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| issue date = 09/02/1988
| issue date = 09/02/1988
| title = LER 88-006-00:on 880803,isolation of CO2 Fire Protection Sys,W/O Compensatory Action Occurred.Caused by Personnel Error.Appropriate Administrative Action Taken W/Individuals involved.W/880902 Ltr
| title = LER 88-006-00:on 880803,isolation of CO2 Fire Protection Sys,W/O Compensatory Action Occurred.Caused by Personnel Error.Appropriate Administrative Action Taken W/Individuals involved.W/880902 Ltr
| author name = HODGE W M, SMITH W G
| author name = Hodge W, Smith W
| author affiliation = INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG, MIDWEST ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE
| author affiliation = INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG, MIDWEST ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  
Line 16: Line 16:


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:ttACCELERATED DISTRIBUTION DEMONSTRATION SYSTEMREGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:8809080369 DOC.DATE:
{{#Wiki_filter:ACCELERATED t
88/09/02NOTARIZED-NODOCKETFACIL:50-315 DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit1,Indiana&05000315.AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION HODGE,W.M.
DISTRIBUTION       DEMONSTRATION t              SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
IndianaMichiganPowerCo.(formerly Indiana&MichiganEleSMITH,W.G.
ACCESSION NBR:8809080369     DOC.DATE: 88/09/02 NOTARIZED- NO                  DOCKET FACIL:50-315 Donald C. Cook  Nuclear  Power  Plant, Unit  1, Indiana   & 05000315   .
MidwestElectricCooperative RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
AUTH. NAME        AUTHOR AFFILIATION HODGE,W.M.         Indiana Michigan Power Co. (formerly Indiana & Michigan Ele SMITH,W.G.         Midwest Electric Cooperative RECIP.NAME         RECIPIENT AFFILIATION


