ML14091A957: Difference between revisions

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| number = ML14091A957
| number = ML14091A957
| issue date = 03/19/2014
| issue date = 03/19/2014
| title = Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Units 1, 2, and 3 - Technical Specification Bases (TS Bases) Revision 59 Replacement Pages and Insertion Instructions
| title = Technical Specification Bases (TS Bases) Revision 59 Replacement Pages and Insertion Instructions
| author name = Stephenson C J
| author name = Stephenson C
| author affiliation = Arizona Public Service Co
| author affiliation = Arizona Public Service Co
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  
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=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:PVNGS Technical Specification Bases (
{{#Wiki_filter:Digitally signed by Stephenson, Carl J(Z05778)
Stephenson, Carl J(Z05778)    DN: cn=Stephenson, Carl J(Z05778)
Reason: I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Date
The LCD contains specific activity limits for both DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 and DOSE EQUIVALENT XE-133. The allowable levels are intended to ensure that offsite and control room doses meet the 10 CFR 100.11 (Ref. 1) and GDC 19 limits respectively.
The LCD contains specific activity limits for both DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 and DOSE EQUIVALENT XE-133. The allowable levels are intended to ensure that offsite and control room doses meet the 10 CFR 100.11 (Ref. 1) and GDC 19 limits respectively.
APPLICABLE The LCO limits on the specific activity of the reactor SAFETY ANALYSES coolant ensure that the resulting offsite and control room doses meet the 10 CFR 100.11 (Ref. 1) and GDC 19 limits following a SGTR accident.
APPLICABLE       The LCO limits on the specific activity of the reactor SAFETY ANALYSES   coolant ensure that the resulting offsite and control room doses meet the 10 CFR 100.11 (Ref. 1) and GDC 19 limits following a SGTR accident. The safety analysis (Ref. 2) assumes the specific activity of the reactor coolant is at the LCO limits. and an existing reactor coolant steam generator CSG) tube leakage rate of 1.0 gpm exists. The safety analysis assumes the specific activity of the secondary coolant is at its limit of 0.1 pCi/gm DOSE EQUIVALENT I -131 from LCO 3. 7.16. "Secondary Specific Activity."
The safety analysis (Ref. 2) assumes the specific activity of the reactor coolant is at the LCO limits. and an existing reactor coolant steam generator CSG) tube leakage rate of 1.0 gpm exists. The safety analysis assumes the specific activity of the secondary coolant is at its limit of 0.1 pCi/gm DOSE EQUIVALENT I -131 from LCO 3. 7.16. "Secondary Specific Activity." (continued)
(continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.4.17-1 REVISION 59 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3               B 3.4.17-1                     REVISION 59
RCS Specific Activity B 3.4.17 The analysis for a SGTR accident establishes the acceptance limits for RCS specific activity.
 
Reference to this analysis is used to assess changes to the unit that could affect RCS specific activity, as they relate to the acceptance limits. The safety analysis considers two cases of reactor coolant iodine specific activity.
RCS Specific Activity B 3.4.17 BASES APPLICABLE        The analysis for a SGTR accident establishes the acceptance SAFETY ANALYSES    limits for RCS specific activity. Reference to this analysis (continued)    is used to assess changes to the unit that could affect RCS specific activity, as they relate to the acceptance limits.
One case assumes specific activity at 1.0 pCi/gm DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 with a concurrent large iodine spike that increases the rate of release of iodine from the fuel rods containing cladding defects to the primary coolant immediately after a SGTR (by a factor of 335). The second case assumes the initial reactor coolant iodine activity at 60.0 pCi/gm DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 due to an iodine spike caused by a reactor or an RCS transient prior to the accident.
The safety analysis considers two cases of reactor coolant iodine specific activity. One case assumes specific activity at 1.0 pCi/gm DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 with a concurrent large iodine spike that increases the rate of release of iodine from the fuel rods containing cladding defects to the primary coolant immediately after a SGTR (by a factor of 335). The second case assumes the initial reactor coolant iodine activity at 60.0 pCi/gm DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 due to an iodine spike caused by a reactor or an RCS transient prior to the accident. In both cases, the noble gas specific activity is assumed to be 550 pCi/gm DOSE EQUIVALENT XE-133.
In both cases, the noble gas specific activity is assumed to be 550 pCi/gm DOSE EQUIVALENT XE-133. The STGR analysis assumes a rise in pressure in the ruptured SG causes radioactively contaminated steam to discharge to the atmosphere through the atmospheric dump valves or the main steam safety valves. The atmospheric discharge continues through an assumed stuck open atmospheric dump valve. The unaffected SG removes core decay heat by venting steam until the cooldown event ends and the Shutdown Cooling (SOC)* system is placed in service. Operation with iodine specific activity levels greater than the LCD limit is permissible.
The STGR analysis assumes a rise in pressure in the ruptured SG causes radioactively contaminated steam to discharge to the atmosphere through the atmospheric dump valves or the main steam safety valves. The atmospheric discharge continues through an assumed stuck open atmospheric dump valve. The unaffected SG removes core decay heat by venting steam until the cooldown event ends and the Shutdown Cooling (SOC)* system is placed in service.
if the activity levels do not exceed 60.0 pCi/gm for more than 48 hours. The limits on RCS specific activity are also used for establishing standardization in radiation shielding and plant personnel radiation protection practices.
Operation with iodine specific activity levels greater than the LCD limit is permissible. if the activity levels do not exceed 60.0 pCi/gm for more than 48 hours.
RCS specific activity satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). (continued)
The limits on RCS specific activity are also used for establishing standardization in radiation shielding and       l I plant personnel radiation protection practices.
PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.4.17-2 REVISION 59 l I BASES LCO APPLICABILITY ACTIONS RCS Specific Activity B 3.4.17 The iodine specific activity in the reactor coolant is limited to 1.0 DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131, and the noble gas specific activity in the reactor coolant is limited to 550 DOSE EQUIVALENT XE-133. The limits on specific activity ensure that offsite and control room doses will meet the 10 CFR 100.11 (Ref. 1) and GDC 19 limits. The SGTR accident analysis (Ref. 2) shows that the calculated doses are within acceptable limits. Violation of the LCO may result in reactor coolant radioactivity levels that could, in the event of a SGTR. lead to doses that exceed the 10 CFR 100.11 (Ref. 1) and GDC 19 limits. In MODES 1.2. 3, and 4. operation within the LCO limits for DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 and DOSE EQUIVALENT XE-133 is necessary to limit the potential consequences of a SGTR to within the 10 CFR 100.11 (Ref. 1) and GDC 19 limits. In MODES 5 and 6. the steam generators are not being used for decay heat removal . the RCS and steam generators are depressurized.
RCS specific activity satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).
and primary to secondary leakage is minimal. Therefore.
(continued)
the monitoring of RCS specific activity is not required.
PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3               B 3.4.17-2                     REVISION 59
A.1 and A.2 With the DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 greater than the LCO limit. samples at intervals of 4 hours must be taken to demonstrate that the specific activity is $ 60.0 The Completion Time of 4 hours is required to obtain and analyze a sample. Sampling is continued every 4 hours to provide a trend. The DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 must be restored to within limit within 48 hours. The Completion Time of 48 hours is acceptable since it is expected that. if there were an iodine spike. the normal coolant iodine concentration would be restored within this time period. Also. there is a low probability of a SGTR occurring during this time period. (continued)
 
PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 B 3.4.17-3 REVISION 59 BASES ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 *(continued)
RCS Specific Activity B 3.4.17 BASES LCO              The iodine specific activity in the reactor coolant is limited to 1.0 ~Ci/gm DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131, and the noble gas specific activity in the reactor coolant is limited to 550 ~Ci/gm DOSE EQUIVALENT XE-133. The limits on specific activity ensure that offsite and control room doses will meet the 10 CFR 100.11 (Ref. 1) and GDC 19 limits.
RCS Specific Acti vi ty B 3.4.17 A Note permits the use of the provisions of LCO 3.0.4.c. This allowance permits entry into the applicable MODE(S). relying on Required Actions A.1 and A.2 while the DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 LCO limit is not met. This allowance is acceptable due to the significant conservatism incorporated into the specific activity limit. the low. probability of an event which is limiting due to exceeding this limit. and the ability to restore transient-specific activity excursions while the plant remains at. or proceeds to. power operation.
The SGTR accident analysis (Ref. 2) shows that the calculated doses are within acceptable limits. Violation of the LCO may result in reactor coolant radioactivity levels that could, in the event of a SGTR. lead to doses that exceed the 10 CFR 100.11 (Ref. 1) and GDC 19 limits.
8.1 With the DOSE EQUIVALENT XE-133 greater than the LCO limit. DOSE EQUIVALENT XE-133 must be restored to within limit within 48 hours. The allowed Completion Time of 48 hours is acceptable since it is expected that. if there were a noble gas spike. the normal coolant noble gas concentration would be restored within this time period. Also. there is a low probability of a SGTR occurring during this time period. A Note permits the use of the provisions of LCO 3.0.4.c. This allowance permits entry into the applicable MODE(S). relying on Required Action B.l while the DOSE EQUIVALENT XE-133 LCD limit is not met. This allowance is acceptable due to the significant conservatism incorporated into the specific activity limit. the low probability of an event which is limiting due to exceeding this limit. and the ability to restore transient-specific activity excursions while the plant remains at. or proceeds to. power operation.
APPLICABILITY    In MODES 1.2. 3, and 4. operation within the LCO limits for DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 and DOSE EQUIVALENT XE-133 is necessary to limit the potential consequences of a SGTR to within the 10 CFR 100.11 (Ref. 1) and GDC 19 limits.
C.1 and C.2 If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B is not met. or if the DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 is > 60.0 pCi/gm, the reactor must be brought to MODE 3 within 6 hours and MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable.
In MODES 5 and 6. the steam generators are not being used for decay heat removal . the RCS and steam generators are depressurized. and primary to secondary leakage is minimal.
based on operating experience.
Therefore. the monitoring of RCS specific activity is not required.
to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. (continued)
ACTIONS          A.1 and A.2 With the DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 greater than the LCO limit.
PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 B 3.4.17-4 REVISION 59 RCS Specific Activity B 3.4.17 BASES (continued)
samples at intervals of 4 hours must be taken to demonstrate that the specific activity is $ 60.0 ~Ci/gm. The Completion Time of 4 hours is required to obtain and analyze a sample.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.4.17.1 SR 3.4.17.1 requires performing a gamma isotopic analysis as a measure of the noble gas specific activity of the reactor coolant. This measurement is the sum of the degassed gamma activities and the gaseous gamma activities in the sample taken. This Surveillance provides an indication of any increase in the noble gas specific activity.
Sampling is continued every 4 hours to provide a trend.
The DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 must be restored to within limit within 48 hours. The Completion Time of 48 hours is acceptable since it is expected that. if there were an iodine spike. the normal coolant iodine concentration would be restored within this time period. Also. there is a low probability of a SGTR occurring during this time period.
(continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3               B 3.4.17-3                     REVISION 59
 
RCS Specific Acti vi ty B 3.4.17 BASES ACTIONS           A.1 and A.2 *(continued)
A Note permits the use of the provisions of LCO 3.0.4.c.
This allowance permits entry into the applicable MODE(S).
relying on Required Actions A.1 and A.2 while the DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 LCO limit is not met. This allowance is acceptable due to the significant conservatism incorporated into the specific activity limit. the low. probability of an event which is limiting due to exceeding this limit. and the ability to restore transient-specific activity excursions while the plant remains at. or proceeds to. power operation.
8.1 With the DOSE EQUIVALENT XE-133 greater than the LCO limit.
DOSE EQUIVALENT XE-133 must be restored to within limit within 48 hours. The allowed Completion Time of 48 hours is acceptable since it is expected that. if there were a noble gas spike. the normal coolant noble gas concentration would be restored within this time period. Also. there is a low probability of a SGTR occurring during this time period.
A Note permits the use of the provisions of LCO 3.0.4.c.
This allowance permits entry into the applicable MODE(S).
relying on Required Action B.l while the DOSE EQUIVALENT XE-133 LCD limit is not met. This allowance is acceptable due to the significant conservatism incorporated into the specific activity limit. the low probability of an event which is limiting due to exceeding this limit. and the ability to restore transient-specific activity excursions while the plant remains at. or proceeds to. power operation.
C.1 and C.2 If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B is not met. or if the DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 is > 60.0 pCi/gm, the reactor must be brought to MODE 3 within 6 hours and MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable. based on operating experience. to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
(continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3               B 3.4.17-4                     REVISION 59
 
RCS Specific Activity B 3.4.17 BASES (continued)
SURVEILLANCE       SR 3.4.17.1 REQUIREMENTS SR 3.4.17.1 requires performing a gamma isotopic analysis as a measure of the noble gas specific activity of the reactor coolant. This measurement is the sum of the degassed gamma activities and the gaseous gamma activities in the sample taken. This Surveillance provides an indication of any increase in the noble gas specific activity.
Trending the results of this Surveillance allows proper remedial action to be taken before reaching the LCD limit under normal operating conditions.
Trending the results of this Surveillance allows proper remedial action to be taken before reaching the LCD limit under normal operating conditions.
The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. If a specific noble gas nuclide listed in the definition of DOSE EQUIVALENT XE-133 is not detected.
The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
it should be assumed to be present at the minimum detectable activity.
If a specific noble gas nuclide listed in the definition of DOSE EQUIVALENT XE-133 is not detected. it should be assumed to be present at the minimum detectable activity.
SR 3.4.17.2 This Surveillance is performed to ensure iodine specific activity remains within limit during normal operation and following fast power changes when iodine spiking is more apt to occur. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Frequency, between 2 hours and 6 hours after a power change of RTP within a 1 hour period. is established because the iodine levels peak during this time following iodine spike initiation; samples at other times would provide inaccurate results. If a specific iodine isotope listed in the definition of DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 is not detected.
SR 3.4.17.2 This Surveillance is performed to ensure iodine specific activity remains within limit during normal operation and following fast power changes when iodine spiking is more apt to occur. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Frequency, between 2 hours and 6 hours after a power change of ~15%
it should be assumed to be present at the minimum detectable activity. (continued)
RTP within a 1 hour period. is established because the iodine levels peak during this time following iodine spike initiation; samples at other times would provide inaccurate results.
PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 B 3.4.17-5 REVISION 59 BASES REFERENCES  
If a specific iodine isotope listed in the definition of DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 is not detected. it should be assumed to be present at the minimum detectable activity.
: 1. 10 CFR 100 .11 2. UFSAR, Section 15.6.3 PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.4.17-6 RCS Specific Acti vi ty B 3.4.17 REVISION 59 MSIVs B 3.7 .2 BASES (continued)
(continued)
ACTIONS (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3               B 3.4.17-5                     REVISION 59
E.1 (continued) or more MSIVs inoperable while in MODE 1 requires entry into LCD 3.0.3. F.1 With one MSIV inoperable in MODE 1, time is allowed to restore the component to OPERABLE status. Some repairs can be made to the MSIV with the unit hot. The 4 hour Completion Time is reasonable, considering the probability of an accident occurring during the time period that would require closure of the MSIVs. Condition F is entered when one MSIV is inoperable in MODE 1, including when both actuator trains for one MSIV are inoperable.
 
