RS-16-179, High Frequency Supplement to Seismic Hazard Screening Report, Response to Nrg Request for Information Pursuant to 1 O CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights.

High Frequency Supplement to Seismic Hazard Screening Report, Response to Nrg Request for Information Pursuant to 1 O CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights.

ML16302A131
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	10/28/2016
From:	Jim Barstow Exelon Generation Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
RS-16-179, TMI-16-084
Download: ML16302A131 (53)

Text

Exelon Generation" RS-16-179 10 CFR 50.54(f)

TMl-16-084 October 28, 2016 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-50 NRG Docket No. 50-289

Subject:

High Frequency Supplement to Seismic Hazard Screening Report, Response to NRG Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident

References:

1. NRG Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 1O of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012(ML12053A340)

2. NRG Letter, Electric Power Research Institute Report 3002000704, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic," As An Acceptable Alternative to the March 12, 2012, Information Request for Seismic Reevaluations, dated May 7, 2013 (ML13106A331)

3. NEI Letter, Final Draft of Industry Seismic Evaluation Guidance, Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic (EPRI 1025287), dated November 27, 2012 (ML12333A168 and ML12333A170)

4. NRG Letter, Endorsement of Electric Power Research Institute Final Draft Report 1025287, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance, Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic", dated February 15, 2013 (ML12319A074)

5. Exelon Generation Company, LLC letter to NRG, Three Mile Island, Unit 1 - Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRG Request for Information Pursuant to 10CFR50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident, dated March 31, 2014 (RS-14-073) (ML14090A271)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Seismic Hazard 2.1 High Frequency Supplement October 28, 2016 Page 2

6. NRC Letter, Screening and Prioritization Results Regarding Information Pursuant to Title 1O of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Seismic Hazard Re-evaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated May 9, 2014 (ML14111A147)

7. NRC Memorandum, Support Document for Screening and Prioritization Results Regarding Seismic Hazard Re-Evaluation for Operating Reactors in the Central and Eastern United States, dated May 21, 2014 (ML14136A126)

8. NEI Letter, Request for NRC Endorsement of High Frequency Program: Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation (EPRI 3002004396),

dated July 30, 2015 (ML15223A100/ML15223A102)

9. NRC Letter to NEI: Endorsement of Electric Power Research Institute Final Draft Report 3002004396: "High Frequency Program: Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility," dated September 17, 2015 (ML15218A569) 1O. NRC Letter, Final Determination of Licensee Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessments Under the Request for Information Pursuant to Title 1O of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 "Seismic" of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident, dated October 27, 2015 (ML15194A015)

On March 12, 2012, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a Request for Information per 10 CFR 50.54(f) (Reference 1) to all power reactor licensees. The required response section of Enclosure 1 of Reference 1 indicated that licensees should provide a Seismic Hazard Evaluation and Screening Report within 1.5 years from the date of the letter for Central and Eastern United States (CEUS) nuclear power plants. By NRC letter dated May 7, 2013 (Reference 2), the date to submit the report was extended to March 31, 2014.

By letter dated May 9, 2014 (Reference 6), the NRC transmitted the results of the screening and prioritization review of the seismic hazards reevaluation report for Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 submitted on March 31, 2014 (Reference 5). In accordance with the screening, prioritization, and implementation details report (SPID) (References 3 and 4), and Augmented Approach guidance (Reference 2), the reevaluated seismic hazard is used to determine if additional seismic risk evaluations are warranted for a plant. Specifically, the reevaluated horizontal ground motion response spectrum (GMRS) at the control point elevation is compared to the existing safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) or Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE) High Confidence of Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) Spectrum (IHS) to determine if a plant is required to perform a high frequency confirmation evaluation. As noted in the May 9, 2014 letter from the NRC (Reference 6} on page 3 of Enclosure 2, Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 is to conduct a limited scope High Frequency Evaluation (Confirmation).

Within the May 9, 2014 letter (Reference 6}, the NRC acknowledged that these limited scope evaluations will require additional development of the assessment process. By Reference 8, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI} submitted an Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI} report entitled, High Frequency Program: Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation (EPRI 3002004396) for NRC review and endorsement. NRC endorsement was provided by Reference 9. Reference 1O provided the NRC final seismic hazard evaluation

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Seismic Hazard 2.1 High Frequency Supplement October 28, 2016 Page 3 screening determination results and the associated schedules for submittal of the remaining seismic hazard evaluation activities.

