Information Notice 1987-39, Control of Particle Contamination at Nuclear Power Plants

Control of Particle Contamination at Nuclear Power Plants

ML031130618
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Skagit, Marble Hill
Issue date:	08/21/1987
From:	Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-87-039, NUDOCS 8708170408
Download: ML031130618 (15)

..-.i V' 'SINS No.: 6835 iN 87-39 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 August 21, 1987 NRC INFORMATION

NOTICE NQ. 87-39: CONTROL OF HOT PARTICLE CONTAMINATION

AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

Addressees

All nuclear power reactor facilities

and spent fuel storage facilities

holding an NRC license or a construction

permit.Background

and

Purpose

IE Information

Notice 86-23 (Reference

1) provided information

on events in-volving excessive

skin exposures

resulting

from skin contamination

by small, highly radioactive

particles

with high specific activity (hot particles).

Since that information

notice was issued, there have been more of these events, and a recent report by the Institute

of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) (Reference

2)provides additional

information

on this subject. This information

notice pro-vides information

on some of the subsequent

events and discusses

degraded fuel and a lack of proper radiological

control during fuel reconstitution

as major sources of hot particles.

Generic licensee lessons learned also are included.It is expected that recipients

will review this information

for applicability

to their facilities

and consider action, if appropriate, to preclude a similar problem occurring

at their facilities.

However, suggestions

contained

in this notice do not constitute

NRC requirements;

therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Discussion:

During the first 6 months of 1987, events involving

hot particle exposures

were reported at nine different

nuclear power stations.

Two events in late 1986 (at V.C. Summer and San Onofre) involved exposures

apparently

exceeding

NRC regula-tory limits. Attachment

1 provides summary descriptions

of eight of these events. More detailed descriptions

can be obtained from the referenced

inspec-tion reports for each event. (Copies of NRC Inspection

Reports are available from the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street N.W., Washington, D.C.)Hot particles

come primarily

from two major sources: degraded fuel and neutron-activated

corrosion

and wear products (e.g., Stellite).

While much of the information

in this notice is pertinent

to both neutron-activated

corrosion and wear product particles (hereafter

referred to as activated

particles)

and

K> QIN 87-39 August 21, 1987 irradiated

fuel particles (hereafter

referred to as fuel particles), a major concern of this notice is extended facility operation

with degraded fuel and the resulting

problems with fuel particle contamination.

On the basis of an NRC review of licensees'

corrective

actions, discussions

with licensees'

operating

staffs, and information

obtained by NRC inspectors, the lessons learned and licensee good practices

resulting

from the events summarized

in Attachment

1 are as follows: 1. Extended power plant operation

with degraded fuel (leaking fuel pins) can result in widespread

dispersal

of fuel particles.

Some plants continue to experience

fuel particle contamination

problems long after leaking fuel pins have been removed because of the residual contamination

of plant systems. Some plants with these problems have started programs to account for missing fuel pellets and fragments

and to identify measures to recover this material.2. Considerations

concerning

the handling of leaking fuel include the following:

a. Special techniques

and precautions

for handling leaking fuel bundles are necessary

to prevent aggravating

the spread of fuel particles.

For example, containment

devices should be used when reconstituting

fuel. The lack of proper radiological

controls and oversight

of the fuel reconstitution

process in the San Onofre 3 fuel pool led to loss of control and dispersal

of numerous fuel particles

into the pool.Fuel particles

then spread through the plant spent fuel systems and to the liquid radwaste systems.b. A damaged, leaking fuel pin that is not properly contained

and segregated

from the common fuel pool area could be a significant, long-term

source of fuel particle contamination.

c. Plants should be aware that NSSS vendors' special refueling

tools and equipment

could be a source of fuel particle contamination.

These tools and equipment

should be carefully

surveyed before they are used and before they are shipped to other facilities.

3. Some plants that have operated for extended periods of time with degraded fuel and plants with activated

particle problems now have instituted

specialized, comprehensive

training programs for plant system maintenance

workers and general employees.

These programs are designed to better inform and prepare the plant staff to cope with the continuing

fuel particle problems.