When only one actuator train is inoperable on one MSIV, Condition A applies. The 4 hour Completion Time is consistent with that normally allowed for containment isolation valves that isolate a closed system penetrating containment.
RCS Specific Acti vi ty B 3.4.17 BASES REFERENCES       1. 10 CFR 100 .11
These valves differ from other containment isolation valves in that the closed system provides an additional means for containment isolation.
: 2. UFSAR, Section 15.6.3 PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3             B 3.4.17-6           REVISION 59
G.1 If the MSIV cannot be restored to OPERABLE within 4 hours. the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCD does not apply. To achieve this status. the unit must be placed in MODE 2 within 6 hours and Condition H would be entered. The Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience.
 
to reach MODE 2. and close the MSIVs in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. H.1 and H.2 Condition H is modified by a Note indicating that separate Condition entry is allowed for each MSIV. Since the MSIVs are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 2 and 3, the inoperable MSIVs may either be restored to OPERABLE status or closed. When closed. the MSIVs are already in the position required by the assumptions in the safety analysis. (continued)
MSIVs B 3.7 .2 BASES (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.7.2-7 REVISION 59 MSIVs B 3.7 .2 BASES (continued)
ACTIONS           E.1 (continued)
ACTIONS (continued)
(continued) or more MSIVs inoperable while in MODE 1 requires entry into LCD 3.0.3.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS H.1 and H.2 (continued)
F.1 With one MSIV inoperable in MODE 1, time is allowed to restore the component to OPERABLE status. Some repairs can be made to the MSIV with the unit hot. The 4 hour Completion Time is reasonable, considering the probability of an accident occurring during the time period that would require closure of the MSIVs.
The 4 hour Completion Time is consistent with that allowed in Condition F. Inoperable MSIVs that cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the specified Completion Time. but are closed. must be verified on a periodic basis to be closed. This is necessary to ensure that the assumptions in the safety analysis remain valid. The 7 day Completion Time is reasonablei based on engineering judgment.
Condition F is entered when one MSIV is inoperable in MODE 1, including when both actuator trains for one MSIV are inoperable. When only one actuator train is inoperable on one MSIV, Condition A applies.
MSIV status indications available in the control room. and other administrative controls.
The 4 hour Completion Time is consistent with that normally allowed for containment isolation valves that isolate a closed system penetrating containment. These valves differ from other containment isolation valves in that the closed system provides an additional means for containment isolation.
to ensure these valves are in the closed position.
G.1 If the MSIV cannot be restored to OPERABLE within 4 hours.
I.1 and I.2 If the MSIVs cannot be restored to OPERABLE status. or closed, within the associated Completion Time. the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status. the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours. and in MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable.
the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCD does not apply. To achieve this status. the unit must be placed in MODE 2 within 6 hours and Condition H would be entered. The Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience. to reach MODE 2. and close the MSIVs in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.
based on operating experience.
H.1 and H.2 Condition H is modified by a Note indicating that separate Condition entry is allowed for each MSIV.
to reach the required unit conditions from MODE 2 conditions in an manner and without challenging unit systems. SR 3.7.2.1 This SR verifies that the closure time of each MSIV is within the limit given in Reference 5 with each actuator train on an actual or simulated actuation signal and is within that assumed in the accident and containment analyses.
Since the MSIVs are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 2 and 3, the inoperable MSIVs may either be restored to OPERABLE status or closed. When closed. the MSIVs are already in the position required by the assumptions in the safety analysis.
This SR also verifies the valve closure time is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. This SR is normally performed upon returning the unit to operation following a refueling outage. The MSIVs should not be full stroke tested at power. The Frequency for this SR is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. This Frequency demonstrates the valve closure time at least once per refueling cycle. (continued)
(continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 B 3. 7.2-8 REVISION 54 EW System B 3. 7. 7 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.7 Essential Cooling Water (EW) System BASES BACKGROUND The EW System provides a heat sink for the removal of process and operating heat from safety related components during a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or transient.
PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3               B 3.7.2-7                     REVISION 59
The EW System acts as a backup to the non-safety related Nuclear Cooling Water System for several non-safety related loads. The EW System serves as a barrier to the release of radioactive byproducts between potentially radioactive systems and the Essential Spray Pond System (ESPS). and thus to the environment.
 
The EW System is arranged as two independent full capacity cooling loops. which are normally isolated from the Nuclear Cooling Water System. Each safety related train includes a full capacity pump. surge tank. heat exchanger.
MSIVs B 3.7 .2 BASES (continued)
piping, valves. chemical addition tank. and instrumentation.
ACTIONS           H.1 and H.2 (continued)
Each safety related train is powered from a bus. The surge tank in the system provides pump trip protective functions to ensure sufficient net positive suction head is available.
(continued)
The pump in each train is automatically started on receipt of an ESFAS signal. Additional information on the design and operation of the system. along with a list of the components served. is presented in the UFSAR. Section 9.2.2. Reference  
The 4 hour Completion Time is consistent with that allowed in Condition F.
: 1. and Section 9.2.1. Reference  
Inoperable MSIVs that cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the specified Completion Time. but are closed. must be verified on a periodic basis to be closed. This is necessary to ensure that the assumptions in the safety analysis remain valid. The 7 day Completion Time is reasonablei based on engineering judgment. MSIV status indications available in the control room. and other administrative controls. to ensure these valves are in the closed position.
: 2. The principal safety related function of the EW System is the removal of decay heat from the reactor via the Shutdown Cooling (SOC) System heat exchanger.
I.1 and I.2 If the MSIVs cannot be restored to OPERABLE status. or closed, within the associated Completion Time. the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status. the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours. and in MODE 5 within 36 hours.
APPLICABLE The design basis of the EW System is for one EW train in SAFETY ANALYSES conjunction with the ultimate heat sink and a 100% capacity Containment Spray System to remove sufficient heat to ensure a safe reactor shutdown coincident with a loss of offsite power. The EW System provides a gradual reduction in the temperature of the containment sump fluid as it is supplied to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) by the safety injection pumps. (continued)
The allowed Completion Times are reasonable. based on operating experience. to reach the required unit conditions from MODE 2 conditions in an ord~rly manner and without challenging unit systems.
PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 B 3.7.7-1 REVISION 0 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSIS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE      SR 3.7.2.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that the closure time of each MSIV is within the limit given in Reference 5 with each actuator train on an actual or simulated actuation signal and is within that assumed in the accident and containment analyses. This SR also verifies the valve closure time is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. This SR is normally performed upon returning the unit to operation following a refueling outage. The MSIVs should not be full stroke tested at power.
LCO EW System B 3.7 .7 The EW System is designed to perform its function with a single failure of any active component.
The Frequency for this SR is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. This Frequency demonstrates the valve closure time at least once per refueling cycle.
assuming a loss of offsite power. The EW System also functions to cool the unit from SOC entry conditions  
(continued)
<Tcold < 350&deg;F) to MODE 5 (Tcold < 210&deg;F) during normal and post accident operations.
PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3               B 3. 7.2-8                   REVISION 54
The time required to cool from 350&deg;F to 210&deg;F is a function of the number of EW and SOC trains operating.
 
