Information Notice 1995-33, Switchgear Fire and Partial Loss of Offsite Power at Waterford Generating Station, Unit 3: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
Line 14: Line 14:
| page count = 7
| page count = 7
}}
}}
{{#Wiki_filter:K>UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATIONWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555August 23, 1995NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 95-33: SWITCHGEAR FIRE AND PARTIAL LOSS OF OFFSITEPOWER AT WATERFORD GENERATING STATION, UNIT 3
{{#Wiki_filter:K>UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
 
COMMISSION
 
===OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION===
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 August 23, 1995 NRC INFORMATION
 
NOTICE 95-33: SWITCHGEAR
 
FIRE AND PARTIAL LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER AT WATERFORD
 
GENERATING
 
STATION, UNIT 3  


==Addressees==
==Addressees==
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear powerreactors.PurDoseThe U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this informationnotice (IN) to alert addressees to a switchgear fire and subsequent partialloss of offsite power at Waterford Generating Station, Unit 3. It is expectedthat recipients will review the information for applicability to theirfacilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not NRCrequirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.
All holders of operating
 
licenses or construction
 
permits for nuclear power reactors.PurDose The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
 
Commission (NRC) is issuing this information
 
notice (IN) to alert addressees
 
to a switchgear
 
fire and subsequent
 
partial loss of offsite power at Waterford
 
Generating
 
Station, Unit 3. It is expected that recipients
 
will review the information
 
for applicability
 
to their facilities
 
and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.However, suggestions
 
contained
 
in this information
 
notice are not NRC requirements;  
therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Description
 
of Circumstances
 
On June 10, 1995, Waterford
 
3 was operating
 
at 100 percent power with an operations
 
staff consisting
 
of a shift supervisor (SS), a control room supervisor (CRS), and two reactor operators.
 
At 8:58 a.m. a generator
 
trip occurred in response to failure of a lightning
 
arrester on a remote offsite substation
 
transformer.
 
The generator
 
trip resulted in a fast transfer activation.
 
All 6.9 kV and 4.16 kV buses transferred
 
as designed except the 4.16 kV A2 bus. A fire and electrical
 
fault on the 4.16 kV A2 bus normal power supply breaker caused a voltage and frequency
 
perturbation
 
on the 6.9 kV Al bus, which caused an underspeed
 
condition
 
on rector coolant pumps IA and 2A. This circumstance
 
resulted in a reactor trip and a loss of offsite power to the 4.16 kV nonsafety-related
 
A2 bus and the associated
 
4.16 kV safety-related A3 bus. Emergency
 
Diesel Generator
 
A started and loaded to power the A3 bus. At 9:06 a.m., an auxiliary
 
operator informed the control room of heavy smoke within the turbine generator
 
building.
 
At that time, the SS did not activate the plant fire alarm or dispatch the fire brigade, but directed two auxiliary
 
operators
 
to don protective
 
gear and investigate
 
whether a fire existed. At 9:35 a.m., the operators
 
reported seeing flames above the A2 switchgear
 
and the SS activated
 
the fire brigade. Operators
 
requested assistance
 
from the local offsite fire department
 
and declared an Unusual Event in accordance
 
with emergency
 
response procedures.
 
The fire brigade was unable to suppress the fire using portable fire extinguishers.
 
The offsite fire department
 
arrived on the scene at 9:58 a.m. and extinguished
 
the fire with water at 10:22 a.m., after the A2 bus was deenergized.
 
During the cooldown transition
 
from Mode 4 to Mode 5, operators
 
discovered
 
that the isolation
 
valves for both trains of shutdown cooling did not operate properly.9508180092 PDR It 9S-.o33 9,s5T3 tJ <J IN 95-33 August 23, 1995 The plant cooldown to Mode 5 was delayed approximately
 
38 hours while these valves were repaired.Discussion
 
During the period of June 13-16, 1995, the NRC conducted
 
an augmented inspection
 
team (AIT) inspection
 
to determine
 
the causes, conditions, and circumstances
 
relevant to this event. The results of this AIT inspection
 
are documented
 
in NRC Inspection
 
Report 50-382/92-15, dated July 7, 1995. The AIT identified
 
three primary issues: fire protection, fast bus transfer design, and shutdown cooling valve inoperabilit).
 
These three issues are discussed
 
in greater detail in the following
 
sections.Fire Protection
 
Several recent events at U.S. nuclear power plants have included a fire concurrent
 
with a plant transient.
 
The fire at Waterford
 
3 highlights
 
the importance
 
of (1) training for timely and effective
 
response to initial indications
 
of a plant fire, (2) ensuring personnel
 
are not assigned potentially
 
conflicting
 
duties, and (3) plant staffing.An auxiliary
 
operator (a trained fire brigade member) noticed heavy smoke in the turbine generator
 
building and notified the control room. The auxiliary operator was asked if there was a fire in the room and responded
 
that he did not see flames because of the presence of heavy smoke. The CRS did not declare a fire until 29 minutes after receiving
 
the report of heavy smoke.Activating
 
the fire brigade required the SS to assume the responsibilities
 
of the CRS (the designated
 
fire brigade leader), who was directing
 
plant personnel
 
responding
 
to the event. Following
 
the event, operators
 
stated that the loss of the CRS from the control room did not adversely
 
affect their ability to respond to this event and noted that a fire scenario, which requires that the CRS leave the control room, is routinely
 
used during requalification
 
training.Before the local offsite fire department
 
was allowed to extinguish
 
the fire with water, the fire brigade attempted
 
to extinguish
 
the fire using portable carbon dioxide (CO ), halon, and dry chemical fire extinguishers.
 
The use of portable extinguishers
 
was not effective
 
in extinguishing
 
the fire. When the fire department
 
arrived, it recommended
 
the use of water to extinguish
 
the fire. The fire brigade leader did not allow the use of water until about 20 minutes later. The fire was finally extinguished
 
by the offsite fire department
 
within 4 minutes of using water. The use of water is consistent
 
with documented
 
NRC staff positions.
 
