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| 1.0 PURPOSE The purpose of this report is to describe the design basis that is applied to the relief valves intended for use in the suction piping of the Shutdown Cooling System of C-E System 80 Units.The report will detail the sizing criteria and test specifications applied to these valves.This report documents a C-E presentation which was delivered to the NRC Staff on November 9, 1984.The purpose of that meeting was to substantiate the operability of these valves.NOTE: The figures used in this report represent slides which were'sed at that meeting.2.0 SCOPE This report is applicable to all C-E System 80 units.All the information contained in this report is directly referenceable to CESSAR.In keeping with the CESSAR format no valve manufacturer specific information is presented. | | ===1.0 PURPOSE=== |
| | The purpose of this report is to describe the design basis that is applied to the relief valves intended for use in the suction piping of the Shutdown Cooling System of C-E System 80 Units.The report will detail the sizing criteria and test specifications applied to these valves.This report documents a C-E presentation which was delivered to the NRC Staff on November 9, 1984.The purpose of that meeting was to substantiate the operability of these valves.NOTE: The figures used in this report represent slides which were'sed at that meeting.2.0 SCOPE This report is applicable to all C-E System 80 units.All the information contained in this report is directly referenceable to CESSAR.In keeping with the CESSAR format no valve manufacturer specific information is presented. |
| CESSAR specifies the necessary valve criteria to meet the system's requirement which.can be supplied by any manufacturer of pressure relief devices.3.0 DESIGN BASIS The following sections and figures describe the design basis, test specifications, and sizing criteria applied to the relief valves installed in the suction piping of the shutdown cooling system.As identified in CESSAR these are valves SI-179 and SI-189.They are shown on the system piping and instrumentation diagram in CESSAR Fi gure 6.3.2-1B. | | CESSAR specifies the necessary valve criteria to meet the system's requirement which.can be supplied by any manufacturer of pressure relief devices.3.0 DESIGN BASIS The following sections and figures describe the design basis, test specifications, and sizing criteria applied to the relief valves installed in the suction piping of the shutdown cooling system.As identified in CESSAR these are valves SI-179 and SI-189.They are shown on the system piping and instrumentation diagram in CESSAR Fi gure 6.3.2-1B. |
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| 3.1 FUNCTION CESSAR identifies these valves as providing a dual function.Their initial function was to protect the shutdown cooling system from overpressurizati on from any possi bl e occurance. | | ===3.1 FUNCTION=== |
| | CESSAR identifies these valves as providing a dual function.Their initial function was to protect the shutdown cooling system from overpressurizati on from any possi bl e occurance. |
| Their function was later expanded to provide low temperature overpressure protection (LTOP)for the RCS.For both functions the valves are designed to be redundant, in that one single valve is capable of handling any overpressurization event.Figure 1 is a schematic of the SCS suction piping showing only the section in the region of the relief valves and the suction line isolation valves which isolate the low pressure SCS from RCS pressure.Also indicated are the safety grade interlocks and alarms associated with the isolation valves.The interlocks provide additional overpressure protection for the system.The alarms connected to the isolation valves annunciate overpressure transients which could challange the relief valves and annunciate that LTOP is inhibited by a closed isolation valve.Only train A of the two redundant suction lines is shown.The nomenclature in parentheses indicates Train B's identification. | | Their function was later expanded to provide low temperature overpressure protection (LTOP)for the RCS.For both functions the valves are designed to be redundant, in