ML081490360

Technical Specifications Bases Revision 48 Update

ML081490360
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	05/20/2008
From:	Weber T Arizona Public Service Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
102-05859-TNW/CJS
Download: ML081490360 (84)

Text

Technical Specification 5.5.14 LAWS Palo Verde Nuclear Thomas N. Weber Department Leader Tel. 623-393-5764 Mail Station 7636 PO Box 52034 Generating Station Regulatory Affairs Fax 623-393-5442 Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034 102-05859-TNW/CJS May 20, 2008 ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject:

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)

Units 1, 2, and 3 Docket Nos. STN 50-52815291530 Technical Specifications Bases Revision 48 Update Pursuant to PVNGS Technical Specification (TS) 5.5.14, "Technical Specifications Bases Control Program," Arizona Public Service Company (APS) is submitting changes to the TS Bases incorporated into Revision 48, implemented on May 14, 2008.

The revision insertion instructions and replacement pages are provided in the Enclosure.

No commitments are being made to the NRC by this letter. Should you have any questions, please contact Russell A. Stroud, at (623) 393-5111.

Sincerely,

ýO 90, -,

TNW/RAS/CJS/gat A member of the STARS (Strategic Teaming and Resource Sharing) Alliance 4oo(

Callaway

• Comanche Peak 0 Diablo Canyon 0 Palo Verde 0 South Texas Project

• Wolf Creek

ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Technical Specifications Bases Revision 48 Update Page 2 Enclosure - PVNGS Technical Specification Bases Revision 48 Insertion Instructions and Replacement Pages cc: E. E. Collins Jr. NRC Region IV Regional Administrator (enclosure)

M. T. Markley NRC NRR Project Manager (enclosure)

R. I. Treadway NRC Senior Resident Inspector for PVNGS (enclosure)

ENCLOSURE PVNGS Technical Specification Bases Revision 48 Insertion Instructions and Replacement Pages

Insertion Instructions for the Technical Specifications Bases Revision 48 REMOVE PAGES INSERT PAGES Cover page Cover page List of Effective Pages List of Effective Pages 1/2 through 7/8 1/2 through 7/8 B 3.0-5 / B 3.0-6 B 3.0-5 / B 3.0-6 B 3.0-7 / B 3.0-8 B 3.0-7 / B 3.0-8 B 3.1.7-3/ B 3.1.7-4 B 3.1.7-3/ B 3.1.7-4 B 3.2.4-7 / B 3.2.4-8 B 3.2.4-7/ B 3.2.4-8 B 3.2.4-9 / B 3.2.4-10 B 3.2.4-9 / B 3.2.4-10 B 3.3.9-1 / B 3.3.9-2 B 3.3.9-1 / B 3.3.9-2 B 3.4.12-3/ B 3.4.12-4 B 3.4.12-3/ B 3.4.12-4 B 3.4.15-1/ B 3.4.15-2 B 3.4.15-1 /B 3.4.15-2 B3 3.5.1-1 I B 3.5.1-2 B 3.5.1-1 / B 3.5.1-2 B 3.5.3-1 / B 3.5.3-2 B 3.5.3-1 / B 3.5.3-2 B 3.5.5-1 / B 3.5.5-2 B 3.5.5-1 / B 3.5.5-2 through through B 3.5.5-7 / Blank B 3.5.5-15 / B 3.5.5-16 B 3.6.5-3 / B 3.6.5-4 B 3.6.5-3 B 3.6.5-4 B 3.6.6-7 / B 3.6.6-8 B 3.6.6-7 / B 3.6.6-8 B 3.7.11-3 / B 3.7.11-4 B 3.7.11-3 / B 3.7.11-4 B 3.7.11-5 / B 3.7.11-6 B 3.7.11-5 / B 3.7.11-6 B 3.8.1-11 / B 3.8.1-12 B 3.8.1-11 / B 3.8.1-12 through through B 3.8.1-15/ B 3.8.1-16 B 3.8.1-15/ B 3.8.1-16 B 3.8.1-33 / B 3.8.1-34 B 3.8.1-33 / B 3.8.1-34 B 3.8.1-35 / B 3.8.1-36 B 3.8.1-35 / B 3.8.1-36 I

B 3.8.1-39 / B 3.8.1-40 B 3.8.1-39 / B 3.8.1-40 B 3.8.3-9 ! B 3.8.3-10 B 3.8.3-9 / B 3.8.3-10 B 3.8.4-11 / Blank B 3.8.4-11 / Blank B 3.8.6-7 /Blank B 3.8.6-7 I Blank B'3..8.7-1 / B 3.8.7-2 B 3.8.7-1 / B 3.8.7-2 B 3.8.7-3 / B 3.8.7-4 B 3.8.7-3/ B 3.8.7-4 B 3.8.10-3 / B 3.8.10-4 B 3.8.10-3 / B 3.8.10-4 B 3.9.2-1 / B 3.9.2-2 B 3.9.2-1 / B 3.9.2-2 2

PVNGS Palo Verde Nuclear GeneratingStation Units 1, 2, and 3 Technical Specification Bases Digitally signed by Revision 48 SteDh4 En&

I Stephenson, Carl J(Zo5778)

DN: cn=Stephenson, Carl J May 14, 2008 on , C ,arl k/IlStephenson@aps.com i i/I \,(Z05778), email=Carl.

- Reason: This is an accurate

. ,*i\- copy A. etheriginal document.

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(* ,* 7 Date: 2008.05.09 13:03:39

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• 38 PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 2 Revision 48 May 14, 2200 8 r **i. -*. I

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B 3.9.6-1 0 B 3.9.6-2 0 B 3.9.6-3 0 B 3.9.7-1 0 B 3'3. 9 ."7-2" 0 B-3.9'.7-3 " 0" PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 8 Revision 48 May 14, 2008

LCO Applicability B 3.0 BASES LCO 3.0.3 The requirerdent-of-LCO 3 do not ap plyi n other specifi ed (conti nued) conditions of the Applicability (unless in MODE 1 2.: "3:

or 4) because the ACTIONS of indi-viduaý'T Specifications.

sufficiently define the remedial measrnes to be tke'n'.' -

Exceptions to LCO 3.0.3 are provided in instanceswhered!

requiring a unit shutdown, in accordance with LCO.3-0...3,,,

would not provide appropriate remedial measures forthe associated condition of the unit. An example of this is in LCO 3.7.14, "Fuel Storage Pool Water Level." LCO.'317.14 has an Applicability of "During movement of irradiatedfu6l..

assemblies in the fuel storage pool."'* Therefore,-..this LCQi.

can be applicable in any or all MODES. If the LCO and the Required Actions of LCO 3.7.14 are not met while in MODE i' 2, or 3. there is no safety benefit to-be gained by placing the unit in a shutdown condition. The>Required Action;.of, LCO 3.7.14 of "Suspend movement of irradiated fuel- assembl.ies in fuel storage pool" is the appropriate Required Action to complete in lieu of the actions of LCO 3.0.3. These exceptions are addressed in the individual Specifications.

LCO 3.0.4 LCO 3.0.4 establishes limitations on ch'anges in MODES orý.

other specified conditions in,t Appll6ability

• p.the when:an LCO is notmet. It allows placihg.the uniti n a MODE or'.6thler specified condition stated in that Applicability (e.g.. ,the I

Applicability desired to be entered) when Unit conditions.'are such that the requirements of the LCO would not be.'met in.

accordance with LCO 3.0.4.a, LCO 3.0.4b., or LCO 3.,-0.4:c.

LCO 3.0.4.a allows entry into a MODE or. other specifi-ed condition in the Applicability with the"'LCO not met when th.e associated ACTIONS to be entered permit- continued operationi in the MODE or other specified conditin6 in the Applicability for an unlimited period of time.

(Conti nud).

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2 ,3 B 3.0-5 REVISION 42

LCO Applicability B 3.0 BASES

.... LCO3.04 Ca"..mp] I a wih t ,Requ1ired>A ct- ons that- permi t continued

-ce (con iinLud') "Vp~radiOr onf' 6,0 unt ifdor -an' uniJfrAi ted period of time in a

, MODE 'or other ýsecifiid conditlon provides an acceptable level of sa.fety*Cfor'continue-d operation. This is without the status inof sch regard to hrefore Ichange. cases:,before the.unit after entry orinto the MODE a MODE or other specified cbnditioU i ri1the Applicab.ility :may be made in

, accordance Wi.th the pr6vi'sioons of the Required Actions.

LCO 3.0.4.b allows ehtry into aMODE'or other specified cbndition in the.Appi icability 'with the LCO not met after' performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, conside'ration of the results,

"'determination of. the acceptabilitiy of entering the MODE or other-;speci'fiedcornditi'n in 'theApplicability, and establishmenti"of ris'management actions, if appropriate.

-The risk asses:smnrit6may use quantit :ati.ve:,, qualitative, or blended:approaches:-.and theirisk assessment will be conducted

-:usi-ngýthe plýant.prog:;,"amA, :procedures," and' criteria in place to implement-10:GFR,50.65(a).(4),:whch .r'eqUires that risk impac ts.;of:. mainterranc'e actiVi.ties ito"be assessed and managed.

ýii" .. ,Thelrisk.assessmfntti.for-'the':pL!rpose's of.LCO 3.0.4 (b), must I_ .

t i.nto-accoLultaiý',.liroperable Technitcal Specification equipment .rdgard~ess-of,whether th .equipment is included in the normal 10 CFRz;,.65C(a-):(4). risk :assessment scope. The

_,,risk assessments will be, conducted using, the procedures and guicdarinceendo'r'se~d,;'by-ye*eguatory' Guide' 1.182, "Assessing and

,.,-:Matiagig Ri s~k, Before. Mai.tenance 'Activiltiles at Nuclear Power

Piants' 'Regula.Qry.GUid, 1.182 endorses the guidance in Secti:6jh Of NUMARC.93-'01 "Industry. Guideline for

• -Mbni'torihq'the"'.:Efffecti.'venesso-6f Mainten.ance at Nuclear Power Plats:,:,These cocur ents 'address general guidance for c':onuctof the'e riskassessment, quantitative and qualitative guidelines for .establ.ishing 'isk management actions, and

-' examie~risk management acti'ois' 'These include actions to p]'an and Co-nduct'otfher' acti'vi ties 'ina manner that controls overalli Iisk., increased -risk awareness by shift and management -personnel 'action's to "reduce the duration of the c6ndi tifon,. ,'actions..t . miimize the magnitude of risk increa ses'(e'stabli-shment -of backup'iSuccess paths or

.compe'sa tdbiymeas-ure's), a'd deterii nat i that the proposed

).;-MODE change is-acceptable. Consideration should also be given -o the probabil.ity of:.complet-ing restoration such that

-the r..quJi'rements' of the- [CO ,would be met prior to the

" exirat~ion..of.ACT*ONS 'Com'p1letion Tim'es 'that would requi re exiting the:Appliibabi.lity.

(continued)

PALO, VERDE- UNITS 1,2,3 ;B 3.0-6 ,ý . .; ..*..I -

..RýEVJSIONA8,

ýLCO Applicability B 310 BASES LCO 3.0.4 LCO 3.ýO.4.b, maybe used .wit-h s.ing]e, or, multiple systems and (continued) components' N_.MAR '93-01.O.,provi des guidahe.-

Auh,,v.:aiabe.z

,.rel ati.eto cdnsiderati on.,, f s.*-. ul'tanei06" unavai 1ab'i'l i t "of

,,t .pl.so Ystems 'and. components.. *.,

The

.determi6iresul ts. hg ofth'e, risk -assessment the acc~ptabOi*i- shall-be considered in y'1iftf--entering the MODE or other

,specified.

. condi,~n in the Applicability, and any corresponding.,risk management actions. .'.The LCO 3.0.4.b risk assessment5 do not have, to, be *6cumented.

The. Technical .specifatiin s al low.ýcQntlnued operation with equipment unavai!lable- in MODEJ1for; the 'duration of the Completion Tim.. ,'-Since this is -allowable, and since in genera-l -the. risk :Impat -in. that.ipa.rticu ar MODE bounds the risk of transitioning into and through the applicable MODES

, or:th~enr specified conditio*s.,-in the Applicability of the

.*LC. the use Qf.,the.-LCO L 0,4..b -allowance should be generally

, acgceptab-e;asIpngas**the ri.-sk, ii*s-assessed and managed as st.ated aboove.. M-lQw,ever j*Ttbehere its,ýaLsmdlI subset of systems

.. and. componerits.,-that .have been. determi~ned; to be more important

-to ,risk-anidiruset.'of,.theLtCO 3.-O:0.4.b.ýallowance is prohibited.

The

.- .prohiLCOs. govezrnf.i.ng-bi..t-i:*ng theuse th'ese systems :and componentsthat

o'tC@-,30..4-:by-stating contain LCO Notes, 3 I0 .4. b J-,s O'n:app:iUc&leE9 I: II LCO. 3.i0.4:Cc.al.ws ,:enltry,tot..'a'-MODE oýr.other speci fied co ridoitmoiin.n.t`heAj*.lia'lýitit..t hiLeCO not met based on

. a' Notel n the' S 'e Jf iVat*n w,-h- "hstates LCO 3.0.4.c is appl iabl e. -The 'sec'f-i'Kca*ilowances.-permit entry into MODES or,6ther s"oe-fied*cbndi~tin instnhe Applicability when the continuedassoc~i.ated.ACTIONS opert n*pbriimited. d6b-not

._to-bep'entered.

-tf6r*f-.a period provide of time for and a r"tisk

"'. be;en,.er foe Jhis allowance may S1aPyto al 'Tthe ACTIONS.Q*r,-to-'a'speciffc Required Action of

. a Specificati-T'o .assessments' performed to justify eI .Theri-sk the of Luse LCO 3. Q.41bbu-sual ly only'co.isider systems and components.' F."r--this reason, LCO 3.,.41c is typically

applied. to Speciifi.cations which A c,sc'ri.be values and Sparameters.-(e.iRC Speci-fi

..... Acti.vi

.asd ty), and may be approval.

n.NR..plant-specific appl i ed

-- The' proVi~sions of thi's -Specific' tio should not be i'nterfp'reted as ,endorsinrg-"th*e failure td exercise the good practice of 'resstori~ng. $sterhiobr`I6dponents to OPERABLE "statusý before enter.ing an-:-associated MODE or other specified condition in the Apl* icabi'llty:.

(continued)

PALO"V0RDE UNITS 1.2,3 . B 30-7  : REVFSION 48

LCO Applicability B 3.0 BASES LCO 3.04.4 The provisipns-of LCO 3.0.4 .shall not prevent changes in

.. contiue*d)l. ." o&ther.'Speciied,

-MbOES condi ti ons i'the Appl i cabi li ty that are r'equired-to comply with ACTIONS.. -Iri addition, the provisions of LCO 3.0.4 shall n6tp6revent changes in MODES or other.,specified.-conditions in .the.Applicability that result fromrany, unit'shutdownr In this context, a unit shutdown inis defined s a ch.ange.inMDE or other specified condition the Applicability associa'ted with transitioning from MODE 1 to MODE 2,.'MODE 2 to.MODE 3. MODE 3 to MODE 4. and MODE 4 to "MODE 5.

Upon entry into a MODE or. other specified condition,..in.the Applicability with the LCO not met, LCO 3.0.1 and LCO 3.0.2 require entry into the applicable Conditions and Required

.Acti.ons urtil the Condition :is resolved, untiTthelCO is met, or until the unyit is not within the Applicability of the

• . Technical Speci`ficqati`on ..

Survei l~la rces :.do .not.have,,-'to ,be, ýperformed on the associated inoperable equipment:,(or: on vari ables outside the specified limits), as permitted by SR 3.0.1. Therefore, utilizing

, .LC0:.3.0.4is not.a.,violation,of SR:3.0.1.or SR 3.0.4 for

- an}ii.;urvei.llanicesthathave notbeen performed on inoperable equip ent,

i)However,;SRs must be met to ensure OPERABILITY prior to declaring the associated equipment

.OPERABLE-.(or variabl,e'withinlimits): and restoring

-.compi

" Iance,.:with 4he,,affected-,LCO.

LCO 3.0.5 Lco ;3.0.5 ;establishes the 'al'lowa'nce ].for restoring equipment to 'er'i'ce. under-.administrative-controls when it has been removed from service or declared inoperable to comply with ACTIONS. The sole purpose of this Specification is to ovide'an:excepLion-toLCO 3.0.2,(e.g., to not comply with pi',

4Ehe:"applicable Required-Action(s)) to allow the performance

.of required testing to demonstrate

a.-; The OPERABILITY, of- the equipment being returned to service:. or, .

b. The OPERABILITY of other equipment.

The administrat i~ve controls ensure'the time the equipment is

.returned to service in c hnfli ct with the' requi rements (continued)

PALO. VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.0-8 "REVISION 42

- - -- ~--.~ /

i~*

Regulating CEA Insertion Limits

' ' Regulating CEA Insertion Limits B 3.1.7 BASES BACKGROUND 66eveht'o*f a*/ Ct-A.ejecti-on' aIbdcitd' ,ahd~i"eýl6e shutdown ,anrd..

(continued) rrgodlati*n'",b~rik.i'ns~rtdi`: 'lfnfits.ens'dre: the requifred'SDM is mai ntai-nd Operatio6:rKithinhthe sUbjectLQCOQ limitswill prevent fuel claddi'ng failures that ould breacdhethe primary fission product barrier anid r*eleaý6' fission< products to the reactor

.coolant in 'the.event-df a LOCA. -loss of flow, ejected CEA, or other acc'dent reqUiring terminatioqnby a Reactor Protection System trip function.

APPLICABLE'. The fuel"claddi:ng..must nbt'sus~tain damage as a result of SAFETY'.ANALYSES. normal :operatiorn (Condi-tion fY and -'anticipated operational occurrences (Conditidn6 II)i- The acceptance criteria for the regulating CEA insertion,,-part:1ength* or part strength CEA insertion, ASI, and T. LCOs preclude core power distr~ibution-s frMromc-urring :tiwa 'wo)I-d;violate the fol l owing foel :dei gn -c.i:'er-a:

.:a. During a f'8arge brea k LOCA the-peik cladding temperature :must .'hotýek'eedAi,,imft of 2200'F, 10 :CFR 50:.:456ý;(Refý.-.2.',)';- <2:; " " - -

.b. 'Duing CEATisopati:on event*theere must be at least a 95%..probabiflty-*y .a a95%:-0onfidednte level (the 95/95 DNB criterion) that the hot fuel rod in the core does

........ ot exper.Jence a DNB _cDondition.:

c. During an ;.ejected ,.CEA' acci~dent, c-the !fissi on energy input, to the-f uelus. not exceed 280 cal/gm (Ref. 3) and d'. The.CEAs musttbe 'c.apable-of.*.s*utti1ng down the reactor with a minimum~requi-red SDM, owith.-the highest worth CEA stuck fully GC-26-(Ref.

