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| {{#Wiki_filter:U -AUUNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATIONWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555August 16, 1993NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 93-67: BURSTING OF HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTIONSTEAM LINE RUPTURE DISCS INJURES PLANTPERSONNEL | | {{#Wiki_filter:U -AU UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY |
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| | COMMISSION |
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| | ===OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION=== |
| | WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 August 16, 1993 NRC INFORMATION |
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| | NOTICE 93-67: BURSTING OF HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION STEAM LINE RUPTURE DISCS INJURES PLANT PERSONNEL |
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| ==Addressees== | | ==Addressees== |
| All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear powerreactors. | | All holders of operating |
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| | licenses or construction |
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| | permits for nuclear power reactors. |
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| ==Purpose== | | ==Purpose== |
| The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this informationnotice to remind addressees of the hazards associated with steam drivencoolant injection systems such as the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI)system and the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system at BWRs and theauxiliary feedwater system at PWRs. It is expected that recipients willreview the information for applicability to their facilities and consideractions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions Xcontained in this information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, nospecific action or written response is required.BackgroundThe purpose of HPCI steam exhaust rupture discs is to protect the HPCI turbinecasing and associated exhaust piping from an overpressure event if the normalexhaust path to the suppression pool becomes blocked. At Quad Cities Station,two 40.6-cm [16-inch] stainless steel discs are installed in series with a6.4-cm [2.5-inch] spacer between them to allow for a pressure sensorinstrumentation line. The pressure sensor, while serving no control function,actuates an alarm in the control room at 68.9 kPa [10 psig] to alert theoperators that the inner disc is leaking. The normal range of the HPCIexhaust steam pressure is 172 to 207 kPa [25 to 30 psig].- The HPCI highexhaust pressure turbine trip setpoint is 689 kPa [100 psig] and is sensed bypressure sensors located downstream from where the section of pipingcontaining the rupture discs branches off from the exhaust piping. Thesection of piping containing the rupture discs is mounted vertically over theturbine exhaust and vents directly to the HPCI room. Pressure greater than1034 kPa [150 psig] in the exhaust line will cause the inner disc to ruptureand impact the outer disc, releasing steam into the HPCI room. | | The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory |
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| | Commission (NRC) is issuing this information |
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| | notice to remind addressees |
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| | of the hazards associated |
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| | with steam driven coolant injection |
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| | systems such as the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI)system and the reactor core isolation |
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| | cooling (RCIC) system at BWRs and the auxiliary |
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| | feedwater |
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| | system at PWRs. It is expected that recipients |
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| | will review the information |
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| | for applicability |
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| | to their facilities |
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| | and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. |
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| | However, suggestions |
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| | X contained |
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| | in this information |
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| | notice are not NRC requirements; |
| | therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Background |
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| | The purpose of HPCI steam exhaust rupture discs is to protect the HPCI turbine casing and associated |
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| | exhaust piping from an overpressure |
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| | event if the normal exhaust path to the suppression |
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| | pool becomes blocked. At Quad Cities Station, two 40.6-cm [16-inch] |
| | stainless |
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| | steel discs are installed |
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| | in series with a 6.4-cm [2.5-inch] |
| | spacer between them to allow for a pressure sensor instrumentation |
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| | line. The pressure sensor, while serving no control function, actuates an alarm in the control room at 68.9 kPa [10 psig] to alert the operators |
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| | that the inner disc is leaking. The normal range of the HPCI exhaust steam pressure is 172 to 207 kPa [25 to 30 psig].- The HPCI high exhaust pressure turbine trip setpoint is 689 kPa [100 psig] and is sensed by pressure sensors located downstream |
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| | from where the section of piping containing |
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| | the rupture discs branches off from the exhaust piping. The section of piping containing |
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| | the rupture discs is mounted vertically |
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| | over the turbine exhaust and vents directly to the HPCI room. Pressure greater than 1034 kPa [150 psig] in the exhaust line will cause the inner disc to rupture and impact the outer disc, releasing |
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| | steam into the HPCI room.Description |
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| | of Circumstances |
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| | During a quarterly |
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| | inservice |
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| | test of the HPCI pump at the Commonwealth |
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| | Edison Quad Cities Station, Unit 1, on June 9, 1993, the exhaust steam line rupture 9308100248 F QrRi |
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| | IN 93-67 August 16, 1993 discs burst, releasing |
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| | steam into the HPCI room, burning, and slightly contaminating, five workers. The rupture discs burst within one second after the turbine was started. Fire doors between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 HPCI rooms were blown off their hinges into the Unit 2 HPCI room. Both sets of double doors that are part of the secondary |
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| | containment |
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| | boundary were also blown open. The floor latch on the inner containment |
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| | door was bent; the outer doors were also slightly damaged, but were repaired, closed and sealed approximately |
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| | 35 minutes after the event. The steam release was terminated |
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| | by automatic isolation |
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| | of the steam supply line on high HPCI turbine area temperature |
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| | about 20 seconds into the event.Discussion |
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| | Upon investigating |
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| | the event, the licensee determined |
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| | that water had accumulated |
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| | in the turbine casing because the drain system level switches for the Unit 1 HPCI system had failed. In April 1992, the licensee performed |
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| | a reliability-centered |
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| | maintenance |
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| | study which recommended |
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| | the level switches be included in the preventive |
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| | maintenance |
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| | program but the recommendation |
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| | had not been acted on at the time of the event. The Unit 2 HPCI drain system level switches were also found to be inoperable. |
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| | The slug of water created during the HPCI turbine roll passed from the turbine casing to the vertical exhaust line and compressed |
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| | the air in the 40.6 cm[16 inch] line containing |
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| | the rupture discs. The resulting |
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| | pressure pulse caused the inner rupture disc to burst, which impacted the outer disc as designed and caused it to burst as well. The exhaust line pressure sensors, located in the horizontal |
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| | 61 cm [24 inch] exhaust line that tees off from the vertical 40.6 cm [16 inch] rupture disc line, did not detect a high pressure (see Figure 1). The pressure switches were within tolerance |
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| | and should have immediately |
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| | isolated the steam supply upon sensing a high exhaust pressure before the rupture discs burst. The fact that a high exhaust line pressure was not detected indicates |
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| | two possible causes for the disc rupture. Either the inner rupture disc was degraded and burst at lower-than-design |
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| | pressure, or the pressure pulse actually exceeded the design pressure and caused the disc to burst, relieving |
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| | the exhaust line pressure before the downstream |
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| | pressure sensors detected a high pressure condition. |
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| | While inspection |
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| | of the rupture discs did not reveal any degradation |
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| | from corrosion |
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| | or aging, the vendor, Black Sivalls & Bryson, Inc, stated that the discs are warranted |
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| | for one year of service under normal conditions. |
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| | The HPCI and RCIC rupture discs at Quad Cities Station had been in service for 20 years and were not part of any scheduled |
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| | inspection |
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| | or preventive |
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| | maintenance |