One EW train is sufficient to remove decay heat during subsequent operations with Tcolct < 210&deg;F. This assumes that the worst case meteorological conditions occur simultaneously with the maximum heat loads on the system. The EW System satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (c)(2)(ii).
EW System B 3. 7. 7 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.7 Essential Cooling Water (EW) System BASES BACKGROUND       The EW System provides a heat sink for the removal of process and operating heat from safety related components during a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or transient. The EW System acts as a backup to the non-safety related Nuclear Cooling Water System for several non-safety related loads.
The EW trains are independent of each other to the degree that each has separate controls and power supplies and the operation of one does not depend on the other. In the event of a DBA. one EW train is required to provide the minimum heat removal capability assumed in the safety analysis for the systems to which it supplies cooling water. To ensure this requirement is met. two EW trains must be OPERABLE.
The EW System serves as a barrier to the release of radioactive byproducts between potentially radioactive systems and the Essential Spray Pond System (ESPS). and thus to the environment.
At least one EW train will operate assuming the worst single active failure occurs coincident with the loss of offsite power. A EW train is considered OPERABLE when the following:  
The EW System is arranged as two independent full capacity cooling loops. which are normally isolated from the Nuclear Cooling Water System. Each safety related train includes a full capacity pump. surge tank. heat exchanger. piping, valves. chemical addition tank. and instrumentation. Each safety related train is powered from a sepa~ate bus. The surge tank in the system provides pump trip protective functions to ensure sufficient net positive suction head is available. The pump in each train is automatically started on receipt of an ESFAS signal.
: a. The associated pump and surge tank are OPERABLE; and b. The associated piping, valves. heat exchanger and instrumentation and controls required to perform the safety related function are OPERABLE.
Additional information on the design and operation of the system. along with a list of the components served. is presented in the UFSAR. Section 9.2.2. Reference 1. and Section 9.2.1. Reference 2. The principal safety related function of the EW System is the removal of decay heat from the reactor via the Shutdown Cooling (SOC) System heat exchanger.
The isolation of EW from other components or systems renders those components or systems inoperable.
APPLICABLE       The design basis of the EW System is for one EW train in SAFETY ANALYSES   conjunction with the ultimate heat sink and a 100% capacity Containment Spray System to remove sufficient heat to ensure a safe reactor shutdown coincident with a loss of offsite power. The EW System provides a gradual reduction in the temperature of the containment sump fluid as it is supplied to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) by the safety injection pumps.
but does not necessarily affect the OPERABILITY of the EW System. Isolation of the EW System to the Essential Chiller. while rendering the Essential Chiller inoperable, is acceptable and does not impact the OPERABILITY of the EW System. Disassembly, removal of insulation.
(continued)
and other configuration changes to the isolated portions of an OPERABLE system must be explicitly evaluated for operability impact prior to executing any configuration changes of the OPERABLE system. Isolation of the EW System to SOC system heat exchanger is (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3               B 3.7.7-1                       REVISION 0
PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.7.7-2 REVISION 59 ESPS B 3. 7.8 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.8 Essential Spray Pond System CESPS) BASES BACKGROUND The ESPS provides a heat sink for the removal of process and operating heat from safety related components during a Design Basis Accident CDBA) or transient.
 
During a normal shutdown.
EW System B 3.7 .7 BASES APPLICABLE        The EW System is designed to perform its function with a SAFETY ANALYSIS  single failure of any active component. assuming a loss of (continued)    offsite power.
the ESPS also provides this function for various safety related components.
The EW System also functions to cool the unit from SOC entry conditions <Tcold < 350&deg;F) to MODE 5 (Tcold < 210&deg;F) during normal and post accident operations. The time required to cool from 350&deg;F to 210&deg;F is a function of the number of EW and SOC trains operating. One EW train is sufficient to remove decay heat during subsequent operations with Tcolct
The ESPS consists of two separate.
                  < 210&deg;F. This assumes that the worst case meteorological conditions occur simultaneously with the maximum heat loads on the system.
100% capacity safety related cooling water trains. Each train consists of one 100% capacity pump. one Essential Cooling Water CEW) heat exchanger.
The EW System satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (c)(2)(ii).
piping, valves. instrumentation.
LCO              The EW trains are independent of each other to the degree that each has separate controls and power supplies and the operation of one does not depend on the other. In the event of a DBA. one EW train is required to provide the minimum heat removal capability assumed in the safety analysis for the systems to which it supplies cooling water. To ensure this requirement is met. two EW trains must be OPERABLE. At least one EW train will operate assuming the worst single active failure occurs coincident with the loss of offsite power.
and a cleanup and Chemistry Control System. The valves are manually aligned. and secured in position.
A EW train is considered OPERABLE when the following:
The pumps are automatically started upon receipt of an ESFAS signal. Additional information about the design and operation of the ESPS. along with a list of the components served. is presented in the FSAR. Section 9.2.1 (Ref. 1). The principal safety related function of the ESPS is the removal of decay heat from the reactor via the EW System. APPLICABLE The design basis of the ESPS is for one ESPS train. in SAFETY ANALYSES conjunction with the EW System and a 100% capacity containment spray system to remove sufficient heat to ensure a safe reactor shutdown coincident with a loss of offsite power. The ESPS is designed to perform its function with a single failure of any active assuming the loss of offsite power. The ESPS. in conjunction with the EW System. also cools the unit from shutdown cooling CSDC). as discussed in the UFSAR. Section 5.4.7 (Ref. 2) entry conditions to MODE 5 during normal and post accident operations.
: a. The associated pump and surge tank are OPERABLE; and
The time required for this evolution is a function of the number of EW and SOC System trains that are operating.
: b. The associated piping, valves. heat exchanger and instrumentation and controls required to perform the safety related function are OPERABLE.
One ESPS train is sufficient to remove decay heat during subsequent operations in MODES 5 and 6. This assumes that worst case meteorological conditions occur simultaneously with maximum heat loads on the system. (continued)
The isolation of EW from other components or systems renders those components or systems inoperable. but does not necessarily affect the OPERABILITY of the EW System.
PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 B 3.7.8-1 REVISION 1 BASES ESPS B 3.7 .8 APPLICABLE The ESPS satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (c)(2)(ii).
Isolation of the EW System to the Essential Chiller. while rendering the Essential Chiller inoperable, is acceptable and does not impact the OPERABILITY of the EW System.
Disassembly, removal of insulation. and other configuration changes to the isolated portions of an OPERABLE system must be explicitly evaluated for operability impact prior to executing any configuration changes of the OPERABLE system.
Isolation of the EW System to SOC system heat exchanger is (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3               B 3.7.7-2                       REVISION 59
 
ESPS B 3. 7.8 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.8 Essential Spray Pond System CESPS)
BASES BACKGROUND       The ESPS provides a heat sink for the removal of process and operating heat from safety related components during a Design Basis Accident CDBA) or transient. During a normal shutdown. the ESPS also provides this function for various safety related components.
The ESPS consists of two separate. 100% capacity safety related cooling water trains. Each train consists of one 100% capacity pump. one Essential Cooling Water CEW) heat exchanger. piping, valves. instrumentation. and a cleanup and Chemistry Control System. The valves are manually aligned. and secured in position. The pumps are automatically started upon receipt of an ESFAS signal.
Additional information about the design and operation of the ESPS. along with a list of the components served. is presented in the FSAR. Section 9.2.1 (Ref. 1). The principal safety related function of the ESPS is the removal of decay heat from the reactor via the EW System.
APPLICABLE       The design basis of the ESPS is for one ESPS train. in SAFETY ANALYSES   conjunction with the EW System and a 100% capacity containment spray system to remove sufficient heat to ensure a safe reactor shutdown coincident with a loss of offsite power. The ESPS is designed to perform its function with a single failure of any active ~omponent. assuming the loss of offsite power.
The ESPS. in conjunction with the EW System. also cools the unit from shutdown cooling CSDC). as discussed in the UFSAR.
Section 5.4.7 (Ref. 2) entry conditions to MODE 5 during normal and post accident operations. The time required for this evolution is a function of the number of EW and SOC System trains that are operating. One ESPS train is sufficient to remove decay heat during subsequent operations in MODES 5 and 6. This assumes that worst case meteorological conditions occur simultaneously with maximum heat loads on the system.
(continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3               B 3.7.8-1                       REVISION 1
 