The High Frequency Evaluation Confirmation Report for Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1, provided in the enclosure to this letter, shows that all high frequency susceptible equipment evaluated within the scoping requirements and using evaluation criteria of Reference 8 for seismic demands and capacities, are acceptable. Therefore, no additional modifications or evaluations are necessary.

This letter closes Commitment Number 1 in Reference 5.

This letter contains no new regulatory commitments.

If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact Ronald Gaston at 630-657-3359.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on the 281h day of October 2016.

Respectfully submitted, Director - Licensing & Regulatory Affairs Exelon Generation Company, LLC

Enclosure:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 - Seismic High Frequency Evaluation Confirmation Report cc: NRG Regional Administrator - Region I NRG Project Manager, NRA - Three Mile Island Nuclear Station NRG Senior Resident Inspector - Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Mr. Brett A. Titus, NRR/JLD/JCBB, NRG Mr. Stephen M. Wyman, NRR/JLD/JHMB, NRG Mr. Frankie G. Vega, NRR/JLD/JHMB, NRG Director, Bureau of Radiation Protection - Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources Chairman, Board of County Commissioners of Dauphin County, PA Chairman, Board of Supervisors of Londonderry Township, PA R. R. Janati, Chief, Division of Nuclear Safety, Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, Bureau of Radiation Protection

Enclosure Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 Seismic High Frequency Evaluation Confirmation Report (49 pages)

HIGH FREQUENCY CONFIRMATION REPORT IN RESPONSE TO NEAR TERM TASK FORCE (NTTF) 2.1 RECOMMENDATION for the THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1 Middletown, PA 17057 Facility Operating License No. DPR-50 NRC Docket No. 50-289 Correspondence No.: RS-16-179, TMl-16-084 Exelon Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon)

PO Box 805398 Chicago, ll 60680-5398 Prepared by:

Stevenson & Associates 1661 Feehanville Drive, Suite 150 Mount Prospect, ll 60056 Report Number: 1SC4343-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Printed Name Signature Preparer: F. Ganatra 9/29/2016 Reviewer: M. Delaney 9/30/2016 Approver: M. Delaney 9/30/2016 Lead Responsible Engineer: ~T M,,<..<..t!Pe$

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Document ID: 15C4343-RPT-002

Title:

High Frequency Confirmation Report for Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 in Response to Near Term Task Force (NTTF) 2.1 Recommendation Document Type:

Criteria D Interface D Report ~ Specification D Other D Drawing D Project Name:

Three Mile Island, Unit 1 High Frequency Confirmation Job No.: 15C4343 Client:

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Exelon This document has been prepared under the guidance of the S&A Quality Assurance Program Manual, Revision 18 and project requirements:

Initial Issue (Rev. 0)

Originated by: F. Ganatra Date: 9/29/2016

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Checked by: M . Delaney Date: 9/30/2016

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Approved by: M. Delaney ~ft.(~ Date: 9/30/2016 Revision Record:

Revision Originated by/ Checked by/ Approved by/ Description of Revision No. Date Date Date DOCUMENT PROJECT NO.

APPROVAL SHEET 15C4343 Figure 2.8 Stevenson & Associates

15C4343-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-179, TMl-16-084 Executive Summary The purpose of this report is to provide information as requested by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in its March 12, 2012 letter issued to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status [1] . In particular, this report provides information requested to address the High Frequency Confirmation requirements of Item (4), Enclosure 1, Recommendation 2.1: Seismic, of the March 12, 2012 letter [1].

Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant resulting from the March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established a Near Term Task Force (NTIF) to conduct a systematic review of NRC processes and regulations and to determine if the agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system. The NTIF developed a set of recommendations [15] intended to clarify and strengthen the regulatory framework for protection against natural phenomena . Subsequently, the NRC issued a 50.54(f) letter on March 12, 2012 [1], requesting information to assure that these recommendations are addressed by all U.S. nuclear power plants. The 50.54(f) letter requests that licensees and holders of construction permits under 10 CFR Part 50 reevaluate the seismic hazards at their sites against present-day NRC requirements and guidance. Included in the 50.54(f) letter was a request that licensees' perform a "confirmation, if necessary, that SSCs, which may be affected by high-frequency ground motion, will maintain their functions important to safety."

