Text

PVNGS Technical Specification Bases (TS Bases), Revision 60, Replacement Pages and Insertion Instructions
	ML14255A064
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	08/20/2014
From:	; Arizona Public Service Co
To:	; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML14255A060	List: ML14255A061; ML14255A063; ML14255A064; ML14255A065; ML14255A066;
References
	102-06934-TNW/CJS
	Download: ML14255A064 (30)
	v • d • e

PVNGS Technical Specification Bases (TS Bases)

Revision 60 Replacement Pages and Insertion Instructions The following LDCRs are included in this change:

Technical Specification Bases Revision 60 includes the following changes:

LDCRs 14-B001 clarified the TS Bases description for Action C.1 and TS Bases 3.2.4 to make the description consistent with the implementing analysis and operating procedure. In addition, corrections of errors in the TS Bases are provided for Section 3.2.3 (Azimuthal Tilt) and various typographical corrections provided on pages 3.3.1-4, 3.4.14-3, 3.4.15-2 and 3.4.16-3.

LDCR 14-B004 added the word required in two locations of TS Bases Section 3.7.8 (LCO and SR 3.7.8.1). The addition of the word required clarifies that the diesel generator fuel oil cooler needed for operability of the diesel generator is the focus of the discussion in the TS Bases sections.

Instructions Remove Page: Insert New Page:

Cover Page Cover Page List of Effective Pages List of Effective Pages 1/2 through 9/Blank 1/2 through 9/Blank B 3.1.5-9 / B 3.1.5-10 B 3.1.5-9 / B 3.1.5-10 B 3.2.3-7 / B 3.2.3-8 B 3.2.3-7 / B 3.2.3-8 B 3.2.4-5 / B 3.2.4-6 B 3.2.4-5 / B 3.2.4-6 B 3.3.1-3 / B 3.3.1-4 B 3.3.1-3 / B 3.3.1-4 B 3.4.14-3 / B 3.4.14-4 B 3.4.14-3 / B 3.4.14-4 B 3.4.15-1 / B 3.4.15-2 B 3.4.15-1 / B 3.4.15-2 B 3.4.16-3 / B 3.4.16-4 B 3.4.16-3 / B 3.4.16-4 B 3.7.8-1 / B 3.7.8-2 B 3.7.8-1 / B 3.7.8-2 B 3.7.8-3 / B 3.7.8-4 B 3.7.8-3 / B 3.7.8-4 Stephenson, Digitally signed by Stephenson, Carl J(Z05778)

DN: cn=Stephenson, Carl J(Z05778)

Carl J(Z05778)

Reason: I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Date: 2014.08.20 16:42:30 -07'00' 1

PVNGS Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2, and 3 Technical Specification Bases Revision 60 August 29, 2014 Digita lly signed by Stephenson, Carl J(ZOS778)

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Page Rev. Page Rev No. No. No. No.

B 2.1.1-1 0 B 3.1.3-2 0 B 2.1.1-2 0 B 3.1.3-3 0 B 2.1.1-3 37 B 3.1.3-4 0 B 2.1.1-4 21 B 3.1.3-5 ()

v B 2.1.1-5 54 B 3.1.3-6 56 B 2.1.2-1 0 B 3.1.4--1 0 B 2.1.2-2 31 B 3.1.4-2 31 B 2.1.2-3 0 B 3.1.4-3 0 B 2.1.2-4 54 B 3.1.4-4 0 B 3.0-1 49 B 3.1.4-5 0 B 3.0-2 0 B 3.1.5-1 0 B 3.0-3 0 B 3.1.5-2 52 B 3.0-4 0 B 3.1.5-3 52 B 3.0-5 42 B 3.1.5-4 52 B 3.0-6 48 B 3.1.5-5 52 B 3.0-7 48 B 3.1.5-6 52 B 3.0-8 42 B 3.1.5-7 52 B 3.0-9 42 B 3.1.5-8 52 B 3.0-10 42 B 3.1.5-9 60 B 3. 0-11 42 B 3.1.5-10 60 B 3.0-12 42 B 3.1.5-11 56 B 3.0-13 42 B 3.1.5-12 56 B 3.0-14 49 B 3.1.6-l 0 B 3.0-15 50 B 3.1. 6-2 46 B 3.0-16 50 B 3.1. 6-3 42 B 3.0-17 50 B 3.1. 6-4 42 B 3.0-18 49 B 3.1. 6-5 56 B 3.0-19 49 B 3.1. 6-6 46 B 3.0-20 49 B 3.1.7-1 57 B 3. 0-21 49 B 3.1.7-2 0 B 3.0-22 49 B 3.1.7-3 53 B 3.1.1-1 28 B 3.1.7-4 48 B 3.1.1-2 0 B 3.1.7-5 25 B 3.1.1-3 43 B 3.1.7-6 0 B 3.1.1-4 43 B 3.1.7-7 0 c:c B 3.1.1--5 '"1"7 Ll D 3.1.7-8 JO B 3 .1.1--6 56 B 3.1.7-9 56 B 3.1.2-1 28 B 3.1.8-1 52 B 3.1.L-2 u B 3.1.8-2 SL B 3.1.2-3 43 B 3.1.8-3 52 B 3.1.2-4 28 B 3.1.8-4 52 B 3.1.2-5 0 B 3.1.8-5 56 B 3.1.2-6 43 B 3.1.9-1 0 B 3.1.2-7 12 B 3.1.9-2 0 B 3.1.2-8 47 B 3.1.9-3 0 B 3.1.2-9 56 B 3.1.9-4 0 B 3.1.3-1 0 B 3.1.9-5 56 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 1 Revision 60 August 2 9 f 2014

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Page Rev. Page Rev No. No. No. No.

B 3.1. 9-6 56 B 3.2.5-1 52 B 3.1.10-1 0 B 3.2.5-2 10 B 3.1.10-2 53 B 3.2.5-3 0 B 3.1.10-3 0 B 3.2.5-4 52 B 3.1.10-4 37 B 3.2.5-5 0 B 3.1.10-5 56 B 3.2.5-6 56 B 3.1.10-6 0 B 3.2.5-7 0 B 3.1.11-1 0 B 3.3.1-1 35 B 3.1.11-2 53 B 3.3.1-2 53 B 3.1.11-3 0 B 3.3.1-3 53 B 3.1.11-4 53 B 3.3.1-4 60 B 3.1.11-5 0 B 3.3.1-5 53 B 3.2.1-1 53 B 3.3.1-6 53 B 3.2.1-2 10 B 3.3.1-7 53 B 3.2.1-3 53 B 3.3.1-8 53 B 3.2.1-4 0 B 3.3.1-9 53 B 3.2.1-5 0 B 3.3.1-10 53 B 3.2.1-6 0 B 3.3.1-11 53 B 3.2.1-7 56 B 3.3.1-12 53 B 3.2.1-8 56 B 3.3.1-13 53 B 3.2.2-1 52 B 3.3.1-14 53 B 3.2.2-2 10 B 3.3.1-15 53 B 3.2.2-3 0 B 3.3.1-16 53 B 3.2.2-4 52 B 3.3.1-17 53 B 3.2.2-5 1 B 3.3.1-18 53 B 3.2.2-6 0 B 3.3.1-19 53 B 3.2.2-7 56 B 3.3.1-20 53 B 3.2.3-1 52 B 3.3.1-21 53 B 3.2.3-2 10 B 3.3.1-22 53 B 3.2.3-3 0 B 3.3.1-23 53 B 3.2.3-4 52 B 3.3.1-24 53 B 3.2.3-5 0 B 3.3.1-25 53 B 3.2.3-6 0 B 3.3.1-26 53 B 3.2.3-7 60 B 3.3.1-27 53 B 3.2.3-8 56 B 3.3.1-28 53 t..::.*J D