==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
LER88-006-00:on 880803,isolation ofC02fireprotection sys,w/ocompensatory actionduetopersonnel error.W/8ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODEIE22DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR IENCLLSIZE:TITLE:50.73LicenseeEventReport(LER),IncidentRpt,etc.NOTES:RDRECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD3-1LASTANG,JINTERNAL:
LER  88-006-00:on 880803,isolation of C02 fire protection                      R sys,w/o compensatory action due to personnel error.
ACRSMICHELSON ACRSWYLIEAEOD/DSP/NASAEOD/DSP/TPAB DEDRONRR/DEST/CEB 8HNRR/DEST/ICSB 7NRR/DEST/MTB 9HNRR/DEST/RSB 8ENRR/DLPQ/HFB 10NRR/DOEA/EAB 11NRR/DREP/RPB 10NUDOCS-ABSTRACT RESTELFORD,J RES/DSIR/EIB EXTERNALEG&GWILLIAMSESHSTLOBBYWARDNRCPDRNSICMAYS,GCOPIESRECIPIENT LTTRENCLIDCODE/NAME 11PD3-1PD11111111111111111111111122111111ACRSMOELLERAEOD/DOAAEOD/DSP/ROAB ARM/DCTS/DAB NRR/DEST/ADS 7ENRR/DEST/ESB 8DNRR/DEST/MEB 9HNRR/DEST/PSB 8DNRR/DEST/SGB 8DNRR/DLPQ/QAB 10NRR/DREP/BAB 10NRR/J3RISJSIB 9AGFIL~02DS'IRDEPYRGN3FILE0144FORDBLDGHOY,A11LPDR11NSICHARRIS,J11COPIESLTTRENCL11221122111011111111111111111111111111DDS/ATOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:
W/8        ltr.
LTTR46ENCL45 NRCFarm'AS(440)LICENSEEEYENTREPORT(LER)U.S.NUCLEARREOULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEDOMSNO.3160410IEXPIRES:4/31/44FACILITYNAME(1)D.C.CookNuclearPlant-UnitIDOCKETNVI44ER(2)os00o31PA1OF04soat>ono>rerotectlon ysem,souompensatory et>onDuetoPersonnel ErrorEVENTDATE(SILERNUMBER(4)REPORTDATE(7)OTHERFACILITIES INVOLVED(4)MONTHDAYYEARYEARgPSEOUENTIAL
DISTRIBUTION CODE IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR I ENCL TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.
.%ISREVSIONNUMBERrSNUMEERMONTHOAYYEARFACILITYNAMESDOCKETNUMBER(s) 05000080388006000928805000OPERAT(NOMODE(4)POWERLEYEL09020A02(4)20.405(e)
L    SIZE:                  D NOTES:
(1((I)20ASS(~I(1)(4)20AOS(el(1)(SII 20AOS(eI(I)(Irl20AOS(eI(1)(el20AOS(cl50.34(cl(1) 50.34lc)(2) 50.73(el(2)
RECIPIENT        COPIES            RECIPIENT            COPIES ID  CODE/NAME     LTTR ENCL      ID  CODE/NAME        LTTR ENCL PD3-1 LA            1    1    PD3-1  PD                1    1 STANG,J              1    1 D
II)50.73(~)(2)(4)50.73le)(2)(IS)LICENSEECONTACTFORTHISLERl12)50.73(el(2)
INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON        1    1    ACRS MOELLER              2    2 ACRS WYLIE          1    1    AEOD/DOA                  1    1 AEOD/DS P/NAS        1    1    AEOD/DSP/ROAB              2    2 AEOD/DSP/TPAB       1    1    ARM/DCTS/DAB              1    1 DEDRO                1    1    NRR/DEST/ADS 7E            1    0 NRR/DEST/CEB 8H      1    1    NRR/DEST/ESB 8D            1    1 NRR/DEST/ICSB 7      1    1    NRR/DEST/MEB 9H            1    1 NRR/DEST/MTB 9H      1    1    NRR/DEST/PSB 8D            1    1 NRR/DEST/RSB 8E      1    1    NRR/DEST/SGB 8D            1    1 NRR/DLPQ/HFB 10      1    1    NRR/DLPQ/QAB 10            1    1 NRR/DOEA/EAB 11      1    1    NRR/DREP/BAB 10            1    1 NRR/DREP/RPB 10      2    2    NRR/J3RISJSIB 9A          1    1 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT      1    1        G  FIL~
(Irl50.73(el(2)(r)50.73(e)(2)(rEI50.73(el(2)(rEII(A'I 50.73(el(2)(r(4)(5) 50.73(e)(2)(e)0THEREDUIREMKNTs oF10cFRg;(checfroneormoreoftheforrowinol (11)THISREPORTISSUBMITTED PURSVANTT73.71(4)73.71(clOTHER(SpecifyInAhrtrecthelowenrfInTert,HIICForm3BSAINAMEW.M.HodgeSecurityManagerTELKPHONK NUMSKRAREACODE616465-5901COMPLETEONELINKFOREACHCOMPONENT FAILUREDESCRIBED INTHISREPORT(13)CAUSESYS1'EMCOMPONENT MANUFAGTVRERTONPRDS(%a.5'AUSESYSTEMCOMPONENT MANUFAC.TURKREPORTASLTONPRDSL~%a%AWi5@Ievafrr'(s((LE SUPPLEMENTAL RKPORTEXPECTED(IelYESIffyer,completeEXPECTEDSUBMISSION DAFB)NOASSTRACTILImlttoIc00rpecee,EA,epproefmetery fifteentlngreapece typewrftten float)(14)EXPECTEDSUBMISSION OATS(15)MONTHOAYYEAROnAugust3,1988duringisolation/normalization oftheCardoxC02FireProtection Systemforthe4kvSwitchgear CableVault,personnel errorresultedintheisolation ofthefireprotection system,foraperiodof50minutes,withoutcompensatory actionasrequiredbyTechnical Specifi-cation3.7.9.3,actiona.Ithasbeenconcluded thatintheunlikelyeventofafire,personnel wouldhavebeenpromptlyawareofitspresenceandbeenable'tocontrolandextinguish thefirewithoutsignificant propogation orequipment damage.Topreventrecurrence appropriate administrative actionsweretakencon-cerningtheindividuals involved.
DS'IR 02        1    1 1
8805'080369'30902 PDRADGCK050003i5SPDCNRCForm345(SS3)
RES TELFORD,J        1    1                DEPY          1 RES/DSIR/EIB          1    1    RGN3      FILE  01        1    1 EXTERNAL  EG&G WILLIAMSE S    4    4    FORD BLDG HOY,A            1    1 H ST LOBBY WARD      1    1    LPDR                      1    1 NRC PDR              1    1    NSIC HARRIS,J              1    1 NSIC MAYS,G          1    1 D
NRCForm366A(6831LICENSEEENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION nU.S.NUCLEARREOULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEDOMSNO.31SO&104EXPIRES:8/31/BSFACILITYNAME(11D.C.CookNuclearPlant-Unit1DOCKETNUMBER(21LERNUMBER(61YEARg8'SOVENTIAL
S
~....INVMBBRREVISIONNUMBERPACE(31TECT//F'/4//ro
                                                                                          /
<<>>ce/4iso//Br/I>>Bd/Eor>>/HRC
A TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR      46  ENCL    45
%%dnrr3(ISA3/(IT(050003]88-0060002QF0onditions PriorToccurrence Unit1operating at90percentreactorthermalpower.DescritionofEventOnAugust3,1988,duringisolation/normalization ofthecardoxC02fireprotection system(EIIS/KQ) forthe4kvswitchgear cablevault,personnel errorresultedintheisolation ofthefireprotection system,foraperiodof50minutes,withoutcompensatory measuresasrequiredbyTechnical Specification 3.7.9.3actiona.Thesequenceofeventswereasfollows.Atapproximately 0745hoursaplantsecurityofficerwasdispatched toisolatetheCardoxC02systemforthe4kvswitchgear roomareatofacilitate routinemaintenance activities.
 