The AIT determined
 
that the operators were reluctant
 
to apply water to an electrical
 
fire based on previous training that had emphasized
 
the use of water as a last resort on electrical
 
fires.Although the appropriate
 
fire alarms had activated
 
in the control room, the control room crew was not aware of the alarms because of (1) other auditory alarms caused by the event and (2) the lack of a visual fire alarm signal on a front panel of the control room. Control room operators
 
did not refer to the fire alarm panel when the auxiliary
 
operator reported seeing heavy smoke. In this instance, the ineffectiveness
 
of the fire alarms did not directly affect
 
KJ-J IN 95-33 August 23, 1995 the response to the fire because an auxiliary
 
operator alerted the control room to heavy smoke in the turbine building.
 
Nevertheless, fire alarms that are inaudible
 
under actual operational
 
conditions
 
and lack redundant
 
visual signals can inhibit prompt identification
 
of, and response to, plant fires.Also, it is important
 
for operators
 
to refer to the fire alarm panel upon any verbal report of a potential
 
fire, in order to ensure that the fire is not wider spread than visually reported.
 
NRC fire protection
 
requirements
 
and guidelines
 
specify that fire drills include an assessment
 
of fire alarm effectiveness.
 
IN 91-77 'shift staffing at Nuclear Power Plants', reminded licensees
 
that Section 50.54(m) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations
 
(10 CFR 50.54 (m)) addresses
 
minimum staffing levels for licensed personnel.
 
It does not address availability
 
of personnel
 
for performing
 
all actions specified
 
in the licensee's
 
administrative
 
procedures
 
required during an event. NRC fire protection
 
requirements
 
and guidelines
 
provide flexibility
 
in assigning
 
personnel
 
to a fire brigade (e.g., the brigade leader may possess either an operator's
 
license or an equivalent
 
knowledge
 
of plant safety-related systems).
 
The potential
 
exists for personnel
 
to be assigned duties that, during certain events, may present concurrent
 
and conflicting
 
demands.Such conditions
 
could significantly
 
delay or degrade the response of those individuals.
 
Fast Bus Transfer Design The Waterford
 
3 fast bus transfer design consists of an automatic
 
transfer of safety and nonsafety-related
 
station auxiliary
 
loads from the normal power supply (from the main generator
 
through the unit auxiliary
 
transformer)
to the alternate
 
power supply (from the offsite transmission
 
network through the startup transformer).
 
All supply breakers are General Electric, Magne-Blast
 
type. During a fast bus transfer, the normal supply breakers are designed to open in five cycles and the alternate
 
supply breakers are designed to close in seven cycles, resulting
 
in a two-cycle
 
deadband on the respective
 
buses. To prevent simultaneous
 
closing of both the supply breakers, some other fast bus transfer designs include mechanical
 
or electrical
 
interlocks.
 
The Waterford
 
3 design does not include interlocks.
 
During this event, when the fast bus transfer was initiated, the A2 bus normal supply breaker did not open in five cycles but the alternate
 
supply breaker closed within seven cycles. As a result, (1) the A2 bus was connected
 
to both the offsite transmission
 
network and the main generator, (2) both supply breakers to the A2 bus received overcurrent
 
trip signals, (3) while the A2 bus alternate
 
supply breaker adequately
 
isolated the offsite transmission
 
network, the A2 bus normal supply breaker did not isolate the main generator, (4) the A2 switchgear
 
cubicle for the normal supply breaker caught fire, and (5) the cable bus for the normal supply breaker also caught fire.Shutdown Cooling Valves During the plant cooldown to Mode 5, the shutdown cooling isolation
 
valves failed to operate properly when operators
 
attempted
 
to align low-temperature
 
overpressure
 
protection
 
relief valves in preparation
 
for placing shutdown
 
IN 95-33 August 23, 1995 cooling into service. The Loop 1 shutdown cooling suction header isolation valve (SI-405B)
failed to fully open and automatically
 
closed after approximately
 
15 minutes. The Loop 2 shutdown cooling suction header isolation
 
valve (SI-405A)
fully opened; however, several hours later, the valve hydraulic
 
pump was observed to be running continuously
 
instead of cycling as designed.
 
These two valves isolate low-pressure
 
portions of the shutdown cooling system from the reactor coolant system and must be opened in order to complete plant cooldown below 200 OF (Mode 5). Troubleshooting
 
revealed that both valves contained
 
inadequate
 
hydraulic
 
oil levels in the valve actuator reservoirs.
 
===The cause of the low levels was inadequate===
instructions
 
for a periodic maintenance
 
task for the valves.Related Generic Communications
 
BUL 75-04, wCable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station," dated March 24, 1975.BUL 75-04A, "Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station," dated April 3, 1975 BUL 75-04B, "Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station," dated November 3, 1975.IN 85-80, "Timely Declaration
 
of an Emergency
 
Class, Implementation
 
of an Emergency
 
Plan, and Emergency
 
Notifications," dated October 15, 1985.IN 91-57, "Operational
 
Experience
 
on Bus Transfers," dated September
 
19, 1991.IN 91-77, "Shift Staffing at Nuclear Power Plants," dated November 26, 1991.IN 93-44, "Operational
 
Challenges
 
During a Dual-Unit
 
Transient," dated June 15, 1993.IN 93-81, "Implementation
 
of Engineering
 
Expertise
 
on Shift," dated October 12, 1993.This information
 
notice requires no specific or written response.
 
If you have any questions
 
about the information
 
in this notice, please contact the technical
 
contact listed below or the appropriate
 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.DennvsWM.
 