EPRI 1025287, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic" [6]

provided screening, prioritization, and implementation details to the U.S. nuclear utility industry for responding to the NRC 50.54(f) letter. This report was developed with NRC participation and was subsequently endorsed by the NRC. The SPID included guidance for determining which plants should perform a High Frequency Confirmation and identified the types of components that should be evaluated in the evaluation.

Subsequent guidance for performing a High Frequency Confirmation was provided in EPRI 3002004396, "High Frequency Program, Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation," [8] and was endorsed by the NRC in a letter dated September 17, 2015 [3].

Final screening identifying plants needing to perform a High Frequency Confirmation was provided by NRC in a letter dated October 27, 2015 [2].

This report describes the High Frequency Confirmation evaluation performed for Three Mile Island, Unit 1 (TMl-1). The objective of this report is to provide summary information describing the High Frequency Confirmation evaluations and results. The level of detail provided in the report is intended to enable NRC to understand the inputs used, the evaluations performed, and the decisions made as a result of the evaluations.

EPRI 3002004396 [8] is used forthe TMl-1 evaluations described in this report. In accordance with Reference [8], the following topics are addressed in the subsequent sections of this report:

• Process of selecting components and a list of specific components for high-frequency confirmation

• Estimation of a vertical ground motion response spectrum (GMRS)

• Estimation of in-cabinet seismic demand for subject components Page 3 of 49

1SC4343-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-179, TMl-16-084

• Estimation of in-cabinet seismic capacity for subject components

• Summary of subject components' high-frequency evaluations Page 4 of 49

15C4343-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-179, TMl-16-084 1 Introduction 1.1 PURPOSE The purpose ofthis report is to provide information as requested by the NRC in its March 12, 2012 50.54(f) letter issued to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status [1]. In particular, this report provides requested information to address the High Frequency Confirmation requirements of Item (4), Enclosure 1, Recommendation 2.1:

Seismic, of the March 12, 2012 letter [l].

1.2 BACKGROUND

Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant resulting from the March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established a Near Term Task Force (NTTF) to conduct a systematic review of NRC processes and regulations and to determine if the agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system. The NTTF developed a set of recommendations intended to clarify and strengthen the regulatory framework for protection against natural phenomena. Subsequently, the NRC issued a 50 .54(f) letter on March 12, 2012 [1], requesting information to assure that these recommendations are addressed by all U.S. nuclear power plants. The 50.54(f) letter requests that licensees and holders of construction permits under 10 CFR Part 50 reevaluate the seismic hazards at their sites against present-day NRC requirements and guidance. Included in the 50.54(f) letter was a request that licensees' perform a "confirmation, if necessary, that SSCs, which may be affected by high-frequency ground motion, will maintain their functions important to safety."

EPRI 1025287, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1:

Seismic" [6] provided screening, prioritization, and implementation details to the U.S. nuclear utility industry for responding to the NRC 50.54(f) letter. This report was developed with NRC participation and is endorsed by the NRC. The SPID included guidance for determining which plants should perform a High Frequency Confirmation and identified the types of components that should be evaluated in the evaluation.

Subsequent guidance for performing a High Frequency Confirmation was provided in EPRI 3002004396, "High Frequency Program, Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation," [8] and was endorsed by the NRC in a letter dated September 17, 2015 [3].

Final screening identifying plants needing to perform a High Frequency Confirmation was provided by NRC in a letter dated October 27, 2015 [2].

On March 31, 2014, TMl-1 submitted a reevaluated seismic hazard to the NRC as a part of the Seismic Hazard and Screening Report [4]. By letter dated October 27, 2015 [2], the NRC transmitted the results of the screening and prioritization review of the seismic hazards reevaluation.

This report describes the High Frequency Confirmation evaluation performed for TMl-1 using the methodologies in EPRI 3002004396, "High Frequency Program, Application Guidance for Page 5 of 49

15C4343-RPT-002, Rev.a Correspondence No. : RS-16-179, TMl-16-084 Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation," as endorsed by the NRC in a letter dated September 17, 2015 [3] .

