ML102950281

Part 21 Notification - Crack Indications in Marathon Control Rod Blades

ML102950281
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Dresden, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Nine Mile Point, Perry, Oyster Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Pilgrim, Brunswick, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Duane Arnold, Clinton, Quad Cities, FitzPatrick
Issue date:	10/20/2010
From:	Porter D GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy Americas
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NEDE-31758P, FOIA/PA-2011-0115
Download: ML102950281 (8)

Text

" 10120120l 0 U.S. NuclearRegulatory Commission OperationsCenter Event Report Pease General Information or Other (PAR) Event# 46348 Rep Org: GE HITACHI NUCLEAR ENERGY Notification Date / Time: 10/20/2010 12:54 (EDT)

Supplier: GE HITACHI NUCLEAR ENERGY Event Date /Time: 10/20/2010 (EDT)

Last Modification: 10/20/2010 Region: 1 Docket #:

City: WILMINGTON Agreement State: Yes County: License #:

State: NC NRC Notified by: DALE PORTER Notifications: MARIE MILLER R1DO HQ Ops Officer: ERIC SIMPSON RANDY MUSSER R2DO Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY STEVE ORTH R3DO 10 CFR Section: VIVIAN CAMPBELL R4DO 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH PART 21 GP VIA EMAIL PART 21 - CRACK INDICATIONS IN MARATHON CONTROL ROD BLADES The following was received via facsimile:

"A recent inspection of near 'End-of-Life' Marathon Control Rod Blades (CRB) at an international BWR/6 has revealed crack indications. The CRB assemblies in question were manufactured in 1997. GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy (GEH) continues to investigate the cause(s) of the crack indications. Once the cause of the crack indications is determined, GEH will evaluate the nuclear and mechanical lifetime limits of the Marathon Control Rod Blade design in light of the new inspection data, and make revised lifetime recommendations, if necessary.

"This 60-day interim notification, in accordance with 10CFR Part 21.21(a)(2), is sent for all plants that are D lattice, BWR/2-4 or S lattice, BWR/6 plants. Since there have been no reported cracking occurrences in C lattice assemblies to date, these CRBs are tentatively eliminated from the investigation. C lattice, BWR/4-5 plants have been included on Attachment 2 for identification. Should the results of the investigation implicate the C lattice plants, the final resolution to this 10CFR Part 21 evaluation will include the C lattice plants."

The D lattice and S lattice plants in the US that are affected by this notification include Nine Mile Point, Unit 1; Millstone, Unit 1; Fitzpatrick; Pilgrim; Vermont Yankee; Grand Gulf; River Bend; Clinton; Oyster Creek; Dresden, Unit 2; Dresden, Unit 3; Peach Bottom, Unit 2; Peach Bottom, Unit 3; Quad Cities, Unit 1; Quad Cities, Unit 2; Perry, Unit 1; Duane Arnold; Cooper; Monticello; Brunswick, Unit 1; Brunswick, Unit 2; Hatch, Unit 1; Hatch, Unit 2; Browns Ferry, Unit 1; Browns Ferry, Unit 2; and Browns Ferry, Unit 3.

Received at: 10/20/2010 12:53 9106024965 ATC 2nd FLOOR 01:04:01 p.m. 10-20-2010 1 /7 HITACHI GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy Dale E. Porter GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy Americas LLC Safety Evaluation Program Manager 3901 Castle Hayne Rd.,

Wilmington, NC 28401 USA T 910 819-4491 Dale.Porter@GE.Com October 20, 2010 MFN 10-327 '

Attn: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject:

Part 21 60-Day Interim Report Notification:

Crack Indications in Marathon Control Rod Blades

Reference:

NEDE-31758P-A, "GE Marathon Control Rod Assembly," October 1991.

This letter provides information concerning an evaluation being performed by GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy (GEH) regarding the identification on crack indications in Marathon Control Rod Blades at a non-domestic BWR/6 plant. As stated herein, GEH has not concluded that this is a reportable condition in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR 21.21(d) and continued evaluation is required to determine the impact and extent of this condition.

The information required for a 60-Day Interim Report Notification per §21.21(a)(2) is provided in Attachment 3. The commitment for follow-on actions is provided in Attachment 3, item (vii).

If you have any questions, please call me at (910) 819-4491.

