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{{#Wiki_filter:REGULA T I-'JFORHA I'IOlTI DISTRIBUT IO'I STE I (RIDS)ACCESSIO'I NOR'8010070086 DOC~DATE'0/09/29 iIOTARIZEO'uO DOCKET¹FACIL;Susquehanna Steam Electric Stationp Unit lp Pennsylva 05000387"38 Susquehanna Steam Electric StationE Jnit 2i Pennsylva 05000388 AUT~AUTHOR 4FF ILI ATION CURTIS',8~Pennsylvania Power It Light Co.~P[l RE C I P~u 4'4E RECIPIE'JT AFF ILIAT IO'J GR IER E B,n.Regi on 1 i Phi 1 adel phi ai Of f i ce of the Director  
{{#Wiki_filter:REGULA T           I-'JFORHA I'IOlTI DISTRIBUT IO'I         STE I (RIDS)
ACCESSIO'I NOR'8010070086                       DOC ~ DATE'0/09/29           iIOTARIZEO'uO             DOCKET ¹ FACIL;                 Susquehanna         Steam     Electric Stationp Unit lp Pennsylva               05000387 "38     Susquehanna         Steam     Electric StationE Jnit 2i Pennsylva               05000388 AUT   ~                       AUTHOR     4FF ILIATION CURTIS',8         ~         Pennsylvania Power It Light Co.                                             ~P [l RE C I P ~ u 4'4E             RECIPIE'JT AFF ILIATIO'J GR IER E B,n.                   Regi on i Phi adel phi ai Of f i ce of the Director 1          1


==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
Final deficiency rept re power generation control complex/advanced control room cable connector, Inso program nearly complete.A11 Unit 1 cable reoairs will be completed orio,r to fuel loads Unit 2 cables will be installed 5 reoaried.DISTRIBUTION CODE: B019S COPIES RECEIVED:LTR g ENCL g SIZE:M TITLE: Construction Deficiency Report (10CFR50~55E)NOTES:Send IEE 3 copies FSAR 4 all amends'5000387 05000388 REC IP IETTIT ID CODE/.'PATE ACTIOI': A/0 LICEuSNG 04 RUSHBROOKP'DID 06 INTERNAL: AD/RC I/IE 17 ASLBP/J~HARD EDO 4 STAFF 19 IiYD/GEO BR 22 LIC QUAL BR 12'JRC PDR 02 REV 13 EG F I!-E 0 l 7 ORDS DEV 21 I COPIES L.rTR ENCL 1 1, 1 1-1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 REC IP IETVT ID CODE/'VANE YOUNGBLOODEB 05 STARKPR~07 AEOO 18 D/DIH HUM FAC15 EQUIP QUAL BR11 ICE 09!DIP A 20 OELD 21 QA BR 14 RUTHERFORDEH
Final deficiency rept re power generation control complex/
~IE COPIES LTTR ETJCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 EXTERiuaL:
advanced control room cable connector, Inso program nearly complete.A11 Unit 1 cable reoairs will be completed orio,r to fuel loads Unit 2 cables will be installed 5 reoaried.
ACRS EIS I C 16 16 16 08 1 1 1PDR 03 TOT AL'IU'LIBE JJ OF COPIES cl EQV IRED: LT TR 40 E VCL 40 I P"L.TWO NORTH N1NTM STREEt, ALLENTOWN, PA.1810)PHONE;(215)821~5151 September 29, 1980.'!r.Boyce H.Grier Director, Region I U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 SUSQUEPANNA STEP~M ELECTRIC STATION FINAL REPORT OF A DEFICIENCY ON PGCC/ACR CABLE CONNECTORS ERs 100450/100508 FILE 840-4/900-10 PLA-545  
DISTRIBUTION CODE: B019S                   COPIES RECEIVED:LTR TITLE: Construction Deficiency Report (10CFR50 ~ 55E) g    ENCL  g      SIZE:M NOTES:Send         IEE   3 copies     FSAR 4       all amends'5000387                               05000388 I
REC IP IETTIT           COPIES                  REC IP IETVT            COPIES ID CODE/.'PATE             L.rTR ENCL            ID CODE/'VANE            LTTR ETJCL ACTIOI':       A/0 LICEuSNG 04                           1      YOUNGBLOODEB 05                      1 RUSHBROOKP'DID 06                 1,      1      STARKPR ~            07        1    1 INTERNAL: AD/RC I/IE                 17           1    -1      AEOO                18        1    1 ASLBP/J ~ HARD                     1      1      D/DIH      HUM  FAC15          1    1 EDO 4       STAFF     19           1      1      EQUIP QUAL BR11                1    1 IiYD/GEO BR           22           1      1      ICE                  09        2    2 LIC QUAL       BR   12           1      1      !DIP A              20        1    1
              'JRC   PDR           02           1      1      OELD                21        1    1 REV 13             1      1      QA    BR            14        1    1 EG   F I!-E       0 l                 1     RUTHERFORDEH ~ IE             1     1 7 ORDS    DEV 21              1       1 EXTERiuaL: ACRS                     16         16     16       1PDR                03 EIS IC              08           1       1 TOT AL 'IU'LIBEJJ    OF   COPIES     cl EQV IRED: LT TR         40     E VCL     40 I
 