CrutchfieldP
 
===Director Division of Reactor Program Management===
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
 
Technical
 
contact: Eric J. Benner, NRR (301) 415-1171 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
 
Notices@-gL~5~ 44yAGgQ
 
K>Kreachment
 
IN 95-33 August 23, 1995 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION
 
NOTICES Information
 
Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 95-10, Supp. 2 95-32 95-31 95-30 94-66, Supp. 1 95-29 95-28 95-27 Potential
 
for Loss of Automatic
 
Engineered
 
Safety Features Actuation Thermo-Lag
 
330-1 Flame Spread Test Results Motor-Operated
 
Valve Failure Caused by Stem Protector
 
Pipe Inter-ference Susceptibility
 
of Low-Pressure Coolant Injection and Core Spray Injection Valves to Pressure Locking Overspeed
 
of Turbine-Driven Pumps Caused by Binding in Stems of Governor Valves Oversight
 
of Design and Fabrication
 
Activities
 
for Metal Components
 
Used in Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems Emplacement
 
of Support Pads for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Installations
 
at Reactor Sites NRC Review of Nuclear Energy Institute,"Thermo-Lag
 
330-1 Combustibility
 
Evaluation
 
Methodology
 
Plant Screening Guide" 08/11/95 08/10/95 08/09/95 08/03/95 06/16/95 06/07/95 06/05/95 05/31/95 All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power plants.OL -Operating
 
License CP = Construction
 
Permit
 
-11 IN 95-XX August xx, 1995 order to complete plant cooldown below 200 *F (Mode 5). Troubleshooting
 
revealed that both valves contained
 
inadequate
 
hydraulic
 
oil levels in the valve actuator reservoirs.
 
===The cause of the low levels was inadequate===
instructions
 
for a periodic maintenance
 
task for the valves.Related Generic Communications
 
BUL 75-04, "Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station," dated March 24, 1975.BUL 75-04A, "Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station," dated April 3, 1975 BUL 75-04B, "Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station," dated November 3, 1975.IN 85-80, "Timely Declaration
 
of an Emergency
 
Class, Implementation
 
of an Emergency
 
Plan, and Emergency
 
Notifications," dated October 15, 1985.IN 91-57, "Operational
 
Experience
 
on Bus Transfers," dated September
 
19, 1991.IN 91-77, -Shift Staffing at Nuclear Power Plants," dated November 26, 1991.IN 93-44, "Operational
 
Challenges
 
During a Dual-Unit
 
Transient," dated June 15, 1993.IN 93-81, "Implementation
 
of Engineering
 
Expertise
 
on Shift," dated October 12, 1993.This information
 
notice requires no specific or written response.
 
If you have any questions
 
about the information
 
in this notice, please contact one of the technical
 
contacts listed below or the appropriate
 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Dennis M. Crutchfield, Director Division of Reactor Program Management
 
===Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
Technical
 
contacts:
Eric J. Benner, NRR (301) 415-1171 Attachments:
1. List of Recently Issued NRC Information
 
Notices DOCUMENT NAME: G:\IN\WATERFOR.INR
 
*See Previous Concurrence
 
To receive a copy of this document, Indicate In the box: 'C' = Copy without attachment/enclosure
 
'E' = Copy with attachment/enclosure
 
'N" = No copy---------I OFFICE PECB:DRPM
 
ADM:PUB C/PECB:DRPM
 
C/SPLB:DSSA
 
C/EELB:DE
 
I NAME EBenner* Tech Editor* EGoodwin*
CMcCracken*
JCalvo*DATE 07/21/95 7/24/95 8/2/95 7/25/95 7/27/95 OFFICE C/HHFB:DRCH
 
RI D/DSSA I1> PECB:DRPM
 
J A C/0&.DRPM
 
lNAME CThomas* RHuey* AGHolahan
 
Wb! Riiessel M1AC~affee
 
DATE 8/1/95 8/2/95 /95 /95 95 jOFFICE D/DRPM NAME DCrutchfield
 
DATE / /95 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
 
IN 95-XX'__ _ July xx, 1995 Related Generic Communications
 
BUL 75-04, "Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station," dated March 24, 1995 BUL 75-04B, "Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station," dated November 3, 1995 BUL 75-04A, "Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station," dated April 3, 1995 IN 85-80, "Timely Declaration
 
of an Emergency
 
Class, Implementation
 
of an Emergency
 
Plan, and Emergency
 
Notifications, " dated October 15, 1985 IN 91-57, "Operational
 
Experience
 
on Bus Transfers," dated September
 
19, 1991 IN 91-77, "Shift Staffing at Nuclear Power Plants," dated November 26, 1991 IN 93-44, "Operational
 
Challenges
 
During a Dual Unit Transient," dated June 15, 1993 IN 93-81, Implementation
 
of Engineering
 
Expertise
 
on Shift," dated October 12, 1993 This information
 
notice requires no specific or written response.
 
If you have any questions
 
about the information
 
in this notice, please contact one of the technical
 
contacts below or the appropriate
 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Dennis M. Crutchfield, Director Division of Reactor Program Management
 
===Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
Technical
 
contacts: Forrest R. Huey, RIV (510) 975-0342 Eric J. Benner, NRR (301) 415-1171 Amarjit Singh, NRR (301) 415-1237 David (301)R. Desaulniers, NRR 415-1043 Sikhindra
 
K. Mitra, NRR (301) 415-2783 Thomas A. Bergman, NRR (301) 415-1021 Attachments:
A.1. List of Recently Issued NRC Information
 