The objective of this report is to provide summary information describing the High Frequency Confirmation evaluations and results . The level of detail provided in the report is intended to enable NRC to understand the inputs used, the evaluations performed, and the decisions made as a result of the evaluations.

1.3 APPROACH EPRI 3002004396 [8) is used for the TMl-1 engineering evaluations described in this report.

Section 4.1 of Reference (8) provided general steps to follow for the high frequency confirmation component evaluation . Accordingly, the following topics are addressed in the subsequent sections of this report :

• TMl-1 SSE and GMRS Information

• Selection of components and a list of specific components for high-frequency confirmation

• Estimation of seismic demand for subject components

• Estimation of seismic capacity for subject components

• Summary of subject components' high-frequency evaluations

• Summary of Results 1.4 PLANT SCREENING TMl-1 submitted reevaluated seismic hazard information including GMRS and seismic hazard information to the NRC on March 31, 2014 (4). In a letter dated August 14, 2015, the NRC staff concluded that the submitted GMRS adequately characterizes the reevaluated seismic hazard for the TMl-1 site (14).

The NRC final screening determination letter concluded (2) that the TMl -1 GMRS to SSE comparison resulted in a need to perform a High Frequency Confirmation in accordance with the screening criteria in the SPID (6).

1.5 REPORT DOCUMENTATION Section 2 describes the selection of devices. The identified devices are evaluated in Reference (17) for the seismic demand specified in Section 3 using the evaluation criteria discussed in Section 4. The overall conclusion is discussed in Section 5.

Table B-1 lists the devices identified in Section 2 and provides the results of the evaluations performed in accordance with Section 3 and Section 4.

Page 6 of 49

15C4343-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-179, TMl-16-084 2 Selection of Components for High-Frequency Screening The fundamental objective of the high frequency confirmation review is to determine whether the occurrence of a seismic event could cause credited FLEX/mitigating strategies equipment to fail to perform as necessary. An optimized evaluation process is applied that focuses on achieving a safe and stable plant state following a seismic event. As described in Reference [8], this state is achieved by confirming that key plant safety functions critical to immediate plant safety are preserved (reactor trip, reactor vessel inventory and pressure control, and core cooling) and that the plant operators have the necessary power available to achieve and maintain this state immediately following the seismic event (AC/DC power support systems) .

Within the applicable functions, the components that would need a high frequency confirmation are contact control devices subject to intermittent states in seal-in or lockout circuits. Accordingly, the objective of the review as stated in Section 4.2.1 of Reference (8) is to determine if seismic induced high frequency relay chatter would prevent the completion of the following key functions.

2.1 REACTOR TRIP/SCRAM The reactor trip/SCRAM function is identified as a key function in Reference (8) to be considered in the High Frequency Confirmation. The same report also states that "the design requirements preclude the application of seal-in or lockout circuits that prevent reactor trip/SCRAM functions" and that "No high-frequency review of the reactor trip/SCRAM systems is necessary."

2.2 REACTOR VESSEL INVENTORY CONTROL The reactor coolant system/reactor vessel inventory control systems were reviewed for contact control devices in seal-in and lockout (SILO) circuits that would create a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). The focus of the review was contact control devices that could lead to a significant leak path. Check valves in series with active valves would prevent significant leaks due to misoperation of the active valve; therefore, SILO circuit reviews were not required for those active valves.

The process/criteria for assessing potential reactor coolant leak path valves is to review all P&ID's attached to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) and include all active isolation valves and any active second valve upstream or downstream that is assumed to be required to be closed during normal operation or close upon an initiating event (LOCA or Seismic) . A table with the valves and associated P&ID is included in Table B-2 of this report.

Manual valves that are normally closed are assumed to remain closed and a second simple check valve is assumed to function and not be a Multiple Spurious Failure.

Active Function: A function that requires mechanical motion or a change of state (e.g., the closing of a valve or relay or the change in state of a transistor)

Simple Check Valve: A valve which closes upon reverse fluid flow only.

Page 7 of 49

15C4343-RPT-002, Rev.a Correspondence No.: RS-16-179, TMl-16-084 The Letdown and Purification System on PWRs is a normally in service system with the flowpath open and in operation. If an event isolated a downstream valve, there are pressure relief valves that would flow water out of the RC System. Letdown has auto isolation and abnormal operating procedure which isolate the flow. There are no auto open valves in this flowpath.

