Information Notice 1987-39, Control of Particle Contamination at Nuclear Power Plants

Control of Particle Contamination at Nuclear Power Plants

ML031130618
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Skagit, Marble Hill
Issue date:	08/21/1987
From:	Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-87-039, NUDOCS 8708170408
Download: ML031130618 (15)

! . . - . i

V' 'SINS No.: 6835 iN 87-39 UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 August 21, 1987 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NQ. 87-39: CONTROL OF HOT PARTICLE CONTAMINATION

AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

Addressees

storage facilities holding

All nuclear power reactor facilities and spent fuel

an NRC license or a construction permit.

Background and

Purpose

information on events in- IE Information Notice 86-23 (Reference 1) provided skin contamination by small, volving excessive skin exposures resulting from activity (hot particles). Since

highly radioactive particles with high specific been more of these events, and a

that information notice was issued, there have Operations (INPO) (Reference 2)

recent report by the Institute of Nuclear Power This information notice pro- provides additional information on this subject. and discusses degraded fuel

vides information on some of the subsequent eventsfuel reconstitution as major

and a lack of proper radiological control during learned also are included.

sources of hot particles. Generic licensee lessons

information for applicability

It is expected that recipients will review this to preclude a similar

to their facilities and consider action, if appropriate, suggestions contained in this

problem occurring at their facilities. However, no specific action or

notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, written response is required.

Discussion:

hot particle exposures were

During the first 6 months of 1987, events involving Two events in late 1986 (at

reported at nine different nuclear power stations. exceeding NRC regula- V.C. Summer and San Onofre) involved exposures apparentlyof eight of these

tory limits. Attachment 1 provides summary descriptions from the referenced inspec- events. More detailed descriptions can be obtained Reports are available

tion reports for each event. (Copies of NRC Inspection Washington, D.C.)

from the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street N.W.,

degraded fuel and neutron- Hot particles come primarily from two major sources: While much of the

activated corrosion and wear products (e.g., Stellite). corrosion

information in this notice is pertinent to both neutron-activated

as activated particles) and

and wear product particles (hereafter referred to

K> QIN 87-39 August 21, 1987 irradiated fuel particles (hereafter referred

to as fuel particles), a major

concern of this notice is extended facility operation

the resulting problems with fuel particle contamination. with degraded fuel and

NRC review of licensees' corrective actions, discussions On the basis of an

operating staffs, and information obtained by with licensees'

NRC inspectors, the lessons

learned and licensee good practices resulting

from the events summarized in

Attachment 1 are as follows:

1. Extended power plant operation with degraded fuel

result in widespread dispersal of fuel particles. (leaking fuel pins) can

experience fuel particle contamination problems Some plants continue to

pins have been removed because of the residual long after leaking fuel

systems. Some plants with these problems have contamination of plant

for missing fuel pellets and fragments and to started programs to account

identify measures to recover

this material.

2. Considerations concerning the handling of leaking

following: fuel include the

a. Special techniques and precautions for handling

are necessary to prevent aggravating the spread leaking fuel bundles

For example, containment devices should be used of fuel particles.

fuel. The lack of proper radiological controls when reconstituting

fuel reconstitution process in the San Onofre and oversight of the

3 fuel pool led to loss

of control and dispersal of numerous fuel particles

Fuel particles then spread through the plant spent into the pool.

to the liquid radwaste systems. fuel systems and

b. A damaged, leaking fuel pin that is not properly

segregated from the common fuel pool area could contained and

long-term source of fuel particle contamination. be a significant, c. Plants should be aware that NSSS vendors' special

refueling tools and

equipment could be a source of fuel particle contamination.

tools and equipment should be carefully surveyed These

and before they are shipped to other facilities. before they are used

3. Some plants that have operated for extended periods

fuel and plants with activated particle problems of time with degraded

specialized, comprehensive training programs for now have instituted

workers and general employees. These programs plant system maintenance

inform and prepare the plant staff to cope with are designed to better

particle problems. Additionally, as part of the continuing fuel

comprehensive

control programs, special new procedures to improve contamination

surveys for detection

--

. .IN 87-39 August 21, 1987 of.hot particles have been prepared and health physics technicians have

been trained in their use. Decontamination and dose evaluation methods

and procedures that focus on hot particles have been implemented. (See

summaries of events at Trojan and.San Onofre in Attachment 1.)