ESPS B 3.7 .8 BASES APPLICABLE       The ESPS satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (c)(2)(ii).
SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)
SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)
LCD Two ESPS trains are required to be OPERABLE to provide the required redundancy to ensure that the system functions to remove post accident heat loads. assuming the worst single active failure occurs coincident with the loss of offsite power. APPLICABILITY An ESPS train is considered OPERABLE when: a. The associated pump is OPERABLE; and b. The associated piping, valves. instrumentation.
LCD               Two ESPS trains are required to be OPERABLE to provide the required redundancy to ensure that the system functions to remove post accident heat loads. assuming the worst single active failure occurs coincident with the loss of offsite power.
heat exchanger.
An ESPS train is considered OPERABLE when:
and instrumentation and controls required to perform the safety related function are OPERABLE.
: a. The associated pump is OPERABLE; and
The isolation of the ESPS from other components or systems renders those components or systems inoperable.
: b. The associated piping, valves. instrumentation. heat exchanger. and instrumentation and controls required to perform the safety related function are OPERABLE.
but does not necessarily affect the OPERABILITY of the ESPS. Isolation of the ESPS to the Diesel Generator COG) cooler(s).
The isolation of the ESPS from other components or systems renders those components or systems inoperable. but does not necessarily affect the OPERABILITY of the ESPS. Isolation of the ESPS to the Diesel Generator COG) cooler(s). while rendering the DG inoperable. is acceptable and does not impact the OPERABILITY of the ESPS. Disassembly, removal of insulation. and other configuration changes to the isolated portions of an OPERABLE system must be explicitly evaluated for operability impact prior to executing any configuration changes of the OPERABLE system. Isolation of the ESPS to the essential cooling water heat exchanger is not acceptable and would render both the Essential Cooling Water System and the ESPS inoperable (Ref. 3). The ESPS is inoperable in this situation because it is operating outside of the acceptable limits of the system.
while rendering the DG inoperable.
APPLICABILITY    In MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4. the ESPS System is required to support the OPERABILITY of the equipment serviced by the ESPS and required to be OPERABLE in these MODES.
is acceptable and does not impact the OPERABILITY of the ESPS. Disassembly, removal of insulation.
When the plant is in other than MODES 1. 2. 3 or 4. the requirements of the ESPS shall be consistent with the definition of OPERABILITY which requires (support) equipment to be capable of performing its related support function(s).
and other configuration changes to the isolated portions of an OPERABLE system must be explicitly evaluated for operability impact prior to executing any configuration changes of the OPERABLE system. Isolation of the ESPS to the essential cooling water heat exchanger is not acceptable and would render both the Essential Cooling Water System and the ESPS inoperable (Ref. 3). The ESPS is inoperable in this situation because it is operating outside of the acceptable limits of the system. In MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4. the ESPS System is required to support the OPERABILITY of the equipment serviced by the ESPS and required to be OPERABLE in these MODES. When the plant is in other than MODES 1. 2. 3 or 4. the requirements of the ESPS shall be consistent with the definition of OPERABILITY which requires (support) equipment to be capable of performing its related support function(s).
(continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 B 3.7.8-2 (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3               B 3.7.8-2                     REVISION 59
REVISION 59 EC System B 3. 7.10 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.10 Essential Chilled Water (EC) System BASES BACKGROUND The EC System provides a heat transfer system to the ultimate heat sink for the removal of process and operating heat from selected safety related air handling systems during a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or transient.
 
The EC System is a closed loop system consisting of two independent trains. Each 100% capacity train includes a heat exchanger, surge tank, pump. chemical addition tank. piping, valves. controls, and instrumentation.
EC System B 3. 7.10 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.10 Essential Chilled Water (EC) System BASES BACKGROUND       The EC System provides a heat transfer system to the ultimate heat sink for the removal of process and operating heat from selected safety related air handling systems during a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or transient.
An independent 100% capacity chilled water refrigeration unit cools each train. The EC System is actuated on receipt of an ESFAS signal and supplies chilled water to the Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning CHVAC) units in Engineered Safety Feature CESF) equipment areas (e.g., the main control room. DC equipment room, AFW pump rooms, EW pump rooms and safety injection pump rooms). The flow path for the EC System includes the closed loop of piping to all serviced equipment.
The EC System is a closed loop system consisting of two independent trains. Each 100% capacity train includes a heat exchanger, surge tank, pump. chemical addition tank.
During normal operation, the normal Chilled Water System (WC) and the normal HVAC System cools the areas served by the EC System. The we System and the normal HVAC System are nonsafety grade systems. Following ESFAS actuations.
piping, valves. controls, and instrumentation. An independent 100% capacity chilled water refrigeration unit cools each train. The EC System is actuated on receipt of an ESFAS signal and supplies chilled water to the Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning CHVAC) units in Engineered Safety Feature CESF) equipment areas (e.g., the main control room. DC equipment room, AFW pump rooms, EW pump rooms and safety injection pump rooms).
the EC System with essential HVAC units provide this cooling function to the control room and safety grade equipment.
The flow path for the EC System includes the closed loop of piping to all serviced equipment.
Additional information about the design and operation of the system, along with a list of components served. can be found in the UFSAR, Section 9. 2. 9 (Ref. 1). APPLICABLE The design basis of the EC System is to remove the post SAFETY ANALYSES accident heat load from ESF spaces following a DBA coincident with a loss of offsite power. Each train provides chilled water to the HVAC units. The EC system design flowrates and temperatures are referenced in the Design Bases Manual. (continued)
During normal operation, the normal Chilled Water System (WC) and the normal HVAC System cools the areas served by the EC System. The we System and the normal HVAC System are nonsafety grade systems. Following ESFAS actuations. the EC System with essential HVAC units provide this cooling function to the control room and safety grade equipment.
PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.7.10-1 REVISION 10 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSIS (continued)
Additional information about the design and operation of the system, along with a list of components served. can be found in the UFSAR, Section 9. 2. 9 (Ref. 1).
LCO APPLICABILITY EC System B 3. 7.10 The maximum heat load in the ESF pump room area occurs during the recirculation phase following a loss of coolant accident.
APPLICABLE       The design basis of the EC System is to remove the post SAFETY ANALYSES   accident heat load from ESF spaces following a DBA coincident with a loss of offsite power. Each train provides chilled water to the HVAC units. The EC system design flowrates and temperatures are referenced in the Design Bases Manual.
During recirculation.
(continued)
hot fluid from the containment sump is supplied to the high pressure safety injection and containment spray pumps. This heat load to the area atmosphere must be removed by the EC System to ensure that these pumps remain OPERABLE.
PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3             B 3.7.10-1                     REVISION 10
 
EC System B 3. 7.10 BASES APPLICABLE        The maximum heat load in the ESF pump room area occurs SAFETY ANALYSIS  during the recirculation phase following a loss of coolant (continued)    accident. During recirculation. hot fluid from the containment sump is supplied to the high pressure safety injection and containment spray pumps. This heat load to the area atmosphere must be removed by the EC System to ensure that these pumps remain OPERABLE.
The EC satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (c)(2)(ii).
The EC satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (c)(2)(ii).
Two EC trains are required to be OPERABLE to provide the required redundancy to ensure that the system functions to remove post accident heat loads, assuming the worst single failure. An EC train is considered OPERABLE when: a. The associated pump and surge tank are OPERABLE; and b. The associated piping, valves. heat exchanger.
LCO              Two EC trains are required to be OPERABLE to provide the required redundancy to ensure that the system functions to remove post accident heat loads, assuming the worst single failure.
An EC train is considered OPERABLE when:
: a. The associated pump and surge tank are OPERABLE; and
: b. The associated piping, valves. heat exchanger.
* refrigeration unit, and instrumentation and controls required to perform the safety related function are OPERABLE.
* refrigeration unit, and instrumentation and controls required to perform the safety related function are OPERABLE.
The isolation of the EC System from other components or systems renders those components or systems inoperable, but does not necessarily affect the OPERABILITY of the EC System. Isolation of the EC System to any single EC supplied cooling coil, while rendering the cooling coil inoperable.
The isolation of the EC System from other components or systems renders those components or systems inoperable, but does not necessarily affect the OPERABILITY of the EC System. Isolation of the EC System to any single EC supplied cooling coil, while rendering the cooling coil inoperable. is acceptable and does not impact the OPERABILITY of the EC System. Disassembly, removal of insulation. and other configuration changes to the isolated portions of an OPERABLE system must be explicitly evaluated for operability impact prior to executing any configuration changes of the OPERABLE system. Isolation of the EC System to any additional cooling coil is not acceptable without an engineering evaluation and an operability determination for that configuration (Ref. 2). The EC System is inoperable in this situation. unless it has been specifically evaluated, because it is operating outside of the acceptable limits of the system.
is acceptable and does not impact the OPERABILITY of the EC System. Disassembly, removal of insulation.
APPLICABILITY    In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. the EC System is required to be OPERABLE when a LOCA or other accident would require ESF operation.
and other configuration changes to the isolated portions of an OPERABLE system must be explicitly evaluated for operability impact prior to executing any configuration changes of the OPERABLE system. Isolation of the EC System to any additional cooling coil is not acceptable without an engineering evaluation and an operability determination for that configuration (Ref. 2). The EC System is inoperable in this situation.
(continued)
unless it has been specifically evaluated, because it is operating outside of the acceptable limits of the system. In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. the EC System is required to be OPERABLE when a LOCA or other accident would require ESF operation. (continued)
PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3               B 3.7.10-2                     REVISION 59}}
PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 B 3.7.10-2 REVISION 59}}