[NOTE-Thisisolation isnormallyaccomplished by:1)isolating themaster"normal/isolation" switch(EIIS/KQ-HS) fortheentire4kvarea;2)initiating firewatchpatrolsatafrequency ofonceevery30minutes;and3)loggingtheisolation of'involved switchesonthe"CardoxActivityLog"].At0747hours,thesecurityofficerattempted toisolatethemasterswitchbutnoteditwasinoperable.
NRC Farm 'AS                                                                                                                               U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION (440)
Thisrequiredthesecurityofficertoisolate4individual switches(EIIS/KQ-,HS),
APPROVED OMS NO. 3160410I LICENSEE EYENT REPORT (LER)                                                 EXPIRES: 4/31/44 FACILITY NAME (1)                                                                                                                 DOCKET NVI44ER (2)                        PA D. C.         Cook Nuclear Plant - Unit I                                                                                  os 0 0o31                            1    OF    0 4 so at>on o                              >re  rotectlon ys                      em,   s  ou    ompensatory                et>on Due      to Personnel                  Error EVENT DATE (SI                      LER NUMBER (4)                         REPORT DATE (7)                         OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (4)
threeswitcheslocatedadjacenttothemasterswitchoutsidethe4kventrance, andoneswitchinsidethe4kvarea,attheentrancetothecablevault.Following theisolation, thesecurityofficerlogged"Unit14kv-4switches",
SEOUENTIAL .%IS REVSION MONTH              OAY      YEAR            FACILITYNAMES                  DOCKET NUMBER(s)
ontheCardoxSwitchActivityLog.Whiletheproperswitcheswereisolated, andcompensatory firewatchcoverageinitiated, thesecurityofficerviolatedSecurityPostOrderSP0.016(CardoxSwitchControl)inthatfourentriesshouldhavebeenloggedonthetrackingsheettocorrespond tothefourswitchesthatwere'repositioned fortheisolation ofthearea.At-0828hours,following completion ofMaintenance activities inthearea,securitywasrequested tonormalize theCardoxSystems.SinceSecuritypostrotations hadtakenplaceadifferent securityofficerresponded totherequest.Uponarrivalatthe4kvswitchgear roomthesecondofficerreferredtotheCardoxswitchtrackingsheettodetermine whichswitcheshadbeenisolated.
MONTH      DAY      YEAR    YEAR    gP NUMBER rS NUMEER 0    5    0    0    0 08 03                8 8                      0      0  6      00        0 9                288                                                0    5    0    0    0 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSVANT T0 THE REDUIREMKNTs oF 10 cFR g; (checfr one or more of the forrowinol (11)
Theofficernotedoneentry("Unit14kv-4switches"),
OP ERAT(NO MODE (4)                   20A02(4)                                 20AOS(cl                            50.73(el(2) (Irl                        73.71 (4)
andnormalized threeswitcheslocatedoutsidethe4kvarea,adjacenttothemasterswitch.Theofficerfailedtoenterthe4kvareatonormalize theswitchgear cablevaultcardoxswitch,andfailedtorecognize hehadonlynormalized threeswitches.
POWER                          20.405(e) (1((I)                         50.34(cl(1)                         50.73(e l(2)(r)                       73.71(cl LEYEL                                                                          le)(2) 0      9 0          20 ASS( ~ I (1) (4)                     50.34lc)(2)                         50.73(e) (2)(rEI                        OTHER (Specify In Ahrtrect helow enrf In Tert, HIIC Form 20AOS(el(1)(SII                          50.73(el(2) II)                    50.73(el(2)(rEII(A'I                   3BSAI 20AOS  (e I (I) (Irl                    50.73( ~ )(2)(4)                    50.73(el(2)(r(4)(5) 20AOS(e I (1)(el                        50.73        (IS)                  50.73(e) (2)(e)
Firewatchcoveragewasdiscontinued atthistime(0828Hrs).NRCFORM3BBA(8831*U.S.GPO:I SSS0.624538/455 NRCForm366A(64)3)LICENSEEENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEOOMBNO.3)60M)04EXPIRES:8/31/88FACILITYNAME(1)D.C.CookNuclearPlant-Unit1TEXT/6'/IKBBNMBB)1tor)U(od, IIBBaES/orN/NRC Furr3664'4)(17)OOCKETNUMBER(2)YEAR31588LERNUMBER(6)~SEGUENTIAL NUMBER006>re'EVISION NUMBER-00PAGE(3)03o"04At0918hours,thesamesecondsecurityofficerresponded toanunrelated requesttoreisolate the4kvarea.Whentheofficerreportedtheisolation tothecontrolroom,hewasremindedtoisolatetheswitchinsidethe4kvareabycontrolroompersonnel.
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER l12)
Atthistimethesecurityofficerdiscovered thedeficiency andfirewatch coveragewasimmediately reestablished.
NAME                                                                                                                                              TELKPHONK NUMSKR W. M.       Hodge                                                                                                  AREA CODE Security Manager                                                                                                    616 465 -59 01 COMPLETE ONE LINK FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)
Theswitchgear cablevaultareaCardoxSystemhadbeenisolatedfrom0828hoursto0918hours(50minutes),
CAUSE    SYS1'EM      COMPONENT MANUFAG TVRER          TO NPRDS    (     %a   .5
withoutcompensatory firewatchcoverage.
                                                                                        'AUSE          SYSTEM  COMPONENT MANUFAC.
CauseOfTheEventThiseventwastheresultof2personnel errorsinvolving thefailuretoproperlycomplywiththeapprovedprocedure:
TURKR EPORTASL TO NPRDS L~%
1)Thesecurityofficerinitially isolating theCardoxSystemforentryintothe4kvareafailedtoproperlylogtheisolation ofeachindividual areaswitchturned(Security PostOrderSP0.016requireseachswitchturnedtobeloggedseparately ontheswitchactivitylog,'thesecurityofficermadeoneentryandnotedthatfourswitcheshadbeenturned);and,2)thesecurityofficernormalizing theCardoxSystemsreferenced theswitchactivitylogandproperlyreadtheentryasfourswitches, howeveronlyrepositioned (normalizing) threeswitches.
a%AWi                                                                                      5 @Ievafrr'(s((LE SUPPLEMENTAL RKPORT EXPECTED          (Iel                                                                MONTH      OAY    YEAR EXPECTED SUBMISSION OATS (15)
Thesecurityofficernormalizing theCardoxSystemserroneously countedtheswitcheshehadrepositioned.
YES  Iffyer, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DA FB)                                     NO ASSTRACT ILImlt to Ic00 rpecee, EA, epproefmetery fifteen tlngreapece typewrftten float) (14)
AnalsisOfTheEventTheisolation oftheswitchgear cablevaultCardoxSystemwithoutcompensatory firewatchcoverage, wasinviolation ofTechnical Specification 3.7.9.3actiona,andisreportable under10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).Ithasbeenconcluded thatintheunlikelyeventofafire,personnel wouldhavebeenpromptlyawareofitspresenceandbeenabletocontrolandextinguish thefirewithoutsignificant propagation orequipment damage.Thisconclusion isbasedonthefollowing:
On    August 3, 1988 during isolation/normalization of the Cardox C02 Fire Protection System for the 4kv Switchgear Cable Vault, personnel error resulted in the isolation of the fir e protection system, for a period of 50 minutes, without compensatory action as required by Technical Specifi-cation 3.7.9.3, action a.
1)therelatively lowfixedcombustible loadwithintheareainvolved(33,552BTU'spersquarefoot..for afiredurationoflessthan30minutes);
It    has been concluded that in the                                      unlikely event of            a    fire,   personnel would have been promptly aware of                                          its  presence    and been            able 'to control and    extinguish the                  fire without significant                        propogation or equipment damage.
2)thephysicalandadministrative limitsontheintroduction oftransient combustibles (onlyanegligible amountofcombustibles werepresentintheinvolvedareaforthedurationoftheevent);3)operableearlywarningfiredetection systems(consisting ofbothionization andinfrareddetectors),
To    prevent recurrence appropriate administrative actions were taken con-cerning the individuals involved.
and4)theexistence ofatrainedon-shiftfirebrigade.Basedontheabove,thiseventisnotconsidered tohavecreatedanysignificant safetyconcernanddidnotconstitute anunreviewed
8805'080369'30902 PDR        ADGCK 050003i5 S                                    PDC NRC Form 345 (SS3)
'safetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59,nordiditcreateasignificant hazardtothehealthandsafetyofthegeneralpublic.NRCFORM3BBA(64)3)*U.S.GPO:1986.0 624538/465 NRCForm366A(943)LICENSEEENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEOOMSNO.3150W104EXPIRES:8/3(/88FACILITYNAME(I)D.C.CookNuclearPlant-Unit1OOCKETNUMBER(2)LERNUMBER(6)VEAR'.v<:@'EQUENTIAL 4$NUMBERNOREVISIONNUMBERPAGE(3)TEXTCF/RoroEPBoo/rFBBUSBI/Irooa//I/ooo/NRC
 