P"L.
TWO NORTH N1NTM STREEt, ALLENTOWN, PA. 1810)   PHONE; (215) 821 5151
                                                                            ~
September     29, 1980
.'!r. Boyce H. Grier Director, Region I U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania         19406 SUSQUEPANNA STEP~M ELECTRIC STATION FINAL REPORT OF A DEFICIENCY         ON PGCC/ACR CABLE CONNECTORS ERs   100450/100508         FILE 840-4/900-10 PLA-545


==References:==
==References:==
PLA-437 dated January 8, 1980 PLA-301 dated November 14, 1978
==Dear    i!r. Grier:==
This    letter  serves to provide the Commission with        a  final report of                a
'deficiency    on Power Generation    Control  Comp1.ex/Advanced  Control Room (PGCC/ACR)    cable connector deficiencies originally reported in PLA-301.
The  information is furnished pursuant to PP&L's obligations under of 10CFR50.55(e).                                                  the'rovisions The attachment      to this  letter  describes the deficient condition along with its  safety implications      and the  corrective action being taken to achieve resolution.
He  trust the Commission will find the information forwarded              by  this letter to be satisfactory.
truly yours,    'ery N,''. Curtis Vice President-Engineering        &  Construction-Nuclear Attachment j
FLU'. mk
                                                                                                / /
I 0XOopn pqg  PENNSYLVANlA POWER      8,  LIGHT COMPANY
i'fr. Boyce  H. Grier                                    September 19, 1980
                    ':  ello    (15)
D'".=.ctor-~'fiice of Inspection & Enforcement
: uclear Regulatory Commission D C      20555
            ;. YcDonald, Director Of='.'e of !!anagement information & Program Control L'. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 4'asnington, D.C.        20555 Nr. Robert .'f. Gallo U. S. nuclear Regulatory Commission P, Q. Box 52 Sh  c!:.sninny, Pennsylvania    18655
ATTACHbKNT TO PLA 545 Page 1 of 3 PGCC/ACR CABLE PROBLEh/S FINAL REPORT C/ACR Cab'c P:oblems DESCRIPTION In letters from Bechtel Construction dated October 3, 1978, PP5L was informed that during implementation of General Electric's FDDR-KR1-521, Rev. 0 (General Cable Retrofit) rework,        it  was noted that numerous cases of
-'nsulation damages were found and that one cable was found to have four (4) conductors pulled from their pin connectors.          Due to the high percentage of damaged cable, the quality of all terminations was rendered indeterminate.
NCR-3231 was generated        to document the problems within the PGCC/ACR complex.      t, was  agreed to by PP5L, Bechtel and General Electric, that GE
>>ould prepar an FDI which should have details of a complete inspection plan and an approved repair procedure.
In Februarv, 1979, GE issued FDI-NJGO Rev. 0 to perform a 100'o inspection of all GE supplied SITS/FITS cables used in the Susquehanna 1 ACR control room, upper relay room and lower relay room for damaged insulation and suspect pin crimps.
Approved methods      of repair for damaged PGCC/ACR cable connectors identified during the inspections performed under FDI-t'fJGO were accomplished in accordance with GE FDDR-KRl-526. This FDDR was originally issued on Sept. 6, 1978 to control the repair of PGCC/ACR panel connectors.              The Panel Ccnnector problems were explained in our PLA-506 dated July 8, 1980.
The inspections, repair/rework and tests for the cables under FDI-ÃJGO, FDDR-KR1-526, their revisions and'ddendums are nearly complete.              A total of 1762 cables have been inspected. The results of the inspection are as follows:
            ~Dame  e                                                guuant it
: 1. Nicks to conductor insulation                                  264 Cuts to conductor insulation                                  346 Damaged    or  no shrink tubing                              265 Pins pulled off during pull test or      fell off              58 during depinning
      ."ot pinned in accordance      with wire list  or                78 ass ."..bly method V~    F !iled continuity                                              21


