Text

Part 21 Interim Report - Potential Defect on P/N 535-601 Moore Industries Milliamp Modules
	ML15288A199
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi, Limerick, Clinton, LaSalle
Issue date:	10/09/2015
From:	Chalifoux R; ATC Nuclear
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	51303
	Download: ML15288A199 (7)
	v • d • e

10/09/2015 1 0/0 9/2015U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Report Pn Paez .2 Part 21 (PAR) Event # 51303 Rep Org: ATC-NUCLEAR Notification Date / Time: 08/10/2015 13:50 (EDT)

Supplier: MOORE INDUSTRIES Event Date / Time: 06/11/2015 (EDT)

Last Modification: 10/09/2015 Region: 1 Docket #:

City: OAK RIDGE Agreement State: Yes County: License #:

State: TN NRC Notified by: RAY CHALIFOUX Notifications: ROBERT ORLIKOWSKI R3DO HQ Ops Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER PART 21/50.55 REACTORS EMAIL Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section:

21 .21 (a)(2) INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION PART 21 INTERIM REPORT - POTENTIAL DEFECT ON P/N 535-601 MOORE INDUSTRIES MILLIAMP MODULES The following information is a summary that was excerpted from a facsimile received from ATC-Nuclear:

"The basic component which is the subject of this notification is identified as Moore Industries Mitliamp Module with part number (P/N) 535-601 (alternate P/N: 535-601-SSTRV) which has been provided individually and/or contained within a STS 535 Single Loop Process Controller.

"On December 22, 2014, ATC Nuclear received a 535 controller from Detroit Edison (DTE) with a failed Milliamp Module (P/N 535-601 ). The customer requested ATC Nuclear to perform a failure analysis to determine the cause of no output (0 Ma) on output 2 of the 535 controller. ATC Nuclear initiated a failure analysis in January 2015 that was broken down into several stages to determine the cause of the Milliamp Module failure. ATC Nuclear is continuing to evaluate the cause of the Milliamp Module failure and has preliminarily identified workmanship issues with a surface-mount fuse that is installed in the Milliamp Modules. ATC Nuclear has provided the results of the analysis to Moore Industries and Littelfuse to support or refute the workmanship concerns.

"Preliminary information provided by Littelfuse on June 11, 2015, was sufficient evidence to identify the existence of a deviation potentially associated with a substantial safety hazard (i.e., discovery as defined in 10 CFR Part 21).

This information was documented as part of CAR 15ST-24. Evaluation of reportability in accordance with 10 CFR Part 21 was not able to be completed within the 60 day evaluation period.

"The discovery date of the deviation requiring evaluation under 10 CFR Part 21 is June 11, 2015.

"ATC Nuclear has preliminarily identified a total of 285 Milliamp Modules with P/N 535-601 that have been i÷

1 0/0 9/2015 ..... ........ U.S. Nuclear Re gulatory Comm..ission Operations Center Event Report Pa~e 2 supplied to customers by ATC Nuclear since 2010. However, there is not sufficient evidence to establish that all Milliamp Modules supplied to customers have defective Littelfuse surface-mount fuses (PIN 0448.100MR) installed. ATC Nuclear will continue to work with Moore Industries and Littelfuse to define the population of Milliamp Modules that potentially have a defective surface-mount fuse installed. This information will become available once our 10 CFR Part 21 evaluation is completed.

"ATC Nuclear is reviewing customer purchase orders for Milliamp Modules to identify the population of Milliamp Modules that potentially have a defective surface-mount fuse installed. Additionally, ATC Nuclear is working with Moore Industries to purge its stock of potentially defective fuses. Additional time is needed to evaluate the condition of new surface-mount fuses and it is expected that this evaluation will be completed no later than October 9, 2015.

"Littelfuse identified a very low failure rate (< 0.001 %) in a preliminary report issued June 2015 spanning approximately an eighteen month period commencing January 2014. There were 356,250 fuses manufactured during this period. Littelfuse is conducting a more thorough review of this failure mechanism. There is no additional advice at this time."