Latest revision as of 07:09, 4 November 2019

Technical Specification Bases (TS Bases) Revision 59 Replacement Pages and Insertion Instructions
ML14091A957
Person / Time
Site: Palo Verde  Arizona Public Service icon.png
Issue date: 03/19/2014
From: Stephenson C
Arizona Public Service Co
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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ML14091A919 List:
References
102-06859-TNW/DHK
Download: ML14091A957 (27)


Text

Digitally signed by Stephenson, Carl J(Z05778)

Stephenson, Carl J(Z05778) DN: cn=Stephenson, Carl J(Z05778)

Reason: I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Date: 2014.03.13 15:45:21 -07'00' PVNGS Technical Specification Bases (TS Bases)

Revision 59 Replacement Pages and Insertion Instructions The following LDCRs are included in this change:

LDCRs 09-B007 and 13-B004 reflect changes to the TS Bases Section 3.4.17, RCS Specific Activity, to conform to NRC approved License Amendment 192, dated November 25, 2013. The amendment revised the Technical Specifications (TSs) related to reactor coolant system (RCS) activity limits by replacing the current TS limits on primary coolant gross specific activity with limits on primary coolant noble gas activity. The noble gas activity reflects a new DOSE EQUIVALENT XE-133 definition that replaces the pastE-Bar average disintegration energy definition in TS Section 1.1, Definitions. The changes are consistent with NRC-approved Industry/Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) Standard Technical Specification change traveler, TSTF-490, Revision 0, Deletion of E-Bar Definition and Revision to RCS Specific Activity Technical Specifications, with deviations.

LDCR 13-B003 clarified the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) descriptions forTS Bases Sections 3.7.7, Essential Cooling Water (Ell\1 System, 3.7.8, Essential Spray Pond System (ESPS), and 3. 7.1 0, Essential Chilled Water (EC)

System. Specifically, the following clarifying language was added:

"Disassembly, removal of insulation, and other configuration changes to the isolated portions of an OPERABLE system must be explicitly evaluated for operability impact prior to executing any configuration changes of the OPERABLE system."

This clarifying information was added as a result of CRDR 4450413. In addition, a typographical error in the description of ACTION F.1, of TS Bases Section 3.7.2, Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs), identified in PVAR 4474037, is corrected in this LDCR. Specifically, the word "inoperable" was incorrectly typed as "operable" in TS Bases, Revision 40. This correction is consistent with LDCR 06-B023, dated November 7, 2006.

Instructions Remove Page: Insert New Page:

Cover Page Cover Page List of Effective Pages List of Effective Pages 112 through 91Biank 112 through 91Biank B 3.4.17-11 B 3.4.17-2 B 3.4.17-11 B 3.4.17-2 B 3.4.17-31 B 3.4.17-4 B 3.4.17-31 B 3.4.17-4 B 3.4.17-51 B 3.4.17-6 B 3.4.17-51 B 3.4.17-6 B 3.7.2-7 I B 3.7.2-8 B 3.7.2-7 I B 3.7.2-8

PVNGS Technical Specification Bases (TS Bases)

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PVNGS Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units I, 2, and 3 Technical Specification Bases Revision 59 March 19,2014 Digitally signed by Stephenson, Stephenson, Carl J(Z05778)

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This page intentionally blank RCS Specific Activity B 3.4.17 BASES B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM CRCS)

B 3.4.17 RCS Specific Activity BASES BACKGROUND The maximum dose that an individual at the exclusion area boundary can receive for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> following an accident. or at the low population zone outer boundary for the radiological release duration. is specified in 10 CFR 100.11 (Ref. 1). Doses to control room operators must be limited per GDC 19. The limits on specific activity ensure that the offsite and control room doses are appropriately limited during analyzed transients and accidents.

The RCS specific activity LCO limits the allowable concentration level of radionuclides in the reactor coolant.

The LCD limits are established to minimize the dose consequences in the event of a steam generator tube rupture CSGTR) accident.

The LCD contains specific activity limits for both DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 and DOSE EQUIVALENT XE-133. The allowable levels are intended to ensure that offsite and control room doses meet the 10 CFR 100.11 (Ref. 1) and GDC 19 limits respectively.

APPLICABLE The LCO limits on the specific activity of the reactor SAFETY ANALYSES coolant ensure that the resulting offsite and control room doses meet the 10 CFR 100.11 (Ref. 1) and GDC 19 limits following a SGTR accident. The safety analysis (Ref. 2) assumes the specific activity of the reactor coolant is at the LCO limits. and an existing reactor coolant steam generator CSG) tube leakage rate of 1.0 gpm exists. The safety analysis assumes the specific activity of the secondary coolant is at its limit of 0.1 pCi/gm DOSE EQUIVALENT I -131 from LCO 3. 7.16. "Secondary Specific Activity."

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.4.17-1 REVISION 59

RCS Specific Activity B 3.4.17 BASES APPLICABLE The analysis for a SGTR accident establishes the acceptance SAFETY ANALYSES limits for RCS specific activity. Reference to this analysis (continued) is used to assess changes to the unit that could affect RCS specific activity, as they relate to the acceptance limits.

The safety analysis considers two cases of reactor coolant iodine specific activity. One case assumes specific activity at 1.0 pCi/gm DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 with a concurrent large iodine spike that increases the rate of release of iodine from the fuel rods containing cladding defects to the primary coolant immediately after a SGTR (by a factor of 335). The second case assumes the initial reactor coolant iodine activity at 60.0 pCi/gm DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 due to an iodine spike caused by a reactor or an RCS transient prior to the accident. In both cases, the noble gas specific activity is assumed to be 550 pCi/gm DOSE EQUIVALENT XE-133.

The STGR analysis assumes a rise in pressure in the ruptured SG causes radioactively contaminated steam to discharge to the atmosphere through the atmospheric dump valves or the main steam safety valves. The atmospheric discharge continues through an assumed stuck open atmospheric dump valve. The unaffected SG removes core decay heat by venting steam until the cooldown event ends and the Shutdown Cooling (SOC)* system is placed in service.

Operation with iodine specific activity levels greater than the LCD limit is permissible. if the activity levels do not exceed 60.0 pCi/gm for more than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />.

The limits on RCS specific activity are also used for establishing standardization in radiation shielding and l I plant personnel radiation protection practices.

RCS specific activity satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.4.17-2 REVISION 59

RCS Specific Activity B 3.4.17 BASES LCO The iodine specific activity in the reactor coolant is limited to 1.0 ~Ci/gm DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131, and the noble gas specific activity in the reactor coolant is limited to 550 ~Ci/gm DOSE EQUIVALENT XE-133. The limits on specific activity ensure that offsite and control room doses will meet the 10 CFR 100.11 (Ref. 1) and GDC 19 limits.

The SGTR accident analysis (Ref. 2) shows that the calculated doses are within acceptable limits. Violation of the LCO may result in reactor coolant radioactivity levels that could, in the event of a SGTR. lead to doses that exceed the 10 CFR 100.11 (Ref. 1) and GDC 19 limits.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1.2. 3, and 4. operation within the LCO limits for DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 and DOSE EQUIVALENT XE-133 is necessary to limit the potential consequences of a SGTR to within the 10 CFR 100.11 (Ref. 1) and GDC 19 limits.