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| | program. When consulted |
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| | about the event, the vendor advised against using the spare discs in the plant storeroom |
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| | because they were purchased |
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| | at the same time as the failed discs. The licensee later replaced the failed discs with new units. Before this event, the licensee recently replaced a HPCI rupture disc during a refueling |
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| | outage at the Dresden Station, a plant similar to Quad Cities, after finding a crack in the disc during an inspection. |
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| | The rupture discs were inspected |
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| | at the Dresden station as part of an enhancement |
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| | to the preventive |
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| | maintenance |
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| | program that was recommended |
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| | by a reliability-centered |
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| | analysis. |
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| | I I IN 93-67 August 16, 1993 The steam injured five workers, four of whom were participating |
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| | in the HPCI pump surveillance |
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| | test. The fifth, and m6st severely. |
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| | injured worker was a health physics technician |
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| | in the room on routine rounds, who was not aware of the danger posed by the surveillance |
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| | test. The test procedure |
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| | contained |
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| | no specific guidance on room occupancy. |
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| | Interviews |
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| | with the workers revealed that they had performed |
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| | the surveillance |
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| | in the past and were familiar with the process. This familiarity |
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| | may have led to a relaxed attitude toward personal safety. The workers stated that during previous surveillances |
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| | they sometimes |
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| | evacuated |
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| | the room before rolling the turbine, or stood near the doors to be ready to escape. The licensee made no routine announcement |
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| | over the plant paging system to alert plant personnel |
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| | before the HPCI-turbine |
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| | start, and the workers were not prepared for the turbine to start.A lack of constant communication |
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| | between the workersand |
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| | the control room may have contributed |
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| | to the personnel |
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| | injuries. |
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| | If a control room operator had been in contact with the workers in the HPCI room during the turbine roll, the workers would have been aware of the impending |
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| | turbine start and, after start, the steam supply might have been manually-isolated |
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| | or the turbine manually tripped before the automatic |
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| | isolation |
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| | caused by the high area temperatureoin |
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| | the HPCI room.When the Unit 1 HPCI rupture disc failure caused the fire doors to be blown off their hinges and into the Unit 2 HPCI room, one of the doors impacted a pipe hanger in the room and moved it 5.1 centimeters |
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| | [2 inches]. If the steam release had resulted from a high energy line break from the inlet side of the HPCI steam line instead of the exhaust line, the damage to the Unit 2 HPCI system could have been more severe. While high energy line breaks have been analyzed for safety systems at all plants, the doors to rooms containing |
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| | high energy steam lines may not have been included in the analysis. |
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| | For example, at Duane Arnold Energy Center, the licensee discovered |
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| | that while the HPCI and RCIC rooms were qualified |
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| | for pressures |
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| | of 26.2 kPa [3.8 psig], the doors between these rooms and the reactor building would yield at 6.9 kPa [1 psig].The licensee for the Quad Cities Station will implement |
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| | a preventive |
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| | maintenance |
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| | schedule for both the HPCI and RCIC rupture discs and the level switches. |
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| | The licensee will review the surveillance |
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| | test procedure |
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| | and evaluate the missile hazard created by the fire doors. The licensee replaced the rupture discs for the Unit 2 HPCI and RCIC systems with new ones after the event at Unit 1 and is considering |
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| | burst testing the removed discs to determine |
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| | if they are degraded. |
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| | IN 93-67 August 16, 1993 This information |
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| | notice requires no specific action or written response. |
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| | If you have any questions |
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| | about the information |
| | |
| | in this notice, please contact the technical |
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| | contact listed below or the appropriate |
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| | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grim s, Director Division of Operating |
| | |
| | ===Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation=== |
| | Technical |
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| | contacts: |
| | Clark Vanderniet, RIII (708) 790-5594 David Skeen, NRR (301) 504-1174 Attachments: |
| | 1. Figure 1, "Simplified |
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| | Layout of Quad Cities Station HPCI Turbine Exhaust Steam Line" 2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information |
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| | Notices |
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| | Cq~0cr cO Cd) h r-4 0\TO SUPPRESSION |
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| | POOL 1 OUTER RUPTURE DISC _____CLOSABLE CHECK CHECK VALVE VALVE I INNER RUPTURE DISC[1 In]2 40.6 cm[16 in]VENT TO HPCI ROOM STEAM INLET LINE FROM "B" MAIN STEAM LINE LOCKED OPEN I I I I I RX BLDG I I I I 50.8 cm[20 In]61 cm[24 In]HPCI ROOM 25 cm[10 In]D NOTES: 1. PRESSURE SWITCH ACTUATES ALARM IN CONTROL ROOM WHEN PRESSURE BETWEEN THE INNER RUPTURE DISC AND OUTER RUPTURE DISC IS GREATER THAN 68.9 kPa [10 psig]. ALARM IS FOR INNER RUPTURE DISC LEAK DETECTION. |
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| | 2. REDUNDANT |
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| | PRESSURE SWITCHES IN EXHAUST STEAM LINE TRIP THE HPCI TURBINE IF PRESSURE IS GREATER THAN 689 kPa [100 psig].3. RUPTURE DISC MAXIMUM DESIGN BURST PRESSURE IS 1034 kPa [150 psig].Figure 1 -Simplified |
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| | Layout of Quad Cities Station HPCI Turbine Exhaust Steam Line |
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| | Attachment |
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| | 2 IN 93-67 August 16, 1993 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION |
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| | NOTICES Information |
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| | Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 93-66 93-65 93-64 93-63 93-62 93-61 93-60 93-59 93-58 Switchover |
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| | to Hot-Leg Injection |
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| | Following A Loss-of-Coolant |
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| | Accident in Pres-surized Water Reactors Reactor Trips Caused by Breaker Testing with Fault Protection |
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| | Bypassed Periodic Testing and Preventive |
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| | Maintenance |
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| | of Molded Case Circuit Breakers Improper Use of Soluble Weld Purge Dam Material Thermal Stratification |
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| | of Water in BWR Reactor Vessels Excessive |
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| | Reactor Coolant Leakage Following |
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| | A Seal Failure in A Reactor Coolant Pump or Reactor Recirculation |
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| | Pump Reporting |
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| | Fuel Cycle and Materials |
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| | Events to the NRC Operations |
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| | Center Unexpected |
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| | Opening of Both Doors in An Airlock Nonconservatism |
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| | in Low-Temperature |
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| | ===Overpressure=== |
| | Protection |
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| | for Pressurized- Water Reactors 08/16/93 08/13/93-08/12/93 08/11/93 08/10/93 08/09/93 08/04/93 07/26/93 07/26/93 All holders of OLs or CPs for pressurized |
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| | water reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for boiling water reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All fuel cycle and materials licensees. |
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| | All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for pressurized-water |
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| | reactors.OL = Operating |
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| | License CP = Construction |
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| | Permit |
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| | l--IN 93-67 August 16, 1993 This information |
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| | notice requires no specific action or written response. |
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| | If you have any questions |
| | |
| | about the information |
| | |
| | in this notice, please contact the technical |
| | |
| | contact listed below or the appropriate |
| | |
| | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.orig /s/'d by CIGrimes/for |
| | |
| | Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating |
| | |
| | ===Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation=== |
| | Technical |
| | |
| | contacts: Clark Vanderniet, RIII (708) 790-5594 David Skeen, NRR (301) 504-1174 Attachments: |
