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{{#Wiki_filter:07/82/2012 16:31 8656755399 ATe NUCLEAR TN PAGE 02/03 July 2, 2012 NRC Operations Center FAX (301) 816-5151  
{{#Wiki_filter:07/82/2012     16:31       8656755399                             ATe NUCLEAR TN                                 PAGE   02/03 July 2, 2012 NRC Operations Center FAX (301) 816-5151


==Subject:==
==Subject:==
UPDATE: 10 CFR PART 21 NOTIFICATION OF DEFECTIVE MOORE 535 CONTROLLERS Information Contact: Ray Chalifoux ATC Nuclear 865 384 0124 This notification is in accordance with U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Regulation 10 CFR 21.21.A failure analysis has been concluded to determine the causes for Moore Industries International (MI) 535 Single Loop Process (SLP) Controller failures, initially reported October 6, 2011 and provided by ATC Nuclear, Oak Ridge, TN.. The original failure symptoms were reported to be process variable (PV) drift, controller reset with loss of controller function, or create nuisance alann conditions after a relatively short period (<lyear) following installation.
UPDATE: 10 CFR PART 21 NOTIFICATION OF DEFECTIVE MOORE 535 CONTROLLERS Information Contact: Ray Chalifoux ATC Nuclear 865 384 0124 This notification is in accordance with U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Regulation 10 CFR 21.21.
These controllers passed anl Method 1 Testing including an extended burn-in to monitor for early life failure. Initial investigation isolated the failure to the controller MPU Board and identified the cause as "Indleterminate".
A failure analysis has been concluded to determine the causes for Moore Industries International (MI) 535 Single Loop Process (SLP) Controller failures, initially reported October 6, 2011 and provided by ATC Nuclear, Oak Ridge, TN.. The original failure symptoms were reported to be process variable (PV) drift, controller reset with loss of controller function, or create nuisance alann conditions after a relatively short period (<lyear) following installation. These controllers passed anl Method 1 Testing including an extended burn-in to monitor for early life failure. Initial investigation isolated the failure to the controller MPU Board and identified the cause as "Indleterminate".
Completion of a rigorous analysis by fthe OEM and ATC Nuclear has identified the failures are the result of the introduction of a 3 vDC SRAM Chip P/N CY62256VNLL-70SNXI on the MPU by Moore Industries International in 2010 which is not compatible with the 5vDC circuit, Operation of the 3V part at 5V reduces reliability of the part and could lead to failures in the field. The part change bypassed Moore's Engineering Change Process and therefore was not evaluated as their program requires.
Completion of a rigorous analysis by fthe OEM and ATC Nuclear has identified the failures are the result of the introduction of a 3 vDC SRAM Chip P/N CY62256VNLL-70SNXI on the MPU by Moore Industries International in 2010 which is not compatible with the 5vDC circuit, Operation of the 3V part at 5V reduces reliability of the part and could lead to failures in the field. The part change bypassed Moore's Engineering Change Process and therefore was not evaluated as their program requires. An Extent of Condition review performed by the OEM verified no additional part changes at Moore went unevaluated.
An Extent of Condition review performed by the OEM verified no additional part changes at Moore went unevaluated.
ATC Nuclear review of records identifies the following facilities were delivered controllers as safety related items that are potentially affected by the above condition. Purchase orders italicized are not safety related but are provided for customer convenience.
ATC Nuclear review of records identifies the following facilities were delivered controllers as safety related items that are potentially affected by the above condition.
Clinton           PO 461980, 464441,465044, 466159, 469887, 480894, 480908, 486085, 480940, 481237 LaSalle             P0 462363, 463152, 479964, 481027, 478883 Byron             P0 458656, 484756 Callaway           PO 525828 Fermi 2           PO 4700435518 All MPU Boards integral to 535 controllers with a Controller Serial # greater than 2116813 are suspect to contain the non-conforming SRAM Chip according to Moore Industries International. The SRAM Chip is not readily identifiable through visual inspection without removal of the Processor Chip which is socket mounted and installed over the device.
Purchase orders italicized are not safety related but are provided for customer convenience.
Based on how customers manage the controllers, the case Serial number may not be representative of the controller assembly installed within the case. The controller assembly requires removal and directly verified using the label affixed on the back portion of the display.
Clinton PO 461980, 464441,465044, 466159, 469887, 480894, 480908, 486085, 480940, 481237 LaSalle P0 462363, 463152, 479964, 481027, 478883 Byron P0 458656, 484756 Callaway PO 525828 Fermi 2 PO 4700435518 All MPU Boards integral to 535 controllers with a Controller Serial # greater than 2116813 are suspect to contain the non-conforming SRAM Chip according to Moore Industries International.
During the ATC Root Cause Investigation, an unrelated technical error in the original Qualification Document S2000-RP-03 Revision 0, issued on February 7, 2000 was identified. The Qualification Test Report identified the Moore 535 SLP Controller's ability to withstand a total integrated dose (TID) of 1QE5 Rad. This information j761   9
The SRAM Chip is not readily identifiable through visual inspection without removal of the Processor Chip which is socket mounted and installed over the device.Based on how customers manage the controllers, the case Serial number may not be representative of the controller assembly installed within the case. The controller assembly requires removal and directly verified using the label affixed on the back portion of the display.During the ATC Root Cause Investigation, an unrelated technical error in the original Qualification Document S2000-RP-03 Revision 0, issued on February 7, 2000 was identified.
 
