Information Notice 1993-72, Observations from Recent Shutdown Risk and Outage Management Pilot Team Inspections: Difference between revisions
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| issue date = 09/14/1993 | | issue date = 09/14/1993 | ||
| title = Observations from Recent Shutdown Risk and Outage Management Pilot Team Inspections | | title = Observations from Recent Shutdown Risk and Outage Management Pilot Team Inspections | ||
| author name = Grimes B | | author name = Grimes B | ||
| author affiliation = NRC/NRR | | author affiliation = NRC/NRR | ||
| addressee name = | | addressee name = | ||
Line 13: | Line 13: | ||
| document type = NRC Information Notice | | document type = NRC Information Notice | ||
| page count = 8 | | page count = 8 | ||
}} | }} | ||
{{#Wiki_filter:}} | {{#Wiki_filter:Ku | ||
UNITED STATES | |||
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION | |||
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION | |||
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 September 14, 1993 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 93-72: OBSERVATIONS FROM RECENT SHUTDOWN RISK AND | |||
OUTAGE MANAGEMENT PILOT TEAM INSPECTIONS | |||
==Addressees== | |||
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power | |||
reactors. | |||
==Purpose== | |||
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information | |||
notice to inform addressees of observations from recent shutdown risk and | |||
outage management pilot team inspections. It is expected that recipients will | |||
review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider | |||
actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions | |||
contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no | |||
specific action or written response is required. | |||
Background | |||
Events that occurred during the past several years have caused the NRC staff | |||
to be increasingly concerned about plant safety during shutdown operations. | |||
The Diablo Canyon event of April 10, 1987, in which boiling of the reactor | |||
coolant resulted from a loss of decay heat removal, highlighted the fact that | |||
operation of a pressurized-water reactor with a reduced reactor coolant system | |||
(RCS) inventory is a particularly sensitive condition. Based on its review of | |||
that event, the staff issued Generic Letter 88-17, "Loss of Decay Heat | |||
Removal," October 17, 1988, which requested that licensees address certain | |||
generic deficiencies to improve safety during operations with a reduced RCS | |||
inventory. More recently, Incident Investigation Team report, NUREG-1410, | |||
"Loss of Vital ac Power and the Residual Heat Removal System During Mid-Loop | |||
Operations at Plant Vogtle Unit 1 on March 20, 1990," emphasized the need for | |||
risk management of shutdown operations. Discussions with foreign regulatory | |||
organizations support NRC staff findings that the core-damage-frequency for | |||
shutdown operations may be a substantial fraction of the total core-damage | |||
frequency. | |||
==Description of Circumstances== | |||
Between December 1991 and April 1993, the NRC staff conducted five pilot team | |||
inspections to assess the effectiveness of industry initiatives for improving | |||
shutdown safety. The inspections were performed at Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 2 [NRC Inspection Report (IR)50-270/91-202], Indian Point Nuclear | |||
9309090243 | |||
- U 1?-.crn-9 | |||
3 . | |||
IN 93-72 September 14, 1993 Generating Station, Unit 3 (IR 50-286/92-901), Diablo Canyon Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (IR 50-275/92-201), Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 (IR 50-282/92-201; 50-306/92-201), and Cooper Nuclear Station | |||
(IR 50-298/93-201). Approximately one week of each inspection focused on | |||
licensee pre-outage planning and control processes and 8 to 10 days focused on | |||
licensee implementation of the outage. | |||
In the pre-outage portion of the inspection, the inspectors evaluated the | |||
following: (1) management involvement in and oversight of the outage planning | |||
process, (2) planning and scheduling of outage activities, especially the | |||
relationships between significant work activities and the availability of | |||
electrical power supplies, decay heat removal systems, reactor coolant system | |||
RCS inventory and containment integrity, (3) the process for developing | |||
individual work packages to ensure coordination with other activities, and (4) | |||
operator response procedures, contingency plans and training for mitigation of | |||
loss of decay heat removal capability, loss of RCS inventory and loss of | |||
electrical power sources during shutdown conditions. | |||
The inspectors walked through procedures related to shutdown safety to | |||
determine if the specified activities could be accomplished in the allotted | |||
time frames and to verify that the procedures could be implemented considering | |||
probable equipment availability. The inspectors reviewed training records on | |||
outage procedures to determine if the training was adequate and that, when | |||