.4.. In general, ;licensees have upgraded their programs for contamination

monitoring of "clean," laundered anti-contamination protective clothing

(PC). However, PC continues to be a means of transferring both fuel

particles and activated particles. Some facilities need to consider

making their PC monitoring programs more sensitive. For example, some

licensees that are using contractor laundry services found the contrac- tor's alarm on the radiation monitor (used to screen PC) too high to

-detect 0.4 microcurie (VCi) particles. Moreover, when commercial plant laundry

services are used, it is possible that PC from a "particle-free"

• *-can be mixed with PC from a plant with hot particle problems. Finally, at.leastrone licensee was relying solely on monitoring of large bundles

of washed PC (bulk surveys) and was not monitoring samples of individual

PC. For plants with identified particle problems, individual PC items

may have to be checked before they are reused after cleaning.

5. Except for the-Trojan event discussed in Attachment 1, to date, no

licensee has reported detecting hot.particles during airborne sampling.

However, as a precaution,,some licensees have elected to provide workers

with respiratory protection for performing maintenance on plant systems

known to-be a source of hot particles. No plant has reported inhalation

or ingestion of hot particles by any worker.

6. Hot particles in contact with skin.produce very high dose rates. Diligent

personnel contamination surveys performed as soon as practical after .

completing work involving contamination are needed to minimize potential

exposure times.-

7. Approximately 75 percent of the U.S. power reactor facilities are cur- rently using new high-sensitivity whole-body contamination monitors.

These state-of-the-art contamination monitors increase the probability of

detecting hot-particles on plant personnel while reducing the likelihood

of inadvertently releasing particles from the plant site. To-date, most

of-the particles found on personnel have:been detected by these new

monitors. Even with use of the new monitors, a few instances have oc- curred where hot particles have inadvertently been carried home by workers

. and have-been detected in the home or on the worker returning to the site.

No significant ,public exposures have been reported to date.

8. In a recent study for the NRC (Reference 3), it was reported that a plant

operating with 0.125 percent pin-hole fuel cladding defects showed a

general five-fold increase in whole-body radiation exposure rates in some

IN 87-39 .

August 21, 1987 areas of the plant when compared to a sister plant with

fuel (<0.01percent leakers). Around certain plant systems high-integrity

fuel may elevate.-radiation exposure rates even more. the degraded

-

9. Maintenance-on valves with Stellite components can cause

cobalt-containing debris with Co-60 as the resultant introduction of

product. Some plants have instituted work controls (e.g.,neutron activation

ment and post-maintenance cleaning) to minimize this input use of contain- systems (Reference 4). into reactor

Health Implications and Radiation Protection Criteria

for Hot Particle- Exposures of Skin: -

A hot'particle on the skin gives a high beta dose to

a small area.' Any radia- tion dose to the skin is-assumed to result in'some increased

cancer, although'this type of cancer is rarely fatal.' risk of skin

indicate that highly localized irradiation of-the skin'by Experiments with animals

likely to'cause skin cancer than more uniform irradiation hot particles is less

of radioactive material.:- by the same quantity

In addition to any increased risk of cancer, large

particles also may produce observable effects such doses to the skin from hot

as reddening, hardening, peeling, or ulceration of the skin-immediately around

effects appear only'after a-threshold dose is exceeded.the particle; These

particles 'equired to-produce these effects'in the 'skin The doses from hot

cisely;-Ihowever, -it appears likely, except for a point are'not known pre- effects will only be seen for doses of hundreds of rems reddening,-that these

effects have been seen to date on any workers who have or more.'- No such

particles, even though one exposure has been measured been exposed to-hot

512 rem. or calculated as high as

Recent reviews of radiobiology and radiation protection

cluding considerations of hot particle exposures, have criteria for skin, in- been provided-by-Wells

(Reference 5) and Charles (References 6 and 7).