The Qualification Test Report identified the Moore 535 SLP Controller's ability to withstand a total integrated dose (TID) of 1QE5 Rad. This information j761 9 07/02/2012 16:31 8656755399 ATC NUCLEAR TN PAGE 03/03 is in error and Is related to the original report creator's misunderstanding of the relationship between the presence of semiconductor materials and a citation from an EPRI Report on the effects of radiation.
07/02/2012     16:31       8656755399                           ATC NUCLEAR TN                               PAGE     03/03 is in error and Is related to the original report creator's misunderstanding of the relationship between the presence of semiconductor materials and a citation from an EPRI Report on the effects of radiation. The Moore 535 Controllers have been tested for a TID of 10E3 Rad without failure. A report will be issued to clarify this item. No orders reviewed were provided for IEEE 323 Harsh Environment applications.
The Moore 535 Controllers have been tested for a TID of 1 0E3 Rad without failure. A report will be issued to clarify this item. No orders reviewed were provided for IEEE 323 Harsh Environment applications.
Because the end-use application of each specific item is not known by ATC Nuclear, the safety hazard evaluation has been deferred to customers. The Licenscess above are being notified of this condition.
Because the end-use application of each specific item is not known by ATC Nuclear, the safety hazard evaluation has been deferred to customers.
Sincere     Q,       A         e R. A. Chaliflux Vice President QA, ATC Nuclear
The Licenscess above are being notified of this condition.
 