%%drrn3/)//A'/(17)050003]880060004QF04Corrective ActionTopreventrecurrence, appropriate administrative actionsweretakenconcerning theindividuals involved.
NRC Form 366A                                                                                                            U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION (6831 LICENSEE                ENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION                            APPROVED OMS NO. 31SO&104 n
Althoughthefirstsecurityofficerfailedtofollowprocedural guidanceinloggingoftherepositioned
EXPIR ES: 8/31/BS FACILITY NAME (11                                                          DOCKET NUMBER (21                  LER NUMBER (61                      PACE (31 D. C. Cook              Nuclear Plant                Unit 1                                    YEAR
: switches, theofficerdidprovidesufficient information thatthesecondsecurityofficershouldhaverecognized thecondition oftheaffectedswitches.
                                                                                                        ~
Thesecondofficersimplyfailedtocountthenumberofswitchesherepositioned/normalized.
g8'SOVENTIAL
Ithasbeenconcluded thatadequateprocedural instruction currently exists.Inconsideration offormerLER315/88-005-00 therehasbeenindividual identification numbersandisolation zonedescriptions placedoneachcardoxcontrolswitch.Thesenumbersmaybeusedasanoperational aidtoassuretheproperswitchorswitchesaremanipulated.
                                                                                                              .... I  NVMBBR REVISION NUMBER 0  5  0  0    0 3  ]    88 0          0 6          0    0    0  2 QF      0 TECT //F'/4//ro <<>>ce /4 iso//Br/ I>>B d/Eor>>/HRC %%dnrr 3(ISA3/ (IT(
Installation ofthenumbersandisolation zoneinformation wascompleted onSeptember 1,1988.FailedComonentIdentification Notapplicable
onditions Prior To ccurrence Unit 1 operating at 90 percent reactor thermal power.
-Nocomponents failedduringthecourseofthisevent.PreviousSimilarEvents50-315/88.-005 50-315/85-008,-020 50316/84009F022F02750-316/83-048,-060 50-315/83-022,-028,-034,-094,-114 50-316/82-054,-058,-062,-076,-084 50315/82037F044F045F049F068F081'F082F108NRCFO/IMSBBA(983)*U.S.GPO:1986 0.824538/488 IndianaMichigaPowerCotnpanyCookNuclearPlaniP.O.Box458Bridgman, Ml491066164655901INDIANANICHIGANPOWERSeptember 2,1988UnitedStatesNuclearRegulatory Commission DocumentControlDeskWashington, D.C.20555Operating LicenseDPR-58DocketNo.50-315DocumentControlManager:Inaccordance withthecriteriaestablished by10CFR50.73entitledLicenseeEventReortinSstem,thefollowing reportisbeingsubmitted:
Descri tion of Event On      August 3, 1988, during isolation/normalization of the cardox                                                          C02 fire protection system (EIIS/KQ) for the 4kv switchgear cable vault, personnel error resulted in the isolation of the fire protection system, for a period of 50 minutes, without compensatory measures as required by Technical Specification 3.7.9.3 action a.
88-006-00 Sincerely, u,~gPlantManagerWGS:clwAttachment cc:D.H.Williams, Jr.A.B.Davis,RegionIIIM.P.AlexichP.A.BarrettJ.E.BorggrenR.F.KroegerNRCResidentInspector J.F.Stang,NRCR.C.CallenG.Charnoff, Esq.DottieSherman,ANILibraryD.HahnINPOPNSRCA.A.BlindS.J.Brewer/B.
The sequence of events were as follows. At approximately 0745 hours a plant security officer was dispatched to isolate the Cardox C02 system for the 4kv switchgear room area to facilitate routine maintenance activities. [NOTE This isolation is normally accomplished by: 1) isolating the master "normal/isolation" switch (EIIS/KQ-HS) for the entire 4kv area; 2) initiating fire watch patrols at a frequency of once every 30 minutes; and 3) logging the isolation of'involved switches on the "Cardox Activity Log"]. At 0747 hours, the security officer attempted to isolate the master switch but noted                          it was inoperable.
P.Lauzau}}
officer to isolate 4 individual switches (EIIS/KQ-,HS), three4kv This required the security switches located adjacent to the master switch outside the entrance, and one switch inside the 4kv area, at the entrance to the cable vault. Following the isolation, the security officer logged "Unit 1 4kv  4 switches", on the Cardox Switch Activity Log. While the proper switches were isolated, and compensatory fire watch coverage initiated, the security Control)                              officer violated Security Post Order SP0.016 (Cardox                                    Switch                      in that four entries should have been logged                                on  the  tracking        sheet      to correspond to the four switches                          that  were    'repositioned       for      the    isolation              of the area.
At- 0828 hours, following completion of Maintenance activities in the area, security was requested to normalize the Cardox Systems.
Since Security post rotations had taken place a different security officer responded to the request. Upon arrival the                                        at the 4kv switchgear room the second officer referred to                                                  Cardox switch tracking sheet to determine which switches                                      had been isolated.                         The officer noted one entry ("Unit 1 4kv 4 switches"), and                                                        normalized three switches located outside the 4kv area, adjacent to the master switch. The officer failed to enter the 4kv area to normalize the switchgear cable vault cardox switch, and failed to recognize he had only normalized three switches.                                     Fire watch coverage was discontinued at this time (0828 Hrs).
NRC FORM 3BBA                                                                                                                          *U.S.GPO:I SSS 0.624 538/455 (8831
 