that one single valve is capable of handling any overpressurization event.Figure 1 is a schematic of the SCS suction piping showing only the section in the region of the relief valves and the suction line isolation valves which isolate the low pressure SCS from RCS pressure.Also indicated are the safety grade interlocks and alarms associated with the isolation valves.The interlocks provide additional overpressure protection for the system.The alarms connected to the isolation valves annunciate overpressure transients which could challange the relief valves and annunciate that LTOP is inhibited by a closed isolation valve.Only train A of the two redundant suction lines is shown.The nomenclature in parentheses indicates Train B's identification. |
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Category:REPORTS-TOPICAL (BY MANUFACTURERS-VENDORS ETC)
MONTHYEARML17311B3441995-09-30030 September 1995 Safety Analysis Rept for Use of Advanced Zr Based Cladding Matl in PVNGS Unit 2 Batch J Demonstration Fuel Assemblies. ML17310B2471994-02-28028 February 1994 Nonproprietary Analysis of 137 Degree Capsule from APS Palo Verde Unit 2 Reactor Vessel Radiation Surveillance Program. ML20128E0741992-07-31031 July 1992 Nonproprietary Pvngs,Unit 1 EOC 3 Exam Rept ML17305B5141991-04-30030 April 1991 Suppl 2 to, Annual Rept on C-E ECCS Codes & Methods for 10CFR50.46. ML17305A6051990-02-28028 February 1990 Annual Rept on C-E ECCS Codes & Methods for 10CFR50.46, Suppl 1 ML20006A8231990-01-10010 January 1990 Errata to Rev 3 to BAW-1543, Master Integrated Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program Consisting of Revised Tables 3-20 & E-1 ML19327C1951989-10-31031 October 1989 Nonproprietary Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station-Unit 1 End-of-Cycle 2 Fuel Exam Rept. ML19351A4191989-09-30030 September 1989 Mark-BW Reload LOCA Analysis for Catawba & McGuire Units. ML17223A6971989-04-30030 April 1989 Annual Rept on C-E ECCS Codes & Methods for 10CFR50.46. ML20235M9111989-02-20020 February 1989 Nonproprietary Catawba Unit 1 Evaluation for Tube Vibration Induced Fatigue ML20207L7781988-10-0606 October 1988 Nonproprietary WCAP 11936, McGuire Unit 2 Evaluation for Tube Vibration Induced Fatigue ML20207L9261988-09-30030 September 1988 Nonproprietary Addendum 2 to COBRA-NC,Analysis for Main Steamline Break in Catawba Unit 1 Ice Condenser Containment (Response to NRC Questions) ML20154M2421988-09-30030 September 1988 Simulate-3 Validation & Verification ML20155G7101988-05-31031 May 1988 End-Of-Cycle 1 Surveillance Fuel Exam Rept ML20154J9831988-04-30030 April 1988 RCS Flow Anomaly Investigation Rept ML20150E6661988-02-29029 February 1988 Charging Pump Gas Binding & Cracked Block Evaluation Rept LD-88-005, Draft C-E Sys 80+TM Std Design, Design Certification Licensing Review Bases.Response to NRC Comments on Licensing Document Encl1988-01-18018 January 1988 Draft C-E Sys 80+TM Std Design, Design Certification Licensing Review Bases.Response to NRC Comments on Licensing Document Encl ML20237C4091987-11-30030 November 1987 Nonproprietary Rev 2 to Byron/Braidwood T-Hot Reduction Final Licensing Rept ML20235M2211987-07-13013 July 1987 Nonproprietary Rev 01-NP to Modified Statistical Combination of Uncertainties ML20236B6211987-06-30030 June 1987 Structural & Seismic Evaluation of Palo Verde Charging Pump Block ML18149A5121986-11-30030 November 1986 Qualification of WRB-1 CHF Correlation in VEPCO Cobra Code. ML20207H9761986-11-30030 November 1986 Nonproprietary Resistance Temp Detector Bypass Elimination Licensing Rept for Byron 1 & 2 & Braidwood 1 & 2 ML20210A6051986-09-0505 September 1986 Addendum a to Vol II of Nusco 140-2, Nusco Thermal Hydraulic Model Qualification ML20155J5231986-05-31031 May 1986 Rev 1 to Functional Design Requirement for Core Protection Calculator ML20155J4911986-05-31031 May 1986 Rev 0 to Core Protection Calculator/Control Element Assembly Calculator Software Mods for CPC Improvement Program Reload Data Block ML20155J5051986-05-31031 May 1986 Rev 1 to Functional Design Requirements for Control Element Assembly Calculator ML20203G5481986-03-31031 March 1986 Relaxed Power Distribution Control Methodology & Associated Fq Surveillance Tech