PLA-437 dated January 8, 1980 PLA-301 dated November 14, 1978
CAUSE
{a}                and    ", nicks  and  cuts to conductor insulation; after having inves-
        =!~'..";~'.:,"-'arced con"uctor    insulation within the T-'.lOD wiring "o a conne." sr,
:.'~;e".."..ired by GE that during reassembly (i.e., pin insertion and ez-trac"icn u ing the standard Amphenol tooling for the termination modules) continual difficulty was experienced. The ferrule edge during extraction and the sharp insertion tool edge during assembly impacted on the densely packed w res at the connector area causing nicks, cuts and abrasions.
(b)    It~.. 3, damaged or no shrink tubing, can be broken into two (2) parts: (1) the damaged shrink tubing could have been caused at the factory during asse...bly of the cable or at the construction site during installation; and (2) the lack of shrink tubing was due to an oversight in manufacturing.
(c)    Item 4, pins pulled off during pull test or which fell off during depinning; it  was determined that a combination of manufacturing personnel error and cr-'mping tool malfunction, due to inadequate QA coverage, was responsible for defective cr mps. This would account for pins failing pull tests or falling off during depinning.
(d)    Item 5, not pinned in accordance with wire list or assembly method, is a manufacturing error; i.e., the conductor might be pinned in hole A in a connector but in hole B in the connector on the opposite end of the cable.
(e)    Item 6, failed continuity, is a direct resul't of the conductor not pinned in accordance with the wire list or assembly method (Item 5).
ANALYSIS OF SAFETY DPLICATIONS As  the various problems are of a random nature and there are a number of Class 1E  cables involved, the Safety Analysis is presented on an item by item basis as follows:
(a)    In items 1, 2 and 3, nicks and cuts to conductor insulation and damaged or no heat shrink tubing,            if bare copper wire is exposed and left uncorrected, permit shorting of wires or introduction of external voltages into          i'ould safety related circuits. Any of these conditions could prevent the circuits from performing the designed safety function.
(b)    Items 4, 5 and 6, pins pulled off during pull test or fell off during depinning, not pinned in accordance with wire list or assembly method and failed continuity, could affect the designed safety functions. If during a seismic event, the conductor vibrates loosely in the pin so that there is sporadic or no continuity between the pin and conductor, or            if the conductor is not pinned correctly such that there is no continuity between the proper connector pins at each end of the table, the operation of the circuit could be adversely affected.
Project Engineering has determined that the above items are reportable under 10CF?5C.55(e).,