Additionally, as part of comprehensive

contamination

control programs, special new procedures

to improve surveys for detection

--..IN 87-39 August 21, 1987 of.hot particles

have been prepared and health physics technicians

have been trained in their use. Decontamination

and dose evaluation

methods and procedures

that focus on hot particles

have been implemented. (See summaries

of events at Trojan and.San Onofre in Attachment

1.).4.. In general, ;licensees

have upgraded their programs for contamination

monitoring

of "clean," laundered

anti-contamination

protective

clothing (PC). However, PC continues

to be a means of transferring

both fuel particles

and activated

particles.

Some facilities

need to consider making their PC monitoring

programs more sensitive.

For example, some licensees

that are using contractor

laundry services found the contrac-tor's alarm on the radiation

monitor (used to screen PC) too high to-detect 0.4 microcurie (VCi) particles.

Moreover, when commercial

laundry services are used, it is possible that PC from a "particle-free" plant* *-can be mixed with PC from a plant with hot particle problems.

Finally, at.leastrone

licensee was relying solely on monitoring

of large bundles of washed PC (bulk surveys) and was not monitoring

samples of individual

PC. For plants with identified

particle problems, individual

PC items may have to be checked before they are reused after cleaning.5. Except for the-Trojan

event discussed

in Attachment

1, to date, no licensee has reported detecting

hot.particles

during airborne sampling.However, as a precaution,,some

licensees

have elected to provide workers with respiratory

protection

for performing

maintenance

on plant systems known to-be a source of hot particles.

No plant has reported inhalation

or ingestion

of hot particles

by any worker.6. Hot particles

in contact with skin.produce

very high dose rates. Diligent personnel

contamination

surveys performed

as soon as practical

after .completing

work involving

contamination

are needed to minimize potential exposure times.-7. Approximately

75 percent of the U.S. power reactor facilities

are cur-rently using new high-sensitivity

whole-body

contamination

monitors.These state-of-the-art

contamination

monitors increase the probability

of detecting

hot-particles

on plant personnel

while reducing the likelihood

of inadvertently

releasing

particles

from the plant site. To-date, most of-the particles

found on personnel

have:been

detected by these new monitors.

Even with use of the new monitors, a few instances

have oc-curred where hot particles

have inadvertently

been carried home by workers.and have-been

detected in the home or on the worker returning

to the site.No significant ,public exposures

have been reported to date.8. In a recent study for the NRC (Reference

3), it was reported that a plant operating

with 0.125 percent pin-hole fuel cladding defects showed a general five-fold

increase in whole-body

radiation

exposure rates in some

IN 87-39 .August 21, 1987 areas of the plant when compared to a sister plant with high-integrity

fuel (<0.01percent

leakers).

Around certain plant systems the degraded fuel may elevate.-radiation

exposure rates even more. -9. Maintenance-on

valves with Stellite components

can cause introduction

of cobalt-containing

debris with Co-60 as the resultant

neutron activation

product. Some plants have instituted

work controls (e.g., use of contain-ment and post-maintenance

cleaning)

to minimize this input into reactor systems (Reference

4).Health Implications

and Radiation

Protection

Criteria for Hot Particle-Exposures

of Skin: -A hot'particle

on the skin gives a high beta dose to a small area.' Any radia-tion dose to the skin is-assumed

to result in'some increased

risk of skin cancer, although'this

type of cancer is rarely fatal.' Experiments

with animals indicate that highly localized

irradiation

of-the skin'by hot particles

is less likely to'cause skin cancer than more uniform irradiation

by the same quantity of radioactive

material.:-

In addition to any increased

risk of cancer, large doses to the skin from hot particles

also may produce observable

effects such as reddening, hardening, peeling, or ulceration

of the skin-immediately

around the particle;

These effects appear only'after

a-threshold

dose is exceeded.

The doses from hot particles

'equired to-produce

these effects'in

the 'skin are'not known pre-cisely;-Ihowever, -it appears likely, except for a point reddening,-that

these effects will only be seen for doses of hundreds of rems or more.'- No such effects have been seen to date on any workers who have been exposed to-hot particles, even though one exposure has been measured or calculated

as high as 512 rem.Recent reviews of radiobiology

and radiation

protection

criteria for skin, in-cluding considerations

of hot particle exposures, have been provided-by-Wells (Reference

5) and Charles (References

6 and 7). The NRC staff recognizes

the need for more'information

on the effects of radiation

on skin and particularly

the effects-of

hot particle irradiation.