The NRC staff recognizes the need for more'information

radiation on skin and particularly the effects-of hot on the effects of

The staff has requested the National Council on Radiation particle irradiation.

Measurements (NCRP) to. study the health significance of Protection and

and to provisde recommendations- based on the findings of hot particle exposures

recommendations may result in changes in NRC requirements this study. These

particle exposures. However, until these requirements with respect to hot

are changed, IE Infor- mation Notice 86-23 (Reference 1) contains current information

evaluating doses to skin resulting from hot particles. for use in

./ .. IN 87-39 August. 21, 1987 Page 5 of S

oI specific action or.written response is required by this information notice.

• you have any questions about this matter, please contact the Regional

Admiistrator 'f the appropriate regional office or this office.

e,

.harles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technwcal Contact:- James E..Wigginton, NRR

(301) 492-4663 John D. Buchanan, NRR

.(301) 492-7293 References

I. JAE Information Notice 86-23, "Excessive Skin Exposures Due to Contamina- tihn With Hot Particles," April 9, 1986.

2i. nstitute of Nuclear Power Operations, Significant Event Report 18-87 (Rev..2), "Radiation Exposure From Small Particles," July 16, 1987.

3,- Hoeller; M. P., :G. F. Martin, and D. L..Haggard, "The Impact of Fuel

• -Cladding Failure Events on Occupational Radiation Exposures at Nuclear

PowerPants. Case Study: PWR During RoutineOperations," NUREG/CR-4485 (PNL-5606), January 1986.

Heard, D. B., and R. J. Freeman, "Cobalt Contamination Resulting From

H4

.`Valve IMaintenance," Electric Power Research Institute, EPRI NP-3220, Final

Report, August 1983. .

5.. Welli, 3., "Problems Associated With Localized Skin Exposures," in "Radia- tion Damage to Skin: Fundamental and Practical Aspects," Proceedings of a

. Workshop. heldat Saclay, France, on October 9-11, 1985, Brit.

.J3. Radiology, Supplement No. 19, pp. 146-150 (1986).

• .6. Charles, 4.W., "The Biological Bases of Radiation Protection Criteria for

Superficial, Low Penetrating Radiation Exposure," in "Dosimetry of Beta

Particles and Low Energy X-Rays," Proceedings of a Workshop held at

Sacay, Francei October 7-9,-1985," Radiation Protection Dosimetry 14 (No.

-

79-90 (1986).

P2),pp.

-7. Charles, 14. W., "Skin, Eye, and Testis: Current Exposure Problems and Recent

. .Advances in Radiobiology," J. Soc. Radiol. Prot. 6 (No. 2), pp. 69-81 (1986).

Attachments;.. ..

-l.*. EventSummaries

.2.. List-4f Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

Attachment 1 IN 87-39 August 21, 1987 EVENT SUMMARIES

San Onofre 3. Events Durina November 1986 - March 1987, Inspection Report

No. 50-362/86-37 Background:

At the onset of the first fuel cycle, significant fuel degradation was evident.

The plant continued to operate with approximately 105 defective fuel pins. In

late 1985 during the first refueling outage, a fuel pin was inadvertently

pulled apart during the fuel reconstitution process. Several fuel pellets fell

and dispersed throughout the fuel pool. Fuel particles had previously been

detected early on during reconstitution on fuel handling tools and on the

refueling floors. All the severely damaged fuel pins were then grouped into

one fuel bundle and stored in the pool without any containment.

Event Specifics:

From January 2 through February 20, 1987, the licensee's aggressive hot parti- cle inventory and tracking system indicated that 92 "new" fuel particles

(recently neutron irradiated), 155 "old" fuel particles, 51 ruthenium, 84 crud, and 42 cobalt particles had been found and analyzed. Before 1987, no formal

tracking program existed.

Several incidents involving hot particles have occurred, including an apparent

worker extremity exposure (hand) of 512 rem during November 1986. As a result, appropriate NRC enforcement actions are currently underway. Three events

involving the inadvertent release of hot particles from the plant site occurred

in February 1987. In two of these events, the radiation dose to the public was

determined to be negligible. However, the third event involved a 0.2.;Ci

particle found by a worker at his home during a self-initiated radiological

survey. The licensee has not yet estimated the potential dose to the worker's

family as a result of this occurrence.

