause of this event is ~Design, Manufacturing, Construction/Installation", as classified in Appendix B of NUREG 1022. This occurred as a result of original design of the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) .
The apparent cause of the SSPS power supplies failures has been attributed to aged components and the lack of preventive maintenance.
Prior Similar Occurrence:
Review of documentation did not show similar occurrences.
Safety Significance:
This event did not affect the health and safety of the public. It is reportable pursuant to
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION 1
Salem Generating Station Docket Number LER Number Page 6 of7 Unit # I 50-272 95-001-00 Safety Significance: (cont'd) 10CFRSO. 73 (a) (2) (ii) (B) . In addition, this report is intended to satisfy reporting requirements applicable to a potential 10CFR21 concern involving the SSPS.
A modified hot zero power steam line break (SLB) core response analysis (UFSAR Section 15.4.2) was performed in which all four steam generators blow down to the environment without operator action or automatic mitigation of any kind.
The evaluation shows that the current UFSAR licensing basis analysis of SLB core response remains bounding and DNBR limits are not exceeded and apply to previous operating cycles.
Long term heatup analysis indicates that even though all four steam generators dry out, the actuation of a single motor-driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump is sufficient to prevent reactor coolant system (RCS) over-pressurization, pressurize overfill, or hot leg boiling which are typical bounding criteria applied to long-term events such as loss of normal feedwater, loss of AC power to auxiliaries, and feedline rupture. The evaluation shows the long term consequences of the subsequent heatup of the reactor coolant system (RCS) was analyzed with acceptable results. In addition, the frequencies of these events are relatively low.
Reactor vessel integrity for the effects of pressurized thermal shock (PTS) were evaluated with acceptable results.
Corrective Action:
Design changes have been completed to eliminate the identified failure mechanism of SSPS power supplies.
New power supplies were installed in Unit 2 and one new power supply was installed in Unit 1. Three power supplies were cleaned and bench tested satisfactorily for return to service in Unit 1.
Evaluation is ongoing to determine appropriate action
- Salem Generating Station Unit# 1 Docket Number 50-272 LER Number 95-001-00 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Page 7 of 7 Corrective Action: (cont'd) concerning preventive and predictive testing_ requirements for SSPS power supplies.
J. C. Summers General Manager -
Salem Operations FHW:vs REF: SORC Mtg.95-026