For additional information, contact the following; Ray Chalifoux Vice President QA, ATC-Nuclear 777 Emory Valley Road, Oak Ridge, TN 37830 (865) 384-0124

** UPDATE FROM RAY CHALIFOUX TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1602 EDT ON 10/9/2015 * **

The following information is a synopsis of information received via facsimile:

ATC Nuclear has concluded that the identified deviation could be considered a defect on the surface-mount fuses supplied by Littelfuse. However, ATC Nuclear determined that it does not have the capability to complete a 10 CFR Part 21 evaluation to determine if a substantial safety hazard exists.

A total of 285 Milliamp Modules with P/N 535-601 have been supplied to customers by ATC Nuclear since 201J*.

However, there is not sufficient evidence to establish that all Milliamp Modules supplied to customers have defective Littelfuse surface-mount fuses installed. ATC Nuclear identified Milliamp Modules supplied in the January 2013 - June 18, 2015 timeframe as potentially having defective Littelfuse surface-mount fuses. Nuclear plants that received Milliamp Modules which potentially have a defective surface-mount fuse were as follows:

LaSalle, Fermi 2, Limerick, and Clinton.

ATC Nuclear has developed a Technical Bulletin to direct the purchasers and/or affected licensees for inspections to determined if the manufacturing defect could be present in their applications.

Notified R1 DO (Bickett), R3DO (Stone), and via E-mail Part 21 Group.

10109/2015 16:01 P.0011005 U

To: ,v/C-c. Peg~fzor'-5 cJTr'*.

Fax number; (c3 o/_ s' ,' - *1!5 /

From: R1 y e',**

4/_*&c*.d7 ,P/R.- 4 Phone:(*/S9_ 3 4- " ;~

Fax number: 865-675-5399 a Division of Argo Turboserve Corp.

777 Emory Valley Rd.

Oak Ridge, TN 37830 865-966-5330 ww.argoturbo.comn

Subject:

/0 CFrZ i'*'r" ..2j JXrcc" ,*'*eoV"

o pag, inc -ding.c.ver Comments:

-- r T I

II I -- * [ * . . ... A)~,~FIP CAflov $ATh gIQ/a~I*.

' .... T

10109/2015 16:02 (F/00P.0021005 October 9, 2015 Doc'ument Control Center U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

10CFR Fart 21 Defect, Moore Industries Milliamp Module P/N 535-601 Pursuant to 10CFR 21.21 (d)(3)(ii), ATC Nuclear is providing written notification of the subject defective items.

The following information is required per l0CER 21 .21 (d)(4)

(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.

Ray Chalifoux ATC Nuclear 777 Emory Valley Road1 Oak Ridge, TN 37830.

(Ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

The basic component whioh is the subject of ths notification is identified as Moore Industries Milliamp Module with part n~umber (P/N) 535-601 (alternate P/N: 535-601-SSTRV) which has been provided individually and installed within a STS 535 Single Loop Process Controller.

(iII) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basie component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

ATC Nuclear, 777 Emory Valley Road, Oak Ridge, TN 37830.

(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which Is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

On December 22, 2014, ATC Nuclear received a 535 Controller from Detroit Edison (DTE) with a failed Milliamp Module (P/N 535-601). The customer requested ATC Nuclear to performn a failure analysis to determine the cause of no output (OmA) on output 2 of the 535 Controller. ATC Nuclear initiated a failure antalysis in January 2015 that was broken down into several stages to determiine the cause of the Milliamp Module failure as documented in the ATC Nuclear Failure Analysis Report. During the course of inspctions and tests, workmanship issues were noted with some of thc surface-mount fuses. Failure analyses conducted by ATC Nuclear revealed that two fuses had failed potentially due to an inadequate solder joint; however, the filament was lost on one fuse and a second prepared specimen for visual microscopic examination was obstructed. ATC Nuclear procured and tested additional fuses to further evaluate the fuses. It was observed that the solder ball in some of these fuses A Division of Argo Turbo~serve Corporation ATC Nucleur