Specs ML20151Z0521986-01-31031 January 1986 Rev 3 to CEN-39(A)-NP, CPC Protection Algorithm Software Change Procedure ML20151Z0641986-01-31031 January 1986 Rev 0 to CEN-323-NP Reload Data Block Constant Installation Guidelines ML20140A6821985-12-31031 December 1985 Reactor Vessel Fluence & Ref Temp for Pressurized Thermal Shock Evaluations ML20210E4871985-12-31031 December 1985 Comprehensive Vibration Assessment Program for Palo Verde Generating Station Unit 2 (Sys 80 Nonprototype-Category 1), Evaluation of Pre-Core Hot Functional Insp Program, Preliminary Rept ML20138M4211985-09-30030 September 1985 Justification for Raising Setpoint for Reactor Trip on High Pressure, Transient Assessment Program ML20135A5571985-08-31031 August 1985 B&W Owners Group Cavity Dosimetry Program ML20135H9491985-08-31031 August 1985 Rev 1 to Reload Nuclear Design Methodology ML20205F2711985-08-31031 August 1985 Errata & Addenda Sheet 14,replacing Pages v/vi,3-2,4-3,4-10, 4-15 & 4-16 to, LOCA Analysis Rept for Dresden Units 2,3 & Quad Cities 1,2 Nuclear Power Stations ML20134N2941985-07-31031 July 1985 Rev 00 to Functional Design Requirement for Control Element Assembly Calculator ML20134N3021985-07-31031 July 1985 Rev 00 to Functional Design Requirement for Core Protection Calculator ML17346B1711985-07-31031 July 1985 Retran Code Transient Analysis Model Qualification. ML20133H3591985-07-31031 July 1985 Statistical DNBR Evaluation Methodology ML20138P1541985-07-0202 July 1985 Rev 1 to TMI-1 Nuclear Generating Station Natural Circulation Cooldown Analysis W/O Reactor Vessel Upper Head Void Formation, Topical Rept ML20127K1381985-06-30030 June 1985 Nuclear Physics Methodology for Reload Design ML20128Q2751985-05-31031 May 1985 Revised Nomad Code & Model ML20129E9881985-05-30030 May 1985 VEPCO Reactor Sys Transient Analysis Using Retran Computer Code ML20111C1331985-02-28028 February 1985 Nonproprietary Rev 1-NP to, Response to NRC Questions on Core Protection Calculator Software,Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station,Unit 1 ML20111C1171985-01-31031 January 1985 Rev 1 to Comprehensive Vibration Assessment Program for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 (Sys 80 Prototype),Evaluation of Predictions & Pre-Core Hot Functional Measurement & Insp Programs ML20106A6481985-01-31031 January 1985 Errata & Addenda Sheet 13,replacing Pages v/vi,3-2,4-3, 4-15 & 4-16 to, LOCA Anaysis Rept for Dresden Units 2 & 3 & Quad Cities 1 & 2 Nuclear Power Stations ML18142A1531984-12-31031 December 1984 Nonproprietary Version of Revised VEPCO Evaluation of Control Rod Ejection Transient. ML17298B5391984-11-30030 November 1984 Summary Rept on Design Basis of Shutdown Cooling Sys Relief Valves for Cessar Sys 80. ML20100F0961984-11-30030 November 1984 Abnormal Transient Operating Guidelines (Atog) Comparison of Davis-Besse Unit 1 to Oconee Unit 3 ML17298B5401984-11-30030 November 1984 Summary Rept on Operability of Shutdown Cooling Sys Relief Valves for Palo Verde Units 1,2 & 3. 1995-09-30
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML17300B3811999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 991007 Ltr ML17300B3271999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3 ML17313B0751999-08-27027 August 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990730,test Mode Trip Bypass for EDG Output Breakers Not Surveilled.Cause Under Investigation.Operations Personnel Conservatively Invoked SR 3.0.3 for SR 3.8.1.13. with 990827 Ltr ML17313B0611999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990810 Ltr ML17313B0191999-07-16016 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990618,RT on Low DNBR Was Noted.Caused by Hardware Induced Calculation Error.Cr Operator Was Taken to Place Reactor in Stable Condition IAW Appropriate Operating Procedure ML17300B3151999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990714 Ltr ML17313A9921999-06-21021 June 1999 Special Rept:On 990525,RMS mini-computer Was Removed from Service to Implement Yr 2000 Mod & Was OOS Longer than 72 H Allowed.Caused by Planned Y2K Mods.Preplanned Alternate Sampling Program Was Initiated ML17313A9911999-06-18018 June 1999 Special Rept:On 990510,loose-part Detection Sys Channel 2 Was