Table B-2 contains a list of valves analyzed and the resultant devices selected. Based on the analysis detailed in Table 2-1 below, there are no contact devices that meet the criteria for selection in this category.

Table 2-1: RCS Valve Control Device Screening Valve ID Description Reference Comment RC-V-42 Reactor Head Vent 209-780 [21] Solenoid controlled by hand switch only RC-V-43 Reactor Head Vent 209-780 [21] Solenoid controlled by hand switch only Opening contactor may seal-in and open valve 208-4S2 [22) lC-ESV Unit 3A RC however RCS coolant loss is prevented by 209-503 [23)

DH-V-1 to DH Rem Block normally closed and depowered DH-V-2 and 208-413 [24]

Valve normally closed and non-vulnerable DH-V-3, 302-640 [25) which are in-line with DH-V-1.

lC-ESV Unit 3B RC 208-453 [26] This valve is closed and depowered [28, pp. 3-31]

DH-V-2 to DH Rem Block 209-603 [27] and as such contact chatter has no effect on the Valve 208-413 [24] position of the valve .

lC-ESV Unit 4B RC Motor contactors controlled by hand switches DH-V-3 Outlet to DH 208-454 [29] only with no seal-in of opening contactor and no System permissive in closing circuit RC-V-40A RC Vent Valve 209-779 [30] Solenoid controlled by hand switch only RC-V-41A RC Vent Valve 209-779 [30] Solenoid controlled by hand switch only RC-V-40B RC Vent Valve 209-780 [21] Solenoid controlled by hand switch only RC-V-41B RC Vent Valve 209-780 [21] Solenoid controlled by hand switch only Motor contactors controlled by hand switches lC-ESV Unit SC 208-426 Sh . 1 only; Valve is normally open and in this condition RC-V-2 Pressurizer Relief [31]

limit switches prevent seal-in of opening Block Valve 208-750 [32]

contactor; No permissive in closing circuit Pressurizer 209-034 [33] Solenoid controlled by 63X/RC-3PS8; No Seal-in RC-RV-2 Electromatic Relief 209-069 [34] or Lockout would prevent normal operation Valve RC-V-44 RC Vent Valve 209-780 [21] Solenoid controlled by hand switch only lB-ES Unit lOC Motor contactors controlled by hand switches RC-V-28 Pressurizer Vent 208-430 [35] only with no seal-in of opening contactor and no Valve permissive in closing circuit Page 8 of 49

15C4343-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No. : RS-16-179, TMl-16-084 2.3 REACTOR VESSEL PRESSURE CONTROL The reactor vessel pressure control function is identified as a key function in Reference [8] to be considered in the High Frequency Confirmation. The same report also states that "required post event pressure control is typically provided by passive devices" and that "no specific high frequency component chatter review is required for this function."

2.4 CORE COOLING The core cooling systems were reviewed for contact control devices in seal-in and lockout circuits that would prevent at least a single train of non-AC power driven decay heat removal from functioning. TMl-1 credits their Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump to provide feedwater to the Steam Generators to maintain core decay-heat cooling.

The selection of contact devices for the Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump was performed in TMl-1 ESEL. For more information on the ESEL selection process and the complete ESEL refer to Ref. [19].

2.5 AC/DC POWER SUPPORT SYSTEMS The AC and DC power support systems were reviewed for contact control devices in seal-in and lockout circuits that prevent the availability of DC and AC power sources. The following AC and DC power support systems were reviewed:

• Emergency Diesel Generators,

• Battery Chargers,

• Inverters,

• EOG Ancillary Systems, and

• Switchgear, Load Centers, and MCCs.

Electrical power, especially DC, is necessary to support achieving and maintaining a stable plant condition following a seismic event. DC power relies on the availability of AC power to recharge the batteries. The availability of AC power is dependent upon the Emergency Diesel Generators and their ancillary support systems. EPRI 3002004396 [8] requires confirmation that the supply of emergency power is not challenged by a SILO device. The tripping of lockout devices or circuit breakers is expected to require some level of diagnosis to determine if the trip was spurious due to contact chatter or in response to an actual system fault. The actions taken to diagnose the fault condition could substantially delay the restoration of emergency power.

