Information Notice 1994-08, Potential for Surveillance Testing to Fail to Detect an Inoperable Main Steam Isolation Valve: Difference between revisions

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| issue date = 02/01/1994
| issue date = 02/01/1994
| title = Potential for Surveillance Testing to Fail to Detect an Inoperable Main Steam Isolation Valve
| title = Potential for Surveillance Testing to Fail to Detect an Inoperable Main Steam Isolation Valve
| author name = Grimes B K
| author name = Grimes B
| author affiliation = NRC/NRR
| author affiliation = NRC/NRR
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  
Line 14: Line 14:
| page count = 10
| page count = 10
}}
}}
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES


COMMISSION
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


===OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION===
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 February 1, 1994 NRC INFORMATION


NOTICE 94-08: POTENTIAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 February 1, 1994 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 94-08:   POTENTIAL FOR SURVEILLANCE TESTING TO FAIL


FOR SURVEILLANCE
TO DETECT AN INOPERABLE MAIN STEAM ISOLATION


TESTING TO FAIL TO DETECT AN INOPERABLE
VALVE
 
MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE


==Addressees==
==Addressees==
All holders of operating
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power
 
licenses or construction
 
permits for nuclear power reactors.PurDose The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
 
Commission (NRC) is issuing this information
 
notice (IN) to alert addressees
 
to a potential
 
for surveillance
 
testing to fail to detect that a main steam isolation
 
valve is mechanically
 
bound and will not close. It is expected that recipients
 
will review the information
 
for applicability
 
to their facilities
 
and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
 
However, suggestions
 
contained
 
in this information
 
notice are not NRC requirements;
therefore, no specific action or written response is required.DescriDtion
 
of Circumstances
 
On April 19, 1993, while performing
 
maintenance
 
to repair a presumed faulty limit switch on a main steam isolation


valve, the licensee for the River Bend Station (River Bend) found that the valve was mechanically
reactors.


bound and would not close as required.
PurDose


The valve is a 24-inch-diameter (nominal), spring and pneumatic
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information


closing, pneumatic-opening, internally
notice (IN)to alert addressees to a potential for surveillance testing to


balanced, poppet-type
fail to detect that a main steam isolation valve is mechanically bound and


globe valve manufactured
will not close. It is expected that recipients will review the information for


by the Atwood & Morrill Company Inc. Plant operators
applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to


had previously
avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this information


performed
notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written


partial stroke surveillance
response is required.


testing of the valve on February 27 and April 1, 1993, but did not detect that the valve would not close. The licensee later determined
DescriDtion of Circumstances


that the testing failed to detect that the valve was inoperable
On April 19, 1993, while performing maintenance to repair a presumed faulty


because the test did not adequately
limit switch on a main steam isolation valve, the licensee for the River Bend


consider the design of the valve and the positioning
Station (River Bend) found that the valve was mechanically bound and would not


of the limit switch arm in relation to the valve poppet travel.The licensee determined
close as required. The valve is a 24-inch-diameter (nominal), spring and


that the valve would not close because improper clearances
pneumatic closing, pneumatic-opening, internally balanced, poppet-type globe


between the valve poppet and the valve body had caused excessive wear of the guide ribs and resulted in the valve poppet becoming mechanically
valve manufactured by the Atwood & Morrill Company Inc. Plant operators had


bound. The excessive
previously performed partial stroke surveillance testing of the valve on


wear may have been avoided had the licensee installed
February 27 and April 1, 1993, but did not detect that the valve would not


an anti-rotation
close. The licensee later determined that the testing failed to detect that


modification
the valve was inoperable because the test did not adequately consider the


recommended
design of the valve and the positioning of the limit switch arm in relation to


by the manufacturer
the valve poppet travel.


in 1989.Subsequent
The licensee determined that the valve would not close because improper


to this event, the manufacturer
clearances between the valve poppet and the valve body had caused excessive


reported the failure to close to the NRC under Part 21 to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations
wear of the guide ribs and resulted in the valve poppet becoming mechanically


and informed affected licensees
bound. The excessive wear may have been avoided had the licensee installed an


of the failure mechanism
anti-rotation modification recommended by the manufacturer in 1989.


and recommended
Subsequent to this event, the manufacturer reported the failure to close to


actions to prevent recurrence.
the NRC under Part 21 to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations and


NRC Inspection
informed affected licensees of the failure mechanism and recommended actions


Report 50-458/93-18 and Licensee Event Report.93-006 provide additional
to prevent recurrence. NRC Inspection Report 50-458/93-18 and Licensee Event


details on the valve failure.(9401260242)
Report.93-006 provide additional details on the valve failure.
TJ'O 02 w> 44M'j J7JD#V&//
c/S* '(I


YJ Kx/ IN 94-08 February 1, 1994 Discussion
(9401260242)                                                            TJ'O


The original design positioning
02 w>        44M'j                      J7JD#V&//c/S


of the limit switches was such that, during partial stroke testing, the limit switches could be actuated and indicate movement of the main valve poppet even though the valve poppet had not actually moved. Thus, a failure of the valve to properly stroke may go undetected
*                                                              '(I


by partial stroke testing.Under normal operation, the valve stem travels 28 centimeters
YJ                              Kx/ IN 94-08 February 1, 1994 Discussion


[11 inches] to fully stroke in either direction.
The original design positioning of the limit switches was such that, during


As the valve strokes open, the first 2.5 centimeters
partial stroke testing, the limit switches could be actuated and indicate


[1 inch) of stem travel moves an internal poppet which opens an equalizing
movement of the main valve poppet even though the valve poppet had not


port allowing the pressure on both sides of the main poppet to equalize.
actually moved. Thus, a failure of the valve to properly stroke may go


During the remainder
undetected by partial stroke testing.


of the open stroke, the internal poppet lifts the main poppet and retracts it to the fully open position.
Under normal operation, the valve stem travels 28 centimeters [11 inches] to


During a partial stroke test in the close direction, as the stem (and the internal poppet)begins to close, the main poppet also begins to close because of gravity.However, during the event, with the main poppet stuck in the open position, the stem travelled
fully stroke in either direction. As the valve strokes open, the first


about 2.5 centimeters
2.5 centimeters [1 inch) of stem travel moves an internal poppet which opens