NRC Form 366A                                                                                                          U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (64)3)
LICENSEE              ENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION                            APPROVEO OMB NO. 3) 60M)04 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITYNAME (1)                                                           OOCKET NUMBER (2)
LER NUMBER (6)                    PAGE (3)
D. C. Cook            Nuclear Plant              Unit      1 YEAR  ~  SEGUENTIAL >re'EVISION NUMBER        NUMBER 3  1 5  8  8      0  0 6    0        0    0  3o"      0  4 TEXT /6'/IKBB NMBB )1 tor)U(od, IIBB aES/orN/NRC Furr 3664'4) (17)
At 0918 hours, the same second security officer responded to an unrelated request to reisolate the 4kv area. When the officer reported the isolation to the control room, he was reminded to isolate the switch inside the 4kv area by control room personnel.
At this time the security officer discovered the deficiency and firewatch coverage was immediately reestablished.                                             The switchgear cable vault area Cardox System                                had    been  isolated        from      0828 hours to 0918 hours (50 minutes),                           without        compensatory        fire    watch          coverage.
Cause Of The Event This event                was the result of 2 personnel errors involving the failure              to  properly comply with the approved procedure: 1) The security              officer            initially isolating the Cardox System for entry into the 4kv area failed to properly log the isolation of each individual area switch turned (Security Post Order SP0.016 requires each switch turned to be logged separately on the switch activity log, 'the security officer made one entry and noted that normalizing                                      four switches had been turned); and, 2) the security officer the Cardox Systems referenced the switch activity log and properly read the entry as four switches, however only repositioned (normalizing) three switches. The security officer normalizing the Cardox Systems erroneously counted the switches he had repositioned.
Anal sis Of The Event The isolation of the switchgear cable vault Cardox System without compensatory fire watch coverage, was in violation of Technical Specification 3.7.9.3 action a, and is reportable under 10 CFR            50.73 (a) (2)               (i) (B).
It      has been concluded that in the unlikely event of a fire, personnel would have been promptly aware of its presence and                                                          been able to control and                          extinguish the        fire without significant propagation or equipment damage. This conclusion is based on the following: 1) the relatively low fixed combustible load within of                                                          the area          involved            (33,552      BTU's    per    square    foot..for       a  fire      duration less than 30 minutes); 2) the physical and administrative limits on the introduction of transient combustibles (only a negligible amount of combustibles were present in the involved area for the duration of the event); 3) operable early warning fire detection and systems (consisting of both ionization and infrared detectors),
: 4) the existence of a trained on-shift fire brigade.
Based on the above, this event is not considered to have created any significant safety concern and did not constitute an unreviewed
                        'safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59, nor did of  the it    create a public.
significant hazard to the health and safety                                                    general NRC FORM 3BBA                                                                                                                        *U.S.GPO:1986.0 624 538/465 (64)3)
 