==Dear i!r.Grier:==
                                          -3>>
This letter serves to provide the Commission with a final report of a'deficiency on Power Generation Control Comp1.ex/Advanced Control Room (PGCC/ACR) cable connector deficiencies originally reported in PLA-301.The information is furnished pursuant to PP&L's obligations under the'rovisions of 10CFR50.55(e).
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS The 100%   inspection program for PGCC cable connectors         and   repair/rework for the problems   listed in NCR-3231 is nearly complete.
The attachment to this letter describes the deficient condition along with its safety implications and the corrective action being taken to achieve resolution.
                ...."= '.o prevent recur'rences of like p   oh's       ~ ".:t.~;e i'GCC couche connectors', and which are also applicable to the Susquehanna PGCC/ACR Unit 2 cables, are indicated by GE to be:
He trust the Commission will find the information forwarded by this letter to be satisfactory.
t (1) Appropriate training of personnel involved.
'ery truly yours, N,''.Curtis Vice President-Engineering
(2) 'Revision of fabrication techniques.
&Construction-Nuclear Attachment FLU'.j mk//I PENNSYLVANlA POWER 8, LIGHT COMPANY 0XOopn pqg i'fr.Boyce H.Grier September 19, 1980': ello (15)D'".=.ctor-~'fiice of Inspection
(3)   Increased/revised     inspection activities.
&Enforcement
(4) GE has developed a supplemental reinspection instruction (GE Inspection Instruction CA-006) to identify damaged or nonconforming connectors prior to shipment. Satisfactory completion of this cable reinspection on Susquehanna Unit 2 cables was reverified by PPRL audit on Sept. 9-11, 1980 at the               GE manufacturing     facility in San Jose, CA.
: uclear Regulatory Commission D C 20555;.YcDonald, Director Of='.'e of!!anagement information
In addition, faulty crimping tools were repaired or replaced             and periodic testing of crimping tools was increased.
&Program Control L'.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission 4'asnington, D.C.20555 Nr.Robert.'f.Gallo U.S.nuclear Regulatory Commission P, Q.Box 52 Sh c!:.sninny, Pennsylvania 18655 ATTACHbKNT TO PLA 545 Page 1 of 3 PGCC/ACR CABLE PROBLEh/S FINAL REPORT C/ACR Cab'c P:oblems DESCRIPTION In letters from Bechtel Construction dated October 3, 1978, PP5L was informed that during implementation of General Electric's FDDR-KR1-521, Rev.0 (General Cable Retrofit)rework, it was noted that numerous cases of-'nsulation damages were found and that one cable was found to have four (4)conductors pulled from their pin connectors.
Construction site personnel have been given further instructions in the handling and installation of cables. The site electricians have been instructed to use a steady pull (not a yank) when making pull tests and the spring testers are calibrated every 30 days or sooner           if deemed necessary.
Due to the high percentage of damaged cable, the quality of all terminations was rendered indeterminate.
CONCLUSIONS The repair/rework and testing of the Unit 1 PGCC/ACR cables is nearly complete. All Unit 1 PGCC/ACR cables will be completed prior to fuel load.
NCR-3231 was generated to document the problems within the PGCC/ACR complex.t, was agreed to by PP5L, Bechtel and General Electric, that GE>>ould prepar an FDI which should have details of a complete inspection plan and an approved repair procedure.
The Unit 2 PGCC/ACR     cables will be installed   and repaired   or reworked     as necessary. Discrepancies     will be documented   on an NCR.
In Februarv, 1979, GE issued FDI-NJGO Rev.0 to perform a 100'o inspection of all GE supplied SITS/FITS cables used in the Susquehanna 1 ACR control room, upper relay room and lower relay room for damaged insulation and suspect pin crimps.Approved methods of repair for damaged PGCC/ACR cable connectors identified during the inspections performed under FDI-t'fJGO were accomplished in accordance with GE FDDR-KRl-526.
For Unit   2 PGCC/ACR cables, field inspections of the equipment and additional GE fabrication personnel training, inspection and revised fabrication techniques should preclude recurrence of similar problems.}}
This FDDR was originally issued on Sept.6, 1978 to control the repair of PGCC/ACR panel connectors.
The Panel Ccnnector problems were explained in our PLA-506 dated July 8, 1980.The inspections, repair/rework and tests for the cables under FDI-ÃJGO, FDDR-KR1-526, their revisions and'ddendums are nearly complete.A total of 1762 cables have been inspected.