In MODES 5 and 6. the steam generators are not being used for decay heat removal . the RCS and steam generators are depressurized. and primary to secondary leakage is minimal.

Therefore. the monitoring of RCS specific activity is not required.

ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 With the DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 greater than the LCO limit.

samples at intervals of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> must be taken to demonstrate that the specific activity is $ 60.0 ~Ci/gm. The Completion Time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is required to obtain and analyze a sample.

Sampling is continued every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> to provide a trend.

The DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 must be restored to within limit within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />. The Completion Time of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> is acceptable since it is expected that. if there were an iodine spike. the normal coolant iodine concentration would be restored within this time period. Also. there is a low probability of a SGTR occurring during this time period.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 B 3.4.17-3 REVISION 59

RCS Specific Acti vi ty B 3.4.17 BASES ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 *(continued)

A Note permits the use of the provisions of LCO 3.0.4.c.

This allowance permits entry into the applicable MODE(S).

relying on Required Actions A.1 and A.2 while the DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 LCO limit is not met. This allowance is acceptable due to the significant conservatism incorporated into the specific activity limit. the low. probability of an event which is limiting due to exceeding this limit. and the ability to restore transient-specific activity excursions while the plant remains at. or proceeds to. power operation.

8.1 With the DOSE EQUIVALENT XE-133 greater than the LCO limit.

DOSE EQUIVALENT XE-133 must be restored to within limit within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Time of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> is acceptable since it is expected that. if there were a noble gas spike. the normal coolant noble gas concentration would be restored within this time period. Also. there is a low probability of a SGTR occurring during this time period.

A Note permits the use of the provisions of LCO 3.0.4.c.

This allowance permits entry into the applicable MODE(S).

relying on Required Action B.l while the DOSE EQUIVALENT XE-133 LCD limit is not met. This allowance is acceptable due to the significant conservatism incorporated into the specific activity limit. the low probability of an event which is limiting due to exceeding this limit. and the ability to restore transient-specific activity excursions while the plant remains at. or proceeds to. power operation.

C.1 and C.2 If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B is not met. or if the DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 is > 60.0 pCi/gm, the reactor must be brought to MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable. based on operating experience. to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 B 3.4.17-4 REVISION 59

RCS Specific Activity B 3.4.17 BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.17.1 REQUIREMENTS SR 3.4.17.1 requires performing a gamma isotopic analysis as a measure of the noble gas specific activity of the reactor coolant. This measurement is the sum of the degassed gamma activities and the gaseous gamma activities in the sample taken. This Surveillance provides an indication of any increase in the noble gas specific activity.

Trending the results of this Surveillance allows proper remedial action to be taken before reaching the LCD limit under normal operating conditions.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

If a specific noble gas nuclide listed in the definition of DOSE EQUIVALENT XE-133 is not detected. it should be assumed to be present at the minimum detectable activity.

SR 3.4.17.2 This Surveillance is performed to ensure iodine specific activity remains within limit during normal operation and following fast power changes when iodine spiking is more apt to occur. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Frequency, between 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after a power change of ~15%

RTP within a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> period. is established because the iodine levels peak during this time following iodine spike initiation; samples at other times would provide inaccurate results.

If a specific iodine isotope listed in the definition of DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 is not detected. it should be assumed to be present at the minimum detectable activity.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 B 3.4.17-5 REVISION 59

RCS Specific Acti vi ty B 3.4.17 BASES REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 100 .11

2. UFSAR, Section 15.6.3 PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.4.17-6 REVISION 59

MSIVs B 3.7 .2 BASES (continued)

ACTIONS E.1 (continued)

(continued) or more MSIVs inoperable while in MODE 1 requires entry into LCD 3.0.3.

F.1 With one MSIV inoperable in MODE 1, time is allowed to restore the component to OPERABLE status. Some repairs can be made to the MSIV with the unit hot. The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is reasonable, considering the probability of an accident occurring during the time period that would require closure of the MSIVs.

Condition F is entered when one MSIV is inoperable in MODE 1, including when both actuator trains for one MSIV are inoperable. When only one actuator train is inoperable on one MSIV, Condition A applies.

The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is consistent with that normally allowed for containment isolation valves that isolate a closed system penetrating containment. These valves differ from other containment isolation valves in that the closed system provides an additional means for containment isolation.

G.1 If the MSIV cannot be restored to OPERABLE within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCD does not apply. To achieve this status. the unit must be placed in MODE 2 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and Condition H would be entered. The Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience. to reach MODE 2. and close the MSIVs in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

H.1 and H.2 Condition H is modified by a Note indicating that separate Condition entry is allowed for each MSIV.

Since the MSIVs are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 2 and 3, the inoperable MSIVs may either be restored to OPERABLE status or closed. When closed. the MSIVs are already in the position required by the assumptions in the safety analysis.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.7.2-7 REVISION 59

MSIVs B 3.7 .2 BASES (continued)

ACTIONS H.1 and H.2 (continued)

(continued)

The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is consistent with that allowed in Condition F.

Inoperable MSIVs that cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the specified Completion Time. but are closed. must be verified on a periodic basis to be closed. This is necessary to ensure that the assumptions in the safety analysis remain valid. The 7 day Completion Time is reasonablei based on engineering judgment. MSIV status indications available in the control room. and other administrative controls. to ensure these valves are in the closed position.

I.1 and I.2 If the MSIVs cannot be restored to OPERABLE status. or closed, within the associated Completion Time. the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status. the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

The allowed Completion Times are reasonable. based on operating experience. to reach the required unit conditions from MODE 2 conditions in an ord~rly manner and without challenging unit systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.2.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that the closure time of each MSIV is within the limit given in Reference 5 with each actuator train on an actual or simulated actuation signal and is within that assumed in the accident and containment analyses. This SR also verifies the valve closure time is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. This SR is normally performed upon returning the unit to operation following a refueling outage. The MSIVs should not be full stroke tested at power.

The Frequency for this SR is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. This Frequency demonstrates the valve closure time at least once per refueling cycle.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 B 3. 7.2-8 REVISION 54

EW System B 3. 7. 7 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.7 Essential Cooling Water (EW) System BASES BACKGROUND The EW System provides a heat sink for the removal of process and operating heat from safety related components during a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or transient. The EW System acts as a backup to the non-safety related Nuclear Cooling Water System for several non-safety related loads.

The EW System serves as a barrier to the release of radioactive byproducts between potentially radioactive systems and the Essential Spray Pond System (ESPS). and thus to the environment.

The EW System is arranged as two independent full capacity cooling loops. which are normally isolated from the Nuclear Cooling Water System. Each safety related train includes a full capacity pump. surge tank. heat exchanger. piping, valves. chemical addition tank. and instrumentation. Each safety related train is powered from a sepa~ate bus. The surge tank in the system provides pump trip protective functions to ensure sufficient net positive suction head is available. The pump in each train is automatically started on receipt of an ESFAS signal.

Additional information on the design and operation of the system. along with a list of the components served. is presented in the UFSAR. Section 9.2.2. Reference 1. and Section 9.2.1. Reference 2. The principal safety related function of the EW System is the removal of decay heat from the reactor via the Shutdown Cooling (SOC) System heat exchanger.

APPLICABLE The design basis of the EW System is for one EW train in SAFETY ANALYSES conjunction with the ultimate heat sink and a 100% capacity Containment Spray System to remove sufficient heat to ensure a safe reactor shutdown coincident with a loss of offsite power. The EW System provides a gradual reduction in the temperature of the containment sump fluid as it is supplied to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) by the safety injection pumps.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 B 3.7.7-1 REVISION 0

EW System B 3.7 .7 BASES APPLICABLE The EW System is designed to perform its function with a SAFETY ANALYSIS single failure of any active component. assuming a loss of (continued) offsite power.

The EW System also functions to cool the unit from SOC entry conditions <Tcold < 350°F) to MODE 5 (Tcold < 210°F) during normal and post accident operations. The time required to cool from 350°F to 210°F is a function of the number of EW and SOC trains operating. One EW train is sufficient to remove decay heat during subsequent operations with Tcolct

< 210°F. This assumes that the worst case meteorological conditions occur simultaneously with the maximum heat loads on the system.

The EW System satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (c)(2)(ii).

LCO The EW trains are independent of each other to the degree that each has separate controls and power supplies and the operation of one does not depend on the other. In the event of a DBA. one EW train is required to provide the minimum heat removal capability assumed in the safety analysis for the systems to which it supplies cooling water. To ensure this requirement is met. two EW trains must be OPERABLE. At least one EW train will operate assuming the worst single active failure occurs coincident with the loss of offsite power.

A EW train is considered OPERABLE when the following:

a. The associated pump and surge tank are OPERABLE; and
b. The associated piping, valves. heat exchanger and instrumentation and controls required to perform the safety related function are OPERABLE.

The isolation of EW from other components or systems renders those components or systems inoperable. but does not necessarily affect the OPERABILITY of the EW System.

Isolation of the EW System to the Essential Chiller. while rendering the Essential Chiller inoperable, is acceptable and does not impact the OPERABILITY of the EW System.

Disassembly, removal of insulation. and other configuration changes to the isolated portions of an OPERABLE system must be explicitly evaluated for operability impact prior to executing any configuration changes of the OPERABLE system.

Isolation of the EW System to SOC system heat exchanger is (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.7.7-2 REVISION 59

ESPS B 3. 7.8 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.8 Essential Spray Pond System CESPS)

BASES BACKGROUND The ESPS provides a heat sink for the removal of process and operating heat from safety related components during a Design Basis Accident CDBA) or transient. During a normal shutdown. the ESPS also provides this function for various safety related components.

The ESPS consists of two separate. 100% capacity safety related cooling water trains. Each train consists of one 100% capacity pump. one Essential Cooling Water CEW) heat exchanger. piping, valves. instrumentation. and a cleanup and Chemistry Control System. The valves are manually aligned. and secured in position. The pumps are automatically started upon receipt of an ESFAS signal.

Additional information about the design and operation of the ESPS. along with a list of the components served. is presented in the FSAR. Section 9.2.1 (Ref. 1). The principal safety related function of the ESPS is the removal of decay heat from the reactor via the EW System.

APPLICABLE The design basis of the ESPS is for one ESPS train. in SAFETY ANALYSES conjunction with the EW System and a 100% capacity containment spray system to remove sufficient heat to ensure a safe reactor shutdown coincident with a loss of offsite power. The ESPS is designed to perform its function with a single failure of any active ~omponent. assuming the loss of offsite power.

The ESPS. in conjunction with the EW System. also cools the unit from shutdown cooling CSDC). as discussed in the UFSAR.

Section 5.4.7 (Ref. 2) entry conditions to MODE 5 during normal and post accident operations. The time required for this evolution is a function of the number of EW and SOC System trains that are operating. One ESPS train is sufficient to remove decay heat during subsequent operations in MODES 5 and 6. This assumes that worst case meteorological conditions occur simultaneously with maximum heat loads on the system.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 B 3.7.8-1 REVISION 1

ESPS B 3.7 .8 BASES APPLICABLE The ESPS satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (c)(2)(ii).

SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

LCD Two ESPS trains are required to be OPERABLE to provide the required redundancy to ensure that the system functions to remove post accident heat loads. assuming the worst single active failure occurs coincident with the loss of offsite power.

An ESPS train is considered OPERABLE when:

a. The associated pump is OPERABLE; and
b. The associated piping, valves. instrumentation. heat exchanger. and instrumentation and controls required to perform the safety related function are OPERABLE.

The isolation of the ESPS from other components or systems renders those components or systems inoperable. but does not necessarily affect the OPERABILITY of the ESPS. Isolation of the ESPS to the Diesel Generator COG) cooler(s). while rendering the DG inoperable. is acceptable and does not impact the OPERABILITY of the ESPS. Disassembly, removal of insulation. and other configuration changes to the isolated portions of an OPERABLE system must be explicitly evaluated for operability impact prior to executing any configuration changes of the OPERABLE system. Isolation of the ESPS to the essential cooling water heat exchanger is not acceptable and would render both the Essential Cooling Water System and the ESPS inoperable (Ref. 3). The ESPS is inoperable in this situation because it is operating outside of the acceptable limits of the system.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4. the ESPS System is required to support the OPERABILITY of the equipment serviced by the ESPS and required to be OPERABLE in these MODES.

When the plant is in other than MODES 1. 2. 3 or 4. the requirements of the ESPS shall be consistent with the definition of OPERABILITY which requires (support) equipment to be capable of performing its related support function(s).

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 B 3.7.8-2 REVISION 59

EC System B 3. 7.10 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.10 Essential Chilled Water (EC) System BASES BACKGROUND The EC System provides a heat transfer system to the ultimate heat sink for the removal of process and operating heat from selected safety related air handling systems during a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or transient.

The EC System is a closed loop system consisting of two independent trains. Each 100% capacity train includes a heat exchanger, surge tank, pump. chemical addition tank.

piping, valves. controls, and instrumentation. An independent 100% capacity chilled water refrigeration unit cools each train. The EC System is actuated on receipt of an ESFAS signal and supplies chilled water to the Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning CHVAC) units in Engineered Safety Feature CESF) equipment areas (e.g., the main control room. DC equipment room, AFW pump rooms, EW pump rooms and safety injection pump rooms).

The flow path for the EC System includes the closed loop of piping to all serviced equipment.

During normal operation, the normal Chilled Water System (WC) and the normal HVAC System cools the areas served by the EC System. The we System and the normal HVAC System are nonsafety grade systems. Following ESFAS actuations. the EC System with essential HVAC units provide this cooling function to the control room and safety grade equipment.

Additional information about the design and operation of the system, along with a list of components served. can be found in the UFSAR, Section 9. 2. 9 (Ref. 1).

APPLICABLE The design basis of the EC System is to remove the post SAFETY ANALYSES accident heat load from ESF spaces following a DBA coincident with a loss of offsite power. Each train provides chilled water to the HVAC units. The EC system design flowrates and temperatures are referenced in the Design Bases Manual.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.7.10-1 REVISION 10

EC System B 3. 7.10 BASES APPLICABLE The maximum heat load in the ESF pump room area occurs SAFETY ANALYSIS during the recirculation phase following a loss of coolant (continued) accident. During recirculation. hot fluid from the containment sump is supplied to the high pressure safety injection and containment spray pumps. This heat load to the area atmosphere must be removed by the EC System to ensure that these pumps remain OPERABLE.

The EC satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (c)(2)(ii).

LCO Two EC trains are required to be OPERABLE to provide the required redundancy to ensure that the system functions to remove post accident heat loads, assuming the worst single failure.

An EC train is considered OPERABLE when:

a. The associated pump and surge tank are OPERABLE; and
b. The associated piping, valves. heat exchanger.
  • refrigeration unit, and instrumentation and controls required to perform the safety related function are OPERABLE.

The isolation of the EC System from other components or systems renders those components or systems inoperable, but does not necessarily affect the OPERABILITY of the EC System. Isolation of the EC System to any single EC supplied cooling coil, while rendering the cooling coil inoperable. is acceptable and does not impact the OPERABILITY of the EC System. Disassembly, removal of insulation. and other configuration changes to the isolated portions of an OPERABLE system must be explicitly evaluated for operability impact prior to executing any configuration changes of the OPERABLE system. Isolation of the EC System to any additional cooling coil is not acceptable without an engineering evaluation and an operability determination for that configuration (Ref. 2). The EC System is inoperable in this situation. unless it has been specifically evaluated, because it is operating outside of the acceptable limits of the system.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. the EC System is required to be OPERABLE when a LOCA or other accident would require ESF operation.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 B 3.7.10-2 REVISION 59