| | 1. Figure 1, "Simplified |
| | |
| | Layout of Quad Cities Station HPCI Turbine Exhaust Steam Line" 2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information |
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| | Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE. |
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| | OFC *OEAB:DORS |
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| | *TECH:ED *OGCB:DORS |
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| | *DRS:R-III |
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| | ===NAME DSkeen JMain PWen CVanderniet=== |
| | DATE 07/08/93 , 07/08/93 07/14/93 07/14/93 OFC *C:DRS:R-III |
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| | *SC:OEAB:DORS |
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| | *C/OEAB/DORS |
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| | *C:SPLB:DSSA |
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| | NAME GWright I RDennig AEChaffee |
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| | CEMcCracken |
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| | DATE [ 07/14/93 1 07/15/93 07/15/93 ]07/16/93 I__ _ i OFC*D:DSSA*C/OGCB:DORS |
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| | D/DORS A^r NAME AThadani GMarcus BGrimes t DATE 07/24/93 07/29/93 0,S/\o/93 V[OFFICIAL |
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| | RECORD COPY]DOCUMENT NAME: 93-67.IN |
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| | \-IN 93-XX July XX, 1993 This information |
| | |
| | notice requires no specific action or written response. |
| | |
| | If you have any questions |
| | |
| | about the information |
| | |
| | in this notice, please contact the technical |
| | |
| | contact listed below or the appropriate |
| | |
| | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating |
| | |
| | ===Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation=== |
| | Technical |
| | |
| | contacts: |
| | Clark Vanderniet, RIII (708) 790-5594 David (301)Skeen, NRR 504-1174 Attachment: |
| | List of Recently Issued NRC Information |
| | |
| | Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE. |
| | |
| | *D:DSSA AThadani 07/24/93 OFC *OEAB:DORS |
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| | *TECH:ED *OGCB:DORS |
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| | *DRS:R-III |
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| | ===NAME DSkeen JMain PWen CVanderniet=== |
| | DATE J 07/08/93 07/08/93 07/14/93 07/14/93 OFC *C:DRS:R-III |
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| | *SC:OEAB:DORS |
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| | *C/OEAB/DORS |
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| | *C:SPLB:DSSA |
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| | NAME GWright RDennig AEChaffee |
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| | CEMcCracken |
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| | DATE J 07/14/93 07/15/93 107/15/93 J07/16/93.Y.OFC C/OGCB:DORS |
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| | D/DORS NAME GMarcus ifM BGrimes T DATE 07/.9/93 07/ /93[OFFICIAL |
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| | RECORD COPY]DOCUMENT NAME: IN93 XX.QC1 IN 93-XX July xx, 1993 This information |
| | |
| | notice requires no specific action or written response. |
| | |
| | If you have any questions |
| | |
| | about the information |
| | |
| | in this notice, please contact one of the technical |
| | |
| | contacts listed below or the appropriate |
| | |
| | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating |
| | |
| | ===Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation=== |
| | Technical |
| | |
| | contacts: Clark Vanderniet, R-III (708) 790-5594 David Skeen, NRR (301) 504-1174 Attachment: |
| | List of Recently Issued NRC Information |
| | |
| | Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE |
| | |
| | OFFICE *OEAB:DORS |
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| | *TECH:ED *OGCB:DORS |
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| | *DRS:R-III |
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| | ===NAME DSkeen JMain l PWen CVanderniet=== |
| | DATE 07/08/93 07/08/93 07/14/93 07/14/93 1'I*C:DRS:RIII |
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| | *SC:OEAB:DORS |
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| | *C:OEAB:DORS |
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| | C:SPLBAS* |
| | D: DSS 3q %GWright RDenning AChaffee CEMcCracken |
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| | ACThadani 07/14/93 [07/15/93 |
| | 07/15/93 -07/2/f93 |
| | 07/2A/93 C:OGCB:DORS |
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| | D: DORS GHMarcus BKGrimes 07/ /93 07/ /93 DOCUMENT NAME: QCHPCIIN.WEN |
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| | C 5 G-4J -z--l -2'J 4 3-- -k k- 9 C J- |
| | IN 93-XX July xx, 1993 This information |
| | |
| | notice requires no specific action or written response. |
| | |
| | If you have any questions |
| | |
| | about the information |
| | |
| | in this notice, please contact one of the technical |
| | |
| | contacts listed below or the appropriate |
| | |
| | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating |
| | |
| | ===Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation=== |
| | Technical |
| | |
| | contacts: Clark (708)Vanderniet, R-III 790-5594 David Skeen, NRR (301) 504-1174 Attachment: |
| | List of Recently Issued NRC Information |
| | |
| | Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE |
| | |
| | OFFICE *OEAB:DORS |
| | |
| | *TECH:ED *OGCB:DORS |
| | |
| | *DRS:R-III |
| | |
| | ===NAME DSkeen JMain PWen CVanderniet=== |
| | DATE 07/08/93 07/08/93 07 114/93 07/14/93 L, _, I_,__ _ .., __ ...I_ I -*C:DRS:RIII |
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| | S ODORS EAB:DORS C:SPLB:DSSA |
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| | D:DSSA GWright R enn afaf' afee CEMcCracken |
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| | ACThadani 07/14/93 [ 3 07/j</93 07/ /93 07/ /93 C:OGCB:DORS |
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| | D:DORS GHMarcus BKGrimes 07/ /93 07/ /93 0 DOCUMENT NAME: QCHPCIIN.WEN |
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| | -E7/14/93 12:53 ?03 787905538417463837 P. 0', This infi you have the tech Roactor IN 93-XX July xx. 1993 Irmation notice requires no specific action or written response. |
| | |
| | It any questions |
| | |
| | about the information |
| | |
| | in this noticet please contact lcal contmct listed below or the appropriate |
| | |
| | Office of Nuclear r.gulmtion (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of sOrating RGOM Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| | |
| | Technic~l |
| | |
| | contacts Clark Vanderniet, R-II1 (708) 790-5594 Oavid Skeen NRR (301) 604-1174 Attach 4 nt: List of Recently Issued NRC Information |
| | |
| | Notices/._ _ *,,1'SEL PR -.IUUb 6UNCUUMM6C, OFFIC D _ *TECH:,ED |
| | |
| | -I _ I R NAME _ JGnMain PI_. ., I -- '^A j" IR na jai4 I 7/1k01.%0J//Y//93 I1 UATI I uJ 1 b I W ._ I I nF&-flIA I C:PBDS :ISS I ----.n J T TV cr P. rAn |
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| | * Motw rn r nAs WDgR I C.SPLB*DSSA |
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| | D :DSSA_I Ch ouf I 1NNI I I I;rn n I= -- 1 --.-. -T II 1 A tn"^"4^" I ji 1%V, fam rEIaCracken |
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| | ACThadani |
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| | _1 OI-lqn 0, 7/ R/9M3..~07~11 9 93 07/ /93 -- 107/ /193 -IQl l 193 107/ /93--:_ _r _r.nnr 'f lRS D:DORS us BK rimes-.. ..- _ L4Y.IIuL)OCUME NA ML: QUMrLun.w~J' |
| | 14 JUL 93 B: 5u LETd lN11 211HM DUN 411 b0S T ,z ES:90 t 5os->X-L0 LM1 b0S IQ£ |
| | J\1 IN 93-XX July xx, 1993 This information |
| | |
| | notice requires no specific action or written response. |
| | |
| | If you have any questions |
| | |
| | about the information |
| | |
| | in this notice, please contact the technical |
| | |
| | contact listed below or the appropriate |
| | |
| | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating |
| | |
| | ===Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation=== |
| | Technical |
| | |
| | contacts: Clark (708)Vanderniet, R-III 790-5594 David Skeen, NRR (301) 504-1174 Attachment: |
| | List of Recently Issued NRC Information |
| | |
| | Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE |
| | |
| | I OFFICE *OEAB:DORS |
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| | DATE 07/08/93 07/08/93 07/ W/93 07/ /93 C:DRS:RIII |
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| | D:DSSA GWright RDenning AChaffee CEMcCracken |
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| ==Description of Circumstances==
| | ACThadani 07/ /93 J07/ /93 07/ /93 07/ /93 07/ /93..I C:OGCB:DORS |
| During a quarterly inservice test of the HPCI pump at the Commonwealth EdisonQuad Cities Station, Unit 1, on June 9, 1993, the exhaust steam line rupture9308100248F QrRi
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| IN 93-67August 16, 1993 discs burst, releasing steam into the HPCI room, burning, and slightlycontaminating, five workers. The rupture discs burst within one second afterthe turbine was started. Fire doors between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 HPCI roomswere blown off their hinges into the Unit 2 HPCI room. Both sets of doubledoors that are part of the secondary containment boundary were also blownopen. The floor latch on the inner containment door was bent; the outer doorswere also slightly damaged, but were repaired, closed and sealed approximately35 minutes after the event. The steam release was terminated by automaticisolation of the steam supply line on high HPCI turbine area temperature about20 seconds into the event.DiscussionUpon investigating the event, the licensee determined that water hadaccumulated in the turbine casing because the drain system level switches forthe Unit 1 HPCI system had failed. In April 1992, the licensee performed areliability-centered maintenance study which recommended the level switches beincluded in the preventive maintenance program but the recommendation had notbeen acted on at the time of the event. The Unit 2 HPCI drain system levelswitches were also found to be inoperable.The slug of water created during the HPCI turbine roll passed from the turbinecasing to the vertical exhaust line and compressed the air in the 40.6 cm[16 inch] line containing the rupture discs. The resulting pressure pulsecaused the inner rupture disc to burst, which impacted the outer disc asdesigned and caused it to burst as well. The exhaust line pressure sensors,located in the horizontal 61 cm [24 inch] exhaust line that tees off from thevertical 40.6 cm [16 inch] rupture disc line, did not detect a high pressure(see Figure 1). The pressure switches were within tolerance and should haveimmediately isolated the steam supply upon sensing a high exhaust pressurebefore the rupture discs burst. The fact that a high exhaust line pressurewas not detected indicates two possible causes for the disc rupture. Eitherthe inner rupture disc was degraded and burst at lower-than-design pressure,or the pressure pulse actually exceeded the design pressure and caused thedisc to burst, relieving the exhaust line pressure before the downstreampressure sensors detected a high pressure condition.While inspection of the rupture discs did not reveal any degradation fromcorrosion or aging, the vendor, Black Sivalls & Bryson, Inc, stated that thediscs are warranted for one year of service under normal conditions. The HPCIand RCIC rupture discs at Quad Cities Station had been in service for 20 yearsand were not part of any scheduled inspection or preventive maintenanceprogram. When consulted about the event, the vendor advised against using thespare discs in the plant storeroom because they were purchased at the sametime as the failed discs. The licensee later replaced the failed discs withnew units. Before this event, the licensee recently replaced a HPCI rupturedisc during a refueling outage at the Dresden Station, a plant similar to QuadCities, after finding a crack in the disc during an inspection. The rupturediscs were inspected at the Dresden station as part of an enhancement to thepreventive maintenance program that was recommended by a reliability-centeredanalysis.