Cithdrawn, 1).

Regulating CEA position, ASI, and Tý are process variables

" ""that together charaterie-and 'cntrolthe three dimensional power distribution of the reactor core.

Fuel cladding damage does not occur when the core is

operated outside; these, LCs ,during normal operation.

H..oweve'r,- fuel cl addi ng da'mage cduld r.result, should an (continued)

PALO;VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 ý_;.B 3-1.7-3 REVISIOV28

Regulating CEA Insertion Limits B 3.1.7

'BASES APPLICABLE .:accident -bccura Iof of one or more SAFETY 'ANALYSES thes'e., LCOs.'" Changes- ihn the pbwerý' ditribution can cause-(continued) '" increased power, peak-ing and cor'rspo6nding increased local LHRs. -' -' -

7/Thel SDM requiitement is ensured by limiting the regulating and .sh'utdown CEA inserttion, limits, so that the allowable inserted wofth4:of. theCEAs; is such that sufficient r'eactivity is available in the CEAs to shut down the reactor to hot zero power with a reactivity margin that assumes the

.maximum worth, CEA -remains fully withdrawn upon trip (Ref. 4).

.The most; li.miting'SDM requi-rements forMODE 1 and 2 conditi ons ,at BOC.Gare determined by-the requirements of severaltransients.,, ,e'..g:. ,Loss ofFl.ow, Seized Rotor, etc.

However, the most limiting SDM requirements for MODES 1and

.2 at'EOC come.from just-one transient, Steam Line Break

.(SLB) The. require~ments of the .LB.event at EOC for both

-,the ful :power. and ..no loadý copndi*tions; are significantly

-,larger than those.of,,anyrotherI event at that time in cycle and, also, considerably larger than the most limiting

.requirements at:BOG. i. . .

S Althoughý.,the'most 'l.i.-'ing SDM requirements at EOC are much I .-il rg-r than -thOse,.aBOC, scrarmilng-of th.eavai lable SDM obtained via the the CEAs.-are -al's stbstantially larger due to the--much .ower. boron.concentration ]at, EOC. To verify that

. adequate SDM '"e 'available. throughout. the cycle to satisfy the changing requirements, calculations are performed at

.. '::,::both.BOC and. EQC..>... It has:.been determined that calculations at, these ,two..times in cycle, are sufficient, since the differences ,between available SDM and thejlimiting SDM

,reqUirements. are the small.est at..tiese-,times in the cycle.

The .measurement of CEAbankiworth performed as part of the StartupjTesting Program demonstrates that.the core has

• expected,

. shutdown capabil.ity.. ,Consequently. adherence to LCOs 3.1.6 and:3.1.7. provides .assurance-that the available SDM at any time in -cycle wi ll exceed.the. limiting SDM requirements at that,.time in the-cycle..

. .... . . ... (continued)

PALO. VERDE.UNITS 1,2.3 :B 31.7134 REVISIONr48-.

- *--*-- r .. '.. r I .*

~'

DNBR B 3.2.4 BASES LCO With -the COLSS. out of srvice/,,-the -limitation on DNBR-.as a:

(After CPC 'function .Of eteAS'I represenhts' a- Qonseervlti ve/enve1o-peK'of Upgrade) / 3 operating &ondit hohs cosi.s'ebt ~w /th / he. analy -i'sK;. - '.. >

(continued) assumptions that'hav'e'been'anal'yttfialy.demonstrated' adequate to maintain an acceptablpe minimum DNBR for all AOOs. :..iOperation of the core.wi~th a 'DNBR at or above this limit 'ensures thatan acceptable minimum DNBR is maintained in the event of the m6st-limiting AQO *(ji.e.. loss of flow transient. CEAmisoperati on, ev,ents,-,,or -asymmetric SG a

transient).

APPLICABILITY Power distribution is a concern any time the reactor is critical. Theýpbwer distribution LCOs,.however, are only applicable in MODE. 1 above 20% RTP. Th-elreasons these LCOs are not applicable bel.ow 20% RTP are:*',

'a.- The: inciore :neutron, detectors' tlia't, provide input to the

':',COLSS, oh whidh th,en-calcu.l:ate'%:t.he, operating limits, are i~naccurate-, du*e't6 the ýpoor -sigha1 to-noise ratio that they' experience: :at trelati v~lylw,, wOore power levels.

b. As a result of thi-s"-inaCtcirdca,"'th-&CPCs assume a minimum core power of 20% RTP when generating the 0.Lcl P6wer D fity ('PD) -a'nd"DNBR trip signals. When

I'the c6rep

Oower-bper-ati ng wel s !beI-'fhi's:'Iel. 0 the core is w 1-' beloi ah ' Imi'ts 1eher4r and the resul tan't ZCP-C iatediLPD and',"DNBR trips are highly ul.'a'c conservative-;  :

The upgraded CPC system consists'.of'eight.total CEACs instead of the two found in theCPC-:SyStdm prior to upgrade.

To facilitate the: difference i-n -ther number of CEACs as well

• as: to-support the enhanced -features'-fodnd in the upgraded CPC -system';a"second ý38.2.4 Techniqd]l Spec-ification has been developed... The .determifnation' ion :which 'Specification applies in based on whether -or not: the;ohit has received the upgraded GPCs. Each unit shall. onTyI-use the Specification that reflects the status 'f-their uni't S-CPC system (i.e.,

before'or after CPC U'pgradeY) ,- - -

(continued)I

.. '.. .1 PALO0VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B-1ý2.4-7 REV iS*/IOON".. 27

DNBR B 3.2.4 BASES ACTIONS A.1

.Operatting-'at:or. 'above the mi nimum:'reuýi red value of the DNBR ensures.itha~t an acceptable :minimum DNBR is maintained in the

,event of aPbpstulated AO0.. If:the dlor6 power as calculated by the COLSS exceeds the core ,power limit calculated by the COLSS based on the DNBR, fuel design limits may not be

maintained following an AOO and prompt action must be taken

--to restore the DNBR abOve'its minimum Allowable Value. With

,the COLSS in service, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> isýa reasonable time for the operator, to initiate torrfective actibns to restore the DNBR "aabove its transientoccurrrig

.severe specified limit. because:of the low probability of in this relatively short time.

Bi1, B2'.1,:-and.B.2'.2-If the COLSS is not available the OPERABLE DNBR channels are monitored to ensure that the DNBR is not exceeded.

• Maintaining-the DNBR within-tnis speci~fied range ensures

-that: no postUlated.a~ccidernt'resulits 'in consequences more

,severe ,than those described:ih!-the UFSAR, Chapter 15. A 4*hhOur Frequency istal]owed' t6restore the DNBR limit to

%withinthe..region*'of.akceotable Operation. This Frequency i's rieasonable.bealuse. the,'COLSS-allows the plant to operate with less .DNBR margin (closer to the'DNBR limit) than when monitoring with the CPCs.

W:::"when'ýopera-ing'with-theýCOLSS odtof~se'vice and DNBR outside the region of acceptable operation;' there is a possibility of a slow undetectabletransient that degrades the DNBR slowly over the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> period and is then followed by an anti-cipated-.operational occurrence or an accident. To remedy this, the CPC calculated values of.DNBR are monitored.

every 15 minutes when the COLSS is":out of service and 'DNBR...

outside the region of acceptable operation. The 15 minutet frequency"i's adequate to allow the operator to identify an adverse trend in conditions-that could result in an approach

'to the DNBR !imit.'. Also, amaximumallowable change in the CPC. calculated DNBR ensures that further degradation requires the operatOrs to take immediate action to restore DNBRto',withinlimitS:or reduce'reactor power to comply with the Technical Specifications (TS). With an adverse trend, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> is.allowed for restoring DNBR to within limits if the COLSS is not restored to OPERABLE status. Implementation of this requirement ensures that reductions in core thermal margin are quickly detected and, if necessary, results in a (continued)

PALO^VERDEUNITS 1,2,3 .. B.3.2-.4-8 VI*S TON'48-`ý

0DNBR B 3.2.4 BASES ACTIONS B.1 B.2, and,*B.,2.2 (continued)

(continued) decrease i n reactor, power.,:and'. s.bs.equent-qc;,bmpliance with the

,existing COLSS outof serviceTS.limits., :.If DNBR cannot be monitored*every 15 minutes, *.assume 1thatthere is an adverse trend.,

With no..adverse.,trend', 4-hours is a~l 1owed' 'for restoring the DNBR to withIin, limits if the COLSS is not restored to OPERABLE status. This duration is reasonable because the Frequency of the CPCKdetermination of: DNRR has been increased,: and, ifoperation is.,maintained steady, the likelihood.of exceeding the DNBR limit.-during this period is not increased. The likelihood of induced reactor transients from an early power reduction is also; decreased.

If the DNBR.,cannot be restored or determined within the allowed ;tims of. Conditons A and.B,.core .power must be Ixeduced.ý Reductioni!of-qpre power,- to <-,:20. RIP ensures that the'. coe is operat*IngWithin-its-.thermal;l.imits and places thecore'in a conserv tiyve condition based on trip setpoints

.generated;bysW ha - nimum core power of 20% RTP. , ,.

The allowed

'on operating Completion Time of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> is reasonable, based experience,.to.reacbh 20%:%RTP-from full power conditionrs in. an:ordry maInner and without challenging plant systems SURVEILLAN CE. SR.: 3;.2.4. 1 REQUIýREMEN I*C With the COLSS.out of service&, the&operator must monitor the ODNBR as ind~i,cated on al,-of.,the OPERABLE DNBR channels of the CPCs-tov.erify that the:DNBR".is within the specified

.imitsrshown i~n the COLR. A 2 hour-,Frequency is adequate to

. allow the operator, toijdentify trends in, conditions that

.would result in an approach to the..DNBRli,mit.

(continued)

PALO,,--V-ER.Dý ONITS 1.2,3 ý_B 3.2.4-9 REVISIM`48

DNBR B 3.2.4 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.2.4.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS This SR is modified by a Note that states that the SR is I IoInly applicable--When the"COLSS is:6ut of service. -

Continuous monitor-ing of the DNBR is-provided by the, COLSS,

']WhtCh calcu ates core: power and core'power.operating" limits based on the DNBR'and. continuously displays these limits to the operator. 'ACOLSS margin alarm is annunciated in the event'that the. THERMAL POWER exceeds the core power operating limit based on-the'DNBR. 'This SR is also modified

'by- a Note that states that the SR is not required to be performed until 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> after MODE 1 with THERMAL POWER >

20% RTP. During plant startup (increase. from 15-18% RTP),

the plant dynamics associated with the'downcomer to economizer swapover may result in a temporary power increase

'above 20% RTP. The 2Ihours after reaching.,,20% RTP is

'required for plant 'stabilfization..

.SR. 3.2.4.2 Ve rerifJ atfion that the6COLSS.-mar6in a'larmr.actuates at a power level .equal'tb or ]'ess-than:.he -ore power operating limit, as' calcu.lated by.:the COOSS, based on the DNBR, ensures that

.the perator 'is, alertedwhnen.,'pe-6ating conditions approach

' th'oDNBR~operati' limit.

131 <The day Frequency for p rTformance'df.th's',:SR,-is. cohsistent with the historical testi ng frequency . reacto pr*tection and monitoring

. systemsf,. ,h*TSu'r*iiiarice Frequehny for' testing protection systems" 'as'extendd.,to9" tdays by CEN 327.. Monitoring systems Were, not addressed:in CEN 327; therefore, this Frequency remains 'at 31 'days.'

REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Chapter 15.

2. UFSAR:, Chapter`6. .

I I -3.

C Cbrrelation for DNBR.I 4' 1:0 CFR 50, Appendix A,- GDC 10.,

5. 10' GFR 50.46.'I

6. Regulatory'Guide 1.77,: Rev. 0. May 14.

7. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 26.

PALO VERDE.UNITS 1,2.3 B,3.2.4-10 REV.15,1014 t31.,.

CREFAS B 3.3.9 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.9 Control Room EssentiaL: Fill'tat-ion 'AftuaItion Signal (CREFAS)

BASES .. ,

BACKGROUND This.:LCO encompasses CREFAS.actuatiion, which is an instr umentationch'anne]. that pefforms an actuation Function requi red tfor plant pro'tecti On buit is riot otherwise included in LCO 3.3'..6,, "Engibeered .Safety Features..Actuation System (ESFAS) Logic: and. Man-ual' Trip, ." or LCO 3.3.7, "Diesel Generator (DG), - 'Loss bof Voltage Starf..(LOVS)." This is a BOP ESFAS.,Function that., beCause of .differences in purpose, design, and operating, requirements, is not' included in LCO, 3.3.6 and LCO"3.3.7.

The CREFASini'tiates-act:uationof the Control Room Essential Filtration System.'to minimize. operator radiation exposure.

The CREFAS includes two independent, redundant subsystems, including actuation trains. Each tlrain has a gaseous activity radiation monitor for the control room air intake activity.t,1f ,ither- tra-"ain radjiation-: monitor indicates an unsafe cbhditfonf 6both CREFAS:trains'wiTl` be actuated

.(one-out"'of two 16gi.c.). "*The- two 'tains-- auate separate

."'equipment.Actatingethertrinilrain 1 :i1rform the intended

'functib. ACREFAS is also-initi'ated' byK1a, Containment Purge Iso] ation"Actuati'o-n, SJi gnal ;.(.CPJAJS) from .izther of the two

.CPAS"ch~ines

• or by a Fdue* Bu.xilding Essential Ventilation

-Actuation" Signal ý(FBEVAS) fro6m.ther6f the two FBEVAS

-. channels. 'Control : room'filtrat onalsoioccurs on a Safety

'Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS)-' .

A cross-train trip function is provided as a defense-in-depth function that i-s- not'required for CREFAS operabil-ity; Trip Setpoi nts and All owab.l e Values Trip setpoints used,.in the bistables .are based on the analytical limits (Ref. 1Y. The seldection of these trip setpoints, issuch that..adequate~protection~is provided when all sensor.and pr'oessingtimedelays are taken into account. The trip setpoints are, digi~tally generated by the radiation monitors. These trifpvalues are not subject to driftscommon to analog type..equiipment. The allowable value for this'trip is'itheref6re the same-as the trip setpoint.

(continued)

PAL'O VERDE. UNITS 1,2,3 B 8.3-4 REVISION-'.48

CREFAS B 3.3.9 BASES (continued)

BACKGROUND Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values (continued)

' etp*i.nts: lin'.accordance With the.Allowable Value will ensure

.that the.consequehnes of' Design .asi-s.Accidents will be acceptble,, ':provjiding.. -,he plant is' operated from within the

• .~ ~~ LCOs at -th nset.gnd.,*

. .. .fuctionss`-ds! 'of. the., AO0 or accident , and the equipment APPLICABLE .. The..CREFAS maintains the control room atmosphere, within SAFETY-ANALYSES condi.tons suitable for prolonged, occupancy throughout the "duration of. any one of the accidents discussed in

.Reference 1. The radi.ation-exposure~of, control room personihel. through the durat-ion of any one of the postulated accidents discussed in "Accident Analysis," FSAR, Chapter 15 (Re.f. 1),, does not. exceed the limits:set by 10 CFR 50, Appendix A;, .GDC .9r(Ref:, 2) ...

The CREFAS satisfies, the.r equirements ;ofj.Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36

(c)(2)(ii.. 0I ..

LCO, " LCDO 3,3...:9 requ-i ir-es oe c*hannel Ofd'of Actuation-Logic, CREFAS to be OPERABLE.

Manual "The Ui rd"ChannIlconsists-TJp',"and.a.gs' u:,.d."at-ionnmonitor. -. The specific trip setpoint for the CRE*AS is2 listed in the SR.

Each tri setp oin -.specifi ed is miore conservati Ve than the analytical limit assumed in the transient and accident analysis in order to account for instrument uncertainties

• appropri ate to the trip. Function.. A channel is i noperabl e if:its-actua`] tri pIsetoint isnotI"setito the value specified i" SR 3.3;9-2. 2 l.I

.ThdBases for the LCO]on the "CREFAS are-.discussed below for each :Functi on:

S(.continued)-

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2,3 ý-B 3.3.9-2 48:

Pressurizer Vents B 3.4.12 BASES LCO A vent,.path iJs flow capabil]ity froiw the.,pressurizer to the (Rontinued) RDT 6o'r f r'om the pressurizertopntafnmert atmosphere.

Loss' of 'any sing.te valve, Jn tN IhessurvJ esystem wi cause týwoflow paths to:become inoper'.ble; A pressurizer vent path is required to' depr6ssurtize the .RCS in a SGTR design basis event whdch -assumes LOP and APSS unavailable.

I APPLICABILITY 1Jn MODES 1, 21, 3.- arif.MODE, 4 WitK RCS, pressure _>.385 psia the fourpressurizer vent paths a.rer'equired to be OPERABLE.

"The s'afety analysis fqr the, SGTR with 'LOP and a Single Failure (loss of'APSS):`:credits d pressurizer vent path to

ýreduc& RCS-pressur&.6 J :

in MODES 1, 2,- 3, 4.a MODENA4'Wth RCS pressure > 385 psia the SGs are the primary nmeans'of'heat1rIemboval in the RCS, until shutdown cooling can be initiated.,-assuming In MODES 1,the 2,APSS and OD'4withRCS

... pre:u'e.:38ps-ia 3, is not available, the plressur'ize r'vont paths are the credited means to depressurize the RCS to Shutdown Cooling

..System -entry,-conditions:--. -Further depressurization into MODE 5 requires use ofthe.pressurizer.-vent- paths. In MODE 5 with

'the reactok vesseh# iT"**tlae S MODE 5'( 2 ");enu therCSian .tmpera.9Urerequirements depressurzed.

In MODE, 6 'the RCS.,jside r dessurized.

ACTIONS . A.. 1 If two,"or thl ree ' rs'srr z&ahs cz t are inoperable, they must be restored to OPERABLE status.- Loss of any single valve in the pressurizer vent system will cause two flow paths to become inoperable:. Any vent.path that provides flow capability from the pressurjzer. to 'the RDT or to the containment atmosphere, independent of which train is powering the valves in the flow path, can be considered an operable vent path. The Completion Time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is reasonable because there is at least one pressurizer vent path that remains OPERABLE.

(continued)

PALO.,VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 REVISION:48

Pressurizer Vents B 3.4.12 BASES B.1 If all pressurizer vent paths are inoperable, then restore

.atleast.::one:pressur.i zer- vent path to-OPERABLE status:. The Completion Time of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> is reasonable to allow time to

... correct.,.the.situation,ý.yet-emphasize

,: :-'restoring at ]pastc one,"pressurizer-Vent the importance If at of least one pressurizer vent'path'is not restoredpath to OPERABLE within the Completion Time, then Action-C is entered.

.If the required Actions, A ad ,B, cannot be met within the associ'ated Compl.etioh Times, the plant must be brought to a MODE'inywh'ich the 'reqiirement does riot apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within.;6 hours., andto.MODE wfthin 2.4:hors.

," 4. with RCS pressure

• Tealdwed:ý.Completion Times are< 385 psia reasorn.able, based of opera.,ating,..experience: to reach the requi red p,l ant condi tions `fromfull.power, conditions in an orderly manner without. ch'allegirg'pl ant-systems.

SURVEILILrkNCE 3'. " "1'.

REQUIREMENTS

--SR34,.i2` I'requi res:.,complete cycling of each pressurizer

-vent path vai'Ve. -- Theee v valves:must becycled from the control room to demonstrate theiroperability. Pressurizer

. vent path-valve cycling, demonstrates its. function. The

- frequency of-18 ndnthýhsis-based Qn-a-typical 'refueling cycle

-'and-ntry accepted practice. iThis surveillance test must

'be performed- in Mode .5 *r.Mode 6: - - '

-'SR 3,4,.12'.2 SR-3.4.12.2 requires8verificdatiion of-flow through each pressu.r:iZerivent. path>: Veri~fication of pressurizer vent path f7ow demohstrat6s its 'function'. The frequency of 18 months ls based on a typical refueling cycle and industry accepted practi.e.-'Thfs surveillahce test must be performed in Mode- 5 or Mode 6 : .

(continued)

PALO. VERDE. UNITS 1,2,3 B-3.4.12-4 - - REVISION 0-

RCS PIV Leakage B 3.4.15 B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT ..........

SYSTEM (RCS)

.... *i+.... ,.......t.'?..

B 3.4.15 RCS Pressure Isolation Valve (PIV) Leakage BASES: . , -,

BACKGROUND 10 CFR 50.2,:: IGCFR"50.55,ac)2'andGDOC"55ýof 10 10 CFR 50,

.Appendi!x AV(Refs. -1.' 2',:and 3), define RCS PIVs as any two normally dloSed valves ih series within th'e RCS pressure boundary that separate the high pressure RCS from an attached low pressure system. ýDuring their lives, these valves can produce varying amounts of reactor coolant leakage through either normal operational wear or mechanical The : V RCS high pressure operatipon when .leakage'ýthrough these yalves exists in amoruntsi that dQInot. compromise sa*et, .

+ :, , *

The PiV l/a.age limit-appl es-jo,..'eahrindividual valve.

.Leakage *b.bh bIhrugh PIvs in+]seriesin'a line must be

+included s pa§tortofhe.i:dfntife6df LAKAGE' governed by LCO 3".4.14,'!**cSýOp+ratohaL LEACAGE' This is true during I operatinon 'Or;llyTwh*h 'te'16ss of RCS mass';through two valves in series is determined by a water inventorybalance (SR-3/.4"14i1)4 . . kn6non mp6ne-nt ofTh-e identified LEAKAGE before operation begins is the leadt oftbe two individual leakage rates determined for leak-ihg-siei"re PIVs duri:ng:the required surveillance...testing; leakage measured thrýouf h one

in e i - ' LEAKAGE i f the other i s IPIV

• Although thisspecif cation prov,1des,6,lin*t on allowable PyIV leakage rate..its main purposei-s to-,prevent overpressure failu-d of thbl'w;pres'su.e ,portions of connecting systems.' The'leakagelimit is-an indication that the PIVs between the RCS and the connecting systems are degraded or degrading. PIV leakage'could lead to overpressure of the low pressure piping or~components.

Failure-consequences.could be. a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) outside the

::d~egrade

.+ ,'.*:c~u of .othtainrment.a,,nan" i~ai]ty or-, low pressure# 6a~nalyzedinjection.

condition that

-The basisfor this LOJis the 197w NRC <7Reactor Safety Study (Ref. 4) hat identlfied poten~tial intersystem LOCAs as a significant contributor to the risk of core melt. A subsequent study (Ref. 5) evaluated various PIV configurations to determine the probability of intersystem LOCAs.

.................. (continued).

PALO'VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3-.:;4' 5-'1 REVISION'0

RCS PIV Leakage B 3.4.15 BASES BACKGROUND PIVs are provided to isolate the RCS from the following (continued) typically connected systems:

a. Shutdown Cooling (SDC) System; and

'b. SaSafety- in'c:L1one System; I ".. *The PIVsiare listed in UFSAR section3.9.6.2 (Ref. 6).

Violation of this LCO could result i'n continued degradation of a PIV, which could lead to overpressurization of a low pressure system"and the loss, of the integrity of a fission

.product.barrier.. -

APPLICABLE ' Reference 4."identifiedipotential intersystem LOCAs as a SAFETY ANALYSES significant corittibutor to.'the risk of'core melt. The dominant accident sequence in the intersystem LOCA category is-the failure of.tthe:low pressur~e:"Ortion of the SDC System

.outs-ide:of containment.,) TIhe.ac.identis: the result of a postul:ated failure of ,he.PiVs,: which are part of the

.Reactor Coolantý' Pressure' Boundar* (RCPB), and the subsequent pressuri._ation of,.t t.he:-SDC-System downstream of the PIVs from the RCS.I,%: Because;the, 1./owIpressure portion of the SDC System

,,-.<:i s-. typica. lly des-ignedfor.485 psi.g; overpressurization

,fai lure of.,,'hoe:-SDC-l.Icwipres~sure line would result in a LOCA outside containment and subsequent risk of core melt.

Reference 5.evalUated :vari~ous-.PIV-configurations, leakage

- , testing. of',the valves'. and-operational changes to determine

. . ,the.effect on the~probabili.ty of.,intersystem LOCAs. This study, conc.l.udedt that periodic leakage testing of the PIVs

..can substantiall y.reduce the-'probabii ity of an intersystem LOCA.

RCS PIV-,leakage satisfies Criter)ion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36

.', ~ ~~(C)(2)(ii 0- 1 . . . ..

LCO .. RCS PiV leakage s'_.icdenhtifiedLEAKAGE.'into closed systems connected'to the RCS. Isolation valvec-leakage is usually on the order of drops per minute. Leakage that increases (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.c,4. 157 2 ,REVISION 48

SITs-Operating B 3.5.1 B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

B.3.5.1 Safety. Injecti.on.Tanks (SITs).. Operating BASES .. .-

BACKGROUND The functions of the four SITs are to supply water to the reactor vessel-' during-,the blowdowp.:phase of a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA), toprovide inventory to help accomplish the refili-phase that follows thereafter, and to provide Reactor Coolant System (RCS) makeup for a small break LOCA. ,,

- The blowdown phase of.a large break-.,LOCA is the initial period of the transient duringwhich .the RCS departs from equilibrium conditions, and heat from fission product decay, hot internals, and the ves-sel continues to- be transferred to the reactor coolant. The blowdown phase of the transient

.ends 1when the .RCS pressure falls to a value approaching that

-of the containment atmosphere.:

The-refil..:phase of.a,.OCAfol*lows immediately where reactor

-coola'nt J.inventory has:,vacated,.the.,cobre:-.through steam flashing<and. ejeotTon out,-.,throbgfh-thb: break. The core is

-essential l-n:adiabatiheatup:.." Thebalance of the SITs'

..inventory is thenIa ,able to he-lp-:fi'ilI voids in the lower plenum and reactor :vesselgdowncomer}:tb .establish a recovery

-level at )the bottom;of,::'thecbre: and.ionrgoding reflood of the core.with the,.addi:tion'of Safety Injectin (SI) water.

The SITs are pressure vessels partially filled with borated water :and' pressurized w.ith nitrogen gas." The SITs are passive ,components.. since: :no Iopefator br-control action is required for themwto perform their-function. Internal tank pressure *issuffitcienttod:ischargethe.contents to the RCS.

if RCS preissureýIdecrýe'ses,*below :the SIT pressure.

Each SIT is piped into one RCS cold leg via the injection lires.:utilized bythe-High Pressure Safeoty Injection and Low Pressure Sa'fety Injection (HPSI-and-.LPSI) Systems. Each SIT is isolated from the RCS by a ,motor operated isolation valve

-and two check valves in ser ies. The- motor operated .....

isolation valves are normally open,. with power removed from.

the valve'motor .to prevent -inadvertent closure prior to orl:-

-during an' accident ,

-: , _(continued)

PALO*VERDE UNITS 1,2.3 B :315. 1 REV-ISION 0

SITs -Operating B 3.5.1 BASES BACKGROUND Additionally, the isolation valves are interlocked with the" (continued) pressurizer pressure instrumentation channels to ensure that the valves will automatically open as RCS pressure increases above SIT pressure and to prevent inadvertent closure prior.

. ItoIaiaderit. <The val ves als:o receive a Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) to open, .. These features ensure that the valves meetýthe".requirementsof the Institute of Electrical

.(Ref. 1)foi'and..E]ectr6nic Engineers (IEEE) Standard 279-1971 "operating bypasses" and that the SITs will be available for injection wi.thout reliance on operator action.

During operations at RCS pressure greater than 430 psia the SIT isolation valves are procedurally locked open and motive power is removed with the breakers locked open.

• .. The open and closure interlocks8 aife tested as described in UFSAR 7.6.2ý.2.2i(Reference 7).iTheopen interlock is I functionally tested..,per Reference 8-:(TRM, T3.5 (ECCS)- TSR 3:5.200.4).- The'SIAS 'function to open these valves is tested per Reference 8 using-the.method described in Reference 7.

The.,SI-.!gas; and water vol.umes, r:gas pressure, and outlet pipe si-e:ae/selected ,to-al-low-:threeo-of the four SITs to partially S

recover: the,:core before -.signi.fi cart clad mel ti ng or zi rconi um water reaction can occur following a LOCA. The need to ensure

-that,.threesSITs .,ar-eýadequate for this function is consistent

. with.-the,ý[.LOCAýassumpticon, t-hat- the entire.contents of one SIT

.rwi] lbeý ostyia.the<break duri~ng ,the :blowdown phase of a LOCA.

APPLICABLE SES: 'break The.SITs:.aret'kýer i .dredit for`in .both the large and small LCAnaa.yses at full,.power'(Ref' 2). These are the SAFETY ANALY

-Design. Basis'Atcidehts (DBAs) that establish the acceptance Ifmts f6rthe, SITs) Reference'to theanalyses for these DBAs is used to assess changes to the SITs as they relate to the'acceptance limits.

In.performi-ng the LOCAcalculations, conservative assumptions are.made concerning-the :availabil]ity of SI flow. These

• .assumptions.,include signal generation time, equipment starting times, and delivery time due,,to.system piping. In the early

..stages of a'LOCA:with a:loss of offsi.te power, the SITs provide the-so e source of-makeup water.tothe RCS. (The assumption of

.a--loss of offsite*,power.is requiredby regulations.) This is becausethe LPSI pumps and HPSI pumps, cannot deliver flow until the Diesel Generators (DGs) start, come to. rated speed, and go through their timed loading sequence. In cold leg breaks, the entire contents of one SIT are assumed to be lost through the break during the blowdown and reflood phases.

The limiting large break LOCA is a double ended guillotine cold leg break at the discharge of the reactor coolant pump.

"(continued).

PALO VERDEUNITS 1,2,3 ýB!3.:5 .12 RMSIOV48ý

ECCS - Operating B 3.5.3 B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (EQCC) ----

B 3.5.3 ECCS -,Operating . ..

BASES ' ., ' , .

BACKGROUND: The fudction of therECCS.i.s: toprovide Core cooling and

7. negative reactivity to. eisure, thatitbe reactor core is protected: after any of the.'following accidents:

a. Loss of C~olant Accident (LOCA):

b.,_ Control ;Element Assembly. (CEAI)-ejection accident;

c. Loss of secondary coolant accident, including uncontrolled steamr*,lease or ltoss of feedwater: and

d. Steam'Generatbr Thbei.Rupfbre (SGTR).

the addition of negative reactivity'"is designed primarily

.for--the los s of7",secondary. cool ant :acci*dent where primary cool down,::coul;d-.add 1'enough.:poSitive.rati ity to achieve

.cri ticali ty and[.retarn"to siigri ficarit, power.

There are twb phases,- of E.,CS Operation -injection and

reci.rculatiton>,:Ijn;,the',,injeetifo -:phdse, 'all injection is initialtly1-added. to .theReactor-.,COOlantSy~tem (RCS) via the cold--legs-. - After--the -bl owdownc.sltageof-theLOCA-stabi I i zes.

injection f low is..spli,t equol..ly.*between: the hot and cold

'; egs. . After, theRefuelihi Water Tank' ,(RWT) has..beefn-,

d.cepl eted , ,the ,ECCS. reci.(ul-atifnihaseis entered as the

" "iECCS ..

suctio i&7autno .attcall transferred to the containment sump. .

Two redundant, 100% capacity trainsare provided. In MODES 1,.. 2,. and2;ý3-witf'-0pressuri.ze *ýpressure > 1837 psia or with RCS IT,> 4859F each train"consists of High Pressure

.Safety-:.IJnjection (HPSI) .'and Low ýPressure!-Safety Injection

,(LPSI") subsystems.- In MODES .1 2,; and 3* ..with pressurizer pressure > 1837 psia or with' RCS Tc Ž-4850 F both trains must be. OPERABLE .. This-ensures that 1.00%of:"the core cooling requirements can be prividedi0i 'the eVent of a single active fai lure ...

(continued)

PALO ,V.ERDE UNITS 1,2.3 B!3 5 3.ý 1 REVýSJON 0'

ECCS - Operating B 3.5.3 BASES . . .

BACKGROUND A suction header, supplies water from the RWT or the (continued) containment sump to the ECCS pumps. Separate piping supplies each train. The discharge headers, from each HPSI

.pumpdivide.intO fourisupply Tines>. Both HPSI trains feed into each of the four injection lines. The discharge header

.. ;:-:from each .LPSIL.pump dividesinto two supply lines, each

--feeding the injection .line to twoRCS cold legs. Control valves or orifices are set to balance theflow to the RCS.

This flow balance directs sufficient flow to the core to meet .the analysis assumptions following a LOCA in one of the RCS. cold legs. .

.The Safety :Injection.o(SI) systems are actuated upon receipt of an.SIAS., The..actuation of safeguard loads is accomplished in a programmed, timesequence. If offsite

• power is available,:the safeguard loads start immediately in the programmed sequence. If offsite:,powerjis not available.

-. the Engineered Safe'ty.Feature (ESF) buses shed normal operating.I oads and ar.e. connected to the Diesel Generators (DGs .. SafeguaHrd l oads_ are. then a*ituated in the programmed time, sequence.. The.timdela*y asso6 atediwith diesel startiing. sequenced. loadi.g ,and pump, starting determines the- tinie requi r'ed.. bef.6r.e pumpedflow' i~s available to the

.co flloi nga LOCGA.

["'he active ECCS. coýombnents, ,along withthe passive Safety Injection Tanks (SITsY)ahd the-RWT, covered in LCO 3.5.1,

."Safety. Injection Tanks.. (SITs)-,Operating"., LCO 3.5.2,

'"SITs.'Shutdown" .and LCO:3'5.5: "Refueling-Water Tank

'(RWT);-'rovide"thec0ling wtenecessary to meet GDC 35

• ' , , " ' Me"t.' . ' .  : " ' "

APPLICABLE':. The LCO heips..to ensure that'the following.-acceptance SAFETY ANALYSES .:will "riteria, established-by 10 CFR 50.46 (Ref- 2) for ECCSs, be-met followihg a LOCA:

a.Maximum fuel*:element.blfdding temperature is < 2200 0 F.

a.

b. Maximum cladding oxidation is < 0.17 times the total cladding thicknessý`befbre oxidatidn; (continued).

PALOIVERDEUNITS 12,3 B 3..5. -,3-.2 48-

- .. . P. I

RWT B 3.5.5 B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

B 3.5.5 Refueling WaterTanr n'kk-..(RwT) .. .

- ,. ., '-.' , . .. '," ; , ' : * :i i BASES (Units 1 & 3 on'ly.', I BACKGROUND The- RWT,ý spports' the ECCS ýand.the Gbntainhtent Spray System by providing a, source ,of ,boratedd-water for: Engineered Safety Feature.. (ESF) pump., operatiOn.

The RWT supplies two ECCS trains by separate, redundant supply headers. Each header als-o supplies one train of the Containment Spray System. A motor operated isolation valve

" is provided in each header to:Tall~ow- the operator to isolate the usable volume of the:RW.T from the'ECCS after the ESF

• :

• pump I4( ;-:I* follIowi -suction has beeh"tr'ansferred",tO hg dep/letiO'n o'f:/thie'iRWT 'duri ng:the containment a Loss of Coolantsump

-'Accident.LOCA).; A.ýsbeprate header is;used to supply the

- Chemical arid V-bltme. contirol System' (ýCVCS) -from the RWT. Use

.Of a:`single:RWT to' supply 1both trains. of-the ECCS is

.acceptable ýIn~eýe,-theeRWT! is *aOassive Component, and passive fail1ures 'are not';-:ass-med. to occur c6incidehntly with the

.Des.ign--Basi s"Even-t duing"'the*injecti opph'ase , of an

• .accident. Not a-l th iatnes*'Od*

nthe!RWT is available for injection following-,a..LOGC'A; !th* location of the ECCS suction piping in the RWT wil.] resu].t..,in.some portion of the stdred Iv0olume ing..unaý'a'i: a'bJ0le7I '

• TheHigh Pressure Safety,' Injebti on. (HPSI)ý. Low Pressure Safety'Irnjecton .LPs .nd.cb6nta,inmentspray pumps are provided with reircUl'ation lines'hat'e~sure each pump can maintain minimum flow requirements whenooperating at shutoff head conditions. These lines.discharge back to .the .RWT..

...... . which vehts. h Ful Be uilding Ventilation System. When S...the,-su.ction for the HPSIt-and conta-inment.spray pumps -is

.transferred 'to the contai~nment. sump; this.flow path.:must be isolated to prevent a releaseiof.the.containment sump contents to the RWT. If not isolated, this flow path could result in. a-release..of~contaminants, .to the atmosphere and the eventual loss of suction head for the ESF pumps.

This,LCO, ensures that:.- -1 -

a. The RWT contains sufficient borated water to support the ECCS during the injection phase:

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2,3 ,B 3.5'.'5_1 'REVISION _48-

__L_

RWT B 3.5.5 BASES (Units 1 & 3 only)

BACKGROUND ' ' Suffi'cieite atervolume .exists in the, containment sump uto-dpport (cohntinued) - T conti~nued ooerfation'ofrthe: ESF pumps at the

-time bf-.,transfer to-the -edirculation mode of cooling;

and'

c. 'The !reactor remains subcritical following a LOCA.

Insufficient water inventory in the RWT could result in j.insufficient cooling capacity of the ECCS when the transfer to the recirculation mode occurs. Improper boron

,,,-concentrations could result in a reduction, of SDM or excessive boric acid precipitation in the core following a LOCA, as well as

excessive, caustic stress corrosion of mechanical components and systems inside containment.

The RWT al'soprovides-.a-Isource of borated'water to the charging sy's`tem 'flr niakeup to. the! RCS to compensate for

.cont1*afti,on' -f -the'RS  : coolant dur 4irig plant cooldown while maintaf'iing'adequatý' shutddwin'-margir.n. Although this c"'agfng -systembor.ati'on'fUnctiorfi s not required to be in a

• T"echnica~lS~ecifia't-ion.LCOper 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii)

. .crteriajth~ePRWTVRdlMue requirements of Figure 3.5.5-1

.:ncludethi:s functfio-ihiln order to provide the plant operators with a single .reqdirement for RWT volume.

For hot:zero power, temperature of :565. degrees F, the RWT vol ume:.requirement of..600. :0.00 .gallons will ensure adequate shutdoWn margirrduring a-subsequent cooldown. For power levels greater than zero;:.with a corresponding increase in average RCS temperature, the volume of borated water to maintain the shutdown margin -i's the same as at zero power.

.Contraction requirements are greater, at higher average RCS temperatures: .however.:. theadditional contraction is

.. ,accommodated, by ancacceptable reduction.in pressurizer level.. Consequently,: fo'r.:operation, at_average RCS temperatures* greater than 565 degrees F',,he minimum volume required in the RWT is constant at 600,000 gallons.

(continued)

PALO. VERDE..UNITS 1.2,3 B 3.5.5-2 ,REVIISI.ON.48

RWT B 3.5.5 BASES (Units 1 & 3 only) I APPLICABLE. During acci1dent conditi.ons, the.R.WT .provides a source,--of.-,-

SAFETY ANALYSES:.. borated water to the. HPS.I. LPSlJ:,and.containment spuaypumps.

As such,.- t--provides containmenit cooling and depressurization. core cooling, and-,replacement inventory and is a source of negative reactivity for reactor shutdown

.(Ref. 1). The'.designý..basis- transients and applicable safety analyses concerning each of these systems are discussed in the Applicable'Safety Analyses section of Bases B 3.5.3,

."ECCS - Operating"",-and B 3K6.6, "Cbnta-inment Spray." These analyses areus'ed to assess changes to'the RWT in order to evaluate their effects in relation'to-th'e acceptance limits.

-The'volume limit-*of'Figure:-3.5.5-1 for the ESF function is based on two'factors:. .. .. ....

a . A required volume, of, 558,978 gallons (138' 11").must be avai-l able to.proyi.de. inventory ,to the ESF pumps

,prior to. reaching ajlow:.level switchover to the cQntainment.s.ump for,-reicirculatlo.-.;*_This ESF Reserve

. Volume ensures-,.,th.a~t,.-the .ESFPpump-suction will not be ali gned,. to the -containmen~týýsump- untJ.,l the point at whi ch ,.75% of, the:imi~ni-mum.design-f-low-,of one HPSI pump

• o. .. j,i.s.t*apab~l,IQ of-mee~ti:ng.pro exc~eedizn.g:,..the*decay heat boi-l-Qff,rate..........-

b. A required volume of 576,616 gallons to ensure that sLffficient water,will-, be transferred to the sump for

. . .adequate'net positive sucti-on-headito support continued*ESF pump operation afterthe switchover to reci rcul ation -occurs.. . . z. - ,

.By., time..of recirculation,-,,.the water level: in the containment:sump must be sufficient to provide adequate Net Positive.Suction llead,.(*NPSH) -for both trains of HPSI, LPSI,

- . -' and containmentt*spray pumps operating aat-runout conditions.

--Accounti~ng for LPSI-pump.operation' is conservative because these* pumps- tip automatically uponm- RAS .-and are not (continued)

.1 I, . ,

': I . IRE. V,S104:48 PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B -8.5.5-3

RWT B 3.5.5 BASES (Units 1 & 3 only)

APPLICABLE. r ed duidri'ng,'rec rculation.!' The6 minimum containment-SAFETY, ANALYSES:?.sumip 1T#veican b-,achieved considerinhg-`on.ly' the i.nventory.

(cofit'nued) '. Speci find i:n-theRWT 0p1 us- l irmi ted cont1r.ibutions from' safety injeti'on.tank sand:.'dthe reactor coolant. The resultant contai'iment:Watrnventory i-S further reduced due .to the effects of evaporation and flashing of post-accident fluid:

holdup in'containment atmosphere,* subcompartments, and reservoirs due to containment spray operation: and

. . diversions of-RWT to the CVCS via the high suction nozzle.

Leakages from injection and recirculation equipment to areas outside the cdhtainment during~the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of

• the event are expected to be small in comparison with the overal'.conservatism in the analysis and are therefore neglected. Consi~stent with the .positions in Regulatory

. Guides 1.1 'andlI..82; no credit was-taken-for containment

-' pressiire in calcu.lating available'NPSH.

The 4000.ppm limit for-minimum boron concentration was established to ensure ithat,. followling a LOCA with a minimum

. level;. in the RWT,, the reactor will -remainsubcritical in the cold condition fol.!6wf'ngimi~xing 6f theý RWT and RCS water

--volumes. -...SmallbreakLOCAs- assume that all- control rods are inserted, except for the Control Element Assembly ..(CEA) of

--ý'".brbak highest'L"G'As...as~sume,"th'ý6t:*a'll

'.worth,'which lf1I-.withdrawn from the

,CEAs.-,r~emain core. Large

.wi_thdrawn from the cbre-,..... The.most liri tifingcase occurs at,-beginning of core

~ife*

The maximum boron limit of 4400 ppm in the RWT is based on

'bQron preci pittidr"'intihe core fol l,owing a LOCA. With the reactor vessel A'lsaturated c ndi.ti-ons, the core dissipates heat by pool nucl!eate boiling'. - Beause of this boiling

-phenomenon 'in the core ',the boric acid concentration will increase inrthis region. :If allowed to proceed in this

..manner, a po6intvwill -be.reached where boron precipitation will occur in the core. :Post LOCA emergency procedures direct the operator .to establish simultaneous hot and cold leg injection to prevent this-condition-by establishing a---

forced flow path through the core regardless of break -

location. These procedures are based on the minimum time. in which precipitation could occur, assuming that maximum boron

'concentrations,:exist in the borated ,Water-sources used for S.injecti~on foll~owi,ng .aLOCA. Boron concentrations in the RWT in excess.of:the-,limit could-result in precipitation earlier

. :. than assumed in. the-anaIysis&.,

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B-3.5.5-4 y; ý,,REVISION 48,.

RWT B 3.5.5 BASES (Units I & 3 only) I APPLICABLE Theupper'limit of 1207,F n0-the:, owerfl]imi t of 60 Fý,on: RWT SAFETY ANALYSES tedmperat'ure aarethel.imitsas.sumedi-,n tie.accident.--,,nan s.

(continued) Alth6ugh 1WT temper~atreaifects f heoutcome of several-v

analyses, ,.thRupperandloQwer,,9.mi1ts ,establ i shed .by the LCO are npot *l mited ,by.any of-thes-analyses-.

The RWT"ESF function satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36

,(c) (2) (ii,).

LCO- The RWT ensures that an adequate-supply of borated water is available to cool and depressur'ize the containment in the

event of a Design Basis Accident (DBA),and to cool and cover the core in the event, of-a LOCA, that,:the reactor remains subcritical foll owing a DBA,,and that 'an. adequate level exists in thecontainment sump to support ESF pump operation in the recirculation mode.

To be .con's idered 'OPERABLEI the RWTImust :meet the limits estabiished Jin theSRs for water-volume,, boron concentration., an**temperatu re:

APPLICABILITY. , In MODES 1.,2,32 .3-- and 4',.he RWT QPERABILITY requirements are dictated., by tde :ECS-adotai:nmqnt-,5pray System

• . -:OPERABJLIT-1Y .rqirerent~:."Sin-ebpth theeqECCS and the

.Cohtainment' Sp'ray System must be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2. 3, and 4, the RWT must be OPERABLE to support their operation.

,Core cool iing, requirements. i]-MOQE 5 !are addressed by LCO 3..I4.-7 ,:.RS Loops$: MODE'57j. Loops Filled." and LCO 3.4.8.

-"RCS- Loops,- MODE:.5 Loops .Not F1illed.. MODE 6 core cooling requi-rements are addressed ,by, LCQ 3K9.4,. 4_.'Shutdown Cooling (SDC)- and-Coolant Circul~ati~on - :High. Water Level," and

- LCQ 3.9.5. ,Shutdown,.Cooling .(SDC) and ,Coolant Circulation -Low Water Level.",- .

ACTIONS,' A.I C.

.With RWTI,boron concentration or borated water temperature not, wthin limits .it must.be returned to within limits within 8&hours. :In this :conditimonneither the ECCS nor the Containment Spray. ,System "can "perform.thei r design functions:

therefore, prompt action must be taken to restore the tank to OPERABLE condition. The allowed Completion Time of

.......... . .. ((continued) d PALOýVERDE UNITS 1,2,3 "Bý3ý.5.-5-5 REVI&ION 48

RWT B 3.5.5 I BASES (Units I & 3 only)

ACTIONS A.1 (continued) .

hours.' td res~tre the RWT to wi thi n1'imits was developed

.,8.

.crioideririgY'.the..ýtime, requi redl to"'changb boron concentration

..or, temperature and !that'the contents~of the tank are still

-* avaii]able fori injeetion- and core, cooling.

B.1 With RWT borated water volume not within limits, it must be returned to wi-thinlimits within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. In this condition, neither:the. ECCS nor Containment Spr'ay.System can perform

. -their design functions':. therefore, prompt action must be

-taken to restore. the .tank_ to' OPERABLE status or to place the unit in a MODE in-which these systems are not required. The allowed Completion Time of 1:hourl'to restore the RWT to OPERABLE. status-

- s,.-based.on i' .this. condition since the conten'ts of the-tak,.-..are:not available" for injection and core cooling.

C. 1 and C.22.

,If theiRWT.ap.ort:be-.estored to OPERABLE status within the

-.-.associ.ated. -Coip1.etion-,Time,, -the.plant-must be brought to a

.MODE,,-in.,h.ch- the.,LCO-doestnot appily. To achieve this

-status ,theipiant'-muost. be.brought;to at- least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> ,ahd. to MODE 5within36hours. The allowed C-omplet-ionjlimes are,-; reasonable, based on operating "expperi ence, to- reach. the, requi red,-plant -conditions from full

.:power, conditions'in an* orderly manner and without

. r.hall'eng ,ng plant systems. . -

• SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.5.1 REQUIREMENTS RWT borated Water femperat'urseshall be verified every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to be within the limits, assumed in the acci-dent....

analysis' -This Feq ency'has been shown to be'suffic'ient'to identify temperature changes that approach either acceptable limit.

(continued)

PALO VERDE. UNITS 1,2,3 -;B 3-.5..5-6 REVISION 4

RWT B 3.5.5 BASES (Units 1 & 3 only)

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.5.1 (c"6ntinued) ,,.

REQUIREMENTS The SR*,is. modified- by-.a .Note*thatt- ei.minates the requirement to pe,rform- th..s- Surveil Ianc,e.whený amb-i-ent. air temperatures are wihiJ.. .the oper~atipng-temper.ature limits of the RWT. With ambient temperatures withlin this ,range-, .the RWT temperature should not exceed the limits.

SR 3.5.5.2 TheIRWT water volume level shall be:, verified every 7 days in accordance~with Figure 3i5.5-1.. Thi-sF'requency ensures that a sufficient initial].water supply is 'available for injection and to.support continued ESF pump operation on recirculation-:L S-inte'the RWTIvol ume, i:snormally stable and is. provided with, a Low"Level Alarm in-the Control Room, a

.7,Tdayý Frequency:.isý,appropriate lnd h-as,:been shown to be acceptable. through',operati ng experience;.

SR 3.5.5.3 Boron concentration of the RWT shall be-verified every "days' to be wi thi n- the-: req-ul red r'ange' . Thi s Frequency ensures,,that::the r:r#ctbr. wiqY i:etmea-i,n[ *ubcritical following a

-.LOCA and*Itheiborhhdc reci.litMat'aiff~ i n-: the :core will not occur earlierthanredted. .. Further- it- ens6res that the resulting' sumppH will be .'mainta ned iK"+/-f acceptable range such&that theeffe.t of chlo*de'ahdcacu.stic stress

• .corrosion>on'mechah aYls'ystens "n'd' dorfipnents will be minimized . Sintce.;theI-RWT vb'Ime is!s nbrmally stable, a 7 day sampl i ng Frequency l:-is%a'ppro-pri ate a~n*l has'-, been shown through operating experience to be acceptable.

REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Chapter 6 and Chapter 15.,

- . REVISION 48 PALO VEkRDE UNITS 1,2.3 "'B".'3".'5'.5 -7

RWT B 3.5.5

B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

B 3.5.5 Refueling Water Tank (RWT)

' nly).'

BASES, (.Unit*i 2 '2 i' BACKGROUND, The RWT supports., the ECCS and the Containment Spray System by providing a sourcedf borated water for Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) pump operation..

The RWT.supplies two ECCS traihn by separate, redundant suppl.y headers. Each.header also supplies one train of the Containment Spray System. A.motor operated isolation valve is provided, in each header .to allow the operator to isolate the usable volume of. the.,RWT'from the ECCS after the ESF pump suction has' been transferred to'the containment sump following depletion'of the' RWT during "a Loss of Coolant Acciden'. (LOCA). '.A'separate heade'r is"used to supply the Chemical and Volume Control System:'(CVCS),from the RWT. Use of a single RWT to supply both trains of the ECCS is acceptable since the RWiT.is a passive,..component, and passive failures are not assumed to occur' coincidently with the

'Design fBasi.s Eýent-dhrifng th'e injectioh phase of an

-accident:.. ýNot a8lithewater-stored in the RWT is available for injection*.f ,owioung-, a. LOCA; --the ýlocation of the ECCS

..... suctionipipingin the._RWT-,will ,esult in some portion of the stored volume being unai.i'abe.

.The- Hi.gh-P-isuire *Sdfet' Injection (HPSI). Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI)!,.-and containment spray pumps are provided..wi-hreci rcu]ation lines, that ensure each pump can maintain minimum flow requirements when.operating at shutoff head conditions. These lines discharge back to the RWT.

The RWT vents to the Fuel Building Ventilation System. When the suction for the HPSI and containment spray pumps is transferred to the containment sump, this flow path must be isolated to prevent a release of the containment sump contents to the RWT. If not isolated, this flow path could result in a release of contaminants to the atmosphere and the eventual loss of suction head for the ESF pumps.

This LCO ensures that:

a. The RWT contains sufficient borated water to support the ECCS during the injection phase; (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 B 3.5.5-8 . .. REVISION 48.

-- ,W-

RWT B 3.5.5 BASES (Unit 2 only)

BACKGROUND b. Sufficient water volume exists in the containment sump (continued) to support continued operation of the ESF pumps at the time of transfer to the recirculatin.'mode 6f"6eolir:ng; c:. The reactor remai:ns subcritical"'following a LOCA.':

Insufficient water inventory in the RWT'could result in (1) insufficient cooling capacity of,.the.ECCS,, or (2) insufficient water level'.to support continued ESF pump

-operation when the. transfer to the recirculation mode occurs. Iimprooer boronconcenratiibns could result in a reduction ofdSDM-or exc'essive 'boric'acid precipitation in

...the core following a LOCA,-as.*well.as e cessive caustic

,stress corrosion o, mechanical'.3omponents and systems

. insitde contai nment. ' '

The RWTs a Is provil's a sou, ef ed.water to the

,ýS.,pr a.tedrc

.,charging system, for:, ma.keup_ to ,the:.RCS, to,.,Compensate for contracti.on. of' the.-.,RCS coolanht durinng., plant cooldown while mai ntai niihg. adquat~e s4h6 tdqwfnm -ai)'i "

In Although thi s

'charging syst.im,,!bqortioni fnrid,6"on i's- rirequired to be in a Technical Speci i'c atii6no"'LCO p&" I0' CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) criteria; .the-.RWT youme requirements of Figure 3.5.5-1 include.thisfunction'i'.:in order: .to provide the plant

,operitors with a,;singleO"'e'fquir.me-rt :7fbr. RWT volume.

'. :' . * * * " ':: -/ .: : . * *,' ' ... : i !: ,' , '_,,2 '

" - - " .. (continued)

PALO'VEkOE-'UNITS 1,2,3 B'3'.5.5-9 A1REVISiON 48

RWT B 3.5.5 BASES (Unit 2 only)

.-The,tabe-bellow provides.ýtherequired.RWTlevel at selected

.:,RCS, average temperature: values-.;:c.-o~rresponding to Figure, 3.5-.5-. The,.RWT volume is.the:total*volume of water in

.theRWT above *thevortex breaker.,-; This volume includes the volumes requiredt-to be transferred, as discussed below, an allowance for instrument uncentainty, and the volume that wil.l remain the RWT after the swi.tch over to the

.recirculation mode.

RWT Required Level at RCS Temperatures RCS Temperature (OF) RWT Required Level.. RWT Volume

• average.. . M(% (Gallons) 210.. 9 9 , 601,000 250' 80.1 ,. .. 603,000 300 8_...4 605,000

• 350 80 8:. 608,000 400 ' 2 611,000 450 . . 81;. .- 614,000

-500 `82..1 , 618,000 565 83 0 624,000

'600, ] .,- 83Q...

3 ., . 624,000

• The volumes include instrument uncertainty and-havebeen rounded up or down to. the nearest 1.000 gallons.

. . (on in"d.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.5.5-10 REVISION 48

RWT B 3.5.5 BASES (Unit 2 only) I APPLICABLE During'accident condi,ti'ons, ..ýth'eRWT2-.!provi'des a source of SAFETY ANALYSES borated"Vaterz-tothe HPSI,,LPSI:,and- cont'inment spray pumps.

As s.uch., 1t-:p ovides. conta6nm1int *cooli ng. and depreSsuriration,! core 'coling..d'dreplacement inventory and *isa""source'of,:negative 'reactivitjy-.for reactor shutdown (Ref., 1* '-The design basiS transients-,and applicable safety analyses,`coticerring-each of these systems are discussed in the Applicable Safety Analyses~section of Bases B 3.5.3, "ECCS - Operating," and B 3.6.6, "Containment Spray." These analyses are used to assess changes.. to the RWT in order to evaluate their effects in relation to the acceptance limits.

The level limit of Figure'3.5.5-m for the [SF function is based on: the largest Of the following four factorst a,. .. A

,a.volume of 476.,338 gallons must be transferred to containment via.the ESF pumps! prior to reaching a low

.level--switchover .to the--containment sump for

... ...... recl.rcul at*ion..,. -_ThLis.ESE. Reserve .Voluume ensures that the ESF pump sctcTon will not! be aligned to)the contai im 's uht-p**t tt -Whihý 75% Of the mini mum des.lgn.,f~dw.of-- one. HPSI--pump-.is .-c&apable.of meeting or exceedi~ng the decay heat boil-bf-f rate.

b. A volume of 543,200 gallons (0t. 600 0F) mu"'t-;be t.. . -sf dt.r*e d- the -RCS aidhd6-tfai-meht Tfo-ri'fl66ding of sump. strai ners-.to--pr-event. -vor-texi ng -.and- to`2.ensure.

adequate net p._os0 iive suction: head to support continued ESF pump operation after the switchover to recirculatibn'occcirsý.

c. A volume of 400,00'gallons must be6 available for Containment Spray System operation as credited in the containment pressure and temperature analyses.

d. A volume of borated water is needed during ECCS functions to ensure shut down margin (SDM) is maintained. The volume required is similar to that needed for the charging system function of compensating for contraction of the RCS coolant during plant cooldown. The volume required will vary depending upon the event and is bounded by the volume

. . .. . .. ..... (conti-nued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2,3 B 3.5.5-11 RE .VIISI.ON `48

RWT B 3.5.5 BASES (Unit 2 only)

APPLICABLE . , eeded foi<' a LOCAl '"The`ollunie'!needed for borati on SAFETY ANALYSES§:- ' urposes'for-. a LOCA is ssiaerthan the volumesh*

(conti nued) discussed, i n a b,. and c abbve.

The quantities. ýpebfied aboV{e are fransferývolumes to be available for deliv'e'ry' to the ESF pumps.'"-They are located between. the required level of Figure 3.5.,5-1,and the low level switchover to/the containment. sump for.recirculation (RAS).

The required level OfFigure3.5.5-1 also considers applicable instrument uncertainty for the indicators used to verify level, the switch that actuates the recirculation actuation

.signal ,-,and the indicators for average RCS temperature.

. The level required by Figure'3.5..5-. ensures :that adequate water volume existS)in the'!tank-to provide the transfer volumes discussed above. The temperatures of note on the Figure are. (1) 600 0F which bounds the highes.t expected average RCS temperature.,'.".(2) 565"F, .wh'ich.c6rr.,*ponds. to hot zero

,.power, and 3) 210°E .e which 'i.Q) lowest. temperature for Mode, 4 when thi's LCO is appli cable. Between 600°F and 565°F

'the. required: Ievel:ois constant for ease: of- use by operators to have 6ý--s.-ngle ýval"be fdr'Ka'l-I hot 'condi ti Ons.. Between 5650 F and

'210]F, the 'requIre~d.evef decreases as the volume required to

, ak,. p bf_'RCS' coolant contraction decreas es."

,By time. of, reci rcuil.atibn'.i-,the water level :in the containment sump mUst be, suffiicendt topry.'!de'adequate Net Positive Suction Head (N*SHY' for both; trains of. HPSI, LPSI, and

.. . .cntainient spray Pumps' operating atý rundut conditions.

Accounting for LPSI: !pump. operation is-:conservative because these: pumps trip automatically upon RAS and are not required during recirculation,. The'Urminimum.containment sump level can be achieved considering only the inventory specified in the RWT wit i no citrb.utionsf rom. safety.injection tanks and the reactor coolaitl ..The resultant containmentwater inventory is fur.ter reduced due to. the effec.ts.of evaporation and flashing of post-accidentfl.ui d;.. holdup. in containment atmosphere, subcompartments, and reservoirs due to containment spray operatin:d; and :diVersions .bf RWT'to'.the:CVCS via the high suction nozzle. Leakages from injection and recirculation (continued)

PALO VERDE,:UNITS 1,2,3 ýB 3.;5.5-12 R EV IST

1. ION:, 4ý8.

RWT B 3.5.5 BASES (Unit 2 only)

APPLICABLE -equipment .to ar eas,: otsad* hg÷.ortai nment during the. first SAFETY ANALYSES 24-houns:Of the event ,arelexp*e*ýpe.edto be small in, - *-

(continued) comparison withl-,the overalj:,(;crQ_.vgatism in thetanaly*ý-sis-.

and are therefore neglected. Consistent with the positions i n, Regulatory. Guides h1.1ýand-1.82;. no;.credit; was taken for containmentIpressure. in,,calculating available NPSH.

The:4000 ppmn limit for-6iinimurm'boron concentration was establishedýItb ensure that, following a LOCA with a minimum level in the RWT, -the rekctor will., remain subcritical in the cold-condi,tion following mixing of theRWT and RCS water vol-umes.. Small break LOCAs assume that all control rods are inserted, except, for the Control ElementAssembly (CEA) of highest worthK' which is-withdrawn from the core. Large

. break LOCAs-:aSsUme.that all: CEAs-remain~withdrawn from the

.,,core. The mostJlimitingcase: occu.rs at beginning of core Slife.. 7.

The maxmum bdrhilimit of 4400 ýppm ih the,. RWT is based on boro'n-precppita'tion 'intheýcore followýftng a LOCA. With the

-reactor vess'el ait atiurated' Conditi'ohs,. the tore dissipates heat by poo :!nucl eate boal! ng [Because: ofl this boiling

.,.

• phenomenon i n, the.t~rea the: bo.i0 c: ac*ýi;,concentrati on will increase-in,.th-is regjon., I.fi,all.loped' t& proceed in this manner, a p i.n twill be7 reachedWere, boronr :precipitation wi I cc rI h core.. o'tL6(Apfý&genty1 o, procedures direct the operator to es'ta'blish-'simulltaneous hot and cold

. leg injection-to-.prevepnt ýthi-s- conditiop by establishing a forcedflow pat~hthroughithe core, regardless. of break

. location'. .... Thesep'rocedu~res;afre based Qn .-the6 minimum time in

• : which pi'ecipitation could occur. ass.ming that maximum boron oncentratis' ..ex-tiinthe bo-rated"-water soUrces used in theforRWT I i hjecti o' folOwingaLOCA-. Boron cortertrations

"  : in excess of theil:imit could result inrprecipitation earlier than, assumed inthewanalysis.-.

The: upp&er lmimt of- 120 0'F, an he lower limit of 60°F on RWT

• "- . temperature are the limits'! assumed in .the accident analysisl. Although RWT temperature affects' the outcome of

-several analyses,: the. upper-- and-:lowe& Iimits established by the LCO are not: limi:ted by any of-these analyses.

,,The:RWT:iESF-. function: sat-isfies -Criterion 3:of 10 CFR 50.36 (continued)

PALO VE-RDE UJ6NITS 1,2,3 -BJ.5:-5-13 REVISION48

RWT B 3.5.5 BASES (Unit 2 only)

LCO The RWT ensures that an adequate supply.of borated water is available to cool and depressurize thecontainment in the evehtof ;a`Desgn Basis, (DBA) and to cool and cover the cbre

-- ,th6 event of Accident a*LOCA thfat the reactor remains

, subcritical* filowing 'a DBA, :an6&dthat an adequate level exists in'>the-containmniht sump to* su pOrt ESF pump operation in'the recirculation, mode.

To-be 'considered OPERABLE, the RWT must meet the limits established in the-SRs for water volume, boron concentrationand temperature.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the RWT OPERABILITY requirements are dictated by the ECCS and Containmen~t Spray System OPERABILITY requirements. Since both the ECCS and the Containment. Spray System must-be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and.4,, the RWT must: be. OPERABLE to'-support their operation.

Core cooling requirements!.in MODE'5 are addressed by

[_CO 3-.4._7, ".

RCS Loops.-.MODE 5, .-Loops; Filled," and LCO 3.4.8, "RCS Loops -. MODE,5:.iLoops'..Not' Fi'lled7-- MODE 6 core cooling

.requi~rements are' addressed-;by LCO 3:9.4ý,:,"Shutdown Cooling CSDC) ýand. Coolant ;Ciircuiation, High Water Level," and LCO 3.9.5, "ShutdownCooling,(SDC)**and Coolant Circulation - Low Water Level."

ACTIONS A.1 Wi.thRWT boron concentration or.borated water temperature not, within.iimits.i.t must bereturhed to within limits w.i.thin:8 hours.. in this ,Condition neither the ECCS nor the Containment Spray System can perform their design functions; therefore, prompt action must be taken to restore the tank to OPERABLE condition: The. allowed Completion Time of 8

• hours-.:'to restore the.RWTto'wi.thin limits was developed considering the time required-to change-boron concentration or temperature andthat the;contents of the tank are still available for injectionand core cooling..

(continued)

PALO.VERDE UNITS 1,2.3 B.- 3. 5.05 -14 EV-1IS ION ý48'

RWT B 3.5.5 BASES (Unit 2 only)

A... , .. .-.-.

ACTIONS B; L -

With RWT, bora~ted .water.,volume-,*ot.within, limits. it must be returnred' tb-. within Llimits.wihh'"l-ho~ur.. In this condition, neither. th"EccS-,nor Containmentý Spraya Sy stem can perform

-their, designfunctions,;. therefore. prompt: action must be taken to restore the',sta'nk to OPERABLE status or to place the unit in a MODE in which' these systems are not required. The

.allowed Completion Time::!of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to restore the RWT to

.. :OPERABLE, status is-'based on this condition since the contents of the tank are not avai-l abl.e.,for injection and core cool.ing.

C.: and -C.?2.

S If the RWT cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associate.d CompletJion,'Time,% the pl-ant-must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this Fstatus, the,.plantI must'*be brought toa.,atlIeast MODE 3 within

.6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />s-and to-:MODE--5ýwith in .36 hou'rs:; .'The allowed

.Compl.etion ..- i~inesa, r'reaSonable,,,based 'ooperating experience, 1to.,re..acbh.-!be.-required :plant',conditions from full power condi.ti 6n.- i tanr orderly.: manner. "a'd. without chal l enging:. plant' sy, tems':. . .

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.5.1 REQUIREMENTS RWT borated water temperature shall be verified every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> :tobeiwithinthe limitsassumedin the accident analysis.', This Frequency-has been'yshown.;to be sufficient to identify. temperature'changes ýt.hat approach either acceptable limit.

-The SR is modified by.'a*Note that'eliminates the requirement to-perform this Surveil.lance.when ambient air temperatures are within the operating.temperature.limits of the RWT. With

,ambient temperatures; within th'is.%,range: the RWT temperature should not'*exceed- the limits.-,.

(continued)

PALONVERDE-UNITS 1,2,3 B 3..5.5-15 'REV.'I SION., 48;.

RWT B 3.5.5 I. BASES (Unit 2 only)

SURVEILLANC]E SR 3.5.5.2 REQUIREMENT

."The'&RWTW-t*er volume 11v61-&shal.1 be'verified every 7 days in "accordabtce"i'WithFigure 3.5.5-1.-. 'This Frequency ensures that

.asuffCicientinitial ,ater supply is available for injection Sand to support: coitinued ESFpump'operation on recirculati-on. Since the RWT volume Ts ,normally stable and

is provided with aLow.Level Alarm in the Control Room, a S7day Frequency is appropriate and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.

SR 3.5.5.3

• Boron concentration Of the RWT shall'be-verified every

. 7 days-to be within the required range. This Frequency ensures'that'the. reactor will remain subcritical following a LOCA and the,,boronpirecipitatiOn in, the ,core will not occur earlier, thafi predicted..i Further, it 'ensures that the resulting sump pHwillbe*,maintai.ned in"an acceptable range

--such.,that the-.effect of.',chorhde'.;and caustic stress corrosi.on onmechanica. systems and components will be minimized. Since the RWT volume is normally stable, a 7 day

......... sampl.i.ng._Frequency.1.s..appropr.iate and has been. shown through operating experience to be acceptable.

REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Chapter.- 6.and Chapter` 15.

2. Engineeri'ngo'Calculation I3":JC-CH-'0209 PALO VERDE .UNITS 1,2,3 B 3..5.5-16 REVISION. 48,

Containment Air Temperature B 3.6.5 BASES (continued)

I~

ACTIONS A.I When,-,containment average aiir teqipera~tureis not within the imit, oftheiLCO, it must be--eseeto-.within limit within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.7 This.Requ.red:Actioni,s j-necessary to return ope8atio. tohWirhi n,.the unds of.thez cont*ai nment analysis.

The _-.8hour Completion.jTime is acceptable considering the sensitivity *of the analysis,to variations in this parameter and provides sufficient time-.to correct.,minor problems.

B.1 and B.2 If the containment average air temperature cannot be restored. to wiithin its lim.it..w:ithin the..requi red Completion Time. the plant must. be-brought.,to:a MODE in which the LCO does not apply; :To, achieve thisstatus:,- the plant must be brought .to atj-leas.tMODE13 within 6-hoursand to MODE 5

-".within.,36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.: The,:allowed ComDletion Times are reas~onable.*-ibased.,on operating;,.exper.iencH, to reach the equi;,red'.pantcconditions-fromi;ful~l-ý:power, conditions in an

'r.

.orderly.ymanner. :and i0thout challenging plant systems.

• , :ii . * ! %"" .,.I *'l'~ii ! .I*I '<" !1{ '**-T' SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.5.1 REQUIREMENTS Verifying that containment average air temperature is within the LCO lIimit:.6ehs'ures")that':*,cbntainmient operation remains within the limit assumed for the containment analyses. In order to determine-thee conta-inment average air temperature, an arithmetic a'aVe'rag'i's calculated using measurements taken at locations within the containment--s-elected to provide a

• repres'etative anripl bofthe 6veral l-Cohta*inmeit atriiosphere.

The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Frequency of this SR is considered acceptable based on the observed slow rates of temperature increase within containment as a result of environmental heat sources (due to the large volume of containment). Furthermore, the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Frequency is considered adequate in view of other indications available in the control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to an abnormal containment temperature condition.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 REV-ISIONA8'

Containment Air Temperature B 3.6.5 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.5.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS

,,,he'Priimary

, containgent aVer6 e'ai~rtemperature is determiiied'.by temperatures`-.attaki any g *fiVe the arithmetical average of thezfollowing of the locations:

a. NominalElevation 85'- 0" e.Nominal Elevation 145' - 0"

..... b. NominalElevatibn 85'-* 0"f.Nominal Elevation 188' - 0 c.. NominalT Elevation 126"- 0" g.Nominal Elevation 188' - 0"

d. NominalbElevationrv ,126.'- 0 "

REFERENCES -1. UFSAR, Section 6.2 2: UFSAR, Section 9.4 k r PALO. VERDE. UNITS 1,2.3 B.,3.6.5-4 REVISION 0

.L . . . : . 1. , N.. , . .

Containment Spray System B 3.6.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.6.2 .. .

REQUIREMENTS (continued) Veri*fying that-the containment sp-ray-rheader pi ping is full fof water to.ýthe 113. ft....leye3l mjnhimizes*_the time required to fi.ll.Athe;, header. This ensures;>tat, spray flow will be admitted to the containment atmosphere within the time frame assumedi n. the containment,= analys~is:. :*The analyses shows that the header may-be filled with- nborated water which helps to reduce boron plate out due:to~evaporation. The 31 day Frequency isýbased on the static nature of the fill header and the low probability of a-significant degradation of water level in the piping occurring between surveillances. The value of:'113 ft,,is an indicated value which accounts for instrument uncertainty.

SR 3.6-.6.3 Verifying that each containment spray pump's developed head at the flow test point is greater than or equal to the required developed head ensures that spray pump performance has not degraded during the cycle. Flow and differential pressure are normal tests of centrifugal pump performance required by Section XI of the ASME Code (Ref. 6). Since the containment spray pumps cannot be tested with flow through the spray headers, they are tested on recirculation flow (either full flow or miniflow as conditions permit). This test is indicative of overall performance. Such inservice inspections confirm component OPERABILITY, trend performance, and detect incipient failures by indicating abnormal performance. The Frequency of this SR is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.

(continued)

PALO VERDE>.UNITS 1,2,3 B-16'.-"6-7 REVISION: I

Containment Spray System B 3.6.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE -.'- SR '3.6:6..4..and-SR3.6 6.5 Cobtin'u ed)

REQUIREMENTS. - 7.

. .The 'Ss vereify that eauh aWtoinaticcon'tainment spray valve

. .actuates, to: its correct position and that each containment spray pump starts upon receipt of an actual or simulated safety injection actuationsigfial, recirculation actuation signal and containment spray actuation signal as applicable.

This Surveillance is not required for valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured.in the required position under administrative, controls,. The 18 month Frequency is based on *the need to perform these

, .Surveillancesunderthe conditions t hat apply during a plant outage and the ,potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillances were performed with'the reactor at power.

Operating experience has shown that thesecomponents usually pass the Surveillances.when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore:, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

The surveillance of containment sump isolation valves is al SO .rquired by' SR, 3.5..5':. A si ngle surveillance may be s to satisfy bdth requir Used re-en.ts.f SR 3.6.6.6 .

Unobstructe'dflow he' ers an dn6zzles are determined by

-either flow,:testingor.,yisual ipnspection.

'With the'containment spray-inlet valves.c:losed and the spray header drained 6f 'any s6lution, low pressure air or smoke

..canbe blownthrough test--connections. Performance of this SR demonstrates that each spray nozzle is unobstructedtand

.provides ýssurance.thatspray coverage of..the containment during an accident is not degraded. Due to the passive des5ign .of the nozzile,.. a test at 10. year intervals is considered, adequate to detect ;obstruction of the spray nozzles...

- (continued)

PAL VERDE UNITS*' 1,2,3 '#

B 3.6.6-8 .. REVISION'48 PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2.3 .B 3.6.6-8 REVISION 48

• u~n f CREFS B 3.7. 11 BASES APPLICABLE The worst, case sigle. active..failure of a:,componept of', the;.

SAFETY ANALYSES (continued) ... the, abi,'astu!iing:'-a CREFS ty of -the 'l-osS of-offsite:

,syst*em t-.pe.r formpower,does its.designnoti".'mpra 1r-,

funictioh.

The CREFS satisfies Criterionr3,of'1O-,(FR,50.36 (c)(2)(ii).

LCO. Two independent and redundant trains of. the CREFS are required to.be.OPERABLE to ensure that at least one is available, assuriing that a single failure disables the 'other train.. Total. system failure could result in a control room operator receiving a dose'in'excesSlof 5 rem whole body or its equivalent in the:event:of a large radioactive release.

,TheCREFSis considered OPERABLE when the.individual components:n'ecessary to control' operator exposure are OPERABLE.in both trains, A:CREFS train.is considered OPERABLE.when the' ass~oci ated.  :-

a. *Fan is OPERABLE:

b.b. HEPA. fjlte's. ýnd c'harcoQl* adsorber..are not excessively restri.ctiLng f Ib&w, '.and 'Are -capbale'dt.-f performing thei r fl Itra6ti on Un'f t ons6; and

c. Ductwork, valves, and dam*eýrs..are.OPERABLE, and air ci rcul.ati.on can be.maintajined...

Inadd.itioh, th'e conftro1' tundary mU t be maintained, m.rolm including the integrity of the walls, floors, ceilings.

ductwork,.antd.* cdes. do"rs' APPLICABILITY: ' In MODES- 1,' 2<3, a'nd 4, th&C*EFS rhyt Le OPERABLE to limit operator expqosure'. duri h*Id .nd.folIowi'ng'gja .DBA.

SIn MODES. 5 and 6; the CREFS'i's; .requi.redto cope with the release from -a. 'rupture of a.waste ga-s" tank.

Movement of spent fuel casks containing'irradiated fuel assemblies is not within the scope of the Applicability of this technical specification. The movement of dry casks containing irradiated fuel assemblies will be done with a single-failure-proof handling system and with transport equipment that would prevent any credible accident that could result in a release of radioactivity.

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, the CREFS must be OPERABLE to cope with the release from a fuel handling accident.

(continued)

PALO ..VERDE UNITS -1, 2,1 --- __-B 1-7-11-3--- . REVISION .2.1.

CREFS B 3.7.11 BASES ACTIONS A.1 IW ne7CREFS.traininoperable;:-actior! must be taken to

. restor~eiOP,ýRABLE:status. within.:7jdays. -In this Condition,

. .the.rema~ining OPERABLE CREFS-subsystem~is adequate to perform control roomý.radiati.on protection function.. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE CREFS train could result in loss of CREFS function. The 7 day CompletionTim6 is based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period, and the ability. of'the remaining train to p~rovide the required capability. -

B.1l and B.2 . . "

I,f the inoperable..CREFS cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the unit must be placed in a MODE that minimizes the accident risk. To achieve this status, the unit ,must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />,, and in MODE-5"within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating ýexperiene& to' reach 'the requilred unit conditions from frul i'Ypower Cdr*idijtions"in .an o6deYrly'manner and without chalý ehrging "unit sYstimsl - . .

C.1 in I MODE'5 f-Iq'uer-edA-ti on A'.1 cIannot be completed

-O---6II within the required Completion Time, -the OPERABLE. CREFS train must be immediately placed in the-emergency mode of operation (i,.e., fan.running,, valv.es/dampers aligned to the post-CREFAS I' "mode,,etc) IThisIacti"n ensures that ;the: remaining train is "OPERABLE, that 'no fail ur6s ..p~reventi rg .automatic actuati on

• . -.* W'ill w

loccur I' ,and that, ;any.

a. active faiIureJ.wiIl

. be readily idetectedI D.1 and D.2 During movement 6f irradiated -fuel',assemblies, if required Action A.1 cannot.be compl]eted *wi-thin :the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE' CREFS traii/must.be immediately placed in the emergency mode of operation (i.e., fan running, valves/dampers aligned to the post-CREFAS mode, etc.) or movement of irradiated fuel assembl.ies must, be suspended immediately. The first action ensures that the remaining is -OPERABLE,' `train that no undetected failures preventing

... 'system.operdtionwi Y! i occu~r,-,; and.tfiat;-any acti ve fai Iure wi l l be, readi..ly detected.. i1f the- system i sý not' placed in the

, emergency mode of' bperati'on,,-t isi action requires suspension I- ..(ontinued),

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B:. 3..7...1] -4 -. REVTISION 48

• /

41ý*,-ýý,

CREFS B 3.7.11 BASES ACTIONS D.1 and *D.2 (Mntinued)

-of the"mvemert of,:i radiated'f ela bmbe in order to "minimizei:the ri'sk of ýa rel eai e 6:f. radi oacti vi ty that might requi re.-the; actuation bf -CREFS, Th*. sdoes not preclude the movement of fuel to a,8afe6,positibn,-.:

E.1 anid E.2 When in"MODES 5"and 6, or during movement~of irradiated fuel assemblies with two CREFS trains inoperable, action must be taken immediately to suspend activities that could result in a release of radioactivity that might: enter the control room.

This places the unit.in a condition thatrninimizes the accident r-isk. Thfs does'not**pecl'ude themovement of fuel to a safe

, position..

F..1 -

Iboth CREFS..trý.ains are-inoperable, in,-MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, Jf the -CRE'FS, mayn6t -b6e -apabl e- Of,, per.tform ilg the intended functiOn and the uni~ti.s in.aaconditiip-nputside the accident analyses. Therefore !LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

SURVEILLANCE SR .7..I.1.:

REQUIREMENTS Standby systms shoIumld be checke they, functiorion prop~erly, :Since

,peri6di'ally to ensure that

' the lenvi ronment and normal Soperadting-condi tids'on thi s"SYstem-.are not severe, testing

'each tr ain once ee ry mdhnth -rovides.aiinadequate check on this system.

Monthly operations for _ 15 minutes to dermonstrate the "function of -the 'system is requi~red.' "The 31 day Frequency is based dn the known :retliability..'of the equipment, and the two train reduundany'-:'avaiIabt e.- e....

SR'.7.-.2 3"71 2 , .

T7hi:s-SR verifies -that the -'requi.red CREFS testing is performed

-jin .accdfdance with thetVentiflTatji-.n Filter Testing Program

- - (VFTP)., The CREFS 'filterý tests are' in accordance with Regulatory' Guide 1 15?2 (Re-. f3VFTP, 3 The includes testing HEMA filter performance. charcoal adsbrber efficiency, (continued) - I PALO"' VERDE JUNITS 1,2,3 -B3.7'. 11- 5 REVISION'*48

CREFS B 3.7.11 BAS ES-SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.11.2 (continued)

REQU.IREMENTS minimum.system flow rate, and the-physical properties of the activated6hrc'oal (giehral use and following specific operations).0 Specific test frequencies ard additional

, ;information are discussed in'detail.:!in the VFTP.

SR 3.7.11.3' This SR orverifies eachCREFS and operates on an actuationtrainý starts.This includes actual simulated signal.

verification that the system is automatically placed into a fi-ltration, mode of operation with, flow through the HEPA.

filters and 'ch'arcoal adsorber banks. The Frequency of 18 months is consistent with that specified in Reference 3.

SR 3.7.11.4 - " *.

Thi,sYSR veri~fies theontegrity Of. the control room enclosure

' nhd' the assumed i hleakarj aItra es of'po6tehti ally contaminated aitr' .,The controil'rb6onfi pos'itiv*v pressure,.'with respect to Poteni'ally 'contamnih'ýtad adjacent areas; is periodically

• ested0 vri~f,,y p~'o'per'function'of the.CREFS. During

.operati the: CREFS. is*'desighend to pressdrize the control room.>- 09. 125 'iinches .wat- f, gauge' positive pressure with respect to adjacent areas in order to prevent unfiltered inleakage. The CREFS is designed.,to maintain this positive pressure with one train at a-ventilation flow rate of

~ a_1000,

• ~l IJ:*'.~rflrtd:I*" cfm. The-The rrqecyf flowrate ventilation is theon outside

'18;months makeupTEST a STAGGERED BASIS-is: consistent, wth the~guidance provided in NUREG-0800, Section 6.4. (,Ref.. 4). .

REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Section 6..4.

.-2. UFSAR Chapter 15.

3_3. Reg~latory, Gujde 1.'52 (Rev. 2U.

4. NUREG-O800,: Sectibh 6.4, Rev. 2, July 1981.

.5 UFSAR, :Sec tion-'9,4 .

• ,,~ ~

• 6.,U U SA R_*,. , St

~ ... ;c""tIion 22

,2-.-2' PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 B 3.7.11-6 REVISION 10 I

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS B. 2 (conti nued),:j,.,

allowing time for restoration before subjecting .t-h:&nitýtbo trarisi 6hts: associ ateddw"i th shutdO.

,In this-CQndition;-. the remaining-:OPERABLE'DG and offsite circuits are-adequate.,toi.supply.electrical power to the onsite Class 1E Distribution System. Thus, on a component basis, single failure protection for the required feature's function may have been lost: however, -function has not been lost.... The 4.hour Completion Time takes into account the

-OPERABILITY required feature,:" of..tbe'redundaft Additionally,counterpa'rt

,the.4' ho'ur 'to Completion the inoperable Time takes into account the, capacity and capability of the

-remaining' AC sources.'.a reasonable time: *for repairs, and the lo .. probabi.itydof'a DBA occurring during this period.

If a DG has been declared inoperable and Condition B has been entered, and during that inoperability a new problem with the inoperable DG is discovered, a-separate entry into

-.Condition B is-not ,equired for the oew DG problem.

Therefore, thePeQ-ir.eActions of Condition B would not

. Iapply 1 the:-*ewt .ew DQt.problem

-,-,.obiem.-mhe must be entered i nto the&. cgr.rpect !:ve actiopi.- progrm and corrective

-,actions specifJe~d i"i-,, , * `rdan':'wji:th t~he,-corrective action pogram.- Transportabi.li'yjm$..s be-addres;sed in a timely

.,manner, ipý.accogrdancewit,he :corr cfti-e~-action program.

.- . .. ' 3." 2' B.3.':- 1.ant. - r, ' -,

,-'-,  : t! . i"" , [

• Requir.d.:Actio.B.3.1 provides an alowayce to avoid unnecessary testirfg of OPERABLE I-fI t can be determined IDG'.

that the cause of the' 1,inoperabl':, DGdd6s ýnot exist on the OPERABLE DG, SR 3.8.1.2 dbes" hot haýe' to be performed. If the cause of inoperabi.lityexists on..the..other. DG. the..other DG would be declared inoperable upon discovery and Condition E of LCO 3.8.1 would :be>'nt-ered.:- Once the failure. J ,

repaired, the common causefaillure rno longer exists and Required Action B.3.1 is, satisfifd'..' If the cause of the initial inoper.ab]e DG cannot be ,confirmed not to exist on the remaining DG,' perfo'rmance of'SR 3.:8A1.2 'suffices to provide

.assurance of continued.OPERABILITYtof that DG.

In the event the inoperatl~'e DG is .restored to OPERABLE status prior to completing ei ther B.3.1 or B.3.2, the plant corrective action:,pr'ogram t'.flI! continue to evaluate the common cause possibility. This continued evaluation, however, ' -is:-Ino- 'longer under:' the 24-hour: constr-ai nt-imposed&

while in Condition B.

(conti nued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2.3 B 3.8.1-11 REVISION 43

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS B.3.1 and B.3.2 (continued)

.:Ac*ofdin:gt-t Generi c Letter 15 (Ref, 7). 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is reaso§nable.:onfirmf that the OPERABLE DG(s) is not affec:ted by thesame-problem'as, the inoperable DG.

BA4 In Condition B, the remaining OPERABLE DG and offsite circuits are ladequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1E Distribution System. The 10 day Completion Time takes into-account the:capacityiand capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

When utilizing an extendedDG Completion Time (a Completion Time greater than 72,o'urs'and less than or equal to 10 days),the compensatory measures listed below shall be implemented. For planned maintenance utilizing an extended Completion Time: the.,compensatory,,measures shall be implemented-prior, to eitering*Condition B. For an unplanned entry into an extended ComplretionFime, the compensatory measures shall be implemented without delay.

.: The .r6edundant, DG" .Ion Mwi th" all.

1 i its required

...... system, ssystems ',trains; compbnents, and devices) will be ver ified'OPERABLEE(as required by TS) and no discretionary main tenarc6 activities will be scheduled on the i'edtndant (OPERABLE): DG. "

..2. No'dilscteti6natr'ymaaintenanceý activities will be

.cheduled on:the statidn 'blackout generators (SBOGs).

3. No discretionary maintenance activities will be

. scheduled on. the.startup transformers:

4v. No'iscretionary mainLenaftce "activities will be scheduled in the APS switchyard~or the'unit's 13.8 kV power supply lVines and transformers which could cause a line outage or challenge'offsite-'power availability to the unit utilizing the extended DG Completion Time.

5'.. All.a.ctivity, including.access,: in the Salt River

,Project,(SRP),switchyard shall'be'closely monitored and controjled.-.Discretionary maintenance within the switchyard-that could'challenge offsite power supply

'I,. availability-wil.l be evaluated':in.accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4).-and managed on a~graded, approach according

,- [" tor..isk

o. . .significance.'

.. n.. ." .

I 6. The SBOGs will riot be'usedfor non-safety functions (i.e., power peakihg'to the grid).-.

(continued)

PALO VERDE -UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.8 .1i-:12:] REVISION,'.48-

~ ~

?" X'niw V, V AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS B.4 (continuedy),...,-.

7. Weather, ,conditions wJ l be assessed ,prior to removing a DG *f1rpm servi ce 2during .p.,anned*mai.n'tenhance acti vi ties.

.:ddi tion'ally, DG'o'utages.wfll ,notl* Scheduled when severeweather conditions and/oruýiStable grid conditions are predicted or present.

8. All maintenance activities associated with the unit that is utfliznhg the extended DGCompletibn Time will be

.as~essed and.ma*iaged per 10 CFR :50.65 (Maintenance Rule).

9, The.funftiona]lity of. the SBOGs will be-verified by ensuring that the monthly'start test has been successfully*completed within..the previous four weeks before entering the extended DG Completion Time.

10. The OPERABILITY 'of'the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump will be verified before'entering the extended DG Completion ;Ti 11.n i me..

The-.sysýtemdispatcher,:will be contacted once per day and inforbmed of.the.:DG status, ialong with the power needs of the Jacil* i*t ...

12L Should a severe 'wether'warning be issued for the local area that could,,affec-t-the.swi.tchyard or the offsite

"'powersupplyduii'g..the, .ektnded .DG Completion Time, an

..operator Wialll be avyil.blealod aIat the SBOG should

'.local' operation , of th*e. SBOG.be.rquired as a result of on-site weath,'r:!rel 6ted .dabagey.. -

13. No discretionar-y maintenance wil l be allowed on the main

'Undui t iaulxi!i ary tran'sfo-'me rs f'associ ated with the

ýunit.'

If one or-,more of the above compensatory measures is not met while ,in. the extended completion .time., the corrective action program shall: be ebtered, the risk managed in accordance with the Maintenance Rule. and.,the compensatory measure(s)

. estored.:withbOUtdlay- e cmntyeu s

'The second Completlion Time for Required Action B.4 establishes a"limit on. the maxirmum-time allowed for any combination~of required AC, power;sources to be inoperable

.during any;si~ngle'contiguous occurrence of failing to meet the:LCO. '-If Condition"'B is-entered While, for instance, an

offSite, circuit- is inoperable. and:-that: circuit is subsequently retbrned OPERABLE; the LCO may already have been not met for up:to,72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> (3day-s). This could lead

• to a total- of, 13 *days, since minitjalj.ailure to meet the LCO, fo'.restore: .the DG] .. tA is time. an bffsite circuit (continued)

PALO :VERDE-:UNITS 1,2,3 B.:ý 3. 8.j.-,13'; EV-ISION, 48-ý

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS B.4 (continued)

, could..agai nbecome-i noperable, the' DG'restored OPERABLE, and

.an :addi-tiobral-, 7,2hours .(,for a., total:, of 16 days) allowed pri or .to compl ete. restorati on of. the LCO i -The 13 day Completion Time provides a limit on time allowed in a

.speci fiedicondi.tion: ,after. di scovery- of fai lure to meet the iLCO. This. limit is considered reasonable for situations in S.- ' which Conditions A and B are entered concurrently. The "AND" connector between-the 10 day and 13 day Completion

..iiis means-that both Completion Times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive Completion Time must-be met.

.As in Required Action B.2, the Completion Time allows for an exception to the hor'mal "time zero" for beginning the allowed ti~me "clock." This will .result in establishing the "time' zero" at the .time that 'the LCO was initially not met.

instead, of at .the, time Condition B was entered.

,C. 1 and'C.2 Required Action C.1. which applies when two offsite circuits are inoperable,"iSint~nded.-o.provide'assurance that an egentl".Wi'th:a-"coicnident'single.:failure will not result in a complete loss of reduiiddnt ,requih-ed-safety functions. The Completion Time for this, failure of redundant required S':-featLiresis'.reduced 'tob'12"-hours'from that allowed for one

.*..traino'Without"'.f'fsi:te 'powe" ('Required.!Action A.2). The

'r.atiOnale- for"'therediUctiol to.12'hours'is that Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6) allows a Completion Time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for two required offsite circuits inoperable, based upon the

.assurn'ption that:two;omplete' safety trains'are OPERABLE.

"When"aconcurrent redundant required'-feature failure exists,

'thi~s assumption is' ot .the"case, and a shorter Completion Time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is appropriatei These features are powered from' redundant AC "safety'trains. These features require

'Class lE power from PBA-SO3 or'PBB-S04 ESF buses to be

,OPERABLE,ý and, are identi~cal to those Specified in ACTION A.2. .Mode 'applicability is 'as specified in each appropriate TSsectibn.,

The Completion Time for Required Action C.1 is intended to

- allow the operatortime..to .evaluate and repair any

.,discovered d inoperabilities. This-.Completion Time also

,allows. for an ýexception to the.normal -2'time.zero" for begifhnihg, the allowed outage time ".clock.." -I9this Required Action. the Completion Time qnly begins on-discovery that

a. All required offsite circuits'are 'inoperable; and

b. A required feature is inoperable.

(continued)

PALO VERDE-UNITS 1, 2,3 B 3". 8'.1 14- REVi'S-ION'48'

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (con.,nued)

If atrany .time: during -the,ex-istence- oft..,Condition C (two offsite ci rcuits i noperable) and-a. requi rdfture becomes i noperabl e, this Completion: Time begins torbe.;,racked'.:

According to Regulatory Gui-de 1.93 (Ref.. 6), operation may continue in Condition C for-a period that should not exceed 24 I hours.. This level.- of degradation:.means. that .the offsite

. electrical power system does not have the capability to effect a safe shutdown and. to mitigate.the effects of an accident; however, the onsite AC sources have not:,been degraded. This level of degradation generally corresponds to a total loss of the immediately accessible offsite power. sources.

Because; of. the normally high availablility of the offsite sources, thi.s level: of. dgradation may "appear to be more severe

.than other Combinations of two AC sources inoperable that involve one or more DGs inoperable. However, two factors tend to decrease the severity of this level of-- degradation:

a.. configu-tion-of:.th.redun-dantA 0The e ectrical power system that .,rernains~ravail.able.,i 5,,notýu.susceptible to a

,ingebusorswtchng-failureýand.,

. requj.reed:to.ý;detct:,.and ýrestore ,an unavailable

h. -Theitme, offsite ;.power soueeis..genera]

e-much ly -liess than that requi redý to .detect -a.nd restore:1a unavaii able onsite

.AC source;.,

Wi.th both of the requiredr offsi.teci.rcui:ts, i.noperable, sufficient bositeAC!:sources are. available tomaintain the unit in a safe shutdowrcn--ondi-ti-on: *in. the. event o.ff-a DBA or transient.i* In facts,. a-: simultaneous loss ofr offsite AC sources, a LOCA,. and a worst: case s-i.ngle failure-were, postulated as a part. of the ,design b-asis' in the safety analysis. Thus, the 24 hour: Compl.etion Time provides a, per..iod. of.t.-ime to effect restoration.:of one of .the offsite: ci.rcuits :commensurate with the importance of maintaining an AC.electrica8l power system capable of meeting its design .criteria.