[I inch] and stopped when the internal poppet seated in the equalizing
an equalizing port allowing the pressure on both sides of the main poppet to


port.There are three limit switches on the valve that are of concern in this event.The first two switches provide a safety-related
equalize. During the remainder of the open stroke, the internal poppet lifts


signal to the reactor protection
the main poppet and retracts it to the fully open position. During a partial


system that the valve is 92 percent open. The third switch sends a nonsafety-related
stroke test in the close direction, as the stem (and the internal poppet)
begins to close, the main poppet also begins to close because of gravity.


signal to position indicating
However, during the event, with the main poppet stuck in the open position, the stem travelled about 2.5 centimeters [I inch] and stopped when the


lights in the control room indicating
internal poppet seated in the equalizing port.


that the valve is 90 percent open. The licensee had set the 90-percent-open
There are three limit switches on the valve that are of concern in this event.


limit switch such that stem movement of about 2.8 centimeters
The first two switches provide a safety-related signal to the reactor


[1.1 inch] was required to actuate the switch and indicate that the main valve poppet had moved to the 90-percent-open
protection system that the valve is 92 percent open. The third switch sends a


position.
nonsafety-related signal to position indicating lights in the control room


However, because the limit switches are set with a + 2 percent tolerance, actual stem travel to actuate the 90-percent-open
indicating that the valve is 90 percent open. The licensee had set the


limit switch may be only 2.25 centimeters
90-percent-open limit switch such that stem movement of about 2.8 centimeters


[0.88 inch]. In a worst-case
[1.1 inch] was required to actuate the switch and indicate that the main valve


scenario both the 92- and the 90-percent-open
poppet had moved to the 90-percent-open position. However, because the limit


limit switches could be actuated without the main valve poppet moving.During the partial stroke testing conducted
switches are set with a + 2 percent tolerance, actual stem travel to actuate


on February 7 and April 1, the first two limit switches (92-percent-open
the 90-percent-open limit switch may be only 2.25 centimeters [0.88 inch]. In


indication)
a worst-case scenario both the 92- and the 90-percent-open limit switches
actuated, the third limit switch (90-percent-open


indication)
could be actuated without the main valve poppet moving.
did not actuate. Although the procedural


step called for receipt of the 90-percent-open
During the partial stroke testing conducted on February 7 and April 1, the


indication, the operators
first two limit switches (92-percent-open indication) actuated, the third


did not declare the valve inoperable
limit switch (90-percent-open indication) did not actuate. Although the


because the first two limit switches had actuated and they assumed that the third limit switch (nonsafety)
procedural step called for receipt of the 90-percent-open indication, the
had failed. Later, on April 17, during maintenance


on the presumed faulty limit switch, the licensee found that the main valve poppet was mechanically
operators did not declare the valve inoperable because the first two limit


bound and that the valve would not close.The licensee for River Bend changed the third limit switch setting to actuate at 85 percent of the open position to ensure that its actuation
switches had actuated and they assumed that the third limit switch (nonsafety)
had failed. Later, on April 17, during maintenance on the presumed faulty


during partial stroke testing would give positive indication
limit switch, the licensee found that the main valve poppet was mechanically


of poppet movement.
bound and that the valve would not close.


Pending further evaluation
The licensee for River Bend changed the third limit switch setting to actuate


of these valves during the next refueling
at 85 percent of the open position to ensure that its actuation during partial


outage, the licensee is performing
stroke testing would give positive indication of poppet movement. Pending


full stroke testing of the valves on a quarterly
further evaluation of these valves during the next refueling outage, the


basis and intends to install the anti-rotation
licensee is performing full stroke testing of the valves on a quarterly basis


modification
and intends to install the anti-rotation modification recommended by the


recommended
vendor to prevent recurrence of the excessive wear of the valve guides. Also, operations personnel have been trained on the operation and function of the


by the vendor to prevent recurrence
limit switches.


of the excessive
--- IN 94-08 February 1, 1994 The valve described in this notice is used in safety-related applications at


wear of the valve guides. Also, operations
nuclear facilities. One such application is as a main steam isolation valve.


personnel
At River Bend and most domestic boiling water reactors, there are two main


have been trained on the operation
steam isolation valves for each main steam line; an inboard valve, located


and function of the limit switches.
inside the drywell, and an outboard valve, located Just outside the primary


--- IN 94-08 February 1, 1994 The valve described
containment. After a design-basis accident, these valves are required to


in this notice is used in safety-related
close and remain closed for 1 hour. Should these valves fail to close, offsite dose limits could be exceeded. A similar failure of a main steam


applications
isolation valve to close had occurred at a foreign boiling water reactor.


at nuclear facilities.
The potential for limit switch positioning to adversely affect surveillance


One such application
test accuracy may exist for valves other than that described in this notice.


is as a main steam isolation
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If


valve.At River Bend and most domestic boiling water reactors, there are two main steam isolation
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact


valves for each main steam line; an inboard valve, located inside the drywell, and an outboard valve, located Just outside the primary containment.
one of the persons listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor


After a design-basis
Regulation (NRR) project manager.                                      by


accident, these valves are required to close and remain closed for 1 hour. Should these valves fail to close, offsite dose limits could be exceeded.
Brian K. Grimes, Director


A similar failure of a main steam isolation
Division of Operating Reactor Support


valve to close had occurred at a foreign boiling water reactor.The potential
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


for limit switch positioning
Technical contacts:  Thomas F. Westerman, RIV      Patricia Campbell, NRR


to adversely
(817) 860-8145                (301) 504-1311 David P. Loveless, RIV        William M. McNeill, RIV


affect surveillance
(512) 972-2507                (817) 860-8174 Attachment:


test accuracy may exist for valves other than that described
===List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices===


in this notice.This information
v-" IN 94-08 February 1, 1994 The valve described in this notice is used in safety-related applications at


notice requires no specific action or written response.
nuclear facilities. One such application is as a main steam isolation valve.