| | D:DORS GHMarcus BKGrimes 07/ /93 07/ /93 DOCUMENT NAME: QCHPCIIN.WEN |
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| I IIN 93-67August 16, 1993 The steam injured five workers, four of whom were participating in the HPCIpump surveillance test. The fifth, and m6st severely. injured worker was ahealth physics technician in the room on routine rounds, who was not aware ofthe danger posed by the surveillance test. The test procedure contained nospecific guidance on room occupancy. Interviews with the workers revealedthat they had performed the surveillance in the past and were familiar withthe process. This familiarity may have led to a relaxed attitude towardpersonal safety. The workers stated that during previous surveillances theysometimes evacuated the room before rolling the turbine, or stood near thedoors to be ready to escape. The licensee made no routine announcement overthe plant paging system to alert plant personnel before the HPCI-turbinestart, and the workers were not prepared for the turbine to start.A lack of constant communication between the workersand the control room mayhave contributed to the personnel injuries. If a control room operator hadbeen in contact with the workers in the HPCI room during the turbine roll, theworkers would have been aware of the impending turbine start and, after start,the steam supply might have been manually-isolated or the turbine manuallytripped before the automatic isolation caused by the high area temperatureointhe HPCI room.When the Unit 1 HPCI rupture disc failure caused the fire doors to be blownoff their hinges and into the Unit 2 HPCI room, one of the doors impacted apipe hanger in the room and moved it 5.1 centimeters [2 inches]. If the steamrelease had resulted from a high energy line break from the inlet side of theHPCI steam line instead of the exhaust line, the damage to the Unit 2 HPCIsystem could have been more severe. While high energy line breaks have beenanalyzed for safety systems at all plants, the doors to rooms containing highenergy steam lines may not have been included in the analysis. For example,at Duane Arnold Energy Center, the licensee discovered that while the HPCI andRCIC rooms were qualified for pressures of 26.2 kPa [3.8 psig], the doorsbetween these rooms and the reactor building would yield at 6.9 kPa [1 psig].The licensee for the Quad Cities Station will implement a preventivemaintenance schedule for both the HPCI and RCIC rupture discs and the levelswitches. The licensee will review the surveillance test procedure andevaluate the missile hazard created by the fire doors. The licensee replacedthe rupture discs for the Unit 2 HPCI and RCIC systems with new ones after theevent at Unit 1 and is considering burst testing the removed discs todetermine if they are degraded. | | I' >OFC OEAB:DORS |
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| IN 93-67August 16, 1993 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactthe technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of NuclearReactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grim s, DirectorDivision of Operating Reactor SupportOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts: Clark Vanderniet, RIII(708) 790-5594David Skeen, NRR(301) 504-1174Attachments:1. Figure 1, "Simplified Layout of Quad CitiesStation HPCI Turbine Exhaust Steam Line"2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
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| Cq~0crcOCd) h r-4 0\TOSUPPRESSIONPOOL1OUTER RUPTURE DISC _____CLOSABLE CHECKCHECK VALVE VALVE IINNER RUPTURE DISC[1 In]240.6 cm[16 in]VENT TOHPCI ROOMSTEAM INLET LINEFROM "B" MAINSTEAM LINELOCKEDOPENIIIIIRX BLDGIIII50.8 cm[20 In]61 cm[24 In]HPCI ROOM25 cm[10 In]D NOTES:1. PRESSURE SWITCH ACTUATES ALARM IN CONTROL ROOM WHEN PRESSURE BETWEEN THE INNER RUPTURE DISC AND OUTERRUPTURE DISC IS GREATER THAN 68.9 kPa [10 psig]. ALARM IS FOR INNER RUPTURE DISC LEAK DETECTION.2. REDUNDANT PRESSURE SWITCHES IN EXHAUST STEAM LINE TRIP THE HPCI TURBINE IF PRESSURE IS GREATER THAN 689 kPa [100 psig].3. RUPTURE DISC MAXIMUM DESIGN BURST PRESSURE IS 1034 kPa [150 psig].Figure 1 -Simplified Layout of Quad Cities Station HPCI Turbine Exhaust Steam Line
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| Attachment 2IN 93-67August 16, 1993 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDNRC INFORMATION NOTICESInformation Date ofNotice No. Subject Issuance Issued to93-6693-6593-6493-6393-6293-6193-6093-5993-58Switchover to Hot-LegInjection FollowingA Loss-of-CoolantAccident in Pres-surized Water ReactorsReactor Trips Causedby Breaker Testingwith Fault ProtectionBypassedPeriodic Testing andPreventive Maintenanceof Molded Case CircuitBreakersImproper Use of SolubleWeld Purge Dam MaterialThermal Stratificationof Water in BWR ReactorVesselsExcessive Reactor CoolantLeakage Following A SealFailure in A ReactorCoolant Pump or ReactorRecirculation PumpReporting Fuel Cycle andMaterials Events to theNRC Operations CenterUnexpected Opening ofBoth Doors in AnAirlockNonconservatism in Low-Temperature OverpressureProtection for Pressurized-Water Reactors08/16/9308/13/93-08/12/9308/11/9308/10/9308/09/9308/04/9307/26/9307/26/93All holders of OLs or CPsfor pressurized waterreactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor boiling water reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All fuel cycle and materialslicensees.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor pressurized-waterreactors.OL = Operating LicenseCP = Construction Permit
| | NAME DSkeen o RDennig Tech Ed T7av LY AChaffee[DATE 1 7/g/93 / /93 7/P /93 / /93 OFC OGCB:DORS |
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| l--IN 93-67August 16, 1993 ]DOCUMENT NAME: 93-67.IN
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| \-IN 93-XXJuly XX, 1993 ]DOCUMENT NAME: IN93 XX.QC1 IN 93-XXJuly xx, 1993 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactone of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office ofNuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, DirectorDivision of Operating Reactor SupportOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts:Clark Vanderniet, R-III(708) 790-5594David Skeen, NRR(301) 504-1174Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCEOFFICE *OEAB:DORS *TECH:ED *OGCB:DORS *DRS:R-IIINAME DSkeen JMain l PWen CVandernietDATE07/08/9307/08/9307/14/9307/14/931'I*C:DRS:RIII *SC:OEAB:DORS *C:OEAB:DORS C:SPLBAS* D: DSS 3q %GWright RDenning AChaffee CEMcCracken ACThadani07/14/93 [07/15/93 07/15/93 -07/2/f93 07/2A/93C:OGCB:DORSD: DORSGHMarcus BKGrimes07/ /93 07/ /93DOCUMENT NAME: QCHPCIIN.WENC 5 G-4J -z--l -2'J 4 3-- -k k- 9 C J-
| | DRS/R-III NAME PWen GWright CVanderniet |
| IN 93-XXJuly xx, 1993 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactone of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office ofNuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, DirectorDivision of Operating Reactor SupportOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts:Clark(708)Vanderniet, R-III790-5594David Skeen, NRR(301) 504-1174Attachment:List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCEOFFICE *OEAB:DORS *TECH:ED *OGCB:DORS *DRS:R-IIINAME DSkeen JMain PWen CVandernietDATE07/08/9307/08/9307 114/9307/14/93L, _, I_,__ _ .., __ ...I_ I -*C:DRS:RIII S ODORS EAB:DORS C:SPLB:DSSA D:DSSAGWright R enn afaf' afee CEMcCracken ACThadani07/14/93 [ 3 07/j</93 07/ /93 07/ /93C:OGCB:DORSD:DORSGHMarcus BKGrimes07/ /93 07/ /930DOCUMENT NAME: QCHPCIIN.WEN
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| -E7/14/9312:53 ?03 787905538417463837P. 0',This infiyou havethe techRoactorIN 93-XXJuly xx. 1993 Irmation notice requires no specific action or written response. Itany questions about the information in this noticet please contactlcal contmct listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclearr.gulmtion (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, DirectorDivision of sOrating RGOM SupportOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnic~l contactsClark Vanderniet, R-II1(708) 790-5594Oavid Skeen NRR(301) 604-1174Attach4nt: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices/._ _ *,,1'SEL PR -.IUUb 6UNCUUMM6C,OFFIC D _ *TECH:,ED -I _ I RNAME _ JGnMain PI_. .,I -- '^A j"IR na jai4I 7/1k01.%0J//Y//93I1UATI I uJ 1 b I W ._ II nF&-flIA I C:PBDS :ISS I ----.n J T TVcr P. rAn
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| * Motwrn r nAs WDgRI C.SPLB*DSSAD :DSSA_ICh ouf I 1NNI I I I;rn n I= -- 1 --.-. -T II 1Atn"^"4^"I ji 1%V, famrEIaCrackenACThadani _1OI-lqn 0, 7/ R/9M3..~07~11 9 93 07/ /93 -- 107/ /193 -IQl l 193 107/ /93--:_ _r _r.nnr 'f lRSD:DORSus BK rimes-.. ..- _ L4Y.IIuL)OCUME NA ML: QUMrLun.w~J'14 JUL 93 B: 5uLETd lN11 211HM DUN411 b0S T ,z ES:90 t 5os->X-L0LM1 b0S IQ£
