NRC 2016-0001, Screening and High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Results for Inaccessible and Late Addition Components

Screening and High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Results for Inaccessible and Late Addition Components

ML16047A163
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	02/16/2016
From:	Mccartney E Point Beach
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NRC 2016-0001
Download: ML16047A163 (4)

Text

February 16, 2016 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Docket 50-266 and 50-301 Renewed License Nos. DPR-24 and DPR-27 NRC 2016-0001 10 CFR 50.54(f) NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC, Screening and High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Results for Inaccessible and Late Addition Components

References:

(1) NRC Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012 (ML12073A348)

(2) NEI Letter, Proposed Path Forward for NTTF Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Reevaluations, dated April9, 2013 (ML131078386)

(3) NRC Letter, Electric Power Research Institute Report 3002000704, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance:

Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic," as an Acceptable Alternative to the March 12, 2012, Information Request for Seismic Reevaluations, dated May 7, 2013 (ML13106A331) (4) NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC's Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report (CEUS Sites), Response [to] NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated December 22, 2014 (ML14356A426)

On March 12, 2012, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a 50.54(f) letter to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status (Reference 1). Enclosure 1 of Reference (1) requested each addressee located in the Central and Eastern United States (CEUS) to submit a Seismic Hazard Evaluation and Screening Report within 1.5 years from the date of Reference (1). In Reference (2), the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) requested NRC agreement to delay submittal of the final CEUS Seismic Hazard Evaluation and Screening Reports so that an update to the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) ground motion attenuation model could be completed and used to develop that information.

NRC agreed with the proposed path forward in Reference (3). NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC, 6610 Nuclear Road, Two Rivers, WI 54241 Document Control Desk Page 2 Reference (4) provided NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC's (NextEra)

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report. In Reference (4), NextEra indicated walkdowns would be conducted for inaccessible and late addition components that were listed in Section 7.1 of the Report, the components would be screened and evaluated, and the screening and High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) results would be submitted within 120 days following restart of Unit 2 following the Unit's fall 2015 refueling outage. This letter provides the screening and HCLPF results for the inaccessible and late addition components.

This letter contains no new regulatory commitments.

If you have any questions please contact Mr. Bryan Woyak, Licensing Manager, at 920/755-7599.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on February 16, 2016. Very truly yours, NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC Eric McCartney Site Vice President Enclosure cc: Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Administrator, Region Ill, USNRC Resident Inspector, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, USNRC Project Manager, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, USNRC ENCLOSURE NEXTERA ENERGY POINT BEACH, LLC SCREENING AND HIGH CONFIDENCE LOW PROBABILITY OF FAILURE (HCLPF) RESULTS FOR INACCESSIBLE AND LATE ADDITION COMPONENTS One Page Follows SCREENING AND HIGH CONFIDENCE LOW PROBABILITY OF FAILURE {HCLPF) RESULTS FOR INACCESSIBLE AND LATE ADDITION COMPONENTS NextEra has completed walkdowns and evaluation of components previously noted as inaccessible or late additions requiring further action. The component screenings and High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) results are provided in the following table: HCLPF Values and Failure Modes Tabulation Equipment ID Description Failure Mode HCLPF 2RC-570A Reactor Vessel (RV) Head Vent Solenoid Screened ;::: 0.229 (Unit 2) 2RC-570B RV Head Vent Solenoid (Unit 2) Screened ;::: 0.229 2RC-575A RV/T-1 PZR Vent Header to PRT Solenoid Screened ;::: 0.229 (Unit 2) 2RC-575B RV/T-1 PZR Gas Vent to Containment Screened ;::: 0.229 Standpipe Solenoid (Unit 2) C-061 <1 l Diesel Driven Fire Pump Control Panel Anchorage

0.229 D-600 Diesel Driven Fire Pump Battery Rack Anchorage

0.229 FP-3715 Diesel Fire Pump Relief Valve Screened ;

:: 0.229 FP-448 Fire Water Header Isolation Valve Screened ;::: 0.229 FP-536 Fire Water to Service Water Cross Screened ;::: 0.229 Connection Valve P-358 Diesel Driven Fire Pump Anchorage