If you have any questions
At River Bend and most domestic boiling water reactors, there are two main


about the information
steam isolation valves for each main steam line; an inboard valve, located


in this notice, please contact one of the persons listed below or the appropriate
inside the drywell, and an outboard valve, located Just outside the primary


Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager. by Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating
containment. After a design-basis accident, these valves are required to


===Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
close and remain closed for 1 hour. Should these valves fail to close, offsite dose limits could be exceeded. A similar failure of a main steam
Technical


contacts: Thomas F. Westerman, RIV (817) 860-8145 Patricia Campbell, NRR (301) 504-1311 David P. Loveless, RIV (512) 972-2507 William M. McNeill, RIV (817) 860-8174 Attachment:
isolation valve to close had occurred at a foreign boiling water reactor.
List of Recently Issued NRC Information


Notices
The potential for limit switch positioning to adversely affect surveillance


v -" IN 94-08 February 1, 1994 The valve described
test accuracy may exist for valves other than that described in this notice.


in this notice is used in safety-related
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If


applications
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact


at nuclear facilities.
one of the persons listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor


One such application
Regulation (NRR) project manager.                      Original t1gnad b


is as a main steam isolation
Brian K. Grimes


valve.At River Bend and most domestic boiling water reactors, there are two main steam isolation
Brian K. Grimes, Director


valves for each main steam line; an inboard valve, located inside the drywell, and an outboard valve, located Just outside the primary containment.
Division of Operating Reactor Support


After a design-basis
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


accident, these valves are required to close and remain closed for 1 hour. Should these valves fail to close, offsite dose limits could be exceeded.
Technical contacts:    Thomas F. Westerman, RIV        Patricia Campbell, NRR


A similar failure of a main steam isolation
(817) 860-8145                  (301) 504-1311 David P. Loveless, RIV          William M. McNeill, RIV


valve to close had occurred at a foreign boiling water reactor.The potential
(512) 972-2507                  (817) 860-8174 Attachment:


for limit switch positioning
===List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices===
*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE


to adversely
OFFICE      RPB:ADM    EMEB:DE:NRR    C/EMEB:DE:NRR    PDIV-2 NAME        RSanders*  PCampbell*    JNorberg*        EBaker*
  DATE        11/18/93    12/21/93      12/22/93          12/27/93 REGION IV    REGION IV    C/ES:RIV        DD/DRS:RIV    D/DRS:RIV


affect surveillance
WMcNeill*    DLoveless*    TWesterman*    AHowell*      SCollins*
  12/27/93    01/03/94      01/03/94        01/03/94      01/04/94 of


test accuracy may exist for valves other than that described
OIP/NA/Per _ OGCB:DORS:NRR        C/OGCB:DORS:NRR    D


in this notice.This information
KHenderson*    JBirmingham*      GHMarcus*                  Wg9
01/06/94        01/10/94          01/10/94            01/Z7/94 OFFICIAL DOCUMENT NAME:    94-08. IN


notice requires no specific action or written response.
IN 94-xx


If you have any questions
January xx, 1994 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If


about the information
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact


in this notice, please contact one of the persons listed below or the appropriate
one of the persons listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor


Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager. Original t1gnad b Brian K. Grimes Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating
Regulation (NRR) project manager.


===Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
Brian K. Grimes, Director
Technical


contacts: Thomas F. Westerman, RIV (817) 860-8145 Patricia Campbell, NRR (301) 504-1311 David P. Loveless, RIV (512) 972-2507 William M. McNeill, RIV (817) 860-8174 Attachment:
Division of Operating Reactor Support
List of Recently Issued NRC Information


Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


OFFICE RPB:ADM EMEB:DE:NRR
Technical contacts:
Thomas F. Westerman, Region IV        Patricia Campbell, NRR


C/EMEB:DE:NRR
(817) 860-8145                        (301) 504-1311 David P. Loveless, Region IV          William M. McNeill, Region IV


PDIV-2 NAME RSanders*
(512) 972-2507                        (817) 860-8174 Attachment:
PCampbell*
JNorberg*
EBaker*DATE 11/18/93 12/21/93 12/22/93 12/27/93 REGION IV REGION IV C/ES:RIV DD/DRS:RIV


D/DRS:RIV WMcNeill*
===List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices===
DLoveless*
*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
TWesterman*
AHowell* SCollins*12/27/93 01/03/94 01/03/94 01/03/94 01/04/94 of OIP/NA/Per


_ OGCB:DORS:NRR
OFFICE      RPB:ADM      EMEB:DE:NRR lC/EMEB:DE:NRR     PDIV-2 NAME        RSanders*    PCampbell*      JNorberg*      EBaker*
  DATE        11/18/93    12/21/93      l12/22/93        12/27/93 REGION IV [REGION IV      C/ES:RIV        DD/DRS:RIV lD/DRS:RIV


C/OGCB:DORS:NRR
WMcNeill*  DLoveless*    TWesterman*      AHowell*    SCollins*
12/27/93    01/03/94      01/03/94        01/03/94    01/04/94 OIP/NA/Per


D KHenderson*  
KHenderson*
JBirmingham*
01/06/94 OGCB:DORS:NRR
GHMarcus*
Wg9 01/06/94 01/10/94 01/10/94 01/Z7/94 OFFICIAL DOCUMENT NAME: 94-08. IN


IN 94-xx January xx, 1994 This information
JBirmingham*
                01/10/94 IC/OGCB:DORS:NRR


notice requires no specific action or written response.
GHMarcus


If you have any questions
01/10/94 D/DORS:NRR (
                                                        BKGrimes


about the information
01/ /94 I


in this notice, please contact one of the persons listed below or the appropriate
OFFICIAL DOCUMENT NAME:  ATWOODIN.JLBA


Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating
IN 94-xx


===Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
January xx, 1994 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
Technical


contacts: Thomas F. Westerman, Region IV (817) 860-8145 Patricia Campbell, NRR (301) 504-1311 David P. Loveless, Region IV (512) 972-2507 William M. McNeill, (817) 860-8174 Region IV Attachment:
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
List of Recently Issued NRC Information


Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
one of the persons listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor


OFFICE RPB:ADM EMEB:DE:NRR
Regulation (NRR) project manager.


l C/EMEB:DE:NRR
Brian K. Grimes, Director


PDIV-2 NAME RSanders*
Division of Operating Reactor Support
PCampbell*
JNorberg*
EBaker*DATE 11/18/93 12/21/93 l12/22/93
12/27/93 REGION IV [REGION IV C/ES:RIV DD/DRS:RIV


l D/DRS:RIV WMcNeill*
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
DLoveless*
TWesterman*
AHowell* SCollins*12/27/93 01/03/94 01/03/94 01/03/94 01/04/94 OIP/NA/Per


OGCB:DORS:NRR
Technical contacts:
Thomas F. Westerman, Region IV        Patricia Campbell, NRR


C/OGCB:DORS:NRR
(817) 860-8145                        (301) 504-1311 David P. Loveless, Region IV          William M. McNeill, Region IV


D/DORS:NRR
(512) 972-2507                        (817) 860-8174 Attachment:


(KHenderson*
===List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices===
JBirmingham*  
*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
GHMarcus I BKGrimes I 01/06/94 01/10/94 01/10/94 01/ /94 OFFICIAL DOCUMENT NAME: ATWOODIN.JLBA