Declared Inoperable.Caused by Malfunction of Mineral Cable Connector to Accelerometer.Licensee Will Implement Modifications Which Will Enhance loose-part Detection Sys ML17313A9731999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990608 Ltr ML17313A9281999-05-0707 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990408,PSV Lift Pressures Were Outside of TS Limits.Caused by Lift Pressure Setpoint Drift.Psvs Have Been Tested,Disassembled,Inspected,Reassembled & Certified at Wyle Labs ML17313A9201999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990512 Ltr ML17313A8951999-04-14014 April 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990317,required Surveillance Requirement Not Completed Due to Deficient Procedure,Was Determined. Caused by Cognitive Personnel Error.St Procedures Revised to Require Chiller to Be Operating & Oil Temperature Checked ML17313A8921999-04-13013 April 1999 LER 98-003-01:on 980902,discovered That MSSV as-found Lift Pressures Were Outside TS Limits.Caused by Bonding of Valve Disc to Nozzle Seat.Affected Valves Were Adjusted,Retested & Returned to Svc ML17313A8891999-04-0909 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990310,RT on High Pressurizer Pressure Was Noted.Caused by Loss of Heat Removal.Cr Supervisor Was Removed from Shift Duties for Diagnostics Skills Training. with 990409 Ltr ML17300B3071999-03-31031 March 1999 Seismic Portion of Submittal-Only Screening Review of Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units Ipeee. ML17313A8801999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990412 Ltr ML20207M9231999-03-12012 March 1999 Amended Part 21 Rept Re Cooper-Bessemer Ksv EDG Power Piston Failure.Total of 198 or More Pistons Have Been Measured at Seven Different Sites.All Potentially Defective Pistons Have Been Removed from Svc Based on Encl Results ML20207H7471999-03-10010 March 1999 1999 Emergency Preparedness Exercise 99-E-AEV-03003 ML17313A8361999-03-0101 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990103,TS Violation for Power Dependent Insertion Limit Alarm Being Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Revised Procedure to Clarify How Computer Point Is to Be Returned to Scan Mode.With 990302 Ltr ML17313A8501999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station.With 990311 Ltr ML17313A7791999-02-0505 February 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Rev to Emergency Plan That Would Result in Two Less Radiation Protection Positions Immediatelu Available During Emergencies ML17313A8061999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990218 Ltr ML17313A7701999-01-15015 January 1999 LER 96-008-00:on 960507,inadequate Procedure Results in Nuclear Power Channels Not Calibrated During Power Ascension Tests Occurred.Caused by Deficient Procedure.Procedure Revised ML20206H2101998-12-31031 December 1998 SCE 1998 Annual Rept ML17313A7381998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990113 Ltr ML17313A7031998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Pvngs,Unit 1,2 & 3. with 981209 Ltr ML17313A6701998-11-0404 November 1998 Rev 2 to PVNGS Unit 2 Colr. ML17313A6741998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 981109 Ltr ML17313A6611998-10-24024 October 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980729,EQ of Electrical Connectors Were Not Adequately Demonstrated.Caused Because Test Was Conducted with Only Single Lv Connector & Without Fully Ranged Inputs. Revised EQ Requirements ML17313A6561998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for PVNGS Units 1,2 & 3.With 981007 Ltr ML17313A5961998-09-14014 September 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980814,B Train H Recombiner Was Noted Inoperable Due to cross-wired Power Receptacle.Cause of Event Is Under investigation.Cross-wired Power Supply Receptacle for B Train H Recombiner Was re-wired ML17313A5761998-09-0808 September 1998 LER 98-003-01:on 980113,discovered That One Channel of RWT Level Sys Had Failed High.Caused by Water Intrusion Into Electrical Termination Pull Box.Weep Holes Were Drilled Into Bottoms of Pull Boxes Nearest Level Transmitters ML17313A5591998-08-28028 August 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980730,entered