The staff has requested

the National Council on Radiation

Protection

and Measurements (NCRP) to. study the health significance

of hot particle exposures and to provisde recommendations- based on the findings of this study. These recommendations

may result in changes in NRC requirements

with respect to hot particle exposures.

However, until these requirements

are changed, IE Infor-mation Notice 86-23 (Reference

1) contains current information

for use in evaluating

doses to skin resulting

from hot particles.

./ ..IN 87-39 August. 21, 1987 Page 5 of S o I specific action or. written response is required by this information

notice.* you have any questions

about this matter, please contact the Regional Admiistrator

'f the appropriate

regional office or this office.e ,.harles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technwcal

Contact:-

James E..Wigginton, NRR (301) 492-4663 John D. Buchanan, NRR.(301) 492-7293 References

I. JAE Information

Notice 86-23, "Excessive

Skin Exposures

Due to Contamina- tihn With Hot Particles," April 9, 1986.2i. nstitute of Nuclear Power Operations, Significant

Event Report 18-87 (Rev..2), "Radiation

Exposure From Small Particles," July 16, 1987.3,- Hoeller; M. P., :G. F. Martin, and D. L..Haggard, "The Impact of Fuel*- Cladding Failure Events on Occupational

Radiation

Exposures

at Nuclear:PowerPants.

Case Study: PWR During RoutineOperations," NUREG/CR-4485 (PNL-5606), January 1986.H4 Heard, D. B., and R. J. Freeman, "Cobalt Contamination

Resulting

From.`Valve IMaintenance," Electric Power Research Institute, EPRI NP-3220, Final::Report, August 1983. .5.. Welli, 3., "Problems

Associated

With Localized

Skin Exposures," in "Radia-tion Damage to Skin: Fundamental

and Practical

Aspects," Proceedings

of a: .Workshop.

heldat Saclay, France, on October 9-11, 1985, Brit..J3. Radiology, Supplement

No. 19, pp. 146-150 (1986).* .6. Charles, 4.W., "The Biological

Bases of Radiation

Protection

Criteria for Superficial, Low Penetrating

Radiation

Exposure," in "Dosimetry

of Beta Particles

and Low Energy X-Rays," Proceedings

of a Workshop held at-Sacay, Francei October 7-9,-1985," Radiation

Protection

Dosimetry

14 (No.P2),pp. 79-90 (1986).-7. Charles, 14. W., "Skin, Eye, and Testis: Current Exposure Problems and Recent..Advances

in Radiobiology," J. Soc. Radiol. Prot. 6 (No. 2), pp. 69-81 (1986).Attachments;..

..-*. l. EventSummaries

.2.. List-4f Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices

Attachment

1 IN 87-39 August 21, 1987 EVENT SUMMARIES San Onofre 3. Events Durina November 1986 -March 1987, Inspection

Report No. 50-362/86-37 Background:

At the onset of the first fuel cycle, significant

fuel degradation

was evident.The plant continued

to operate with approximately

105 defective

fuel pins. In late 1985 during the first refueling

outage, a fuel pin was inadvertently

pulled apart during the fuel reconstitution

process. Several fuel pellets fell and dispersed

throughout

the fuel pool. Fuel particles

had previously

been detected early on during reconstitution

on fuel handling tools and on the refueling

floors. All the severely damaged fuel pins were then grouped into one fuel bundle and stored in the pool without any containment.

Event Specifics:

From January 2 through February 20, 1987, the licensee's

aggressive

hot parti-cle inventory

and tracking system indicated

that 92 "new" fuel particles (recently

neutron irradiated), 155 "old" fuel particles, 51 ruthenium, 84 crud, and 42 cobalt particles

had been found and analyzed.

Before 1987, no formal tracking program existed.Several incidents

involving

hot particles

have occurred, including

an apparent worker extremity

exposure (hand) of 512 rem during November 1986. As a result, appropriate

NRC enforcement

actions are currently

underway.

Three events involving

the inadvertent

release of hot particles

from the plant site occurred in February 1987. In two of these events, the radiation

dose to the public was determined

to be negligible.

However, the third event involved a 0.2.;Ci particle found by a worker at his home during a self-initiated

radiological

survey. The licensee has not yet estimated

the potential

dose to the worker's family as a result of this occurrence.

