NRC-2021-0010, CFR 50.59 Evaluation and Commitment Change Summary Report

CFR 50.59 Evaluation and Commitment Change Summary Report

ML21092A006
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	04/02/2021
From:	Schultz E Point Beach
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NRC-2021-0010
Download: ML21092A006 (3)

Text

NEXTera ENERGY ~

POINT BEACH April 2, 2021 NRC 2021-0010 10 CFR 50.71(e)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN : Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Dockets 50-266 and 50-301 Renewed License Nos. DPR-24 and DPR-27 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation and Commitment Change Summary Report NextEra Energy Point Beach (NextEra), LLC, is submitting the 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation and Commitment Change Summary Report for the Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP), Units 1 and 2, for October 1, 2019 through March 1, 2021.

Sincerely, NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC Licensing Manager Eric Schultz Enclosure cc: Administrator, Region Ill , USNRC Resident Inspector, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, USNRC Project Manager, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, USNRC NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC 6610 Nuclear Road, Two Rivers, WI 54241

ENCLOSURE NEXTERA ENERGY POINT BEACH, LLC POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 10 CFR 50.59 & COMMITMENT CHANGE

SUMMARY

REPORT FOR OCTOBER 1, 2019- MARCH 1, 2021 10 CFR 50.59 EVALUATIONS FSAR/Technical Requirement Manual: Changes to Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement (TSR 3.6.7.1) was done in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The 50.59 Evaluation revised FSAR Section 14.1 .12 and Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) TRM 3.7.6.

Activity

Description:

Extended the required channel functional test interval for the Independent Overspeed Protection System (IOPS) control circuits and relays from monthly to quarterly. Extended the required functional test interval for the mechanical turbine overspeed trip actuator and valve from semi-annual to 9 months. Extended the required functionality test interval for cross-over steam dump valves, solenoids and associated relays from semi-annually to 9 months. Extended the required functional test interval for the turbine stop valves and governor valves, including a stop valve integrity check, from 6 months to 9 months.

Summary of Evaluation:

The 50.59 evaluated the following:

While the changes in the surveillance frequencies result in a 1.8 times increase in the calculated frequency of an overspeed event, the frequency remains below the plant-specific acceptance criterion of 1E-5/year (WCAP16054-P) . Therefore, the proposed change meets the 2nd test described in NEI 96-07 for being not resulting in a "more than minimal increase" in the frequency of occurrence of an accident previously described in the FSAR.

==

Conclusion:==

No activity requiring prior NRC approval per 10 CFR 50.59 was identified and no Technical Specification change is involved. UFSAR Section 14.1.12 and TRM 3. 7.6 were updated to reflect the revised results of the surveillance frequency change of TSR 3.7.6. [EVAL 2020-002]

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COMMITMENT CHANGE EVALUATIONS Bolting Integrity Program - Hardness Testing : The original commitment was to perform hardness testing of random samples of bolting materials as part of the receipt inspection process as recommended in EPRI NP-5769 during the period of extended operation. Cancelled the commitment for NextEra to perform the hardness testing because the testing is being performed by the vendor.

Justification for Change: PBNP has continued to conduct hardness testing of random samples of safety-related fasteners as part of the receipt inspection process. The period of extended operation began October 5, 201 O for Unit1; and to present, there have been no recorded test failures. The accumulated test data represents nine years of operating experience regarding the quality of the fasteners purchased by PBNP. The data shows that the fasteners are consistently compliant with their associated Certified Material Test Report and/or Certificate of Compliance, negating the need for future testing. (CCE 2019-002)

Steam Generator Integrity Program: As part of the Steam Generator Integrity Program, visual inspections of accessible areas to verify the integrity of steam generator secondary-side components will be performed at least every six effective full power years (EFPY). Indications of degradation or unacceptable conditions will be evaluated within the corrective action program, including the extent of condition. The existing commitment remains in effect with the following exception: visual inspection of the PBN Unit 2 upper steam drum (USO) components in SG-A in U2R37 will be deferred an additional fuel cycle beyond the 6 EFPY requirement.

Justification for Change: Alignment of SG primary side (ECT) and secondary side inspection/maintenance. There are no SG eddy-current (ECT) exams scheduled for U2R37; the next exam is in U2R38. The PBN Unit 2 SG preventive maintenance (PM) strategic plan is to perform all secondary-side inspection/maintenance on both SGs in the same outage with primary-side activities (such as ECT, tube plugging and channel-head inspections) every 3 cycles. The plant-specific operating experience has shown that the PBN Unit 2 USO components in both SGs have not exhibited degradation in over 19 EFPYs, since SG replacement in 1997. This change does not change the frequency of future inspection, the periodic inspection required by the commitment (at least every 6 EFPY) remain in effect after the one-time deferral. The commitment for periodic visual inspections on the SG secondary-side components has been implemented on each SG on PBN Unit 2 since entering the period of extended operation. (CCE 2019-003)

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