777 Emnory Valley Road, Oak Ridge, TN 37830

865-966-5330*

www.aruoturbo.com

10109/2015 16:03P0315 P.0031005

(--Nduu"L was not adequately sealed at some of the fuses' ends. ATC Nuclear provided the results of this analysis to Moore Industries and Litteiftse to support or refute the concerns, On Jfune 11, 2015, Littelfuse provided a separate analysis of the potential cau.se of the fuse'sa workmanship issues. The manufacturer determined that surface-mount fuses manufactured could have wire elements not filly embedded to the solder inside the fuse caps. The root cause identified by Littelfuse was overheating during the pre-melt process. Overheating the solder during pre-melt can potentially cause wetting issues as the flux content of the solder may burn which can inhibit a good bond with the wire element. On June 19, 2015, Littelfuise also provided a Preliminary Reliability Project Report with estimates of failure rates for fuses that include those instaled in Milhiamp Modules. The report provides an initial estimate based on the number of confirmed returns for poor internal solder connections in the January 2014 -

June 18, 2015 timeframe. Littelfuse listed the expected failures in time (FIT) rate for Littelfuse PiN 448.100 and related fuses within the 400 series (e.g., PIN 451.062, 451.250) based on researching similar complaints received to date. The FIT is defined as the number of failures that can be expected in one billion device-hours of operation. Based on the preliminary report, the expected FIT is 8,421 for Littelfse P/N 448.100, which is extremely low. Moore Industries reported on September 28, 2015 that Littelfuse has come across some cold solder joint issues fr'om their increased socrning procedures and have still seen failures both internally and from a few of their customers although at an extremely low rote. Arc has experienced no additional failures during this time period during test of 200 modules containing newly manufactured fuses or in installed applications. Littelfuse continues to work on additional process improvements to address this issue.

The infonmation provided by Littelfuse, combined with the Failure Analysis performed by ATC Nuclear, was sufficient evidence to identify the existence of a deviation in the surface-mount fuses (i.e., discovery as defined in 10 CFR Part 21I) which could be potentially be associated with a substantial safety hazard depending on end-use application. This in~formation was documented as part of ATC Nuclear CAR 15T-24. ATC Nuclear utilized the Failure Analysis information as input to a 10 CFR Part 21 evaluation to determfine whether the Littelfuse surface-mounted fuses were defective and could potentially affect the operation of a system or component that is being controlled by a host 535 Controller. The evaluation identifiedl that, if a defective fuse installed in a Milliamp Module failed, the Milliamp Module would not be able to provide a milliamp output signal when installed in a host 535 Controller.

While in this condition, the Controller will not be able to per'o an associated output control function via the milliamp module to an associated downstream device (e.g., valve, heater, damper). Notwithstanding the above, the failure of a Milliamp Module would not completely affect the operation of the host 535 Controller, as a blown fuse is designed to isolate a failure of a Milliamnp Module and minimize the operational impact on the host 535 Controller. ATC Nuclear reported the progress of this 10 CFR Part 21 evaluation to the NRC on August 10, 2015 and has not received any substantive update from Littlefuse, that identifies condition resolution at this time.

The analysis performed by ATC Nuclear does not consider purchasers and/or licensee application-specific information as it only focuses on the operational aspects of a Milliamp Module when installed in a 535 Controller. Based on this, ATC Nuclear does not have the capability to complete the 10 CFR Part 21 evaluation to determie whether this deviation could cause a substantial safety hazard, so we are informing the purchasers and/or affected A Division of Argo Turbo~serve Corporation ATC Nuclemr

777 Emory Valley Road, Oak Ridge, TN 37830 *865-966-5330 www.araoturbo.com*

10/0912015 16:05 100105 AQ60 P.0041005 licensees of this determination so that the purchasers and/or affected licensees may evaluate the identified deviation or faiure to comply, pmursat to §10 CER 21.21(a). ATC Nuclear recommends that the affected licensees evaluate their specific applicaion of the Moore Industries 535 Controller containing MiUliamp Modules to determine whether the deviation described in this notice affects their specific design basis.

An stated previously, Littelfuse has not provided any additional update associated to the prevously identified failure rate (< 0.001%) in the preliminsa, report issued June 2015 spanning approximately an 18-month period commencing J'anuary 2014. As noted in the report, there were 356,250 surface-mount fuses manufactured during this period, so the probability of a licensee experiencing a failure of a Milliamp Module due to a defective surface-mount fuse is low.