Sincerely, Dale E. Porter Safety Evaluation Program Manager GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy Americas LLC

9106024965 A"C 2nd FLOOR 01:04:36 p~m. 10-20-2010 2/7 MFN 10-327 Page 2 of 2 Attachments:

1 Description of Evaluation

2. US Plants Potentially Affected

3. 60-Day Interim Report Notification Information per §21.21(a)(2) cc: S. S. Philpott, USNRC S. J. Pannier, USNRC

0. Tabatabai-Yazdi, USNRC J. F. Harrison, GEH J. G. Head, GEH P. L. Campbell, GEH Washington A. A. Lingenfelter, GNF PRC File DRF Section No. 0000-0124-3633

9106024965 ATC 2nd FLOOR 01:04:56 p.m. 10-20-2010 3/7 MFN 10-327 Attachment 1 Page I of 2 Attachment I - Description of Evaluation Summary A recent inspection of near "End-of-Life" Marathon Control Rod Blades (CRB) at an international BWR/6 has revealed crack indications. The CRB assemblies in question were manufactured in 1997. GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy (GEH) continues to investigate the cause(s) of the crack indications. Once the cause of the crack indications is determined, GEH will evaluate the nuclear and mechanical lifetime limits of the Marathon Control Rod Blade design in light of the new inspection data, and make revised lifetime recommendations if necessary.

This 60-day interim notification, in accordance with 10CFR Part 21.21(a)(2), is sent for all plants that are D lattice, BWR/2-4 or S lattice, BWR/6 plants. Since there have been no reported cracking occurrences in C lattice assemblies to date, these CRBs are tentatively eliminated from the investigation. C lattice, BWR/4-5 plants have been included on Attachment 2 for identification. Should the results of the investigation implicate the C lattice plants, the final resolution to this 10CFR Part 21 evaluation will include the C lattice plants.

Background

GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy (GEH) provides Marathon Control Rod Blades (CRB) to BWR's throughout the fleet, inclusive of D lattice, BWR/2-4 plants, S lattice, BWR/ 6 plants, and C lattice, BWR/4-5 plants, as well as to other reactor vendor plants with similar configurations.

GEH maintains a continuous surveillance program to monitor Marathon CRB performance in the BWR fleet as required by the NRC Safety Evaluation (NEDE-31758P-A) for the Marathon Control Rod Blade. This surveillance program primarily consists of visual inspections of highly irradiated near "End-of-Life" Marathon CRBs. The most recent update report for the Marathon surveillance program was provided to the BWR fleet in May 2010; report number 0000-0071-8269-R2. This report was also sent to the NRC via MFN 10-153 on May 14, 2010. Since that update was released, GEH has completed the planned visual inspection of four-discharged Marathon CRBs at an international BWRI6, identified as 'Plant 0' in the surveillance report. The visual inspection of these assemblies has revealed crack indications on all four CRBs. Some of the crack indications are larger when compared to those previously observed and reported in the surveillance report, and occur at locations of lower reported local boron-10 depletion than previously documented.

9106024965 ATC 2nd FLOOR 01:05:46 p.m. 10-20-2010 4/7 MFN 10-327 Attachment 1 Page 2 of 2 Discussion The CRBs in question were manufactured in 1997. To date, no obvious characteristic of manufacturing or operation have provided an indication as to, why these specific blades deviate from other Marathon CRBs that have successfully operated to higher control rod depletions. GEH continues to investigate the cause(s) of the crack indications, including the examination of manufacturing records, material properties, water chemistry, specific operational history and duty. GEH will determine if there is a nuclear safety concern that is reportable under 10CFR Part 21.21(d) based on this investigation. GEH is also evaluating the nuclear and mechanical lifetime limits of the Marathon CRB design in light of the new inspection data, and will make revised lifetime recommendations, if necessary.

Crack indications at this plant occurred in "S" lattice CRB assemblies, which have a similar configuration to "D" lattice Marathon CRB assemblies. As reported in the surveillance report, crack indications have only been observed in D and S lattice Marathon CRBs.

Therefore D and S lattice CRBs are the primary focus of the on-going investigation and the subject of this 60-day interim notification. Since there have been no reported cracking occurrences in C lattice assemblies to date, these CRBs are tentatively eliminated from the investigation. Should the results of the investigation implicate the C lattice plants, the final resolution to this 10CFR Part 21 evaluation will include the C lattice plants.