TS 3.0.3 Due to Safety Injection Flow Instruments Being Removed from Svc.Caused by Personnel Error.Transmitters Were Unisolated & Returned to svc.W/980828 Ltr ML20151S0941998-08-21021 August 1998 Rev 6 to COLR for PVNGS Unit 3 ML20151S0901998-08-21021 August 1998 Rev 1 to COLR for PVNGS Unit 2 ML20151S0861998-08-21021 August 1998 Rev 4 to COLR for PVNGS Unit 1 ML18066A2771998-08-13013 August 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Deficiency in CE Current Screening Methodology for Determining Limiting Fuel Assembly for Detailed PWR thermal-hydraulic Sa.Evaluations Were Performed for Affected Plants to Determine Effect of Deficiency ML17313A5401998-08-13013 August 1998 Special Rept:On 980715,declared PASS Inoperable.Caused by Failure of Offgas Flush/Purge Control Handswitch HS0101. Handswitch Replaced & Post Maintenance Retesting Was Initiated ML17313A5301998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1998 for Pvgns,Units 1,2 & 3.W/980812 Ltr ML17313A5201998-07-30030 July 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980630,personnel Discovered That Pressure Safety Valve Had Not Received Periodic Set Pressure Test for ASME Class 1 Pressure Safety Valve.Caused by Personnel Error.Pressure Safety Valve reviewed.W/980730 Ltr ML17313A5791998-07-0707 July 1998 to PVNGS SG Tube ISI Results for Seventh Refueling Outage Mar & Apr 1998. ML17313A5001998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1998 for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station,Units 1,2 & 3.W/980710 Ltr ML17313A4671998-06-19019 June 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980520,CR Personnel Observed Flow & Pressure Perturbations on Chemical & Vol Control Sys Letdown Sys.Caused by Cyclic Fatigue Due to Dynamic Pressure Transients.Unit Letdown Piping Replaced ML17313A4521998-06-19019 June 1998 Rev 5 to COLR for Pvngs,Unit 3. ML17313A4501998-06-19019 June 1998 Rev 4 to COLR for Pvngs,Unit 3. ML17313A4131998-06-0505 June 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980507,determined That Plant Was Outside Design Basis Due to SI Discharge Check Valve Reverse Flow. Check Valve Was Disassembled,Examined & Reassembled, Whereupon Valve Met Acceptance Criteria ML17313A4211998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1998 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.W/980609 Ltr ML17313A3951998-05-26026 May 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980428,noted That Required Response Time Testing Had Not Been Performed.Caused by Personnel Error. Coached I&C Personnel Responsible for Reviewing Work Authorization Documentation ML17313A3691998-04-30030 April 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1998 for PVNGS.W/980412 Ltr ML17313A3251998-04-0101 April 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980304,safety Valves as-found Pressures Out of Tolerance.Cause of Event Is Under Investigation.Three Mssv'S & Psv Will Be Replaced W/Refurbished & Recertified Valves During Refueling Outage U1R7 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
SUMMARY
REPORT ON THE DESIGN BASIS OF THE SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM RELIEF VALVES FOR CESSAR SYSTEM 80 November 1984 Nuclear Power Systems COMBUSTION ENGINEERING, INC.Windsor, Connecticut 84i'f28030i 8gii2g;"PDR ADOCK 05000528PDR 4~c f TABLE OF CONTENTS Section~Pa e 1.0 PURPOSE 2.0 SCOPE 3.0 DESIGN BASIS 4.0
SUMMARY
5.0 REFERENCES
FIGURES
1.0 PURPOSE
The purpose of this report is to describe the design basis that is applied to the relief valves intended for use in the suction piping of the Shutdown Cooling System of C-E System 80 Units.The report will detail the sizing criteria and test specifications applied to these valves.This report documents a C-E presentation which was delivered to the NRC Staff on November 9, 1984.The purpose of that meeting was to substantiate the operability of these valves.NOTE: The figures used in this report represent slides which were'sed at that meeting.2.0 SCOPE This report is applicable to all C-E System 80 units.All the information contained in this report is directly referenceable to CESSAR.In keeping with the CESSAR format no valve manufacturer specific information is presented.