(v) The date on which the information off such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

ATC Nuclear has concluded that the identified deviation could be considered a defect on the swrface-mount fuses supplied by Littelfuse. However, ATC Nuclear determined it does not have the capability to complete a 10 CER Part 21 evaluation to determine if a substantial safety hazard exists. An initial interim notification of this defect was provided to the NRC Operations Center on August 10, 2015 (

Reference:

Event Notification51303).

(vi) In the ease of a baie component which conains a defect or fails to comply, the number and hocation of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilites or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

A total of 285 Milliamp Modules with P/N 535-601 have been supplied to customers by ATC Nuclear since 2010. However, there is not sufficient evidence to establish that all Milliamp Modules supplied to customers have defective Littelfbse surface-mount fuses (P/N 0448.I00MR) installed. Considering Moore industries, Littelfuse returns, and customer complaints documented in their Preliminary Reliability Project Reports, ATC Nuclear identified Mililamp Modules supplied in the Sanuary 2013 -June 18, 2015 timeframe as potentially having defective Littelfuse surfce-mount fuses. The population of Milliamp Modules that potentially have a defective surface-mount fuse is contained in the table below.

Utility Plant ]Purchase ATC Nuclear Part Number* Milliamp Order Job Number Modules

_______ ____________ Supplied Exelou L~aSasle 00502958 13T0615 535-601-SSTRV 7 DTE Fermi 2 4700642795 13T1230 535-221100HOST 12 Exelon Limerick 90 060232 13T1325 535-601-SSTRv " 12 Exeloa Clinton 00507117 13T1505 535-601-SSTRV 22"*

E~xelon Limerick 90 061342 13T1860 535-601-SSTRV 16 ..

DTE Fermi 2 4700681404 13T2290 535-2211001108T 4 Exelon LaSalle 00031128 13T2380 535-601-SSTRV 9

______ ______REL 05930 ______ _______ ______

Exelon Limerick 90 064160 13T2965 535-601-SSTRV 9 A Divieion of Argo Turboserve Corporation ATC Nuclear

777 Emory Valley Road, Oak Ridge, TN 37830

865-968-5330

www.arnoturbo.com

1010912015 16:06 100/05F60 AX) P.0051005

--J,4"T'41*"

~:~iLi

-Y Exelon Limerick 90 065091 14T0095 535-601-SSTRV 10 E.xolo n Limerick 90 068148 14T1405 535-601-SSTRV 9 Exelon Limerick 90 068646 14T1660) 535-601-SSTRV 8 Exe1on Limeric~k 90 069992 14T'2160 535-601-SSTRV 1..

9' Exolon Clinton 00529924 14T2335 535-601-SSTRV 12 Exelon Limerick 90 072666 14T3265 535-601-SSTRV 14

'Total 163

Certain purchase orders were for 535 Controllers with Mll2iamp Modules installed.

(vii) The corrective action which has been, Ii being, or will be taken; the namne of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action, ATC Nuclear has implemented the following correctve actions:

- ATC Nuclear has developed a Technical Bulletin to direct the purchasers and/or affected licensees for inspections to determine if the manufacurn defect could be present in their application.. The Technical bulletin will be issued to the purchasers andi/or affected licensees a+/-ter the NRC is notified of this issue.

- ATO Nuclear has additional safety-related replaeent Milliamp Modules, P/N 535-601 in stock. Purchasers and/or affected licensees should contact ATC Nuclear if they desire to maintain spare modules in stock. These modules contain Littelfuse P/N: 0448.100)P, which are potentially subject to same condition.

- ATC Nuclear confirmed Moore Jiudustries had purged their stock of previously purchased ftses. All fuses nmanufactured after September 15. 2014 and installed in Milliamp Modules with P/N 535-601 remain potentially subject to the same condition.

- ATC Nuclear will continue to monitor this issue with Moore Industries and Littelfuse, and will coordinate directly with purchasers and/or affected licensees if additional information is received.

(vifi) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.

None at this time.

(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit warn transferred.

Not applicable.

A Division of Argo Turboserve Corporation ATO Nuclear

777 Emory Valley Road, Oak Ridge, TN 37830

885-986-5330

www.ar~loturbo.com