appropriate, additional training was provided as the procedures were revised. | |||
The inspectors also evaluated the probable effects of environmental conditions | |||
such as temperature, steam and flooding on the performance of activities that | |||
would be required to mitigate adverse shutdown events. | |||
In the implementation portion of the inspection, the inspectors evaluated: | |||
(1) the control of changes to the outage schedule, control of work activities, and control of system alignments, (2) the working relationships and | |||
communication channels between operations, maintenance and other plant support | |||
personnel, (3) the conduct of operations personnel both inside and outside of | |||
the control room regarding awareness of plant status, control of plant | |||
evolutions, response to alarms and other abnormal indications, (4) the | |||
completeness and effectiveness of shift turnovers, (5) whether maintenance and | |||
modification work was performed in accordance with current written and | |||
approved procedures and appropriate post-maintenance testing was required and | |||
performed, and (6) the adequacy of management involvement and oversight of the | |||
conduct of the outage as it progressed. | |||
Other areas observed were, plant housekeeping, normal and emergency plant | |||
lighting, configuration control, radiological controls, equipment labeling and | |||
status tagging, vital area access control, use of overtime and licensee | |||
control of contractor work including contractor training and qualifications. | |||
Discussion | |||
In general, the inspectors found that licensees had instituted programmatic | |||
changes developed from guidance contained in a Nuclear Management and | |||
Resources Council document, NUMARC 91-06, "Guidelines for Industry Actions to | |||
TV | |||
IN 93-72 September 14, 1993 individual examples of | |||
Assess Shutdown Management." The team inspectors found the inspectors | |||
licensee failure to follow procedures but more importantly assessment for | |||
identified two areas of more general concern: (1) risk | |||
and (2) | |||
pre-outage planning, emergent work and schedule changes, availability. | |||
methodologies for equipment | |||
implementation of defense-in-depth Specific details of | |||
A general discussion of these areas is provided below. | |||
above. | |||
the findings are contained in the inspection reports referenced | |||
and Schedule Changes | |||
Risk Assessment for Pre-Outage Planning, Emergent Work | |||
controls to | |||
The inspectors found that licensees used various programmatic emergent work and | |||
assess shutdown risk factors during initial outage planning, outage planning | |||
schedule changes. Assessment methodologies used for initial availability to | |||
ranged from following minimum guidelines for equipment outage activities. | |||
performing a probabilistic risk assessment of scheduled the licensee in | |||
The inspection team found that the risk assessment aided during the sched led | |||
identifying activities that would be subject to high risk became less | |||
outage. However, as the outage progressed, the risk assessment schedule occurreda | |||
valid because it was not updated as changes to the outage | |||
inspectors found that | |||
In the areas of emergent work and schedule changes, the effect of \ | |||
three of the plants had a proceduralized process to assess the two plants relied | |||
other | |||
emergent work or schedule changes on plant risk. Theoperators to adjust the | |||
on a functional review by planners, schedulers, and | |||
schedule appropriately to reduce risk. | |||
status boards or | |||
The inspectors found that all of the plants maintained in tracking the | |||
checklists in the control room to assist the operators | |||
potential | |||
configuration status of plant systems and to help identify | |||
risk-significant activities. | |||
Implementation of Defense-in-Depth for Equipment Availability | |||
of defense-in-depth | |||
The inspection teams found that licensee implementation industry guidelines for | |||
for equipment availability was inconsistent. Although | |||
that the criteria | |||
declaring equipment "available" exist, the inspectors found of safety | |||
an appropriate margin | |||
for declaring equipment needed to ensure declaring that | |||
"available" varied from licensee to licensee. For example, include ensuring that support systems | |||
equipment was "available" did not always conditioning) were also | |||
(e.g., cooling water and heating, ventilation and air | |||
had been performed, equipment was | |||
available. At times, after maintenance functional | |||
listed as "available" without the benefit of a post-maintenance considered to be | |||
test. The inspectors also found that some equipment was | |||
as removal of clearances or realignment | |||
"available" even though actions, such perform its function. | |||
of valves, would be required before the equipment could | |||
the team inspectors | |||
In addition to the above concerns, at most of the plants restrictions | |||