IN 94-xx January xx, 1994 This information
OFFICE      RPB:ADM    EMEB:DE:NRR    C/EMEB:DE:NRR    PDIV-2 NAME        RSanders*  PCampbell*    JNorberg*        EBaker*
  DATE        11/18/93    12/21/93        12/22/93        12/27/93 REGIONY,     EG10  YVI C/ES:RI ee      DD/DR      ' D/DRS:R    ' ,,20d


notice requires no specific action or written response.
'7--
WM6N                      Tte 'ste a    nAH &i'        SColl I i 12+
  12/27/93  01/03/94      01/03/94        01/03/94      01/04/94 OIP/NA er      OGCB: DORS:NK,    C/OGCB:DORS:NRR    D/DORS:NRR


If you have any questions
KHen6'ri¶"'1 JBI rminghar      GHMarcus            BKGrimes


about the information
01/06/94      101//0/94          01/  /94          01/    /94 OFFICIAL DOCUMENT NAME:  ATWOODIN.JLB


in this notice, please contact one of the persons listed below or the appropriate
IN 93-xx


Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating
January x, 1993 stroke testing would give positive indication of poppet movement. Pending


===Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
further evaluation of these valves during the next refueling outage, the
Technical


contacts: Thomas F. Westerman, Region IV (817) 860-8145 Patricia Campbell, (301) 504-1311 NRR David P. Loveless, Region IV (512) 972-2507 William M. McNeill, (817) 860-8174 Region IV Attachment:
licensee is performing full stroke testing of the valves on a quarterly basis
List of Recently Issued NRC Information


Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
and is considering installing the anti-rotation modification recommended by


OFFICE RPB:ADM EMEB:DE:NRR
the vendor to prevent recurrence of the excessive wear of the valve guides.


C/EMEB:DE:NRR
Also, operations personnel have been trained on the operation and function of


PDIV-2 NAME RSanders*
the limit switches.
PCampbell*
JNorberg*
EBaker*DATE 11/18/93 12/21/93 12/22/93 12/27/93 REGIONY, EG10 YVI C/ES:RI ee DD/DR ' D/DRS:R ' ,,20d WM6N Tte 'ste a n AH &i' SColl I i 12+12/27/93 01/03/94 01/03/94 01/03/94 01/04/94 OIP/NA er OGCB: DORS:NK, C/OGCB:DORS:NRR


D/DORS:NRR
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If


KHen6'ri¶"'1 JBI rminghar GHMarcus BKGrimes 01/06/94 1 01//0/94 01/ /94 01/ /94 OFFICIAL DOCUMENT NAME: ATWOODIN.JLB
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact


'7--
one of the persons listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor
IN 93-xx January x, 1993 stroke testing would give positive indication


of poppet movement.
Regulation (NRR) project manager.


Pending further evaluation
Brian K. Grimes, Director


of these valves during the next refueling
Division of Operating Reactor Support


outage, the licensee is performing
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


full stroke testing of the valves on a quarterly
Technical contacts:
Thomas F. Westerman, Region IV                  Patricia Campbell, NRR


basis and is considering
(817) 860-8145                                  (301) 504-1311 David P. Loveless, Region IV                    William M. McNeill, Region IV


installing
(512) 972-2507                                  (817) 860-8174 Attachment:


the anti-rotation
===List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices===
*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES


modification
OFFICE    EMEB:DE:NRR          C100AWR              PDIV-2 NAME      PCampbel


recommended
__JN___rg__      _ I


by the vendor to prevent recurrence
DATE      12/AI/93            12/1ZI93              12/27/93        I


of the excessive
OFFICE  }jGIONI                REGION IV          [REGION IV        F


wear of the valve guides.Also, operations
NAME


personnel
_McNeil                f'      DLoveless            TWesterman


have been trained on the operation
DATE      12A_7/93____          12/  /93            12/ /93            12/  /93 OFFICE    RPB:ADM              OGCB:DORS:NRR        C/OGCB:DORS:NRR    D/DORS:NRR


and function of the limit switches.This information
NAME      RSanders*            JBirmingham          GHMarcus          BKGrimes


notice requires no specific action or written response.
DATE      11/18/93            12/ /93              12/ /93            12/  /93 A.F IC A _U U L l NAME:  .' R                  LI._.^
                              L ,A~wu v r. . .J_.


If you have any questions
===M FIGIAL DOUMEN                  AMUMOIN.JLB===


about the information
IN 93-xx


in this notice, please contact one of the persons listed below or the appropriate
January x, 1993 stroke testing would give positive indication of poppet movement. Pending


Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating
further evaluation of these valves during the next refueling outage, the


===Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
licensee is performing full stroke testing of the valves on a quarterly basis
Technical


contacts: Thomas F. Westerman, Region IV (817) 860-8145 Patricia Campbell, (301) 504-1311 NRR David (512)P. Loveless, Region IV 972-2507 William M. McNeill, (817) 860-8174 Region IV Attachment:
and is considering installing the anti-rotation modification recommended by
List of Recently Issued NRC Information


Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
the vendor to prevent recurrence of the excessive wear of the valve guides.


OFFICE EMEB:DE:NRR
Also, operations personnel have been trained on the operation and function of


C100AWR PDIV-2 NAME PCampbel __JN___rg
the limit switches.


__ _ I DATE 12/AI/93 12/1ZI93 12/27/93 I OFFICE }jGIONI REGION IV [REGION IV F NAME _McNeil f' DLoveless
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If


TWesterman
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact


DATE 12A_7/93____
one of the persons listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor
12/ /93 12/ /93 12/ /93 OFFICE RPB:ADM OGCB:DORS:NRR


C/OGCB:DORS:NRR
Regulation (NRR) project manager.