NRC Form 366A                                                                                                                U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (943)
LICENSEE                ENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINU          ION                    APPROVEO OMS NO. 3150W104 EXPIRES: 8/3(/88 FACILITYNAME (I)                                                             OOCKET NUMBER (2)                   LER NUMBER (6)                     PAGE (3)
VEAR '.v<:@'EQUENTIAL NO REVISION Unit                                              4$     NUMBER        NUMBER D. C. Cook            Nuclear Plant                                1 0  5  0  0    0  3   ]    8  8        0 0    6        0    0    0 4 QF 0        4 TEXT CF/Roro EPBoo /r FBBUSBI/ Iroo a //I/ooo/NRC %%drrn 3/)//A'/ (17)
Corrective Action To prevent recurrence, appropriate administrative actions were taken concerning the individuals involved. Although the first security officer failed to follow procedural guidance in logging of the repositioned switches, the officer did provide sufficient information that the second security officer should have recognized the condition of the affected switches. The second officer simply failed to count the number of switches he repositioned/normalized.
It has been concluded that adequate procedural instruction currently exists.
In consideration of former LER 315/88-005-00 there has been individual identification numbers and isolation zone descriptions placed on each cardox control switch. These numbers may be used as an operational aid to assure the proper switch or switches are manipulated. Installation of the numbers and isolation zone          information was completed on September 1, 1988.
Failed Com onent Identification Not applicable  No components failed during the course of this event.
Previous Similar Events 50-315/88.-005 50-315/85-008,-020 50 316/84 009F 022F 027 50-316/83-048,-060 50-315/83-022,-028,-034,-094,-114                                       50-316/82-054,-058,-062,-076,-084 50 315/82 037F                          044F 045F    049F    068F      081'F  082F    108 NRC FO/IM SBBA                                                                                                                            *U.S.GPO:1986 0.824 538/488 (983)
 
Indiana Michiga Power Cotnpany Cook Nuclear Plani P.O. Box 458 Bridgman, Ml 49106 616 465 5901 INDIANA NICHIGAN POWER September          2, 1988 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.             20555 Operating License DPR-58 Docket No. 50-315 Document        Control Manager:
In accordance with the criteria established by 10 CFR 50.73 entitled Licensee Event Re ortin S stem, the following report is being submitted:
88-006-00 Sincerely, u,~g Plant Manager WGS:clw Attachment cc:       D. H. Williams, Jr.
A. B. Davis, Region M. P. Alexich III P. A. Barrett J. E. Borggren R. F. Kroeger NRC    Resident Inspector J. F. Stang, NRC R. C. Callen G. Charnoff, Esq.
Dottie    Sherman,   ANI Library D. Hahn INPO PNSRC A. A. Blind S. J. Brewer/B. P. Lauzau}}

Latest revision as of 06:15, 29 October 2019

LER 88-006-00:on 880803,isolation of CO2 Fire Protection Sys,W/O Compensatory Action Occurred.Caused by Personnel Error.Appropriate Administrative Action Taken W/Individuals involved.W/880902 Ltr
ML17326B439
Person / Time
Site: Cook American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 09/02/1988
From: Hodge W, Will Smith
INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG, MIDWEST ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE
To:
NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
LER-88-006-01, LER-88-6-1, NUDOCS 8809080369
Download: ML17326B439 (6)


Text

ACCELERATED t

DISTRIBUTION DEMONSTRATION t SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:8809080369 DOC.DATE: 88/09/02 NOTARIZED- NO DOCKET FACIL:50-315 Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Indiana & 05000315 .

AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION HODGE,W.M. Indiana Michigan Power Co. (formerly Indiana & Michigan Ele SMITH,W.G. Midwest Electric Cooperative RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 88-006-00:on 880803,isolation of C02 fire protection R sys,w/o compensatory action due to personnel error.

W/8 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR I ENCL TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

L SIZE: D NOTES:

RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD3-1 LA 1 1 PD3-1 PD 1 1 STANG,J 1 1 D

INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON 1 1 ACRS MOELLER 2 2 ACRS WYLIE 1 1 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DS P/NAS 1 1 AEOD/DSP/ROAB 2 2 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1 ARM/DCTS/DAB 1 1 DEDRO 1 1 NRR/DEST/ADS 7E 1 0 NRR/DEST/CEB 8H 1 1 NRR/DEST/ESB 8D 1 1 NRR/DEST/ICSB 7 1 1 NRR/DEST/MEB 9H 1 1 NRR/DEST/MTB 9H 1 1 NRR/DEST/PSB 8D 1 1 NRR/DEST/RSB 8E 1 1 NRR/DEST/SGB 8D 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/HFB 10 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/QAB 10 1 1 NRR/DOEA/EAB 11 1 1 NRR/DREP/BAB 10 1 1 NRR/DREP/RPB 10 2 2 NRR/J3RISJSIB 9A 1 1 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT 1 1 G FIL~

DS'IR 02 1 1 1

RES TELFORD,J 1 1 DEPY 1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 RGN3 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL EG&G WILLIAMSE S 4 4 FORD BLDG HOY,A 1 1 H ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LPDR 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC HARRIS,J 1 1 NSIC MAYS,G 1 1 D

S

/

A TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 46 ENCL 45

NRC Farm 'AS U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION (440)

APPROVED OMS NO. 3160410I LICENSEE EYENT REPORT (LER) EXPIRES: 4/31/44 FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NVI44ER (2) PA D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant - Unit I os 0 0o31 1 OF 0 4 so at>on o >re rotectlon ys em, s ou ompensatory et>on Due to Personnel Error EVENT DATE (SI LER NUMBER (4) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (4)