found examples of failures to comply with technical specification | |||
to exceed overtime limits was | |||
on overtime work in that management approval | |||
inadequately documented. | |||
K-, | |||
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If | |||
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact | |||
the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear | |||
Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager. | |||
Brian K. Grimes, Director | |||
Division of Operating Reactor Support | |||
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation | |||
Technical contact: J.D. Wilcox, NRR | |||
(301) 504-1262 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices | |||
RSIB:DRIL:NRR RSIB:DRIL:NRR AC/RSIB:DRIL:NRR D/DRIL:NRR | |||
JDWilcox SSanders DNorkin CERossi | |||
07/02/93 07/02/93 07/02/93 07/10/93 RPB:ADM OGCB:DORS:NRR C70MO:DORS:NRR D/DORS:NRR | |||
NBeeson JLBirmingham iGHMarcus BKGrimes | |||
08/10/93 08 /1/ 93 J9 PT | |||
;S/Al/93 09/ /93 RSIB:DRIL:NRR | |||
PSKoltay | |||
07/06/93 | |||
- IN 93-xx | |||
September xx, 1993 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If | |||
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact | |||
the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear | |||
Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager. | |||
Brian K. Grimes, Director | |||
Division of Operating Reactor Support | |||
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation | |||
Technical contact: J.D. Wilcox, NRR | |||
(301) 504-1262 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices | |||
*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE | |||
*RSIB:DRIL:NRR *RSIB:DRIL:NRR *AC/RSIB:DRIL:NRR *D/DRIL:NRR | |||
JDWilcox SSanders DNorkin CERossi | |||
07/02/93 07/02/93 07/02/93 07/10/93 | |||
*RPB:ADM *OGCB:DORS:NRR > C/OGCB:DORS:NRR D/DORS:NRR | |||
NBeeson JLBirmingham GHMarcus/Wen BKGrimes | |||
08/10/93 08/27/93 08/27/93 09/ /93 | |||
*RSIB:DRIL:NRR | |||
PSKoltay | |||
07/06/93 DOCUMENT NAME: OUTAGEIN.JLB | |||
'-vJ | |||
IN 93-72 September 14, 1993 Based on the five pilot inspections, the NRC inspection teams concluded that | |||
NRC actions and industry initiatives have increased licensee awareness of the | |||
risk associated with shutdown and low power conditions. The inspection teams | |||
found that licensees were aware of the necessity for ensuring that required | |||
systems be available and of the need to maintain the capability of backup | |||
equipment during an outage. However, the inspection teams found that licensee | |||
interpretations of industry initiatives for addressing shutdown risk varied | |||
greatly. This was demonstrated by the various licensee interpretations of | |||
industry guidelines for declaring equipment "available." | |||
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If | |||
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact | |||
the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear | |||
Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager. | |||
Original signed by | |||
Brian K.Grimes | |||
Brian K. Grimes, Director | |||
Division of Operating Reactor Support | |||
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation | |||
Technical contact: J.D. Wilcox, NRR | |||
(301) 504-1262 Attachment: | |||
===List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices=== | |||
*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE | |||
*RSIB:DRIL:NRR *RSIB:DRIL:NRR *AC/RSIB:DRIL:NRR *D/DRIL:NRR | |||
JDWilcox SSanders DNorkin CERossi | |||
07/02/93 07/02/93 07/02/93 07/1 dJ3 (qy | |||
*RPB:ADM *OGCB:DORS:NRR *C/OGCB:DORS:NRR | |||
NBeeson JLBirmingham GHMarcus/Wen | |||
08/10/93 08/27/93 08/27/93 | |||
*RSIB:DRIL:NRR | |||
PSKoltay | |||
07/06/93 DOCUMENT NAME: 93-72.IN | |||
IN 93-72 September 14, 1993 Based on the five pilot inspections, the NRC inspection teams concluded that | |||
NRC actions and industry initiatives have increased licensee awareness of the | |||
risk associated with shutdown and low power conditions. The inspection teams | |||
found that licensees were aware of the necessity for ensuring that required | |||
systems be available and of the need to maintain the capability of backup | |||
equipment during an outage. However, the inspection teams found that licensee | |||
interpretations of industry initiatives for addressing shutdown risk varied | |||
greatly. This was demonstrated by the various licensee interpretations of | |||
industry guidelines for declaring equipment "available." | |||
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If | |||
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact | |||
the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear | |||
Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager. | |||
C- | |||
Brian K. Grimes, Director | |||
Division of Operating Reactor Support | |||
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation | |||
Technical contact: J.D. Wilcox, NRR | |||
(301) 504-1262 Attachment: | |||
===List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices=== | |||
KJ | |||
Attachment | |||
IN 93-72 September 14, 1993 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED | |||