D/DORS:NRR
Brian K. Grimes, Director


NAME RSanders*
Division of Operating Reactor Support
JBirmingham


GHMarcus BKGrimes DATE 11/18/93 12/ /93 12/ /93 12/ /93.F I C A _ U U L l .' R L ,A ~ w u v r ..J_. L I._.^ .A M FIGIAL DOUMEN NAME: AMUMOIN.JLB
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


IN 93-xx January x, 1993 stroke testing would give positive indication
Technical contacts:
Thomas F. Westerman, Region IV      Patricia Campbell, NRR


of poppet movement.
(817) 860-8145                      (301) 504-1311 David P. Loveless, Region IV        William M. McNeill, Region IV


Pending further evaluation
(512) 972-2507                      (817) 860-8174 Attachment:


of these valves during the next refueling
===List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices===
*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES


outage, the licensee is performing
OFFICE    EMEB:DE:NRR  C/EMEB:DE:NRR    PDIV-2 NAME      PCampbell    JNorberg      I


full stroke testing of the valves on a quarterly
DATE      12/  /93    12/  /93      I 12/  /93 OFFICE    REGION IV      REGION IV      REGION IV


basis and is considering
NAME      WMcNeill      DLoveless      TWesterman


installing
DATE      12/  /93      12/  /93        12/  /93        12/  /93 OFFICE    R1B:Ap    L  OGCB:DORS:NRR    C/OGCB:DORS:NRR  D/DORS:NRR


the anti-rotation
NAME      RSanders      JBirmingham      GHMarcus        BKGrimes


modification
DATE      11/18/93      12/  /93        12/  /93        12/  /93 OFFICIAL DOCUMENT NAME:  ATWOODIN.JLH


recommended
Atta -ement, IN 94-08 February 1, 1994 Page I of 1 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED


by the vendor to prevent recurrence
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES


of the excessive
Information                                  Date of


wear of the valve guides.Also, operations
Notice No.             Subject                Issuance  Issued to


personnel
93-26,          Grease Solidification          01/31/94  All holders of OLs or CPs


have been trained on the operation
Supp. 1        Causes Molded-Case                        for nuclear power reactors.


and function of the limit switches.This information
Circuit Breaker Failure


notice requires no specific action or written response.
to Close


If you have any questions
94-07          Solubility Criteria for        01/28/94  All byproduct material and


about the information
Liquid Effluent Releases                  fuel cycle licensees with


in this notice, please contact one of the persons listed below or the appropriate
to Sanitary Sewerage Under                the exception of licensees


Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating
the Revised 10 CFR Part 20                authorized solely for


===Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
sealed sources.
Technical


contacts: Thomas F. Westerman, Region IV (817) 860-8145 Patricia Campbell, (301) 504-1311 NRR David P. Loveless, Region IV (512) 972-2507 William M. McNeill, (817) 860-8174 Region IV Attachment:
94-06          Potential Failure of          01/28/94  All holders of OLs or CPs
List of Recently Issued NRC Information


Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
Long-Term Emergency                      for boiling water reactors.


OFFICE EMEB:DE:NRR
Nitrogen Supply for the


C/EMEB:DE:NRR
Automatic Depressurization


PDIV-2 NAME PCampbell
System Valves


JNorberg I DATE 12/ /93 12/ /93 I 12/ /93 OFFICE REGION IV REGION IV REGION IV NAME WMcNeill DLoveless
93-85,          Problems with X-Relays        01/20/94  All holders of OLs or CPs


TWesterman
Rev. 1          in DB- and DHP-Type                      for nuclear power reactors.


DATE 12/ /93 12/ /93 12/ /93 12/ /93 OFFICE R1B:Ap L OGCB:DORS:NRR
Circuit Breakers Manu- factured by Westinghouse


C/OGCB:DORS:NRR
94-05          Potential Failure of          01/19/94  All holders of OLs or CPs


D/DORS:NRR
Steam Generator Tubes                    for pressurized water


NAME RSanders JBirmingham
with Kinetically Welded                  reactors (PWRs).


GHMarcus BKGrimes DATE 11/18/93 12/ /93 12/ /93 12/ /93 OFFICIAL DOCUMENT NAME: ATWOODIN.JLH
Sleeves


Atta -ement, IN 94-08 February 1, 1994 Page I of 1 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION
94-04          Digital Integrated            01/14/94   All NRC licensees except


NOTICES Information
Circuit Sockets with                      licensed operators.


Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 93-26, Supp. 1 94-07 94-06 93-85, Rev. 1 94-05 94-04 94-03 94-02 Grease Solidification
Intermittent Contact


Causes Molded-Case
94-03          Deficiencies Identified        01/11/94  All holders of OLs or CPs


Circuit Breaker Failure to Close Solubility
during Service Water System              for nuclear power reactors.


Criteria for Liquid Effluent Releases to Sanitary Sewerage Under the Revised 10 CFR Part 20 Potential
Operational Performance
 
Failure of Long-Term
 
Emergency Nitrogen Supply for the Automatic
 
===Depressurization===
System Valves Problems with X-Relays in DB- and DHP-Type Circuit Breakers Manu-factured by Westinghouse
 
Potential
 
Failure of Steam Generator
 
Tubes with Kinetically
 
===Welded Sleeves Digital Integrated===
Circuit Sockets with Intermittent
 
Contact Deficiencies
 
Identified
 
during Service Water System Operational
 
Performance


Inspections
Inspections


Inoperability
94-02            Inoperability of General     01/07/94   All holders of OLs or CPs
 
of General Electric Magne-Blast
 
Breaker Because of Mis-alignment
 
of Close-Latch
 
Spring 01/31/94 01/28/94 01/28/94 01/20/94 01/19/94 01/14/94 01/11/94 01/07/94 All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All byproduct
 
material and fuel cycle licensees
 
with the exception
 
of licensees authorized
 
solely for sealed sources.All holders of OLs or CPs for boiling water reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for pressurized
 
water reactors (PWRs).All NRC licensees
 
except licensed operators.
 
All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.OL = Operating
 
License CP = Construction
 
Permit
 
K-' x J IN 94-08 February 1, 1994 The valve described


in this notice is used in safety-related
Electric Magne-Blast                      for nuclear power reactors.


applications
Breaker Because of Mis- alignment of Close-Latch


at nuclear facilities.
Spring


One such application
OL  = Operating License


is as a main steam isolation
CP  = Construction Permit


valve.At River Bend and most domestic boiling water reactors, there are two main steam isolation
K-'                                  xJ    IN94-08 February 1, 1994 The valve described in this notice is used in safety-related applications at


valves for each main steam line; an inboard valve, located inside the drywell, and an outboard valve, located Just outside the primary containment.
nuclear facilities. One such application is as a main steam isolation valve.