Notices If- M DOCUMENT NAME: G:\IN\WATERFOR.IN
 
To rocalva a ca at ofis docunm Indicatae
 
I Oem box: ' -COY wilthout atachment/enrcbsum
 
T a Cov with Irtthnt/encosure


==Description of Circumstances==
W -No copy*. 4tD SW07teV1_F OFFICE PECB:DRPM
On June 10, 1995, Waterford 3 was operating at 100 percent power with anoperations staff consisting of a shift supervisor (SS), a control roomsupervisor (CRS), and two reactor operators. At 8:58 a.m. a generator tripoccurred in response to failure of a lightning arrester on a remote offsitesubstation transformer. The generator trip resulted in a fast transferactivation. All 6.9 kV and 4.16 kV buses transferred as designed except the4.16 kV A2 bus. A fire and electrical fault on the 4.16 kV A2 bus normalpower supply breaker caused a voltage and frequency perturbation on the 6.9 kVAl bus, which caused an underspeed condition on rector coolant pumps IA and2A. This circumstance resulted in a reactor trip and a loss of offsite powerto the 4.16 kV nonsafety-related A2 bus and the associated 4.16 kV safety-related A3 bus. Emergency Diesel Generator A started and loaded to power theA3 bus. At 9:06 a.m., an auxiliary operator informed the control room ofheavy smoke within the turbine generator building. At that time, the SS didnot activate the plant fire alarm or dispatch the fire brigade, but directedtwo auxiliary operators to don protective gear and investigate whether a fireexisted. At 9:35 a.m., the operators reported seeing flames above the A2switchgear and the SS activated the fire brigade. Operators requestedassistance from the local offsite fire department and declared an UnusualEvent in accordance with emergency response procedures. The fire brigade wasunable to suppress the fire using portable fire extinguishers. The offsitefire department arrived on the scene at 9:58 a.m. and extinguished the firewith water at 10:22 a.m., after the A2 bus was deenergized. During thecooldown transition from Mode 4 to Mode 5, operators discovered that theisolation valves for both trains of shutdown cooling did not operate properly.9508180092PDR It 9S-.o33 9,s5T3 tJ <J IN 95-33August 23, 1995 The plant cooldown to Mode 5 was delayed approximately 38 hours while thesevalves were repaired.DiscussionDuring the period of June 13-16, 1995, the NRC conducted an augmentedinspection team (AIT) inspection to determine the causes, conditions, andcircumstances relevant to this event. The results of this AIT inspection aredocumented in NRC Inspection Report 50-382/92-15, dated July 7, 1995. The AITidentified three primary issues: fire protection, fast bus transfer design,and shutdown cooling valve inoperabilit). These three issues are discussed ingreater detail in the following sections.Fire ProtectionSeveral recent events at U.S. nuclear power plants have included a fireconcurrent with a plant transient. The fire at Waterford 3 highlights theimportance of (1) training for timely and effective response to initialindications of a plant fire, (2) ensuring personnel are not assignedpotentially conflicting duties, and (3) plant staffing.An auxiliary operator (a trained fire brigade member) noticed heavy smoke inthe turbine generator building and notified the control room. The auxiliaryoperator was asked if there was a fire in the room and responded that he didnot see flames because of the presence of heavy smoke. The CRS did notdeclare a fire until 29 minutes after receiving the report of heavy smoke.Activating the fire brigade required the SS to assume the responsibilities ofthe CRS (the designated fire brigade leader), who was directing plantpersonnel responding to the event. Following the event, operators stated thatthe loss of the CRS from the control room did not adversely affect theirability to respond to this event and noted that a fire scenario, whichrequires that the CRS leave the control room, is routinely used duringrequalification training.Before the local offsite fire department was allowed to extinguish the firewith water, the fire brigade attempted to extinguish the fire using portablecarbon dioxide (CO ), halon, and dry chemical fire extinguishers. The use ofportable extinguishers was not effective in extinguishing the fire. When thefire department arrived, it recommended the use of water to extinguish thefire. The fire brigade leader did not allow the use of water until about20 minutes later. The fire was finally extinguished by the offsite firedepartment within 4 minutes of using water. The use of water is consistentwith documented NRC staff positions. The AIT determined that the operatorswere reluctant to apply water to an electrical fire based on previous trainingthat had emphasized the use of water as a last resort on electrical fires.Although the appropriate fire alarms had activated in the control room, thecontrol room crew was not aware of the alarms because of (1) other auditoryalarms caused by the event and (2) the lack of a visual fire alarm signal on afront panel of the control room. Control room operators did not refer to thefire alarm panel when the auxiliary operator reported seeing heavy smoke. Inthis instance, the ineffectiveness of the fire alarms did not directly affect


KJ-J IN 95-33August 23, 1995 the response to the fire because an auxiliary operator alerted the controlroom to heavy smoke in the turbine building. Nevertheless, fire alarms thatare inaudible under actual operational conditions and lack redundant visualsignals can inhibit prompt identification of, and response to, plant fires.Also, it is important for operators to refer to the fire alarm panel upon anyverbal report of a potential fire, in order to ensure that the fire is notwider spread than visually reported. NRC fire protection requirements andguidelines specify that fire drills include an assessment of fire alarmeffectiveness.IN 91-77 'shift staffing at Nuclear Power Plants', reminded licensees thatSection 50.54(m) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations(10 CFR 50.54 (m)) addresses minimum staffing levels for licensed personnel.It does not address availability of personnel for performing all actionsspecified in the licensee's administrative procedures required during anevent. NRC fire protection requirements and guidelines provide flexibility inassigning personnel to a fire brigade (e.g., the brigade leader may possesseither an operator's license or an equivalent knowledge of plant safety-related systems). The potential exists for personnel to be assigned dutiesthat, during certain events, may present concurrent and conflicting demands.Such conditions could significantly delay or degrade the response of thoseindividuals.Fast Bus Transfer DesignThe Waterford 3 fast bus transfer design consists of an automatic transfer ofsafety and nonsafety-related station auxiliary loads from the normal powersupply (from the main generator through the unit auxiliary transformer) to thealternate power supply (from the offsite transmission network through thestartup transformer). All supply breakers are General Electric, Magne-Blasttype. During a fast bus transfer, the normal supply breakers are designed toopen in five cycles and the alternate supply breakers are designed to close inseven cycles, resulting in a two-cycle deadband on the respective buses. Toprevent simultaneous closing of both the supply breakers, some other fast bustransfer designs include mechanical or electrical interlocks. The Waterford 3design does not include interlocks.During this event, when the fast bus transfer was initiated, the A2 bus normalsupply breaker did not open in five cycles but the alternate supply breakerclosed within seven cycles. As a result, (1) the A2 bus was connected to boththe offsite transmission network and the main generator, (2) both supplybreakers to the A2 bus received overcurrent trip signals, (3) while the A2 busalternate supply breaker adequately isolated the offsite transmission network,the A2 bus normal supply breaker did not isolate the main generator, (4) theA2 switchgear cubicle for the normal supply breaker caught fire, and (5) thecable bus for the normal supply breaker also caught fire.Shutdown Cooling ValvesDuring the plant cooldown to Mode 5, the shutdown cooling isolation valvesfailed to operate properly when operators attempted to align low-temperatureoverpressure protection relief valves in preparation for placing shutdown
ADM:PUB SC/PECB:DRPM