In the licensee's licensee event report (LER No.86-015, Revision 1) of Febru- ary 22, 1987, the following program improvements for detecting hot particles

and controlling personnel exposures from hot particles were described:

f

Extensive, mandatory use of exceedingly sensitive fixed instrumentation

(frisking booths) for the detection of personnel contamination;

Special training (including hands-on laboratory exercises) in radioactive

particle characteristics and survey techniques for all Health Physics

Technicians;

C-.

Attachment 1 IN 87-39 August 21, 1987 Oral and written indoctrination of all managers, first line super- visors and workers in the special problems associated with radio- active particles, including the methods each person must employ to

protect himself;

Special procedures to assure detection and control of radioactive

particles which feature the establishment of a clearly identifiable

zone, to demark and contain such particles, surrounded by clearly

identified buffer zones (or solid physical barriers) which are

surveyed frequently to verify that control is being maintained;

Maintenance and wide publication of a radioactive particle census

during outages to maintain station awareness;

The establishment of a Task Force to recommend and implement action to

minimize the future production and movement of radioactive particles.

Trojan, April, 1987, Inspection Report No. 50-344/87-15 Background:

The facility has operated since July 1982 with an estimated 112 fuel pellets

unaccounted for throughout the reactor and support plant systems. The licensee

recovered or located about 264 pellets of the estimated 376 missing after the

1982 refueling outage, which occurred because of the baffle jetting problems of

the 1981 fuel cycle. (See IE Information Notice 82-27, "Fuel Rod Degradation

Resulting From Baffle.Water-Jet Impingement," August .5, 1982.)

Event Specifics:

Shortly after the start of the 1987 refueling outage in April, a significant

increase in personnel skin contaminations occurred. On April 9, high surface

contamination (up to 300,000 dpm/100 cm2) and high airborne activity levels

-.(2E-7 pCi/cc, mixed fission products) in containment resulted from the dis- persal of fuel fragments during reactor vessel. stud removal and stud-hole

plugging operations. The workers in the reactor cavity were wearing respira- tors and no excessive uptakes of.radioactive materials were detected during

followup whole-body counting. Because of the spread of contamination to the

spent fuel building, the licensee stopped all- reactor building cavity work and

all personnel evacuated the area that afternoon.

On April 10, a licensee radiation survey located a hot spot on the cavity floor

near a reactor vessel stud-hole (>100 rad/hr beta and 30 R/hr gamma contact

reading using a portable ion-chamber survey.instrument). On April 11, another

worker located what appeared to be about one-half of a fuel pellet in the

flange area at the stud hole. This partial fuel pellet was removed on

April 12.

Attachment 1 IN 87-39 August 21, 1987 On April 17, a radiation protection technician, after performing a survey of

the lower refueling cavity, discovered a fuel particle lodged in his protective

rubber shoe cover. This particle was later determined to be composed of

approximately 50 mCi of mixed fission product activity; showed readings of 1200

mR/hr with the window open and 250 mR/hr with the window closed. After a

careful time-and-motion study of the technician's activities, the licensee

determined that no NRC regulatory dose limits were exceeded. (Licensee esti- mates were 1.2 rem to whole body; 4.6 rem to skin; 9.6 rem to extremities.)

In general, it appears that the licensee experienced a programmatic breakdown

that resulted in several workers receiving significant, unnecessary radiation

exposures from fuel particle contamination. In LER No. 87-08'dated May 8, 1987, the licensee identified the following additional concerns and'corrective

actions. The LER stated in part:

Workers entering containment on April 9 were not-aware of the fuel

particle hazards. As a corrective measure, all personnel with

access to radiological control areas were retrained to be informed of

the fuel particle problem and perform hands-on training to demonstrate

competence in anti-contamination clothing use. Daily reports

are being provided to workers on the status of containment activities.

Radiation surveys and record keeping were inadequate. As a corrective

measure, new procedures were developed to specifically address

discrete radioactive particles. All radiation protection technicians

have been trained on these new procedures...