| | D/DORS NAME l GMarcus l BGrimes DATE / /93 / /93 / /93 1 / /93 l[OFFICIAL |
| J\1IN 93-XXJuly xx, 1993 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactthe technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of NuclearReactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, DirectorDivision of Operating Reactor SupportOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts:Clark(708)Vanderniet, R-III790-5594David Skeen, NRR(301) 504-1174Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCEIOFFICE *OEAB:DORS *TECH:ED _ _GC i'O W DRS:R-IIINAME DSkeen JMain PWen CVandernietDATE07/08/9307/08/9307/ W/9307/ /93C:DRS:RIII SC:OEAB:DORS C:OEAB:DORS C:SPLB:DSSA D:DSSAGWright RDenning AChaffee CEMcCracken ACThadani07/ /93 J07/ /93 07/ /93 07/ /93 07/ /93..IC:OGCB:DORSD:DORSGHMarcus BKGrimes07/ /93 07/ /93DOCUMENT NAME: QCHPCIIN.WEN
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| I' >OFC OEAB:DORS SC/OEAB:DORS PUB:ADM C/OEAB:DORSNAME DSkeen o RDennig Tech Ed T7av LY AChaffee[DATE 17/g/93 / /93 7/P /93 / /93OFC OGCB:DORS C/DRS/R-III DRS/R-IIINAME PWen GWright CVandernietDATE / /93 / /93 / /93OFC TECH BRANCH CHF TECH BR C/OGCB:DORS D/DORSNAME l GMarcus l BGrimesDATE / /93 / /93 / /93 1 / /93 l[OFFICIAL RECORD COPY]DOCUMENT NAME: IN93 XX.QC1
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Bursting of High Pressure Coolant Injection Steam Line Rupture Discs Injures Plant PersonnelML031070135 |
Person / Time |
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Site: |
Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000349, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant ![Entergy icon.png](/w/images/7/79/Entergy_icon.png) |
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Issue date: |
08/16/1993 |
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From: |
Grimes B K Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
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To: |
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References |
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IN-93-067, NUDOCS 9308100248 |
Download: ML031070135 (14) |
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Similar Documents at Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000349, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant |
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Category:NRC Information Notice
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Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Containment Liner Cor Information Notice 2012-13, Boraflex Degradation Surveillance Programs and Corrective Actions in the Spent Fuel Pool2012-08-10010 August 2012 Boraflex Degradation Surveillance Programs and Corrective Actions in the Spent Fuel Pool Information Notice 2012-13, Boraflex Degradation Surveillance Programs And Corrective Actions In The Spent Fuel Pool2012-08-10010 August 2012 Boraflex Degradation Surveillance Programs And Corrective Actions In The Spent Fuel Pool Information Notice 2012-11, Age Related Capacitor Degradation2012-07-23023 July 2012 Age Related Capacitor Degradation ML12031A0132012-02-0606 February 2012 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Investigation Report No. 2-2010-058, Cpn International, Inc Information Notice 2011-19, Licensee Event Reports Containing Information Pertaining to Defects to Basic Components2011-09-26026 September 2011 Licensee Event Reports Containing Information Pertaining to Defects to Basic Components Information Notice 2011-15, Steel Containment Degradation and Associated License Renewal Aging Management Issues2011-08-0101 August 2011 Steel Containment Degradation and Associated License Renewal Aging Management Issues Information Notice 2011-17, Calculation Methodologies for Operability Determinations of Gas Voids in Nuclear Power Plant Piping2011-07-26026 July 2011 Calculation Methodologies for Operability Determinations of Gas Voids in Nuclear Power Plant Piping Information Notice 2011-13, Official Exhibit - NYS000329-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (NRC in 2011-13)2011-06-29029 June 2011 Official Exhibit - NYS000329-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (NRC in 2011-13) Information Notice 2011-13, Official Exhibit - Nys000329-00-Bd01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (Nrc in 2011-13)2011-06-29029 June 2011 Official Exhibit - Nys000329-00-Bd01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (Nrc in 2011-13) Information Notice 2011-13, OFFICIAL EXHIBIT - NYS000329-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (NRC in 2011-13)2011-06-29029 June 2011 OFFICIAL EXHIBIT - NYS000329-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (NRC in 2011-13) Information Notice 2011-04, IN: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors2011-02-23023 February 2011 IN: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors Information Notice 2011-04, In: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors2011-02-23023 February 2011 In: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors Information Notice 2011-04, in: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors2011-02-23023 February 2011 in: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors Information Notice 2010-26, New England Coalition'S Motion for Leave to Reply to NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 and Entergy'S Response to the Supplement to Nec'S Petition for Commission Review of LBP-10-2010-12-30030 December 2010 New England Coalition'S Motion for Leave to Reply to NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 and Entergy'S Response to the Supplement to Nec'S Petition for Commission Review of LBP-10-19 Information Notice 2010-26, New England Coalition'S Motion for Leave to Reply to NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 and Entergy'S Response to the Supplement to Nec'S Petition for Commission Review2010-12-30030 December 2010 New England Coalition'S Motion for Leave to Reply to NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 and Entergy'S Response to the Supplement to Nec'S Petition for Commission Review of LBP-10-19 Information Notice 2010-26, 2010/12/21-NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-262010-12-21021 December 2010 2010/12/21-NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 ML13066A1872009-12-16016 December 2009 Draft NRC Information Notice 2009-xx - Underestimate of Dam Failure Frequency Used in Probabilistic Risk Assessments ML1007804482009-11-23023 November 2009 Email from Peter Bamford, NRR to Pamela Cowan, Exelon on TMI Contamination Control Event Information Notice 2009-11, NSP000059-Revised Prefiled Testimony of Northard/Petersen/Peterson-NRC Information Notice 2009-112009-07-0707 July 2009 NSP000059-Revised Prefiled Testimony of Northard/Petersen/Peterson-NRC Information Notice 2009-11 Information Notice 2009-10, Official Exhibit - NYS000019-00-BD01- NRC Information Notice 2009-10, Transformers Failures - Recent Operating Experience (Jul. 7, 2009) (NRC in 2009-10)2009-07-0707 July 2009 Official Exhibit - NYS000019-00-BD01- NRC Information Notice 2009-10, Transformers Failures - Recent Operating Experience (Jul. 7, 2009) (NRC in 2009-10) Information Notice 2009-09, Improper Flow Controller Settings Renders Injection Systems Inoperable and Surveillance Did Not Identify2009-06-19019 June 2009 Improper Flow Controller Settings Renders Injection Systems Inoperable and Surveillance Did Not Identify Information Notice 2008-12, Reactor Trip Due to Off-Site Power Fluctuation2008-07-0707 July 2008 Reactor Trip Due to Off-Site Power Fluctuation Information Notice 2008-11, Service Water System Degradation at Brunswicksteam Electric Plant Unit 12008-06-18018 June 2008 Service Water System Degradation at Brunswicksteam Electric Plant Unit 1 Information Notice 2008-04, Counterfeit Parts Supplied to Nuclear Power Plants2008-04-0707 April 2008 Counterfeit Parts Supplied to Nuclear Power Plants Information Notice 1991-09, Counterfeiting of Crane Valves2007-09-25025 September 2007 Counterfeiting of Crane Valves Information Notice 2007-28, Potential Common Cause Vulnerabilities in Essential Service Water Systems Due to Inadequate Chemistry Controls2007-09-19019 September 2007 Potential Common Cause Vulnerabilities in Essential Service Water Systems Due to Inadequate Chemistry Controls Information Notice 2007-29, Temporary Scaffolding Affects Operability