IN 95-33August 23, 1995 cooling into service. The Loop 1 shutdown cooling suction header isolationvalve (SI-405B) failed to fully open and automatically closed afterapproximately 15 minutes. The Loop 2 shutdown cooling suction headerisolation valve (SI-405A) fully opened; however, several hours later, thevalve hydraulic pump was observed to be running continuously instead ofcycling as designed. These two valves isolate low-pressure portions of theshutdown cooling system from the reactor coolant system and must be opened inorder to complete plant cooldown below 200 OF (Mode 5). Troubleshootingrevealed that both valves contained inadequate hydraulic oil levels in thevalve actuator reservoirs. The cause of the low levels was inadequateinstructions for a periodic maintenance task for the valves.Related Generic CommunicationsBUL 75-04, wCable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station," dated March 24,1975.BUL 75-04A, "Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station," dated April 3,1975BUL 75-04B, "Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station," datedNovember 3, 1975.IN 85-80, "Timely Declaration of an Emergency Class, Implementation of anEmergency Plan, and Emergency Notifications," dated October 15, 1985.IN 91-57, "Operational Experience on Bus Transfers," dated September 19, 1991.IN 91-77, "Shift Staffing at Nuclear Power Plants," dated November 26, 1991.IN 93-44, "Operational Challenges During a Dual-Unit Transient," datedJune 15, 1993.IN 93-81, "Implementation of Engineering Expertise on Shift," datedOctober 12, 1993.This information notice requires no specific or written response. If you haveany questions about the information in this notice, please contact thetechnical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear ReactorRegulation (NRR) project manager.DennvsWM. CrutchfieldP DirectorDivision of Reactor Program ManagementOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contact: Eric J. Benner, NRR(301) 415-1171Attachment:List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices@-gL~5~ 44yAGgQ
I C/SWA C/EELB:DE NAME EBenner _ Tech Editors EGoodwin I McC__;_____
JCavo /_T-DATE 07/21/95 '/-r//95 /I&2J95 'I / 3795 "A 12/27 /95 l"a'OFFICE /"ff:DRCgL


K>KreachmentIN 95-33August 23, 1995 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDNRC INFORMATION NOTICESInformation Date ofNotice No. Subject Issuance Issued to95-10,Supp. 295-3295-3195-3094-66,Supp. 195-2995-2895-27Potential for Loss ofAutomatic EngineeredSafety Features ActuationThermo-Lag 330-1 FlameSpread Test ResultsMotor-Operated ValveFailure Caused by StemProtector Pipe Inter-ferenceSusceptibility of Low-Pressure Coolant Injectionand Core Spray InjectionValves to Pressure LockingOverspeed of Turbine-Driven Pumps Caused byBinding in Stems ofGovernor ValvesOversight of Design andFabrication Activitiesfor Metal Components Usedin Spent Fuel Dry StorageSystemsEmplacement of SupportPads for Spent Fuel DryStorage Installations atReactor SitesNRC Review of NuclearEnergy Institute,"Thermo-Lag 330-1Combustibility EvaluationMethodology Plant ScreeningGuide"08/11/9508/10/9508/09/9508/03/9506/16/9506/07/9506/05/9505/31/95All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power plants.OL -Operating LicenseCP = Construction Permit
D/DRCH C/TQMB:DOTS


-11IN 95-XXAugust xx, 1995 order to complete plant cooldown below 200 *F (Mode 5). Troubleshootingrevealed that both valves contained inadequate hydraulic oil levels in thevalve actuator reservoirs. The cause of the low levels was inadequateinstructions for a periodic maintenance task for the valves.Related Generic CommunicationsBUL 75-04, "Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station," dated March 24,1975.BUL 75-04A, "Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station," dated April 3,1975BUL 75-04B, "Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station," datedNovember 3, 1975.IN 85-80, "Timely Declaration of an Emergency Class, Implementation of anEmergency Plan, and Emergency Notifications," dated October 15, 1985.IN 91-57, "Operational Experience on Bus Transfers," dated September 19, 1991.IN 91-77, -Shift Staffing at Nuclear Power Plants," dated November 26, 1991.IN 93-44, "Operational Challenges During a Dual-Unit Transient," datedJune 15, 1993.IN 93-81, "Implementation of Engineering Expertise on Shift," datedOctober 12, 1993.This information notice requires no specific or written response. If you haveany questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of thetechnical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear ReactorRegulation (NRR) project manager.Dennis M. Crutchfield, DirectorDivision of Reactor Program ManagementOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts: Eric J. Benner, NRR(301) 415-1171Attachments:1. List of Recently Issued NRC Information NoticesDOCUMENT NAME: G:\IN\WATERFOR.INR *See Previous ConcurrenceTo receive a copy of this document, Indicate In the box: 'C' = Copy without attachment/enclosure 'E' = Copy with attachment/enclosure 'N" = No copy---------IOFFICE PECB:DRPM ADM:PUB C/PECB:DRPM C/SPLB:DSSA C/EELB:DE INAME EBenner* Tech Editor* EGoodwin* CMcCracken* JCalvo*DATE 07/21/95 7/24/95 8/2/95 7/25/95 7/27/95OFFICE C/HHFB:DRCH RI D/DSSA I1> PECB:DRPM J A C/0&.DRPM lNAME CThomas* RHuey* AGHolahan Wb! Riiessel M1AC~affeeDATE 8/1/95 8/2/95 /95 /95 95jOFFICE D/DRPMNAME DCrutchfieldDATE / /95OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
RIV PECB:DRPM NAME h [BBoger SBlack RHueyQ! A k~ RKiessel DATE I /95 / 95 /95 J 1/-> /95 I / /95 OFFICE PECB:DRPM


