ML093560845

Submittal of Changes to the TS Bases Incorporated Into Revision 51, Implemented on December 2, 2009

ML093560845
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	12/09/2009
From:	Weber T Arizona Public Service Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
102-06101-TNW/CJS
Download: ML093560845 (69)

Text

Technical Specification 5.5.14 Zm Thomas N. Weber Mail Station 7636 Palo Verde Nuclear Department Leader Tel. 623-393-5764 PO Box 52034 Generating Station Regulatory Affairs Fax 623-393-5442 Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034 102-06101-TNW/CJS December 09, 2009 ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject:

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)

Units 1, 2, and 3 Docket Nos. STN 50-528/529/530 Technical Specifications Bases Revision 51 Update Pursuant to PVNGS Technical Specification (TS) 5.5.14, "Technical Specifications Bases Control Program," Arizona Public Service Company (APS) is submitting changes to the TS Bases incorporated into Revision 51, implemented on December 2, 2009.

The revision insertion instructions and replacement pages are provided in the Enclosure.

No commitments are being made to the NRC by this letter. Should you need further information regarding this submittal, please contact Russell A. Stroud, Licensing Section Leader, at (623) 393-5111.

Sincerely, TNW/RAS/CJS/gat

Enclosure:

PVNGS Technical Specification Bases Revision 51 Insertion Instructions and Replacement Pages cc:

E. E. Collins Jr.

NRC Region IV Regional Administrator (enclosure)

J. R. Hall NRC NRR Project Manager (enclosure)

R. I. Treadway NRC Senior Resident Inspector for PVNGS (enclosure)

A member of the STARS (Strategic Teaming and Resource Sharing) Alliance Callaway

• Comanche Peak

• Diablo Canyon 9 Palo Verde 0 San Onofre 0 South Texas

• Wolf Creek

ENCLOSURE PVNGS Technical Specification Bases Revision 51 Insertion Instructions and Replacement Pages

Insertion Instructions for the Technical Specifications Bases Revision 51 REMOVE PAGES Cover page List of Effective Pages 1/2 through 7/8 B 3.1.7-7 / B 3.1.7-8 B 3.3.1-49 / B 3.3.1-50 B 3.3.1-51 / B 3.3.1-52 B 3.3.2-5 / B 3.3.2-6 B 3.3.2-13/B 3.3.2-14 B 3.3.3-15 / B 3.3.3-16 B 3.3.3-17 / B 3.3.3-18 B 3.3.3-19 / B 3.3.3-20 B 3.3.5-15 / B 3.3.5-16 B 3.3.5-25 / B 3.3.5-26 B 3.3.7-7 / B 3.3.7-8 B 3.3.7-9 / Blank B 3.3.8-5 / B 3.3.8-6 B 3.3.9-5 / B 3.3.9-6 B 3.3.10-9 / B 3.3.10-10 B 3.3.10-19 / B 3.3.10-20 B 3.3.11-5 / B 3.3.11-6 B 3.3.12-5 / B 3.3.12-6 INSERT PAGES Cover page List of Effective Pages 1/2 through 7/8 B 3.1.7-7 / B 3.1.7-8 B 3.3.1-49 / B 3.3.1-50 B 3.3.1-51 / B.3.3.1-52 B 3.3.2-5 / B 3.3.2-6 B 3.3.2-13 /B 3.3.2-14 B 3.3.3-15 / B 3.3.3-16 B 3.3.3-17 / B 3.3.3-18 B 3.3.3-19 / B 3.3.3-20 B 3.3.5-15 / B 3.3.5-16 B 3.3.5-25 / B 3.3.5-26 B 3.3.7-7 / B 3.3.7-8 B 3.3.7-9 / Blank B 3.3.8-5 / B 3.3.8-6 B 3.3.9-5/ B 3.3.9-6 B 3.3.10-9 / B 3.3.10-10 B 3.3.10-19 / B 3.3.10-20 B 3.3.11-5 B 3.3.11-6 B 3.3.12-5 B 3.3.12-6 I

B 3.5.5-1 / B 3.5.5-2 Through B 3.5.5-15 / B 3.5.5-16 B 3.7.11-3 / B 3.7.11-4 B 3.8.3-5 / B 3.8.3-6 B 3.8.9-1 / B 3.8.9-2 B 3.8.9-3 / B 3.8.9-4 B 3.8.9-11 / Blank B 3.5.5-1 / B 3.5.5-2 Through B 3.5.5-9 / Blank B 3.7.11-3 / B 3.7.11-4 B 3.8.3-5 lB 3.8.3-6 B 3.8.9-1 I B 3.8.9-2 B 3.8.9-3 / B 3.8.9-4 B 3.8.9-11 / Blank 2

PVNGS Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2, and 3 Digitally signed by Stephenson, Carl J Stephenson,

• DN: cn=Stephenson, Carl J(Z05778)

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This is an accurate copy of the Carlna document.)

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Date: 2009.12.01 10:31:20 -07'00' Technical Specification Bases Revision 51 December 2, 2009 p.

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3.7.12-3 3.7.12-4 3.7.13-1 3.7.13-2 3.7.13-3 3.7.13-4 3.7.13-5 3.7.14-1 3.7.14-2 3.7.14-3 3.7.15-1 3.7.15-2 3.7.16-1 3.7.16-2 3.7.16-3 3.7.16-4 3.7.17-1 3.7.17-2 3.7.17-3 3.7.17-4 3.7.17-5 3.7.17-6 3.8.1-1 3.8.1-2 3.8.1-3

3. 8.1-4 3.8.1-5 3.8.1-6 3.8.1-7 3.8.1-8 3.8.1-9 3.8.1-10 3.8.1-11 3.8.1-12 3.8.1-13 3.8.1-14 3.8.1-15 3.8.1-16 3.8.1-17 3.8.1-18 3.8.1-19 3.8.1-20 3.8.1-21 3.8.1-22 3.8.1-23 3.8.1-24 3.8.1-25 3.8.1-26 3.8.1-27 3.8.1-28 3.8.1-29 3.8.1-30 3.8.1-31 3.8.1-32 21 10 0

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B 8.5-4' B 3.8.5*5 B 3.8.5-6 B 3.8.6-1 B 3.8.6-2 B 3.8.6-3 B 3.8.6-4 B 3.8.6-5 48 45 50 50 45 45 45 48 50 45 45 45 45 50 45 45 0

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6 37 Corrected PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2,

AND 3 7

i

- Rek"ision 51 December 2, 2009

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Page No.

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F PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2,

AND 3 8

Revision 51 December 2, 2009

Regulating CEA Insertion Limits B 3.1.7 BASES ACTIONS B.1 (continued)-

Additionally, since the CEAs can be in this condition without misalignment, penalty factors'are not inserted in the core protection calculators to compensate for the developing peaking factors.

Experience has shown that rapid power.increases in areas of the core, in which the flux has been depressed, can result in fuel damage as the LHR in those areas rapidly increases.

Restricting the rate of THERMAL POWER increases to

• 5% RTP per hour, following CEA insertion beyond the short-term steady state insertion limits, ensures.the power transients experienced by the fuel will not result in fuel failure (Ref. 4).

The restriction on THERMAL POWER increases shall remain in effect until the Regulating CEA groups are inserted between short term steady state limit and the-transient insertion limit for

• 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> per 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> interval.

The 15 minute Completion Time ensures that prompt action shall be taken to restrict THERMAL POWER increases..

C.1 With the regulating CEAs inserted between the long term

steady state insertion limit and'the transient insertion limit, and with the core approaching the 5 effective full ower days (EFPD) per 30 EFPD, or 14 EFPD per 365 EFPD imits, the core approaches the acceptable limits placed on operation with flux patterns outside those assumed in the long.term burnup assumptions.

In this case, the CEAs.must be returned to within the long term steady state Ii.nsertioh limits, or the core must be placed in a condition in which the abnormal fuel burnup cannot continue.

A Completion. Thme of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> is a reasonable time to return the CEAs-to within the long term steady state insertion limits.

The required Completion Time of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> from initial'.

discovery of a regulating CEA group outside the limits until its restoration to within the long term steady state:limits, shown on the figures in. the COLR, allows sufficient timefor borated water to enter the Reactor Coolant System fromi the chemical addition and makeup systems, and to cause.,the--

regulating CEAs to withdraw to the acceptable region.

It. is reasonable to continue operation for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> afterzit is

"(contnued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.1.7-7,

REVISION 0

Regulating CEA Insertion Limits B 3.1.7 BAS.ES ACTIONS C.1 (continued) discovered that the 5 day or 14 day EFPD limit has been exceeded.

This'Completion"Time is based on limiting the potential xenon redistribution, the low probability of an accident,:and the steps required to. complete the action.

D..1 ý ". :,

With the PDIL:circuit inoperable, performing SR 3.1.7.1 within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> thereafteriensures improper CEA alignments are identified before unacceptable flux

. distributions~occur.

"* ' El. "

.71:.-.-.

When a Required Action. cannot be completedýwithin the

required Completion Time,.a,controlledshutdown should be commenced.

The-all'owed Completion Time of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> is reasonable,, based on-operating experience,; for reaching MODE 3 from full power conditions. in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.1.7.1.,.

REQUIREMENTS With the PDIL alarm cirýuit'OPERABLE,.ver'ification of each regulating CEA'group position every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, is sufficient

.to detect CEA positions that may, approach the acceptable limits, and provides the operator With time to undertake the

.Required..Actiofi(S) should thes'quence or'insertion limits be found to be exceeded." The'12. hour Frequency also takes int6,account the indication provided by the PDIL alarm circuit and. other ;informrationaboutCEA', group positions

,available to the operator in.the control. oom.

PDIL alarms are received'on both'the Plant' Computer'(PC) and the Core Monitoring.-Computer (CMC,)/Core. Operating L.ijmi t_Supervisory System (COLSS) after the CMC/COLSS Upgrade.

SR 3.1.7.1 is:'modified b:a 'Note indicating that entry is' J. : 'allowied into MODE 2 without havingi pe'rf'ormed the SR, This 1s.

sýnecessary,, s.i.nce the. unit must be in the applicable MODES in order to perform Surveillances that demonstrate the LCO limits are met.

(continued)

PALOVEROE UNITS 1,2,3 B 1 *. 1.7-8 REVISION 51

RPS Instrumentation - Operating B 3.3.1 BASES ACTIONS F_1 (Before CPC Upgrade)

Condition F applies if an OPERABLE, autorestarts in a 12.hour period, CPC has three or more

. CPCs and CEACs will attempt to, autorestart if they detect a fault condition, such as a calculator malfunction or loss of power.

A successful autorestart restores the calculator to operation: however, excessive autorestarts might be indicative of a calculator problem.

The autorestart periodic test.'res-tart -'Code 30)Y,and normal system load

.(Code 33)iare~not included'in the tot-al..

If a nonbypassed CPC has,-three-or more autorestarts, it may not be completely reliable.

Therefore,'a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST must be performed on the CPC to ensure it is functioning properly.. Based on plant operating experience, the Completion Time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is adequate and

'yr~easonable~to perform'the' test while still keeping the risk of operating i'nthis condi'ti.on'at an acceptable level, s:, -nce overt channe lfailjrewill most, ikely be indicated and'.annunci ated :iin'the control room by CPC-onl i ne diagnostics:;

s G-I (Before OPC.Upgrade)

Condition G is entered when the Required Action and.'

• njitf1 F*nmnlptin~n Timp nf flnnrtitinn A R C.,n

• F or' F'ý are not met.'

-;If-e-Requied.Actions :as'dciated with these Conditions

".,_.cannot-be compileted 'withinithe required"Completion Time,

' te r

`actdr'.must be brioughttba MODE:Where the Required

"'Acti'ons 'do.not apply." The allowed Completion Time of "6

hourrs isý'easonable. based on, operating experience, for

, reaching the. required'MODE.from,'fulI "power conditions in an

'...Prderly manner and without: cha'lle'hg ng" plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE_,-., The SRs for any particular RPS Function are found in the SR REQUIREMENTS,* :olu rInof Table 3.'3.'11 for'.that Function.

Most Functions

."-a Subject to.CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL, FUNCTIONAL TEST,

-I*CHANNEL CALIBRATION, and response timei te'sting.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 1:*:3.1-49

REVISION.35

RPS Instrumentation -

Operating B 3.3.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1 REQUIREMENTS R

Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ensures that gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred.

ACHANNEL CHECK is normally,a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a simi ar parameter on other channels.

It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoringithe. same parameter should read~approximately the-same-value.

,. Significant deviations between the twoinstrument channels could be an indication of excessive-instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious.

CHANNEL

-'CHECK will detect gross'channel.'failure!.thus, it is key to

-verifying that the.instrumentationContinues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION, Agreement criteria'are determined'b' 'the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and-readability. 'If'a channel is outside the criteria,.- it may. be, an indication that the

...'tr'ansmitter or the: signal..processing equipment has drifted outside its'.limits.., For 'clarification;, a CHANNEL CHECK is

• a qualitative assessment.ofan instrument's behavior.

Where possible,.a numerical. 'omparison between like instrument-channels.should.be:incl~uded but is not required

• for an acceptable'CHANNEL CHECK performance.

J' The Frequencyý about once every.shift,,i,s based on operating experience that demonstrates the rarity of channel failure.

Since the probability of tNo random failures in 'redundant channels'in any 112hour period is extremely low, the CHANNEL CHECK minimiZes the chance of S

.loss of protective funct-ion due'to:.faiure of redundant

.channels The CHANNEL..CHECK.supplements:less formal, but more-frequent,'checks-of channel OPERABILITY during normal operational. use of the displaysassociated with the LCO required :channels.

In-the case of, RPS, trips with multiple-,inputs, such as the DNBR and LPD inputs to the CPCs, a",CHANNEL CHECK must be performed on all inputs.

SR 3.3.1.2 The RCS flow rate indicated by each CPC is verified, as required by a Note, to beless'than or equal to the actual (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3

. B 3.3.1-50 REVISION.51

RPS Instrumentation - Operating B 3.3.1 BASES SURVEILLA REQUIREME NCE NTS SR 3.3.1.2 (continued)

RCS total. flow-rate, determined by either..using the reactor coolant pump differential pressure instrumentation or by

-calorimetric calculations, every 12 hoUrs when THERMAL POWER.is >-:70% RTP.

-The 12.hours 'after *reaching 70% RTP is

,for plant-stabilization, data taking, and'flow verificati:on.

This check (and~if necessary, the adjustment of the CPC addressab.leconstant,,-flow~coefficients) ensures that the DNBR setpoint is conservatively adjusted with

!respect to actual..flow indic`ations,- asdetermined by the Core. Operating.Limits Supervisory -System (COLSS).

" :Theif-low measurement uncertaintyf may be,.i'ncluded in the BERRI term in the CPC and,-1s equal to, or greater than 4%.

SR. 1.3-i 1-..3

, (Before. CPC Upgrade).

The CPC; autorestart.count.is, checked every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> to f monitor the CPC, and CEAC, for-normal *operation.

If three or r,

more autorestarts:of. a nonbypassed CPC occur within a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.period,.the CPC may not be completely reliable..

Therefore;,: the Required "Action ofCondition F must be performed,:-:.The;:,auto-restart periodic tes~ts restart

'(Code30). and normal system load (Code 33) are not included in-this-total?. The Frequency is based~on operating experience that demonstrates the rarity of more than one chanhel,Ifai'ling within,the same 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> interval.

'SR3.;33.1 3 (After CPO Upgrade)

The CPCSystemEvent Logi, is checked, evyery 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> to S

monitor.the, CPC-i-channel' performance:,;-i,-nc-l udi ng redundant

".features hot--required for:theCPC to perform its safety

-related trip functi-on;..fThe..system event log provides a historical record of the, last thirty detected CPC channel error conditions.

A detected error condition may not

..;rend'r a, chanhel.inoperable,. unless it is accompanied by a

-CPC-'Fail itidfcation-.

The Frequency of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is based upon the nature of the surveillance in detecting many non-critical error

.conditions, and considers that detectable failures resulting in a channel inoperability wi.ll result in a CPC Fail condition..-,

I (continued)

.PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 I !,,,

B 3.3.1-51 PALOVERD UNIS 12,3 3.31-51REVISION 51

RPS. Instrumentation - Operating B 3.3.1 BASES SURVEILL$

REQUIREME ANCE.

FNTj.

SR 3.3.1.4 A daily calibration (heatt.balance) is performed when THERMAL POWER is Ž 20%.

The Linear Power Level signal and the CPC addressableconstant multipliersare~adjOSted to make the CPC AT power and nuclear power calculations'agree with.the-calorimetric calculation if the absolute difference is Ž 2%

when THERMALPOWER is : 80% RTP, and -0,5% to 10% when THERMAL POWER'is between'20%a6nd 80%.

The'valde'Dof,2% when THERMAL POWER is*_ 80% RTP, and '-0.5%:to.10%.wheri THERMAL POWER i.s between 20% and.80% is adequate becaose this value is assumed in the safety analylsis."These'checks (arld.Kif necessary, the adjustment of-the Linear Power* Level Signal~and the CPC addressable'constant coefficients)-are adequate to ensure *that.

,, the accuracy of these. CPCcalcuiation'is' is, taintained within thelanalyzed errorma rgins." The power level must be > 20% RTP to-obtain.accurate.data.

At lower pOwer-levels, the accuracy o f'CaldrimetriC data*i s.i.questionable.-

The tolerance between 20% 'and 80% RIP is +10% to reduce the number of adjus'tments.required as the power, level increases.

• -The.-'0.5% tolerance between 20%,and.80% RTpRis based on the reduced'accuracy of.the calorimetric data i~nputs at low power levels,..: Performing a calorimetric calibration with a -0.5%

.. tolerance.at low power-.levels.ensures, the difference will remain wi'thin-,2.0% when power:js,,:increased-above 80% RTP.

If alcalorimetric~calculation.isperformed above 80% RTP. it willuse *accurate inputs to the, calorimetric calculation available at higher power levels.

When the power level is decreased below 80% RTP anwadditiQnal performance of the SR to' the' -0.5% to 10%L tolerance is not required if the SR has been performed above 80% RTP..

During, any power ascension from below 80%..toabove 80% RTP, the cal.ibration requirements of ITS SR 3.3.1.4 must be met (except during PHYSICS TESTS, as allowed by the Note in SR,3.3.1.4).

This is accomplished by performing SR-3.3.1.4 between,75% and,80% RTP during power ascension with anraceptancecriteria of- -(.5% to <2% to bound the requirements for both below and.above 80% RTP.

,. The Frequency of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.is. based on pl.ant operating expernience and takes into account indications and alarms located jnthe control, room -to detect de\\i-ations in channel S boutputs.

The Frequency 'is modified'by.:Jai:Note indicating this

-Surve~illance need only beperformed w thin.r12 hours after reaching 20%.RTP.

ý,The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />s~after reaching 20% RTPis required for stabilization, data taking, and flow verification.

secondary calorimetric is inaccurate at lower power lant he levels.

(continued)

PALOVERDE UNITS 1,2,3 Bý3.3.J-52 REVISION 35

IRPS Instrumentation - Shutdown B 3.3.2 BASES LCO Actions allow maintenance (trip channel) bypass of.

.,individual channels, but the bypass activates interlocks that prevent operation with a second channel in the same Function bypassed.

With'one channel in each Function trip channel bypassed, this effectively places the plant in a two-out-of-three logic configuration infthose Functions.

'..Onr]ly-the Allowable Values (AVs) are'specified for this RPS

,.triipFunction inthe LCO.,The AV is'considered an operability, limit for the channel.

If'the as-found

'instrument settingis found to be non-conservative with respect to the'AV,, or the as7ieft' instrument setting cannot

be, returnd to a setting within As-Left Tolerance (ALT),

or the:"nst'ument,isnot'fun~titnirlg es required: then the instrument channel-shalYl, bedecla d-ihoper'able.

Nominal trip-setpoints are specified in the plant s~pecific setpoint calculations.

The nominal-seipolnt is-se:ected to ensure the setpointmeasuredhby'CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TESTS does not exceed'the'Allowable Value if the bistable is performing as required.

Operation with*a tr.ip.setpoin.t less conservative than the nominal trip setpoint,,but wi~thin its Allowable ValueI is'acc'eotable provided that operat-ion and testing are

' consitstentlwi'th the assumptions of theiplant specific

/ "' setpointcalculations:'

Each'Allowable Value specified is sfrety onservati.ve thandthe analytical-limit assumed in the safyanalysisinorder to account for instrument

.uncertainties'appropriate to the tripFunction.

'Thes'e uncertainties are defined in' the: ':Plant Protection System Selection of Trip'Setpoint Values"..(Ref. 4).

A c

chahnel is' i'noperable if its 'actual'trip'.setpoint is not

'. : within its rpquired Allowable' Value,:

.This LCO requires all'fO0r channels'of -theLogarithmic Power Level <lHigh-to be OPERABLE MODES"in,3,4,, or 5 when the RTCBs are closed and the CEA Drive System is capable of CEA

• ~~

~W thdrawa-l A. CEA. i s, consi.de'red"capabl e of withdrawal when power i s applied to the' Control Element Drive Me~hanisms (CEDMs).

are a

several methods used"to remove. power from the

.'QMss'uch a6de'-energizing the CEDM MGs,' opening the CEDM MG'du'tput breakers,' opening the.Control Element Assembly Control System (CEDMCS)

CEA breakers', opening the RTCBs, or disconnecting the power, cables from the.CEDMs. Any method (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.3.2-5 REVISION -3.5

• .RPS Instrumentation - Shutdown B 3.3.2 BASES LCO that removes power from the CEDMs may be used. The CEAs are (continued) still capable of withdrawal if the CEDMCS.Wit.hdrawal, circuits are disabled with power applied to the.CEDMs because failures in the CEDMCS could result in CEA withdrawal.'

This LCO requires alll four channels of Steam Generator #1 Pressure-Low, and Steam Generator.#2 Pressure-Low, to be OPERABLE in MODE!3,. when the-RTQBs are closed and the CEA Drive System is capable of:CEA withdrawalr

.These RPS functionsare not required in MODES 4..and 5 because the Steam

-Generator temperature is low,..therefore the energy. release and resulting cooldown following a large.MSLB in MODES 4 and "5 is notsignificant.,

Footnote'...(e). which is divided~intoitwo.Yparts, will ensure compliance with.;10 CFRR50.36. in the'event that the instrument set points are found not to be'conservative with respect to the as-found acceptance criteria.

Part 1requires evaluation of instrument performance for the"cond.ition where-the as-found setting for these.instruments is outside its As-Found-Tolerance :(ArT) but2'conservative'with respect to the.

-Allowable Value.

Evaluatjon'of instrument performance wilI verify that the instrument will continue~to behave in accordance with design-basis assumptions.

The purpose of the assessment i-s to'ensure confidencyin."th'e instrument performance 'prior to returning he'"

'ns rUment to service.

In.:i.tial evaluation will be performed by the technician performing the s'urveillance"wh6o will 'evaluate the instrument's ability'to maintai-n a stable trip setpoint within the As-Left Tolerance (ALT)%.-:The-technician's evaluation will'be" reviewed by'6n,shift, personnel both during the approval of the surveillance data and as a result of entrS'of the 'devi'ati6on 'in the s'ite ' 'corrective action program.

In 'accordance with prbcedures; entry into the cQrrective*action 'program wi.1l'requi re, review and

!-documentation of the' condition f6r'oper'ability.

Additional evaluation and potential corrective actions as necessary will ensure that any as-found setting found':outside the AFT is evaluated for long-term operability trends.

Part'-2'r~quires that the as-left"settiig-,for the instrument be returned to within'"the ALT of..:the specified trip setpoint.

The 'specified field installed trip setpoint is termed as the Design Setpoint (DSp) and 'is equal toor,ýmore conservative than the UFSAR Trip Setpoint.ý The general relationship among the.PVNGS trip setpoint terms'is as follows: The calculated

• limiting setpoint (

iSp) is determined within the plant specific setpoint analysis and is based on the Analytical Limit and Total Loop Uncertainty.

The UFSAR Trip Setpoint is (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.3.2-6 REVISION 51

RPS Instrumentation -

Shutdown B 3.3.2 BASES ACTIONS E.1 (continued.)

If Required Actions associated with these-Conditions cannot be completed within the requ-ired.Completion Time, all RTCBs must be opened, placing the plant in a condition where the

-RPS. t~r,ip channe'Is areinot required.to be OPERABLE.

A Completion.Time of 1:houir is a, reasonable time to perform the

".-*.""<Required Ation!,.which maintains the risk,at an acceptable

.lvel, while having oner or two channels inoperable.

Requ

,'.ired Ac i, which manan th risk at anacetal SURVEILLANCE The SR's for any particular!RPS function are found in the SR REQUIREMENTS column of Table 3.3:2-1. for that function.

The SRs are an

-extensioh of~those, listed in LCO"3.3-.1, listed here because

___.'othei 'r;"Applicability' i n these MODES..,;I

~:,,:

SR: A.3.2.1I

• SR;3.3.2..is the, erformance of a 'CHANNEL CHECK of each RPS channel,-This;.,SRis identical to SR3.3.1.1.

Only the Applicability differs..

Perfor.an.-of,th CHNNEL CHECK: 6n6e every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ensures that gross failureof.-instrumentation has not occurred.

A CHANNEL-CHECK is normally a compari son of, the parameter i ndica ted.bn.,one channel toa similar.-parameter on another

• -~ r.>.

channel..' it is..based.on.the assumption that instrument S.-,

channels monitoring the same paralmeter.;should read approximately the same value Significant deviations.between ithe

.,two instrument channels

..coulcdbe.ano--ind.ic.ation.of excessive instrument drift in one

,of, the chanrnel s or off..somethi ngeven. more serious.

CHANNEL

.CHECK wil,l detect gross channel:'fai.lure:,thus, it is key to

-verifyi~ng that-the instrumentation continues to operate

-properly between eaH'hCHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on

-,.ja,:combination of the channel instrument uncertainties,

.--.-...;.hc lu d ing,i, nd i c at i o n, an d. re ad ab i 'l ity.

If a c h an ne l is t.,outside the criteria; iti.nay be an indication that the sensor

.-,or,,-the signal processing equipment has. drifted outside its

.limits.. For c-larification, a CHANNEL CHECK is a qualitative assessment-ofI.:an, instrument's behavior.,

Where possible, a S.:

numerical comparison, between 1-ike iinsttrument channels should (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3

• .B 3.3.2-13

" REVISION 51

RPS Instrumentation - Shutdown B 3.3.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.2.1 (continued) be included. but is not' required for aniacceptable CHANNEL:.

-CHECK performance.

The Frequency, about once every shift,-is based on operating e.xperience that demOnstrates,the.rarity of channel failure.

Since the.probability of two2random failures in redundant channels in any 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> period-isextremely low; the CHANNEL CHECK minimizes.the chance of loss/of protective function due

to faiflure.ofredundant ch'annels.

The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more' ftequent, checks of channel OPERABILITY during normal operational use of the displays associated with the LCO required channrels.