L) 3.2.3--9 S6 B 3.3.1-29 JJ B 3.2.3-10 0 B 3.3.1-30 53 B 3.2.4-1 52 B 3.3.1-31 53 B 3.2.4-2 10 13 3.3.1-32 53 B 3.2.4-3 0 B 3.3.1-33 53 B 3.2.4-4 52 B 3.3.1-34 53 B 3.2.4-5 60 B 3.3.1-35 53 B 3.2.4-6 53 B 3.3.1-36 53 B 3.2.4-7 53 B 3.3.1-37 53 B 3.2.4-8 56 B 3.3.1-38 53 B 3.2.4-9 56 B 3.3.1-39 53 B 3.2.4-10 31 B 3.3.1-40 56 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 2 Revision 60 August 2 9, 2014

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Page Rev. Page Rev No. No. No. No.

B 3.3.1-41 56 B 3.3.4-7 0 B 3.3.1-42 56 B 3.3.4-8 0 B 3.3.1-43 56 B 3.3.4-9 0 B 3. 3. 1-*4 4 56 B 3.3.4-10 0 B 3.3.1-45 53 B 3.3.4-11 0 B 3.3.1-46 56 B 3.3.4-12 0 B 3.3.1-47 57 B 3.3.4-13 56 B 3.3.1-48 56 B 3.3.4-14 56 B 3.3.1-49 56 B 3.3.4-15 56 B 3.3.1-50 53 B 3.3.5-1 0 B 3.3.1-51 53 B 3.3.5-2 0 B 3.3.2-1 50 B 3.3.5-3 0 B 3.3.2-2 0 B 3.3.5-4 35 B 3.3.2-3 1 B 3.3.5-5 0 B 3.3.2-4 35 B 3.3.5-6 0 8 3.3.2-5 35 B 3.3.5-7 0 B 3.3.2-6 51 B 3.3.5-8 31 B 3.3.2-7 35 B 3.3.5-9 54 B 3.3.2-8 35 B 3.3.5-10 54 B 3.3.2-9 50 B 3.3.5-11 54 B 3.3.2-10 38 B 3.3.5-12 1 B 3.3.2-11 42 B 3.3.5-13 0 8 3.3.2-12 42 B 3.3.5-14 0 B 3.3.2-13 56 B 3.3.5-15 35 B 3.3.2-14 56 B 3.3.5-16 51 B 3.3.2-15 56 B 3.3.5-17 35 B 3.3.2-16 56 B 3.3.5-18 54 B 3.3.2-17 56 B 3.3.5-19 54 B 3.3.2-18 35 B 3.3.5-20 54 B 3.3.3-1 53 B 3.3.5-21 35 B 3.3.3-2 53 B 3.3.5-22 35 8 3.3.3-3 53 B 3.3.5-23 52 B 3.3.3-4 53 B 3.3.5-24 38 B 3.3.3-5 53 B 3.3.5-25 42 B 3.3.3-6 53 B 3.3.5-26 56 B 3.3.3-7 B 3.3.5-27 Ct:

JU B 3.3.3-8 53 B 3.3.5-28 56 B 3.3.3-9 53 B 3.3.5-29 56 B 3.3.3-10 56 8 3.3.S-30 3S 8 3.3.3-11 56 B 3.3.6-1 0 B 3.3.3-12 56 B 3.3.6-2 0 8 3.3.4-1 0 B 3.3.6-3 0 8 3.3.4-2 0 B 3.3.6-4 0 B 3.3.4-3 0 B 3.3.6-5 31 B 3.3.4-4 0 B 3.3.6-6 0 B 3.3.4-5 0 8 3.3.6-7 27 B 3.3.4-6 31 B 3.3.6-8 27 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 3 Revision 60 August 29, 2014

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Page Rev. Page Rev No. No. No. No.

B 3.3.6-9 0 B 3.3.10-10 57 B 3.3.6-10 0 B 3.3.10-11 50 B 3.3.6-11 0 B 3.3.10-12 50 B 3.3.6-12 0 B 3.3.10-13 50 B 3.3.6-13 0 B 3.3.10-14 50 B 3.3.6-14 0 B 3.3.10-15 50 B 3.3.6-15 0 B 3.3.10-16 50 B 3.3.6-16 0 B 3.3.10-17 50 B 3.3.6-17 27 B 3.3.10-18 50 B 3.3.6-18 0 B 3.3.10-19 56 B 3.3.6-19 56 B 3.3.10-20 56 B 3.3.6-20 0 B 3.3.10-21 50 B 3.3.6-21 56 B 3.3.10-22 32 B 3.3.6-22 46 B 3.3.11-1 0 B 3.3.7-1 2 B 3.3.11-2 2 B 3.3.7-2 2 B 3.3.11-3 2 B 3.3.7-3 0 B 3.3.11-4 42 B J. 3. "/ -4 0 B 3.3.11-5 42 B 3.3.7-5 0 B 3.3.11-6 56 B 3.3.7-6 42 B 3.3.11-7 56 B 3.3.7-7 0 B 3.3.12-1 15 B 3.3.7-8 56 B 3.3.12-2 50 B 3.3.7-9 56 B 3.3.12-3 37 B 3.3.8-1 0 B 3.3.12-4 37 B 3.3.8-2 44 B 3.3.12-5 56 B 3.3.8-3 0 B 3.3.12-6 56 B 3.3.8-4 0 B 3.4.1-1 10 B 3.3.8-5 0 B 3.4.1-2 53 B 3.3.8-6 56 B 3.4.1-3 0 B 3.3.8-7 56 B 3.4.1-4 0 B 3.3.8-8 56 B 3.4.1-5 56 B 3.3.9-1 48 B 3.4.2-1 7 B 3.3.9-2 48 B 3.1.2-2 57 B 3.3.9-3 55 B 3.4.3-1 52 B 3.3.9-4 55 B 3.4.3-2 52 B 3.3.9-S 56 B 3.4.3-3 0 B 3.3.9-6 56 B 3.4.3-4 52 B 3.3.9-7 56 B 3.4.3-5 52 8 3.3.10-1 0 8 3.4.3-6 0 B 3.3.10-2 0 B 3.4.3-7 56 B 3.3.10-3 0 B 3.4.3-8 52 B 3.3.10-4 0 B 3.4.4-1 0 B 3.3.10-5 18 B 3.4.4-2 50 B 3.3.10-6 0 B 3.4.4-3 7 B 3.3.10-7 0 B 3.4.4-4 56 B 3.3.10-8 14 B 3.4.5-1 0 B 3.3.10-9 14 B 3.4.5-2 38 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 4 Revision 60 August 29, 2014

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Page Rev. Page Rev No. No. No. No.