Sincere Q, A e R. A. Chaliflux Vice President QA, ATC Nuclear 0710212012 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Report Page I Part 21 (PAR)Event# 47326 Rep Org: ATC NUCLEAR Notification Date ITime: 10/06/2011 13:35 (EDT)Supplier:
0710212012                     U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission OperationsCenter Event Report                       Page I Part 21 (PAR)                                                                                     Event#       47326 Rep Org: ATC NUCLEAR                                             Notification Date ITime: 10/06/2011 13:35       (EDT)
MOORE CONTROLLERS Event Date I Time: 10/06/2011 (EDT)Last Modification:
Supplier: MOORE CONTROLLERS                                               Event Date I Time: 10/06/2011           (EDT)
07/02/2012 Region: 1 Docket #: City: OAK RIDGE Agreement State: Yes County: License #: State: TN NRC Notified by: GREG HOTT Notifications:
Last Modification: 07/02/2012 Region: 1                                                     Docket #:
MONTE PHILLIPS R3DO HQ Ops Officer: BILL HUFFMAN PART 21 GROUP E-MAIL Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 21.21 (d)(3)(i)
City: OAK RIDGE                                 Agreement State:               Yes County:                                                     License #:
DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE PART 21 NOTIFICATION CONCERNING MOORE PROCESS CONTROLLERS The following information was received from ATC Nuclear Via facsimile: "This notification is in accordance with U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Regulation 10 CFR 21.21(a)(3)(ii)(b)."Exelon Corporation Clinton and LaSalle Stations have identified common mode failures associated with Moore 535 Controllers (Part Number 535-OOOOOOHOST-SSTRV) provided through ATC Nuclear Tennessee.
State: TN NRC Notified by:   GREG HOTT                             Notifications:   MONTE PHILLIPS                   R3DO HQ Ops Officer:   BILL HUFFMAN                                           PART 21 GROUP                     E-MAIL Emergency Class:       NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section:
These items were provided as safety related components to Exelon under Clinton Purchase Order 00461980 and LaSalle Purchase Order 00462363.
21.21 (d)(3)(i)       DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE PART 21 NOTIFICATION CONCERNING MOORE PROCESS CONTROLLERS The following information was received from ATC Nuclear Via facsimile:
All safety related failures to date appear to originate from these specific purchase orders. The failures have been evaluated with the original equipment manufacturer and appear to be isolated to controllers containing a main processor board containing  
  "This notification is in accordance with U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Regulation 10 CFR 21.21(a)(3)(ii)(b).
'Revision F' labeling manufactured in early 2010 (Date Code 1310). These items all passed an extended burn-in during testing. The failures may manifest themselves as process variable (PV) drift, controller reset with loss of controller function, or create nuisance alarm conditions after a relatively short period (less than 1 year) following installation."Because the end-use application of each item is not known by ATC Nuclear, the safety hazard evaluation has been deferred to the customer.
  "Exelon Corporation Clinton and LaSalle Stations have identified common mode failures associated with Moore 535 Controllers (Part Number 535-OOOOOOHOST-SSTRV) provided through ATC Nuclear Tennessee. These items were provided as safety related components to Exelon under Clinton Purchase Order 00461980 and LaSalle Purchase Order 00462363. All safety related failures to date appear to originate from these specific purchase orders. The failures have been evaluated with the original equipment manufacturer and appear to be isolated to controllers containing a main processor board containing 'Revision F' labeling manufactured in early 2010 (Date Code 1310). These items all passed an extended burn-in during testing. The failures may manifest themselves as process variable (PV) drift, controller reset with loss of controller function, or create nuisance alarm conditions after a relatively short period (less than 1 year) following installation.
The Licensees above have been formally notified of the defect."*** UPDATE FROM RAY CHALIFOUX TO DONG PARK AT 1638 EDT ON 7/2/12 VIA FACSIMILE  
  "Because the end-use application of each item is not known by ATC Nuclear, the safety hazard evaluation has been deferred to the customer. The Licensees above have been formally notified of the defect."
***"A failure analysis has been concluded to determine the causes for Moore Industries International (MII) 535 Single Loop Process (SLP) Controller failures, initially reported October 6, 2011 and provided by ATC Nuclear, Oak Ridge, TN. The original failure symptoms were reported to be process variable (PV) drift, controller reset with loss of controller function, or create nuisance alarm conditions after a relatively short period (<1 year) following 07/02/2012 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Report Page 2 Part 21 (PAR) Event# 47326 installation.
  ***   UPDATE FROM RAY CHALIFOUX TO DONG PARK AT 1638 EDT ON 7/2/12 VIA FACSIMILE                           ***
These controllers passed all Method 1 Testing including an extended burn-in to monitor for early life failure. Initial investigation isolated the failure to the controller MPU [Micro-Processing Unit] Board and identified the cause as "Indeterminate.""Completion of a rigorous analysis by the OEM [Original Equipment Manufacturer]
  "A failure analysis has been concluded to determine the causes for Moore Industries International (MII) 535 Single Loop Process (SLP) Controller failures, initially reported October 6, 2011 and provided by ATC Nuclear, Oak Ridge, TN. The original failure symptoms were reported to be process variable (PV) drift, controller reset with loss of controller function, or create nuisance alarm conditions after a relatively short period (<1 year) following
and ATC Nuclear has identified the failures are the result of the introduction of a 3 vDC SRAM Chip P/N CY62256VNLL-70SNXI on the MPU by Moore Industries International in 2010 which is not compatible with the 5vDC circuit. Operation of the 3V part at 5V reduces reliability of the part and could lead to failures in the field. The part change bypassed Moore's Engineering Change Process and therefore was not evaluated as their program requires.
 
An Extent of Condition review performed by the OEM verified no additional part changes at Moore went unevaluated." The orders were delivered to the following facilities:
07/02/2012                       U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission OperationsCenter Event Report                       Page 2 Part 21 (PAR)                                                                                     Event#       47326 installation. These controllers passed all Method 1 Testing including an extended burn-in to monitor for early life failure. Initial investigation isolated the failure to the controller MPU [Micro-Processing Unit] Board and identified the cause as "Indeterminate."
Clinton, LaSalle, Byron, Callaway, Fermi 2.Notified R3DO (Daley), R4DO (Allen), and Part 21 Group.
"Completion of a rigorous analysis by the OEM [Original Equipment Manufacturer] and ATC Nuclear has identified the failures are the result of the introduction of a 3 vDC SRAM Chip P/N CY62256VNLL-70SNXI on the MPU by Moore Industries International in 2010 which is not compatible with the 5vDC circuit. Operation of the 3V part at 5V reduces reliability of the part and could lead to failures in the field. The part change bypassed Moore's Engineering Change Process and therefore was not evaluated as their program requires. An Extent of Condition review performed by the OEM verified no additional part changes at Moore went unevaluated."
Received at: 07/02/2012 16:37 07/02/2012 16:31 8656755399 ATC NUCLEAR TN PAGE 01/03 To: 0,e0---, Fax number: 3o/16 WQ3 C5ri a Division of Argo Turboserve Corp.777 Emory Valley Rd.Oak Ridge, TN 37830 865-966-5330 www, argoturbo, coin From: ?AYv CA.0 ,,o.Phone: q45 &#xfd;tvi tI-AJ Fax number: 865-675-5399 Date:  
The orders were delivered to the following facilities: Clinton, LaSalle, Byron, Callaway, Fermi 2.
Notified R3DO (Daley), R4DO (Allen), and Part 21 Group.
 