In order to ensure contact chatter cannot compromise the emergency power system, control circuits were analyzed for the Emergency Diesel Generators (EOG), Battery Chargers, Vital AC Inverters, and Switchgear/Load Centers/MCCs as necessary for power supply from EOGs to Battery Chargers and EOG Ancillary Systems. General information on the arrangement of safety-related AC and DC systems, as well as operation of the EOGs, was obtained from TMl's UFSAR

[36]. TMI has two (2) DGs which provide emergency power for their two (2) divisions of Class 1E loads, with one DG for each division [37]. Four (4) battery chargers provide DC power and battery recharging functions [38] . (The output disconnect switches of the lE and 1F chargers are normally open and for this reason these chargers were not considered in this analysis.)

Page 9 of 49

15C4343-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-179, TMl-16-084 The analysis necessary to identify contact devices in this category relies on conservative worse-case initial conditions and presumptions regarding event progression . The analysis considers the reactor is operating at power with no equipment failures or LOCA prior to the seismic event.

The Emergency Diesel Generators are not operating but are available . The seismic event is presumed to cause a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) and a normal reactor SCRAM.

In response to bus undervoltage relaying detecting the LOOP, the Class lE control systems must automatically shed loads, start the EDGs, and sequentially load the diesel generators as designed. Ancillary systems required for EOG operation as well as Class lE battery chargers and inverters must function as necessary. The goal of this analysis is to identify any vulnerable contact devices which could chatter during the seismic event, seal-in or lock-out, and prevent these systems from performing their intended safety-related function of supplying electrical power during the LOOP.

The following sections contain a description of the analysis for each element of the AC/DC Support Systems. Contact devices are identified by description in this narrative and apply to all divisions.

Emergency Diesel Generators The analysis of the Emergency Diesel Generators, lA and lB, is divided into two sections, generator protective relaying and diesel engine control. General descriptions of these systems and controls appear in the UFSAR [36, pp. 8.2-17].

Generator Protective Relaving The control circuits for the DGlA circuit breakers [39] include Generator Lockout Relay 86G/1D2 and Bus Lockout Relay 86B/1D. If any ofthese lockout relays are tripped the EOG breaker will not close automatically during the LOOP. Chatter in the generator protective relaying during the period of strong shaking may trip the DGlA circuit breaker. These relays are 46G Negative Phase Sequence (Phase-to-Phase Fault), 76FX Field Overload, 64G Neutral Ground, 32 Reverse Power, Kl Exciter Shutdown, and 40X Loss of Excitation. The 86G/1D2 Generator Lockout may be tripped by chatter in Differential Relay 87M/1D2 on the EOG breaker [40]. The 86B/1D Bus Lockout Relay may be tripped by chatter in Phase Overcurrent Relays SlB/lD/A, SlB/lD/B, and SlB/lD/C; and Neutral Overcurrent Protective Relay SlB/lD/N [41].

The control circuit for the DGlB circuit breaker is identical in design and sensitive to chatter in its equivalent devices: 86G/1E3, 87M/1E3, 86B/1E, 46G, 76FX, 64G, 32, Kl, 40X, SlB/lE/A, SlB/lE/B, SlB/lE/C, and SlB/lE/N [40, 41, 42].

Diesel Engine Control Chatter analysis for the diesel engine control was performed on the start and shutdown circuits of each EOG [43, 44]. The SILO devices which may block EOG Emergency Start in response to a LOOP are the Generator Lockout Relay 86G (already covered), and Shutdown Relay SOR.

Chatter in any other device in the start control circuit would only have a transient effect, delaying start by, at most, the period of strong shaking.

The devices which could trip and seal-in the Shutdown Relay are the Lube Oil Pressure Low at Idle Relay OPL; Start Failure Relay SFR; Lube Oil Pressure Low Relays OPl, OP2, and OP3; Crankcase Pressure High Relays CCl, CC2, and CC3; and Engine Overspeed Relay EOR. When the engine is not operating the oil pressure is low and the oil pressure switches are closed. To Page 10 of 49

15C4343-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-179, TMl-16-084 prevent tripping the Shutdown Relay timers T3A, T3B, and T3C block the oil pressure switches.