The results of the inspection are as follows:~Dame e guuant it 1.Nicks to conductor insulation 264 Cuts to conductor insulation Damaged or no shrink tubing 346 265 Pins pulled off during pull test or fell off during depinning 58."ot pinned in accordance with wire list or ass."..bly method 78 V~F!iled continuity 21 CAUSE{a}and", nicks and cuts to conductor insulation; after having inves-=!~'..";~'.:,"-'arced con"uctor insulation within the T-'.lOD wiring"o a conne." sr,:.'~;e".."..ired by GE that during reassembly (i.e., pin insertion and ez-trac"icn u ing the standard Amphenol tooling for the termination modules)continual difficulty was experienced.
The ferrule edge during extraction and the sharp insertion tool edge during assembly impacted on the densely packed w res at the connector area causing nicks, cuts and abrasions.(b)It~..3, damaged or no shrink tubing, can be broken into two (2)parts: (1)the damaged shrink tubing could have been caused at the factory during asse...bly of the cable or at the construction site during installation; and (2)the lack of shrink tubing was due to an oversight in manufacturing.(c)Item 4, pins pulled off during pull test or which fell off during depinning; it was determined that a combination of manufacturing personnel error and cr-'mping tool malfunction, due to inadequate QA coverage, was responsible for defective cr mps.This would account for pins failing pull tests or falling off during depinning.(d)Item 5, not pinned in accordance with wire list or assembly method, is a manufacturing error;i.e., the conductor might be pinned in hole A in a connector but in hole B in the connector on the opposite end of the cable.(e)Item 6, failed continuity, is a direct resul't of the conductor not pinned in accordance with the wire list or assembly method (Item 5).ANALYSIS OF SAFETY DPLICATIONS As the various problems are of a random nature and there are a number of Class 1E cables involved, the Safety Analysis is presented on an item by item basis as follows: (a)In items 1, 2 and 3, nicks and cuts to conductor insulation and damaged or no heat shrink tubing, if bare copper wire is exposed and left uncorrected, i'ould permit shorting of wires or introduction of external voltages into safety related circuits.Any of these conditions could prevent the circuits from performing the designed safety function.(b)Items 4, 5 and 6, pins pulled off during pull test or fell off during depinning, not pinned in accordance with wire list or assembly method and failed continuity, could affect the designed safety functions.
If during a seismic event, the conductor vibrates loosely in the pin so that there is sporadic or no continuity between the pin and conductor, or if the conductor is not pinned correctly such that there is no continuity between the proper connector pins at each end of the table, the operation of the circuit could be adversely affected.Project Engineering has determined that the above items are reportable under 10CF?5C.55(e).,
-3>>CORRECTIVE ACTIONS The 100%inspection program for PGCC cable connectors and repair/rework for the problems listed in NCR-3231 is nearly complete....."='.o prevent recur'rences of like p oh's~".:t.~;e i'GCC couche connectors', and which are also applicable to the Susquehanna PGCC/ACR Unit 2 cables, are indicated by GE to be: t (1)Appropriate training of personnel involved.(2)'Revision of fabrication techniques.
(3)Increased/revised inspection activities.
(4)GE has developed a supplemental reinspection instruction (GE Inspection Instruction CA-006)to identify damaged or nonconforming connectors prior to shipment.Satisfactory completion of this cable reinspection on Susquehanna Unit 2 cables was reverified by PPRL audit on Sept.9-11, 1980 at the GE manufacturing facility in San Jose, CA.In addition, faulty crimping tools were repaired or replaced and periodic testing of crimping tools was increased.
Construction site personnel have been given further instructions in the handling and installation of cables.The site electricians have been instructed to use a steady pull (not a yank)when making pull tests and the spring testers are calibrated every 30 days or sooner if deemed necessary.
CONCLUSIONS The repair/rework and testing of the Unit 1 PGCC/ACR cables is nearly complete.All Unit 1 PGCC/ACR cables will be completed prior to fuel load.The Unit 2 PGCC/ACR cables will be installed and repaired or reworked as necessary.
Discrepancies will be documented on an NCR.For Unit 2 PGCC/ACR cables, field inspections of the equipment and additional GE fabrication personnel training, inspection and revised fabrication techniques should preclude recurrence of similar problems.}}