Accordifng., to Regul atory .Guide; . 93. (Ref;. ,6)'., wi th the avai I able offsi-te" AC.sources, twoTles§s thah requu.ired by the LCO, T. operation mmay ,cohti nue for 24."hours.":. I.f two :offsite sources are restored

.contihue, i" :wit-hin oh1y i:24

'te-source hdurs-', uhr'str:icted qoperation may one off, ist'restbred within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, power operation continues in accordance with

..>,Condition.A..-  :. .

(conti nued)

PALO,VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 - ISJOW48 YE R

AC Sources - Operating

• B3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (contin'ed)

C-nd~ii-i c:applTis only: whefthe '~iteocircuits are unavibeto 'cormmence autdýatic i:a d~equencing inthe

< eev*en, ofa des i g basIs" acc#iderit(DBA).",In cases where the of-fsite cir'cbits a vailablefor sequencing, but a DBA could cau"se actuation off-the Degraded Voltage Relays, ConditionG. appl-ies. . -

-D.1'a~nd D.2 Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, the Distribution System ACTIONS would not be entered-even -ifall, AC sources to it were inoperable resulting in de-energization. Therefore, the Required Actions of Condition D are modified by a Note to indicate that when.ConditionrDVis entered with no AC source to a

.. train., the Conhditions and.Required Actions for LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution System.- ' Operating,"rmust be immediately

, entered. This.allows. Condition D.to provide requirements for- the loss of.one 6ffs.ite circui-t.,and one DG without regard to whether a train.i sý:de-energized. LCO 3.8.9 p -oves the., appropriate restrictions for a de-energized train. "

+

ýAt.A* jrding-toi'Regulatory':Gui'de 1.931 (Ref. 6). operation may

.ont,C~nue1 ih niti6 D,':fodra p5er-iod that should not exceed Ffý1Codit h ouhs ih``iul."e -

.n*,iI.Condition_0,individual.reddancyis lost in both the

'-tffsi te". e-lectr.i. ai power system--and- the onsite AC electrical power system.- 'S1innce: powe-r systbem-redundancy is provided by

,,"'.. two diverse-sources

'thep p oweri' systems -in-ofthi's-Condition

.power, however, may the reliability appear of higher than in.Coffdition C. 'los's'ofboth required'offsite

-circuits):' This differehce-in, reliabi1ity is offset by the

. .scep'tibility of. thi:s;power system- configuration to a singlebbsý'or,.switching-failure. The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Completion Time 'tak'es. into account the capacity and capability of the refiainfing'AC. sources a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a. DBA occurring during this period.

(continued)

PALO VERDOLUNITS 1,2,3 K ý .8. ii--116, REVTMON'41

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.10 (continued) ), .. .

REQUIREMENTS

• should..be maintained as c!oste.as,pr.:rcticable to 0.89 while still"imaintaining ac~ceptable Vbl.tage..1 ,J it,ts on the emergency busses... In.t'ther cirumstance-, th-grid ,voltage may be suchthAt.ht'e: DG excitation-,1ev'el s rneeded to obtain a power factor of.,089 may ntcause unacceptable voltages on the emergency busses, but the_ excitation. levels are in excess of those recommended for the D0G In such cases, the power factor shall be maintained as close as: practicable to 0.89 without exceeding DG excitation limits. "

The following compensatoryrmeasures shall be implemented prior to ,.the per~formance-Qf. this SR in MODE 1 or 2:

a., Weather. c6nd-itions will be assessed, and the SR will not be schedule'dwhen severe weather condi-tions and/or urstable grid iconditions. arej.predi~cted or present.

..bl. ,No discretionary- maintenance activities will be

-.schedufled -in-theAPStswit chyard orthe unit's 13.8 kV pOw er- 'pup'sly llnet and transfdrmes, 'wh'ich could cause a 1i ne' outage*"6r '6hal'lege-offsit;ei avai I abi I i ty to the unit performing this SR.

c. All activi,-tty.;. .1inc.iud,ing-..a-cess i mtieSalt River lProject'.(SRP) -:ýWi tc~y-ar' .sh aý!-,6eý95psely monitored and controlled. 'Oiscretionary main~te' a!n, ce: within the switchyard that could challenge offsite power supply avai labi lity will- be- .evalT.uated, iI"a-qiodance with

.10 CFR 50:i65(a)(4)- and monaged:.on a;graded approach accordi ng ::to .rsksjgnificance *,.,,- Ii This SR must. be performed atý.a laggi ngI p ower factor of S-0.89,' at tleast once every. .36 months, for each DG. The first performance of this- -SR; at a _lagging,.pow.er* factor of _*0.89 shal.l .be withinn36, months, plus thet,9-mo..ntb allowance of SR 3.0-.2., from:tihe,'date ofirn-plementation.of the Technical Specification amendmentthat is adding thepower factor test.ing.requirement to this. SR."i, (Amendment No. 167.

impI emented., on August 29,, 2007) .

SR 3.8.1.11 As required by Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3),

paragraph 2.2.4, this Surveillance demonstrates the as designed operation of the standby power sources during loss of the offsite source. This test verifies all actions encountered from the loss of offsite power, including (continued)

PALO..VER.DE:UNITS 1,2,3 B--3_8_.1-33-ý, REVJSION:48ý-

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.11 (continued)

D CnTDCI IT-MCIlTC I\Lt.¶Ji I R LI'I

.... I~iI.*I sedcing0s

' ._ : , . ' .te

- no sen. -

l6ads'.,and.eh6rgization of the

-emerge.ncy 1,'es -and .respecti ve 1 o.ads'; from jthe DG. It further, ddm'66stirates- the. 'cap abi 1 ty of the' DG to automatical'y:.achieVe'the requi red. v6ltage and frequency within the specified 'time,.

The DG auto-start timedf 10 s'econds "is derived from requirefiients of the accident analysis.. The Surveillance should be conti.nued f6r. a mini.mum of 5 minutes in order to demonstrate that all startihg transients, have decayed and stability has been .achieved.

-TheI'.requirement to verify the. connection .and power supply of

.permanent and auto-connected'emergency loads is intended to satisfactdrily show the '.relati'onship of these loads to the

'DG loading logic. In certain circumstances, many of these loads"cannot 'act~ually bie'cOnnected or loaded without undue hardship or potenti al: for',undesitred operation. For ilnstahce, *Emergen,cb"Core* Cool i'ng:"Systems .-(ECCS) injection val*ves' are rnot desir'd'to be. stroked ope, high pressure injection' 'systems"are.,ot: c ap'able' of being operated at full flow o.r shutdown' c*oiiý.09(SDC) :systems performing a decay h6a't 'removal.Ifucti'n aret. e ddsired -to be realigned to the

-C.S.iode .bp*"erati-hbn:. -IAn: li eu of..actual' demonstrati on of Sconection *'ahd.'oanidng If loads, .tes~ting that adequately

.shows the capa]ility-of,--the'DG.systemn to perform these

..fun ctions is' acceptable.""-This testing may include any

-series.:d "theIentire

" sequetii

,cbnnection al,. ,and:

overlapping,. or total issteps so that adirng .-sequence verified to the' extent p0ssi'ble ensuring power is available to the component. .' .'

The Frequency of '18 iionths'-,is-consistent with the recommendations'of Regulatory-Guide 1-.9 (Ref. 3), takes into consideration unit 'conditibns required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

This SR is modified by four No-tes. The reason for Note 1 is "to min1inimize wear.,and tear .On -the-DG's -ddring testing. The reason for Note i.2"1 s that performi ng -the Survei l lance would remove a requi.red offsite ci.rcuit' from service, perturb the electrical d'istrifbution' system,.' and: challenge safety I,systems:. This -restriction, fr~om normailly performing the (continued)

PALO"VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3:B.`1'34 REVI"--JION 45ý

/., -*,.

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES QIID\II7TI I AKI'fC 1 11 (r'~'intinc~-V~

RU REQU IREMENTS sur~veJ ll ance. in MODE 1_,.2-,.,, 3,..: anQ4.,i1 s. further amplified' to-'

allow off the*'srre, v),rilntionS n, lprformed

.. for the

.pur'pose od reeS,tabishing,'PABILTTY (e.g., post work testing.gfo-l IOwing 6or-erct ive -corrective modification, deficient Ior, A:cbmi'Pete surveillance testing.

and other unanticipated OPERABItITY c6ncerns) provided an

,,.assessment determines plant safety is maintained or enhanced.. This .assessment sh:all, as a minimum, consider the potential outcomes, and transients associated with the failed partial surveiJ1lance, a successful partial surveillance, and a perturbation of the offsite or onsite system within they are tied together or operated irndependently for the partial surveillance.; as well :as the operator .procedures available tQ cope with'these outcomes. These shallbe measured against thb avoided ri-sk Ofa plant. shutdown and startup to deteimoine that pl-aht ' afety is maintained or enhanced when orions tr of the-'surveillance, are pe'rformed in MODE 1, 2, 3,

, .i 4.. Risk insi ghts or,- 'determiIni sti c/,"methods may be used for',,thisi.asses8bsmný .. 'N.ote :3 stat6e, thi{ momentary voltage

,'and ,freqiency* r sn~ts* .inrduce'd .by. l-d changes. do not

,invaliidate' thisit Nte ..4 .s-ates.. hat.the steady state Voltage and f-*e

• r,.Imi-ts:,:e.al.8aTyzid,.;values and have not, beer adj'Ustif 'f o Rlstrufe- a The analyzed

. ,,.. for-tbe'-,e~at.a values-: d s.lgeher-.tor voltage limits are .-.4000 and ýsa4377.".'.2.ivoIS.ahrih ariyzed values for the st~ay 's i §6her limits are -

59.7 and '60.7 h.ertz.:,"1The!,T.6dJ:ca*t*d steady state diesel generatOr: fvqlage .and "requency,. limits-'ý,:.,'s.,ing the panel mounted 4d'iýeSeiY:.gen:e.rator. .ins:str'u;mfentatlio.pn'nd adjusted for instfrument error,,- ie . 4080 and - 4300 volts (Ref. 12), and

" 59.9 and 6015 he"rtz "(Ref.i3),*res pectively. If digital Maintenance and Testing Equipment (M&TE) is used instead of Fthe ,panel* mounted.diesel :gener ator.-ins.trumentation, the instrument.,error., may, beý reduced.,:increasing the range for the: i'ndicated steady state': v.oltage,. and/frequency limits.

SR 3.8.1.12

-This, Survei 1lance dermonstrate5: that. the-DG automatically s.:,tarts :,and achi eves -the: requi red vol tage. and frequency withi.n..,'the-,speci:-fied  ;:time-(-Q,.econds). from the design basis accident.(-LOCA) signl.,.and sut~sequent!y -achieves steady

. -ta!-reqpi -ed-voltage-and .fr quency.-.nges, and operates I for >- 5 minutes. The 5 minute period provides sufficient time to demonstrate stability. SR 3.8.1.12.d and (continued)

PALO VERDE.UNITS 1.2,3 B,3.:.8ý,J-ý35, REVE-ION, 48.

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMEN.TS ... .SR. SR.. 3.8:-12:e 3.8.1.12 (continued)

IR.T1[ ,.....-*..

REQU . . .- permabehnt]y

.ensure"that . , * .,,* connected

. loads and aut6-cohnefted mernercyc loads (auto-connected through the a[utoraatic-i load sequencer) are ehergized from the offsite electricalpPower system on an. ESFsignal without loss of offsite power.

The requirement to verify the'connection of permanent and auto-connected emergency loads is intended to satisfactorily showthe.relationship of these loads to the offsite circuit loading logic., 'Incertain circumstances, many of these loads cannot actually be connected or loaded without undue S

ha'rdship or potential for undesired operati.on. For instance, ECCS injection valves are not desired to be stroked open, high.pressure injecti~on systems are not capable of being operated at full flow, or SDC systems performing a decay heat1 r'eroval*.func tion aýe not desired to be realigned to the ECCS mode of operation. In lieu of actual, demonstration of. connection.andloading of loads, s,tgt adequatelyshoSt.ecapability of the offsite

..,ci rcuit'system to-perform thesee functions is acceptable.

. .Th*itest ng--,may..inc],de anyiseries of, sequential,

.,ý,;overl appng, -,or.totc, *'.stepsrso ,that the enti re connection

.a loading.

. sequence iSF-verlfled tothe extent possible

.. ensur-ng,

.. powera bis.vailbe to, ',the component.

The Frequency of 18 months takes into consideration unit

. ., conditions:'required: t6b:perform the&Surveillance and is i~ntended to'.be consistent with'the expected fuel cycle

.- lengths:Operating experience has'shown that these components usually pass 'the'ýSR when performed at the 18 month Frequency.,..Therefore-, the Frequency was

.concuded'to.be acceptablefrom a reliabiIity standpoint.

...... ...(continued)-

PALO VERDE.UNITS 1,2,3 B'3.8.1ý36' REVISION145

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES cZD Q~ Q 1 1A SURVEILLAN( 17L -Fiý,!A REQUIREMEN' TS

. oads represent.theidutodMtjye ]oa*iigtthat-the DG-wuld exper'ie*c*e"to the. extent,,practicAbie"*nAs consistent with the intent. f-RegulatOryGu1,de: 9.f'(R-'.3). Administrative limitKs,"'have-been placed 'upop,,thb'Ce8s `1E 4160 V buses due to high voltage concerns. At'a'result, power factors deviating much from unity arecuOirently not possible when the DG runs parallel to the grid while,the plant is shutdown. To the extent practicable- VARS will be provided by the DG during this SR.. Theiload band.is provided to avoid routine overloading of'the DG. Rbutine overloading may result'in more frequent teardown:inspections in accordance.with vendor,recommendatibhs' in order to maintain DG OPERABILITY.

.The"following,,compensatory measures shal1 be implemented

%.. prior to the performance of this SRý.in*MODE 1 or 2 with the

'DG connected to an offýite circuit:

a.' Weather conditions Will be assessed', and the SR will not

. bey siheduled .when'ýevere weather'.'6nditions and/or unstable'g'ri'd bi6nditions a*P*r..edict~d 'or present.

b. .No, dis'retiQnary' mýintena8iic'*'titVitibs will be scheduled-1n:-the-APS soitChyard".otheo"unit's 13.8 kV power'supply'lines and':.transfor&er* Which could cause a qine outage or chalenge ffs~tep**pbWe?.eavailability to the unit performing this SR.

c. .All.'activJity", ,JIncluding'acoess:Jin, the:Salt River Project (SRP)' switchyard shall be.closely monitored and I*controlled':i..Discretionary'.=maintenance" within the

,switchyard.that could *challenge offs'ite power supply avai]abi jty'wili beLevaluated i,n accordance with

.10CFR:50.65(a)(4):and managed'on.aýgraded approach according to risk significance.

The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3).

paragraph 2.2.9, takes into consideration unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

(continued)

PALO VERDE .UNITS 1,2,3 B:,;3,:, 8. 1 -139 REVI:SION-45,,

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.14 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS This , Surveillance is modified by four .. . Notes.

Note 1 states

.that momentary. ,var.iations due to,.changing bus loads do not irivaii.date; the'test,. ;,Note 2 ensures that the DG is tested under i'd-ad .conditi.ons that 'are as"'close-to design basis cornditiohns .s, possible. When sy'nhronized. with offsite

,power' testing should'be performed at a lagging power factor of _<0.89. This power factor'is representative of the actual inductive loading a DG'would see. under design basis accident conditions.'. This power factor should be able to be achieved when pe'rforming this SR ,at.power and synchronized with offsite power by transferring house loads from the auxiliary transformer to the startup transformer in order to

'lower the Class 1E bus "voltage.. Under certain conditions, however, Note 2 allows the surveillance to be conducted at a pDower.factor other than _<0.89.. These. conditions occur when grid voltage is-high', and the additional field excitation needed to get the power factor to < 0189 results in voltages on the emergency busses that are too high. This would occur when performing this SR while shutdown,- and the loads on the startup transformer are too i-ightito.:lower the voltage sufficiently to achieve a 0.89 power factor. Under these Jc'obditi o's",. the' pbwer*fac*tbri.should be maintained as close as'asp iactibcabi :to'0 sti ll' mai ntai ni ng acceptable 6891vhiiT

.o ricy b s. In other

-.c cui: stances,, the g d'` -6tage may ýbe such that the DG IexciItationiIee'sibVeeded*:toobta-in a power factor of 0.89 "may ta n a vo-lg6s on: the emergency busses, but thexkei'tatidon, TeveTs:are- in. excess of those recommended

-;.for the:":DG.: :In: such c'asers , the 'power factor shall be

...maiitained 's.close 'as pr ictiabTe to' 0'89 without exceeding DG excitation. linmits.:: The provisions for prelubricating and Waii*opup,, discussed in' SR 3.8.1.2, and for gradual loading,

• discussedJin 'SR 3.:8.1.3; are applicable tothis SR (Note 3 and Note 4))v,..,

-This *.SR must .be performed at a lagging .power factor of

<--0 ý89..at'least: once every '36.months for each DG. The first performance:of this, SR at"a:lagging power factor of _<0.89 shall be within 36 months, plus the:9-month allowance of

'SR 3.0.2, "from the ;date of.implementation.,of the Technical Specification amendment that is .add-ingthe power factor testing requirement of this SR. (Amendment No. 167, implemented on August 29, 2007)

S .. ... . (continued.)..

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B S.8'.1-40 REVISION 48"

Diesel Fuel Oil. Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.8.3 BASES SURVEILLANC -0 E SR 3.8.3.4 i,,,{'* - .1 REQUIREMENT (continue jThis' S'rve'; 1 ance ensures th4t. 'wi'tIput:the aid of the

'refi 1.1compressor.. uf~iciOf*i* r* tiast1capacity for each DG i s avail abl e.'. Thie sys.1tem deli gh '.requi re6nents provide for a mmof five engin* start cycles without recharging. A

'minimum start cycle 1is def.ined by the"DG'yQndor, but usually is measured in terms, Of time (seconds'or-cranking) or engine cranking speed., The pressure specified in this SR is intended to-ireflect the ,1lowest value at which the DG can be considered OPERABLE.

-he 31 day Frequency takes into account'the capacity, T

capability,, r edundancy,.:andrdiveirsity..ofithe AC sources and other indicat'.oris avai lable inithecontroi room, including alarms, to ;alert the operator to"'below Inormal air start

.Pressure.

p Microb iol og ical ,*o1, 1 iS s a major,-cause. .,of fuel oil deg radation fuel o1il adave T6her*e,'a-,.e,-'numerousý. 'bacttera'I.'that acan grow in water fuenvirftnment , e ooeage.anksonce, p.'suie..'

eve ry.92 .Rerhqy*aý.of water from the

-day eliminates the necessary, enpvirdonmen'tfor bacterial -survival. This is the most effective means of controlling micrfobiological fouling.