IN 95-XX'__ _ July xx, 1995 Related Generic CommunicationsBUL 75-04, "Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station," dated March 24,1995BUL 75-04B, "Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station," datedNovember 3, 1995BUL 75-04A, "Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station," dated April 3,1995IN 85-80, "Timely Declaration of an Emergency Class, Implementation of anEmergency Plan, and Emergency Notifications, " dated October 15, 1985IN 91-57, "Operational Experience on Bus Transfers," dated September 19, 1991IN 91-77, "Shift Staffing at Nuclear Power Plants," dated November 26, 1991IN 93-44, "Operational Challenges During a Dual Unit Transient," datedJune 15, 1993IN 93-81, Implementation of Engineering Expertise on Shift," datedOctober 12, 1993This information notice requires no specific or written response. If you haveany questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of thetechnical contacts below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear ReactorRegulation (NRR) project manager.Dennis M. Crutchfield, DirectorDivision of Reactor Program ManagementOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts:Forrest R. Huey, RIV(510) 975-0342Eric J. Benner, NRR(301) 415-1171Amarjit Singh, NRR(301) 415-1237David(301)R. Desaulniers, NRR415-1043Sikhindra K. Mitra, NRR(301) 415-2783Thomas A. Bergman, NRR(301) 415-1021Attachments: A.1. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices If- MDOCUMENT NAME: G:\IN\WATERFOR.INTo rocalva a ca at ofis docunm Indicatae I Oem box: ' -COY wilthout atachment/enrcbsum T a Cov with Irtthnt/encosure W -No copy*. 4tDSW07teV1_FOFFICE PECB:DRPM ADM:PUB SC/PECB:DRPM I C/SWA C/EELB:DENAME EBenner _ Tech Editors EGoodwin I McC__;_____ JCavo /_T-DATE 07/21/95 '/-r//95 /I&2J95 'I / 3795 "A 12/27 /95 l"a'OFFICE /"ff:DRCgL D/DRCH C/TQMB:DOTS RIV PECB:DRPMNAME h [BBoger SBlack RHueyQ! A k~ RKiesselDATE I /95 / 95 /95 J 1/-> /95 I / /95OFFICE PECB:DRPM D/DRPMNAME AChaffee DCrutchfield _DATE / /95 R D/95 OOFF ICIA L RECORD COPY
D/DRPM NAME AChaffee DCrutchfield


}}
_DATE / /95 R D/95 O OFF ICIA L RECORD COPY}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Revision as of 14:02, 31 August 2018

Switchgear Fire and Partial Loss of Offsite Power at Waterford Generating Station, Unit 3
ML031060305
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 08/23/1995
From: Crutchfield D M
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-95-033, NUDOCS 9508180092
Download: ML031060305 (7)
v • d • e


K>UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 August 23, 1995 NRC INFORMATION

NOTICE 95-33: SWITCHGEAR

FIRE AND PARTIAL LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER AT WATERFORD

GENERATING

STATION, UNIT 3

Addressees

All holders of operating

licenses or construction

permits for nuclear power reactors.PurDose The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) is issuing this information

notice (IN) to alert addressees

to a switchgear

fire and subsequent

partial loss of offsite power at Waterford

Generating

Station, Unit 3. It is expected that recipients

will review the information

for applicability

to their facilities

and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.However, suggestions

contained

in this information

notice are not NRC requirements;

therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Description

of Circumstances

On June 10, 1995, Waterford

3 was operating

at 100 percent power with an operations

staff consisting

of a shift supervisor (SS), a control room supervisor (CRS), and two reactor operators.

At 8:58 a.m. a generator

trip occurred in response to failure of a lightning

arrester on a remote offsite substation

transformer.

The generator

trip resulted in a fast transfer activation.

All 6.9 kV and 4.16 kV buses transferred

as designed except the 4.16 kV A2 bus. A fire and electrical

fault on the 4.16 kV A2 bus normal power supply breaker caused a voltage and frequency

perturbation

on the 6.9 kV Al bus, which caused an underspeed

condition

on rector coolant pumps IA and 2A. This circumstance

resulted in a reactor trip and a loss of offsite power to the 4.16 kV nonsafety-related

A2 bus and the associated

4.16 kV safety-related A3 bus. Emergency

Diesel Generator

A started and loaded to power the A3 bus. At 9:06 a.m., an auxiliary

operator informed the control room of heavy smoke within the turbine generator

building.

At that time, the SS did not activate the plant fire alarm or dispatch the fire brigade, but directed two auxiliary

operators

to don protective

gear and investigate

whether a fire existed. At 9:35 a.m., the operators

reported seeing flames above the A2 switchgear

and the SS activated

the fire brigade. Operators

requested assistance

from the local offsite fire department

and declared an Unusual Event in accordance

with emergency

response procedures.

The fire brigade was unable to suppress the fire using portable fire extinguishers.

The offsite fire department

arrived on the scene at 9:58 a.m. and extinguished

the fire with water at 10:22 a.m., after the A2 bus was deenergized.

During the cooldown transition

from Mode 4 to Mode 5, operators

discovered

that the isolation

valves for both trains of shutdown cooling did not operate properly.9508180092 PDR It 9S-.o33 9,s5T3 tJ <J IN 95-33 August 23, 1995 The plant cooldown to Mode 5 was delayed approximately

38 hours4.398148e-4 days <br />0.0106 hours <br />6.283069e-5 weeks <br />1.4459e-5 months <br /> while these valves were repaired.Discussion

During the period of June 13-16, 1995, the NRC conducted

an augmented inspection

team (AIT) inspection

to determine

the causes, conditions, and circumstances

relevant to this event. The results of this AIT inspection

are documented

in NRC Inspection

Report 50-382/92-15, dated July 7, 1995. The AIT identified

three primary issues: fire protection, fast bus transfer design, and shutdown cooling valve inoperabilit).

These three issues are discussed

in greater detail in the following

sections.Fire Protection

Several recent events at U.S. nuclear power plants have included a fire concurrent

with a plant transient.