Received at: 07/02/2012 16:37 07/02/2012     16:31     8656755399                   ATC NUCLEAR TN                       PAGE 01/03 To: *-,gc 0,e0---, 16    WQ3  C5ri Fax number: 3o/
From:   ?AYv CA. 0 ,,o.
Phone:   q45   &#xfd;tvi tI-AJ Fax number: 865-675-5399 a Division of Argo Turboserve Corp.
777 Emory Valley Rd.            Date:
Oak Ridge, TN 37830 865-966-5330


==Subject:==
==Subject:==
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Revision as of 02:12, 12 November 2019

Update 10 CFR Part 21 Notification of Defective Moore 535 Controllers
ML121910337
Person / Time
Site: Fermi, Byron, Callaway, Clinton, LaSalle  DTE Energy icon.png
Issue date: 07/02/2012
From: Chalifoux R
ATC Nuclear
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML121910337 (5)


Text

07/82/2012 16:31 8656755399 ATe NUCLEAR TN PAGE 02/03 July 2, 2012 NRC Operations Center FAX (301) 816-5151

Subject:

UPDATE: 10 CFR PART 21 NOTIFICATION OF DEFECTIVE MOORE 535 CONTROLLERS Information Contact: Ray Chalifoux ATC Nuclear 865 384 0124 This notification is in accordance with U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Regulation 10 CFR 21.21.

A failure analysis has been concluded to determine the causes for Moore Industries International (MI) 535 Single Loop Process (SLP) Controller failures, initially reported October 6, 2011 and provided by ATC Nuclear, Oak Ridge, TN.. The original failure symptoms were reported to be process variable (PV) drift, controller reset with loss of controller function, or create nuisance alann conditions after a relatively short period (<lyear) following installation. These controllers passed anl Method 1 Testing including an extended burn-in to monitor for early life failure. Initial investigation isolated the failure to the controller MPU Board and identified the cause as "Indleterminate".

Completion of a rigorous analysis by fthe OEM and ATC Nuclear has identified the failures are the result of the introduction of a 3 vDC SRAM Chip P/N CY62256VNLL-70SNXI on the MPU by Moore Industries International in 2010 which is not compatible with the 5vDC circuit, Operation of the 3V part at 5V reduces reliability of the part and could lead to failures in the field. The part change bypassed Moore's Engineering Change Process and therefore was not evaluated as their program requires. An Extent of Condition review performed by the OEM verified no additional part changes at Moore went unevaluated.

ATC Nuclear review of records identifies the following facilities were delivered controllers as safety related items that are potentially affected by the above condition. Purchase orders italicized are not safety related but are provided for customer convenience.

Clinton PO 461980, 464441,465044, 466159, 469887, 480894, 480908, 486085, 480940, 481237 LaSalle P0 462363, 463152, 479964, 481027, 478883 Byron P0 458656, 484756 Callaway PO 525828 Fermi 2 PO 4700435518 All MPU Boards integral to 535 controllers with a Controller Serial # greater than 2116813 are suspect to contain the non-conforming SRAM Chip according to Moore Industries International. The SRAM Chip is not readily identifiable through visual inspection without removal of the Processor Chip which is socket mounted and installed over the device.

Based on how customers manage the controllers, the case Serial number may not be representative of the controller assembly installed within the case. The controller assembly requires removal and directly verified using the label affixed on the back portion of the display.

During the ATC Root Cause Investigation, an unrelated technical error in the original Qualification Document S2000-RP-03 Revision 0, issued on February 7, 2000 was identified. The Qualification Test Report identified the Moore 535 SLP Controller's ability to withstand a total integrated dose (TID) of 1QE5 Rad. This information j761 9

07/02/2012 16:31 8656755399 ATC NUCLEAR TN PAGE 03/03 is in error and Is related to the original report creator's misunderstanding of the relationship between the presence of semiconductor materials and a citation from an EPRI Report on the effects of radiation. The Moore 535 Controllers have been tested for a TID of 10E3 Rad without failure. A report will be issued to clarify this item. No orders reviewed were provided for IEEE 323 Harsh Environment applications.