SEOUENTIAL .%IS REVSION MONTH OAY YEAR FACILITYNAMES DOCKET NUMBER(s)

MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR gP NUMBER rS NUMEER 0 5 0 0 0 08 03 8 8 0 0 6 00 0 9 288 0 5 0 0 0 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSVANT T0 THE REDUIREMKNTs oF 10 cFR g; (checfr one or more of the forrowinol (11)

OP ERAT(NO MODE (4) 20A02(4) 20AOS(cl 50.73(el(2) (Irl 73.71 (4)

POWER 20.405(e) (1((I) 50.34(cl(1) 50.73(e l(2)(r) 73.71(cl LEYEL le)(2) 0 9 0 20 ASS( ~ I (1) (4) 50.34lc)(2) 50.73(e) (2)(rEI OTHER (Specify In Ahrtrect helow enrf In Tert, HIIC Form 20AOS(el(1)(SII 50.73(el(2) II) 50.73(el(2)(rEII(A'I 3BSAI 20AOS (e I (I) (Irl 50.73( ~ )(2)(4) 50.73(el(2)(r(4)(5) 20AOS(e I (1)(el 50.73 (IS) 50.73(e) (2)(e)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER l12)

NAME TELKPHONK NUMSKR W. M. Hodge AREA CODE Security Manager 616 465 -59 01 COMPLETE ONE LINK FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE SYS1'EM COMPONENT MANUFAG TVRER TO NPRDS ( %a .5

'AUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC.

TURKR EPORTASL TO NPRDS L~%

a%AWi 5 @Ievafrr'(s((LE SUPPLEMENTAL RKPORT EXPECTED (Iel MONTH OAY YEAR EXPECTED SUBMISSION OATS (15)

YES Iffyer, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DA FB) NO ASSTRACT ILImlt to Ic00 rpecee, EA, epproefmetery fifteen tlngreapece typewrftten float) (14)

On August 3, 1988 during isolation/normalization of the Cardox C02 Fire Protection System for the 4kv Switchgear Cable Vault, personnel error resulted in the isolation of the fir e protection system, for a period of 50 minutes, without compensatory action as required by Technical Specifi-cation 3.7.9.3, action a.

It has been concluded that in the unlikely event of a fire, personnel would have been promptly aware of its presence and been able 'to control and extinguish the fire without significant propogation or equipment damage.

To prevent recurrence appropriate administrative actions were taken con-cerning the individuals involved.

8805'080369'30902 PDR ADGCK 050003i5 S PDC NRC Form 345 (SS3)

NRC Form 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION (6831 LICENSEE ENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMS NO. 31SO&104 n

EXPIR ES: 8/31/BS FACILITY NAME (11 DOCKET NUMBER (21 LER NUMBER (61 PACE (31 D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1 YEAR

~

g8'SOVENTIAL

.... I NVMBBR REVISION NUMBER 0 5 0 0 0 3 ] 88 0 0 6 0 0 0 2 QF 0 TECT //F'/4//ro <<>>ce /4 iso//Br/ I>>B d/Eor>>/HRC %%dnrr 3(ISA3/ (IT(

onditions Prior To ccurrence Unit 1 operating at 90 percent reactor thermal power.

Descri tion of Event On August 3, 1988, during isolation/normalization of the cardox C02 fire protection system (EIIS/KQ) for the 4kv switchgear cable vault, personnel error resulted in the isolation of the fire protection system, for a period of 50 minutes, without compensatory measures as required by Technical Specification 3.7.9.3 action a.

The sequence of events were as follows. At approximately 0745 hours0.00862 days <br />0.207 hours <br />0.00123 weeks <br />2.834725e-4 months <br /> a plant security officer was dispatched to isolate the Cardox C02 system for the 4kv switchgear room area to facilitate routine maintenance activities. [NOTE This isolation is normally accomplished by: 1) isolating the master "normal/isolation" switch (EIIS/KQ-HS) for the entire 4kv area; 2) initiating fire watch patrols at a frequency of once every 30 minutes; and 3) logging the isolation of'involved switches on the "Cardox Activity Log"]. At 0747 hours0.00865 days <br />0.208 hours <br />0.00124 weeks <br />2.842335e-4 months <br />, the security officer attempted to isolate the master switch but noted it was inoperable.

officer to isolate 4 individual switches (EIIS/KQ-,HS), three4kv This required the security switches located adjacent to the master switch outside the entrance, and one switch inside the 4kv area, at the entrance to the cable vault. Following the isolation, the security officer logged "Unit 1 4kv 4 switches", on the Cardox Switch Activity Log. While the proper switches were isolated, and compensatory fire watch coverage initiated, the security Control) officer violated Security Post Order SP0.016 (Cardox Switch in that four entries should have been logged on the tracking sheet to correspond to the four switches that were 'repositioned for the isolation of the area.

At- 0828 hours0.00958 days <br />0.23 hours <br />0.00137 weeks <br />3.15054e-4 months <br />, following completion of Maintenance activities in the area, security was requested to normalize the Cardox Systems.

Since Security post rotations had taken place a different security officer responded to the request. Upon arrival the at the 4kv switchgear room the second officer referred to Cardox switch tracking sheet to determine which switches had been isolated. The officer noted one entry ("Unit 1 4kv 4 switches"), and normalized three switches located outside the 4kv area, adjacent to the master switch. The officer failed to enter the 4kv area to normalize the switchgear cable vault cardox switch, and failed to recognize he had only normalized three switches. Fire watch coverage was discontinued at this time (0828 Hrs).