In the licensee's

licensee event report (LER No.86-015, Revision 1) of Febru-ary 22, 1987, the following

program improvements

for detecting

hot particles and controlling

personnel

exposures

from hot particles

were described:

f Extensive, mandatory

use of exceedingly

sensitive

fixed instrumentation (frisking

booths) for the detection

of personnel

contamination;

Special training (including

hands-on laboratory

exercises)

in radioactive

particle characteristics

and survey techniques

for all Health Physics Technicians;

C-.

Attachment

1 IN 87-39 August 21, 1987 Oral and written indoctrination

of all managers, first line super-visors and workers in the special problems associated

with radio-active particles, including

the methods each person must employ to protect himself;Special procedures

to assure detection

and control of radioactive

particles

which feature the establishment

of a clearly identifiable

zone, to demark and contain such particles, surrounded

by clearly identified

buffer zones (or solid physical barriers)

which are surveyed frequently

to verify that control is being maintained;

Maintenance

and wide publication

of a radioactive

particle census during outages to maintain station awareness;

The establishment

of a Task Force to recommend

and implement

action to minimize the future production

and movement of radioactive

particles.

Trojan, April, 1987, Inspection

Report No. 50-344/87-15 Background:

The facility has operated since July 1982 with an estimated

112 fuel pellets unaccounted

for throughout

the reactor and support plant systems. The licensee recovered

or located about 264 pellets of the estimated

376 missing after the 1982 refueling

outage, which occurred because of the baffle jetting problems of the 1981 fuel cycle. (See IE Information

Notice 82-27, "Fuel Rod Degradation

Resulting

From Baffle.Water-Jet

Impingement," August .5, 1982.)Event Specifics:

Shortly after the start of the 1987 refueling

outage in April, a significant

increase in personnel

skin contaminations

occurred.

On April 9, high surface contamination (up to 300,000 dpm/100 cm 2) and high airborne activity levels-.(2E-7 pCi/cc, mixed fission products)

in containment

resulted from the dis-persal of fuel fragments

during reactor vessel. stud removal and stud-hole plugging operations.

The workers in the reactor cavity were wearing respira-tors and no excessive

uptakes of.radioactive

materials

were detected during followup whole-body

counting.

Because of the spread of contamination

to the spent fuel building, the licensee stopped all- reactor building cavity work and all personnel

evacuated

the area that afternoon.

On April 10, a licensee radiation

survey located a hot spot on the cavity floor near a reactor vessel stud-hole

(>100 rad/hr beta and 30 R/hr gamma contact reading using a portable ion-chamber

survey.instrument).

On April 11, another worker located what appeared to be about one-half of a fuel pellet in the flange area at the stud hole. This partial fuel pellet was removed on April 12.

Attachment

1 IN 87-39 August 21, 1987 On April 17, a radiation

protection

technician, after performing

a survey of the lower refueling

cavity, discovered

a fuel particle lodged in his protective

rubber shoe cover. This particle was later determined

to be composed of approximately

50 mCi of mixed fission product activity;

showed readings of 1200 mR/hr with the window open and 250 mR/hr with the window closed. After a careful time-and-motion

study of the technician's

activities, the licensee determined

that no NRC regulatory

dose limits were exceeded. (Licensee

esti-mates were 1.2 rem to whole body; 4.6 rem to skin; 9.6 rem to extremities.)

In general, it appears that the licensee experienced

a programmatic

breakdown that resulted in several workers receiving

significant, unnecessary

radiation exposures

from fuel particle contamination.

In LER No. 87-08'dated

May 8, 1987, the licensee identified

the following

additional

concerns and'corrective

actions. The LER stated in part: Workers entering containment

on April 9 were not-aware

of the fuel particle hazards. As a corrective

measure, all personnel

with access to radiological

control areas were retrained

to be informed of the fuel particle problem and perform hands-on training to demonstrate

competence

in anti-contamination

clothing use. Daily reports are being provided to workers on the status of containment

activities.

Radiation

surveys and record keeping were inadequate.

As a corrective

measure, new procedures

were developed

to specifically

address discrete radioactive

particles.

All radiation

protection

technicians

have been trained on these new procedures...