Latest revision as of 00:49, 22 October 2019

Final Deficiency Rept Re Power Generation Control Complex/ Advanced Control Room Cable Connector.Insp Program Nearly Complete.All Unit 1 Cable Repairs Will Be Completed Prior to Fuel Load.Unit 2 Cables Will Be Installed & Repaired
ML18030A013
Person / Time
Site: Susquehanna  Talen Energy icon.png
Issue date: 09/29/1980
From: Curtis N
PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To: Grier B
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, PLA-545, NUDOCS 8010070086
Download: ML18030A013 (6)


Text

REGULA T I-'JFORHA I'IOlTI DISTRIBUT IO'I STE I (RIDS)

ACCESSIO'I NOR'8010070086 DOC ~ DATE'0/09/29 iIOTARIZEO'uO DOCKET ¹ FACIL; Susquehanna Steam Electric Stationp Unit lp Pennsylva 05000387 "38 Susquehanna Steam Electric StationE Jnit 2i Pennsylva 05000388 AUT ~ AUTHOR 4FF ILIATION CURTIS',8 ~ Pennsylvania Power It Light Co. ~P [l RE C I P ~ u 4'4E RECIPIE'JT AFF ILIATIO'J GR IER E B,n. Regi on i Phi adel phi ai Of f i ce of the Director 1 1

SUBJECT:

Final deficiency rept re power generation control complex/

advanced control room cable connector, Inso program nearly complete.A11 Unit 1 cable reoairs will be completed orio,r to fuel loads Unit 2 cables will be installed 5 reoaried.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: B019S COPIES RECEIVED:LTR TITLE: Construction Deficiency Report (10CFR50 ~ 55E) g ENCL g SIZE:M NOTES:Send IEE 3 copies FSAR 4 all amends'5000387 05000388 I

REC IP IETTIT COPIES REC IP IETVT COPIES ID CODE/.'PATE L.rTR ENCL ID CODE/'VANE LTTR ETJCL ACTIOI': A/0 LICEuSNG 04 1 YOUNGBLOODEB 05 1 RUSHBROOKP'DID 06 1, 1 STARKPR ~ 07 1 1 INTERNAL: AD/RC I/IE 17 1 -1 AEOO 18 1 1 ASLBP/J ~ HARD 1 1 D/DIH HUM FAC15 1 1 EDO 4 STAFF 19 1 1 EQUIP QUAL BR11 1 1 IiYD/GEO BR 22 1 1 ICE 09 2 2 LIC QUAL BR 12 1 1 !DIP A 20 1 1

'JRC PDR 02 1 1 OELD 21 1 1 REV 13 1 1 QA BR 14 1 1 EG F I!-E 0 l 1 RUTHERFORDEH ~ IE 1 1 7 ORDS DEV 21 1 1 EXTERiuaL: ACRS 16 16 16 1PDR 03 EIS IC 08 1 1 TOT AL 'IU'LIBEJJ OF COPIES cl EQV IRED: LT TR 40 E VCL 40 I

P"L.