CESSAR specifies the necessary valve criteria to meet the system's requirement which.can be supplied by any manufacturer of pressure relief devices.3.0 DESIGN BASIS The following sections and figures describe the design basis, test specifications, and sizing criteria applied to the relief valves installed in the suction piping of the shutdown cooling system.As identified in CESSAR these are valves SI-179 and SI-189.They are shown on the system piping and instrumentation diagram in CESSAR Fi gure 6.3.2-1B.
3.1 FUNCTION
CESSAR identifies these valves as providing a dual function.Their initial function was to protect the shutdown cooling system from overpressurizati on from any possi bl e occurance.
Their function was later expanded to provide low temperature overpressure protection (LTOP)for the RCS.For both functions the valves are designed to be redundant, in that one single valve is capable of handling any overpressurization event.Figure 1 is a schematic of the SCS suction piping showing only the section in the region of the relief valves and the suction line isolation valves which isolate the low pressure SCS from RCS pressure.Also indicated are the safety grade interlocks and alarms associated with the isolation valves.The interlocks provide additional overpressure protection for the system.The alarms connected to the isolation valves annunciate overpressure transients which could challange the relief valves and annunciate that LTOP is inhibited by a closed isolation valve.Only train A of the two redundant suction lines is shown.The nomenclature in parentheses indicates Train B's identification.
3.2 REGULATORY
REQUIREMENTS Figure 2 presents the regulatory requirements which create the design bases for the SCS relief valves.Branch Technical Position, RSB 5-1 stipulates the basis for overpressure protection of the SCS and makes direct reference to the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code for relief capacity sizing.Branch Technical Position, RSB 5-2 creates the basis for the LTOP function of these valves.3.3 SIZING CRITERIA Figure 3 details the sizing criteria for these valve.This figure also highlights the history of the design of these valves in that they were initially designed for the SCS overpressure protection function.
The L'TOP function was later added to these valves, (which necessitated evaluating LTOP events against the existing design).CESSAR sections 5.4.7.2.2 (4.a2)and 5.2.2.10.2.1 explain in detail the data used to determining the capacity and setpoint for these valves.A significant point about the capacity of these valves is that although the initial sizing criteria for the SCS function of these valves appears conservative the inclusion of'the LTOP events to the valve requirements utilizes the full rated capacity.3~4 TEST REQUIREMENTS Figure 4 details the test requirements imposed on the valves at their purchase.The ASME code accepts capacity certification by calculation rather than full size testing.C-E imposes additional requirements.
The seismic tests are necessary because these valves are rated for Seismic Class I operation.
Prorated tests are acceptable for seismic operability testing.The standard production tests do not require full flow verfication only verification of setpoint and leakage.I CESSAR Technical Specification 4.4.8.3.2 requires that these valves be tested for setpoint drift once every 18 months.4.0
SUMMARY
The shutdown cooling relief valves are designed to provide overpressure protection of the low pressure Shutdown Cooling System and LTOP protection of the Reactor Coolant System.They are specified to meet the applicable NRC and industry requirements.