There was-insufficient

extremity

monitoring

and no procedures

for particle control. As a corrective

measure, procedures

have been prepared to address particle control. Additional

extremity

moni-toring is being utilized.Evaluation

of radiological

events needs to be improved.

A'new-pro

cedure will be prepared for documenting

and evaluating

radiologicalj

events.-Review of radiation

protection

activities.'is

insufficient.

A new separate onsite review committee

will be established

to evaluate radiological

events and to routinely

review the performance

of the Radiation

Protection

Department.

-Insufficient

staffing existed. Increasing

the manpower in both the onsite Radiation

Protection

Department

and the corporate

Radiological

Safety Branch of the Nuclear Safety and Regulation

Department

is being pursued.

Attachment

1 IN 87-39 August 21, 1987 Problems existed due to insufficient

radiation

monitoring

and surveying equipment.

Additional

equipment

including

new portal monitors and radiation

monitoring

equipment

has been procured.There was the potential

for radiation

exposure to individuals

from fuel particles

on anti-contamination

clothing.

An evaluation

for potential exposure is in progress.V. C. Summer, November 1986, Inspection

Report No. 50-395/86-22 After working-in

a "clean" area where no protective

clothing was required, contamination

was detected on the hand of an electrician

who had worked on a control panel for the overhead crane in the fuel handling building.

After measuring

the dose rates (window open and window closed) with a portable survey instrument

the worker's hand was decontaminated.

The contaminant

was not retained for further analysis.

Based on the survey instrument

readings, the dose to the workers hand was calculated

to be about 420 rems (at a depth of 7 mg/cm 2 averaged over an area of 1 cm 2).Salem Unit 2, April 1987, Inspection

Report No. 50-311/87-11 A fuel particle was detected by a whole-body

contamination

monitor on a work-er's arm. The particle was identified

as a fuel particle (about 225 days since in core) by using a gamma-ray

spectrometer

[Ge(Li) detector].

The licensee believes that the source of the particle was from the last refueling

outage about 8 months earlier.Yankee Nuclear Power Station, May 1987, Inspection

Report No. 50-29/87-10

A potential

skin exposure of 7.6 rem to a worker's scalp occurred from an activated

particle.

The apparent source of the particle was the worker's PC hood. After its discovery, the particle remained on the worker's scalp for about 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br />, awaiting medical assistance

to remove the particle.

Prior to medical assistance

arriving on site, the particle was removed by shaving the hair. Earlier in May, the licensee reported that, during fuel assembly move-ment, pieces of fuel rods were seen to have fallen away from the assembly and land on top of the reactor core and in the refueling

cavity area. Fuel recon-stitution

was in progress.

-

Attachment

1 IN 87-39 August 21, 1987 Indian Point Unit 3, May 1987, Inspection

Report No. 50-286/87-18 A maintenance

foreman exiting the containment

after helping to replace steam generator

manway covers received an estimated

4 rem dose to the skin (in back of neck) from an activated

zirconium

particle.

It appears the particle dis-lodged from his PC hood and fell on his neck during temporary

removal of the hood during a work rest-break.

Quad Cities/Dresden/Zion, 1986 and 1987 A special program to investigate

hot particle incidents

has been in place at these Commonwealth

Edison Company facilities

for the last 1-2 years. A total of approximately

100 individual

hot particles

were found on workers' skin or clothing in 1986. Approximately

130 particles

were found in the first six months of 1987. The particles

have been predominantly

Co-60 with activities

ranging from about 0.01 to 1 pCi. Those particles

were analyzed for physical size; the smallest was 20 microns. The licensee investigated

each event and calculated

skin doses. No overexposures

have been reported.

The transfer mechanism

of the particles

to the workers has not been positively

identified.

Callaway Station, 1986 Period, Report No. 50-483/8700 (DRSS)The licensee experienced

ten hot particle skin contamination

incidents

primari-ly during the refueling

outage early during the year. No NRC dose limits were exceeded.

Ineffective

frisking (hand-held

pancake GM-tube) of laundered

PC and potentially

degraded dry-cleaning

fluid quality (leading to cross-contami- nation of PC during cleaning)

were identified

by the licensee as possible contributors

to this contamination

problem.