TWO NORTH N1NTM STREEt, ALLENTOWN, PA. 1810) PHONE; (215) 821 5151

~

September 29, 1980

.'!r. Boyce H. Grier Director, Region I U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 SUSQUEPANNA STEP~M ELECTRIC STATION FINAL REPORT OF A DEFICIENCY ON PGCC/ACR CABLE CONNECTORS ERs 100450/100508 FILE 840-4/900-10 PLA-545

References:

PLA-437 dated January 8, 1980 PLA-301 dated November 14, 1978

Dear i!r. Grier:

This letter serves to provide the Commission with a final report of a

'deficiency on Power Generation Control Comp1.ex/Advanced Control Room (PGCC/ACR) cable connector deficiencies originally reported in PLA-301.

The information is furnished pursuant to PP&L's obligations under of 10CFR50.55(e). the'rovisions The attachment to this letter describes the deficient condition along with its safety implications and the corrective action being taken to achieve resolution.

He trust the Commission will find the information forwarded by this letter to be satisfactory.

truly yours, 'ery N,. Curtis Vice President-Engineering & Construction-Nuclear Attachment j

FLU'. mk

/ /

I 0XOopn pqg PENNSYLVANlA POWER 8, LIGHT COMPANY

i'fr. Boyce H. Grier September 19, 1980

': ello (15)

D'".=.ctor-~'fiice of Inspection & Enforcement

uclear Regulatory Commission D C 20555
. YcDonald, Director Of='.'e of !!anagement information & Program Control L'. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 4'asnington, D.C. 20555 Nr. Robert .'f. Gallo U. S. nuclear Regulatory Commission P, Q. Box 52 Sh c!
.sninny, Pennsylvania 18655

ATTACHbKNT TO PLA 545 Page 1 of 3 PGCC/ACR CABLE PROBLEh/S FINAL REPORT C/ACR Cab'c P:oblems DESCRIPTION In letters from Bechtel Construction dated October 3, 1978, PP5L was informed that during implementation of General Electric's FDDR-KR1-521, Rev. 0 (General Cable Retrofit) rework, it was noted that numerous cases of

-'nsulation damages were found and that one cable was found to have four (4) conductors pulled from their pin connectors. Due to the high percentage of damaged cable, the quality of all terminations was rendered indeterminate.

NCR-3231 was generated to document the problems within the PGCC/ACR complex. t, was agreed to by PP5L, Bechtel and General Electric, that GE

>>ould prepar an FDI which should have details of a complete inspection plan and an approved repair procedure.

In Februarv, 1979, GE issued FDI-NJGO Rev. 0 to perform a 100'o inspection of all GE supplied SITS/FITS cables used in the Susquehanna 1 ACR control room, upper relay room and lower relay room for damaged insulation and suspect pin crimps.

Approved methods of repair for damaged PGCC/ACR cable connectors identified during the inspections performed under FDI-t'fJGO were accomplished in accordance with GE FDDR-KRl-526. This FDDR was originally issued on Sept. 6, 1978 to control the repair of PGCC/ACR panel connectors. The Panel Ccnnector problems were explained in our PLA-506 dated July 8, 1980.

The inspections, repair/rework and tests for the cables under FDI-ÃJGO, FDDR-KR1-526, their revisions and'ddendums are nearly complete. A total of 1762 cables have been inspected. The results of the inspection are as follows:

~Dame e guuant it

1. Nicks to conductor insulation 264 Cuts to conductor insulation 346 Damaged or no shrink tubing 265 Pins pulled off during pull test or fell off 58 during depinning

."ot pinned in accordance with wire list or 78 ass ."..bly method V~ F !iled continuity 21

CAUSE

{a} and ", nicks and cuts to conductor insulation; after having inves-

=!~'..";~'.:,"-'arced con"uctor insulation within the T-'.lOD wiring "o a conne." sr,

.'~;e".."..ired by GE that during reassembly (i.e., pin insertion and ez-trac"icn u ing the standard Amphenol tooling for the termination modules) continual difficulty was experienced. The ferrule edge during extraction and the sharp insertion tool edge during assembly impacted on the densely packed w res at the connector area causing nicks, cuts and abrasions.