The fire at Waterford

3 highlights

the importance

of (1) training for timely and effective

response to initial indications

of a plant fire, (2) ensuring personnel

are not assigned potentially

conflicting

duties, and (3) plant staffing.An auxiliary

operator (a trained fire brigade member) noticed heavy smoke in the turbine generator

building and notified the control room. The auxiliary operator was asked if there was a fire in the room and responded

that he did not see flames because of the presence of heavy smoke. The CRS did not declare a fire until 29 minutes after receiving

the report of heavy smoke.Activating

the fire brigade required the SS to assume the responsibilities

of the CRS (the designated

fire brigade leader), who was directing

plant personnel

responding

to the event. Following

the event, operators

stated that the loss of the CRS from the control room did not adversely

affect their ability to respond to this event and noted that a fire scenario, which requires that the CRS leave the control room, is routinely

used during requalification

training.Before the local offsite fire department

was allowed to extinguish

the fire with water, the fire brigade attempted

to extinguish

the fire using portable carbon dioxide (CO ), halon, and dry chemical fire extinguishers.

The use of portable extinguishers

was not effective

in extinguishing

the fire. When the fire department

arrived, it recommended

the use of water to extinguish

the fire. The fire brigade leader did not allow the use of water until about 20 minutes later. The fire was finally extinguished

by the offsite fire department

within 4 minutes of using water. The use of water is consistent

with documented

NRC staff positions.

The AIT determined

that the operators were reluctant

to apply water to an electrical

fire based on previous training that had emphasized

the use of water as a last resort on electrical

fires.Although the appropriate

fire alarms had activated

in the control room, the control room crew was not aware of the alarms because of (1) other auditory alarms caused by the event and (2) the lack of a visual fire alarm signal on a front panel of the control room. Control room operators

did not refer to the fire alarm panel when the auxiliary

operator reported seeing heavy smoke. In this instance, the ineffectiveness

of the fire alarms did not directly affect

KJ-J IN 95-33 August 23, 1995 the response to the fire because an auxiliary

operator alerted the control room to heavy smoke in the turbine building.

Nevertheless, fire alarms that are inaudible

under actual operational

conditions

and lack redundant

visual signals can inhibit prompt identification

of, and response to, plant fires.Also, it is important

for operators

to refer to the fire alarm panel upon any verbal report of a potential

fire, in order to ensure that the fire is not wider spread than visually reported.

NRC fire protection

requirements

and guidelines

specify that fire drills include an assessment

of fire alarm effectiveness.

IN 91-77 'shift staffing at Nuclear Power Plants', reminded licensees

that Section 50.54(m) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations

(10 CFR 50.54 (m)) addresses

minimum staffing levels for licensed personnel.

It does not address availability

of personnel

for performing

all actions specified

in the licensee's

administrative

procedures

required during an event. NRC fire protection

requirements

and guidelines

provide flexibility

in assigning

personnel

to a fire brigade (e.g., the brigade leader may possess either an operator's

license or an equivalent

knowledge

of plant safety-related systems).

The potential

exists for personnel

to be assigned duties that, during certain events, may present concurrent

and conflicting

demands.Such conditions

could significantly

delay or degrade the response of those individuals.

Fast Bus Transfer Design The Waterford

3 fast bus transfer design consists of an automatic

transfer of safety and nonsafety-related

station auxiliary

loads from the normal power supply (from the main generator

through the unit auxiliary

transformer)

to the alternate

power supply (from the offsite transmission

network through the startup transformer).

All supply breakers are General Electric, Magne-Blast

type. During a fast bus transfer, the normal supply breakers are designed to open in five cycles and the alternate

supply breakers are designed to close in seven cycles, resulting

in a two-cycle

deadband on the respective

buses. To prevent simultaneous

closing of both the supply breakers, some other fast bus transfer designs include mechanical

or electrical

interlocks.

The Waterford

3 design does not include interlocks.

During this event, when the fast bus transfer was initiated, the A2 bus normal supply breaker did not open in five cycles but the alternate

supply breaker closed within seven cycles. As a result, (1) the A2 bus was connected

to both the offsite transmission

network and the main generator, (2) both supply breakers to the A2 bus received overcurrent

trip signals, (3) while the A2 bus alternate

supply breaker adequately

isolated the offsite transmission

network, the A2 bus normal supply breaker did not isolate the main generator, (4) the A2 switchgear

cubicle for the normal supply breaker caught fire, and (5) the cable bus for the normal supply breaker also caught fire.Shutdown Cooling Valves During the plant cooldown to Mode 5, the shutdown cooling isolation

valves failed to operate properly when operators

attempted

to align low-temperature

overpressure

protection

relief valves in preparation

for placing shutdown

IN 95-33 August 23, 1995 cooling into service. The Loop 1 shutdown cooling suction header isolation valve (SI-405B)

failed to fully open and automatically

closed after approximately

15 minutes. The Loop 2 shutdown cooling suction header isolation

valve (SI-405A)

fully opened; however, several hours later, the valve hydraulic

pump was observed to be running continuously

instead of cycling as designed.

These two valves isolate low-pressure

portions of the shutdown cooling system from the reactor coolant system and must be opened in order to complete plant cooldown below 200 OF (Mode 5). Troubleshooting

revealed that both valves contained

inadequate

hydraulic

oil levels in the valve actuator reservoirs.

The cause of the low levels was inadequate

instructions

for a periodic maintenance

task for the valves.Related Generic Communications

BUL 75-04, wCable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station," dated March 24, 1975.BUL 75-04A, "Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station," dated April 3, 1975 BUL 75-04B, "Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station," dated November 3, 1975.IN 85-80, "Timely Declaration

of an Emergency

Class, Implementation

of an Emergency

Plan, and Emergency

Notifications," dated October 15, 1985.IN 91-57, "Operational

Experience

on Bus Transfers," dated September

19, 1991.IN 91-77, "Shift Staffing at Nuclear Power Plants," dated November 26, 1991.IN 93-44, "Operational

Challenges

During a Dual-Unit

Transient," dated June 15, 1993.IN 93-81, "Implementation

of Engineering

Expertise

on Shift," dated October 12, 1993.This information

notice requires no specific or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.DennvsWM.