After a design-basis
At River Bend and most domestic boiling water reactors, there are two main


accident, these valves are required to close and remain closed for 1 hour. Should these valves fail to close, offsite dose limits could be exceeded.
steam isolation valves for each main steam line; an inboard valve, located


A similar failure of a main steam isolation
inside the drywell, and an outboard valve, located Just outside the primary


valve to close had occurred at a foreign boiling water reactor.The potential
containment. After a design-basis accident, these valves are required to


for limit switch positioning
close and remain closed for 1 hour. Should these valves fail to close, offsite dose limits could be exceeded. A similar failure of a main steam


to adversely
isolation valve to close had occurred at a foreign boiling water reactor.


affect surveillance
The potential for limit switch positioning to adversely affect surveillance


test accuracy may exist for valves other than that described
test accuracy may exist for valves other than that described in this notice.


in this notice.This information
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If


notice requires no specific action or written response.
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact


If you have any questions
one of the persons listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor


about the information
Regulation (NRR) project manager.                      Original igned Iy


in this notice, please contact one of the persons listed below or the appropriate
Brian K. Grimes


Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager. Original igned Iy Brian K. Grimes Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating
Brian K. Grimes, Director


===Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
Division of Operating Reactor Support
Technical


contacts: Thomas F. Westerman, RIV (817) 860-8145 Patricia Campbell, NRR (301) 504-1311 David P. Loveless, RIV (512) 972-2507 William M. McNeill, RIV (817) 860-8174 Attachment:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
List of Recently Issued NRC Information


Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
Technical contacts:    Thomas F. Westerman, RIV        Patricia Campbell, NRR


OFFICE RPB:ADM [EMEB:DE:NRR
(817) 860-8145                  (301) 504-1311 David P. Loveless, RIV          William M. McNeill, RIV


lC/EMEB:DE:NRR
(512) 972-2507                    (817) 860-8174 Attachment:


l PDIV-2 NAME RSanders*
===List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices===
PCampbell*
*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
JNorberg*
EBaker*DATE 11/18/93 12/21/93 12/22/93 12/27/93 REGION IV REGION IV C/ES:RIV DD/DRS:RIV


D/DRS:RIV WMcNeill*  
OFFICE      RPB:ADM    [EMEB:DE:NRR lC/EMEB:DE:NRR l PDIV-2 NAME        RSanders*    PCampbell*     JNorberg*         EBaker*
DLoveless*  
  DATE        11/18/93     12/21/93      12/22/93          12/27/93 REGION IV  REGION IV      C/ES:RIV        DD/DRS:RIV    D/DRS:RIV
TWesterman*  
AHowell* SCollins*12/27/93 01/03/94 01/03/94 01/03/94 01/04/94 do OIP/NA/Per


OGCB:DORS:NRR
WMcNeill*  DLoveless*    TWesterman*    AHowell*      SCollins*
  12/27/93    01/03/94      01/03/94        01/03/94      01/04/94    do


C/OGCB:DORS:NRR
OIP/NA/Per      OGCB:DORS:NRR      C/OGCB:DORS:NRR


KHenderson*  
KHenderson*   JBirmingham*       GHMarcus*
JBirmingham*  
  01/06/94       01/10/94           01/10/94           0 1/Z7/94 OFFICIAL DOCUMENT NAME:     94-08.IN}}
GHMarcus*01/06/94 01/10/94 01/10/94 0 1/Z7/94 OFFICIAL DOCUMENT NAME: 94-08.IN}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Latest revision as of 04:25, 24 November 2019

Potential for Surveillance Testing to Fail to Detect an Inoperable Main Steam Isolation Valve
ML031070034
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 02/01/1994
From: Grimes B
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-94-008, NUDOCS 9401260242
Download: ML031070034 (10)
v • d • e


UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 February 1, 1994 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 94-08: POTENTIAL FOR SURVEILLANCE TESTING TO FAIL

TO DETECT AN INOPERABLE MAIN STEAM ISOLATION

VALVE

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power

reactors.

PurDose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information

notice (IN)to alert addressees to a potential for surveillance testing to

fail to detect that a main steam isolation valve is mechanically bound and

will not close. It is expected that recipients will review the information for

applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to

avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this information

notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written

response is required.

DescriDtion of Circumstances

On April 19, 1993, while performing maintenance to repair a presumed faulty

limit switch on a main steam isolation valve, the licensee for the River Bend

Station (River Bend) found that the valve was mechanically bound and would not

close as required. The valve is a 24-inch-diameter (nominal), spring and

pneumatic closing, pneumatic-opening, internally balanced, poppet-type globe

valve manufactured by the Atwood & Morrill Company Inc. Plant operators had

previously performed partial stroke surveillance testing of the valve on

February 27 and April 1, 1993, but did not detect that the valve would not

close. The licensee later determined that the testing failed to detect that

the valve was inoperable because the test did not adequately consider the

design of the valve and the positioning of the limit switch arm in relation to

the valve poppet travel.

The licensee determined that the valve would not close because improper

clearances between the valve poppet and the valve body had caused excessive

wear of the guide ribs and resulted in the valve poppet becoming mechanically

bound. The excessive wear may have been avoided had the licensee installed an

anti-rotation modification recommended by the manufacturer in 1989.

Subsequent to this event, the manufacturer reported the failure to close to

the NRC under Part 21 to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations and

informed affected licensees of the failure mechanism and recommended actions

to prevent recurrence. NRC Inspection Report 50-458/93-18 and Licensee Event

Report.93-006 provide additional details on the valve failure.

(9401260242) TJ'O

02 w> 44M'j J7JD#V&//c/S

  • '(I

YJ Kx/ IN 94-08 February 1, 1994 Discussion

The original design positioning of the limit switches was such that, during

partial stroke testing, the limit switches could be actuated and indicate

movement of the main valve poppet even though the valve poppet had not

actually moved. Thus, a failure of the valve to properly stroke may go

undetected by partial stroke testing.

Under normal operation, the valve stem travels 28 centimeters [11 inches] to

fully stroke in either direction. As the valve strokes open, the first

2.5 centimeters [1 inch) of stem travel moves an internal poppet which opens

an equalizing port allowing the pressure on both sides of the main poppet to

equalize. During the remainder of the open stroke, the internal poppet lifts

the main poppet and retracts it to the fully open position. During a partial

stroke test in the close direction, as the stem (and the internal poppet)

begins to close, the main poppet also begins to close because of gravity.

However, during the event, with the main poppet stuck in the open position, the stem travelled about 2.5 centimeters [I inch] and stopped when the

internal poppet seated in the equalizing port.

There are three limit switches on the valve that are of concern in this event.