There was-insufficient extremity monitoring and no procedures for

particle control. As a corrective measure, procedures have been

prepared to address particle control. Additional extremity moni- toring is being utilized.

Evaluation of radiological events needs to be improved. A'new-pro

cedure will be prepared for documenting and evaluating radiologicalj :

events.-

Review of radiation protection activities.'is insufficient. A new

separate onsite review committee will be established to evaluate

radiological events and to routinely review the performance of the

Radiation Protection Department. -

Insufficient staffing existed. Increasing the manpower in both the

onsite Radiation Protection Department and the corporate Radiological

Safety Branch of the Nuclear Safety and Regulation Department is being

pursued.

Attachment 1 IN 87-39 August 21, 1987 Problems existed due to insufficient radiation monitoring and surveying

equipment. Additional equipment including new portal monitors and

radiation monitoring equipment has been procured.

There was the potential for radiation exposure to individuals from fuel

particles on anti-contamination clothing. An evaluation for potential

exposure is in progress.

V. C. Summer, November 1986, Inspection Report No. 50-395/86-22 After working-in a "clean" area where no protective clothing was required, contamination was detected on the hand of an electrician who had worked on a

control panel for the overhead crane in the fuel handling building. After

measuring the dose rates (window open and window closed) with a portable survey

instrument the worker's hand was decontaminated. The contaminant was not

retained for further analysis. Based on the survey instrument readings, the

dose to the workers hand was calculated to be about 420 rems (at a depth of

7 mg/cm 2 2 averaged over an area of 1 cm ).

Salem Unit 2, April 1987, Inspection Report No. 50-311/87-11 A fuel particle was detected by a whole-body contamination monitor on a work- er's arm. The particle was identified as a fuel particle (about 225 days since

in core) by using a gamma-ray spectrometer [Ge(Li) detector]. The licensee

believes that the source of the particle was from the last refueling outage

about 8 months earlier.

Yankee Nuclear Power Station, May 1987, Inspection Report No. 50-29/87-10

A potential skin exposure of 7.6 rem to a worker's scalp occurred from an

activated particle. The apparent source of the particle was the worker's PC

hood. After its discovery, the particle remained on the worker's scalp for

about 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br />, awaiting medical assistance to remove the particle. Prior to

medical assistance arriving on site, the particle was removed by shaving the

hair. Earlier in May, the licensee reported that, during fuel assembly move- ment, pieces of fuel rods were seen to have fallen away from the assembly and

land on top of the reactor core and in the refueling cavity area. Fuel recon- stitution was in progress. -

Attachment 1 IN 87-39 August 21, 1987 Indian Point Unit 3, May 1987, Inspection Report No. 50-286/87-18 A maintenance foreman exiting the containment after helping to replace steam

generator manway covers received an estimated 4 rem dose to the skin (in back

of neck) from an activated zirconium particle. It appears the particle dis- lodged from his PC hood and fell on his neck during temporary removal of the

hood during a work rest-break.

Quad Cities/Dresden/Zion, 1986 and 1987 A special program to investigate hot particle incidents has been in place at

these Commonwealth Edison Company facilities for the last 1-2 years. A total

of approximately 100 individual hot particles were found on workers' skin or

clothing in 1986. Approximately 130 particles were found in the first six

months of 1987. The particles have been predominantly Co-60 with activities

ranging from about 0.01 to 1 pCi. Those particles were analyzed for physical

size; the smallest was 20 microns. The licensee investigated each event and

calculated skin doses. No overexposures have been reported. The transfer

mechanism of the particles to the workers has not been positively identified.

Callaway Station, 1986 Period, Report No. 50-483/8700 (DRSS)

The licensee experienced ten hot particle skin contamination incidents primari- ly during the refueling outage early during the year. No NRC dose limits were

exceeded. Ineffective frisking (hand-held pancake GM-tube) of laundered PC and

potentially degraded dry-cleaning fluid quality (leading to cross-contami- nation of PC during cleaning) were identified by the licensee as possible

contributors to this contamination problem.