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES | |||
Information Date of | |||
Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to | |||
93-71 Fire at Chernobyl Unit 2 09/13/93 All holders of OLs or CPs | |||
for nuclear power reactors. | |||
93-70 Degradation of Boraflex 09/10/93 All holders of OLs or CPs | |||
Neutron Absorber Coupons for nuclear power reactors. | |||
93-69 Radiography Events at 09/02/93 All holders of OLs or CPs | |||
Operating Power Reactors for nuclear power reactors | |||
and all radiography | |||
licensees. | |||
93-68 Failure of Pump Shaft 09/01/93 All holders of OLs or CPs | |||
Coupling Caused by for nuclear power reactors. | |||
Temper Embrittlement | |||
during Manufacture | |||
92-16, Loss of Flow from the 08/23/93 All holders of OLs or CPs | |||
Supp. 2 Residual Heat Removal for nuclear power reactors. | |||
Pump during Refueling | |||
Cavity Draindown | |||
93-67 Bursting of High 08/16/93 All holders of OLs or CPs | |||
Pressure Coolant for nuclear power reactors. | |||
Injection Steam Line | |||
Rupture Discs Injures | |||
Plant Personnel | |||
93-66 Switchover to Hot-Leg 08/16/93 All holders of OLs or CPs | |||
Injection Following for pressurized water | |||
A Loss-of-Coolant reactors. | |||
Accident in Pres- surized Water Reactors | |||
93-65 Reactor Trips Caused 08/13/93 All holders of OLs or CPs | |||
by Breaker Testing for nuclear power reactors. | |||
with Fault Protection | |||
Bypassed | |||
OL = Operating License | |||
CP = Construction Permit}} | |||
{{Information notice-Nav}} | {{Information notice-Nav}} |
Latest revision as of 04:24, 24 November 2019
Ku
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 September 14, 1993 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 93-72: OBSERVATIONS FROM RECENT SHUTDOWN RISK AND
OUTAGE MANAGEMENT PILOT TEAM INSPECTIONS
Addressees
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power
reactors.
Purpose
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information
notice to inform addressees of observations from recent shutdown risk and
outage management pilot team inspections. It is expected that recipients will
review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider
actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions
contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no
specific action or written response is required.
Background
Events that occurred during the past several years have caused the NRC staff
to be increasingly concerned about plant safety during shutdown operations.
The Diablo Canyon event of April 10, 1987, in which boiling of the reactor
coolant resulted from a loss of decay heat removal, highlighted the fact that
operation of a pressurized-water reactor with a reduced reactor coolant system
(RCS) inventory is a particularly sensitive condition. Based on its review of
that event, the staff issued Generic Letter 88-17, "Loss of Decay Heat
Removal," October 17, 1988, which requested that licensees address certain
generic deficiencies to improve safety during operations with a reduced RCS
inventory. More recently, Incident Investigation Team report, NUREG-1410,
"Loss of Vital ac Power and the Residual Heat Removal System During Mid-Loop
Operations at Plant Vogtle Unit 1 on March 20, 1990," emphasized the need for
risk management of shutdown operations. Discussions with foreign regulatory
organizations support NRC staff findings that the core-damage-frequency for
shutdown operations may be a substantial fraction of the total core-damage
frequency.
Description of Circumstances
Between December 1991 and April 1993, the NRC staff conducted five pilot team
inspections to assess the effectiveness of industry initiatives for improving
shutdown safety. The inspections were performed at Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 2 [NRC Inspection Report (IR)50-270/91-202], Indian Point Nuclear
9309090243
- U 1?-.crn-9
3 .
IN 93-72 September 14, 1993 Generating Station, Unit 3 (IR 50-286/92-901), Diablo Canyon Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (IR 50-275/92-201), Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 (IR 50-282/92-201; 50-306/92-201), and Cooper Nuclear Station
(IR 50-298/93-201). Approximately one week of each inspection focused on
licensee pre-outage planning and control processes and 8 to 10 days focused on
licensee implementation of the outage.
In the pre-outage portion of the inspection, the inspectors evaluated the
following: (1) management involvement in and oversight of the outage planning
process, (2) planning and scheduling of outage activities, especially the
relationships between significant work activities and the availability of
electrical power supplies, decay heat removal systems, reactor coolant system
RCS inventory and containment integrity, (3) the process for developing
individual work packages to ensure coordination with other activities, and (4)
operator response procedures, contingency plans and training for mitigation of
loss of decay heat removal capability, loss of RCS inventory and loss of
electrical power sources during shutdown conditions.