B 3.4.5-3 38 B 3.4.13-8 52 B 3.4.5-4 56 B 3.4.13-9 56 B 3.4.5-5 56 B 3.4.13-10 56 B 3.4.6-1 ('I v B 3.4.13-11 55 B 3.4.6-2 6 B 3.4.14-1 0 B 3.4.6-3 52 B 3.4.14-2 34 B 3.4.6-4 6 B 3.4.14-3 60 B 3.4.6-5 56 B 3.4.14-4 38 B 3.4.7-1 0 B 3.4.14-5 38 B 3.4.7-2 6 B 3.4.14-6 38 B 3.4.7-3 52 B 3.4.14-7 56 B 3.4.7-4 54 8.3.4.14-8 56 B 3.4.7-5 0 B 3.4.15-1 0 B 3.4.7-6 56 B 3.4.15-2 60 B 3.4.7-7 52 B 3.4.15-3 0 B 3.4.8-1 0 B 3.4.15-4 0 B 3.4.8-2 58 B 3.4.15-5 56 B 3.4.8-3 58 B 3.4.15-6 56 B 3.4.8-4 58 B 3.4.15-7 54 B 3.4.9-1 41 B 3.4.16-1 2 B 3.4.9-2 31 B 3.4.16-2 10 B 3.4.9-3 41 B 3.4.16-3 60 B 3.4.9-4 41 B 3.4.16-4 42 B 3.4.9-5 56 B 3.4.16-5 56 B 3.4.9-6 c;-

~b B 3.4.16-6 56 B 3.4.10-1 53 B 3.4.17-1 59 B 3.4.10-2 7 B 3.4.17-2 59 B 3.4.10-3 0 B 3.4.17-3 59 B 3.4.10-4 54 B 3.4.17-4 59 B 3.4.11-1 0 B 3.4.17-5 59 B 3.4.11-2 53 B 3.4.17-6 59 B 3.4.11-3 0 B 3.4.18-1 38 B 3.4.11-4 52 B 3.4.18-2 40 B 3.4.11-5 56 B 3.4.18-3 38 B 3.4.11-6 54 B 3.4.18-4 38 D 3.4.12-1 1

_L I3 3.4.18-5 38 B 3. 4. 12 -*2 34 B 3.4.18-6 38 B 3.4.12-3 48 B 3.4.18-7 38 B 3.4.12-4 S6 B 3.4.18-8 38 B 3.4.12-5 31 B 3.5.1-1 0 B 3.4.13-1 0 B 3.5.1-2 53 B 3.4.13-2 55 B 3.5.1-3 7 B 3.4.13-3 55 B 3.5.1-4 0 B 3.4.13-4 52 B 3.5.1-5 0 B 3.4.13-5 55 B 3.5.1-6 0 B 3.4.13-6 55 B 3.5.1-7 1 B 3.4.13-7 52 B 3.5.1-8 1 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 5 Revision 60 August 2 9' 2014

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Page Rev. Page Rev No. No. No. No.

B 3.5.1-9 57 B 3.6.2-4 0 B 3.5.1-10 56 B 3.6.2-5 0 B 3.5.2-1 0 B 3.6.2-6 0 B 3.5.2-2 53 B 3.6.2-7 0 B 3.5.2-3 53 B 3.6.2-8 57 B 3.5.2-1 0 B 3.6.3-1 36 B 3.5.2-5 0 B 3.6.3-2 43 B 3.5.2-6 0 B 3.6.3-3 49 B 3.5.2-7 1 B 3.6.3-4 43 B 3.5.2-8 22 B 3.6.3-5 43 B 3.5.2-9 57 B 3.6.3-6 43 B 3.5.2-10 56 B 3.6.3-7 43 B 3.5.3-1 0 B 3.6.3-8 43 B 3.5.3-2 48 B 3.6.3-9 43 B 3.5.3-3 0 B 3.6.3-10 43 B 3.5.3-4 0 B 3.6.3-11 43 B 3.5.3-5 0 B 3.6.3-12 43 B 3.5.3-6 2 B 3.6.3-lJ 43 B 3.5.3-7 2 B 3.6.3-14 43 B 3.5.3-8 56 B 3.6.3-15 43 B 3.5.3-9 56 B 3.6.3-16 56 B 3.5.3-10 56 B 3.6.3-17 56 B 3.5.4-1 15 B 3.6.3-18 56 B 3.5.4-2 0 B 3.6.3-19 56 B 3.5.4-3 B 3.6.4-l 53 B 3.5.5-1 54 B 3.6.4-2 38 B 3.5.5-2 54 B 3.6.4-3 56 B 3.5.5-3 55 B 3.6.5-1 0 B 3.5.5-4 54 B 3.6.5-2 1 B 3.5.5-5 51 B 3.6.5-3 56 B 3.5.5-6 51 B 3.6.5-4 0 B 3.5.5-7 51 B 3.6.6-1 0 B 3.5.5-8 56 B 3.6.6-2 0 B 3.5.5-9 56 B 3.6.6-3 53 B 3.5.6-1 0 B 3.6.6-4 7 B 3. 5. 6--2 1 D LJ 3.6.6-5 l B 3.5.6-3 0 B 3.6.6-6 56 B 3.5.6-4 56 B 3.6.6-7 56

]:) 3.5.6-5 56 B 3.6.6-8 56 B 3.6.1-1 0 B 3.6.6-9 54 B 3.6.1-2 53 B 3.7.1-1 50 B 3.6.1-3 0 B 3.7.1-2 50 B 3.6.1-4 29 B 3.7.1-3 34 B 3.6.1-5 29 B 3.7.1-4 34 B 3.6.2-l 45 B 3.7.1-5 54 B 3.6.2-2 53 B 3.7.1-6 54 B 3.6.2-3 0 B 3.7.2-1 40 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 6 Revision 60 August 29, 2014

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Page Rev. Page Rev No. No. No. No.