In addition,.. it e!linminates the pqtenti.al.,for water

. entrainnment..ip,- the,.-fuel oi-,l :during. DG;operation. Water may come fromi any.of .severa*ý-sources, -i~ncluding condensation, ground water', rain water. contami.nated,. fuel oil, and from break~doin o-ýf the :fuel. Oi-,l iby bacteria. Frequent checking for and removal of accqmul-ated water minimizes fouling and provides data regarding the watertight integrity of the *fuel Qil1;:system .The. Surveilliance Frequencies are

.,established byiRegulatory: Gui~de 1.:137T(Ref. 10). This SR is

.for ,preventive maintenance. The presence of water does not necessari.ly r.epresent-faj.lure' of this.'SR provided the accumulated Water is removodduriing,.the performance of this

.- Surve~ill~ance-

- , (cont e d' (continued)

PALOVERDE.UNITS 1.2,3 REVISION,41

Diesel Fuel Oil. Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.8.3 BASES REFERENCES 1. ,FSAR. Section 9.5.4.2.

S.Regulatory Gui~deQ. 1.137.,

'-2

.3 ANS N195:-1976-j,,-Appendi-x B

.4. FSAR, Chapter 6..,.

5* FSAR, Chapter 15.

I 6. ASTM Standards: D4057-81: D975-07b:

D976-91; D4737-90; D1796-83  :

D2276-89, Method A.

ASTM Standards, D975, Table1.e "

• 8 ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI.

9 .Emergency Diesel-Generator and Diesel Fuel Oil -

Systems Instrumentation,-Uncertainty Calculation", 13-JC-DG-203, Parts*23 and 51 .

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.8.3-10 REVISION 48

DC Sources - Operating B 3.8.4 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.4.8 (continued).

REQUIREMENTS battery has reached 85%'of its-: e'xpected life and capacity is

< 100% of the manufacturer's rating, the Surveillance Frequency is reduced to_ 12 mon'ths!. "However, if the battery shows no degradation but has reached 85% of its expected life, the Surveillance Frequency is only reduced to 24 months for batteries that retain capacity Ž 100% of the manufacturer's rating. Degradation is indicated when the battery capacity.drops by more than 10% relative to its capacity on the. preVious'performance test, or when it is 10% below themanufacturer's rating.

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance would perturb the electrical distribution system and. challenge safety systems.

REFERENCES 1.' 1'0 CFR,50. AppendixAGDC A 17.G,

..2.- RegulatQryG.Gui.de,. 1-.6._ Ma rch.-.10 171 ......197

3. IEEE-308-1974.

4. UFSAR, Chapter 8.3.2.

5. IEEE-485-1983. June 1983.

6. UFSAR, Chapter 6.

7. UFSAR, Chapter 15.

8. Regulatory Guide 1.93, December 1974.

9. IEEE-450-1995.

10. Regulatory Guide 1.32, Revision 0, August 11. 1972.

11. Regulatory Guide 1.129, Revision 1, February 1978.

12. Design Basis Manual "Class 1E 125 VDC Power System".

13. Calculation 1,2,3ECPK207 PALO. VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.8.4-11 REVISION 48

1' This page intentionally blank

Battery Cell Parameters B 3.8.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE Table 3.8.6-1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS Because of specific gravity gradients that are produced during the recharging process, delays of several days may occur while waiting for the specific gravity to stabilize. A stabilized charger current is an acceptable alternative to specific gravity measurement for determining the state of charge. This phenomenon is discussed in IEEE-450 (Ref. 3).

Footnote (c) to Table 3.8.6-1 allows the float charge current to be used as an alternate to specific gravity for up to 7 days following a battery equalizing recharge. Within 7 days, each connected cell's specific gravity must be measured to confirm the state of charge. Following a minor battery recharge (such as equalizing charge that does not follow a deep discharge) specific gravity gradients are not significant, and confirming measurements may be made in less than 7 days.

REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Chapter 6.

2. UFSAR, Chapter 15.

3. IEEE-450-1995.

I PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.8.6-7 REVISION 48

-. 2, -

.4 This page intentionally blank 2 F t I -. , "

'Cr

Inverters - Operating B 3.8.7 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8.7 Inverters - Operating BASES BACKGROUND The inverters are the preferred source of power for the AC vital instrument buses because of the stability and reliability they achieve by being powered from the 125 VDC battery source. The function of the inverter is to provide AC electrical power to the AC vital instrument buses. The AC vital instrument bus can be powered from an AC source via a Class 1E constant voltage regulator or from the inverter connected to the station battery. This configuration provides an uninterruptible power source for the instrumentation and controls for the Reactor Protective System (RPS) and the Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS). There are two inveprters per Train (A and B) which totals t6 f6dC'*in'erters.per unit. Specific details on inverters and their operating characteristics are found in the UFSAR, Chapter 8 (Ref. 1).

APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident (DBA) and SAFETY ANALYSES transient, analyses in the UFSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 2) and Chapter 15 (Ref. 3), assume Engineered Safety Feature systems are OPERABLE. The inverters are designed to provide the required capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliabilityto ensure the availability of necessary power to the RPS and ESFAS instrumentation and controls so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded. These limits are discussed in more detail in the Bases for Section 3.2, Power Distribution Limits; Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS): and Section 3.6, Containment Systems.

The OPERABILITY of the inverters is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based on meeting the design basis of the unit. This includes maintaining required AC vital instrument buses OPERABLE during accident conditions in the event of:

a. An assumed loss of all offsite AC electrical power or all onsite AC electrical power; and

b. A worst case single failure.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.8.7-1 REVISION 48

Inverters - Operating B 3.8.7

-BASES (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSIS Inyer-ersr&arart"'f the distribution system and, as

• -(conthi.Ued - such, :s~ati fy, Criteri on3 of"10. CFR -50.36., (c) (2) (i i).

LCO The inverters ensurestrumentation the availability of ACto electrical shut down.the power for 'the 'systems'in required reactor and maintain i-t in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence (AO0) or a postulated DBA.

Maintaining the required inverters OPERABLE ensures that the redundancy incorporated into the design of the RPS and ESFAS instrumentation and controls is maintained. The four inverters (two per train) ensure an Oninterruptible supply of AC electrical power to the- AC vital instrument buses even if the 4.16 kV safety buses are de-energized.

OPERABLE ..inverters require the associatedr-AC vital instrument bus to be powered, by the.inverter with output voltage and frequency within tolerances, and power input to the--i nverters *from--a--125- VDC--st-ation --battery..

This LCO is modified by a Note that allows one inverter-to be disconnected from its assoc.iated battery for < 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

.- 'ifthe AC \ital inr'Umeit -bus-.'s'powe'red from a Class 1E I'::*-donstn~t.vdIet~age regitoidCing'the period and all other i-nverter. are.,operable"': .Thif-.l.lowsý an-equalizing charge to be placed on one battery. If the inverter was not di :Sonnected*,! the result.i'ng, voltage condition might damage inverter,: ;IThese prov.Ki.sioraS* mini mi-zelthe loss of e- Jhe

..equipment -that would:.bcc-ur,.:ihthe:event*:of a loss of offsite

-,' power The 24.hour'time period for the allowance minimizes the time .during'whi.ch: a ilo'ss of,.offsite-power could result in:the loss 'of equipment:,energized from the affected AC vital instrument bus while taking into consideration the time required to perform an equalizing charge on the battery

• bd-nk. ,

The intent 'of this Note. i's to limit the number of inverters that may bedisconnected... .Only-the inverter associated with the.single battery undergoing an equalizing charge may be (continued)

.PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2,3 3.8.7-2 PALOVERE UITS1,23 B3.81-2REVISION 4,8

Inverters - Operating B 3.8.7 BASES (continued)

LCO disconnected.:'A'l othe.r irwer-tersmUs't,-be connected to (continued) "their-,6ssocia'ted batte'ries..;an igne their, associated"

' AC viýtal lnstrument 'buses.

APPLICABILITY The:inverters are required tQ*-be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3.

and 4:-to ensure that ,-.

a. Acceptable fuel design limits and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits are not exceeded as a result of AOOs o.r ,abnormal.transients;> and.,

b.; Adequate core cooling is provided, and containment OPERABILITY and other vital functions are maintained in the,.event of a postulated DBA, Inverter. requirements for MODES 5 and 6, and during movement of. irradiated fuel .assembl.i-es are covered in the Bases for LCO,3'.R.8., '.Inverters *Shutdown.! "*

ACTIONS. A.1 '  ::

'With a- required .inver,te inoperab, ts -associated AC vital instrument bus be*m..s-inoler ble .un.til,-it is re-energized from its Cl'as:s IlI con~stanivolt-age, -source regulator.

Requi red* .Act,,Acton:.A..l is, modi-fi.ed., by -.-_-Note, which states to enter, the: app]i cab!e conditions,:and- Requi-red Actions of LCO. 3.8-.9,- Ti stri-buti on. Systems -,Operating," when

. ConditionA, is entered with one AC vital-instrument bus de-energized:. This ensures ,the -ACvital-instrument bus is re-energitzed within .2*hours vi a :the C-lass 1E constant voltage: regullator .

Required Action A.1 allows 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to, fix the inoperable inverter and return it to service. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> limit is based upon. engineer ing: judgment,; taking into consideration the time";required.'to: repair :an inverter.and the additional risk' tQ'whi:ch ;the uniit. is-expo'sed-because of the inverter inoperability. This has to be balanced against the risk of an immediate shutdown, along with the potential challenges to safety systems such a shutdown might entail. When the AC

- -"(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 ýB 33.8.7-3 REVISION 48

Inverters - Operating B 3.8.7 BASES (continued)

ACTI1ONS

,I?:

L ,. i

- 'A.1 (conti nuedY:.

Urent bb-.i s poweredfr~om"its constant voltage vital. !ir~ t rn source, it is relying upon interruptible AC electrical power sources (offsite and onsite). The..uninterruptible inverter source :to theAC.vvital instrument buses is the preferred source for powering instrumentation trip setpoint devices.

' B.1 and B.2 If the inoperable devices or components cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the unit mus't be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply., JTo achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6hours and~to MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Complet-ion Times are reasonable, b,.ased on operating experience. to reachf'the requi red unit conditions. from full.. power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems..

SURVE ILLAI '.387T1.,, .CE,"*SR REQUIREMEJNI-S

-rhis Suirve! l1 ance verifi es "that the ihverters are

.functioning properly.. withall..required ci.rcuit breakers cL' rlosed instriimen":buses. energized from the

'arAC.vital i nverte, . Th&1/2rjfication.:ofi-p-oper voltage and frequency

.outp'ut 66sur.s that. therequiire.power is readily available

' for the",instnumientati on., Of 'the. RPS. and ESFAS connected to

.'the. AC vitainstrument,bss'. The"7 day. Frequency takes

'i.nto6accounti the-redondanhd*t,,c'apab'ilityiof the inverters and

.other ,.indcatios a0ailable 'n the, control room that alert the'.operator. to inverter ,Imal functi ons'.-

REFERENCES 1. UFSAR," Chapter 8..

2. UFSAR, Chapter 6.

3. UFSAR, Chapter 15.

,PALO ýVERDE UNITS 1.2,3 3i:83-4 ;REVISION .0,:

Distribution Systems - Shutdown B 3.8.10 BASES (continued)

ACTIONS The Actions aro&-odi fied by ,*a Noteu that. i denti fies requjired Action A.2.3 is not applicable to the movement of irradiated fuel assembl.i esin Modes,; l7.tthr.oug, 4 .-

A.1, A.2.1A;, A22.2 A.2:,3k2A.'2,4A 2 and4-A2.5 Although redundant requi red features may requi re redundant trains of electrical power distribution; subsys~tems to be OPERABLE, one OPERABLE distribution subsystem train may be capable of supporting sufficient ,required features to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS and fuel, movement. By allowing the option to declare required features associated with-an inoperable distribution subsystem inoperable,

.appropriate restrictions are implemented in accordance with the. affected required features LCO.s:Required Actions. In

..many instances-; this option may ,involve undesired administrative efforts;., .Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made. (i.e., to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, movement of irradiated fuel assemblies,

...... and operations---involvi.ng positive-re~activity additions).

The Required Action to suspend posi.ti.ve ,,eactivity additions does not preclude actions to ma-iritai.r or increase reactor vessel inventory provided ther required SDM is maintained.

Suspension-;6f these/,6ac'.**ifs. -*sh-al i/Opreclude completion of actibns-to

ýestabýJs :,a' 'afecoftse'rat'ive condition. If

-,moving' irr'adi'at6ed *f*uel" errb-Tles Ih*ie"in MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4:thefiie). movement i.s-is*dee.ndeft freactor operations.

Thereforei" abilityto imjediately:'suspend movement of i rradi ate'd -fuel * .ass-erblies--Wbul'd' nO't"be: sufficient reason to req*ire a r huldown*I - The-e

'a;tor"s titons minimize the probabil:ityoY.f,.the occurrence of.'postulated events. It is further required to imimediately i-ate action to restore 1ni the required AC, DC, and AC vital instrument bus electrical power dis-tributi6n subsystems and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished.i.n order to provi-de -the .-.

necessary power to the unit safety systems.

7.  :,'-7 , }: '

(continued)

PALOIVERMr:'UNITS 1.2.3 I I B:8.10-3 REVISION 48

Distribution Systems - Shutdown B 3.8.10 BASES (continued)

ACTIONS (continued)

Notwithstanding performance of the above conservative

'Required Actions- -a required -shutdown--cooi ing (SDC) subsystem may. beinoperable. ..In thjs-case, Required Actions A:.2.1 'through A.2.4'do not 'dequatelly'address the concerns rel ating .to coo an't ci rcul ati bntiand heat removal. Pursuant to LCO 3:0.6, ,th*SDC:ACTIONS would not be entered.

Therefore, Required Action A..:2.5 is provided to direct declaring SDC'inoperable, which results in taking the appropriate SDC actions.

The Completion Time of immediately: is'"consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required distribution ,subsystems should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time the unit safety systems may be without power.

SURVEILLANCE ~SR -3.'8.10.1-REQUIREMENTS- - .' -.. T  :. .

Thi s Surývei I Iance Veri fi es that the AC. DC. and AC vital ins-trumenft s bUs electrica-i 'power distribution system is

" 'functfohi ng 'properil,"..Wth all the required buses energized.

" "The'ver~fi catinofrp~e-oage vol is availlability on the buses ensures that- "t'e'..requir'e.-power readil& available for motive as well as control functions for critical system

. ...loads' connectedto hese buses -The "7day Frequency- takes into account the ,redundant capability of the electrical power "dtstriblution s ibsystems;and other indications -

available i'n the "control.,room" that alei.t.-the operator to subsy'te'em~*afunctitns.

'REFERENCES 1. -UFSAR Chapter 6. ..

2. UFSAR, Chapter 15.

I'

.PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2.3 .-,B 3.-8,10-4 .,.REVISION Q..,

Nuclear Instrumentation B 3.9.2 B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS B 3.9.2 Nuclear Instr.umentation BASES .'..  :. .- iJi:K ,-Y  :.

BACKGROUND The Startup. Channel Netron'IFluxF M:oiors or Startup Range

" Monitors.(SRMs).are used-during Cdre,:alterations or mnovement 'of irrad ated f'uel. assembli es ifn containment to monitorthecorereact'ivity..condition. The installed SRMs are part oftheExcore. uclear Instrumentation System.

These detectors are'l6cated external tothe reactor vessel and detect neutrons leaking from-the core. The use of

. portable, detectors is permitted, provided the LCO

-requirements are met.

..The installed-'SRMs are BF3 detectors operating in the proportional region,of the gas filled detector characteristic curve". The detectors monitor the neutron flux in counts per second. The instrument range covers five decades of neutron flux (1E+5 cps) with a 5% instrument.,

accuracy. The detectors also provide continuous visual:"

indication in/thecontrol room and ,an audible indi~ation in the control rbpi aVl conta-rnment. Aýn audWible BDAS al arm

'alerts operators toa possibled lutio.n a-ccident. The excore startup chael ris-are'de-signed, in 'accordance with the cri re .-prsne nRerec.-

APPLICABLE~ Two OPERABLE SRMs"an'hd: the associ-ated- BDAS are requi red to SAFETY ANALYSES provide a.`s'ighall'to a] ert. the".&ie'tor 'to' unexpected changes in cor'e re'activity*from a .bordn: di'l-dti'on 'accident. The safety analysis of the unt6ntro'! lled. -bo'ron dilution accident is described in Reference 2. The analysis of the uncontrol led 'b(orn di-I ution- acci dent-'shOws that normal l available reactor subcriticality would be reduced,-.:but there is sufficient time for th'e"operator'to take corrective actions.

The .SRMs. satisfy; Cni teri.on 3 of 10: CFR: 50.36 (c (2)(i.1i,).

LCO This LCO requires two SRMs OPERABLE to ensure that redundant monitoring capability is available-to detect changes in core reactivity.

(continued) I PALO VERMEi:!UNITS 1.2,3 B T9ý.-2-1 REVISIO448

Nuclear Instrumentation B 3.9.2 BASES LCO (continued) The SRMs include detectors, preamps, amplifiers, power supplies, indicators, recorders, speakers, alarms, switches and other components necessary to complete the SRM functions. Specifically, each SRM must provide continuous visual indication in the Control Room and each SRM must have the capability to provide audible indication in both the Control Room and Containment via use of the Control Room switch.

APPLICABILITY In MODE 6, the SRMs must be OPERABLE to determine changes in core reactivity. There is no other direct means available to check core reactivity levels.

The requirements for the associated Boron Dilution Alarm System (BDAS) operability in MODE 6 are contained in LCO 3.3.12, "Boron Dilution Alarm System." LCO 3.3.12 also covers SRM and BDAS operability requirements for MODES 3, 4 and 5.

ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 With only one SRM OPERABLE, redundancy has been lost. Since these instruments are the only direct means of monitoring core reactivity conditions, CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity additions must be suspended immediately.

Performance of Required Action A.1 shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.

With one required SRM channel inoperable, the associated BDAS is also inoperable. Action A.1 of LCO 3.3.12 requires the RCS boron concentration to be determined immediately and at the applicable monitoring frequency specified in the COLR Section 3.3.12 in order to satisfy the requirements of the inadvertent deboration safety analysis. The monitoring frequency specified in the COLR ensures that a decrease in the boron concentration during a boron dilution event will be detected with sufficient time for termination of the event before the reactor achieves criticality. The boron concentration measurement and the OPERABLE BDAS channel provide alternate methods of detection of boron dilution.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.9.2-2 REVISION 15