The inspectors walked through procedures related to shutdown safety to
determine if the specified activities could be accomplished in the allotted
time frames and to verify that the procedures could be implemented considering
probable equipment availability. The inspectors reviewed training records on
outage procedures to determine if the training was adequate and that, when
appropriate, additional training was provided as the procedures were revised.
The inspectors also evaluated the probable effects of environmental conditions
such as temperature, steam and flooding on the performance of activities that
would be required to mitigate adverse shutdown events.
In the implementation portion of the inspection, the inspectors evaluated:
(1) the control of changes to the outage schedule, control of work activities, and control of system alignments, (2) the working relationships and
communication channels between operations, maintenance and other plant support
personnel, (3) the conduct of operations personnel both inside and outside of
the control room regarding awareness of plant status, control of plant
evolutions, response to alarms and other abnormal indications, (4) the
completeness and effectiveness of shift turnovers, (5) whether maintenance and
modification work was performed in accordance with current written and
approved procedures and appropriate post-maintenance testing was required and
performed, and (6) the adequacy of management involvement and oversight of the
conduct of the outage as it progressed.
Other areas observed were, plant housekeeping, normal and emergency plant
lighting, configuration control, radiological controls, equipment labeling and
status tagging, vital area access control, use of overtime and licensee
control of contractor work including contractor training and qualifications.
Discussion
In general, the inspectors found that licensees had instituted programmatic
changes developed from guidance contained in a Nuclear Management and
Resources Council document, NUMARC 91-06, "Guidelines for Industry Actions to
TV
IN 93-72 September 14, 1993 individual examples of
Assess Shutdown Management." The team inspectors found the inspectors
licensee failure to follow procedures but more importantly assessment for
identified two areas of more general concern: (1) risk
and (2)
pre-outage planning, emergent work and schedule changes, availability.
methodologies for equipment
implementation of defense-in-depth Specific details of
A general discussion of these areas is provided below.
above.
the findings are contained in the inspection reports referenced
and Schedule Changes
Risk Assessment for Pre-Outage Planning, Emergent Work
controls to
The inspectors found that licensees used various programmatic emergent work and
assess shutdown risk factors during initial outage planning, outage planning
schedule changes. Assessment methodologies used for initial availability to
ranged from following minimum guidelines for equipment outage activities.
performing a probabilistic risk assessment of scheduled the licensee in
The inspection team found that the risk assessment aided during the sched led
identifying activities that would be subject to high risk became less
outage. However, as the outage progressed, the risk assessment schedule occurreda
valid because it was not updated as changes to the outage
inspectors found that
In the areas of emergent work and schedule changes, the effect of \
three of the plants had a proceduralized process to assess the two plants relied
other
emergent work or schedule changes on plant risk. Theoperators to adjust the
on a functional review by planners, schedulers, and
schedule appropriately to reduce risk.
status boards or
The inspectors found that all of the plants maintained in tracking the
checklists in the control room to assist the operators
potential
configuration status of plant systems and to help identify
risk-significant activities.
Implementation of Defense-in-Depth for Equipment Availability
of defense-in-depth
The inspection teams found that licensee implementation industry guidelines for
for equipment availability was inconsistent. Although
that the criteria
declaring equipment "available" exist, the inspectors found of safety
an appropriate margin
for declaring equipment needed to ensure declaring that
"available" varied from licensee to licensee. For example, include ensuring that support systems
equipment was "available" did not always conditioning) were also
(e.g., cooling water and heating, ventilation and air
had been performed, equipment was
available. At times, after maintenance functional
listed as "available" without the benefit of a post-maintenance considered to be
test. The inspectors also found that some equipment was
as removal of clearances or realignment
"available" even though actions, such perform its function.
of valves, would be required before the equipment could
the team inspectors
In addition to the above concerns, at most of the plants restrictions
found examples of failures to comply with technical specification
to exceed overtime limits was
on overtime work in that management approval
inadequately documented.