The first two switches provide a safety-related signal to the reactor

protection system that the valve is 92 percent open. The third switch sends a

nonsafety-related signal to position indicating lights in the control room

indicating that the valve is 90 percent open. The licensee had set the

90-percent-open limit switch such that stem movement of about 2.8 centimeters

[1.1 inch] was required to actuate the switch and indicate that the main valve

poppet had moved to the 90-percent-open position. However, because the limit

switches are set with a + 2 percent tolerance, actual stem travel to actuate

the 90-percent-open limit switch may be only 2.25 centimeters [0.88 inch]. In

a worst-case scenario both the 92- and the 90-percent-open limit switches

could be actuated without the main valve poppet moving.

During the partial stroke testing conducted on February 7 and April 1, the

first two limit switches (92-percent-open indication) actuated, the third

limit switch (90-percent-open indication) did not actuate. Although the

procedural step called for receipt of the 90-percent-open indication, the

operators did not declare the valve inoperable because the first two limit

switches had actuated and they assumed that the third limit switch (nonsafety)

had failed. Later, on April 17, during maintenance on the presumed faulty

limit switch, the licensee found that the main valve poppet was mechanically

bound and that the valve would not close.

The licensee for River Bend changed the third limit switch setting to actuate

at 85 percent of the open position to ensure that its actuation during partial

stroke testing would give positive indication of poppet movement. Pending

further evaluation of these valves during the next refueling outage, the

licensee is performing full stroke testing of the valves on a quarterly basis

and intends to install the anti-rotation modification recommended by the

vendor to prevent recurrence of the excessive wear of the valve guides. Also, operations personnel have been trained on the operation and function of the

limit switches.

--- IN 94-08 February 1, 1994 The valve described in this notice is used in safety-related applications at

nuclear facilities. One such application is as a main steam isolation valve.

At River Bend and most domestic boiling water reactors, there are two main

steam isolation valves for each main steam line; an inboard valve, located

inside the drywell, and an outboard valve, located Just outside the primary

containment. After a design-basis accident, these valves are required to

close and remain closed for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. Should these valves fail to close, offsite dose limits could be exceeded. A similar failure of a main steam

isolation valve to close had occurred at a foreign boiling water reactor.

The potential for limit switch positioning to adversely affect surveillance

test accuracy may exist for valves other than that described in this notice.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

one of the persons listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation (NRR) project manager. by

Brian K. Grimes, Director

Division of Operating Reactor Support

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: Thomas F. Westerman, RIV Patricia Campbell, NRR

(817) 860-8145 (301) 504-1311 David P. Loveless, RIV William M. McNeill, RIV

(512) 972-2507 (817) 860-8174 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

v-" IN 94-08 February 1, 1994 The valve described in this notice is used in safety-related applications at

nuclear facilities. One such application is as a main steam isolation valve.

At River Bend and most domestic boiling water reactors, there are two main

steam isolation valves for each main steam line; an inboard valve, located

inside the drywell, and an outboard valve, located Just outside the primary

containment. After a design-basis accident, these valves are required to

close and remain closed for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. Should these valves fail to close, offsite dose limits could be exceeded. A similar failure of a main steam

isolation valve to close had occurred at a foreign boiling water reactor.

The potential for limit switch positioning to adversely affect surveillance

test accuracy may exist for valves other than that described in this notice.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

one of the persons listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation (NRR) project manager. Original t1gnad b

Brian K. Grimes

Brian K. Grimes, Director

Division of Operating Reactor Support

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: Thomas F. Westerman, RIV Patricia Campbell, NRR

(817) 860-8145 (301) 504-1311 David P. Loveless, RIV William M. McNeill, RIV

(512) 972-2507 (817) 860-8174 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

  • SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

OFFICE RPB:ADM EMEB:DE:NRR C/EMEB:DE:NRR PDIV-2 NAME RSanders* PCampbell* JNorberg* EBaker*

DATE 11/18/93 12/21/93 12/22/93 12/27/93 REGION IV REGION IV C/ES:RIV DD/DRS:RIV D/DRS:RIV

WMcNeill* DLoveless* TWesterman* AHowell* SCollins*

12/27/93 01/03/94 01/03/94 01/03/94 01/04/94 of

OIP/NA/Per _ OGCB:DORS:NRR C/OGCB:DORS:NRR D

KHenderson* JBirmingham* GHMarcus* Wg9

01/06/94 01/10/94 01/10/94 01/Z7/94 OFFICIAL DOCUMENT NAME: 94-08. IN

IN 94-xx

January xx, 1994 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

one of the persons listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Brian K. Grimes, Director

Division of Operating Reactor Support

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts:

Thomas F. Westerman, Region IV Patricia Campbell, NRR

(817) 860-8145 (301) 504-1311 David P. Loveless, Region IV William M. McNeill, Region IV

(512) 972-2507 (817) 860-8174 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

  • SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

OFFICE RPB:ADM EMEB:DE:NRR lC/EMEB:DE:NRR PDIV-2 NAME RSanders* PCampbell* JNorberg* EBaker*

DATE 11/18/93 12/21/93 l12/22/93 12/27/93 REGION IV [REGION IV C/ES:RIV DD/DRS:RIV lD/DRS:RIV

WMcNeill* DLoveless* TWesterman* AHowell* SCollins*

12/27/93 01/03/94 01/03/94 01/03/94 01/04/94 OIP/NA/Per

KHenderson*

01/06/94 OGCB:DORS:NRR

JBirmingham*

01/10/94 IC/OGCB:DORS:NRR

GHMarcus

01/10/94 D/DORS:NRR (

BKGrimes

01/ /94 I

OFFICIAL DOCUMENT NAME: ATWOODIN.JLBA

IN 94-xx

January xx, 1994 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

one of the persons listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Brian K. Grimes, Director

Division of Operating Reactor Support

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts:

Thomas F. Westerman, Region IV Patricia Campbell, NRR

(817) 860-8145 (301) 504-1311 David P. Loveless, Region IV William M. McNeill, Region IV

(512) 972-2507 (817) 860-8174 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

  • SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

OFFICE RPB:ADM EMEB:DE:NRR C/EMEB:DE:NRR PDIV-2 NAME RSanders* PCampbell* JNorberg* EBaker*

DATE 11/18/93 12/21/93 12/22/93 12/27/93 REGIONY, EG10 YVI C/ES:RI ee DD/DR ' D/DRS:R ' ,,20d

'7--

WM6N Tte 'ste a nAH &i' SColl I i 12+

12/27/93 01/03/94 01/03/94 01/03/94 01/04/94 OIP/NA er OGCB: DORS:NK, C/OGCB:DORS:NRR D/DORS:NRR

KHen6'ri¶"'1 JBI rminghar GHMarcus BKGrimes

01/06/94 101//0/94 01/ /94 01/ /94 OFFICIAL DOCUMENT NAME: ATWOODIN.JLB

IN 93-xx

January x, 1993 stroke testing would give positive indication of poppet movement. Pending

further evaluation of these valves during the next refueling outage, the

licensee is performing full stroke testing of the valves on a quarterly basis

and is considering installing the anti-rotation modification recommended by

the vendor to prevent recurrence of the excessive wear of the valve guides.