B 3.7.2-2 42 B 3.7.10-2 59 B 3.7.2-3 40 B 3.7.10-3 1 B 3.7.2-4 40 B 3.7.10-4 56 B 3.7.2-5 40 B 3.7.11-1 50 B 3.7.2-6 40 B 3.7.11-2 50 B 3.7.2-7 0:0

.J J B 3.7.11-3 51 B 3.7.2-8 54 B 3.7.11-4 55 B 3.7.2-9 54 B 3.7.11-5 50 B 3.7.3-1 1 B 3.7.11-6 55 B 3.7.3-2 1 B 3.7.11-7 57 B 3.7.3-3 37 B 3.7.11-8 56 B 3.7.3-4 0 B 3.7.11-9 50 B 3.7.3-5 54 B 3.7.12-1 1 B 3.7.4-1 58 B 3.7.12-2 21 B 3.7.4-2 58 B 3.7.12-3 55 B 3.7.4-3 58 B 3.7.12-4 56 B 3.7.4-4 58 B 3.7.13-1 0 B 3.7.4-5 58 B 3.7.13-2 0 B 3.7.4-6 58 B 3.7.13-3 0 B 3.7.5-1 0 B 3.7.13-4 57 B 3.7.5-2 0 B 3.7.13-5 56 B 3.7.5-3 40 B 3.7.14-1 0 B 3.7.5-4 27 B 3.7.14-2 21 B 3.7.5-5 42 B 3.7.14-3 56 B 3.7.5-6 42 B 3.7.15-1 3 B 3.7.5-7 9 B 3.7.15-2 56 B 3.7.5-8 56 B 3.7.16-1 7 B 3.7.5-9 56 B 3.7.16-2 0 B 3.7.5-10 56 B 3.7.16-3 56 B 3.7.5-11 54 B 3.7.16-4 0 B 3.7.6-1 54 B 3.7.17-1 52 B 3.7.6-2 54 B 3.7.17-2 3 B 3.7.6-3 55 B 3.7.17-3 3 B 3.7.6-4 c;r

~D B 3.7.17-4 3 B 3.7.7-1 0 B 3.7.17-5 3 D 3.7.7-2 59 D 3.7.17-6 52 B 3. 7. 7 *-3 1 B 3. 8. 1--1 35 B 3.7.7-4 56 B 3.8.1-2 2 B 3.7.7-S 56 B 3.8.1-3 34 B 3.7.8-1 1 B 3.8.1-4 34 B 3.7.8-2 60 B 3.8.1-5 20 B 3.7.8-3 l B 3.8.1-6 57 B 3.7.8-4 60 B 3.8.1-7 42 B 3.7.9-1 0 B 3.8.1-8 50 B 3.7.9-2 44 B 3.8.1-9 42 B 3.7.9-3 56 B 3.8.1-10 43 B 3.7.10-1 10 B 3.8.1-11 50 PALO VERDE UNITS 1' 2' AND 3 7 Revision 60 August 2 9' 2014

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Page Rev. Page Rev No. No. No. No.

8 3.8.1-12 48 8 3.8.3-5 54 8 3.8.1-13 48 8 3.8.3-6 56 8 3.8.1-14 48 8 3.8.3-7 56 8 3.8.1-15 48 B 3.8.3-8 41 8 3.8.1-16 41 8 3.8.3-9 56 B 3.8.1-17 41 8 3.8.3-10 51 8 3.8.1-18 41 8 3.8.4-1 0 8 3.8.1-19 41 8 3.8.4-2 37 8 3.8.1-20 41 8 3.8.4-3 0 8 3.8.1-21 41 8 3.8.4-4 2 8 3.8.1-22 41 B 3.8.4-5 2 8 3.8.1-23 57 8 3.8.4-6 56 8 3.8.1-24 50 B 3.8.4-7 56 8 3.8.1-25 56 B 3.8.4-8 56 8 3.8.1-26 56 B 3.8.4-9 56 8 3.8.1-27 56 B 3.8.4-10 56 8 3.8.1-28 56 B 3.8.4-11 48 8 3.8.1-29 53 8 3.Cl.5-1 1 B 3.8.1-30 56 8 3.8.5-2 1 8 3.8.1-31 50 8 3.8.5-3 21 8 3.8.1-32 56 8 3.8.5-4 21 8 3.8.1-33 56 8 3.8.5-5 2 B 3.8.1-34 56 B 3.8.5-6 "

L 8 3.8.1-35 50 8 3.8.6-1 0 8 3.8.1-36 56 8 3.8.6-2 0 8 3.8.1-37 45 8 3.8.6-3 56 8 3.8.1-38 56 8 3.8.6-4 56 8 3.8.1-39 56 8 3.8.6-5 37 8 3.8.1-40 56 8 3.8.6-6 37 8 3.8.1-41 56 8 3.8.6-7 48 8 3.8.1-42 56 8 3.8.7-1 48 B 3.8.1-43 56 8 3.8.7-2 48 8 3.8.1-44 56 8 3.8.7-3 53 8 3.8.1-45 56 B 3.8.7-4 53 8.3.8.1-46 56 8 3.8.7-5 56 8.3.8.1-47 4S 8 3.8.8--l l 8.3.8.1-48 53 8 3.8.8-2 1 B 3.8.2-1 0 8 3.8.8-3 21 8 3.8.2-2 0 B 3.8.8-4 56 B 3.8.2-3 0 8 3.8.8-5 56 8 3.8.2-4 21 8 3.8.9-1 51 B 3.8.2-5 21 B 3.8.9-2 0 8 3.8.2-6 0 B 3.8.9-3 51 8 3.8.3-1 0 8 3.8.9-4 0 B 3.8.3-2 0 8 3.8.9-5 0 8 3.8.3-3 50 8 3.8.9-6 0 8 3.8.3-4 0 8 3.8.9-7 0 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 8 Revision 60 August 29, 2014

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Page Rev. Page Rev No. No. No. No.

B 3.8.9-8 0 B 3.8.9-9 0 B 3.8.9-10 56 B 3.8.9-11 51 B 3.8.10-1 0 B 3.8.10-2 ')1 B 3.8.10-3 48 B 3.8.10-4 56 B 3.9.1-1 34 Corrected B 3.9.1-2 0 B 3.9.1-3 0 B 3.9.1-4 56 B 3.9.2-1 48 B 3.9.2-2 15 B 3.9.2-3 56 B 3.9.2-4 56 B 3.9.3-1 18 B 3.9.3-2 19 B 3.9.3-3 27 B 3.9.3-4 19 B 3.9.3-5 56 8.3.9.3-6 56 B 3.9.4-1 0 B 3.9.4-2 54 B 3.9.4-3 0 B 3.9.4-4 56 B 3.9.5-1 0 B 3.9.5-2 58 B 3.9.5-3 58 B 3.9.5-4 58 B 3.9.6-1 0 B 3.9.6-2 0 B 3.9.6-3 56 B 3.9.7-1 0 B 3.9.7-2 0 B 3.9.7-3 56 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 9 Revision 60 August 29, 2014

This page intentionally blank CEA Alignment B 3.1.5 BASES ACTIONS C.1 If a Required Action or associated Completion Time of Condition A or Condition B is not met. or if one or more regulating or shutdown CEAs are untrippable (immovable as a result of excessive friction or mechanical interference or known to be untrippable). the unit is required to be brought to MODE 3. By being brought to MODE 3. the unit is brought outside its MODE of applicability.

When a Required Action cannot be completed within the required Completion Time. a controlled shutdown should be commenced. The allowed Completion Time of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months is reasonable. based on operating experience. for reaching MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. Reducing THERMAL POWER in accordance with the Abnormal Operating procedures ensures acceptable power distributions are maintained. The specified ramp rate is intended to ensure DNBR SAFDLs are not challenged.

If a full strength CEA is untrippable. it is not available for reactivity insertion during a reactor trip. With an untrippable CEA. meeting the insertion limits of LCD 3.1.6.

"Shutdown Control Element Assembly (CEA) Insertion Limits."

and LCD 3.1.7. "Regulating Control Element Assembly (CEA)

Insertion Limits." does not ensure that adequate SDM exists.

Therefore. the plant must be shut down in order to evaluate the SDM required boron concentration and power level for critical operation. Continued operation is allowed with untrippable part strength CEAs if the alignment and insertion limits are met.

Continued operation is not allowed with one or more full length CEAs untrippable. This is because these cases are indicative of a loss of SDM and power distribution. and a loss of safety function. respectively.

D.1 Continued operat1on is not allowed in the case of more than one CEA misaligned from any other CEA in its group by

> 9.9 inches. For example. two CEAs in a group misaligned from any other CEA in that group by > 9.9. inches. or more than one CEA group that has a least one CEA misaligned from any other CEA in that group by> 9.9 inches. This is indicative of a loss of power distribution and a loss of (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 B 3.1.5-9 REVISION 60

CEA Alignment B 3.1.5 BASES ACTIONS D.1 (continued) safety function. respectively. Multiple CEA misalignments should result in automatic protective action. Therefore.

with two or more CEAs misaligned more than 9.9 inches. this could result in a situation outside the design basis and immediate action would be required to prevent any potential fuel damage. Immediately opening the reactor trip breakers minimizes these effects.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3 .1. 5.1 REQUIREMENTS Verification that individual CEA positions are within 6.6 inches (indicated reed switch positions) of all other CEAs in the group allows the operator to detect a CEA that is beginning to deviate from its expected position. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3 .1. 5. 2 OPERABILITY of at least two CEA position indicator channels is required to determine CEA positions. and thereby ensure compliance with the CEA alignment and insertion limits. The CEA full in and full out limits provide an additional independent means for determining the CEA positions when the CEAs are at either their fully inserted or fully withdrawn positions. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3 .1. 5. 3 Verifying each full strength CEA is tri ppab l e vmul d require that each CEA be tripped. In MODES 1 and 2 tripping each full strength CEA wo0ld result in radial or axial power tilts. or oscillations. Therefore individual full strength CEAs are exercised to orovide increased confidence that all

~ull strength CEAs rnn'tinun tn bo +r,*nn~hlo n*,on i~ +hoy I I I I I \..;U Ill \...... V \..... VI tJ~UIJ I\......, '-..\1\.....1 1 I V \.....

are not regularly tripped. A movement of 5 inches is adequate to demonstrate motion without exceeding the alignment limit when only one full strength CEA is being moved. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. Between required (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 B 3.1.5-10 REVISION 60

Tg B 3.2.3 BASES ACTIONS B.1. B.2. B.3. B.4. and B.5 (continued)

Also in the case of a tilt generated by a CEA misalignment.

the 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months allows recovery of the CEA misalignment. Except as a result of CEA misalignment. a measured Tq not within the limit in the COLR with COLSS in service or> 0.03 with COLSS out of service is not expected. If it occurs.

continued operation of the reactor may be necessary to discover the cause of the tilt. Operation then is restricted to only those conditions required to identify the cause of the tilt. It is necessary to explicitly account for power asymmetries because the radial power peaking factors used in the core power distribution calculation are based on an untilted power distribution.

If the measured Tq is not restored to within its specified limits. the reactor continues to operate with an axial power distribution mismatch. Continued operation in this configuration may induce an axial xenon oscillation. which results in increased LHGRs when the xenon redistributes. If the measured Tq cannot be restored to within its limit within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . reactor power must be reduced. Reducing THERMAL POWER to < 50% RTP within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months orovides an acceptable level of protection from increased power peaking due to potential xenon redistribution while maintaining a power level sufficiently high enough to allow the tilt to be analyzed.

The Variable Overpower trip setpoints are reduced to

~55% RTP to ensure that the assumptions of the accident analysis regarding power peaking are maintained. After power has been reduced to~ 50% RTP. the rate and magnitude of changes in the core flux are greatly reduced. Therefore.

16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months is an acceptable time period to allow for reduction of the Variable Overpower trip setpoints. Required Action B.2. The 16 hour1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months Comoletion Time allowed to reduce the Variable Overpower trip setpoints is required to perform the actions necessary to reset the trip setpoints.

TUCDMAL pn1WER l'r rest~l*~+ed t~ hO% RTD u~+;l the m~~sur~d Tq I I I L I \I. f\ U ...) I I._.. L V J 0 \ I I I I ~ I I I Ill C.: U I C is restored to within its specified limit by correcting the out of limit condition. This action prevents the operator from increasing THERMAL POWER above the conservative limit when a significant Tq has existed. but allows the unit to continue operation for diagnostic purposes.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 B 3.2.3-7 REVISION 60

Tq B 3.2.3 BASES ACTIONS 8.1. 8.2. 8.3. 8.4, and 8.5 (continued)

If Tq is restored prior to identifying and correcting the cause. the plant corrective action program will continue to evaluate the cause of the out of limit condition.

After a THERMAL POWER increase following restoration of Tq.

operation may proceed provided the measured Tq is determined to remain within its specified limit at the increased THERMAL POWER level.

The provision to allow discontinuation of the Surveillance after verifying that Tq is within its specified limit at least once per hour for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months or until T is verified to be within its specified limit at a THERMAL POWER~ 95% RTP provides an acceptable exit from this action after the measured Tq has been returned to an acceptable value.

C.1 If the measured Tq cannot be restored or determined within its specified lim1t. core power must be reduced. Reduction of core power to ~ 20% RTP ensures that the core is operating within its thermal limits and places the core in a conservative condition based on the trip setpoints generated by the CPCs. which assume a minimum core power of 20% RTP.

Six hours is a reasonable time to reach 20% RTP in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.2.3.1 REQUIREMENTS Continuous monitoring of the measured Tq by the i ncore nuclear detectors is provided by the COLSS. A COLSS alarm "C:

!~ d~nnun~" ~tP...J

! .... Lid ~U l. n.I +-11e L. P"ent

~V .. ~ that

~.! ~ tllP

~ m~~c:ur~ri

.t:d~. t:'~ T!q P"~~e...J~

~ALe U::O _ 11P

_,L!.~

value used in the CPCs.

With the COLSS out of service. the operator must calculate Tq and verify that it is within its specified limits. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 B 3.2.3-8 REVISION 56

DNBR B 3.2.4 BASES APPLICABLE Fuel cladding damage does not occur from conditions outside SAFETY ANALYSES the limits of these LCOs during normal operation. However.

(continued) fuel cladding damage could result if an accident occurs from initial conditions outside the limits of these LCOs. This potential for fuel cladding damage exists because changes in the power distribution can cause increased power peaking and correspondingly increased local LHRs.

DNBR satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36 (c)(2)(ii).

LCD The power distribution LCD limits are based on correlations between power peaking and certain measured variables used as inputs to the LHR and DNBR operating limits. The power distribution LCD limits are provided in the COLR.

With the COLSS in service and at least one of the Control Element Assembly Calculators CCEACs) OPERABLE in each operable CPC Channel. the DNBR will be maintained by ensuring that the core power* calculated by the COLSS is equal to or less than the permissible core power operating limit based on DNBR calculated by the COLSS. In the event that the COLSS is in service but the above condition is not met. the DNBR is maintained by ensuring that the core power calculated by the COLSS is equal to or less than a reduced value of the permissible core power operating limit calculated by the COLSS. In this condition. the calculated operating limit must be reduced by the allowance specified in the COLR.

In instances for which the COLSS is out of service and at least one of the CEACs are OPERABLE in each operable CPC Channel. the DNBR is maintained by operating within the acceptable region specified in the COLR and using any OPERABLE CPC channel. Alternatively, when the COLSS is out of service and the above condition is not met. the ONBR is maintained by operating within the acceptable region specified in the COLR for this condition and using any OPERABLE CPC chJnnel with two inoperable CEACs. Note that the DNBR Margin Operating Limit based on CPC COLR limits (Figures 3.2.4-2 &3.2.4-3) should not be used during a four finger CEA misalignment event as the radial distortion (static and xenon transient) and azimuthal tilt are not accounted for in the CPC DNBR calculation in all cases.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 B 3.2.4-5 REVISION 60

DNBR B 3.2.4 BASES LCO With the COLSS out of service. the limitation on DNBR as a (continued) operating conditions consistent with the analysis assumptions that have been analytically demonstrated adequate to maintain an acceptable minimum DNBR for all ADOs. Operation of the core with a DNBR at or above this limit ensures that an acceptable minimum DNBR is maintained in the event of the most limiting AOO (i.e .. loss of flow transient. CEA misoperation events. or asymmetric SG transient).

APPLICABILITY Power distribution is a concern any time the reactor is critical. The power distribution LCOs. however. are only applicable in MODE 1 above 20% RTP. The reasons these LCOs are not applicable below 20% RTP are:

a. The incore neutron detectors that provide input to the COLSS. which then calculates the operating limits. are inaccurate due to the poor signal to noise ratio that they experience at relatively low core power levels.

b. As a result of this inaccuracy. the CPCs assume a mini mum core power of 20% RTP 1.vhen generating the Local Power Density (LPD) and DNBR trip signals. When the core power is below this level. the core is operating well below the thermal limits and the resultant CPC calculated LPD and DNBR trips are highly conservative.

ACTIONS A.1 Operating at or above the minimum required value of the DNBR ensures that an acceptable minimum DNBR is maintained in the event of a postulated ADO. If the core power as calculated by the COLSS exceeds the core power limlt calculated by the COLSS based on the DNBR. fuel design limits may not be maintained following an AOO and prompt action must be taken lo r*es lor'e Lhe Dr~BR above its mini 1num All owaiJ l e Vd l ue. Wi Lh the COLSS in service. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months is a reasonable time for the operator to initiate corrective actions to restore the DNBR above its specified limit. because of the low probability of a severe transient occurring in th1s relatively short time.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 B 3.2.4-6 REVISION 53

RPS Instrumentation - Operating B 3.3.1 BASES BACKGROUND Measurement Channels (continued)

Measurement channels used as an input to the RPS are not used for control functions.

When a channel monitoring a parameter exceeds a predetermined setpoint. indicating an unsafe condition. the bistable monitoring the parameter in that channel will trip. Tripping bistables monitoring the same parameter in two or more channels will de-energize Matrix Logic. which in turn de-energizes the Initiation Logic. This causes all four RTCBs to open. interrupting power to the CEAs.

allowing them to fall into the core.

Three of the four measurement and bistable channels are necessary to meet the redundancy and testability of 10 CFR 50. Appendix A. GDC 21 (Ref. 1). The fourth channel provides additional flexibility by allowing one channel to be removed from service (trip channel bypass) for maintenance or testing while still maintaining a minimum two-out-of-three logic. Thus. even with a channel inoperable. no single additional failure in the RPS can either cause an inadvertent trip or prevent a required trip from occurring.

Adequate channel to channel independence includes physical and electrical independence of each channel from the others. This allows operation in two-out-of-three logic with one channel removed from service until following the next MODE 5 entry. Since no single failure will either cause or prevent a protective system actuation. and no protective channel feeds a control function. this arrangement meets the applicable requirements of standards referenced in the UFSAR. Chapter 7 (Ref. 4).

The CPCs perform the calculations required to derive the DNBR and LPD parameters and their associated RPS trips.

Fou ~ sAna~~+e CF'C~ nArt-o~m the ~~ CU ~+~A~~ ~nd'enend'en+'"

1 1

I CfJ 101.- .J fJC 1111 II \...01 101.-IUII.J I fJ I 11.-lj, one for each of the four RPS channels. The CPCs provide outputs to drive display indications CDNBR margin. LPD margin. and calibrated neutron flux power levels) and provide DNBR- Low and LPD- High pretrip and trip signals.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 B 3.3.1-3 REVISION 53

RPS Instrumentation - Operating B 3.3.1 BASES BACKGROUND Measurement Channels (continued)

The CPC channel outputs for the DNBR - Low and LPD - High trips operate contacts in the Matrix Logic in a manner identical to the other RPS trips.

Each CPC receives the following inputs:

Hot leg and cold leg temperatures:

Pressurizer pressure:

Reactor coolant pump speed:

Excore neutron flux levels:

Target CEA positions: and

CEAC penalty factors.

Each CPC is programmed with "addressable constants." These are various alignment values. correction factors. etc ..

that are required for the CPC computations. They can be accessed for display or for the purpose of changing them as necessary.

The CPCs use this constant and variable information to perform a number of calculations. These include the calculation of CEA group and subgroup deviations (and the assignment of conservative penalty factors). correction and calculation of average axial power distribution (APD)

(based on excore flux levels and CEA positions).

calculation of coolant flow (based on pump speed). and calculation of calibrated average power level (based on excore flux levels and ~T power).

The DNBR calculation considers primary pressure. inlet temperature. coolant flow average power. APD. radial peaking factors. and CEA deviation penalty factors from the CEACs to calculate the state of the limitinq (hot) coolant channel in the core. A DNBR - Low trip occGrs when the calculated value reaches the minimum DNBR trip setpoint.

The LPD calculation considers APD. average power. radial peaking factors (based upon target CEA position). and CEAC penalty factors to calculate the current value of compensated peak power density. An LPD - High trip occurs when the calculated value reaches the trip setpoint. The four CPC channels provide input to the four DNBR - Low and four LPD - High RPS trip channels. They effectively act as the sensor and bistable trip units (using many inputs) for these trips.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 8 3.3.1-4 REVISION 60

RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.14 BASES APPLICABLE on operating experience as an indication of one or more SAFETY ANALYSES propagating tube leak mechanisms. This leakage rate limit (continued) provides additional assurance against tube rupture at normal and faulted conditions and provides additional assurance that cracks will not propagate to burst prior to detection by leakage monitoring methods and commencement of plant shutdown.

RCS operational LEAKAGE satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50 . 36 (c) ( 2)( i i ) .

LCO RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:

a. Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE No pressure boundary LEAKAGE is allowed. being indicative of material deterioration. L~AKAGE ot this type is unacceptable as the leak itself could cause further deterioration. resulting in higher LEAKAGE.

Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of the RCPB. LEAKAGE past seals and gaskets is not pressure boundary LEAKAGE.

b. Unidentified LEAKAGE One gallon per minute (gpm) of unidentified LEAKAGE is allowed as a reasonable minimum detectable amount that the containment air monitoring and containment sump level monitoring equipment can detect within a reasonable time period. Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of the RCPB. if the LEAKAGE is from the pressure boundary.

c. Identified LEAKAGE Up to 10 gpm of identified LEAKAGE is considered allowable because l_EAKAGE is from known sources that do not interfere with detection of unidentified LEA.KAGE and is v.1e ll within the capability of the RCS makeup system. Identified LE.L\K.L\GE includes LE.L\KA.GE to the containment from specifically known and located sources. but does not include pressure boundary LEAKAGE or controlled Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal leakoff (a normal function not considered LEJ\K,LI,GE). Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of a component or system.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 B 3.4.14-3 REVISION 60

RCS Operational LEAKAGE B 3.4.14 BASES LCO LCO 3.4.15. "RCS Pressure Isolation Valve (PIV)

(continued) Leakage," measures leakage through each individual PIV and can impact this LCO. Of the two PIVs in series in each isolated line. leakage measured through one PIV does not result in RCS LEAKAGE when the other is leaktight. If both valves leak and result in a loss of mass from the RCS. the loss must be included in the allowable identified LEAKAGE.

d. Primary to Secondary LEAKAGE through Any One SG The limit of 150 gallons per day per SG is based on the operational LEAKAGE performance criterion in NEI 97-06. Steam Generator Program Guidelines (Ref. 7).

The Steam Generator Program operational LEAKAGE performance criterion in NEI 97-06 states. "The RCS operational primary to secondary leakage through any one SG shall be limited to 150 gallons per day." The limit is based on operating experience with SG tube degradation mechanisms that result in tube leakage.

The operational leakage rate criterion in conjunction with the implementation of the Steam Generator Program is an effective measure for minimizing the frequency of steam generator tube ruptures.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4. the potential for RCPB LEAKAGE is greatest when the RCS is pressurized.

In ~*10DES 5 and 6. LEAKAGE limits are not required because the reactor coolant pressure is far lower. resulting in lower stresses and reduced potentials for LEAKAGE.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 B 3.4.14-4 REVISION 38

RCS PIV Leakage B 3.4.15 B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.15 RCS Pressure Isolation Valve (PIV) Leakage BASES BACKGROUND 10 CFR 50.2, 10 CFR 50.55a(c). and GOC 55 of 10 CFR 50.

Appendix A (Refs. 1. 2. and 3). define RCS PIVs as any two normally closed valves in series within the RCS pressure boundary that separate the high pressure R.CS from an attached low pressure system. During their lives. these valves can produce varying amounts of reactor coolant leakage through either normal operational wear or mechanical deterioration. The RCS PIV LCO allows R.CS high pressure operation when leakage through these valves exists in amounts that do not compromise safety.

The PIV leakage limit applies to each individual valve.

Leakage through both PIVs in series in a line must be included as part of the identified LEAKAGE. governed by LCO 3.4.14. "RCS Operational LEAKAGE." This is true durinq operation only when the loss of RCS mass through two valves in series is determined by a water inventory balance (SR 3.4.14.1). A known component of the identified LEAKAGE before operation begins is the least of the two individual leakage rates determined for leaking series PIVs during the required surveillance testing; leakage measured through one PIV in a line is not RCS operational LEAKAGE if the other is leaktight.

Although this specification provides a limit on allowable PIV leakage rate. its main purpose is to prevent overpressure failure of the low pressure portions of connecting systems. The leakage limit is an indication that the PIVs between the RCS and the connecting systems are degraded or degrading. PIV leakage could lead to overpressure of the low pressure piping or components.

Failure consequences could be a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) outside of containment. an unanalyzed conditlon that could degrade the ability for low pressure injection.

The basis for this LCD is the 197.5 NRC "Reactor Safety Study" (Ref. 4) that identified potential intersystem LOCAs as a significant contributor to the risk of core melt. A subsequent study (Ref. 5) evaluated various PIV configurations to determine the probability of intersystem LOCAs.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 B 3.4.15-1 REVISION 0

RCS PIV Leakage B 3.4.15 BASES BACKGROUND PIVs are provided to isolate the RCS from the following (continued) typically connected systems:

a. Shutdown Cooling (SOC) System; and

b. Safety Injection System; The PIVs are listed in UFSAR section 3.9.6.2 (Ref. 6).

Violation of this LCO could result in continued degradation of a PIV. which could lead to overpressurization of a low pressure system and the loss of the integrity of a fission product barrier.

APPLICABLE Reference 4 identified potential intersystem LOCAs as a SAFETY ANALYSES significant contributor to the risk of core melt. The dominant accident sequence in the intersystem LOCA category is the failure of the low pressure portion of the SOC System outside of containment. The accident is the result of a postulated failure of the PIVs. which are part of the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (RCPB). and the subsequent pressurization of the SOC System downstream of the PIVs *from the RCS. Because the low pressure portion of the SOC System is typically designed for 485 psig, overpressurization failure of the SOC low pressure line would result in a LOCA outside containment and subsequent risk of core melt.

Reference 5 evaluated various PIV configurations. leakage testing of the valves. and operational changes to determine the effect on the probability of intersystem LOCAs. This study concluded that periodic leakage testing of the PIVs can substantially reduce the probability of an intersystem LOCA.

RCS PIV leakage satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36 (c)(2)(ii).

LCO RCS PIV leakage is identified LEAKAGE into closed systems connected to the RCS. Isolation valve leakage is usually on the order of drops per minute. Leakage that increases (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 B 3.4.15-2 REVISION 60

RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation B 3.4.16 BASES APPLICABLE The safety significance of RCS LEAKAGE varies widely SAFETY ANALYSES depending on its source. rate. and duration. Therefore.

(continued) detecting and monitoring RCS LEAKAGE into the containment area are necessary. Quickly separating the identified LEAKAGE from the unidentified LEAKAGE provides quantitative information to the operators. allowing them to take corrective action should leakage occur detrimental to the safety of the facility and the public.

RCS leakage detection instrumentation satisfies Criterion 1 of 10 CFR 50.36 (c)(2)(ii).

LCD One method of protecting against large RCS LEAKAGE derives from the ability of instruments to detect extremely small leaks. This LCD requires instruments of diverse monitoring principles to be OPERABLE to provide a high degree of confidence that extremely small leaks are detected in time to allow actions to place the plant in a safe condition when RCS LEAKAGE indicates possible RCPB degradation.

The LCD is satisfied when monitors of diverse measurement means are available. Thus. the containment sump monitor in combination with a particulate and gaseous radioactivity monitor (RU-1) provides an acceptable minimum. It has been determined that it is acceptable to continue to call the containment sump OPERABLE with one containment sump pump out of service.

APPLICABILITY Because of elevated RCS temperature and pressure in MODES 1.

2. 3. and 4. RCS leakage detection instrumentation is required to be OPERABLE.

In MODE 5 or 6. the temperature is ~ 210°F and pressure is maintained low or at atmospheric pressure. Since the temperatures and pressures are far lower than those for MODES 1. 2. 3. and. the likelihood of leakage and crack propagation is much smaller. Therefore. the requirements of this LCD are not applicable in MODES 5 and 6.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 B 3.4.16-3 REVISION 60

RCS Leakage Detect4on Instrumentat4on B 3.4.16 BASES (continued)

ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 If the containment sump monitor is inoperable. no other form of sampling can provide the equivalent information.

However. the containment atmosphere radioactivity monitor will provide indications of changes in leakage. Together with the atmosphere monitor. the periodic surveillance for RCS water inventory balance. SR 3.4.14.1. must be performed at an increased frequency of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months to provide information that is adequate to detect leakage.

Restoration of the sump monitor to OPERABLE status is required to regain the function in a Completion Time of 30 days after the monitor's failure. This time is acceptable considering the frequency and adequacy of the RCS water inventory balance required by Required Action A.l.

B.1.1. B.1.2. and B.2 With either the gaseous or particulate containment atmosphere radioactivity monitoring instrumentation channels inoperable. alternative action is required. Either grab samples of the containment atmosphere must be taken and analyzed. or water inventory balances. in accordance with SR 3.4.14.1. must be performed to provide alternate periodic information. With a sample obtained and analyzed or an inventory balance performed every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . the reactor may be operated for up to 30 days to allow restoration of both of the radioactivity monitors.

The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months interval provides periodic information that is adequate to detect leakage. The 30 day Completion Time recoqnizes at least one other form of leakaqe detection is avai1able. *

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 B 3.4.16-4 REVISION 42

ESPS B 3.7.8 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.8 Essential Spray Pond System (ESPS)

BASES

~ --------------~~--~-------~ -------~----~~-------- *----------- -~--------------~--- -- ---~--

BACKGROUND The ESPS provides a heat sink for the removal of process and operating heat from safety related components during a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or transient. During a normal shutdown. the ESPS also provides this function for various safety related components.

The ESPS consists of two separate. 100% capacity safety related cooling water trains. Each train consists of one 100% capacity pump. one Essential Cooling Water (EW) heat exchanger. piping. valves. instrumentation. and a cleanup and Chemistry Control System. The valves are manually aligned. and secured in position. The pumps are automatically started upon receipt of an CSFAS signal.

Additional information about the design and operation of the ESPS. along with a list of the components served. is presented in the FSAR. Section 9.2.1 (Ref. 1). The principal safety related function of the ESPS is the removal of decay heat from the reactor via the EW System.

APPLICABLE The design basis of the ESPS is for one ESPS train. in SAFETY ANALYSES conjunction with the EW System and a 100% capacity containment spray system to remove sufficient heat to ensure a safe reactor shutdown coincident with a loss of offsite power. The ESPS is designed to perform its function with a single failure of any active component. assuming the loss of offsite power.

The ESPS. in conjunction with the EW System. also cools the unit from shutdown cooling (SOC). as discussed in the UFSAR.

Section 5.4.7 (Ref. 2) entry conditions to MODE 5 during normal and post accident operations. The time required for this evolution is a function of the number of EW and SOC System trains that are operating. One ESPS train is sufficient to remove decay heat during subsequent operations in MODES 5 and 6. This assumes that worst case meteorological conditions occur simultaneously with maximum heat loads on the system.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 B 3.7.8-1 REVISION 1

ESPS B 3.7.8 BASES APPLICABLE The ESPS satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (c)(2)(ii).

SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

LCO Two ESPS trains are required to be OPERABLE to provide the required redundancy to ensure that the system functions to remove post accident heat loads. assuming the worst single active failure occurs coincident with the loss of offsite power.

An ESPS train is considered OPERABLE when:

a. The associated pump is OPERABLE; and

b. The associated piping, valves. instrumentation. heat exchanger. and instrumentation and controls required to perform the safety related function are OPERABLE.

The isolation of the ESPS from other components or systems renders those components or systems inoperable. but does not necessarily affect the OPERABILITY of the ESPS. Isolation of the ESPS to required Diesel Generator (DG) cooler(s).

while rendering the DG inoperable. is acceptable and does not impact the OPERABILITY of the ESPS. Disassembly, removal of insulation. and other configuration changes to the isolated portions of an OPERABLE system must be explicitly evaluated for operability impact prior to executing any configuration changes of the OPERABLE system.

Isolation of the ESPS to the essential cooling water heat exchanger is not acceptable and would render both the Essential Cooling Water System and the ESPS inoperable (Ref.

3). The ESPS is inoperable in this situation because it is operating outside of the acceptable limits of the system.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1. 2. 3. and 4. the ESPS System is required to support the OPERABILITY of the equipment serviced by the ESPS and required to be OPERABLE in these MODES.

When the plant is in other than MODES 1. 2. 3 or 4. the requirements of the ESPS shall be consistent with the definition of OPERABILITY which requires (support) equipment to be capable of performing its related support function(s).

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 B 3.7.8-2 REVISION 60

ESPS B 3.7.8 BASES ACTIONS A.1 With one ESPS train inoperable. action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . In this Condition.

the remaining OPERABLE ESPS train is adequate to perform the heat removal function. HovJever. the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the ESPS train could result in loss of ESPS function. Required Action A.1 is modified by two Notes. The first Note indicates that the applicable Conditions of LCO 3.8.1. ;oAC Sources- Operating."

must be entered when the inoperable ESPS train results in an inoperable emergency diesel generator. The second Note indicates that the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.6. "RCS Loops- MODE 4." should be entered if an inoperable ESPS train results in an inoperable SOC System. This note is only applicable in MODE 4. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time is based on the redundant capabilities afforded by the OPER.li.BLE train. and the l m-J probability of a DBA occurring during this time period.

B.1 and B.2 If the ESPS train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time. the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status. the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months .

The allowed Completion Times are reasonable. based on operating experience. to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.8.1 REQUIREMENTS Verifying the correct alignment for manual and power operated, valves in the ESPS flow path ensures that the proper flow paths exist for ESPS operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked. sealed. or otherwise secured in position. since they are verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing. or securing.

This SR also does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned. such as check valves. This (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 B 3.7.8-3 REVISION 1

ESPS B 3.7.8 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.8.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS Surveillance does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather. it involves verification that those valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct positlon. Thls SR lS modified by a Note lndicating that the isolation of the ESPS components or systems renders those components or systems inoperable but does not necessarily affect the OPERABILITY of the ESPS. Isolation of the ESPS to required Diesel Generator (DG) cooler(s).

while rendering the DG inoperable. is acceptable and does not impact the OPERABILITY of the ESPS. Isolation of the ESPS to the essential cooling water heat exchanger is not acceptable and would render both the Essential Cooling Water System and the ESPS inoperable (Ref. 3). The ESPS is inoperable in this situation because it is operating outside of the acceptable limits of the system.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.7.8.2 The SR verifies proper automatic operation of the ESPS pumps on an actual or simulated actuation sional. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

REFERENCES 1. UFSAR. Section 9.2.1.

2. UFSAR. Section 5.4./.

3. CRDR 980795 PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 B 3.7.8-4 REVISION 60

ML14255A064

Text

Navigation menu

Search