K-,
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Brian K. Grimes, Director
Division of Operating Reactor Support
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contact: J.D. Wilcox, NRR
(301) 504-1262 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
RSIB:DRIL:NRR RSIB:DRIL:NRR AC/RSIB:DRIL:NRR D/DRIL:NRR
JDWilcox SSanders DNorkin CERossi
07/02/93 07/02/93 07/02/93 07/10/93 RPB:ADM OGCB:DORS:NRR C70MO:DORS:NRR D/DORS:NRR
NBeeson JLBirmingham iGHMarcus BKGrimes
08/10/93 08 /1/ 93 J9 PT
- S/Al/93 09/ /93 RSIB
- DRIL:NRR
PSKoltay
07/06/93
- IN 93-xx
September xx, 1993 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Brian K. Grimes, Director
Division of Operating Reactor Support
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contact: J.D. Wilcox, NRR
(301) 504-1262 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
- RSIB:DRIL:NRR *RSIB:DRIL:NRR *AC/RSIB:DRIL:NRR *D/DRIL:NRR
JDWilcox SSanders DNorkin CERossi
07/02/93 07/02/93 07/02/93 07/10/93
- RPB:ADM *OGCB:DORS:NRR > C/OGCB:DORS:NRR D/DORS:NRR
NBeeson JLBirmingham GHMarcus/Wen BKGrimes
08/10/93 08/27/93 08/27/93 09/ /93
- RSIB:DRIL:NRR
PSKoltay
07/06/93 DOCUMENT NAME: OUTAGEIN.JLB
'-vJ
IN 93-72 September 14, 1993 Based on the five pilot inspections, the NRC inspection teams concluded that
NRC actions and industry initiatives have increased licensee awareness of the
risk associated with shutdown and low power conditions. The inspection teams
found that licensees were aware of the necessity for ensuring that required
systems be available and of the need to maintain the capability of backup
equipment during an outage. However, the inspection teams found that licensee
interpretations of industry initiatives for addressing shutdown risk varied
greatly. This was demonstrated by the various licensee interpretations of
industry guidelines for declaring equipment "available."
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Original signed by
Brian K.Grimes
Brian K. Grimes, Director
Division of Operating Reactor Support
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contact: J.D. Wilcox, NRR
(301) 504-1262 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
- RSIB:DRIL:NRR *RSIB:DRIL:NRR *AC/RSIB:DRIL:NRR *D/DRIL:NRR
JDWilcox SSanders DNorkin CERossi
07/02/93 07/02/93 07/02/93 07/1 dJ3 (qy
- RPB:ADM *OGCB:DORS:NRR *C/OGCB:DORS:NRR
NBeeson JLBirmingham GHMarcus/Wen
08/10/93 08/27/93 08/27/93
- RSIB:DRIL:NRR
PSKoltay
07/06/93 DOCUMENT NAME: 93-72.IN
IN 93-72 September 14, 1993 Based on the five pilot inspections, the NRC inspection teams concluded that
NRC actions and industry initiatives have increased licensee awareness of the
risk associated with shutdown and low power conditions. The inspection teams
found that licensees were aware of the necessity for ensuring that required
systems be available and of the need to maintain the capability of backup
equipment during an outage. However, the inspection teams found that licensee
interpretations of industry initiatives for addressing shutdown risk varied
greatly. This was demonstrated by the various licensee interpretations of
industry guidelines for declaring equipment "available."
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
C-
Brian K. Grimes, Director
Division of Operating Reactor Support
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contact: J.D. Wilcox, NRR
(301) 504-1262 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
KJ
Attachment
IN 93-72 September 14, 1993 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES
Information Date of
Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to
93-71 Fire at Chernobyl Unit 2 09/13/93 All holders of OLs or CPs
for nuclear power reactors.
93-70 Degradation of Boraflex 09/10/93 All holders of OLs or CPs
Neutron Absorber Coupons for nuclear power reactors.
93-69 Radiography Events at 09/02/93 All holders of OLs or CPs
Operating Power Reactors for nuclear power reactors
and all radiography
licensees.
93-68 Failure of Pump Shaft 09/01/93 All holders of OLs or CPs
Coupling Caused by for nuclear power reactors.
Temper Embrittlement
during Manufacture
92-16, Loss of Flow from the 08/23/93 All holders of OLs or CPs
Supp. 2 Residual Heat Removal for nuclear power reactors.
Pump during Refueling
Cavity Draindown
93-67 Bursting of High 08/16/93 All holders of OLs or CPs
Pressure Coolant for nuclear power reactors.
Injection Steam Line
Rupture Discs Injures
Plant Personnel
93-66 Switchover to Hot-Leg 08/16/93 All holders of OLs or CPs
Injection Following for pressurized water
A Loss-of-Coolant reactors.
Accident in Pres- surized Water Reactors
93-65 Reactor Trips Caused 08/13/93 All holders of OLs or CPs
by Breaker Testing for nuclear power reactors.
with Fault Protection
Bypassed
OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit