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| | issue date = 03/18/1997 | | | issue date = 03/18/1997 |
| | title = LER 97-001-00:on 970221,identified Deficiencies in Post Accident Sampling Systems (Pass).Caused by Failure of Personnel to Specify Drawing Update Requirements.Added PASS to List of Maint Rule systems.W/970318 Ltr | | | title = LER 97-001-00:on 970221,identified Deficiencies in Post Accident Sampling Systems (Pass).Caused by Failure of Personnel to Specify Drawing Update Requirements.Added PASS to List of Maint Rule systems.W/970318 Ltr |
| | author name = BENKEN E, STALL J A | | | author name = Benken E, Stall J |
| | author affiliation = FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. | | | author affiliation = FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| | addressee name = | | | addressee name = |
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| {{#Wiki_filter:CATEGORY REGULATO INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION | | {{#Wiki_filter:<<J CATEGORY REGULATO INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION STEM (RIDS) |
| <<J STEM (RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9703280001 DOC.DATE: 97/03/18 NOTARIZED:
| | ACCESSION NBR:9703280001 DOC.DATE: 97/03/18 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-.335 $ t. Lucie Plant, Unit 1, Florida Power 6 Light Co. 05000335 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION BENKEN,E. Florida Power 6 Light Co. |
| NO FACIL:50-.335 | | STALLSgJ A~ Florida Power a Light Co. |
| $t.Lucie Plant, Unit 1, Florida Power 6 Light Co.AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION BENKEN,E.Florida Power 6 Light Co.STALLSgJ~A Florida Power a Light Co.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DOCKET 05000335 | | RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION |
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| ==SUBJECT:== | | ==SUBJECT:== |
| LER 97-001-00:on 970221,identified deficiencies in Post Accident Sampling Systems (PASS).Caused by failure of personnel to specify drawing update requirements. | | LER 97-001-00:on 970221,identified deficiencies in Post Accident Sampling Systems (PASS). Caused by failure of personnel to specify drawing update requirements. Added PASS to list of Maint Rule systems.W/970318 ltr. |
| Added PASS to list of Maint Rule systems.W/970318 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE: TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.,.NOTES: RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD2-3 PD INTERNAL: ACRS AEOD/SPD/RRAB NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DRCH/HQMB NRR/DSSA/SPLB RES/DET/EIB EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD NOAC POOREgW NRC PDR COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME WIENS,L.AE IL CENTE NRR D EELB NRR/DRCH/HHFB NRR/DRCH/HOLB NRR/DRPM/PECB NRR/DSSA/SRXB RGN2 FILE 01 LITCO BRYCEiJ H NOAC QUEENERiDS NUDOCS FULL TXT COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1~1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 D N NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS: | | DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE: |
| PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE.TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK (DCD)ON EXTENSION 415-2083 FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 25 ENCL 25 s l Florida Power 8 Light Company.6501 South Ocean Drive.Jensen Beach, FL 34957 APL March 18, 1997 L-97-74 10 CFR 50.73 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.20555 Re: St.Lucie Unit 1 Docket No.'0-335 Reportable Event: 97401 Date of Event: February 21, 1997 Operation Prohibited By Technical Specifications due to The attached Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 to provide notification of the subject event.Very truly yours, J.A.Stall Vice President St.Lucie Plant JAS/EJB Attachment cc: Regional Administrator, USNRC Region II Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, St.Lucie Plant.970328000i 970318 PDR ADQCK 05000335 S PDR IllitlillllllPll'Iglllilllllllll an FPL Group company 0 | | TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc. |
| RC FORM 3SS 4-96)U.S.NUCLEAR REQULATORY COMMLSSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)APPROVED SY~NO.$1')104 BKFslss 04rsoiso ESTIMATED BUBO BI PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH TIBS MANDA INFORMATION COLLECTION REOUESTI BOJI HRS.IEPORTEO LESSON LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE UCENSNO PROCESS AND F BACK TO INDUSTRY.FORWARD COMMENTS REOARDINO SURD BI ESTIMAT TO THE INFORMATION ANO RECORDS MANAOEMENT BRANCH IT%F22I US NUCLEAR REOIAATORY COMMISSON.
| | ,. NOTES: |
| WASHINOTON.
| | RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD2-3 PD 1 1 WIENS,L. 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS 1 1 AE 2 2 AEOD/SPD/RRAB 1 1 IL CENTE 1 1 NRR/DE/ECGB 1 1 NRR D EELB 1 1 NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DRCH/HQMB 1 |
| DC 206660001 ANO TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT 1$160OHM), OFRCE 0 MANAOEMENT AND BUOOET, WASHINOTON, OC 20602.PACNJTY NAME ill ST LUCIE UNIT 1 DOCKET NIIABBl 12 I 05000335 PAOSISI 1 OF5 Operation Prohibited By Technical Specifications due to Deficiencies in the Program for Post Accident Sampling DAY YEAR 8EQU EN TI AL RE VI SI ON MONTH DAY Y EAR NUMSBI NUM BBl FAOUTY HAM E St.Lucie Unit 2 DOCKET N UMBER 05000389 02 21 97 97-001-00 03 18 97 FACIUTY NAME DOCKET NUMBER OPERAT(NO MoDE Is)POWER LEVEL (10)""@4'>>'.+20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)20.2203(e)(2)(iv)20.2203(a)(2)(v)20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
| | 1 1 |
| S0.3B(0)(1)S0.3B(0)l2)50.73(a)(2)(i)50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 50.73(e)(2)(vii) 50.73(a)(2)(vlii) 73.71 OTHER In Abstract below orinN CFonn388A E.Benken, Licensing Engineer TELEPHONE NUMBBI Onekde hreo Codol (561)467-7156 SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE To NPRDS CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT REPORTABLE To NPRDS X IP LI I 130 N YES Of yes, oomplete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).X No MONTH DAY YEAR SUBMISSION DATE (15)ABSTRACT (Umit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 sinole-spaced typewritten lines)(16)On February 21, 1997, St.Lucie Units 1 and 2 were operating at 100 percent reactor power.A review of the Units'ost Accident Sampling Systems (PASS)identified several deficiencies associated with those systems which, in the aggregate, represented a failure to satisfy the administrative requirements delineated in the plant Technical Specifications.
| | 1 1 |
| The deficiencies involved design configuration control, post maintenance testinq (PMT), and periodic maintenance.
| | 1 NRR/DRCH/HHFB NRR/DRCH/HOLB NRR/DRPM/PECB 1 |
| Additionally, the Unit 2 PASS was temporarily inoperable without aggressive corrective actions being pursued to return the system to operable status.The cause of the PASS desiqn control deficiencies was a failure of plant personnel to consistently specify drawing update requirements in plant change packages.Maintenance program inadequacies and the inoperability of the Unit 2 PASS were caused by the lack of clearly defined accountability for the PASS and insufficient reviews of the maintenance requirements related to the system.Corrective Actions Include: 1)PASS was included as a Maintenance Rule system and a system engineer was assigned responsibility.
| | 1 1 |
| 2)The Unit 2 PASS was returned to service and work controls associated with PASS are being improved to prioritize system maintenance.
| | ~1 1 1 |
| 3)A detailed system walkdown was performed to identify configuration discrepancies.
| | NRR/DSSA/SPLB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SRXB 1 1 RES/DET/EIB 1 1 RGN2 FILE 01 1 1 D |
| 4)PMT requirements are being'assessed to ensure adequacy.5)Data base and labeling improvements are being made to facilitate future PASS maintenance.
| | EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LITCO BRYCEiJ H 1 1 NOAC POOREgW 1 1 NOAC QUEENERiDS 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 N |
| 6)Teel)nical Manuals, UFSAR requirements and drawings are being reviewed to determine PASS preventive maintenance requirements.
| | NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS: |
| 7)Engineering process improvements are in place to enhance configuration control.NRC FORM Me (4.96)
| | PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE. TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK (DCD) ON EXTENSION 415-2083 FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 25 ENCL 25 |
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| NRC FOAM 366A I4-06)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NucLEAR REQuLATORY COMMIssl ST.LUCIE UNIT 1 05000335 YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION 97-001-00 2 OF 5 TEXT flf mote epeoe le reqttlred, ttee eddltionel ooplee of NRC Fetm 3684/I17I On February 21, 1997, St.Lucie Units 1 and 2 were operating at 100 percent reactor power.NRC inspection activities which were conducted during the period from February 5, 1997 to February 21, 1997, along with inspections by FPL personnel, identified deficiencies associated with the Unit 1 and.Unit 2 Post Accident Sampling Systems (PASS)(EIIS:IP).
| | s l Florida Power 8 Light Company. 6501 South Ocean Drive. Jensen Beach, FL 34957 March 18, 1997 APL L-97-74 10 CFR 50.73 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Re: St. Lucie Unit 1 Docket No.'0-335 Reportable Event: 97401 Date of Event: February 21, 1997 Operation Prohibited By Technical Specifications due to The attached Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 to provide notification of the subject event. |
| The items identified were related to design configuration control of PASS at St.Lucie Units 1 and 2, and inadequacies in program requirements for maintenance of sampling and analysis equipment at St.Lucie Unit 2.A summary of the deficiencies which were identified is given below.At St.Lvcie Unit 1.a review of engineering documents, procedures and valve lineups associated with the PASS identified that a Plant Change/Modification (PCM), completed in 1992, did not properly identify that engineering drawing 8770-9520, Revision 0, required revision as a part of the PCM.This resulted in the drawing not depicting a valve which was installed in the system.Additional design control discrepancies were found which included an error on the PASS panel mimic display and a failure to update vendor technical manual drawing information.
| | Very truly yours, J. A. Stall Vice President St. Lucie Plant JAS/EJB Attachment cc: Regional Administrator, USNRC Region II Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, St. Lucie Plant . |
| These items were identified as a result of the review performed by the NRC and FPL personnel.
| | 970328000i 970318 PDR ADQCK 05000335 S PDR IllitlillllllPll'Iglllilllllllll an FPL Group company |
| At St.Lucie Unit 2, a similar review of the PASS was conducted which identified that engineering drawing 2998-G-078, Sheet 152, Revision 4, was not in agreement with the as-built configuration of the PASS.Additionally, it was determined that component calibration frequencies described in the Unit 2 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Table 9.3-10d, for a PASS panel alarm (EIIS:IP:ALM) and a pressure instrument (PIA 503)(EIIS:IP:Pl) had not been performed as described in the UFSAR table.Post maintenance test (PMT)requirements associated with PASS were also reviewed which identified that system functional testing was not specifically required to verify proper system operation following calibration of PASS instrumentation.
| |
| On November 26.1996, FPL Chemistry personnel, performing a periodic functional test, determined that the Unit 2 PASS was out of service due to inoperable level indication, and a work request was submitted for repair.The required repairs were not implemented expeditiously, and the system remained out of service until February 22, 1997.St.Lucie Unit 1 PASS remained available for all required sampling functions during the above period, and the identified design control discrepancies on the Unit 1 PASS did not preclude operation or availability of that system.The Unit 2 PASS was returned to operable status on February 22, 1997, following maintenance to the system and the satisfactory completion of functional testing.The deficiencies identified for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Post Accident Sampling Systems and the failure to maintain the availability of the Unit 2 PASS to obtain and analyze samples represent a failure to satisfy the program requirements as stated in the St.Lucie Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specification Administrative Controls.NRC FOAM 3MA I4.06I NRC FORM 388A I4-96)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION u.s.NucLEAR REQUIATORY COINMISSI ST.LUCIE UNIT 1 05000335 YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION 97-001-00 3 OF 5 TEXT (If more space is required, use edditionel copies of NRC Arm 368Ai I17I There were several causal factors contributing to the program deficiencies associated with the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Post-accident Sampling Systems.These are discussed below.PASS flow diagram and mimic display errors resulted from the failure of FPL personnel to consistently specify the requirement for drawing updates in Plant Change/Modification (PCM)packages.On Unit 2, a flowpath error discovered during initial system construction was corrected on the local panel mimic;however, the information was not provided to design engineers for incorporation into the flow drawing Additionally, vendor technical manuals for the PASS were not always identified as requiring an update when modifications were implemented.
| |
| The above omissions resulted in discrepancies between actual system configuration, controlled documents, and mimic displays.At St.Lucie Unit 2, the PASS was determined to be inoperable from November 26, 1996, to February 22, 1997, and several inadequacies were identified in the PASS preventive maintenance and post maintenance testing programs for both St.Lucie Units..The causes of these deficiencies were: Specific accountability for the Post-accident Sampling Systems was not clearly defined and maintaining PASS availability was not adequately prioritized from a work control standpoint since the system is not safety related.As a result, equipment problems were not always corrected in an expeditious manner.2.Preventive maintenance inadequacies resulted from an insufficient review of UFSAR and vendor technical manual requirements during PM development.
| |
| A review of PASS maintenance during this event identified that not all UFSAR described preventive maintenanc checks had been performed for the Unit 2 PASS..3.Post maintenance test requirements associated with PASS instrument calibration were insufficiently specified in Plant Work Orders and therefore did not ensure that operability checks were consistently performed following maintenance to verify proper system operation.
| |
| This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B), as"Any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications (TS)." St.Lucie Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications 6.8.4.e, require for Post-accident Sampling,"A program which will ensure the capability to obtain and analyze reactor coolant, radioactive iodines, and particulates in plant gaseous effluents, and containment atmosphere samples under accident conditions.
| |
| The program shall include the following: (i)(ii)(iii)Training of personnel, Procedures for sampling and analysis, and Provisions for maintenance of sampling and analysis equipment." MAC FORM seRA t4 06I NRC FORM 366A (4-9')LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COINMISSI ST.LUCIE UNIT 1 05000335 YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION 4 OF 5 97-001-00 TEXT (If more space is reguired, use additional copies of NRC Form 366Al I17I The deficiencies identified during inspection and review of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Post-accident Sampling Systems, and the unavailability of the Unit 2 system, represent a failure to satisfy the above requirements and therefore a condition prohibited by TS.The design control discrepancies identified for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Post-accident Sampling Systems did not impact the operability of those systems.For St.Lucie Unit 1, the PASS continued to be operable for all required sampling functions.
| |
| For St.Lucie Unit 2, the PASS was declared out of servtce on November 26, 1996, as a result of inoperable level instrumentation required for obtaining a diluted reactor coolant sample following an accident.This sample is used to obtain post accident reactor coolant gross activity for core damage assessment and reactor coolant boron concentration.
| |
| System loop calibrations for the level instrumentation had been performed on August, 26, 1996, however a full system operability check was not required, following completion of the calibrations.
| |
| The ability to obtain an undiluted liquid sample of the reactor coolant using the PASS was not affected by the inoperable level instrumentation, and reactor coola'nt gross activity and boron could have been determined using an undiluted sample.1 Following repair of the inoperable level indication on January 28, 1997, the Unit 2 PASS remained out of service pending calibration of an internal hydrogen analyzer used for measuring dissolved hydrogen in the reactor coolant post accident.The analyzer calibration was completed and the PASS was returned to operable status following satisfactory functional testing on February 22, 1997.The ability to obtain and measure hydrogen concentration from reactor coolant using the normal (non-accident) sampling system was not affected by the inoperability of the analyzer.The Post-Accident Sampling Systems, at St.Lucie Unit 1 and 2 provide a means to obtain and analyze pressurized and unpressurized, diluted and undiluted reactor coolant samples and containment building samples (Unit 2 only).The systems are designed to simplify the operational requirements for collecting post-accident reactor coolant chemistry and radiochemistry information while minimizing radiological exposure to plant personnel.
| |
| The St.Lucie Unit 1 and 2 Post-accident Sampling Systems are not safety related and are not required for the safe shutdown of the plant.The operability of the Unit 1 PASS was not impacted by this event and backup methodologies were available on Unit 2 for obtaining necessary samples following an accident.The protection of the health and safety of the public was therefore not adversely affected by the event.The Post-Accident Sampling Systems at St Lucie Unit 1 and 2 were added to the list of Maintenance Rule systems and have been assigned indicators for trending the performance and maintenance of the systems.Additionally, a system engineer has been assigned the accountability to monitor PASS performance and system modifications, and to assist in improving overall reliability.
| |
| NRC FORM 36ttA (4.96)
| |
|
| |
|
| NRC FORM 368A I4.96)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.Nut%EAR REGULATORY COMMSSI ST.LUCIE UNIT 1 05000335 YEAR SEOUENTIAL REVISION 97-001-00.5 OF 5 TEXT/if more~e is required, use additional copies of SRC Arm 3MAJ I171 2.Recent changes in engineering processes promote an enhanced emphasis on the comprehensive identification and verification of documents (i.e.drawings, UFSAR, vendor manuals, etc.)affected by plant modifications, 3.A Condition Report was issued to assess and improve the prioritization of work controls associated with the Unit 1 and Unit 2 PASS so that system availability is adequately maintained. | | 0 RC FORM 3SS 4-96) |
| 4, A detailed walkdown of each Unit's PASS was performed to identify existing design.configuration discrepancies. | | U.S. NUCLEAR REQULATORY COMMLSSION APPROVED SY ~ NO. $ |
| The identified discrepancies will be corrected on applicable drawings, including vendor drawings, and mimic panels in the field.5.Post maintenance testing requirements for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 PASS are being reviewed to ensure that adequate functional testing is performed following preventive and corrective maintenance. | | BKFslss 04rsoiso 1') 104 ESTIMATED BUBO BI PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH TIBS MANDA INFORMATION COLLECTION REOUESTI BOJI HRS. IEPORTEO LESSON LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE UCENSNO PROCESS AND F BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REOARDINO SURD BI ESTIMAT LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TO THE INFORMATION ANO RECORDS MANAOEMENTBRANCH IT% F22I US NUCLEAR REOIAATORY COMMISSON. WASHINOTON. DC 206660001 ANO TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT 1$ 160OHM), OFRCE 0 (See reverse for required number of MANAOEMENTAND BUOOET, WASHINOTON, OC 20602. |
| 6.Additional PASS components are being added to the Total Equipment Data Base (TEDB)and improvements in system labeling are being made to better facilitate maintenance processes. | | digits/characters for each block) |
| 7.A detailed review is being performed of the Vendor Technical Manuals, UFSAR requirements, and controlled drawings related to PASS to identify the preventive maintenance (PM)requirements for applicable components. | | PACNJTY NAME ill DOCKET NIIABBl12 I PAOSISI ST LUCIE UNIT 1 05000335 1 OF5 Operation Prohibited By Technical Specifications due to Deficiencies in the Program for Post Accident Sampling FAOUTY HAME DOCKET N UMBER DAY YEAR 8EQU EN TI AL RE VISI ON MONTH DAY YEAR NUMSBI NUMBBl 05000389 St. Lucie Unit 2 FACIUTY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 02 21 97 97 001 00 03 18 97 OPERAT(NO MoDE Is) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2) (v) 50.73(a) (2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(vlii) |
| Additional preventive maintenance requirements will be developed as necessary, based on this review.Equipment: | | POWER LEVEL (10) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 73.71 |
| PASS Level Indicators Manufacturer: | | ""@4'>> '.+ |
| International Instruments Model: 9263X-00-D None NAG FORM 388A H-QS)}} | | OTHER 20.2203(a)(2) (iii) S0.3B(0) (1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) In Abstract below orinN CFonn388A 20.2203(e)(2) (iv) S0.3B(0) l2) 50.73(e)(2)(vii) |
| | TELEPHONE NUMBBI Onekde hreo Codol E. Benken, Licensing Engineer (561) 467 - 7156 REPORTABLE REPORTABLE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER To NPRDS CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT To NPRDS X IP LI I 130 N MONTH DAY YEAR YES SUBMISSION Of yes, oomplete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE). X No DATE (15) |
| | ABSTRACT (Umit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 sinole-spaced typewritten lines) (16) |
| | On February 21, 1997, St. Lucie Units 1 and 2 were operating at 100 percent reactor power. A review of the Units'ost Accident Sampling Systems (PASS) identified several deficiencies associated with those systems which, in the aggregate, represented a failure to satisfy the administrative requirements delineated in the plant Technical Specifications. The deficiencies involved design configuration control, post maintenance testinq (PMT), and periodic maintenance. Additionally, the Unit 2 PASS was temporarily inoperable without aggressive corrective actions being pursued to return the system to operable status. |
| | The cause of the PASS desiqn control deficiencies was a failure of plant personnel to consistently specify drawing update requirements in plant change packages. Maintenance program inadequacies and the inoperability of the Unit 2 PASS were caused by the lack of clearly defined accountability for the PASS and insufficient reviews of the maintenance requirements related to the system. |
| | Corrective Actions Include: 1) PASS was included as a Maintenance Rule system and a system engineer was assigned responsibility. 2) The Unit 2 PASS was returned to service and work controls associated with PASS are being improved to prioritize system maintenance. 3) A detailed system walkdown was performed to identify configuration discrepancies. 4) PMT requirements are being'assessed to ensure adequacy. 5) Data base and labeling improvements are being made to facilitate future PASS maintenance. 6) Teel)nical Manuals, UFSAR requirements and drawings are being reviewed to determine PASS preventive maintenance requirements. 7) Engineering process improvements are in place to enhance configuration control. |
| | NRC FORM Me (4.96) |
| | |
| | NRC FOAM 366A U.S. NucLEAR REQuLATORY COMMIssl I4-06) |
| | LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) |
| | TEXT CONTINUATION YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 05000335 2 OF 5 97 001 00 TEXT flfmote epeoe le reqttlred, ttee eddltionel ooplee of NRC Fetm 3684/ I17I On February 21, 1997, St. Lucie Units 1 and 2 were operating at 100 percent reactor power. NRC inspection activities which were conducted during the period from February 5, 1997 to February 21, 1997, along with inspections by FPL personnel, identified deficiencies associated with the Unit 1 and |
| | .Unit 2 Post Accident Sampling Systems (PASS) (EIIS:IP). The items identified were related to design configuration control of PASS at St. Lucie Units 1 and 2, and inadequacies in program requirements for maintenance of sampling and analysis equipment at St. Lucie Unit 2. A summary of the deficiencies which were identified is given below. |
| | At St. Lvcie Unit 1. a review of engineering documents, procedures and valve lineups associated with the PASS identified that a Plant Change/Modification (PCM), completed in 1992, did not properly identify that engineering drawing 8770-9520, Revision 0, required revision as a part of the PCM. This resulted in the drawing not depicting a valve which was installed in the system. Additional design control discrepancies were found which included an error on the PASS panel mimic display and a failure to update vendor technical manual drawing information. These items were identified as a result of the review performed by the NRC and FPL personnel. |
| | At St. Lucie Unit 2, a similar review of the PASS was conducted which identified that engineering drawing 2998-G-078, Sheet 152, Revision 4, was not in agreement with the as-built configuration of the PASS. Additionally, it was determined that component calibration frequencies described in the Unit 2 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Table 9.3-10d, for a PASS panel alarm (EIIS:IP:ALM) and a pressure instrument (PIA 503) (EIIS:IP:Pl) had not been performed as described in the UFSAR table. Post maintenance test (PMT) requirements associated with PASS were also reviewed which identified that system functional testing was not specifically required to verify proper system operation following calibration of PASS instrumentation. |
| | On November 26. 1996, FPL Chemistry personnel, performing a periodic functional test, determined that the Unit 2 PASS was out of service due to inoperable level indication, and a work request was submitted for repair. The required repairs were not implemented expeditiously, and the system remained out of service until February 22, 1997. |
| | St. Lucie Unit 1 PASS remained available for all required sampling functions during the above period, and the identified design control discrepancies on the Unit 1 PASS did not preclude operation or availability of that system. The Unit 2 PASS was returned to operable status on February 22, 1997, following maintenance to the system and the satisfactory completion of functional testing. |
| | The deficiencies identified for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Post Accident Sampling Systems and the failure to maintain the availability of the Unit 2 PASS to obtain and analyze samples represent a failure to satisfy the program requirements as stated in the St. Lucie Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specification Administrative Controls. |
| | NRC FOAM 3MA I4.06I |
| | |
| | NRC FORM 388A u.s. NucLEAR REQUIATORY COINMISSI I4-96) |
| | LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) |
| | TEXT CONTINUATION YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 05000335 3 OF 5 97 001 00 TEXT (Ifmore space is required, use edditionel copies of NRC Arm 368Ai I17I There were several causal factors contributing to the program deficiencies associated with the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Post-accident Sampling Systems. These are discussed below. |
| | PASS flow diagram and mimic display errors resulted from the failure of FPL personnel to consistently specify the requirement for drawing updates in Plant Change/Modification (PCM) packages. On Unit 2, a flowpath error discovered during initial system construction was corrected on the local panel mimic; however, the information was not provided to design engineers for incorporation into the flow drawing Additionally, vendor technical manuals for the PASS were not always identified as requiring an update when modifications were implemented. The above omissions resulted in discrepancies between actual system configuration, controlled documents, and mimic displays. |
| | At St. Lucie Unit 2, the PASS was determined to be inoperable from November 26, 1996, to February 22, 1997, and several inadequacies were identified in the PASS preventive maintenance and post maintenance testing programs for both St. Lucie Units.. The causes of these deficiencies were: |
| | Specific accountability for the Post-accident Sampling Systems was not clearly defined and maintaining PASS availability was not adequately prioritized from a work control standpoint since the system is not safety related. As a result, equipment problems were not always corrected in an expeditious manner. |
| | : 2. Preventive maintenance inadequacies resulted from an insufficient review of UFSAR and vendor technical manual requirements during PM development. A review of PASS maintenance during this event identified that not all UFSAR described preventive maintenanc checks had been performed for the Unit 2 PASS.. |
| | : 3. Post maintenance test requirements associated with PASS instrument calibration were insufficiently specified in Plant Work Orders and therefore did not ensure that operability checks were consistently performed following maintenance to verify proper system operation. |
| | This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B), as "Any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications (TS)." St. Lucie Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications 6.8.4.e, require for Post-accident Sampling, "A program which will ensure the capability to obtain and analyze reactor coolant, radioactive iodines, and particulates in plant gaseous effluents, and containment atmosphere samples under accident conditions. The program shall include the following: |
| | (i) Training of personnel, (ii) Procedures for sampling and analysis, and (iii) Provisions for maintenance of sampling and analysis equipment." |
| | MAC FORM seRA t4 06I |
| | |
| | NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COINMISSI (4-9') |
| | LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) |
| | TEXT CONTINUATION YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 05000335 4 OF 5 97 001 00 TEXT (Ifmore space is reguired, use additional copies of NRC Form 366Al I17I The deficiencies identified during inspection and review of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Post-accident Sampling Systems, and the unavailability of the Unit 2 system, represent a failure to satisfy the above requirements and therefore a condition prohibited by TS. |
| | The design control discrepancies identified for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Post-accident Sampling Systems did not impact the operability of those systems. For St. Lucie Unit 1, the PASS continued to be operable for all required sampling functions. |
| | For St. Lucie Unit 2, the PASS was declared out of servtce on November 26, 1996, as a result of inoperable level instrumentation required for obtaining a diluted reactor coolant sample following an accident. This sample is used to obtain post accident reactor coolant gross activity for core damage assessment and reactor coolant boron concentration. System loop calibrations for the level instrumentation had been performed on August, 26, 1996, however a full system operability check was not required, following completion of the calibrations. The ability to obtain an undiluted liquid sample of the reactor coolant using the PASS was not affected by the inoperable level instrumentation, and reactor coola'nt gross activity and boron could have been determined using an undiluted sample. |
| | 1 Following repair of the inoperable level indication on January 28, 1997, the Unit 2 PASS remained out of service pending calibration of an internal hydrogen analyzer used for measuring dissolved hydrogen in the reactor coolant post accident. The analyzer calibration was completed and the PASS was returned to operable status following satisfactory functional testing on February 22, 1997. The ability to obtain and measure hydrogen concentration from reactor coolant using the normal (non-accident) sampling system was not affected by the inoperability of the analyzer. |
| | The Post-Accident Sampling Systems, at St. Lucie Unit 1 and 2 provide a means to obtain and analyze pressurized and unpressurized, diluted and undiluted reactor coolant samples and containment building samples (Unit 2 only). The systems are designed to simplify the operational requirements for collecting post-accident reactor coolant chemistry and radiochemistry information while minimizing radiological exposure to plant personnel. The St. Lucie Unit 1 and 2 Post-accident Sampling Systems are not safety related and are not required for the safe shutdown of the plant. The operability of the Unit 1 PASS was not impacted by this event and backup methodologies were available on Unit 2 for obtaining necessary samples following an accident. The protection of the health and safety of the public was therefore not adversely affected by the event. |
| | The Post-Accident Sampling Systems at St Lucie Unit 1 and 2 were added to the list of Maintenance Rule systems and have been assigned indicators for trending the performance and maintenance of the systems. Additionally, a system engineer has been assigned the accountability to monitor PASS performance and system modifications, and to assist in improving overall reliability. |
| | NRC FORM 36ttA (4.96) |
| | |
| | NRC FORM 368A U.S. Nut%EAR REGULATORY COMMSSI I4.96) |
| | LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) |
| | TEXT CONTINUATION YEAR SEOUENTIAL REVISION ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 05000335 5 OF 5 97 001 00. |
| | TEXT /ifmore ~e is required, use additional copies of SRC Arm 3MAJ I171 |
| | : 2. Recent changes in engineering processes promote an enhanced emphasis on the comprehensive identification and verification of documents (i.e. drawings, UFSAR, vendor manuals, etc.) affected by plant modifications, |
| | : 3. A Condition Report was issued to assess and improve the prioritization of work controls associated with the Unit 1 and Unit 2 PASS so that system availability is adequately maintained. |
| | 4, A detailed walkdown of each Unit's PASS was performed to identify existing design . |
| | configuration discrepancies. The identified discrepancies will be corrected on applicable drawings, including vendor drawings, and mimic panels in the field. |
| | : 5. Post maintenance testing requirements for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 PASS are being reviewed to ensure that adequate functional testing is performed following preventive and corrective maintenance. |
| | : 6. Additional PASS components are being added to the Total Equipment Data Base (TEDB) and improvements in system labeling are being made to better facilitate maintenance processes. |
| | : 7. A detailed review is being performed of the Vendor Technical Manuals, UFSAR requirements, and controlled drawings related to PASS to identify the preventive maintenance (PM) requirements for applicable components. Additional preventive maintenance requirements will be developed as necessary, based on this review. |
| | Equipment: PASS Level Indicators Manufacturer: International Instruments Model: 9263X-00-D None NAG FORM 388A H-QS)}} |
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Category:LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML17241A4891999-10-0707 October 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990912,noted That MSSV Surveillance Was Outside of TS Requirements.Caused by Setpoint Drift.Subject MSSVs Are Being Refurbished & Retested Prior to Unit Startup from SL1-16 Refueling Outage.With 991007 Ltr ML17241A4111999-07-16016 July 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990610,unplanned Cooldown Transient Occurred Due to Personnel Error.Trained & Briefed Personnel & Revised Procedures.With 990716 Ltr ML17241A4031999-07-0606 July 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990605,sub-critical Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Inadvertent MSIV Opening.Caused by Personnel Error. Provided Operation Supervision Instruction to Operating Crews,Stand Down Meetings & Operator Aids.With 990706 Ltr ML17241A4041999-07-0606 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990604,CEA Drop Resulted in Manual Reactor Trip.Caused by Procedural Inadequacies.Procedure Changes Are Planned to Correct Lack of Procedural Guidance for CEA Subgroup Power Switch Replacement.With 990706 Ltr ML17241A3941999-06-30030 June 1999 LER 99-004-01:on 990415,as Found Cycle 10 Psv Setpoints Were Outside TS Limits.Caused by Manufacturing Process Defect. All Three Psvs Were Replaced with pre-tested Valves During Cycle 11 Refueling Outage.With 990630 Ltr ML17241A3551999-06-0404 June 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990505,both Trains of Safety Injection Actuation Were Blocked During Surveillance.Caused by Procedure Error.Procedure Revised.With 990604 Ltr ML17241A3321999-05-17017 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990415,determined That as Found Cycle 10 Psv Setpoints Outside TS Limits.Root Cause Under Investigation.Psvs Replaced with pe-tested Valves During Cycle 11 ML17241A3271999-05-0606 May 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990406,ECCS Suction Header Leak Resulted in Both ECCS Trains Being Inoperable & Entry Into TS 3.0.3. Caused by Chloride Induced OD Stress Corrosion Cracking of Piping.Made Code Repairs & Coated Piping.With 990506 Ltr ML17229B0791999-04-0707 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990309,discovered Inadequate Design & IST SRs for Iodine Removal Sys (Irs).Caused by Original Design Inadequacies & Personnel Error.Naoh Tank Vent Valve V07233 Was Tagged Open.With 990407 Ltr ML17229B0801999-04-0707 April 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990311,SG ECT Error Caused Operation with Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Deficiencies in Data Analysis Guideline Instructions.Licensee Will Change Data Analysis Guidelines for Lead Analysts.With 990407 Ltr ML17229B0541999-03-10010 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990211,inadequate TS SRs for SIT & SDC Isolation Valves Were Noted.Caused by Failure to Correctly Implement TS Srs.Submitted LAR to Align Required TS SR with Design Bases Requirements Being Verified.With 990310 Ltr ML17229A9901999-01-20020 January 1999 LER 98-009-00:on 981223,noted That Facility Operated Outside of Design Basis.Caused by non-conservative MSLB Analysis Inputs.Will Review SR Component Differences Between Units & Will re-baseline LTOP Analysis.With 990120 Ltr ML17229A9821999-01-0404 January 1999 LER 98-010-00:on 981207,RCS Boron Sample Frequency Required by Ts,Was Exceeded by Twelve Minutes.Caused by Personnel Error.Equipment Clearance Order Was Lifted to Draw Required Sample & Operations Procedure Was Changed.With 990104 Ltr ML17229A9611998-12-22022 December 1998 LER 97-002-01:on 981204,containment Sump Debris Screen Was Not IAW Design.Caused by Inadequate C/As for Sump Screen Anamolies.All Identified Sump Screen Deficiencies Were Dispositioned &/Or Repaired.With 981222 Ltr ML17229A9561998-12-15015 December 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 981118,missed TS SG U Tube Insp.Caused by Encoding Errors While Using Remote Positioning Fixtures.All SG Tube Surveyed.With 981215 Ltr ML17229A9301998-11-25025 November 1998 LER 98-005-01:on 980807,discovered That New MOV Methodology Caused Past PORV Block Valve Operability Problem.Caused by Inadequacies in Original Vendor MOV Methodology.Planned Valve Mods Will Be Implemented During Cycle 11 1998 Outage ML17229A9021998-11-0404 November 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 981008,inadequate Reactor Protection Sys Trip Bypass TS Was Noted.Caused by Poorly Worded Ts. Submitted LAR to Clarify Power Requirements for High Rate of Power Trips.With 981104 Ltr ML17229A8771998-10-14014 October 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980918,inadvertent Afas Actuation Was Noted.Caused by Degradation of Multiple Afas Power Supplies. Replaced Afas Power Supplies & Revised Procedures.With 981014 Ltr ML17229A8761998-10-14014 October 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980918,identified Discrepancies Between Fire Protection Design Requirements & Field Conditions. Caused by Inadequate Translation & Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements.Procedures Revised.With 981014 Ltr ML17229A8511998-09-0202 September 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980807,discovered That PORV Margins Were Insufficient to Accommodate Addl Conservatism.Caused by Inadequacies in Original Vendor MOV Methodology.Will Implement Planned Valve Actuator mods.W/980902 Ltr ML17229A8201998-07-29029 July 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980630,inadequate Procedure May Have Resulted in SBO Recovery Complications.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Attached Caution Tags to Appropriate Control switches.W/980729 Ltr ML17229A7411998-05-28028 May 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980430,discovered Waste Gas Decay Tank Operation W/O Available Oxygen Analyzers,Which Is Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Inadequate Licensee Review of License Amend. Oxygen Analyzer recalibrated.W/980528 Ltr ML17229A7381998-05-21021 May 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980421,missed EDG Fuel Oil Sample Surveillance Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Revised Fuel Oil Sampling Service Purchase Order & Revised Site procedure.W/980521 Ltr ML17229A7011998-04-27027 April 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980326,discovered Containment Pressure Instrumentation Design Single Failure Vulnerability.Caused by Inadequate Design by Personnel Error.Removed RPS & ESFAS Containment Pressure Bypass Keys immediately.W/980427 Ltr ML17229A6761998-04-0202 April 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980305,identified Two Conditions That Were Outside App R Design Bases.Caused by Design Oversight During Development of Original App R Safe SD Design.Established 30 Minute Roving Fire Watches & Provided training.W/980402 Ltr ML17229A6731998-03-26026 March 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980224,radiation Monitor Surveillance Inadequacies Led to Operating of Facility Prohibited by Tss. Caused by Congnitive Personnel Error.Permanent Procedure Changes Were implemented.W/980326 Ltr ML17229A6551998-03-0505 March 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980206,high/low Pressure Shutdown Cooling Interface Was Noted Outside App R Design Bases.Caused by Personnel Error.Addl Guidance Was Provided to Engineering Dept personnel.W/980305 Ltr ML17229A6281998-02-19019 February 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980121,emergency Lighting Outside App R Design Bases Occurred.Caused by Congnitive Personnel Error During Translation of App R Section Iii.Procedures Onop 1 & 2 ONP-100.01 Were Issued for Use on 980206.W/980219 Ltr ML17229A6211998-02-0909 February 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980110,manual Rt Due to DEH Leak at Turbine Test Block Was Noted.Caused by o-ring Extrusion.Shortened Bolts by About 0.125 & Reinstalled at Correct Torque values.W/980209 Ltr ML17229A6191998-02-0404 February 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980105,CIS Bistable in Bypass Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Tss.Caused by Personnel Error. Radiation Monitor Was Restored to service.W/980204 Ltr ML17229A6161998-02-0303 February 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980104,inadvertent RPS Actuation Occurred Due to Personnel Error.Caused by Procedural Inadequacies & Inadequate self-checking by Licensed Utility Personnel. Placards Have Been Placed in CRs.W/980203 Ltr ML17229A6051998-01-27027 January 1998 LER 97-010-01:on 971027,inadvertent Core Alteration Prohibited by TSs Were Noted Due to Stuck Cea.Caused by Personnel Error.Cea #24 Was Dislodged & Transferred to Spent Pool for insp.W/980127 Ltr ML17229A5501997-12-0505 December 1997 LER 97-008-00:on 971107,inadequate CR Ventilation Surveillance Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by non-cognitive Personnel Error.Operating Procedure 2-1900050 Was revised.W/971205 Ltr ML17309A9091997-12-0202 December 1997 LER 97-011-00:on 971102,non-conservative RAS Set Point Resulted in Operation Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Inadequate Set Point & Instrument Loop Scaling Process.Revised ESFAS Functional Tp W/Proper Set point.W/971202 Ltr ML17229A5391997-11-26026 November 1997 LER 97-010-00:on 971027,inadvertant Core Alteration Prohibited by TS Occurred.Caused by CEA Failure to Detach from Ugs.Safety Evaluation Was Performed & Procedural Rev Made to Continue Upper Guide Structure move.W/971126 Ltr ML17229A5151997-11-0707 November 1997 LER 97-007-00:on 971008,inoperable Containment Cooling Fan Resulted in Operation of Facility Outside Design Basis. Caused by non-cognitive Personnel Error.Ccs Operation Was Revised & Issued on 971013.W/971107 Ltr ML17229A4991997-10-17017 October 1997 LER 97-009-00:on 970917,inoperable PORV Block Valve Resulted in Operation Prohibited by Tech Specs Occurred.Caused by Plant GL 89-10 Program Plan to Review Plant Manager Action Item Sys.Porv Block Valve V-1403 restored.W/971017 Ltr ML17309A9011997-08-27027 August 1997 LER 97-008-00:on 970728,mechanical Fire Penetrations Were Inoperable & Outside App R Design Bases.Caused by Seal Mfg Not Providing Formal Documentation for Installed Seals. Modified Inoperable Fire penetrations.W/970827 Ltr ML17229A4311997-07-29029 July 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 970630,discovered Inadequate Testing of Engineered Safety Features Subgroup Relays.Caused by Inadequacy in Implementing TS Requirements in Surveillance Procedures.Revised Surveillance procedures.W/970729 Ltr ML17229A4241997-07-25025 July 1997 LER 97-005-00:on 970625,discovered That Hot Shutdown Control Panel Shutdown Cooling Flow indicator,FI-3306 Inoperable. Caused by Weakness in Work Order & Procedure Used to Repair FI-3306.Section Meeting W/I&C Planners held.W/970725 Ltr ML17229A3971997-07-11011 July 1997 LER 97-004-00:on 970611,discovered Incorrect Original Cable Tray Fire Stop Assembly Installation Was Outside App R Design Basis.Caused by Personnel Error.Hourly Fire Watch Patrols Will Be posted.W/970711 Ltr ML17229A3871997-06-19019 June 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970521,determined Required Post Maint Open Stroke Test for Valve V3245,2B2 SIT Discharge Check Valve, Had Not Been Performed.Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure revised.W/970619 Ltr ML17229A3841997-06-17017 June 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970518,containment Sump Debris Screen Was Not IAW Design Due to Gaps in Screen Encl.Performed SER to Document Containment Sump Design requirements.W/970617 Ltr ML17229A3751997-06-0202 June 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 970501,operation Was Prohibited by TS Due to Inadequately Tested Degraded Voltage Sys.Revised Unit 1 ESFAS Surveillance Test procedure.W/970602 Ltr ML17229A3611997-05-29029 May 1997 LER 97-007-00:on 970502,reactor Coolant Pump Oil Collection Sys Was Outside App R Design Bases.Identified Leak Sites Were Repaired & Mods to RCP Oil Collection Sys to Capture Any Future Leakage from areas.W/970529 Ltr ML17229A3491997-05-21021 May 1997 LER 97-001-00:on 970423,containment Isolation Actuation Occurred.Caused by Increased Radiation Levels During Removal of Upper Guide Structure.Proper Actuation of Containment Isolation Components Was verified.W/970521 Ltr ML17229A3441997-05-13013 May 1997 LER 97-005-00:on 970419,reactor Was Shutdown Due to Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage.Hot Cracking Was Caused by Weld Contamination.Repairs to RCPB Were Completed & 1A SDC Train Was Restored to Svc ML17229A3141997-04-30030 April 1997 LER 97-004-00:on 970402,refueling Machine Was Operating in Manner Prohibited by TS Due to Original Design of Refueling Machine Bypass Feature Conflicting W/Ts Requirements. Eliminated Overload Cut Off Limit bypass.W/970430 Ltr ML17229A2951997-03-31031 March 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970304,automatic Rt Resulted from Loss of Electrical Power to 1A2 Rc Pump.Rcp Breaker Was Replaced & Pump Was Returned to svc.W/970331 Ltr ML17229A2721997-03-21021 March 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970221,operation in Excess of Max Rated Thermal Power Occurred Due to Digital Data Processing Sys (Ddps) Calorimetric Error.Verified Acceptable Performance of Ddps Functions & Reviewed Software mods.W/970321 Ltr 1999-07-06
[Table view] Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML17241A4891999-10-0707 October 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990912,noted That MSSV Surveillance Was Outside of TS Requirements.Caused by Setpoint Drift.Subject MSSVs Are Being Refurbished & Retested Prior to Unit Startup from SL1-16 Refueling Outage.With 991007 Ltr ML17241A4111999-07-16016 July 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990610,unplanned Cooldown Transient Occurred Due to Personnel Error.Trained & Briefed Personnel & Revised Procedures.With 990716 Ltr ML17241A4031999-07-0606 July 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990605,sub-critical Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Inadvertent MSIV Opening.Caused by Personnel Error. Provided Operation Supervision Instruction to Operating Crews,Stand Down Meetings & Operator Aids.With 990706 Ltr ML17241A4041999-07-0606 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990604,CEA Drop Resulted in Manual Reactor Trip.Caused by Procedural Inadequacies.Procedure Changes Are Planned to Correct Lack of Procedural Guidance for CEA Subgroup Power Switch Replacement.With 990706 Ltr ML17241A3941999-06-30030 June 1999 LER 99-004-01:on 990415,as Found Cycle 10 Psv Setpoints Were Outside TS Limits.Caused by Manufacturing Process Defect. All Three Psvs Were Replaced with pre-tested Valves During Cycle 11 Refueling Outage.With 990630 Ltr ML17241A3551999-06-0404 June 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990505,both Trains of Safety Injection Actuation Were Blocked During Surveillance.Caused by Procedure Error.Procedure Revised.With 990604 Ltr ML17241A3321999-05-17017 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990415,determined That as Found Cycle 10 Psv Setpoints Outside TS Limits.Root Cause Under Investigation.Psvs Replaced with pe-tested Valves During Cycle 11 ML17241A3271999-05-0606 May 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990406,ECCS Suction Header Leak Resulted in Both ECCS Trains Being Inoperable & Entry Into TS 3.0.3. Caused by Chloride Induced OD Stress Corrosion Cracking of Piping.Made Code Repairs & Coated Piping.With 990506 Ltr ML17229B0791999-04-0707 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990309,discovered Inadequate Design & IST SRs for Iodine Removal Sys (Irs).Caused by Original Design Inadequacies & Personnel Error.Naoh Tank Vent Valve V07233 Was Tagged Open.With 990407 Ltr ML17229B0801999-04-0707 April 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990311,SG ECT Error Caused Operation with Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Deficiencies in Data Analysis Guideline Instructions.Licensee Will Change Data Analysis Guidelines for Lead Analysts.With 990407 Ltr ML17229B0541999-03-10010 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990211,inadequate TS SRs for SIT & SDC Isolation Valves Were Noted.Caused by Failure to Correctly Implement TS Srs.Submitted LAR to Align Required TS SR with Design Bases Requirements Being Verified.With 990310 Ltr ML17229A9901999-01-20020 January 1999 LER 98-009-00:on 981223,noted That Facility Operated Outside of Design Basis.Caused by non-conservative MSLB Analysis Inputs.Will Review SR Component Differences Between Units & Will re-baseline LTOP Analysis.With 990120 Ltr ML17229A9821999-01-0404 January 1999 LER 98-010-00:on 981207,RCS Boron Sample Frequency Required by Ts,Was Exceeded by Twelve Minutes.Caused by Personnel Error.Equipment Clearance Order Was Lifted to Draw Required Sample & Operations Procedure Was Changed.With 990104 Ltr ML17229A9611998-12-22022 December 1998 LER 97-002-01:on 981204,containment Sump Debris Screen Was Not IAW Design.Caused by Inadequate C/As for Sump Screen Anamolies.All Identified Sump Screen Deficiencies Were Dispositioned &/Or Repaired.With 981222 Ltr ML17229A9561998-12-15015 December 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 981118,missed TS SG U Tube Insp.Caused by Encoding Errors While Using Remote Positioning Fixtures.All SG Tube Surveyed.With 981215 Ltr ML17229A9301998-11-25025 November 1998 LER 98-005-01:on 980807,discovered That New MOV Methodology Caused Past PORV Block Valve Operability Problem.Caused by Inadequacies in Original Vendor MOV Methodology.Planned Valve Mods Will Be Implemented During Cycle 11 1998 Outage ML17229A9021998-11-0404 November 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 981008,inadequate Reactor Protection Sys Trip Bypass TS Was Noted.Caused by Poorly Worded Ts. Submitted LAR to Clarify Power Requirements for High Rate of Power Trips.With 981104 Ltr ML17229A8771998-10-14014 October 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980918,inadvertent Afas Actuation Was Noted.Caused by Degradation of Multiple Afas Power Supplies. Replaced Afas Power Supplies & Revised Procedures.With 981014 Ltr ML17229A8761998-10-14014 October 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980918,identified Discrepancies Between Fire Protection Design Requirements & Field Conditions. Caused by Inadequate Translation & Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements.Procedures Revised.With 981014 Ltr ML17229A8511998-09-0202 September 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980807,discovered That PORV Margins Were Insufficient to Accommodate Addl Conservatism.Caused by Inadequacies in Original Vendor MOV Methodology.Will Implement Planned Valve Actuator mods.W/980902 Ltr ML17229A8201998-07-29029 July 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980630,inadequate Procedure May Have Resulted in SBO Recovery Complications.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Attached Caution Tags to Appropriate Control switches.W/980729 Ltr ML17229A7411998-05-28028 May 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980430,discovered Waste Gas Decay Tank Operation W/O Available Oxygen Analyzers,Which Is Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Inadequate Licensee Review of License Amend. Oxygen Analyzer recalibrated.W/980528 Ltr ML17229A7381998-05-21021 May 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980421,missed EDG Fuel Oil Sample Surveillance Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Revised Fuel Oil Sampling Service Purchase Order & Revised Site procedure.W/980521 Ltr ML17229A7011998-04-27027 April 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980326,discovered Containment Pressure Instrumentation Design Single Failure Vulnerability.Caused by Inadequate Design by Personnel Error.Removed RPS & ESFAS Containment Pressure Bypass Keys immediately.W/980427 Ltr ML17229A6761998-04-0202 April 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980305,identified Two Conditions That Were Outside App R Design Bases.Caused by Design Oversight During Development of Original App R Safe SD Design.Established 30 Minute Roving Fire Watches & Provided training.W/980402 Ltr ML17229A6731998-03-26026 March 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980224,radiation Monitor Surveillance Inadequacies Led to Operating of Facility Prohibited by Tss. Caused by Congnitive Personnel Error.Permanent Procedure Changes Were implemented.W/980326 Ltr ML17229A6551998-03-0505 March 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980206,high/low Pressure Shutdown Cooling Interface Was Noted Outside App R Design Bases.Caused by Personnel Error.Addl Guidance Was Provided to Engineering Dept personnel.W/980305 Ltr ML17229A6281998-02-19019 February 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980121,emergency Lighting Outside App R Design Bases Occurred.Caused by Congnitive Personnel Error During Translation of App R Section Iii.Procedures Onop 1 & 2 ONP-100.01 Were Issued for Use on 980206.W/980219 Ltr ML17229A6211998-02-0909 February 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980110,manual Rt Due to DEH Leak at Turbine Test Block Was Noted.Caused by o-ring Extrusion.Shortened Bolts by About 0.125 & Reinstalled at Correct Torque values.W/980209 Ltr ML17229A6191998-02-0404 February 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980105,CIS Bistable in Bypass Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Tss.Caused by Personnel Error. Radiation Monitor Was Restored to service.W/980204 Ltr ML17229A6161998-02-0303 February 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980104,inadvertent RPS Actuation Occurred Due to Personnel Error.Caused by Procedural Inadequacies & Inadequate self-checking by Licensed Utility Personnel. Placards Have Been Placed in CRs.W/980203 Ltr ML17229A6051998-01-27027 January 1998 LER 97-010-01:on 971027,inadvertent Core Alteration Prohibited by TSs Were Noted Due to Stuck Cea.Caused by Personnel Error.Cea #24 Was Dislodged & Transferred to Spent Pool for insp.W/980127 Ltr ML17229A5501997-12-0505 December 1997 LER 97-008-00:on 971107,inadequate CR Ventilation Surveillance Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by non-cognitive Personnel Error.Operating Procedure 2-1900050 Was revised.W/971205 Ltr ML17309A9091997-12-0202 December 1997 LER 97-011-00:on 971102,non-conservative RAS Set Point Resulted in Operation Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Inadequate Set Point & Instrument Loop Scaling Process.Revised ESFAS Functional Tp W/Proper Set point.W/971202 Ltr ML17229A5391997-11-26026 November 1997 LER 97-010-00:on 971027,inadvertant Core Alteration Prohibited by TS Occurred.Caused by CEA Failure to Detach from Ugs.Safety Evaluation Was Performed & Procedural Rev Made to Continue Upper Guide Structure move.W/971126 Ltr ML17229A5151997-11-0707 November 1997 LER 97-007-00:on 971008,inoperable Containment Cooling Fan Resulted in Operation of Facility Outside Design Basis. Caused by non-cognitive Personnel Error.Ccs Operation Was Revised & Issued on 971013.W/971107 Ltr ML17229A4991997-10-17017 October 1997 LER 97-009-00:on 970917,inoperable PORV Block Valve Resulted in Operation Prohibited by Tech Specs Occurred.Caused by Plant GL 89-10 Program Plan to Review Plant Manager Action Item Sys.Porv Block Valve V-1403 restored.W/971017 Ltr ML17309A9011997-08-27027 August 1997 LER 97-008-00:on 970728,mechanical Fire Penetrations Were Inoperable & Outside App R Design Bases.Caused by Seal Mfg Not Providing Formal Documentation for Installed Seals. Modified Inoperable Fire penetrations.W/970827 Ltr ML17229A4311997-07-29029 July 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 970630,discovered Inadequate Testing of Engineered Safety Features Subgroup Relays.Caused by Inadequacy in Implementing TS Requirements in Surveillance Procedures.Revised Surveillance procedures.W/970729 Ltr ML17229A4241997-07-25025 July 1997 LER 97-005-00:on 970625,discovered That Hot Shutdown Control Panel Shutdown Cooling Flow indicator,FI-3306 Inoperable. Caused by Weakness in Work Order & Procedure Used to Repair FI-3306.Section Meeting W/I&C Planners held.W/970725 Ltr ML17229A3971997-07-11011 July 1997 LER 97-004-00:on 970611,discovered Incorrect Original Cable Tray Fire Stop Assembly Installation Was Outside App R Design Basis.Caused by Personnel Error.Hourly Fire Watch Patrols Will Be posted.W/970711 Ltr ML17229A3871997-06-19019 June 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970521,determined Required Post Maint Open Stroke Test for Valve V3245,2B2 SIT Discharge Check Valve, Had Not Been Performed.Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure revised.W/970619 Ltr ML17229A3841997-06-17017 June 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970518,containment Sump Debris Screen Was Not IAW Design Due to Gaps in Screen Encl.Performed SER to Document Containment Sump Design requirements.W/970617 Ltr ML17229A3751997-06-0202 June 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 970501,operation Was Prohibited by TS Due to Inadequately Tested Degraded Voltage Sys.Revised Unit 1 ESFAS Surveillance Test procedure.W/970602 Ltr ML17229A3611997-05-29029 May 1997 LER 97-007-00:on 970502,reactor Coolant Pump Oil Collection Sys Was Outside App R Design Bases.Identified Leak Sites Were Repaired & Mods to RCP Oil Collection Sys to Capture Any Future Leakage from areas.W/970529 Ltr ML17229A3491997-05-21021 May 1997 LER 97-001-00:on 970423,containment Isolation Actuation Occurred.Caused by Increased Radiation Levels During Removal of Upper Guide Structure.Proper Actuation of Containment Isolation Components Was verified.W/970521 Ltr ML17229A3441997-05-13013 May 1997 LER 97-005-00:on 970419,reactor Was Shutdown Due to Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage.Hot Cracking Was Caused by Weld Contamination.Repairs to RCPB Were Completed & 1A SDC Train Was Restored to Svc ML17229A3141997-04-30030 April 1997 LER 97-004-00:on 970402,refueling Machine Was Operating in Manner Prohibited by TS Due to Original Design of Refueling Machine Bypass Feature Conflicting W/Ts Requirements. Eliminated Overload Cut Off Limit bypass.W/970430 Ltr ML17229A2951997-03-31031 March 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970304,automatic Rt Resulted from Loss of Electrical Power to 1A2 Rc Pump.Rcp Breaker Was Replaced & Pump Was Returned to svc.W/970331 Ltr ML17229A2721997-03-21021 March 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970221,operation in Excess of Max Rated Thermal Power Occurred Due to Digital Data Processing Sys (Ddps) Calorimetric Error.Verified Acceptable Performance of Ddps Functions & Reviewed Software mods.W/970321 Ltr 1999-07-06
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML17241A4891999-10-0707 October 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990912,noted That MSSV Surveillance Was Outside of TS Requirements.Caused by Setpoint Drift.Subject MSSVs Are Being Refurbished & Retested Prior to Unit Startup from SL1-16 Refueling Outage.With 991007 Ltr ML17241A4951999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 991014 Ltr ML17241A4741999-08-31031 August 1999 Rev 1 to PCM 99016, St Lucie Unit 1,Cycle 16 Colr. ML17241A4591999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 990913 Ltr ML17241A4301999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Jul 1999 for St Lucie Units 1 & 2.With 990805 Ltr ML17241A4111999-07-16016 July 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990610,unplanned Cooldown Transient Occurred Due to Personnel Error.Trained & Briefed Personnel & Revised Procedures.With 990716 Ltr ML17241A4031999-07-0606 July 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990605,sub-critical Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Inadvertent MSIV Opening.Caused by Personnel Error. Provided Operation Supervision Instruction to Operating Crews,Stand Down Meetings & Operator Aids.With 990706 Ltr ML17241A4041999-07-0606 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990604,CEA Drop Resulted in Manual Reactor Trip.Caused by Procedural Inadequacies.Procedure Changes Are Planned to Correct Lack of Procedural Guidance for CEA Subgroup Power Switch Replacement.With 990706 Ltr ML17241A4091999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 990712 Ltr ML17241A3941999-06-30030 June 1999 LER 99-004-01:on 990415,as Found Cycle 10 Psv Setpoints Were Outside TS Limits.Caused by Manufacturing Process Defect. All Three Psvs Were Replaced with pre-tested Valves During Cycle 11 Refueling Outage.With 990630 Ltr ML17355A3681999-06-30030 June 1999 Revised Update to Topical QA Rept, Dtd June 1999 ML17241A3551999-06-0404 June 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990505,both Trains of Safety Injection Actuation Were Blocked During Surveillance.Caused by Procedure Error.Procedure Revised.With 990604 Ltr ML17241A3631999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for St Lucie Units 1 & 2.With 990610 Ltr ML17241A3321999-05-17017 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990415,determined That as Found Cycle 10 Psv Setpoints Outside TS Limits.Root Cause Under Investigation.Psvs Replaced with pe-tested Valves During Cycle 11 ML17241A3271999-05-0606 May 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990406,ECCS Suction Header Leak Resulted in Both ECCS Trains Being Inoperable & Entry Into TS 3.0.3. Caused by Chloride Induced OD Stress Corrosion Cracking of Piping.Made Code Repairs & Coated Piping.With 990506 Ltr ML17241A3331999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 990517 Ltr ML17229B0801999-04-0707 April 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990311,SG ECT Error Caused Operation with Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Deficiencies in Data Analysis Guideline Instructions.Licensee Will Change Data Analysis Guidelines for Lead Analysts.With 990407 Ltr ML17229B0841999-04-0707 April 1999 Rev 2 to PSL-ENG-SEMS-98-102, Engineering Evaluation of ECCS Suction Lines. ML17229B0791999-04-0707 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990309,discovered Inadequate Design & IST SRs for Iodine Removal Sys (Irs).Caused by Original Design Inadequacies & Personnel Error.Naoh Tank Vent Valve V07233 Was Tagged Open.With 990407 Ltr ML17229B0961999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 990408 Ltr ML17229B0541999-03-10010 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990211,inadequate TS SRs for SIT & SDC Isolation Valves Were Noted.Caused by Failure to Correctly Implement TS Srs.Submitted LAR to Align Required TS SR with Design Bases Requirements Being Verified.With 990310 Ltr ML17229B0461999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 990310 Ltr ML17229B0051999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1999 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 990211 Ltr ML17229A9901999-01-20020 January 1999 LER 98-009-00:on 981223,noted That Facility Operated Outside of Design Basis.Caused by non-conservative MSLB Analysis Inputs.Will Review SR Component Differences Between Units & Will re-baseline LTOP Analysis.With 990120 Ltr ML17229A9961999-01-14014 January 1999 SG Tube Inservice Insp Special Rept. ML17229A9821999-01-0404 January 1999 LER 98-010-00:on 981207,RCS Boron Sample Frequency Required by Ts,Was Exceeded by Twelve Minutes.Caused by Personnel Error.Equipment Clearance Order Was Lifted to Draw Required Sample & Operations Procedure Was Changed.With 990104 Ltr ML17229A9831998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 990111 Ltr ML17229A9611998-12-22022 December 1998 LER 97-002-01:on 981204,containment Sump Debris Screen Was Not IAW Design.Caused by Inadequate C/As for Sump Screen Anamolies.All Identified Sump Screen Deficiencies Were Dispositioned &/Or Repaired.With 981222 Ltr ML17229A9561998-12-15015 December 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 981118,missed TS SG U Tube Insp.Caused by Encoding Errors While Using Remote Positioning Fixtures.All SG Tube Surveyed.With 981215 Ltr ML17241A3581998-12-0909 December 1998 Changes,Tests & Experiments Made as Allowed by 10CFR50.59 for Period of 970526-981209. ML17229A9421998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 981215 Ltr ML17229A9301998-11-25025 November 1998 LER 98-005-01:on 980807,discovered That New MOV Methodology Caused Past PORV Block Valve Operability Problem.Caused by Inadequacies in Original Vendor MOV Methodology.Planned Valve Mods Will Be Implemented During Cycle 11 1998 Outage ML17229A9021998-11-0404 November 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 981008,inadequate Reactor Protection Sys Trip Bypass TS Was Noted.Caused by Poorly Worded Ts. Submitted LAR to Clarify Power Requirements for High Rate of Power Trips.With 981104 Ltr ML17241A4931998-11-0101 November 1998 Statement of Account for Period of 981101-990930 for Suntrust Bank,As Trustee for Florida Municipal Power Agency Nuclear Decommissioning Trust (St Lucie Project). ML17229A9051998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 981110 Ltr ML17229A8871998-10-19019 October 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Defect in Swagelok Stainless Steel Front Ferrule,Part Number SS-503-1 Which Was Machined with Improper Length.C/A Includes Insp Equipment That Will 100% Identify Short Length ML17229A8781998-10-19019 October 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Defect in Swagelok Stainless Steel Front Ferrule,Part Number SS-503-1,which Was Machined with Improper Length.Insp Equipment That Will 100% Identify Short Length ML17229A8771998-10-14014 October 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980918,inadvertent Afas Actuation Was Noted.Caused by Degradation of Multiple Afas Power Supplies. Replaced Afas Power Supplies & Revised Procedures.With 981014 Ltr ML17229A8761998-10-14014 October 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980918,identified Discrepancies Between Fire Protection Design Requirements & Field Conditions. Caused by Inadequate Translation & Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements.Procedures Revised.With 981014 Ltr ML17229A8721998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1998 for St Lucie Units 1 & 2.With 981009 Ltr ML17229A8511998-09-0202 September 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980807,discovered That PORV Margins Were Insufficient to Accommodate Addl Conservatism.Caused by Inadequacies in Original Vendor MOV Methodology.Will Implement Planned Valve Actuator mods.W/980902 Ltr ML17229A8611998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1998 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 980911 Ltr ML18066A2771998-08-13013 August 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Deficiency in CE Current Screening Methodology for Determining Limiting Fuel Assembly for Detailed PWR thermal-hydraulic Sa.Evaluations Were Performed for Affected Plants to Determine Effect of Deficiency ML17229A8481998-08-0707 August 1998 Rev 1 to PSL-ENG-SEFJ-98-013, St Lucie Unit 2,Cycle 10 Colr. ML17229A9461998-08-0707 August 1998 Rev 0 to PCM 98016, St Lucie Unit 2,Cycle 11 Colr. ML17229A8301998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1998 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.W/980814 Ltr ML17229A8201998-07-29029 July 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980630,inadequate Procedure May Have Resulted in SBO Recovery Complications.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Attached Caution Tags to Appropriate Control switches.W/980729 Ltr ML17229A7981998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1998 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.W/980713 Ltr ML17229A7701998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1998 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.W/980612 Ltr ML17229A7411998-05-28028 May 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980430,discovered Waste Gas Decay Tank Operation W/O Available Oxygen Analyzers,Which Is Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Inadequate Licensee Review of License Amend. Oxygen Analyzer recalibrated.W/980528 Ltr 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
<<J CATEGORY REGULATO INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION STEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR:9703280001 DOC.DATE: 97/03/18 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-.335 $ t. Lucie Plant, Unit 1, Florida Power 6 Light Co. 05000335 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION BENKEN,E. Florida Power 6 Light Co.
STALLSgJ A~ Florida Power a Light Co.
RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
SUBJECT:
LER 97-001-00:on 970221,identified deficiencies in Post Accident Sampling Systems (PASS). Caused by failure of personnel to specify drawing update requirements. Added PASS to list of Maint Rule systems.W/970318 ltr.
DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:
TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.
,. NOTES:
RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD2-3 PD 1 1 WIENS,L. 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS 1 1 AE 2 2 AEOD/SPD/RRAB 1 1 IL CENTE 1 1 NRR/DE/ECGB 1 1 NRR D EELB 1 1 NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DRCH/HQMB 1
1 1
1 1
1 NRR/DRCH/HHFB NRR/DRCH/HOLB NRR/DRPM/PECB 1
1 1
~1 1 1
NRR/DSSA/SPLB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SRXB 1 1 RES/DET/EIB 1 1 RGN2 FILE 01 1 1 D
EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LITCO BRYCEiJ H 1 1 NOAC POOREgW 1 1 NOAC QUEENERiDS 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 N
NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE. TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK (DCD) ON EXTENSION 415-2083 FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 25 ENCL 25
s l Florida Power 8 Light Company. 6501 South Ocean Drive. Jensen Beach, FL 34957 March 18, 1997 APL L-97-74 10 CFR 50.73 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Re: St. Lucie Unit 1 Docket No.'0-335 Reportable Event: 97401 Date of Event: February 21, 1997 Operation Prohibited By Technical Specifications due to The attached Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 to provide notification of the subject event.
Very truly yours, J. A. Stall Vice President St. Lucie Plant JAS/EJB Attachment cc: Regional Administrator, USNRC Region II Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, St. Lucie Plant .
970328000i 970318 PDR ADQCK 05000335 S PDR IllitlillllllPll'Iglllilllllllll an FPL Group company
0 RC FORM 3SS 4-96)
U.S. NUCLEAR REQULATORY COMMLSSION APPROVED SY ~ NO. $
BKFslss 04rsoiso 1') 104 ESTIMATED BUBO BI PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH TIBS MANDA INFORMATION COLLECTION REOUESTI BOJI HRS. IEPORTEO LESSON LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE UCENSNO PROCESS AND F BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REOARDINO SURD BI ESTIMAT LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TO THE INFORMATION ANO RECORDS MANAOEMENTBRANCH IT% F22I US NUCLEAR REOIAATORY COMMISSON. WASHINOTON. DC 206660001 ANO TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT 1$ 160OHM), OFRCE 0 (See reverse for required number of MANAOEMENTAND BUOOET, WASHINOTON, OC 20602.
digits/characters for each block)
PACNJTY NAME ill DOCKET NIIABBl12 I PAOSISI ST LUCIE UNIT 1 05000335 1 OF5 Operation Prohibited By Technical Specifications due to Deficiencies in the Program for Post Accident Sampling FAOUTY HAME DOCKET N UMBER DAY YEAR 8EQU EN TI AL RE VISI ON MONTH DAY YEAR NUMSBI NUMBBl 05000389 St. Lucie Unit 2 FACIUTY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 02 21 97 97 001 00 03 18 97 OPERAT(NO MoDE Is) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2) (v) 50.73(a) (2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(vlii)
POWER LEVEL (10) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 73.71
""@4'>> '.+
OTHER 20.2203(a)(2) (iii) S0.3B(0) (1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) In Abstract below orinN CFonn388A 20.2203(e)(2) (iv) S0.3B(0) l2) 50.73(e)(2)(vii)
TELEPHONE NUMBBI Onekde hreo Codol E. Benken, Licensing Engineer (561) 467 - 7156 REPORTABLE REPORTABLE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER To NPRDS CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT To NPRDS X IP LI I 130 N MONTH DAY YEAR YES SUBMISSION Of yes, oomplete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE). X No DATE (15)
ABSTRACT (Umit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 sinole-spaced typewritten lines) (16)
On February 21, 1997, St. Lucie Units 1 and 2 were operating at 100 percent reactor power. A review of the Units'ost Accident Sampling Systems (PASS) identified several deficiencies associated with those systems which, in the aggregate, represented a failure to satisfy the administrative requirements delineated in the plant Technical Specifications. The deficiencies involved design configuration control, post maintenance testinq (PMT), and periodic maintenance. Additionally, the Unit 2 PASS was temporarily inoperable without aggressive corrective actions being pursued to return the system to operable status.
The cause of the PASS desiqn control deficiencies was a failure of plant personnel to consistently specify drawing update requirements in plant change packages. Maintenance program inadequacies and the inoperability of the Unit 2 PASS were caused by the lack of clearly defined accountability for the PASS and insufficient reviews of the maintenance requirements related to the system.
Corrective Actions Include: 1) PASS was included as a Maintenance Rule system and a system engineer was assigned responsibility. 2) The Unit 2 PASS was returned to service and work controls associated with PASS are being improved to prioritize system maintenance. 3) A detailed system walkdown was performed to identify configuration discrepancies. 4) PMT requirements are being'assessed to ensure adequacy. 5) Data base and labeling improvements are being made to facilitate future PASS maintenance. 6) Teel)nical Manuals, UFSAR requirements and drawings are being reviewed to determine PASS preventive maintenance requirements. 7) Engineering process improvements are in place to enhance configuration control.
NRC FORM Me (4.96)
NRC FOAM 366A U.S. NucLEAR REQuLATORY COMMIssl I4-06)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 05000335 2 OF 5 97 001 00 TEXT flfmote epeoe le reqttlred, ttee eddltionel ooplee of NRC Fetm 3684/ I17I On February 21, 1997, St. Lucie Units 1 and 2 were operating at 100 percent reactor power. NRC inspection activities which were conducted during the period from February 5, 1997 to February 21, 1997, along with inspections by FPL personnel, identified deficiencies associated with the Unit 1 and
.Unit 2 Post Accident Sampling Systems (PASS) (EIIS:IP). The items identified were related to design configuration control of PASS at St. Lucie Units 1 and 2, and inadequacies in program requirements for maintenance of sampling and analysis equipment at St. Lucie Unit 2. A summary of the deficiencies which were identified is given below.
At St. Lvcie Unit 1. a review of engineering documents, procedures and valve lineups associated with the PASS identified that a Plant Change/Modification (PCM), completed in 1992, did not properly identify that engineering drawing 8770-9520, Revision 0, required revision as a part of the PCM. This resulted in the drawing not depicting a valve which was installed in the system. Additional design control discrepancies were found which included an error on the PASS panel mimic display and a failure to update vendor technical manual drawing information. These items were identified as a result of the review performed by the NRC and FPL personnel.
At St. Lucie Unit 2, a similar review of the PASS was conducted which identified that engineering drawing 2998-G-078, Sheet 152, Revision 4, was not in agreement with the as-built configuration of the PASS. Additionally, it was determined that component calibration frequencies described in the Unit 2 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Table 9.3-10d, for a PASS panel alarm (EIIS:IP:ALM) and a pressure instrument (PIA 503) (EIIS:IP:Pl) had not been performed as described in the UFSAR table. Post maintenance test (PMT) requirements associated with PASS were also reviewed which identified that system functional testing was not specifically required to verify proper system operation following calibration of PASS instrumentation.
On November 26. 1996, FPL Chemistry personnel, performing a periodic functional test, determined that the Unit 2 PASS was out of service due to inoperable level indication, and a work request was submitted for repair. The required repairs were not implemented expeditiously, and the system remained out of service until February 22, 1997.
St. Lucie Unit 1 PASS remained available for all required sampling functions during the above period, and the identified design control discrepancies on the Unit 1 PASS did not preclude operation or availability of that system. The Unit 2 PASS was returned to operable status on February 22, 1997, following maintenance to the system and the satisfactory completion of functional testing.
The deficiencies identified for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Post Accident Sampling Systems and the failure to maintain the availability of the Unit 2 PASS to obtain and analyze samples represent a failure to satisfy the program requirements as stated in the St. Lucie Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specification Administrative Controls.
NRC FOAM 3MA I4.06I
NRC FORM 388A u.s. NucLEAR REQUIATORY COINMISSI I4-96)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 05000335 3 OF 5 97 001 00 TEXT (Ifmore space is required, use edditionel copies of NRC Arm 368Ai I17I There were several causal factors contributing to the program deficiencies associated with the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Post-accident Sampling Systems. These are discussed below.
PASS flow diagram and mimic display errors resulted from the failure of FPL personnel to consistently specify the requirement for drawing updates in Plant Change/Modification (PCM) packages. On Unit 2, a flowpath error discovered during initial system construction was corrected on the local panel mimic; however, the information was not provided to design engineers for incorporation into the flow drawing Additionally, vendor technical manuals for the PASS were not always identified as requiring an update when modifications were implemented. The above omissions resulted in discrepancies between actual system configuration, controlled documents, and mimic displays.
At St. Lucie Unit 2, the PASS was determined to be inoperable from November 26, 1996, to February 22, 1997, and several inadequacies were identified in the PASS preventive maintenance and post maintenance testing programs for both St. Lucie Units.. The causes of these deficiencies were:
Specific accountability for the Post-accident Sampling Systems was not clearly defined and maintaining PASS availability was not adequately prioritized from a work control standpoint since the system is not safety related. As a result, equipment problems were not always corrected in an expeditious manner.
- 2. Preventive maintenance inadequacies resulted from an insufficient review of UFSAR and vendor technical manual requirements during PM development. A review of PASS maintenance during this event identified that not all UFSAR described preventive maintenanc checks had been performed for the Unit 2 PASS..
- 3. Post maintenance test requirements associated with PASS instrument calibration were insufficiently specified in Plant Work Orders and therefore did not ensure that operability checks were consistently performed following maintenance to verify proper system operation.
This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B), as "Any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications (TS)." St. Lucie Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications 6.8.4.e, require for Post-accident Sampling, "A program which will ensure the capability to obtain and analyze reactor coolant, radioactive iodines, and particulates in plant gaseous effluents, and containment atmosphere samples under accident conditions. The program shall include the following:
(i) Training of personnel, (ii) Procedures for sampling and analysis, and (iii) Provisions for maintenance of sampling and analysis equipment."
MAC FORM seRA t4 06I
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COINMISSI (4-9')
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 05000335 4 OF 5 97 001 00 TEXT (Ifmore space is reguired, use additional copies of NRC Form 366Al I17I The deficiencies identified during inspection and review of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Post-accident Sampling Systems, and the unavailability of the Unit 2 system, represent a failure to satisfy the above requirements and therefore a condition prohibited by TS.
The design control discrepancies identified for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Post-accident Sampling Systems did not impact the operability of those systems. For St. Lucie Unit 1, the PASS continued to be operable for all required sampling functions.
For St. Lucie Unit 2, the PASS was declared out of servtce on November 26, 1996, as a result of inoperable level instrumentation required for obtaining a diluted reactor coolant sample following an accident. This sample is used to obtain post accident reactor coolant gross activity for core damage assessment and reactor coolant boron concentration. System loop calibrations for the level instrumentation had been performed on August, 26, 1996, however a full system operability check was not required, following completion of the calibrations. The ability to obtain an undiluted liquid sample of the reactor coolant using the PASS was not affected by the inoperable level instrumentation, and reactor coola'nt gross activity and boron could have been determined using an undiluted sample.
1 Following repair of the inoperable level indication on January 28, 1997, the Unit 2 PASS remained out of service pending calibration of an internal hydrogen analyzer used for measuring dissolved hydrogen in the reactor coolant post accident. The analyzer calibration was completed and the PASS was returned to operable status following satisfactory functional testing on February 22, 1997. The ability to obtain and measure hydrogen concentration from reactor coolant using the normal (non-accident) sampling system was not affected by the inoperability of the analyzer.
The Post-Accident Sampling Systems, at St. Lucie Unit 1 and 2 provide a means to obtain and analyze pressurized and unpressurized, diluted and undiluted reactor coolant samples and containment building samples (Unit 2 only). The systems are designed to simplify the operational requirements for collecting post-accident reactor coolant chemistry and radiochemistry information while minimizing radiological exposure to plant personnel. The St. Lucie Unit 1 and 2 Post-accident Sampling Systems are not safety related and are not required for the safe shutdown of the plant. The operability of the Unit 1 PASS was not impacted by this event and backup methodologies were available on Unit 2 for obtaining necessary samples following an accident. The protection of the health and safety of the public was therefore not adversely affected by the event.
The Post-Accident Sampling Systems at St Lucie Unit 1 and 2 were added to the list of Maintenance Rule systems and have been assigned indicators for trending the performance and maintenance of the systems. Additionally, a system engineer has been assigned the accountability to monitor PASS performance and system modifications, and to assist in improving overall reliability.
NRC FORM 36ttA (4.96)
NRC FORM 368A U.S. Nut%EAR REGULATORY COMMSSI I4.96)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION YEAR SEOUENTIAL REVISION ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 05000335 5 OF 5 97 001 00.
TEXT /ifmore ~e is required, use additional copies of SRC Arm 3MAJ I171
- 2. Recent changes in engineering processes promote an enhanced emphasis on the comprehensive identification and verification of documents (i.e. drawings, UFSAR, vendor manuals, etc.) affected by plant modifications,
- 3. A Condition Report was issued to assess and improve the prioritization of work controls associated with the Unit 1 and Unit 2 PASS so that system availability is adequately maintained.
4, A detailed walkdown of each Unit's PASS was performed to identify existing design .
configuration discrepancies. The identified discrepancies will be corrected on applicable drawings, including vendor drawings, and mimic panels in the field.
- 5. Post maintenance testing requirements for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 PASS are being reviewed to ensure that adequate functional testing is performed following preventive and corrective maintenance.
- 6. Additional PASS components are being added to the Total Equipment Data Base (TEDB) and improvements in system labeling are being made to better facilitate maintenance processes.
- 7. A detailed review is being performed of the Vendor Technical Manuals, UFSAR requirements, and controlled drawings related to PASS to identify the preventive maintenance (PM) requirements for applicable components. Additional preventive maintenance requirements will be developed as necessary, based on this review.
Equipment: PASS Level Indicators Manufacturer: International Instruments Model: 9263X-00-D None NAG FORM 388A H-QS)