The valves'apacity and setpoint are chosen so as to be redundant.
Each valve can individually provide system protection from any design basis overpressurization event.
5.0 REFERENCES
(A)Combustion Engineering Standard Safety Analysis Report (CESSAR), System 80, Nuclear Steam Supply System, FSAR.(8)American Society of Mechanical Enginers, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III Division 1, Subsection NC,"Class 2 Components." (C)Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Branch Technical Position: (C.1)'RSB 5-1,"Design Requirements of the Residual Heat Removal System." (C.2)RSB 5-2,"Overpressurization Protection of Pressurized Water Reactors While Operating at Low Temperatures." 4 FIGURE 1 SYSTEM CONFIGURATION SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM SUCTION LINE RELIEF AND I SOLAT ION VALVES CONTA INMENT BUILDING TRAIll A B)OUT IN S I-179(S I-109)CONTAI>l1ENT SUMP LPSI PUl1P l(2 SUCTION I i SI-655 ((SI-656)f I I P-103 (104)SI-653 (SI-654)l I I I P-105 (106)M I SI-651 (S0-652)I f I I RCS HOT LEG LOOP 1 (2)P-103 (104)AUTO CLOSURE SETPOINT: 500 PSIA OPEN PERMISSIVE SETPOINT: 400 PSIA SETPOINT: 700 PSIA SETPOINT;400 PSIA LTOP ALARMS: RCS PRESS>400 PSIA VALVE NOT CLOSED RCS TEMP<260 F VALVE CLOSED SETPOINT: 700 PSIA SETPOINT;400 PSIA LTOP ALARMS;RCS PRESS>400 PSIA, VALVE NOT CLOSED RCS TEMP C, 260 F VALVE CLOSED SOURCE: CESSAR FIGURE 6.3.2-1B CESSAR TABLE 7.6-1
FIGURE 2 DESIGN BASIS DESIGN REQUIREMENTS OF RESIDUAL HEAT RENOVAL SYSTEN: BRANCH TECHNICAL POSITION, RSB 5-1 (ASNE BRPVC SEC III, NC-7000)OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION OF PNR HHILE OPERATING AT LOM TENPERATURE:
BRANCH TECHNICAL POSITION, RSB 5-2 6 FIGURE 3 SIZING CRITERIA ORIGINAL FUNCTION: SDC OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION CESSAR SECT'ION 5,<f,7,2,2, (P.A2)~EACH VALVE;RELIEF OF CO INC IDENT OCCURENCE OF: 2 HPSI PUP[PS (RUNOUT)3 CHARGING PUNPS ENERGIZATION OF PRESSU'RIZER HEATERS ADDITIONAL FUNCTION: LTOP CESSAR SECTION 5,2,2,10,2,1
~EVALUATED MITH AS PURCHASED EQUIPMENT~LIMITING EVALUATIONS:
.'lASS ADDITION: INADVERTANT SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION ENERGY ADDITION: RCP START WITH POSITIVE S.G.TO RCS AT,
FIGURE 4.Y 8 R FVV PURCHASED TO 1974 ASNE SECTION II I p SUBSECTION NC o ASNE CODE REQUIRB1ENTS CAPACITY CERTIFICATION BY CALCULATIONS OR FLOW TEST FULL SCALE TESTING WAS NOT REQU I RED HYDROSTATIC TESTS o C-E SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS SEISMIC OPERABILITY TO BE DEMONSTRATED BY TEST AND/OR ANALYSIS~LOADS TO BE CONSIDERED IN THE VALVE DESIGN SEISMIC LOADS SYSTEM PRESSURE I OADS DUE TO VALVE OPERATION~STANDARD PRODUCTION TESTS VERIFY SET PRESSURE SEAT LEAKAGE TEST AT 90ÃOF SET PRESSURE