,SR 3.3.2.2 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL-TEST on each charhel, except power range neutron flux, is performed every 92 days to ensure the entire channel will perform its intended.function when needed.

This SR is identical to SR 3.3.1.7.

Only the Applicability differs.

The RPS' CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TESTT;.:cons.ists of three overlapping tests as descri'bed.in the UFSAR,, Section 7.2 (Ref. 3).

These tests verify that the.RPS is capable of performing its intended function, from bistable input through the RTCBs.

They include:

.Bistable Tests A test signal is superimposed on the input in one channel at a time to verify that the bistable trips within the specified

.. tolerance,ar~ound the setpoint.. This is done with the affected RPS:channel !trip channel bypassed.

Any setpoint adjustment shall be consisten't with~the assumptions of the current plant:.specific setpoint analysis.

The as.found and as.l.1eft 'values iriust,"Ialso be recorded and reviewed for consistency with:.the..assumptions of the

-.. surveillance interval exterisi6n analysis.

The requirements for this review are outlifed In'Reference 6.

(continued)

`PAL*OV-'/ERE UNITS 1,2,3

ý'!.

Bý 3. 3. 2 - 14

.*REVISION.51

CEACs B 3.3.3 BASES ACTIONS B.2.2 (continued)

(After CPC Upgrade).

.-are prevented., The Upper Electrical Limit (UEL)

CEA reed (continued) switches provide an acceptable'indication of CEA position.

S...

B.2 3

.The "RSPTCEACInoperable," addressable. constant in each of the OPERABLE CPCs is' set ito'ndicat6 that both CEACs are

-"~~

~

"*'noper~abl'e*.

'

T~his provides a conservative penalty factor to "ensture 'th.at'.a'conseryative.,offective margin is maintained

'" by, the, CPCS in the o.,mputation of DNBR and LPD trips.

4 The CEDMCS is placed and maintained in "STANDBY MODE,"

except during CEA motion permittted by-Required Action B.2, to prevent inadvertent motion and possible

.i i'grfnment of the"CELAs.,.

A comprehensive set of comparison checks on individual CEAs within groups must be made within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

Verification

.-.thfateath.CEAl.iS.,withi-n.6.6 inches of other CEAs in its

'group provides-,-a check that no CEA has deviated from its proper, posi:tion within.the group.

B.2.6 The Reactor Power Cutback (RPCB) System must be disabled.

This ensures that CEA position wi.]l..not be affected by RPCB operation.

C j

.r.'.

Co n'dition C S'.

entered when the Required Action and

,.associated. Completion 'Time' of Condition B is not met.

If the Requii,ied Actionsýassociated`with this Condition

.,,,cannot be completed within the required Completion Time, t"e;re** '-reactor:

must 'be brought 'to a MODE where the Required A'ctions do'not,'aply.

The Completion' Time of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> is

."reaso abile,"based on operatingexperience, for reaching

'the i equi red 'pl ant cond'itions from full power conditions in an orderly manner, and without challenging plant systems.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3

, ý- -, R 3.3-13-15 REVI-SION-27

CEACs B 3.3.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.3.1 REQUIREMENTS (Before CPC-Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once-every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ensures Upgrade)

that gross fai'lure of instr.umentationihas not occurred.

A CHANNEL CHECK is normally..a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on another channel.

It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the, same value..._

l.

Significant deviations between the t'o instrument channels could be an, indication of excessive' instrument drift in one of the channels.or of something even more serious.

CHANNEL CHECK w.ill,detect gross channeltfaiIure:'thus, it is key to verifying that the insrubmentation;c6ntin Ies to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Agreement criteria are determined by--the-pylant staff,.based on a:combination of the, channel i.nstrument.uncerta'inties, including indication and readability,.

If 'a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the sensor, or the.s,ignal processing equipment has drifted outside its limits.

For clarificatiohn, a CHANNEL CHECK is a qualitative assessment6of an,.,instrumpnt'.sbehavior.

Where

• possible,. a numericaLcomparis~onbet~een like instrument

channels should'be included but-is.n'ot"required for acceptable CHANNEL CHECKperformanc*e'.

The Frequency, about"bnce everyashift,*i Jbased on operating experience that demonstrates, the rarity of channel failure.

Since the probability of two random failures in redundant

• channels in any 12,hour period i~s extremely low, the CHANNEL

-CHECK minimizes thedchance.of lo~s. of.protective function due to. failure of,.redundant channels.

The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less forma'i, but more frequent, checks of channel OPERABILITY during normal operational.use of-the displays-associated with the LCO required channels'.

SR 3.3.3.2 The CEAC auto restart count -is checked every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> to monitor the CPC and CEAC for normal-.operation, If three or

-more auto restarts of a nonbypassed CPC occur within a 1,2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> period,, the'.CPC mayhnot be completely reliable.

The autorestart periodic test restart (code 30) and normal system ldad (code 33)'aretnot included in the total.

Therefore,'1ýthe Required Action of Condition D must be (continued)

PALO-VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.31..3-16 R.EVIS.ION 51

CEACs B 3.3.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.3.2 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS (Before"CPC performed.

The.-Frequency'is based on operating experience Upgrade) that demonstrate's the rarity of more than one channel, (continued) failjng-wi'thifnthesame 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> interval.

SR "33'3.3" 3

CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on'each CEAC channel is performed every 92 days to ensure the entire channel will perform its

.intended fuhctibfhwhen needed)i The:*uarte'rly CHANNEL

,UNCTIONAL TEST is'pe.foirmed using test 'software.

The r

• Fq~uency 'of. 92 days-is based' on' the reliability analysis presented' in, topical report".CEN-327, "RPS/ESFAS Extended T: elst! ý 'Mterva~l" EValuation ".(Ref.;* '5)..*,

SR 3.3.3.4

" sR :3.33.4 is the 2performance of'a',CHANNEL, CALIBRATION every

18 months'.;*

CHANNEL CALIBRATION is at 'complete check. of the instrument

'channel I-including,.the sensor.

The Surveillance verifies

.'thatthe'charange rdsponds~to a measuredparameter within the

.necessar.range.and "accuracy., CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the ch'annel adju'sted.:to account for instrument drift between successive'cali'brations to ensure that the channel remains operational between. successive surveillance.

CHANNEL

'CALIBRATIONS must.-be perfbrmed consistent'with the plant s

pe i f1'c" setpoiint~analysi's. ".ý 2'

,.,hasfound and as left values'must:ýalso'be recorded and revi'ewed-for c6nsistenccywith the assrmptions of the surveillance intervalý extehs'ion analysis..

The requirements for this review are. outlined in Reference 5.

":*The Frequency. is; based upon the. assumption of an 18 month L cal'ibration 'inter\\)al. -in the determination, of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint anal-ysis -and includes operating experience and consistency with the typical 18 month fuel cycle.

SR'._ 3.3.3. 5

Every 18 'months, a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on the CEACs.

The. CHANNELFUNCTIONAL TESTI;shall include the injecti.on of a.-signal. as close to the sensors as practicable

'to verify OPERABILITY, including alarm.;ahd trip Functions.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3

-B 3.3.3-17 RE.VI'SION51

CEACs B 3.3.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Before CPC Upgrade)

(continued).

SR 3.3.3.5 (continued),

The basis for the,18 month Frequency,is that the CEACs perform a.continuous selfmonitoring function that Selimi.nates the need for frequent CHANNEL' FUNCTIONAL TEST" ThisPCHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST essertially ivalidates the self monitor-ingfunction,and checks for a,'small set of failure modes that are undetectable by 'the sel.f monitoring function.

Operating experience has shown that undetected CPC or CEAC failures, do notoccur inany given,18 month interval.

SR 3.3.3.6 The iso lati oh" characteristics of' each"i:CEAC CEA position i.solation ampli fier* are ýverifed 'once per, refueling to ensure,that *a fault in' a" CEAC'of aCPC channel will not render another CEAC or CPC~channel inoperable.

The CEAC CEA position iso'lation amp'lifiers', mounted: in CPC cabinets.A

.and D, prevent a CEAC fault frompropagating back to CPC A or D.

fo rpgtn akt P The.CEA pos~ition Isolati'on ampp'iifi er isolation characteristics test shall include the following:.1) with

'120 VAC (60HZ) applied for atleast 30 seconds across the output; the reading on the input 'does-not change by more than 0.015 VDC, with an applied input volt -age of 5-10 VDC, and:2)'with.120 VAC (60 HZ) appliied' for at least 30 seconds across the i~np'ut,,,the readi'ng"on the'botput does not exceed 15 VDC.'

The Frequency is based on plant operating experience with regard to channel OPERABILITY, which demonstrates the failure of a channel in any 18 month interval is rare.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (After CPC Upgrade)-.

SR 3.3.3.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ensures that gross failure of instrumentation has-not occurred.

A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a~compariSon pf the parameter indicated-on.one'channel t6'a similarpar-ameter on another

-channel.

It is based on theassumption,.,that instrument

,,channels.,monitoring,he same parameter. should read

,.:approximately the same value.

(continued)

,PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3..3.3-18 REVISION 51

CEACs B 3.3.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (After CPC Upgrade.),

(conti nued)"

SR 3.3.3,1 (continued)

Significant deviations between the two instrument channels could be:an indic'ation of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something'even'more serious.

CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure: thus, it is key to veri-fying that the instrumentation continues to operate properl'y between-each CHANNEL'CALIBRATION-.

" "Agreement'crteria are determ-ined by/;-the.plant staff, based on 'a'cortbirnatioh of the channel ins-trument uncertainties, including indication and readability.

If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be.an i.ndication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted

.outside. iits limits.,,. For clarification, aCHANNEL CHECK is a

.q'uali.t t'at~i ve'asss'ment of s

J.nstrumdnt' s' behavior.

Where possib1e,. a.numerlical. compariison.betwe6n.".like instrument

.chanel~ Sho"I'Id be included' buti.s 'not. reqf ired for an acceptable-,CHANNEL CHECK performance. :-

'The Frequency, about once' every shi"ft,.is' based on operating experience.that demonstrates the rarity of channel failure.

Since the-probabi.lity of two. random failures in redundant channelss-in :any 12..hour period is'extremely low, the CHANNEL

.-CHECK minimizes ý,thd chance of loss' of protective function

'due. to failure of. redundant channels.

T he CHANNEL.CHECK!'sufplements'less.formal, but more

-frequent, ch*ecks of'channel OPRERABILITY during normal operational use of the di Spl ays associated with the LCO requi red channels.

S.'.SR:.-3.3.3.2, Deleted SR 3.3.3.3..

""",CHANNEL'FUNCTIONAL' TEST on each CEAC channel is performed'ý

", ey'ery;92'days to ensure the entire channel will perform its f intended' function when needed.

The quarterly CHANNEL

.. ",::FUNCTIONAL TEST is perforiiied using test.software.

The

'Frequ'ency'-of!92 days' 'is' basedý'on the rel'iability analysis presented in topical report. CEN-327",. "RPS/ESFAS Extended Test Interval Evaluation" (Ref. 5).

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B'3.3.'3-19 RE-VISION' 51

CEACs B 3.3.3 BASES SURVEILLANC REQUIREMENT (After CPC Upgrade)

E S.

SR 33.3.4 SR 3.3.3.4,is the performance of.a CHANNEL CALIBRATION every 18 months.-

CHANNEL 'CALIBRATION is a complete check of.the instrument

.channel indludingthe sensor.

The Surveillance verifies that-the' channel.responds to a measured parameter within the

' necessaryj*range and accuracy.,

CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the charnel'adjusted to' account for instrument drift between successive calibrations to ensure that the channel remains

.operational,between successive surveillance.

CHANNEL,

,CALIBRATIONS.M ust"be performed Consistent with the plant specifi~c 'setpoint anal]ysis..'

The as found: and as left valuesmust also be recorded and reviewed for consistency with the assumptions of the.

surveillance interval. extension analys.is.

The requirements for this review are outlined.-in. Reference 5'.

The Frequency, is based upon the assumption of an 18 month calibration ihterval 'in the-determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the.,setpoin~t analysis and includes operating experience and'donsis'tency with the typical 18 month fuel,cycle..

SR 3.3.3.5 Every,18 months, 'a CHANNEL,-FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on theCEACs.

TheCHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall include the injection of'a signal as close to the sensors as practicable to verify OPERABILITY, inrcluding:alarm and trip Functions.

The basis for'the 18 month Frequency is that the CEACs perform a continuous self monitoring function that eliminates the need for frequent CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TESTS.

This CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TESTessentially validates the self monitoring function and checks. for a small set of failure modes.that are undetectable by 'the self monitoring function.

Operating experience. 'has shoWn"that undetected CPC or CEAC

' failures' do not *occur in any given 18 month interval.

I (continued)

PALO.,..VERDE UNITS 1,2,3

.B 3.3.3-20 REVISION 51

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.5 BASES LCO Bypass Removal (continued).

-. This LCO' appl ies to:the operatin' bypass removal feature only.

If theoperating bypass enable.

function is failed so as totprevent entering a operating. bypass condi tJ on, operation may conotinue::: Because the trip setpoint has a floor V

Value 'of 100 psia. aý'hannel' trip will result if "r'es~sur~e',i s decreased below :thi~s setpoint without

.,bypas'8ing_..

.The boperatinq bypass reTmoval Allowable Value was chosen b.ecause MSLBlevents origi nating from below this setpoifnt add lss p-ositi've'.reactivity than that.which,.can becompensated for by required SDMx,,'

4..

Mirn. Steam Iso-lation Signal '.

°.

.The.

LCO is. applicable to the.MSIS-in MODES 1, 2 and 3 except when aýtl.assoc~jated Va~lvesare closed.

a.

,,Stedam Generator Pressure-Low This LCO requires four channels-"of Steam Generator Pressure -

Low to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2 and 3.