Attachment 2 IN 87-39 August 21, 1987 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

INFORMATION NOTICES 1987

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

87-38 Inadequate or Inadvertent 8/17/87 All nuclear power

Blocking of Valve Movement reactor facilities

holding an OL or CP.

87-37 Compliance with the General 8/10/87 All persons specifi- License Provisions of cally licensed to

10 CFR Part 31 manufacture or to

initially transfer

devices containing

radioactive material

to general licensees, as defined in 10 CFR

Part 31.

87-36 Significant Unexpected 8/4/87 All nuclear power

Erosion of Feedwater Lines reactor facilities

holding an OL or CP.

87-35 Reactor Trip Breaker, 7/30/87 All nuclear power

Westinghouse Model DS-416, reactor facilities

Failed to Open on Manual holding an OL or

Initiation from the Control CP employing W DS-416 Room reactor trip breakers.

87-34 Single Failures in Auxiliary 7/24/87 All holders of an

Feedwater Systems OL or a CP for

pressurized water

reactor facilities.

87-33 Applicability of 10 CFR 7/24/87 All NRC licensees.

Part 21 to Nonlicensees

87-32 Deficiencies in the Testing 7/10/87 All nuclear power

of Nuclear-Grade Activated reactor facilities

Charcoal. holding an OL or CP.

87-31 Blocking, Bracing, and 7/10/87 All NRC licensees.

Securing of Radioactive

Materials Packages in

Transportation.

. :

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit

- .V IN 87-XX

August, 1987 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the Regional

Administrator of the appropriate regional office or this office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

James E. Wigginton, NRR

(301) 492-4663 John 0. Buchanan, NRR

(301) 492-7293 References

1. IE Information Notice 86-23, "Excessive Skin Exposures Due to Contamina- tion With Hot Particles," April 9, 1986.

2. Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, Significant Event Report 18-87 (Rev. 2), "Radiation Exposure From Small Particles," July 16, 1987.

3. Moeller, M. P., G. F. Martin, and D. L. Haggard, "The Impact of Fuel

Cladding Failure Events on Occupational Radiation Exposures at Nuclear

Power Plants. Case Study: PWR During Routine Operations," NUREG/CR-4485 (PNL-5606), January 1986.

4. Heard, D. B., and R. J. Freeman, "Cobalt Contamination Resulting From

Valve Maintenance," Electric Power Research Institute, EPRI NP-3220, Final

Report, August 1983.

5. Wells, J., "Problems Associated With Localized Skin Exposures," in "Radia- tion Damage to Skin: Fundamental and Practical Aspects," Proceedings of a

Workshop held at Saclay, France, on October 9-11, 1985, Brit.

J. Radiology, Supplement No. 19, pp. 146-150 (1986).

6. Charles, M. W,., "The Biological Bases of Radiation Protection Criteria for

Superficial, Low Penetrating Radiation Exposure," in "Dosimetry of Beta

Particles and Low Energy X-Rays," Proceedings of a Workshop held at

Saclay, France, October 7-9, 1985," Radiation Protection Dosimetry 14 (No.

2), pp. 79-90 (1986).

7. Charles, M. W., "Skin, Eye, and Testis: Current Exposure Problems and Recent

Advances in Radiobiology," J. Soc. Radiol. Prot. 6 (No. 2), pp. 69-81 (1986).

Attachments:

1. Events Summaries

2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

• SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES p g C

/OGCB:DOEA:NRR

z UERidlHBerlinger

RBDE-R

PN R n 1 847 4 S8//' 87 8/ /87 RPB:DREP:NRR *RP:DREP:NRR R P:NR '*D:DREP:NRR *PPMB:ARM

JEWigginton JDBuchanan LJCunningham FJCongel TechEd

7/28/87 7/28/87 7/28/87 7/28/87 7/28/87

IN 87-XX

August, 1987 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the Regional

Administrator of the appropriate regional office or this office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

James E. Wigginton, NRR

(301) 492-4663 John D. Buchanan, NRR

(301) 492-7293 References

1. "IE Information Notice 86-23, "Excessive Skin Exposures Due to Contamina- tion With Hot Particles," April 9, 1986.

2. Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, Significant Event Report 18-87 (Rev. 2), "Radiation Exposure From Small Particles," July 16, 1987.

3. Moeller, M. P., G. F. Martin, and D. L. Haggard, "The Impact of Fuel

Cladding Failure Events on Occupational Radiation Exposures at Nuclear

Power Plants. Case Study: PWR During Routine Operations," NUREG/CR-4485 (PNL-5606), January 1986.

4. Heard, D. B., and R. J. Freeman, "Cobalt Contamination Resulting From

Valve Maintenance," Electric Power Research Institute, EPRI NP-3220, Final

Report, August 1983.

5. Wells, J., "Problems Associated With Localized Skin Exposures," in "Radia- tion Damage to Skin: Fundamental and Practical Aspects," Proceedings of a

Workshop held at Saclay, France, on October 9-11, 1985, Brit.

J. Radiology, Supplement No. 19, pp. 146-150 (1986).

6. Charles, M. W., "The Biological Bases of Radiation Protection Criteria for

Superficial, Low Penetrating Radiation Exposure," in "Dosimetry of Beta

Particles and Low Energy X-Rays," Proceedings of a Workshop held at

Saclay, France, October 7-9, 1985," Radiation Protection Dosimetry 14 (No.

2), pp. 79-90 (1986).

7. Charles, M. W., "Skin, Eye, and Testis: Current Exposure Problems and

Recent Advances in Radiobiology," J. Soc. Radiol. Prot. 6 (No. 2), pp.

69-81 (1986).

Attachments:

1. Events Summaries

2. List of Recently Issued

NRC Information Notices

• SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES D/DOEA:NRR C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR

CERossi CHBerlinger

8/ /87 8/10/87

• RPB:DREP:NRR *RPB:DREP:NRR *AC:RPB:DREP:NRR *D:DREP:NRR *PPMB:ARM

JEWigginton JDBuchanan LJCunningham FJCongel TechEd

7/28/87 7/28/87 7/28/87 7/28/87 7/28/87

~'V IN 87-XX

August, 1987 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the Regional

Administrator of the appropriate regional office or this office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

James E. Wigginton, NRR

(301) 492-4663 John D. Buchanan, NRR

(301) 492-7293 References

1. "IE Information Notice 86-23, "Excessive Skin Exposures Due to Contamina- tion With Hot Particles," April 9, 1986.

2. Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, Significant Event Report 18-87 (Rev. 2), "Radiation Exposure From Small Particles," July 16, 1987.

3. Moeller, M. P., G. F. Martin, and D. L. Haggard, "The Impact of Fuel

Cladding Failure Events on Occupational Radiation Exposures at Nuclear

Power Plants. Case Study: PWR During Routine Operations," NUREG/CR-4485 (PNL-5606), January 1986.

4. Heard, D. B., and R. J. Freeman, "Cobalt Contamination Resulting From

Valve Maintenance," Electric Power Research Institute, EPRI NP-3220, Final

Report, August 1983.

5. Wells, J., "Problems Associated With Localized Skin Exposures,' in "Radia- tion Damage to Skin: Fundamental and Practical Aspects," Proceedings of a

Workshop held at Saclay, France, on October 9-11, 1985, Brit.

J. Radiology, Supplement No. 19, pp. 146-150 (1986).

6. Charles, M. W., "The Biological Bases of Radiation Protection Criteria for

Superficial, Low Penetrating Radiation Exposure," in "Dosimetry of Beta

Particles and Low Energy X-Rays," Proceedings of a Workshop held at

Saclay, France, October 7-9, 1985," Radiation Protection Dosimetry 14 (No.

2), pp. 79-90 (1986).

7. Charles, M. W., "Skin, Eye, and Testis: Current Exposure Problems and

Recent Advances in Radiobiology," J. Soc. Radiol. Prot. 6 (No. 2), pp.

69-81 (1986).

Attachments:

1. Events Summaries

2. List of Recently Issued

NRC Information Notices

C/OGCB:DOEA:NRF

CHBerlinger

R i EP:NRR RPM :NRR A REP:NRR D:DREP:NRRI

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