ABWR and ESBWR Design Certification Documentation Applicability The issues described above have been reviewed for applicability to documentation associated with 10CFR 52 and it has been determined that there is no affect on the technical information contained in either the ABWR certified design or the ESBWR design in certification.

Corrective/Preventive Actions GEH will complete the evaluations by February 15, 2011.

Refer to Attachment 3, Item (vii) for corrective actions.

9106024965 ATC 2nd FLOOR 01:06:30 p.m. 10-20-2010 5/7 MFN 10-327 Attachment 2 Page 1 of 1 Attachment 2 - US Plants Potentially Affected D&S Lattice C Lattice Plants Plants Utility Plant x Constellation Nuclear Nine Mile Point 1 x

Constellation Nuclear. Nine Mile Point 2 x Detroit Edison Co. Fermi 2 x Dominion Generation Millstone 1 x Energy Northwest Columbia x Entergy Nuclear Northeast FitzPatrick x Entergy Nuclear Northeast Pilgrim x Entergy Nuclear Northeast Vermont Yankee x Entergy Operations, Inc. Grand Gulf x Entergy Operations, Inc. River Bend x Exelon Generation Co. Clinton x Exelon Generation Co. Oyster Creek x Exelon Generation Co. Dresden 2 & 3 x Exelon Generation Co. LaSalle 1 & 2 x Exelon Generation Co. Limerick 1 & 2 x Exelon Generation Co. Peach Bottom 2 & 3 x Exelon Generation Co. Quad Cities 1 & 2 x FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co. Perry I x FPL Energy Duane Arnold x Nebraska Public Power District Cooper x Nuclear Management Co. Monticello x PPL Susquehanna LLC. Susquehanna 1 & 2 x Progress Energy Brunswick 1 & 2 x Southern Nuclear Operating Co. Hatch 1 &2 x Tennessee Valley Authority Browns Ferry I - 3

910602ý965 ATC 2nd FLOOR 01:07:01 p.m. 10-20-2010 6/7 MFN 10-327 Attachment 3 Page 1 of 2 Attachment 3 Day Interim Report Notification Information per §21.21(a)(2)

(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.

Dale E. Porter GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy Safety Evaluation Program Manager 3901 Castle Hayne Road, Wilmington, NC 28401 (ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

The basic component that contains a defect is Marathon Control Rod Blades for D and S lattice plants. See Attachment 2 for a list of potentially affected plants.

(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy (iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy Marathon Control Rod Blade 107E1425G001, developed cracks on the outer surface of absorber tubes containing boron carbide capsules.

Cracking of the absorber tubes could result in loss of boron carbide, which functions as a neutron absorber.

(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

A Potential Reportable Condition Evaluation in accordance with 10CFR Part 21 was initiated on August 24, 2010.

(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

Marathon CRBs 107E1425G001, manufactured in 1997, and installed at an international utility are the primary object of the evaluation. The failure investigation will identify the extent of condition and identify if any other CRBs are affected and at which sites they are located. Preliminary information indicates that the potential for cracking could include high depletion Marathon Control Rods Blades installed in BWR/2-4, D lattice plants and BWRJ6, S lattice plants. A list of all plants that have been supplied these types of Marathon Control Rod Blades is shown in Attachment

2. The list in Attachment 2 also identifies non-GEH BWRs that have been supplied

910602ý965 ATC 2nd FLOOR 01:07:50 p.m. 10-20-2010 7/7 MFN 10-327 Attachment 3 Page 2 of 2 with Marathon Control Rod Blades that employ the same absorber tube and capsule combination as Marathon Control Rod Blades supplied to D lattice and S lattice GEH BWRs.

(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action.

GEH is performing a failure analysis of Control Rod Blades. The results of this analysis will make it possible to determine if a reportable condition exists within the context of 10CFR Part 21.21(d), and will provide input for the development of a solution to prevent future recurrence. Completion of the 10CFR Part 21 evaluation will be based upon the findings of this failure analysis. Completion of this evaluation is scheduled for February 15, 2011.

(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.

For all plants containing D and S lattice Marathon Control Blades, continue to monitor for Boron and Tritium in reactor water chemistry, which could indicate potential leaching of boron carbide from control rod tubes. If significant increases in Boron and Tritium are identified, a visual inspection of any suspect CRBs should be scheduled for the next refueling outage.

(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.

This is not an early site permit concern.