Attachment

2 IN 87-39 August 21, 1987 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED INFORMATION

NOTICES 1987 Information

Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 87-38 87-37 87-36 87-35 87-34 87-33 87-32 Inadequate

or Inadvertent

Blocking of Valve Movement Compliance

with the General License Provisions

of 10 CFR Part 31 Significant

Unexpected

Erosion of Feedwater

Lines Reactor Trip Breaker, Westinghouse

Model DS-416, Failed to Open on Manual Initiation

from the Control Room Single Failures in Auxiliary Feedwater

Systems Applicability

of 10 CFR Part 21 to Nonlicensees

Deficiencies

in the Testing of Nuclear-Grade

Activated Charcoal.8/17/87 8/10/87 8/4/87 7/30/87 7/24/87 7/24/87 7/10/87 7/10/87 All nuclear power reactor facilities

holding an OL or CP.All persons specifi-cally licensed to manufacture

or to initially

transfer devices containing

radioactive

material to general licensees, as defined in 10 CFR Part 31.All nuclear power reactor facilities

holding an OL or CP.All nuclear power reactor facilities

holding an OL or CP employing

W DS-416 reactor trip breakers.All holders of an OL or a CP for pressurized

water reactor facilities.

All NRC licensees.

All nuclear power reactor facilities

holding an OL or CP.All NRC licensees.

87-31 Blocking, Bracing, and Securing of Radioactive

Materials

Packages in Transportation.

.: OL =CP =Operating

License Construction

Permit

-.V IN 87-XX August, 1987 No specific action or written response is required by this information

notice.If you have any questions

about this matter, please contact the Regional Administrator

of the appropriate

regional office or this office.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

Contact: James E. Wigginton, NRR (301) 492-4663 John 0. Buchanan, NRR (301) 492-7293 References

1. IE Information

Notice 86-23, "Excessive

Skin Exposures

Due to Contamina- tion With Hot Particles," April 9, 1986.2. Institute

of Nuclear Power Operations, Significant

Event Report 18-87 (Rev. 2), "Radiation

Exposure From Small Particles," July 16, 1987.3. Moeller, M. P., G. F. Martin, and D. L. Haggard, "The Impact of Fuel Cladding Failure Events on Occupational

Radiation

Exposures

at Nuclear Power Plants. Case Study: PWR During Routine Operations," NUREG/CR-4485 (PNL-5606), January 1986.4. Heard, D. B., and R. J. Freeman, "Cobalt Contamination

Resulting

From Valve Maintenance," Electric Power Research Institute, EPRI NP-3220, Final Report, August 1983.5. Wells, J., "Problems

Associated

With Localized

Skin Exposures," in "Radia-tion Damage to Skin: Fundamental

and Practical

Aspects," Proceedings

of a Workshop held at Saclay, France, on October 9-11, 1985, Brit.J. Radiology, Supplement

No. 19, pp. 146-150 (1986).6. Charles, M. W,., "The Biological

Bases of Radiation

Protection

Criteria for Superficial, Low Penetrating

Radiation

Exposure," in "Dosimetry

of Beta Particles

and Low Energy X-Rays," Proceedings

of a Workshop held at Saclay, France, October 7-9, 1985," Radiation

Protection

Dosimetry

14 (No.2), pp. 79-90 (1986).7. Charles, M. W., "Skin, Eye, and Testis: Current Exposure Problems and Recent Advances in Radiobiology," J. Soc. Radiol. Prot. 6 (No. 2), pp. 69-81 (1986).Attachments:

1. Events Summaries 2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES

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RBDE-R R PN n 1 847 4 S8//' 87 8/ /87 RPB:DREP:NRR

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• PPMB:ARM JEWigginton

JDBuchanan

LJCunningham

FJCongel TechEd 7/28/87 7/28/87 7/28/87 7/28/87 7/28/87 IN 87-XX August, 1987 No specific action or written response is required by this information

notice.If you have any questions

about this matter, please contact the Regional Administrator

of the appropriate

regional office or this office.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

Contact: James E. Wigginton, NRR (301) 492-4663 John D. Buchanan, NRR (301) 492-7293 References

1. "IE Information

Notice 86-23, "Excessive

Skin Exposures

Due to Contamina- tion With Hot Particles," April 9, 1986.2. Institute

of Nuclear Power Operations, Significant

Event Report 18-87 (Rev. 2), "Radiation

Exposure From Small Particles," July 16, 1987.3. Moeller, M. P., G. F. Martin, and D. L. Haggard, "The Impact of Fuel Cladding Failure Events on Occupational