CrutchfieldP

Director Division of Reactor Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contact: Eric J. Benner, NRR (301) 415-1171 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices@-gL~5~ 44yAGgQ

K>Kreachment

IN 95-33 August 23, 1995 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION

NOTICES Information

Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 95-10, Supp. 2 95-32 95-31 95-30 94-66, Supp. 1 95-29 95-28 95-27 Potential

for Loss of Automatic

Engineered

Safety Features Actuation Thermo-Lag

330-1 Flame Spread Test Results Motor-Operated

Valve Failure Caused by Stem Protector

Pipe Inter-ference Susceptibility

of Low-Pressure Coolant Injection and Core Spray Injection Valves to Pressure Locking Overspeed

of Turbine-Driven Pumps Caused by Binding in Stems of Governor Valves Oversight

of Design and Fabrication

Activities

for Metal Components

Used in Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems Emplacement

of Support Pads for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Installations

at Reactor Sites NRC Review of Nuclear Energy Institute,"Thermo-Lag

330-1 Combustibility

Evaluation

Methodology

Plant Screening Guide" 08/11/95 08/10/95 08/09/95 08/03/95 06/16/95 06/07/95 06/05/95 05/31/95 All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power plants.OL -Operating

License CP = Construction

Permit

-11 IN 95-XX August xx, 1995 order to complete plant cooldown below 200 *F (Mode 5). Troubleshooting

revealed that both valves contained

inadequate

hydraulic

oil levels in the valve actuator reservoirs.

The cause of the low levels was inadequate

instructions

for a periodic maintenance

task for the valves.Related Generic Communications

BUL 75-04, "Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station," dated March 24, 1975.BUL 75-04A, "Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station," dated April 3, 1975 BUL 75-04B, "Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station," dated November 3, 1975.IN 85-80, "Timely Declaration

of an Emergency

Class, Implementation

of an Emergency

Plan, and Emergency

Notifications," dated October 15, 1985.IN 91-57, "Operational

Experience

on Bus Transfers," dated September

19, 1991.IN 91-77, -Shift Staffing at Nuclear Power Plants," dated November 26, 1991.IN 93-44, "Operational

Challenges

During a Dual-Unit

Transient," dated June 15, 1993.IN 93-81, "Implementation

of Engineering

Expertise

on Shift," dated October 12, 1993.This information

notice requires no specific or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact one of the technical

contacts listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Dennis M. Crutchfield, Director Division of Reactor Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contacts:

Eric J. Benner, NRR (301) 415-1171 Attachments:

1. List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices DOCUMENT NAME: G:\IN\WATERFOR.INR

  • See Previous Concurrence

To receive a copy of this document, Indicate In the box: 'C' = Copy without attachment/enclosure

'E' = Copy with attachment/enclosure

'N" = No copy---------I OFFICE PECB:DRPM

ADM:PUB C/PECB:DRPM

C/SPLB:DSSA

C/EELB:DE

I NAME EBenner* Tech Editor* EGoodwin*

CMcCracken*

JCalvo*DATE 07/21/95 7/24/95 8/2/95 7/25/95 7/27/95 OFFICE C/HHFB:DRCH

RI D/DSSA I1> PECB:DRPM

J A C/0&.DRPM

lNAME CThomas* RHuey* AGHolahan

Wb! Riiessel M1AC~affee

DATE 8/1/95 8/2/95 /95 /95 95 jOFFICE D/DRPM NAME DCrutchfield

DATE / /95 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

IN 95-XX'__ _ July xx, 1995 Related Generic Communications

BUL 75-04, "Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station," dated March 24, 1995 BUL 75-04B, "Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station," dated November 3, 1995 BUL 75-04A, "Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station," dated April 3, 1995 IN 85-80, "Timely Declaration

of an Emergency

Class, Implementation

of an Emergency

Plan, and Emergency

Notifications, " dated October 15, 1985 IN 91-57, "Operational

Experience

on Bus Transfers," dated September

19, 1991 IN 91-77, "Shift Staffing at Nuclear Power Plants," dated November 26, 1991 IN 93-44, "Operational

Challenges

During a Dual Unit Transient," dated June 15, 1993 IN 93-81, Implementation

of Engineering

Expertise

on Shift," dated October 12, 1993 This information

notice requires no specific or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact one of the technical

contacts below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Dennis M. Crutchfield, Director Division of Reactor Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contacts: Forrest R. Huey, RIV (510) 975-0342 Eric J. Benner, NRR (301) 415-1171 Amarjit Singh, NRR (301) 415-1237 David (301)R. Desaulniers, NRR 415-1043 Sikhindra

K. Mitra, NRR (301) 415-2783 Thomas A. Bergman, NRR (301) 415-1021 Attachments:

A.1. List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices If- M DOCUMENT NAME: G:\IN\WATERFOR.IN

To rocalva a ca at ofis docunm Indicatae

I Oem box: ' -COY wilthout atachment/enrcbsum

T a Cov with Irtthnt/encosure

W -No copy*. 4tD SW07teV1_F OFFICE PECB:DRPM

ADM:PUB SC/PECB:DRPM

I C/SWA C/EELB:DE NAME EBenner _ Tech Editors EGoodwin I McC__;_____

JCavo /_T-DATE 07/21/95 '/-r//95 /I&2J95 'I / 3795 "A 12/27 /95 l"a'OFFICE /"ff:DRCgL

D/DRCH C/TQMB:DOTS

RIV PECB:DRPM NAME h [BBoger SBlack RHueyQ! A k~ RKiessel DATE I /95 / 95 /95 J 1/-> /95 I / /95 OFFICE PECB:DRPM

D/DRPM NAME AChaffee DCrutchfield

_DATE / /95 R D/95 O OFF ICIA L RECORD COPY


Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=Information_Notice_1995-33,_Switchgear_Fire_and_Partial_Loss_of_Offsite_Power_at_Waterford_Generating_Station,_Unit_3&oldid=1011542"