of Safety-Related Equipment2007-09-17017 September 2007 Temporary Scaffolding Affects Operability of Safety-Related Equipment Information Notice 2007-14, Loss of Offsite Power and Dual-Unit Trip at Catawba Nuclear Generating Station2007-03-30030 March 2007 Loss of Offsite Power and Dual-Unit Trip at Catawba Nuclear Generating Station Information Notice 2007-06, Potential Common Cause Vulnerabilities in Essential Service Water Systems2007-02-0909 February 2007 Potential Common Cause Vulnerabilities in Essential Service Water Systems Information Notice 2007-05, Vertical Deep Draft Pump Shaft and Coupling Failures2007-02-0909 February 2007 Vertical Deep Draft Pump Shaft and Coupling Failures Information Notice 2006-31, Inadequate Fault Interrupting Rating of Breakers2006-12-26026 December 2006 Inadequate Fault Interrupting Rating of Breakers Information Notice 2006-29, Potential Common Cause Failure of Motor-operated Valves as a Result of Stem Nut Wear2006-12-14014 December 2006 Potential Common Cause Failure of Motor-operated Valves as a Result of Stem Nut Wear Information Notice 2006-29, Potential Common Cause Failure of Motor-operated Valves As a Result of Stem Nut Wear2006-12-14014 December 2006 Potential Common Cause Failure of Motor-operated Valves As a Result of Stem Nut Wear Information Notice 2006-13, E-mail from M. Mclaughlin on NRC, Regarding NRC Information Notice 2006-13: Groundwater Contamination2006-07-13013 July 2006 E-mail from M. Mclaughlin on NRC, Regarding NRC Information Notice 2006-13: Groundwater Contamination 2020-09-03 The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:05000349]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>.
[Table view]The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:05000349]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>. |
U -AU UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 August 16, 1993 NRC INFORMATION
NOTICE 93-67: BURSTING OF HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION STEAM LINE RUPTURE DISCS INJURES PLANT PERSONNEL
Addressees
All holders of operating
licenses or construction
permits for nuclear power reactors.
Purpose
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) is issuing this information
notice to remind addressees
of the hazards associated
with steam driven coolant injection
systems such as the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI)system and the reactor core isolation
cooling (RCIC) system at BWRs and the auxiliary
feedwater
system at PWRs. It is expected that recipients
will review the information
for applicability
to their facilities
and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
However, suggestions
X contained
in this information
notice are not NRC requirements;
therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Background
The purpose of HPCI steam exhaust rupture discs is to protect the HPCI turbine casing and associated
exhaust piping from an overpressure
event if the normal exhaust path to the suppression
pool becomes blocked. At Quad Cities Station, two 40.6-cm [16-inch]
stainless
steel discs are installed
in series with a 6.4-cm [2.5-inch]
spacer between them to allow for a pressure sensor instrumentation
line. The pressure sensor, while serving no control function, actuates an alarm in the control room at 68.9 kPa [10 psig] to alert the operators
that the inner disc is leaking. The normal range of the HPCI exhaust steam pressure is 172 to 207 kPa [25 to 30 psig].- The HPCI high exhaust pressure turbine trip setpoint is 689 kPa [100 psig] and is sensed by pressure sensors located downstream
from where the section of piping containing
the rupture discs branches off from the exhaust piping. The section of piping containing
the rupture discs is mounted vertically
over the turbine exhaust and vents directly to the HPCI room. Pressure greater than 1034 kPa [150 psig] in the exhaust line will cause the inner disc to rupture and impact the outer disc, releasing
steam into the HPCI room.Description
of Circumstances
During a quarterly
inservice
test of the HPCI pump at the Commonwealth
Edison Quad Cities Station, Unit 1, on June 9, 1993, the exhaust steam line rupture 9308100248 F QrRi
IN 93-67 August 16, 1993 discs burst, releasing
steam into the HPCI room, burning, and slightly contaminating, five workers. The rupture discs burst within one second after the turbine was started. Fire doors between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 HPCI rooms were blown off their hinges into the Unit 2 HPCI room. Both sets of double doors that are part of the secondary
containment
boundary were also blown open. The floor latch on the inner containment
door was bent; the outer doors were also slightly damaged, but were repaired, closed and sealed approximately
35 minutes after the event. The steam release was terminated
by automatic isolation
of the steam supply line on high HPCI turbine area temperature
about 20 seconds into the event.Discussion
Upon investigating
the event, the licensee determined
that water had accumulated
in the turbine casing because the drain system level switches for the Unit 1 HPCI system had failed. In April 1992, the licensee performed
a reliability-centered
maintenance
study which recommended
the level switches be included in the preventive
maintenance
program but the recommendation
had not been acted on at the time of the event. The Unit 2 HPCI drain system level switches were also found to be inoperable.
The slug of water created during the HPCI turbine roll passed from the turbine casing to the vertical exhaust line and compressed
the air in the 40.6 cm[16 inch] line containing
the rupture discs. The resulting
pressure pulse caused the inner rupture disc to burst, which impacted the outer disc as designed and caused it to burst as well. The exhaust line pressure sensors, located in the horizontal
61 cm [24 inch] exhaust line that tees off from the vertical 40.6 cm [16 inch] rupture disc line, did not detect a high pressure (see Figure 1). The pressure switches were within tolerance
and should have immediately
isolated the steam supply upon sensing a high exhaust pressure before the rupture discs burst. The fact that a high exhaust line pressure was not detected indicates
two possible causes for the disc rupture. Either the inner rupture disc was degraded and burst at lower-than-design
pressure, or the pressure pulse actually exceeded the design pressure and caused the disc to burst, relieving
the exhaust line pressure before the downstream
pressure sensors detected a high pressure condition.
While inspection
of the rupture discs did not reveal any degradation
from corrosion
or aging, the vendor, Black Sivalls & Bryson, Inc, stated that the discs are warranted
for one year of service under normal conditions.
The HPCI and RCIC rupture discs at Quad Cities Station had been in service for 20 years and were not part of any scheduled
inspection
or preventive
maintenance
program. When consulted
about the event, the vendor advised against using the spare discs in the plant storeroom
because they were purchased
at the same time as the failed discs. The licensee later replaced the failed discs with new units. Before this event, the licensee recently replaced a HPCI rupture disc during a refueling
outage at the Dresden Station, a plant similar to Quad Cities, after finding a crack in the disc during an inspection.
The rupture discs were inspected
at the Dresden station as part of an enhancement
to the preventive
maintenance
program that was recommended
by a reliability-centered
analysis.
I I IN 93-67 August 16, 1993 The steam injured five workers, four of whom were participating
in the HPCI pump surveillance
test. The fifth, and m6st severely.
injured worker was a health physics technician
in the room on routine rounds, who was not aware of the danger posed by the surveillance
test. The test procedure
contained
no specific guidance on room occupancy.
Interviews
with the workers revealed that they had performed
the surveillance
in the past and were familiar with the process. This familiarity
may have led to a relaxed attitude toward personal safety. The workers stated that during previous surveillances
they sometimes
evacuated
the room before rolling the turbine, or stood near the doors to be ready to escape. The licensee made no routine announcement
over the plant paging system to alert plant personnel
before the HPCI-turbine
start, and the workers were not prepared for the turbine to start.A lack of constant communication
between the workersand
the control room may have contributed
to the personnel
injuries.