Radiation

Exposures

at Nuclear Power Plants. Case Study: PWR During Routine Operations," NUREG/CR-4485 (PNL-5606), January 1986.4. Heard, D. B., and R. J. Freeman, "Cobalt Contamination

Resulting

From Valve Maintenance," Electric Power Research Institute, EPRI NP-3220, Final Report, August 1983.5. Wells, J., "Problems

Associated

With Localized

Skin Exposures," in "Radia-tion Damage to Skin: Fundamental

and Practical

Aspects," Proceedings

of a Workshop held at Saclay, France, on October 9-11, 1985, Brit.J. Radiology, Supplement

No. 19, pp. 146-150 (1986).6. Charles, M. W., "The Biological

Bases of Radiation

Protection

Criteria for Superficial, Low Penetrating

Radiation

Exposure," in "Dosimetry

of Beta Particles

and Low Energy X-Rays," Proceedings

of a Workshop held at Saclay, France, October 7-9, 1985," Radiation

Protection

Dosimetry

14 (No.2), pp. 79-90 (1986).7. Charles, M. W., "Skin, Eye, and Testis: Current Exposure Problems and Recent Advances in Radiobiology," J. Soc. Radiol. Prot. 6 (No. 2), pp.69-81 (1986).Attachments:

1. Events Summaries 2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES

D/DOEA:NRR

C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR

CERossi CHBerlinger

8/ /87 8/10/87*RPB:DREP:NRR

• RPB:DREP:NRR

• AC:RPB:DREP:NRR

• D:DREP:NRR

• PPMB:ARM JEWigginton

JDBuchanan

LJCunningham

FJCongel TechEd 7/28/87 7/28/87 7/28/87 7/28/87 7/28/87

~' V IN 87-XX August, 1987 No specific action or written response is required by this information

notice.If you have any questions

about this matter, please contact the Regional Administrator

of the appropriate

regional office or this office.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

Contact: James E. Wigginton, NRR (301) 492-4663 John D. Buchanan, NRR (301) 492-7293 References

1. "IE Information

Notice 86-23, "Excessive

Skin Exposures

Due to Contamina- tion With Hot Particles," April 9, 1986.2. Institute

of Nuclear Power Operations, Significant

Event Report 18-87 (Rev. 2), "Radiation

Exposure From Small Particles," July 16, 1987.3. Moeller, M. P., G. F. Martin, and D. L. Haggard, "The Impact of Fuel Cladding Failure Events on Occupational

Radiation

Exposures

at Nuclear Power Plants. Case Study: PWR During Routine Operations," NUREG/CR-4485 (PNL-5606), January 1986.4. Heard, D. B., and R. J. Freeman, "Cobalt Contamination

Resulting

From Valve Maintenance," Electric Power Research Institute, EPRI NP-3220, Final Report, August 1983.5. Wells, J., "Problems

Associated

With Localized

Skin Exposures,'

in "Radia-tion Damage to Skin: Fundamental

and Practical

Aspects," Proceedings

of a Workshop held at Saclay, France, on October 9-11, 1985, Brit.J. Radiology, Supplement

No. 19, pp. 146-150 (1986).6. Charles, M. W., "The Biological

Bases of Radiation

Protection

Criteria for Superficial, Low Penetrating

Radiation

Exposure," in "Dosimetry

of Beta Particles

and Low Energy X-Rays," Proceedings

of a Workshop held at Saclay, France, October 7-9, 1985," Radiation

Protection

Dosimetry

14 (No.2), pp. 79-90 (1986).7. Charles, M. W., Recent Advances 69-81 (1986)."Skin, Eye, and Testis: Current Exposure Problems and in Radiobiology," J. Soc. Radiol. Prot. 6 (No. 2), pp.Attachments:

1. Events Summaries 2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices C/OGCB:DOEA:NRF

CHBerlinger

R i EP:NRR J Eigginton 7/&X/87 RPM :NRR J. an 7/ig/87 A REP:NRR LJC I4nningham

7}(%/87 D:DREP:NRRI

FJCongel-4/ti/8 7 Techd 7/w