(b) It~.. 3, damaged or no shrink tubing, can be broken into two (2) parts: (1) the damaged shrink tubing could have been caused at the factory during asse...bly of the cable or at the construction site during installation; and (2) the lack of shrink tubing was due to an oversight in manufacturing.

(c) Item 4, pins pulled off during pull test or which fell off during depinning; it was determined that a combination of manufacturing personnel error and cr-'mping tool malfunction, due to inadequate QA coverage, was responsible for defective cr mps. This would account for pins failing pull tests or falling off during depinning.

(d) Item 5, not pinned in accordance with wire list or assembly method, is a manufacturing error; i.e., the conductor might be pinned in hole A in a connector but in hole B in the connector on the opposite end of the cable.

(e) Item 6, failed continuity, is a direct resul't of the conductor not pinned in accordance with the wire list or assembly method (Item 5).

ANALYSIS OF SAFETY DPLICATIONS As the various problems are of a random nature and there are a number of Class 1E cables involved, the Safety Analysis is presented on an item by item basis as follows:

(a) In items 1, 2 and 3, nicks and cuts to conductor insulation and damaged or no heat shrink tubing, if bare copper wire is exposed and left uncorrected, permit shorting of wires or introduction of external voltages into i'ould safety related circuits. Any of these conditions could prevent the circuits from performing the designed safety function.

(b) Items 4, 5 and 6, pins pulled off during pull test or fell off during depinning, not pinned in accordance with wire list or assembly method and failed continuity, could affect the designed safety functions. If during a seismic event, the conductor vibrates loosely in the pin so that there is sporadic or no continuity between the pin and conductor, or if the conductor is not pinned correctly such that there is no continuity between the proper connector pins at each end of the table, the operation of the circuit could be adversely affected.

Project Engineering has determined that the above items are reportable under 10CF?5C.55(e).,

-3>>

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS The 100% inspection program for PGCC cable connectors and repair/rework for the problems listed in NCR-3231 is nearly complete.

...."= '.o prevent recur'rences of like p oh's ~ ".:t.~;e i'GCC couche connectors', and which are also applicable to the Susquehanna PGCC/ACR Unit 2 cables, are indicated by GE to be:

t (1) Appropriate training of personnel involved.

(2) 'Revision of fabrication techniques.

(3) Increased/revised inspection activities.

(4) GE has developed a supplemental reinspection instruction (GE Inspection Instruction CA-006) to identify damaged or nonconforming connectors prior to shipment. Satisfactory completion of this cable reinspection on Susquehanna Unit 2 cables was reverified by PPRL audit on Sept. 9-11, 1980 at the GE manufacturing facility in San Jose, CA.

In addition, faulty crimping tools were repaired or replaced and periodic testing of crimping tools was increased.

Construction site personnel have been given further instructions in the handling and installation of cables. The site electricians have been instructed to use a steady pull (not a yank) when making pull tests and the spring testers are calibrated every 30 days or sooner if deemed necessary.

CONCLUSIONS The repair/rework and testing of the Unit 1 PGCC/ACR cables is nearly complete. All Unit 1 PGCC/ACR cables will be completed prior to fuel load.

The Unit 2 PGCC/ACR cables will be installed and repaired or reworked as necessary. Discrepancies will be documented on an NCR.

For Unit 2 PGCC/ACR cables, field inspections of the equipment and additional GE fabrication personnel training, inspection and revised fabrication techniques should preclude recurrence of similar problems.