NRC FORM 3BBA *U.S.GPO:I SSS 0.624 538/455 (8831

NRC Form 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (64)3)

LICENSEE ENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVEO OMB NO. 3) 60M)04 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITYNAME (1) OOCKET NUMBER (2)

LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1 YEAR ~ SEGUENTIAL >re'EVISION NUMBER NUMBER 3 1 5 8 8 0 0 6 0 0 0 3o" 0 4 TEXT /6'/IKBB NMBB )1 tor)U(od, IIBB aES/orN/NRC Furr 3664'4) (17)

At 0918 hours0.0106 days <br />0.255 hours <br />0.00152 weeks <br />3.49299e-4 months <br />, the same second security officer responded to an unrelated request to reisolate the 4kv area. When the officer reported the isolation to the control room, he was reminded to isolate the switch inside the 4kv area by control room personnel.

At this time the security officer discovered the deficiency and firewatch coverage was immediately reestablished. The switchgear cable vault area Cardox System had been isolated from 0828 hours0.00958 days <br />0.23 hours <br />0.00137 weeks <br />3.15054e-4 months <br /> to 0918 hours0.0106 days <br />0.255 hours <br />0.00152 weeks <br />3.49299e-4 months <br /> (50 minutes), without compensatory fire watch coverage.

Cause Of The Event This event was the result of 2 personnel errors involving the failure to properly comply with the approved procedure: 1) The security officer initially isolating the Cardox System for entry into the 4kv area failed to properly log the isolation of each individual area switch turned (Security Post Order SP0.016 requires each switch turned to be logged separately on the switch activity log, 'the security officer made one entry and noted that normalizing four switches had been turned); and, 2) the security officer the Cardox Systems referenced the switch activity log and properly read the entry as four switches, however only repositioned (normalizing) three switches. The security officer normalizing the Cardox Systems erroneously counted the switches he had repositioned.

Anal sis Of The Event The isolation of the switchgear cable vault Cardox System without compensatory fire watch coverage, was in violation of Technical Specification 3.7.9.3 action a, and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (i) (B).

It has been concluded that in the unlikely event of a fire, personnel would have been promptly aware of its presence and been able to control and extinguish the fire without significant propagation or equipment damage. This conclusion is based on the following: 1) the relatively low fixed combustible load within of the area involved (33,552 BTU's per square foot..for a fire duration less than 30 minutes); 2) the physical and administrative limits on the introduction of transient combustibles (only a negligible amount of combustibles were present in the involved area for the duration of the event); 3) operable early warning fire detection and systems (consisting of both ionization and infrared detectors),

4) the existence of a trained on-shift fire brigade.

Based on the above, this event is not considered to have created any significant safety concern and did not constitute an unreviewed

'safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59, nor did of the it create a public.

significant hazard to the health and safety general NRC FORM 3BBA *U.S.GPO:1986.0 624 538/465 (64)3)

NRC Form 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (943)

LICENSEE ENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINU ION APPROVEO OMS NO. 3150W104 EXPIRES: 8/3(/88 FACILITYNAME (I) OOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

VEAR '.v<:@'EQUENTIAL NO REVISION Unit 4$ NUMBER NUMBER D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant 1 0 5 0 0 0 3 ] 8 8 0 0 6 0 0 0 4 QF 0 4 TEXT CF/Roro EPBoo /r FBBUSBI/ Iroo a //I/ooo/NRC %%drrn 3/)//A'/ (17)

Corrective Action To prevent recurrence, appropriate administrative actions were taken concerning the individuals involved. Although the first security officer failed to follow procedural guidance in logging of the repositioned switches, the officer did provide sufficient information that the second security officer should have recognized the condition of the affected switches. The second officer simply failed to count the number of switches he repositioned/normalized.

It has been concluded that adequate procedural instruction currently exists.

In consideration of former LER 315/88-005-00 there has been individual identification numbers and isolation zone descriptions placed on each cardox control switch. These numbers may be used as an operational aid to assure the proper switch or switches are manipulated. Installation of the numbers and isolation zone information was completed on September 1, 1988.

Failed Com onent Identification Not applicable No components failed during the course of this event.

Previous Similar Events 50-315/88.-005 50-315/85-008,-020 50 316/84 009F 022F 027 50-316/83-048,-060 50-315/83-022,-028,-034,-094,-114 50-316/82-054,-058,-062,-076,-084 50 315/82 037F 044F 045F 049F 068F 081'F 082F 108 NRC FO/IM SBBA *U.S.GPO:1986 0.824 538/488 (983)

Indiana Michiga Power Cotnpany Cook Nuclear Plani P.O. Box 458 Bridgman, Ml 49106 616 465 5901 INDIANA NICHIGAN POWER September 2, 1988 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Operating License DPR-58 Docket No. 50-315 Document Control Manager:

In accordance with the criteria established by 10 CFR 50.73 entitled Licensee Event Re ortin S stem, the following report is being submitted:

88-006-00 Sincerely, u,~g Plant Manager WGS:clw Attachment cc: D. H. Williams, Jr.

A. B. Davis, Region M. P. Alexich III P. A. Barrett J. E. Borggren R. F. Kroeger NRC Resident Inspector J. F. Stang, NRC R. C. Callen G. Charnoff, Esq.

Dottie Sherman, ANI Library D. Hahn INPO PNSRC A. A. Blind S. J. Brewer/B. P. Lauzau