Because the end-use application of each specific item is not known by ATC Nuclear, the safety hazard evaluation has been deferred to customers. The Licenscess above are being notified of this condition.

Sincere Q, A e R. A. Chaliflux Vice President QA, ATC Nuclear

0710212012 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission OperationsCenter Event Report Page I Part 21 (PAR) Event# 47326 Rep Org: ATC NUCLEAR Notification Date ITime: 10/06/2011 13:35 (EDT)

Supplier: MOORE CONTROLLERS Event Date I Time: 10/06/2011 (EDT)

Last Modification: 07/02/2012 Region: 1 Docket #:

City: OAK RIDGE Agreement State: Yes County: License #:

State: TN NRC Notified by: GREG HOTT Notifications: MONTE PHILLIPS R3DO HQ Ops Officer: BILL HUFFMAN PART 21 GROUP E-MAIL Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section:

21.21 (d)(3)(i) DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE PART 21 NOTIFICATION CONCERNING MOORE PROCESS CONTROLLERS The following information was received from ATC Nuclear Via facsimile:

"This notification is in accordance with U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Regulation 10 CFR 21.21(a)(3)(ii)(b).

"Exelon Corporation Clinton and LaSalle Stations have identified common mode failures associated with Moore 535 Controllers (Part Number 535-OOOOOOHOST-SSTRV) provided through ATC Nuclear Tennessee. These items were provided as safety related components to Exelon under Clinton Purchase Order 00461980 and LaSalle Purchase Order 00462363. All safety related failures to date appear to originate from these specific purchase orders. The failures have been evaluated with the original equipment manufacturer and appear to be isolated to controllers containing a main processor board containing 'Revision F' labeling manufactured in early 2010 (Date Code 1310). These items all passed an extended burn-in during testing. The failures may manifest themselves as process variable (PV) drift, controller reset with loss of controller function, or create nuisance alarm conditions after a relatively short period (less than 1 year) following installation.

"Because the end-use application of each item is not known by ATC Nuclear, the safety hazard evaluation has been deferred to the customer. The Licensees above have been formally notified of the defect."

      • UPDATE FROM RAY CHALIFOUX TO DONG PARK AT 1638 EDT ON 7/2/12 VIA FACSIMILE ***

"A failure analysis has been concluded to determine the causes for Moore Industries International (MII) 535 Single Loop Process (SLP) Controller failures, initially reported October 6, 2011 and provided by ATC Nuclear, Oak Ridge, TN. The original failure symptoms were reported to be process variable (PV) drift, controller reset with loss of controller function, or create nuisance alarm conditions after a relatively short period (<1 year) following

07/02/2012 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission OperationsCenter Event Report Page 2 Part 21 (PAR) Event# 47326 installation. These controllers passed all Method 1 Testing including an extended burn-in to monitor for early life failure. Initial investigation isolated the failure to the controller MPU [Micro-Processing Unit] Board and identified the cause as "Indeterminate."

"Completion of a rigorous analysis by the OEM [Original Equipment Manufacturer] and ATC Nuclear has identified the failures are the result of the introduction of a 3 vDC SRAM Chip P/N CY62256VNLL-70SNXI on the MPU by Moore Industries International in 2010 which is not compatible with the 5vDC circuit. Operation of the 3V part at 5V reduces reliability of the part and could lead to failures in the field. The part change bypassed Moore's Engineering Change Process and therefore was not evaluated as their program requires. An Extent of Condition review performed by the OEM verified no additional part changes at Moore went unevaluated."

The orders were delivered to the following facilities: Clinton, LaSalle, Byron, Callaway, Fermi 2.

Notified R3DO (Daley), R4DO (Allen), and Part 21 Group.

Received at: 07/02/2012 16:37 07/02/2012 16:31 8656755399 ATC NUCLEAR TN PAGE 01/03 To: *-,gc 0,e0---, 16 WQ3 C5ri Fax number: 3o/

From: ?AYv CA. 0 ,,o.

Phone: q45 ýtvi tI-AJ Fax number: 865-675-5399 a Division of Argo Turboserve Corp.

777 Emory Valley Rd. Date:

Oak Ridge, TN 37830 865-966-5330

Subject:

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