If a control room operator had been in contact with the workers in the HPCI room during the turbine roll, the workers would have been aware of the impending
turbine start and, after start, the steam supply might have been manually-isolated
or the turbine manually tripped before the automatic
isolation
caused by the high area temperatureoin
the HPCI room.When the Unit 1 HPCI rupture disc failure caused the fire doors to be blown off their hinges and into the Unit 2 HPCI room, one of the doors impacted a pipe hanger in the room and moved it 5.1 centimeters
[2 inches]. If the steam release had resulted from a high energy line break from the inlet side of the HPCI steam line instead of the exhaust line, the damage to the Unit 2 HPCI system could have been more severe. While high energy line breaks have been analyzed for safety systems at all plants, the doors to rooms containing
high energy steam lines may not have been included in the analysis.
For example, at Duane Arnold Energy Center, the licensee discovered
that while the HPCI and RCIC rooms were qualified
for pressures
of 26.2 kPa [3.8 psig], the doors between these rooms and the reactor building would yield at 6.9 kPa [1 psig].The licensee for the Quad Cities Station will implement
a preventive
maintenance
schedule for both the HPCI and RCIC rupture discs and the level switches.
The licensee will review the surveillance
test procedure
and evaluate the missile hazard created by the fire doors. The licensee replaced the rupture discs for the Unit 2 HPCI and RCIC systems with new ones after the event at Unit 1 and is considering
burst testing the removed discs to determine
if they are degraded.
IN 93-67 August 16, 1993 This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.
If you have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact the technical
contact listed below or the appropriate
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grim s, Director Division of Operating
Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
contacts:
Clark Vanderniet, RIII (708) 790-5594 David Skeen, NRR (301) 504-1174 Attachments:
1. Figure 1, "Simplified
Layout of Quad Cities Station HPCI Turbine Exhaust Steam Line" 2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Notices
Cq~0cr cO Cd) h r-4 0\TO SUPPRESSION
POOL 1 OUTER RUPTURE DISC _____CLOSABLE CHECK CHECK VALVE VALVE I INNER RUPTURE DISC[1 In]2 40.6 cm[16 in]VENT TO HPCI ROOM STEAM INLET LINE FROM "B" MAIN STEAM LINE LOCKED OPEN I I I I I RX BLDG I I I I 50.8 cm[20 In]61 cm[24 In]HPCI ROOM 25 cm[10 In]D NOTES: 1. PRESSURE SWITCH ACTUATES ALARM IN CONTROL ROOM WHEN PRESSURE BETWEEN THE INNER RUPTURE DISC AND OUTER RUPTURE DISC IS GREATER THAN 68.9 kPa [10 psig]. ALARM IS FOR INNER RUPTURE DISC LEAK DETECTION.
2. REDUNDANT
PRESSURE SWITCHES IN EXHAUST STEAM LINE TRIP THE HPCI TURBINE IF PRESSURE IS GREATER THAN 689 kPa [100 psig].3. RUPTURE DISC MAXIMUM DESIGN BURST PRESSURE IS 1034 kPa [150 psig].Figure 1 -Simplified
Layout of Quad Cities Station HPCI Turbine Exhaust Steam Line
Attachment
2 IN 93-67 August 16, 1993 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION
NOTICES Information
Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 93-66 93-65 93-64 93-63 93-62 93-61 93-60 93-59 93-58 Switchover
to Hot-Leg Injection
Following A Loss-of-Coolant
Accident in Pres-surized Water Reactors Reactor Trips Caused by Breaker Testing with Fault Protection
Bypassed Periodic Testing and Preventive
Maintenance
of Molded Case Circuit Breakers Improper Use of Soluble Weld Purge Dam Material Thermal Stratification
of Water in BWR Reactor Vessels Excessive
Reactor Coolant Leakage Following
A Seal Failure in A Reactor Coolant Pump or Reactor Recirculation
Pump Reporting
Fuel Cycle and Materials
Events to the NRC Operations
Center Unexpected
Opening of Both Doors in An Airlock Nonconservatism
in Low-Temperature
Overpressure
Protection
for Pressurized- Water Reactors 08/16/93 08/13/93-08/12/93 08/11/93 08/10/93 08/09/93 08/04/93 07/26/93 07/26/93 All holders of OLs or CPs for pressurized
water reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for boiling water reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All fuel cycle and materials licensees.
All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for pressurized-water
reactors.OL = Operating
License CP = Construction
Permit
l--IN 93-67 August 16, 1993 This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.
If you have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact the technical
contact listed below or the appropriate
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.orig /s/'d by CIGrimes/for
Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating
Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
contacts: Clark Vanderniet, RIII (708) 790-5594 David Skeen, NRR (301) 504-1174 Attachments:
1. Figure 1, "Simplified
Layout of Quad Cities Station HPCI Turbine Exhaust Steam Line" 2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE.
OFC *OEAB:DORS
NAME DSkeen JMain PWen CVanderniet
DATE 07/08/93 , 07/08/93 07/14/93 07/14/93 OFC *C:DRS:R-III
NAME GWright I RDennig AEChaffee
CEMcCracken
DATE [ 07/14/93 1 07/15/93 07/15/93 ]07/16/93 I__ _ i OFC*D:DSSA*C/OGCB:DORS
D/DORS A^r NAME AThadani GMarcus BGrimes t DATE 07/24/93 07/29/93 0,S/\o/93 V[OFFICIAL
RECORD COPY]DOCUMENT NAME: 93-67.IN
\-IN 93-XX July XX, 1993 This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.
If you have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact the technical
contact listed below or the appropriate
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating
Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
contacts:
Clark Vanderniet, RIII (708) 790-5594 David (301)Skeen, NRR 504-1174 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE.
- D:DSSA AThadani 07/24/93 OFC *OEAB:DORS
NAME DSkeen JMain PWen CVanderniet
DATE J 07/08/93 07/08/93 07/14/93 07/14/93 OFC *C:DRS:R-III
NAME GWright RDennig AEChaffee
CEMcCracken
DATE J 07/14/93 07/15/93 107/15/93 J07/16/93.Y.OFC C/OGCB:DORS
D/DORS NAME GMarcus ifM BGrimes T DATE 07/.9/93 07/ /93[OFFICIAL
RECORD COPY]DOCUMENT NAME: IN93 XX.QC1 IN 93-XX July xx, 1993 This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.
If you have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact one of the technical
contacts listed below or the appropriate
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating
Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
contacts: Clark Vanderniet, R-III (708) 790-5594 David Skeen, NRR (301) 504-1174 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
OFFICE *OEAB:DORS
NAME DSkeen JMain l PWen CVanderniet
DATE 07/08/93 07/08/93 07/14/93 07/14/93 1'I*C:DRS:RIII
C:SPLBAS*
D: DSS 3q %GWright RDenning AChaffee CEMcCracken
ACThadani 07/14/93 [07/15/93
07/15/93 -07/2/f93
07/2A/93 C:OGCB:DORS
D: DORS GHMarcus BKGrimes 07/ /93 07/ /93 DOCUMENT NAME: QCHPCIIN.WEN
C 5 G-4J -z--l -2'J 4 3-- -k k- 9 C J-
IN 93-XX July xx, 1993 This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.
If you have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact one of the technical
contacts listed below or the appropriate
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating
Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
contacts: Clark (708)Vanderniet, R-III 790-5594 David Skeen, NRR (301) 504-1174 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
OFFICE *OEAB:DORS
NAME DSkeen JMain PWen CVanderniet
DATE 07/08/93 07/08/93 07 114/93 07/14/93 L, _, I_,__ _ .., __ ...I_ I -*C:DRS:RIII
S ODORS EAB:DORS C:SPLB:DSSA
D:DSSA GWright R enn afaf' afee CEMcCracken
ACThadani 07/14/93 [ 3 07/j</93 07/ /93 07/ /93 C:OGCB:DORS
D:DORS GHMarcus BKGrimes 07/ /93 07/ /93 0 DOCUMENT NAME: QCHPCIIN.WEN
-E7/14/93 12:53 ?03 787905538417463837 P. 0', This infi you have the tech Roactor IN 93-XX July xx. 1993 Irmation notice requires no specific action or written response.