Also, operations personnel have been trained on the operation and function of

the limit switches.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

one of the persons listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Brian K. Grimes, Director

Division of Operating Reactor Support

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts:

Thomas F. Westerman, Region IV Patricia Campbell, NRR

(817) 860-8145 (301) 504-1311 David P. Loveless, Region IV William M. McNeill, Region IV

(512) 972-2507 (817) 860-8174 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

  • SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES

OFFICE EMEB:DE:NRR C100AWR PDIV-2 NAME PCampbel

__JN___rg__ _ I

DATE 12/AI/93 12/1ZI93 12/27/93 I

OFFICE }jGIONI REGION IV [REGION IV F

NAME

_McNeil f' DLoveless TWesterman

DATE 12A_7/93____ 12/ /93 12/ /93 12/ /93 OFFICE RPB:ADM OGCB:DORS:NRR C/OGCB:DORS:NRR D/DORS:NRR

NAME RSanders* JBirmingham GHMarcus BKGrimes

DATE 11/18/93 12/ /93 12/ /93 12/ /93 A.F IC A _U U L l NAME: .' R LI._.^

L ,A~wu v r. . .J_.

M FIGIAL DOUMEN AMUMOIN.JLB

IN 93-xx

January x, 1993 stroke testing would give positive indication of poppet movement. Pending

further evaluation of these valves during the next refueling outage, the

licensee is performing full stroke testing of the valves on a quarterly basis

and is considering installing the anti-rotation modification recommended by

the vendor to prevent recurrence of the excessive wear of the valve guides.

Also, operations personnel have been trained on the operation and function of

the limit switches.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

one of the persons listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Brian K. Grimes, Director

Division of Operating Reactor Support

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts:

Thomas F. Westerman, Region IV Patricia Campbell, NRR

(817) 860-8145 (301) 504-1311 David P. Loveless, Region IV William M. McNeill, Region IV

(512) 972-2507 (817) 860-8174 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

  • SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES

OFFICE EMEB:DE:NRR C/EMEB:DE:NRR PDIV-2 NAME PCampbell JNorberg I

DATE 12/ /93 12/ /93 I 12/ /93 OFFICE REGION IV REGION IV REGION IV

NAME WMcNeill DLoveless TWesterman

DATE 12/ /93 12/ /93 12/ /93 12/ /93 OFFICE R1B:Ap L OGCB:DORS:NRR C/OGCB:DORS:NRR D/DORS:NRR

NAME RSanders JBirmingham GHMarcus BKGrimes

DATE 11/18/93 12/ /93 12/ /93 12/ /93 OFFICIAL DOCUMENT NAME: ATWOODIN.JLH

Atta -ement, IN 94-08 February 1, 1994 Page I of 1 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

93-26, Grease Solidification 01/31/94 All holders of OLs or CPs

Supp. 1 Causes Molded-Case for nuclear power reactors.

Circuit Breaker Failure

to Close

94-07 Solubility Criteria for 01/28/94 All byproduct material and

Liquid Effluent Releases fuel cycle licensees with

to Sanitary Sewerage Under the exception of licensees

the Revised 10 CFR Part 20 authorized solely for

sealed sources.

94-06 Potential Failure of 01/28/94 All holders of OLs or CPs

Long-Term Emergency for boiling water reactors.

Nitrogen Supply for the

Automatic Depressurization

System Valves

93-85, Problems with X-Relays 01/20/94 All holders of OLs or CPs

Rev. 1 in DB- and DHP-Type for nuclear power reactors.

Circuit Breakers Manu- factured by Westinghouse

94-05 Potential Failure of 01/19/94 All holders of OLs or CPs

Steam Generator Tubes for pressurized water

with Kinetically Welded reactors (PWRs).

Sleeves

94-04 Digital Integrated 01/14/94 All NRC licensees except

Circuit Sockets with licensed operators.

Intermittent Contact

94-03 Deficiencies Identified 01/11/94 All holders of OLs or CPs

during Service Water System for nuclear power reactors.

Operational Performance

Inspections

94-02 Inoperability of General 01/07/94 All holders of OLs or CPs

Electric Magne-Blast for nuclear power reactors.

Breaker Because of Mis- alignment of Close-Latch

Spring

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit

K-' xJ IN94-08 February 1, 1994 The valve described in this notice is used in safety-related applications at

nuclear facilities. One such application is as a main steam isolation valve.

At River Bend and most domestic boiling water reactors, there are two main

steam isolation valves for each main steam line; an inboard valve, located

inside the drywell, and an outboard valve, located Just outside the primary

containment. After a design-basis accident, these valves are required to

close and remain closed for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. Should these valves fail to close, offsite dose limits could be exceeded. A similar failure of a main steam

isolation valve to close had occurred at a foreign boiling water reactor.

The potential for limit switch positioning to adversely affect surveillance

test accuracy may exist for valves other than that described in this notice.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

one of the persons listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation (NRR) project manager. Original igned Iy

Brian K. Grimes

Brian K. Grimes, Director

Division of Operating Reactor Support

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: Thomas F. Westerman, RIV Patricia Campbell, NRR

(817) 860-8145 (301) 504-1311 David P. Loveless, RIV William M. McNeill, RIV

(512) 972-2507 (817) 860-8174 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

  • SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

OFFICE RPB:ADM [EMEB:DE:NRR lC/EMEB:DE:NRR l PDIV-2 NAME RSanders* PCampbell* JNorberg* EBaker*

DATE 11/18/93 12/21/93 12/22/93 12/27/93 REGION IV REGION IV C/ES:RIV DD/DRS:RIV D/DRS:RIV

WMcNeill* DLoveless* TWesterman* AHowell* SCollins*

12/27/93 01/03/94 01/03/94 01/03/94 01/04/94 do

OIP/NA/Per OGCB:DORS:NRR C/OGCB:DORS:NRR

KHenderson* JBirmingham* GHMarcus*

01/06/94 01/10/94 01/10/94 0 1/Z7/94 OFFICIAL DOCUMENT NAME: 94-08.IN


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