0.229 P35B-E Diesel Driven Fire Pump Engine Anchorage

0.229 T-30 Diesel Fire Pump Fuel Tank Anchorage

0.229 <1 l This component was incorrectly labeled "C-601" in the 12/22/14 submittal due to a typographical error. Enclosure February 16, 2016 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN

Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Docket 50-266 and 50-301 Renewed License Nos. DPR-24 and DPR-27 NRC 2016-0001 10 CFR 50.54(f) NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC, Screening and High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Results for Inaccessible and Late Addition Components

References:

(1) NRC Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012 (ML12073A348)

(2) NEI Letter, Proposed Path Forward for NTTF Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Reevaluations, dated April9, 2013 (ML131078386)

(3) NRC Letter, Electric Power Research Institute Report 3002000704, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance:

Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic," as an Acceptable Alternative to the March 12, 2012, Information Request for Seismic Reevaluations, dated May 7, 2013 (ML13106A331) (4) NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC's Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report (CEUS Sites), Response [to] NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated December 22, 2014 (ML14356A426)

On March 12, 2012, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a 50.54(f) letter to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status (Reference 1). Enclosure 1 of Reference (1) requested each addressee located in the Central and Eastern United States (CEUS) to submit a Seismic Hazard Evaluation and Screening Report within 1.5 years from the date of Reference (1). In Reference (2), the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) requested NRC agreement to delay submittal of the final CEUS Seismic Hazard Evaluation and Screening Reports so that an update to the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) ground motion attenuation model could be completed and used to develop that information.

NRC agreed with the proposed path forward in Reference (3). NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC, 6610 Nuclear Road, Two Rivers, WI 54241 Document Control Desk Page 2 Reference (4) provided NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC's (NextEra)

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report. In Reference (4), NextEra indicated walkdowns would be conducted for inaccessible and late addition components that were listed in Section 7.1 of the Report, the components would be screened and evaluated, and the screening and High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) results would be submitted within 120 days following restart of Unit 2 following the Unit's fall 2015 refueling outage. This letter provides the screening and HCLPF results for the inaccessible and late addition components.

This letter contains no new regulatory commitments.

If you have any questions please contact Mr. Bryan Woyak, Licensing Manager, at 920/755-7599.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on February 16, 2016. Very truly yours, NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC Eric McCartney Site Vice President Enclosure cc: Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Administrator, Region Ill, USNRC Resident Inspector, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, USNRC Project Manager, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, USNRC ENCLOSURE NEXTERA ENERGY POINT BEACH, LLC SCREENING AND HIGH CONFIDENCE LOW PROBABILITY OF FAILURE (HCLPF) RESULTS FOR INACCESSIBLE AND LATE ADDITION COMPONENTS One Page Follows SCREENING AND HIGH CONFIDENCE LOW PROBABILITY OF FAILURE {HCLPF) RESULTS FOR INACCESSIBLE AND LATE ADDITION COMPONENTS NextEra has completed walkdowns and evaluation of components previously noted as inaccessible or late additions requiring further action. The component screenings and High Confidence Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) results are provided in the following table: HCLPF Values and Failure Modes Tabulation Equipment ID Description Failure Mode HCLPF 2RC-570A Reactor Vessel (RV) Head Vent Solenoid Screened ;::: 0.229 (Unit 2) 2RC-570B RV Head Vent Solenoid (Unit 2) Screened ;::: 0.229 2RC-575A RV/T-1 PZR Vent Header to PRT Solenoid Screened ;::: 0.229 (Unit 2) 2RC-575B RV/T-1 PZR Gas Vent to Containment Screened ;::: 0.229 Standpipe Solenoid (Unit 2) C-061 <1 l Diesel Driven Fire Pump Control Panel Anchorage

0.229 D-600 Diesel Driven Fire Pump Battery Rack Anchorage

0.229 FP-3715 Diesel Fire Pump Relief Valve Screened ;

:: 0.229 FP-448 Fire Water Header Isolation Valve Screened ;::: 0.229 FP-536 Fire Water to Service Water Cross Screened ;::: 0.229 Connection Valve P-358 Diesel Driven Fire Pump Anchorage

0.229 P35B-E Diesel Driven Fire Pump Engine Anchorage

0.229 T-30 Diesel Fire Pump Fuel Tank Anchorage

0.229 <1 l This component was incorrectly labeled "C-601" in the 12/22/14 submittal due to a typographical error. Enclosure