.TheJUFSAR Trjip Setpoint for this trip is set below the full load operating value" for steam pressure

- so as. not to interfere with normal plant operation.

However,.the sett~ing is high enough to provide ah MSIS (Function "4) during an

.... excessive steam demand event.

An excessive steam I dm ad evenit causes..ýthe,RCS t6cool down.

resulting in a positive reaý.tivity addition to

the, core.

MS IS: lits this cooldown by isolating both steam generators if the pressure in either drops below J.,

the trip setpo;int.

'An RPS trip,.on Steam Generator Pressure ' Low is ini'tiated simultaneously, using thesame bistable.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B -3. 3. 5 -15 REVI-S'IOW35

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.5 BASES LCO

a.

Steam Generator Pressure - Low (continued)

The, Steam Generator Pressure-Low trip setpoint

.,.maybe manually dec.reased as steam generator pressure' is. reduced.... This prevents an RPS trIp or MSIS'.actuation during controlled plant

-cooldown.. Themargin between actual steam generator pressure and the.t.ripsetpoint must be maintained less than or equal' tb the.specified value of 200 psia.to ensure a reactor trip and

.MSIS will occur when required.

.:.Footnote (d),' which is divided-into two parts, will

,ensure compliance with:.10 CFR 50,.36 in the event that the instrument set poihts'are found not to be

',conservati.,ve with respect.to the as-found acceptance

-criteria..: Part 1 requi res.evaTuation of instrument performance for the condition where the as-found setting for these instruments is outside its As-Found Tolerance (AFT) but conservative with respect to the AllowableValue.-' Evaluation of instrument-performance willverify that the instrument will. cont.inue tobehave in accordance with.design-basis assumptions.; The purpose of the assessment isto ensure confidence in the instrument

- performance-prior.toreturhing the instrument to service..Initi a.. valuation.,will be performed by

' the.technicianl~performing the surveillance who will evaluate the instrument's ability to maintain a stabie*trip, setpoint'withfi, the As-Left Tolerance (ALT)..,The technician's evaluation will be reviewed by on shift personnel,,both.,du-ing the approval of

.the, surveillance data and as a result of entry of the..deviation 'ih the, si'.te-s ciorrective action program.

In accordance with'procedures, entry into the corrective action program will require review and documentation of the condition for operability.

Additional evaluation and potential corrective actions as necessary will ensure that any as-found setting found outside the AFT is evaluated for long-term operability trends, Part 2 requires that the as-left setting for the instrument be returned to within the ALT of the specified tripsetpoint.

The specified.field installed trip setpoint is termed as the Design Setpoint (DSp) and is equal to or more (continued)

PALO.VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B-:3.3.5-16

-REVISI.ON 51

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.5 BASES ACTIONS C.1. C..2.1, and C.2.2 (continued)

'Condition'C~applies to one. automatic operating bypass removal channel inoperable. 'The.only automatic operating bypass removal'-on'ýan ESFAS is on the Pressurizer Pressure -Low signal:. This operating bypass removal is

--shared with the RPS Pressurizer Pressure - Low bypass removal. i

'If the byi~ss-remnoval chahnel for any operating bypass cannot'ibe 'restored to OPERABLE status, the associated ESFAS channel may be considered OPERABLE only if the bypass is not

" n effett'.

Otherwise. the -affected ESFAS channel must be S"decired':-inoperab'le, as in Condition A, and the operating

""-byp'ass,'e'ither removed or the bypass removal channel repai;red

• TIhe Bgases:,forthe Requi red Actions and required

-Complteti'ori-Fimes are'consistent-with Condition A.

D.I and D.2.

" "aCondition Dpplies"to.two ioperable automatic operating bypass removal channels.ý.If, e operating bypass removal channel s *for two Operating bypasses cannot be restored to OPERABLE. status,"..the associated ESFAS channel may be consideredOPERABLE only if the operating bypass is not in effect., 'Otherwi-se, the affected ESFAS channels must be

" declaredinoperable, a' in Condition B, and either the operating bypass removed. or the bypass removal channel repafred.

The relstoration of one affected bypassed automiatic trio channel must be completed prior to the next CHANNEL* FUNCTIONAL TEST'br the plant must shut down per LCO. 3. V3, as; explainedin COnditionB.

Completion Times are cons*istert with Condition..B.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3B B'13.5-25 REVISION 42

ESFAS Instrumentati on B 3.3. 5 BASES ACTIONS (continued)

E.1 and E.2 If the RequiredActions and associated Completion Times of Condition A; B, CjorD cannot be met,:the plant must be brought~to a MODE: in which the-LCO-does not apply.

To achieve this status, the,.plant must.be broijght to at least MODE 3 within.6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and to MODE 4.withiri 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience,, to reach the required -laht. condi tions from full power conditions in an orderly manner-and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS SR 3.3.5.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ensures

.thatagross failure of instrumentation has not occurred.

A CHANNEL CHECK is normally.a comparison.Qfthe parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other

'channels:

It isbasedon the~assumption.that instrument channels-monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value,.Significant deviations

-. between instrument channels could; be an-indication of excessive instrument drjft-:in,one o#f the channels or of

' something.even, more serious....,CHANNEL CHECK will detect grosschannel failure;-thus, it-isý: key tovverifying the instrumentation, continues to-operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties,

.lincludling-indication and readability:,.i.*,If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the sensor or the s~ignal processing equipment has drifted outside its limi.t.

If the channels are~within the criteria, it is,an indicati-on that.the channels are OPERABLE.

For clarificati.on, a CHANNEL CHECK is.a. qua1itative assessment of an instrument's behavior.

Where pos*sIble, a numerical comparison between like instrument channels should be inc uded but is not required for an acceptable CHANNEL CHECK performance.

(continued)

PALO. VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.3.5-26 REV'ISION 51

DG - LOVS B 3.3.7 BASES ACTIONS B.1 and B.2 (continued)

One of the.two".inoperable channels will need to be restored to OPERABLE status prior to the next required CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST because channel surveillance testing on an

-OPERABLE channe] requires that,the OPERABLE channel be placed :in bypass.

However', itjs

'not permitted to bypass "more than one DG-LOVS channel, and placing a second channel

,iIh trfp.will result in a' loss.of voltage diesel start signal."

After one channel is restored to OPERABLE status, the provisions of Condition-A sti-11 appl-y to. the-remaining inoperable channel.

C.1

"."Condition"C.!iapplies when more.than two channels on a single'bus are inoperable.

.,Requifed Action C.'1 requires all but two channels to be restored!*to OPERABLE, status* within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

With more than two channel.s inoperable, the logicis not capable of providing 'the DG-LOVS signal for valid Loss of Voltage or

" degraded vb.Itage'tondition..

The 1. hour Completion Time is reasonable'.to evaluate and take action to correct the

.,degraded.Ondit~ion'inan orderly manner and takes into

.'aCcoUntthe'low probability of an eventrequiring LOVS occurring during this interval'.-

'Cohditnion D.- 'applies if 'the Required Actions and associated a

Completion Times are not. met'..

Required Action DiI ednsures that -Required Actions for the a ffectedý DuGinoperabi'lities. are initiated.

Depending upon pl ant' MODE, the ACTIONS specified.in LCO.3.8.1. "AC

., ources Operating," orLCO 3.8:2 are required immediately.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3-.3.7-7

)ýREVIýJON 0

DG LOVS B 3.3.7 BASES SURVEILLANCE The following SRs apply..to each DG.-

LOVS. Function.

REQUIREMENTS SR 3..7.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ensures that a gross failure of instrumen;tation, has not occurred.

A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a q6alitatiVe'assessment, by observation, of channel behavior.,during operation.

This determination shall include, where possible, comparison of thechannel indication andstatus.,to other indications or status derived:from independent instrlJment channels measuring;.-the 'same parameter., A CHANNE.

CHECK consists of veri fying all*. relay.statu'sI,lights'6n the' control board are lit.

CHANNEL CHECK wil'I detect, gross cha*hel failure; thus,

'it isSkey *to everifying'thatthe ijnstrumentation continues to operate.proper;ly betweeneach CHANNEL 'CCA.IBRATION.

". Agreement-cri*teria are determined by.the plant staff.

If the channels arewithin the criteria. iti*s an indication tjhat the'channels.,.are OPERABLE.

For clarification, a CHANNEL CHECK is' a qUali.tative s'a*esSmente of an instrument's behavior.

Where ossible,."a~numer.ical comparison between lie-lik instrument cýannels should..be in6lu)ed but is not required for ahnacceptabl& CHANNEL.CIECK..performance.

The Frequency,.,about once every.shift, i.sbased upon operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare.

Since the probability of two random failures in redundant channels in any 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.period is extremely low, the.,CHANNEL CHECK mjnimizesthe'chance offloss of protective

f.

unctjion' due.to fa.iiure.of :redundant channels.

The CHANNEL CHECK supplements.less formal, but-more'frequent, checks of channel OPERABILITY during normal.bperational use of the di.splaysassodiated.with theýLCO required channels.

SR 3.3.7.2 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed every 18 months to ensure that the entire channel will perform its intended function when needed.

.The Frequency of 18.months is based on plant operating experience with regard'to channel OPERABILITY and drift, which demonstrates that-failure of more than one channel of a given Function in any. 18 months Frequency is a rare event.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.3.7-8 REVISION 51

DG - LOVS B 33.7 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.7.2 (continued).

Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific-s'etpoint analysis.

The'as found and as'.left -value's must also be recorded and SI viwed-fo0 consi stencyv.

SR ;837.

SRj3.3..3 i*'the performance'of a"CHANNEL, CALIBRATION every

'18 month's 7 The. CHANNEL CALIBRATION veri'fies the accuracy of

'-eachd'ompOrient within the'> instrUment channel.

This includes cal ibration"of the 'Loss of.Voltageard 'Degraded Voltage relay and demonstrates 8that the'equipment falls within the

, specified:[oper'ating cha'acteristic's defiried by the nmanufacturer.

Th-e Surveillance verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy:.'

CHANNEL-CALIBRATION Ieaves the channel

.adjusted to account for instrumentdrift between successive surveillInces-to ehnsu're the instrument channel remains operaion'ai. -"CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS must be performed consistent with the-plant specific setpoint analysis.

Any

-seto'int adjiustmient shal'lbelconsistent with the assumptions

-'of the current plant 'specific setpo'int analysis.,

F,,'

The as fotund and as left' vialues must also be recorded and rev'iewed,, for tons istency.' I

.. The setpointsas we as'the response to~a Loss of Voltage and DegrýPaded, Voltage test, shall, include :a single point Vr 1veif icat'in that the'tr'ip Occurýs wi thin 'the required delay

• timpe s Thowh'inReference 1.:.ThFrequency is based upon th-assumpti on. of "an i8: month'cal i bratiOn i nterval 'for the determination of the magni'tude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

REFERENCES "'UFSAR5ecti on 8..3.

2.

UFSAR, Chapter 15.

3'.:

ontro'dlled Dwg. Relay 'Setpoirt 'Sheets.

'4.

10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 21.

5.

Calculatilon 13-EC-PB-202'

6. Calculations 01, 02, 03-EC-MA-221 REVISION 51 PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2,3 B 3.3.7-9

This*Page intentionally blank

CPIAS B 3.3.8 BASES ACTIONS B.1 (continued)

Condition B applies when the'Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A are not met in MODES 1, 2. 3, or 4.

If Required Action A cannot be met within the required Completion Time, entry into LCO 3.6.3 "Containment Isolation Valves"'is required.

The Completion Time accounts for the fact that the inability to close and maintain the purge and exhaust valves closed may affect the ability of the valves to automatically close on a Containment Isolation Actuation Signal (CIAS)

C.1, C.2.1, and C.2.2.

Condition C applies to two channels of radiation monitor, Manual Trip, or Actuation Logic inoperable, the applicability is du'ring"CORE ALTERATIONS or during the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment.

Required Action C.1 is to place the containment purge and exhaust isolation valves in the closed position.

The Required Action immediately performs the isolation function of the CPIAS.

Required Actions C.2.1 and C.2.2 may be performed in lieu of Required Action C.1.

Required Action C.2.1 requires the suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS and

.Required Action C..2.2 requires suspension of movement of irradiated fuel in containment immediately.

The Completion Time accounts for: the fact that the automatic capability-to isolate containment on valid power access and refueling purge exhaust duct high radiation signals is degraded during, conditions in which a fuel handling accident is possible and CPIAS provides the only automatic mitigation of radiation release.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.3.8-5 REVISION 0

CPIAS B 3.3.8 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.8.1 REQUIREMENTS Performance of the.CHANNEL CHECK once.every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ensures thata gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred on the required radiation"monitor channels.us6d in the CPIAS, A CHANNEL, CHECKXis. normally a,.comparison of the parameter.

indicated on one channel to a 'similar, p.arameter on other channels..'[It.is based on the.assumption that instrument channels monitoring, the same parameter should read approximately the same value'"

Signif.ilcan tdeviations between the two instrument channels couId be a'n'indic'ation of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious.

CHANNEL CHECK.will detect.gross channl,.fail-ure; tus, it is key to verifyi'ng"the 'instrumeiehtatiohn continues' to"'perate properly between each-CHANNEL"CALIBRATION"."

-Agreemeenthýcriteriaaredetermihed. y the piant staff based on-.a comýbiation of the channel instrrument uncertainties, including indication and readability:

If a channel is outside'the criteria it may~be an ihdicat'ion that the transmi'tteror the.signal processing equipment has drifted outside,itslimit'. For clarification,*a'CHANNEL CHECK is a qualitati.e assessment'of.an instrument's'behavior.

Where possible, a numerical compar"isoný'between li'ke instrument channels should be'included but'is not required for an acceptable CHANNEL CHECK p6rformance,.

.The Frequency,' about once every' `hilft; 'is 'based on operating experience..th'at'demonstrates the rarity of channel.failure..

Si nc'e the probability o'f two:'random.-fa'lures in redundant

' channels in any' 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> period'i's'low, 'the' CHANNEL CHECK mini'mizes' the ch'ah'ce'ofi oss, of protecti'v',,function due to fail'ure of redundant channels.'ý The CHANNEL CHECK supplements les's 'formal, but: more' frequent, checks of channe~l OPERABILITY during normal, operatioial use of the displays associated With the LCO required 'dhannels.

SR 3.3.8.2 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required containment radiation monitoring channel (RU-37 and RU-38)

,to eosure the entire channel will perform its intended function.

The Frequency-of 92 days-is'based on plant operating experience with regard to channel OPERABILITY and drift, which demonstrates that failure of more than one

..channelof agiven.Function in'any 92 day Frequency is a

-rare event.,,

(continued)

PALO.VERDE.UNITS 1,2.3

'B 3,.18-6 RENISION-.51

CREFAS B 3.3.9 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.9.1 REQUIREMENTS R j "Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ensures that a-grossfailure of instrumentation has, not occurred.

A

.,CHANNEL-CHECK is normally a comparisonlof the parameter indidated Qn one channel to a similar parameter on other

• chann*els-..it is basedron the assumption'that instrument channel's monit6ring the same parameter should read approximately 'the same value.

Significant, devi~ations between the two instrument channels

..cduld be ah. indication of excessive" instifument drift in one of thelchaine1soor'of something even more serious.

CHANNEL

.CHECK'wilI; detect gross channelfailure;,.thus, it is key to

• verlfyi ng Ithe instrumentation' continues to operate properly between each:.CHANNELCALIBRATIQN.

.:-,-Agreement criteri,a are determined by the plant staff based on.a combinationof the chann.eli nuncertainties including'*indication andýreadability.

If:' channel is

.transmitte or the signal processing.equipment has drifted

-. outsi'de its.litia.

'For clarification, a CHANNEL CHECK is a

.,quaiitatsve assessment.of anrinstrumeit's"behavior.

Where uaItative'assessnlenf of asn bewn'lk instrumre~tsbhvo.Were possib le., a numerical comparison between like instrument chanhels *hou.ldbe included but is-not required for an acceptable.,CHANJEL CHECK performance.

The. Frequency,. about once every, shift, is based on operating experience-that.,demohstrates: the rarity -of channel failure.

Since the probability of. ;two random failures in redundant "channe*s in, any 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, pe[ribd is low,' the CHANNEL CHECK

-:minimizes. the chance of. ldss'of. pr.otekctive' function due to faiiur'e.ofj reduhdant chanhels..

Th'e-CHANNEL CHECK supplements,les.formal' out more frequeft, checks of

-channelOPERABILITY during normal operational use of the di;s 1pay§..associ ated, with the& LCO r.equi red channel s.

SR 3.3.9.2

.,-A, CHANNEL'FUNCTIONAL, TEST'.is.perfor.med*'on each required control room radiati:on mbnitoring channel (RU-29 and RU-30)

.to ensure the. entire channel will perform its intended function...

The Frequency of 92 days'is based "on plarft operating experience with regard to'channel OPERABILITY and drift, which demonstrates that failure of more than one channel of a given Function in any 92 day interval is a rare event.

(continued)

PALOVERD UNTS.12.3..3..9-PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2,3 B 3.3ý9-5 REVISION 51

CREFAS B 3.3.9 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

,SR 3.3.9.3 Proper operation of theindividual actuation relays is verified by de-energizing these relays during the CHANNEL FUNCTIONALTEST of the ActuationLogic every 18 months.

This will,'.actuate the"Function,-operating all associated equipment..

Proper operation of the. equipment actuated by

.each train is, thus, verified.

, 1... i The Frequency of 18

months is based 'on plant operating experifence with regard to channel OPERABILITY, which.,

demonstrates~that failure of'more'than one channel of a..

given Fur*ction,,in any 18,month interval is a rareevent.'

Note. 1 -i'ndi'catts this.Survei:l lVance A ntl udes verification of operatio6 fo'r., each.actuation relay.

Note'.2,'ndi cates 'that.,relays that, cannot bejtested at power are, excepted from the Survei I llance '.Requirement while'at

.power,.

These 'relays must, howeveri be tested during each entry.int o MODE,.5 exceeding.24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> unless they have been testedwi'thin the previous..6monfths.', At PVNGS all of the actuation" relays can be tested at power.

SR'l 3.3.9.4 CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument channel including the sensor.' The Surveillance verifies that.the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy:. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves

-..the channel adjusted to account for instrument drift between successive calibrations to ensure :that the channel remains operational between successive surveillances.

CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS must'beý. performed,cons~i~stent with the plant isp~eci~f.ic setpoint, analysis.

iThe Frequency: is.:bas*'d upon the assumption of cal,ibratiori.interval for the determination of of eqUipment drift in.

the setpoi-n't analysis.

an 18 month the magnitude (continued)

PA.LOIVERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B. 3.3.9-6 REVISION 0

..-1 1 1 I.i ý

PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.10 BASES LCO (continued)

8.

Containment Isolation Valve Position (continued).

At PVNGS the Cohtainment Isolation Valve position instrumentation cons-ist Of:

CPA7UV-2A, PA-UV-2B CPB-UV-3A CPB-UV-3B

.CPA-UV-4A&!

CPA;UV-4B.

CPB-UV-.SA

CPB-,UV-5B, Containment Containment

-Containment Containment

<,Containment Contai nment, Containment Containment, Refueling Purge Supply Refueling.Purge Exhaust Refueling Purge Supply Refueling Purge Exhaust Power.Access Purge Supply Power AccessPurge Exhaust Power Access Purge Supply Power. Access Purge Exhaust CHB-UV-505 RCP Controlled Bleedoff to VCT

" CHAUý-,UV-506 RCPjControlled'Bleedoff',to VCT CHA-UV-ý516 Letdown to Regen' HX" CHB-UV-523 Letdown from Regen HX

.CHAUV7-560 Reactor DrainTankOutlet C

., CHB-UV-561 Reactor Drain'ITank Outlet CHA-UV-'580 M.ake-Up.Supply"to Reactor Drain Tank CHA-UV-715*F'Sample Return to Reactor Drain Tank CHB-LIV-924*

,LetdoVwn Line Sample PASS

,)

GAA-UV-1 HP Nitrogen to Safety Injection Tanks GAA-UV-2 LP Nitrogen to Containment GRA-UV-1

GRB:UV--2 Waste, Gas Header Waste'Gas Header

-HCB-UV-44*

.HCA-UV-45*

HCkAUV-.46.*

HCB-'UV-47*

HPA:UV-1!

HPBLUV-2 HPA-UV-3 FPB.UV.47, HPAiU' V5 AHPB'7UV.6 HPA-UV-23*

HPA-UV-24*

'Radiation Monitor :RU'-I -Supply Radiation Monitor..RU-l-,Supply

,:.Radiation. Monitor-RU-1 Return

• .'Radiation Monitor RU-1,Return Containmen.t Hydroge'hv:Control System

.:.Containmenit* Hydrogen Control System

'Hydrogen Recombine'r Supply Hydrogen Recombiner Supply Hydrbgen. Recornbi ner, Return Hydrogen Recombiner Return Hydrogen Monitor Return

-Hydrogen Monitor Supply IAA-UV-2*

Instrument and. Service Air (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.3' 10-9 REVISION 14

PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.10 BASES LCO (continued)

8.

Containment Isolation Valve Position (continued).

NCB-UV-401

',NCA-UV-.402

-,NCB-UV-403:,.

RDA-UV-23 RDB-UV-24:

RDBLUV-407*

,. SGB.- FV.-200

.SGB-HV-201 ST-SIA-UV-708" SSB-U'V7206 SSB-UV-201i SSB-UV-202

.........SSA-UVW2O3 SSA-UV-204 SSA-UVW205.

WCB-UV-61 WCA-UV-62 WCB-UV-63 Nuclear, Cooling Water

.Nuclear Cooling Water Nuclear,;Cooling Water,.

Containment Sumps.. }

Containment: Sumps"'

Containment.Radwaste;Sumps (Unit I & 3 only)

Steam, Genenat6r'#1 Chemical Injection Steam Generat!r #2' CheOmical Injection Containment ýRe'circ Sump'pAss Ho't-Leg Samp.l.',.

Surge Line Sample' Pressurizer Steam Space Sample Hbt'Leg'Sample

.Surge Line Sample Pressurizer. Steam Space.-Sample Normal Chilled Water Return Header Normal Chilled Water Return Header Normal Chilled&:Water Supply Header

• -Solenoid operated 'vaves with'relay-driven SESS/ERFDADS indication.

9.

.Cont'ainment Area Radiation (high range)

Containmeht-Area Radiationi'is-provided to monitor for the potential" of' signifi'c'an*t:.radiati'on releases and to prpvide rel.ease: assess~nent: "for use. by operators in

'determining the: need to' invoke site emergency plans.

.,.The alarm setpbints shal'"be*set Within the limits specified.in the UFSAR.

At PVNGS, Containmii:nt Area ýRadi8aion, instrumentation consists of the following:,

SQAJRU:!48'

,,SQB-RU-149 (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 "B 3.3.10-10 REVISION 51

PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.10 BASES ACTIONS

' F. 1 (continued)

-Alternate m'ens-of'monit6ring Reactor, Vessel Water Level.

RCS Activity, and Containment AreaRadiation have been developed,and tested. *Thesb'alternate means may be temporar.i,ly installed if the;normal PAM channel cannot be restored.to OPERABLE status within'the allotted time.

If these alternate.lmeans' are used, theI.Required Action is not to shut.down the plant, but rather to follow the directions of Speci'fi"cati'Oh 5.6:6.

pThe'report'provided to the NRC should discuss whether the alternatemeans are equivalent

to the installed:PAM channels, justify the areas in which they are not equivalent. and,providela schedule for restoring the 'normal PAM channels,,-.,.

SURVEILLANCE A Note at:the' beginning-of the SR table specifies that REQUIREMENTS" tt;%he :followi ng SRsapply ýto each',PAM'instrumentation Function found in Table 3.3.10-1.

... erfonmanceof the CH.NNEL CHECK once. every 31 days ensures that ai ross failuýe"of instrUmentation has not occurred.

A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one-channel to a similar parameter on other "channIs,- -It' is' based on.the a sumption that instrument

,channe-ls,monitoring the same parameter should read

... ~.approximately~ the same. va l~e' ;Significant deviations

• ,.,betleeh,-the two c

ntuetcahnels' could be an indication

.. ekcessie instrumentdri.ft in one' of the channels or of

.somethi'ng -even more.seriou'.'

A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure;.ý.thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL, CA IBRATION..;

Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties,

.including indication and readability.

If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside its limit.

If the channels are within the criteria, it is an indication that the channels are OPERABLE.

For clarification, a CHANNEL CHECK is a qualitative assessment of an instrument's behavior.

Where possible, a numerical comparison between like instrument channels should be included but is not required for an acceptable CHANNEL CHECK performance.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3B B 31. 3. 10 19 REVISION 51

PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.10 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.10.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS If the'channels are normally off scal.e during times when surveillance isý required, the. CHANNEL CHECK will only verify that 'they are 'off scal ein. thesame direction.'

Curreht.lobop channels-are:verified:to:be reading at the bottom of'the range and not-,failed'downscaie.

The. Frequency of 31 days is based'upon plant operating experience with, regard to channel OPERABILITY and drift, which demonstrates that failure of more'than one channel of

' a givenFunctiVon in any 31 day intewval, is.a rare event.

The CHANNEL CHECK 'suppl ements less' formal. but more frequent;'.checks of channel during"normal:operational use of the displays associated with.this LCO&s required channels.

SR 3:

.3.10

-A CHANNEL CALIBRATION'i's performed every.18 months or approximately every refueling.

CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument channel including the sensor.

The Surveillance verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and

'accuracy.

ANote.e6cludes the neutron,,detectors from the CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

For the Containment Area Radiation, instrumentation, a CHANNEL CALIBRATION as described in UFSAR Sections

18. 1..Fý. 1.3 and 11.5.2.1.6.2 will be.,performed.

The' dalirbration of thd Containment Isolation Valve (CIV),

p6si-tion indi 6ation channels wil~lconsist, of verification that the position indication changes*from not-closed to closed when the valve is actuated to its isolation position by SR 3.6.3.7.

The position switch is the sensor for the CIV position indication channels.

The Frequency is based upon operating experience and consistency with the typical industry refueling cycle and is justified by the assumption of an 18 month calibration interval for the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift.

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 Bý.1,1,10-20 REVISION 50

Remote Shutdown System B 3.3.11 BASES ACTIONS A Note has been added in the ACTIONS-to clarify the (continued) application of Completion Time rules, The Conditions of

• this Specification may be entered independently for each FUnction listed in Table,3.3.11-1.

The Completion Time(s) of:the inoperable channel(s)/traiJn(s) of a Function will be tracked separately.for, each Function*starting from the time the.-Condi,tionwas:entered for that Function.

Condition A addresses, the situation'wher'eone or more

, i.rnstrumentation channels of, the Remote Shutdown System are inoperabl-et., T.his includes 'any. Funtionl li.sted in The Required Action is to restore the channels to OPERABLE status within 30 days.

The Completion Time is based on operating experience and the lowprobability of an event

'that,woul'Td,,require..evacua~tion of the control room.

-B.%1 and B.2.:

Condi ti.on B addresses the.situatioh.wh 'ere-one or more disconnect or control circuits of the,.Rem6te Shutdown System are inoperable.

The required disconnect and control circui ts-are-li sted-in PVNGS controlled documents.

_'f-,The, required Action is, to restore the ;required switch(s)/circuit(s) to OPERABLE status or issue procedure changes.-that,identify:-aliternate diiscpnnect methods or

controlicircuits.

The Completion Ti~me-for either of the two Actions i s. 30 days:. :-

4

.~

.j, (conti nued)

PALOVERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.3.!11-5 P V D N 1 3B 3.REVISION.42

Remote Shutdown System B 3.3.11 BASES ACTIONS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE C.1 and C.2

'If the Required Action and associated. Completion Time of Condition A' are not met,,.the plant must be-brought to a MODE in which the.LCO does not.apply.

To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3:within 6. hours and to MODEý 4 within'12, hours.

The allIowed Compietion Times are reasonable; based on operating experience.,to reach the requiredý MODE from,full. power conditi'Ons in an orderly. manner and wi~thout. chall.enging plant systems'.'

SR

'3.-3 11.,1, REQUIREMENTS

-Performance of the CHANNELCHECKldnceeevery31 days ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation-,has. not', occurred.

A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a&simiflariparameter bnother channels.

It is based

% on-the assumption that"instrurment-channelsýmonitoring the same

". parametershould'read approximately the'same-value.

Significant deviations between theiinstrument-hannels could be an indication of excessive instrumentdrift in.one of the channels

orof something.even more'serious.-,A.CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure;; thus, it'is key.'to verifying that the

.. instrumentation continues to operate..proper'ly between each

'CHANNEL CALIBRATION.* Agreement-criteria are determined *by the plant staff, based-on'a combination of the channel instrument unhcertainties, including-indicatioh and readability.

If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that

.the'sensor or:the signal processing equipment has drifted

'outside its limit:

As specified-in the-Surveillance, a CHANNEL CHECK *s only required for. those' hannels,that are normally energized.. For clarification.,.a CHANNEL CHECK is a qualitative assessment of, an. instrument's behavior...'.Where possible, a

..'humerical comparison betweenlike. instrument channels should be included but-is not required-for an acceptable CHANNEL CHECK performance.

If the channels are normally off scale during times when

. surveillance.'is required, theKiCHANNEL'CHECK will only verify that they are offscale in the same direction.

Current loop channels'are. verified to be. readingat the bottom of the range and not-failed.downscale.

The Frequency of 31 days is based on plant operating experience with regard to channel OPERABILITY and drift, which demonstrates that failure of more than one channel of a given Function in any 31 day interval is a rare event.

(continued)

PALO;VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3,1311-6 REVJSION.51

.. V Boron Dilution Alarm System (BDAS)

B 3.3.12 BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE RFOJIREMENTS SR 3.3.12.1 SR'3,3:12.1,.fs the'performance of a CHANNEL CHECK on each requIred channel every1,2.hours.'

A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one

.,channel to a'-simil-ar parameter'dn'other-channels.

It is baýed-"upon the assumption that instrument channels monitoriing the same parameter should read approximately the

• name va.lue.

Significant deviations between instrument channels-'could be an indication of'excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious.

CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure:

thus, it is key to verifying that-the instrumentation continrues:to operate properly between eachCHANNEL CALIBRATIONs..

. Agreement criteri:a are determined bytheplant staff and

.should:,be basedo n a combination ofthe channel instrument uncertainties.

I:f,.a-channel isIoutsideof the criteria, it may, be an-.indi~cation-that the transmitteribr the signal processing equipment has. dri~fted outside of-its limits.

If the channels are within the-criteria, it is an indication that:the channels are OPERABLE.

-For. clarification, a

,,CHANEL CHECK.-i.s a quali.tative-,assessment.of an instrument s

.,,:.. behavior:;-Where.possible..,anumerical comparison between i,

ike.instrument channels should be included but is not required for an acceptab.le-CHANNEL CHECK.periformance.

, The.,Frequency; about once-every.,shift, is based on operating

.,experience~that demonstrates the rarity-of*channel failure.

.;SinceOthe.'probabjlity of:two random fai,ures in redundant

.,channe'ls;ýin any 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, period.,is extremely low, CHANNEL "CHECK. minimizes the chance of loss of protective function due..to:failure of redundant channels*.-

CHANNEL CHECK supplements,essformal., but more frequent,. checks of channel OPERABILITY during normal operational use of displays associated with the LCO required channels.

,,Thi s.SR. is, modified 'by a Note.,that,.states the CHANNEL CHECK

.. is. not-: requi.red to be performed until 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after neutron

.fl uX: is within 'the startup range. Neutron.flux is defined to be within the startup range following a-.reactor shutdown when reactor power is 2E-6% NRTP or less.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.3;:12-5 REV' IS`ION

Boron Dil-ution Alarm Systemn(BDAS)

B 3.3.12 BASES SURVEILLANCE

'REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.3.12.2 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed every 92 days to ensure that the BDAS is capable of properly,alerting the operator to a boron dilution event.

'Internal excore:startup channel test circuitry is used to feed preadjusted test signals i'nto the excore startup channel to verify the'proper neutron flux indication is-received at the BDAS.

The Frequency is based on operating experience with regard to channel 'OPERABILITY and drift.' which demonstrates that failure of more than'one channel in 'any'92 day Frequency is

a rare event'. " This SR'ismoidifi.ed'by..a:*Note that states the

.. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL -TEST.is not required,to be performed "until 12 hoLirs aft'er neutron flux is"within the startup range.

The 72"hours is basedon 'allow ing a reasonable time toi-perform the testing-following a::p arit"shutdown. Neutron

'flux is defined t6 be withinthe startup range following a reactor'shutdown when reactor powerfs 2-E-6% NRTP or less.

The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of the BDAR consists of online I:-tests*

including'verificatioh of-the Lontrol room alarm.

SR 3.3.12.3 SR 3.3.12.3 is the performance of-a CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 18 months.

The Surveill'anceis a complete check and'readjustment of the excore startup'channel from the.input through to the BDAS.

The, Surveillance.veri'fies that the channel responds to a measured'.parameter within :the' necessary* range and accuracy.

S"CHANNEL CALIBRATION 'leaves the channel 'adjusted to account

!for 'i nstrument*. dri.ft between successive 'calibrations to ensure that the channel'remains, operati-onal, This'SR is,modified by a Note.to-indicate that it is not necessary to -test *the deteictor, because-generating a me aningful test signal is d;ifficult:;..'the detectors are of simple constrcti'on', and any,failures in: the detectors will be apparent as a change in channel, output.

REFERENCES

.1.

UFSAR, Chapter"7 and Chapter 15.

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.3.12-6 REVISION 6

"[

I-

RWT B 3.5.5 B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS.(,ECGS:)

B 3.5..5 Refueling Water Tank (RWT)

BASES

,BACKGROUND The, RWT supports the ECCS -and:thed Containment Spray System

• by providing a source of borated,wa~er for Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) pump operation.

Theý RWT suipplies two ECCS trainsý.by separate, redundant

• supply-headers.

Each header also supplies one train of the

.Containment. Spray, System*. A motor. operated isolation valve

- *is'provided-in each h'ader;to.-alldwthe operator to isolate Sthe usable ;volume of, theýRWT..fr6m~the ECCS after the ESF pump.sucti.on hasbeen.transferýedto.'the..,containment sump folowing depl'etion:.of the RWTduring.a.Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA).., Aseparate:header:is. used to supply the c

.Chemical,.andVolume Control SystemZ.(CVCS) from the RWT.

Use of a single RWT to supply both trains of the ECCS is acceptabl:e since the,.RWT-is, a passive component, and passive failures are not assumdd to occur coincidently with the Design Basis Event during the injectiont hase of an accident.

Not all the water stored in the RWT is available for injection following a LOCA:.the loc ation of the ECCS suction piping in the RWT will resu-lt in some portion of the storedvolume, being unavailable.t The"Hgh P"ressure.Safety Injection (HPSI),

Low Pressure

.Z.

Safetynjectio LPSI), and contai~nment spray pumps are providedwithrecirCulation. line-that ensure each pump can

-i v

maintain minimum flow.requirements when,.operating at shutoff head ýcondltions.- These lines di-scharge back to the RWT.

The.RWT yents to the Fuel, Bu-Ilding yentilation System.

When

-the.s ctiqn-lfor the HPSl and containment, spray pumps is transferred to the containment sump, this flow path must be isolated<to.prevent a:.releaseof, the containment sump

...,contentstothe RWT..

If-notJi-solated, this flow path could

.result in a-release of-contaminants to the atmosphere and

.the eventual.!ossý,of §uction -head for. the ESF pumps.

This LCO ensures that:

a. The RWT contains sufficient borated water to support

.!the' ECCS during the injection phase; (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3:.5.5-1 REVISION 51

RWT B 3.5.5 BASES BACKGROUND

b. : Sufficient'water volume exists in the containment sump (continued) to support continued operation of the ESF pumps at the

. time of transfer to the recirculati~on.mode of-cooling; and

c. The:'reactor remains subcritical, following a LOCA.

Insufficient water inventory in.:the,RWT could result in (1) insufficient cooling capacity of theECCS, or (2) insufficient water level to support continued ESF pump operati6nwheh~the-transfer 'to the,.recirculation mode occurs.

Improper boron concentrations could r.esult in a reduction of SDM or extessive boric acid precipitation in.,

the core following a LOCA, as well as excessive caustic

'stress corrosion of mechanical...components.,and systems.....

inside containment.,.

The RWT also provides a source of borated water to the charging system..for'makeup. to the RCS to compensate for

.7* contraction of the.RCS coolant during plant coQldown while maintaining adequate shutdown margin.

Although this, charging-system borati'on.function.is not. required to be in a, Technical Specification LCO per 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) criteria, the RWT volume requirements of Figure 3.5.5i

.. include this function in order..to"provide.the..'3lant......

operators with a single requirement for RWT volume.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3'.5.5-2 REVISION. 51

RWT B 3.5.5 BASES BACKGROU!

.(conti ND

-'The table below provides the required RWTIlevel at selected nued)

RCS average temperature values,..corresponding to Figure 3.5.5-1: 'The RWT volume:.is the total volume of water in the RWT above the vortex breaker. :This volume includes the volumes required to be transferred, as discussed below, an allowance for instrument uncertainty, and the volume that will remain in the RWT after the switch over to the I ;reciirculatiO6 mode".

RWT Required Level at RCS Temperatures..,

RCS Temperature, (F),:

.. RWT. Required Level RWT Volume

• average -

(%)

(Gallons) 210 79.9 601,000 250 80.1 603,000 30,0 80:-4'-

605,000

'350-:.

80.8-

608,000 400v

'81.2 611,000

'450" 81.6 614,000 o500 82.1" 618,000

!83.0 624,000 600 83.0 624,000

• The volumes include instrument uncertainty and have been rounded up or down to the nearest 1,000 gallons.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3

' B" 3'.5. 5-3 REVjISION 51

RWT B.3.5.5 I

BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANAL During accident conditions, the RWT provides a source o.f.

YSESi borated water to the.HPSI, LPSI-and containment spray pumps..

As such;.it provides containment.cooling and depressurization., core cooling, and replacement inventory and is a,.source. of negative.reactivity for.reactor shutdown (Ref. 1).*"

The design basis. transients-and.applicable safety analyses concerning each of these systems. are discussed in

,:the Applicable-Safety. Analyses. section..of. Bases B 3.5.3,

'ECCS'- Operating," and B 3.6.6,:."Containment Spray."

These analyses are used to assess.changes..to--.the.RWT i.n Order to evaluateý their';effects in relation ýto the acceptance limits.

The level limit of Figure 3.5.5-1 for the ESF function is based/..on the larg'est',of the following four factors:

..i,."

a.

'A V61 ume of'476,338" gal.'on:'s must be transferred to containment via the ESF'pumps'prior:'td reaching a low

" l~evei switchov*r *to the contai'nment sump for recirculatfon.

This ESF Reserve Volume. ensures that the ESF pump suction will':not be aligned to the containment sump until-the point at wh~fch 75% of the minimum desii gflow of6Ohe-HPSI :pump-i~s, capable of meeting or'exceedirng the decay"-heat boil-off rate.

b.

A volume of 543,200 gallohs (at 600°F) must be transferred'to the RCS and containment for flooding of sump strainers to:preventvortexing and to ensure

'adequate net pos'itive suction-head tO support

-continued ESFipunmp.opera'tion after the'switchover to rec'ircul'ation occurs.'

q:.

Ay-volume of 400-,000 gall ons mustbe av-ailable for

'Containment Spray System operation as credited in the containment pressure and temperature analyses.

d.

A~volum6 of boratedwater..is.needed during ECCS functions to ensure shut.down. mar~gin !(SDM) is mainta.ined, IThe voluime required'xis similar to that needed for the-charging system function of compensating for contraction of the. RCS coolant during plant cooldown.,;.The volume.required..will vary depending upon the event and is bounded by the volume (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3,.,5. 5 -4 REVISION 51

RWT B 3.5.5 BAS[S E-S."

APPLICABLE needed for;a LOCA The volume needed for boration SAFETY ANALYSES purposes for a LOCA is smaller than the.volumes (continued)

'.discussed inma-b-, and c above.

,-. ;'The~quantities specified-above.are transfer volumes to be ava~ilabletfor.delitvery to the ESFr~pumps.-They are located between the required level-of Figure,3.5.5-1 and the low level

)switchover;to the containment sump.-for recirculation (RAS).

Therequtred level of Figure 3.5.5.7 also pcnsiders applicable instrument. uncertainty -for theindi cators !used to verify l..evel,' theswitch -that actuates, the recirculation actuation signal, and the indicators for average RCS temperature.

The. 1ve!.:.reqdi.nred,b' Figure 3l5' '5-,1'ensures. that adequate water voluime exists in thetank fd provide the transfer

", volumes..discussed.above.

The temperatures of note on the Figure are (1) 600°F which bounds the.highest expected average

,RCS temperature,; (2) 5650F,' whi~ch dor.responds to hot zero power,- and (3), 210 0F,. which is the lowest temperature for

• Mode,4,.;when this,.LCO.is appl~icable..Between 600°F and 5650F

.,:,the, required level is constant,,for,'eas.e of use by operators to have. a:..s.rgle-yalue for-a.ll.hot conditions:, Between 565°F and

210 0F the.xeqy.ired level... dcreases as' the volume required to Smakeup for,,RCS coolant contraction decreases.

,.-. By.time..of recirculati.on, the water level in the containment Msmp.,must.be~sufficient to,provide adequate Net Positive S.,..Suction Head.,,N*PSH).for.,both -trains of HPSI,

LPSI, and

..-:containment.spray,,pumps, operati.ng it runout conditions.

Accounting for LPSI pump opeiration, is:.conservative because these pumps trip automatically upon RAS and are not required

• .'during recirdulation.- The mihimOm containmient sump level can

bee adchiev'dc.6nsider'ing only te. inventory specified in the KWfT with no contributions from safety injection tanks and. the reactor cool:ant.

The:resultant :containment water inventory is

"..urt~herreduced due-to the effects of evaporation and flashing "off. post-acci.dent flui.d;,holdup.in containment atmosphere, sudbcomoartments; andreservoirs due to containment spray operation;,:and diiversions of RWT to the CVCS via the high suction,.nozzle". Leakages from injection and recirculation (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3

.... B 3'S.5. 5-5

".."B3555-REViSION 51

RWT B 3.5.5 BASES APPLICABLE equipment to areas outside the containment during the first SAFETY ANALYSES.

24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of the event are expected,to be small in (continued) comparison with the.overall conservatism in the analysis and are therefore neglected.,* Consi.stentwith the posiltions Sin Regulatory,Guidess Lil and,.1.82, no credit was taken for containment pressure in calculating availlable NPSH.

The..4000 ppm;limit-for minimum bron, concentration was.

..established tO ensure Ithat,' following: a 'LOCA with a minimum level in the RWT, the'reactor will.remain subcritical in the cold conditi'ohfollowing mixing of the RWT and RCS water.

volumes.

Small break'LOCAs assume that'all ýontrOl, rods are

.inserted,,except for.-the Control ElementAssembly (CEA) of

.highe.stworth-;,which is withdrawnfrom the core.

Large break LOCAs assume that all CEAs rem41n',withdrawn from the

.core..The.mostlimiting case occurs atbeginning of core

...The maximum boron limi-t of 4400 ppm.in the RWT is based on boron precipitation..in the core following a LOCA.

With the

reactor vessel at saturated'condit.ions,.. the core dissipates heat by pool nucleateiboiling.

Becau'eof this boiling phenomenon in the core, the, bric acid concentration, will increase i.n this'sregion..

If,.alllowed to proceed in this manner, a point will.be.reached whefe.boron precipitation will occur in the core.

Post LOCAeemergency procedures direct the operator-to establi.sh..simultaneou.s, hot and cold leg injection to prevent this condition by establishing a forced flow path through the core regardless of break,.,

location.

These procedures are based on the minimumntime in

,which precipitati.oncould occurý, assuming that maximum boron

.concentrations exist'in the..bbrated wa'ter sources used for injection-,followinga LOCA.

Boron concentrations -in the RWT

• in excess of the limit could 'result in. precipitation earlier than assumed in the analysis.,

The upper i mit of,120KF and th6&1o4wer'limit of 60°F on RWT temperature are. the li.mi.ts assUmed, in the accident analysis.

Although RWTtemperatur'i.affects the outcome of several analyses, the upperahd*.iower*li'mits established by the LCO are not limitedby any of'the&eanalyses.

The RWT ESF function satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (c)(2)(ii).

• ":"*(continued).

11 1. 1

ý -

ý PALO-VE RDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.5.5-6 PAID UT 1:E-REVISION 51

RWT B 3.5.5 BASES LCO The RWT ensures that an adequate supply of borated water is available, to cool and depressurize the containment in the event of a Design Basis Accident (DBA) and tocool and cover O

the co'r-in the event of a LOCA,that the reactor remains

.subcritical following a' DBA,.and that an adequate level Sexists in the conrtainmkent"sumpto support ESF pump operation "in the'Yeci"culation {node.

Tobe'&.cor sideredQPERABLE, the RWT must meet the limits established in theSRs' for water volume' -boron

• concentration,, and temperatureO.

APPLICABILITY..' ':" In'MODES 1'.

2,. 3,and

4. the-,RWT OPERABILITY requirements 1-a"re'zdictated,&.by the ECCS and Containment'Spray System

'OPERA*BiLITY"-requ'irem'e'ts.'

Since both the ECCS and the

" Containment Spray.System must~b&eOPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3.

and 4, the RWT must be OPERABLE to support their operation.

-c Corecooli'ng, requiIments in MODE 5.are addressed by

' LCO 3.4.7 "RCS "Loops

-MODE 5',

Lo6ps Filled," and LCO 3.4.8, "RCS Loops:

MODE: 5,."Loops,Not Filled."

MODE 6 core cooling requ.i rements. are' addressed by. LCO 3.9.4., 'Shutdown Cool i ng (SDC)and:Coolant Cir cul'ation' -'High'.Water Level," and LCO 3-.'9 5,. Shutdown, Coolin'g (SDC)'and Coolant elrculatilon !- Low Water Level.".

ACTIONS A.

I Wi'h RT. boron concentr'ation or :borated'.water temperature not thtnin'limits' it must 'be' returnedto within limits With.n 8, hours.

In this,corhdi'tio'n ',ther the ECCS nor the Containmen't Sp5ray_ ys'tem":&an rlerform'tffeir design functions; therefore, prompt action must:be taken'to restore the tank to OPERABLE condition.., The allowed Completion Time of 8 h.our's"'to-restore the RWT to'within' limfts was developed considering the-time requir~d to change.boron concentration

or temper'ature and that thb'contents ofthe tank are still

"" avail'ab Ie `for' injection and, core cool ing.

(continued)

PALO'VERDE UNITS 1.2,3

. B-3.5.5-7 REVISION.51

RWT B 3.5.5 BASES ACTIONS B.1 With RWT borated water.volume not within11mits, it must be returned towithin.limits within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />,.

In this condition, neither the ECCS nor Containment Spray System. can perform their design functions; therefore, prompt action must be taken to restore the tank to OPERABLEstatus or to place the unit inma MODE in'which these systemsa're not required.

The allowed Completion Time of 1 hour-to'restore the RWT to OPERABLE status is based. on this condition since the contents of the tank-are not availablefor injection and core cooling.

C.1 and,.C.-2

.If,theRWTcannot be restored toOPERABLE status within the associated Completio6iTime. th6,plant must be brought to a MODE in which the. LCO does not apply' To achieve this" status, the plant. must be brQughttooat least.MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and to.MODE 5 within:36 hours.

The allowed

.CompletiJon.Times are reasonable, based~on operating

.experienc~e, to reach.the'required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challengin'ngplant systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.5.1 REQUIREMENTS RWT borated water temperature shall be verified every

• .24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to be within the limits assumed in the accident

analysis, This Frequ'ency' has been'shown to be sufficient to

... identify temperature changes that approach either acceptable

-limit.

The SR is modified by a Note that eliminates the requirement to perform this Surveillance when ambient air temperatures are within the operating temperature limits of the RWT.

With ambient temperatures within this range, the RWT temperature should not exceed the limits.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.5.5-8 REVISION 51

RWT B 3.5.5 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.5.5.2 7;

The.RWT water volumelevel shall beverified every 7 days in accordance witth.Figure 3.5.5-1.. This Frequency ensures that a:sufficient, ini-tial water-supply is available for injection and to support continued ESF pdmp, operation on recircul.ation.

-Since the RWT.. olume is normally stable and i;s.provided.with a Low LevelAlarm in.the Control Room, a

'7.;day Frequency is appropriate.,and has been shown to be acceptable through operating exp~eri~ence..

SR 3.5.5.3 Boron concentration of the RWThshal.l:.be. verified every 7 days~to, be within the required rangei This Frequency ensures thaýt the

• dactor 'wi.. -remain subtri tical fol lowing a LOCA and 'the" boron precipi-tation in.the *core will not occur eahliet*han predicted.

Further",, it ensures that the

-resultingmsurppHwi.l,l.:be~maintained.in an acceptable range such that the effect of chlorideand-:taustic stress

..4

corrosion, onmechanical systems.and"'tomponents will be minimized..,.Si'nce thheRWT volume is normally stable, a 7 day sampling Frequency. is appropriate andhýas been shown through operating experfence to be acceptabl'e.'-

REFERENCES

1.

UFSAR, Chapter 6 and Chapter 15.

2.;

Engineering aculation 13-JC-CH-0209

, 1ý PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.5.5-9 REVISION 51

This pageý intentidnall* blank I.

4 4

It 44 I

CREFS B 3.7.11 BASES APPLICABLE The CREFS provides airborne radiological protection for CRE SAFETY ANALYSES occupants, as demonstrated by the CRE occupant dose (continued) analyses for the most limiting design basis accident fission product release presented in the UFSAR, Chapter 15 (Ref. 2).

The CREFS provides protection from smoke and hazardous chemicals to the CRE occupants: however, hazardous chemicals are not stored or used onsite in quantities sufficient to necessitate CRE protection, as required by Regulatory Guide 1.78.

In addition, nearby industrial, military, and transportation facilities present no hazard to the operation of PVNGS, and there are no site-related design basis events due to accidents at these facilities (Ref. 1 and Ref. 3).

The evaluation of a smoke challenge demonstrates that it will not result in the inability of the CRE occupants to control the reactor either from the contro.room or.-from.,theremote shutdown panel (Ref. 4).

The worst case single active failure of a component of the CREFS, assuming a loss of offsite power, does not impair the ability of the system to perform its design function.

The CREFS satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (c)(2)(ii).

LCO Two independent and redundant trains of the CREFS are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that at least one is available if a single active failure disables the other train.

Total system failure, such as from a loss of both ventilation trains or from an inoperable CRE boundary, could result in exceeding a dose of 5 rem whole body or its equivalent to any part of the body to the CRE occupants in the event of a large radioactive release.

Each CREFS train is considered OPERABLE when the individual components necessary to limit CRE occupant exposure are OPERABLE.

A CREFS train is considered OPERABLE when the associated:

a.

Fan is OPERABLE;

b.

HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber are not excessively restricting flow, and are capable of performing their filtration functions; and

c.

Ductwork, valves, and dampers are OPERABLE, and air circulation can be maintained.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.7.11-3 REVISION 51

CREFS B 3.7.11 BASES LCO in order for the CREFS trains to be considered OPERABLE, (continued) the CRE boundary must be maintained such that the CRE.,

occupant dose from a large radioactive release does not.

exceed the calculated dose in theilicensirJg basis consequence analyses for DBAs. and. that the CRE occupants are protected fromn.hazardous.'chemicals and smoke.

The LCO is modified by a Note allowih'g-the CRE boundary to be opened, intermittently urider administrative controls.

,This Note,.only 'appliesjto,6penings in,the.CRE boundary that can be-rapidly restored to the design 'condition such as

• doors, hatches, floor, plugs, and access panels.

For entry and exit~through doors', the administfative control of the

".,opening is performed by the person(s)-entering or exiting the area.

For other openings, 'these controls should be proceduralized and consist of-stationing a dedicated individual at the opening who is in continuous communication with. the. operators in the CRE.

This

.. individual-will, have,a method to.rapid, yclose the opening

.:.and to restore the CRE boundary.integrityito the design condition when a need for CRE isolation is indicated.

APPLICABILITY In MODES, 2,, 3, 4, and durng mdv'ement of irradiated fuel assemblits, 'the CREFS must be OPERABLE to'ensure that the CRE will remain habitable during arid following a DBA.

In, MODES 5 and'.6, "the GREFS is r.equi.red to cope with the release* from"a ruptu e of, a Waste gas tank.

Moveme'nt of spent'fuel casks 'containi'hg' irradiated fuel

.,assembliesis not within the scope, of "the Applicability of thi.s technical specification.

The-nMovement of dry casks c'ontaining 'irradiated fuel assemblies will be done with a single-failuffe-p7roof handlinhg system'and"with transport equipment that would prevent' any credible accident that could result in a release of radioactivity.

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, the CREFS must be OPERABLE to cope withthe release from a fuel handling accident.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.7.11-4 REVISION 50

Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.8.3 BASES ACTIONS D.i (continued)

'With the new fuel oil properties'defined in the Bases for SR 3.18.3.3 not within the r~equired -limits, a period of 32,0days is'allowed for restoring the stored fuel oil properties'"

This period "provide's'ýufficient time to test the. stored. fuel, oil to determine that the new fuel oil, when mixed with prevyiously store'd"fuel oil, remains acceptable, or'.,restore the stored fuel oil properties; This restoration may 1involve. feed' and bleed procedures', filtering, or combinations of fhese'procedures' Even if a DG start and load wa~s require'd: du'ring this:-timei'interval and the fuel oil properties were'outside Iimit§) thee-Jeiý"a high likelihood thý.at th'e' DG would-sti.lI be dapable bf performing its iritended~fjnction

• I ( '.

E.

'EachDG-is"OPERABLE with oneMir'receivericapable of d~liviering, an"'operatii-ig pr'essure:'of 2 :230 psig indicated.

Although there are' two'independent and redundant starting air receivers per DG, only one starting air receiver is required for-DG OPERABILITY..

Each receiver is sized to,..

accomplish.5 DG starts from its normal operating pressure of

.250 ps.i g., and each. wi 11. start. the DG.in < 10 seconds wi th.a

.minimum..pressure. of 185.:psig indicated. 'If the required' starting air 'receiver, is.< 230 psig. and > 185 psig indicated,"the starting air system is degraded and a period of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> -is considered sufficient to complete restoration

'to. the& required pressurle prior'to declaritng the DG ii'operable. 'This 48'-hou'r perio'd-is' acceptable based on the minimum starting air capacity (>_ 185 psig indicated), the fact.-tha6tthe DG"start must' be "accomplished on the first attempt, (.tnere.: are no,.sequential 'starts in emergency mode),

and. the rlow, probabili.ty' of anl event during this brief

.. pe-i6d. '.Cdalculation'13-JCQDG-203,'(Ref."9) supports the p.hroposed v.al uesforK..receiver ipressures'.

F.1 WithlaRequir'edAction-and associated Completion Time not met, or one or more DGs with:diesel fuel oil, lube oil, or starting air subsystem inoperable for reasons other than addressed by Conditions A through E, the associated DG may be incapable of performing its intended function and must be immediately declared inoperable.

(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.8.3-5 REVISION 51

DieselIFuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.8.3 BASES ACTIONS F.1 (continued)

A.Note modifies condition F.

Periodic starting of the Emergency Diesel.Generator(s) requires":isoiation on one of, the two. normally. alignedairl.startreceivers.

Duri:ng.the."

subsequent..D.iesel Generator.sta't,,..the..air.pressure in the*

one, remajningiair receiver may momentarily drop-below the minimum, required pressure of,185.psig-;ind~icated.

This would normally require declaring the now running:Diesel.Generator inoperable, due to low pressure in the air start system.

This,is not required, as: the Diesel,Geinerator would now be running :foll~owing 'the' successful start.

Should the start not.be'successful the MDG would.be decl.ared inoperable per

...the-requirements of LCO 31.8.1:.

As such,,.this Condition is

,modified by~a Note stating.that:shouldthe required starting "air :receiver pressure.momentarily: drop to <185 psig indicated while startingthe-Di:esel: Generator.on one air

?

7.1 receive& only,.:.then.entry into Condition F is not required.

.,It.is expectedý:that this.condition would. be fairly short durati6n,.(approximately 8rminutes).,:as the;air start compressors should quickly restore the air receiver pressure Iafterithe diesel start.

SURVEILLANCE 3SR 3.8.3.1 REQUIREMENTS S:This.SR provides verification that there is an adequate inventory, of-fuel,.oil in.-the.st6rage.,tanks to support each DG's operation-for 7 days.at-full load... The 7 day period is sufficient time.to-,place the-uni,t in a-safe shutdown

.condition and to bring in replenishmeht fbel from an offsite

.location..

I The 31 day Frequency'is adequatel toersure that a sufficient supply of fuel oil is available, sih6e low level alarms are provided and Unit operators would be aware of any large uses of fuel oil during this period...

SR 3.8.3.2 This SurVeillance ensures that, suffic-ientlube oil inventory is available.to support at least-7..d.ays of full load operationfor.each DG.I.The.2.5 inches visible in the sightglass requirement.is. based on the DG manufacturer co'nsumption values for: the runctime of the DG.

Implicit in this SR is the requirement.to verify the capability to (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B ;3.ý8.13-6 REVISION 51

. fo ýý

Distribution Systems - Operating B 3.8.9 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS.

B 3.8.9 Distributi-on Systems - Operating BASES BACKGROUND

.. The onsite"Glass 1E AC., DC,, and AC.vital instrument bus

'electr.ical.,power distribution's~ystems are divided into two

":".tr'ains

.Erach train has redundan~t~and independent AC, DC, and'AC:-v:Ital: instrument bus electrical power distribution

-subs,ýstenis,

.. TheýAC&'p'rimary electrical-powerdistribution system consists of two.44'.16. kV Engineered Safety Feature,(ESF) buses.

Each' 4:16kV.ESF bus Jis normanl-ly.connected to an offsite

.,-IToure..

rIf the.,bf-fs.i'te sourceji :s, de-ene~rgized or di.sconnected,' the onsite emergency:D.G supplies power to the

-4.16,kV:.ESF.bus...,:Control power.for..the,4.16 kV breakers is suppli ed-froni the ClasslIE batteri~es..:. Additional descri ptiolp of othis

system may be found in the Bases for

.LCO 3..:8. i,.,"AC Sources' :Opera.ting,'

and.:the Bases for

' LCO 3,.:8.,4,.."DC Sources,-

Operating.'

The secondary AC electrical*powe.r distribAltion system for each train includes the safety related load centers, motor control centers and distribution panels shown in,.,

Table B 3.8.9-1.

-The'"120 VAC'.vital 'instrument buses are arranged in two

.harnnel s pe'r.rsubsystem and*are.normally powered from the

,inverters.,

'There.'are four channels.designated as A, B, C

-,,and D for eacdh: uit.- The alternate power-supply for the

-vital'CTihstrument buses'are Class 1E constant voltage source regulators powered from train-relatediClass 1E motor control centers and its use is governed by LCO 3.8.7.

"Inýerthers`'T-Ope~afhg'"

There a&ebtwo' independent' 125.VDC electrical power distribution-subsystems -(Trai~n A and.Tra'in B).

Each subsystem contains two DC power channels.

There are four channels designated as A, B, C, and D for each unit.

'2.

.5 The list of all required distribution buses is presented in

'Table' B 3.8.,9-1.

Thesix el-ectri~cal power distribution

. ubsystems.' consist of those components identified by Table 7 B'3.8*.9.r1.

' Load breakers, not identified by this table do not impact :th.is LCO but-.may7-impact supported system LCOs.

Load'"breakers that'are required.to maintain energized those

.. buses -identified byiTable B 3.8.9.-i (e.g. PG to PH) do impact this LCO.

(contAnued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3

'B 3.8.9-1 REVISION 51

Distribution Systems - Operating B 3.8.9 BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANAL)

The initial conditions of Design.Basis-Accident (DBA) and,;,

'SES' transient analyses in the UFSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref: 1) and '7 Chapter 15 (Ref. 2),,assume ESF 'systems. are OPERABLE..

The AC, DC* and AC vital instrument bus.electrical power distribution~systems are designed, to,provide sufficient capacity.' capability',

redundancy.,and reliability to ensure the availability of'necessary power.to',ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolantý:System:,,and containment design limits are. not exceeded.

These limits;.are discussed in more detail in the Bases for Section,;3.2, Power Distribution Limits; Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS);

and Section 3.6'. Containment-Systems.

The OPERABILITYof theAC',

DC, and AC.vital instrument bus el.ectrical -power distribution systems,,.is consistent with the

'initial assumptions of-the accidentanalyses and is based upon meeting the design basi!s.of the. unit.

This includes,

'maintaining power distribution systems, OPERABLE during accident conditions -in the. event of:_...

a..

A* sue os-ofalofst oe

• a..

An,assumed loss~of all-,offsite-power electrical power.; and

.*-bý. Alworst case single failure.,_-,

The distribution systems satisfy Criterion

' (c )(2 )(ii )....

or all Onsite AC 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 LCO The six required power distribution subsystems listed in

'Table B3.8.94'lf"nsure the 'availability of AC.

DC, and AC vital -instrumient bus"electricalpower for the systems required to shut 'down the reactor-and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence (AOO) or'a'postulated'DBA.,: The.AC,tDC,.'and AC vital instrument bus el ectrical'*power~distribution'subsystems are required to be OPERABLE.

Ma'intaining'the 'Train' Aand'.Train B.AC,:.DC, and AC vital "instrument bus eledtrical power distr'ibution subsystems

'OPERABLE ensures that the redundancy"li-ncorporated into the design of ESF'is not'defeated: 'Therefore, a single failure within any system or within the electrical power distribution subsystems will not prevent safe shutdown of the reactor.

(continued)

PALO-VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.8,9-2

-REVISION 0

Distribution Systems - Operating B 3.8.9 BASES LCO OPERABLE AC electrical power distribution subsystems require (conti-nued) '

the-associated buses, load centers, motor control centers, and'distribution panels to be energized.to their proper voltages::.: OPERABLE DC electrical, power distribution subsystems-ýrequire the associated buses to be energized to

-their proper voltage from. eithe~r the associated battery or c*arger>.

OPERABLE AC Vital.iihstrument bus electrical power distributi'on subsystems. require.the associated buses to be energized, to-their proper vol:tage :from -the associated inverter vi~a-inverted DC voltage, or.Class 1E constant Vollt6ge, regulator-..

In addition, tie breakers between redundant safety related AC., DC', land AC vital instrument bus-power distribution

- -subsysiteMs,,: if 1they exist,: must be&

vopen,., - This prevents any

- eleftri`ca]' malfunction ;i n any power distribution subsystem from' propagating.,to-the'redundant.ysubsystem, which could c'aus-e tthe failureof a redundant, subsystem and a loss of essential.s:afety, :function(s):.

If-,any,, tie breakers are closed, the affected redundant electrical power distribution subsystems are considered.inoperable.

This applies to the onsite, safety related-.redundantelectrical power distribution subsystems.

It does not. however, preclude redundant-Cl ass E 4'. 16 XkV buses.-from being powered from the same offsi te circuit.

APPLICABILITY The ejectr~ical power distribution subsystems are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3,'and 4-to ensure that

&a.

Acceptable.-fuel.design.limits. and reactor coolant

.pressutLe boundarylimitis.ar~enot 'exceeded as a result of AOOs:. or. abnormal t'ransients;-.and b,.

.Adequatecore cooli.ngis',prow,ded,.'and containment

,.-;.OPERABILITY ?and othervital functions are maintained in the event of a postulated DBA.

.Elec-trica, power, distribution subsystem.-..requirements for

• O-Q:*,.dM0OES,-5.and, 6, and-during movement of irradiated fuel

' assembljes*.,are cQvered.-in the. Bases for.LCO 3.8.10,

-.!Distribution -Systems - Shutdown.."

..(continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1.2,3

.B 3'.8.9-3 REVISION 51

Distribution Systems - Operating B 3.8.9 BASES (continued)

ACTIONS A.1 With one or more required AC buses, load centers, or. mo'tor,.

control centers (see Table B 3.8.9.-1), except AC vital instrument buses,'in one subsystem inoperable, the remaining

..,AC electr-ical power distribution subsystem in-the other

.train is-capable Qf supporting.the minimrjm safety functions necessary to shut down the reactor and maintain it in_,a safe shutdown,condition, assuming no single failure.

The overall reliability is reduced, howeverbecause a single failure in the remaining power',distribution subsystems could result in the minimum required ESF funftions not being supported.

Therefore, the required AC buses, load centers and motor control, centers,..must berestoredto.O[PERABLE-stat.us within 8,

.,hours.

Condition A worst scenario is one train ý(PBA or PBB) without AC power;(i:e.,, no dffsite pdwe'r~to the train and the associated DG inoperable)..

In"this condition, the unit is more-vulrherable to.,a complete loss of AC pow6r.

It i's>

therefore, imperative that the,'unit operator's attention be

.,fOcused on minimiZing the potential for-loss of power to the' r"emaining train'by stabilizing theunit, and, on restoring

power tothe affected train., The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> time limit before requiring a unit shutdown in this,,condition is acceptable because of:

.a The potential for decreased"safety if the unit operator'slattention is'diverted from the evaluations and actions necessary torestore. power.,.to the, affected train, to the actions associated with taking the unit toshutdown withi~n'this,time limit; and'

b.

The potential for an event in conjunction with a single failure of a redundant component in the train with AC power.

The second Completion Time for Required Action A.1 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required distribution subsystems to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.8.9-4 REVISION 0

.1

~.;

I.

Distribution Systems - Operating B 3.8.9 Table B 3.8.9-1 (Units 1, 2, and!3)

TYPE VOLTAGE TRAIN A TRAIN B 4160V

.V.ESF Bus PBA-S03 ESF Bus PBB-S04 480. V Load Centers..,

Load Centers

.-L31'

-L33.

PGB-L32, PGB-L34, AC.-safety

.IG-31 PG-L35' PGB6 PGA-L35 PGB-L36 buses 480 V,

'Motor'

'Coitrol,Centers.

Motor Control Center PHA-M31, PHA-M33,.

PHB-M32, PHB-M34, PHA-M35, PHA-M37.

PHB-M36, PHB-M38 CHANNEL A CHANNEL C CMANNEL B CHANNEL D ro ntolA Center

-zControl Center Control Center Control Center P KA M.,-

PKC7M43 PKB-M42 PKD-M44 DC buses 125 V,

.istr.ibutioh Distribution Distribution Distribution Pane Panel Panel Panel PKA-D21

'PKC-D23 V

PKB-D22 PKD-D24 S.

CHANNL. A

'CHANNEL C CHANNEL B CHANNEL D AC 0vital 120 V instrumen Distribution Distribution

-Distribution Distribution Panel Panel Panel Panel buses NA-D25.

PNC-D27T-PNB-D26 PND-D28

-r NOTE:

Each train of :the electri:cal power. distribution independent AC, DC, and AC vital instrument bus

• ",.J D,

system is comprised of the subsystems.

RDE UNITS 1,2,3 B 3.8.9-11 PALO VEF REVISION 51

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