It any questions
about the information
in this noticet please contact lcal contmct listed below or the appropriate
Office of Nuclear r.gulmtion (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of sOrating RGOM Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technic~l
contacts Clark Vanderniet, R-II1 (708) 790-5594 Oavid Skeen NRR (301) 604-1174 Attach 4 nt: List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Notices/._ _ *,,1'SEL PR -.IUUb 6UNCUUMM6C, OFFIC D _ *TECH:,ED
-I _ I R NAME _ JGnMain PI_. ., I -- '^A j" IR na jai4 I 7/1k01.%0J//Y//93 I1 UATI I uJ 1 b I W ._ I I nF&-flIA I C:PBDS :ISS I ----.n J T TV cr P. rAn
- Motw rn r nAs WDgR I C.SPLB*DSSA
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14 JUL 93 B: 5u LETd lN11 211HM DUN 411 b0S T ,z ES:90 t 5os->X-L0 LM1 b0S IQ£
J\1 IN 93-XX July xx, 1993 This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.
If you have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact the technical
contact listed below or the appropriate
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating
Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
contacts: Clark (708)Vanderniet, R-III 790-5594 David Skeen, NRR (301) 504-1174 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
I OFFICE *OEAB:DORS
- TECH:ED _ _GC i'O W DRS:R-III NAME DSkeen JMain PWen CVanderniet
DATE 07/08/93 07/08/93 07/ W/93 07/ /93 C:DRS:RIII
SC:OEAB:DORS
C:OEAB:DORS
C:SPLB:DSSA
D:DSSA GWright RDenning AChaffee CEMcCracken
ACThadani 07/ /93 J07/ /93 07/ /93 07/ /93 07/ /93..I C:OGCB:DORS
D:DORS GHMarcus BKGrimes 07/ /93 07/ /93 DOCUMENT NAME: QCHPCIIN.WEN
I' >OFC OEAB:DORS
SC/OEAB:DORS
PUB:ADM C/OEAB:DORS
NAME DSkeen o RDennig Tech Ed T7av LY AChaffee[DATE 1 7/g/93 / /93 7/P /93 / /93 OFC OGCB:DORS
C/DRS/R-III
DRS/R-III NAME PWen GWright CVanderniet
DATE / /93 / /93 / /93 OFC TECH BRANCH CHF TECH BR C/OGCB:DORS
D/DORS NAME l GMarcus l BGrimes DATE / /93 / /93 / /93 1 / /93 l[OFFICIAL
RECORD COPY]DOCUMENT NAME: IN93 XX.QC1
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list | - Information Notice 1993-01, Accuracy of Motor-Operated Valve Diagnostic Equipment Manufactured by Liberty Technologies (4 January 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-02, Malfunction of a Pressurizer Code Safety Valve (4 January 1993, Topic: Loop seal)
- Information Notice 1993-04, Investigation and Reporting of Misadministrations by the Radiation Safety Officer (7 January 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-05, Locking of Radiography Exposure Devices (14 January 1993, Topic: Uranium Hexafluoride)
- Information Notice 1993-06, Potential Bypass Leakage Paths Around Filters Installed in Ventilation Systems (22 January 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-07, Classification of Transportation Emergencies (1 February 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-08, Failure of Residual Heat Removal Pump Bearings Due to High Thrust Loading (1 February 1993, Topic: Probabilistic Risk Assessment)
- Information Notice 1993-09, Failure of Undervoltage Trip Attachment on Westinghouse Model DB-50 Reactor Trip Breaker (2 February 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-10, Dose Calibrator Quality Control (2 February 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-11, Single Failure Vulnerability of Engineered Safety Features Actuation Systems (4 February 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-12, Off-Gassing in Auxiliary Feedwater System Raw Water Sources (11 February 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-13, Undetected Modification of Flow Characteristics in High Pressure Safety Injection System (16 February 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-14, Clarification of 10 CFR 40.22, Small Quantities of Source Material (18 February 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-15, Failure to Verify the Continuity of Shunt Trip Attachment Contacts in Manual Safety Injection and Reactor Trip Switches (18 February 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-16, Failures of Not-Locking Devices in Check Valves (19 February 1993, Topic: Anchor Darling, Flow Induced Vibration)
- Information Notice 1993-17, Safety Systems Response to Loss of Coolant and Loss of Offsite Power (25 March 1994, Topic: Fire Barrier, Backfit)
- Information Notice 1993-18, Portable Moisture-Density Gauge User Responsibilities During Field Operations (10 March 1993, Topic: Moisture Density Gauge, Moisture-Density Gauge, Stolen)
- Information Notice 1993-19, Slab Hopper Bulging (17 March 1993, Topic: Hydrostatic)
- Information Notice 1993-20, Thermal Fatigue Cracking of Feedwater Piping to Steam Generators (24 March 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-21, Summary of NRC Staff Observations Compiled During Engineering Audits or Inspections of Licensee Erosion/Corrosion Programs (25 March 1993, Topic: Weld Overlay)
- Information Notice 1993-22, Tripping of Klockner-Moeller Molded-Case Circuit Breakers Due to Support Lever Failure (26 March 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-23, Weschler Instruments Model 252 Switchboard Meters (31 March 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-24, Distribution of Revision 7 of NUREG-1021, Operation Licensing Examiner Standards (31 March 1993, Topic: Job Performance Measure)
- Information Notice 1993-25, Electrical Penetration Assembly Degradation (1 April 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-26, Grease Soldification Causes Molded-Case Circuit Breaker Failure to Close (31 January 1994)
- Information Notice 1993-27, Level Instrumentation Inaccuracies Observed During Normal Plant Depressurization (8 April 1993, Topic: Reactor Vessel Water Level)
- Information Notice 1993-28, Failure to Consider Loss of DC Bus in the Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation May Lead to Nonconservative Analysis (9 April 1993, Topic: Fuel cladding)
- Information Notice 1993-29, Problems with the Use of Unshielded Test Leads in Reactor Protection System Circuitry (12 April 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-30, NRC Requirements for Evaluation of Wipe Test Results; Calibration of Count Rate Survey Instruments (12 April 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-31, Training of Nurses Responsible for the Care of Patients with Brachytherapy Implants (13 April 1993, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1993-32, Nonconservative Inputs for Boron Dilution Events Analysis (21 April 1993, Topic: Shutdown Margin)
- Information Notice 1993-33, Potential Deficiency of Certain Class Ie Instrumental and Control Cables (28 April 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-33, Potential Deficiency of Certain Class IE Instrumental and Control Cables (28 April 1993, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1993-34, Potential for Loss of Emergency Cooling Function Due to a Combination of Operational and Post-LOCA Debris in Containment (6 May 1993, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1993-35, Insights from Common-Cause Failure Events (12 May 1993, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1993-36, Notifications, Reports, and Records of Misadministrations (7 May 1993, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1993-37, Eyebolts with Indeterminate Properties Installed in Limitorque Valve Operator Housing Covers (19 May 1993, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1993-38, Inadequate Testing of Engineered Safety Features Actuation Systems (24 May 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-39, Radiation Beams From Power Reactor Biological Shields (25 May 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-39, Radiation Beams from Power Reactor Biological Shields (25 May 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-40, Fire Endurance Test Results for Thermal Ceramics FP-60 Fire Barrier Material (26 May 1993, Topic: Safe Shutdown, Fire Barrier, Fire Protection Program)
- Information Notice 1993-41, One Hour Fire Endurance Test Results for Thermal Ceramics Kaowool, 3M Company FS-195 and 3M Company Interam E-50 Fire Barrier Systems (28 May 1993, Topic: Safe Shutdown, Fire Barrier)
- Information Notice 1993-42, Failure of Anti-Rotation Keys in Motor-Operated Valves Manufactured by Yelan (9 June 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-43, Use of Inappropriate Lubrication Oils in Satety-Related Applications (10 June 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-44, Operational Challenges During a Dual-Unit Transient (15 June 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-45, Degradation of Shutdown Cooling System Performance (16 June 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-46, Potential Problem with Westinghouse Rod Control System and Inadvertent Withdrawal of Single Rod Control Cluster Assembly (10 June 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-47, Unrecognized Loss of Control Room Annunciators (18 June 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-48, Failure of Turbine-Driven Main Feedwater Pump to Trip Because of Contaminated Oil (6 July 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-49, Improper Integration of Software Into Operating Practices (8 July 1993)
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