In this state, chatter in the contacts of these timers could lead to an engine trip. Chatter in the contacts of Cranking Timers T2A and T2B could energize the Start Failure Relay lead to engine shutdown. Similarly, Chatter in the Engine Overspeed Switch EOS could energize the Engine Overspeed Relay and lead to engine shutdown.

The control circuit for the DGlB Engine Control is identical in design and sensitive to chatter in its identically-named devices.

Battery Chargers Chatter analysis of the battery chargers was performed using the vendor schematic diagrams

[45, 46, p. 32] as well as an As-Built Walkdown described in Attachment 9.2 of Reference [18].

Each battery charger has a High Voltage Shutdown (HVSD) circuit which is intended to protect the batteries and DC loads from overvoltage due to charger failure. The high voltage shutdown circuit has a latching output relay K which, upon detection of an output overvoltage, disconnects the auxiliary voltage transformers via the High Voltage Shutdown Relay (HVSDR), shutting the charger down. Chatter in the contacts of the HVSD output relay Kor the HVSDR will only have a temporary effect on the charger during the period of strong shaking. The operate coil of HVSD output relay K is controlled by a non-vulnerable solid-state circuit [46, p. 32). No other vulnerable contact device affects the availability of the battery chargers.

Inverters Chatter analysis of the inverters was performed using schematic diagrams contained in the vendor manual [47). Chatter in the contacts of the time delay relay Kl could energize the shunt trip coil of the DC input circuit breaker CBl. The 10 second time delay associated with Kl masks any chatter in the contacts of the relays in the Kl's coil circuit.

EDG Ancillary Systems In order to start and operate the Emergency Diesel Generators require a number of components and systems. For the purpose of identifying electrical contact devices, only systems and components which are electrically controlled are analyzed . Information in the UFSAR [36) was used as appropriate for this analysis.

Starting Air Based on Diesel Generator availability as an initial condition the passive air reservoirs are presumed pressurized and the only active components in this system required to operate are the air start solenoids [36, pp. 8.2-18], which are covered under the EOG engine control analysis in section above.

Combustion Air Intake and Exhaust The combustion air intake and exhaust for the Diesel Generators are passive systems which do not rely on electrical control.

Page 11 of 49

15C4343-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-179, TMl-16-084 Lube Oil The Diesel Generators utilize engine-driven mechanical lubrication oil pumps which do not rely on electrical control.

Fuel Oil The Diesel Generators utilize engine-driven mechanical pumps to supply fuel oil to the engines from the day tanks. The day tanks are re-supplied using AC-powered Diesel Oil Transfer Pumps.

Chatter analysis of the control circuits for the electrically-powered transfer pumps [48, 49) concluded they do not include SILO devices. The mechanical pumps do not rely on electrical control.

Cooling Water The Diesel Generator Jacket Water System is described in the UFSAR [36, pp. 8.2-18], "The jacket coolant system is designed to dissipate excess heat from the engine and lube oil to the atmosphere through heat exchangers (radiators) which employ a fan driven directly from the engine." This cooling system is purely mechanical and thus no chatter analysis is necessary.

Ventilation The Diesel Generator Building Ventilation System is described in Section 9.8.7 of the UFSAR [36, pp. 9.8-21). Ventilation for each Diesel Generator is provided via an air handling unit which is operated manually from the control room. The UFSAR discusses the loss of ventilation to the Diesel Generator Building and states manual actions are required within one hour. This time frame is deemed adequate to reset any SILO device which may inhibit the ventilation system, and thus chatter analysis of this system is unnecessary.

Switchgear, load Centers, and MCCs Power distribution from the EDGs to the necessary electrical loads (Battery Chargers, Inverters, Fuel Oil Pumps, and EDG Air Handlers) was traced to identify any SILO devices which could lead to a circuit breaker trip and interruption in power [38, 50, 51). This effort excluded the EDG circuit breakers, which are covered in section above, as well as component-specific contactors and their control devices, which are covered in the analysis of each component above.

The medium- and low-voltage circuit breakers in 4160V Busses and 480V Switchgear which are supplying power to loads identified in this section have been selected for evaluation [SO, 51).

480V Control Centers use Molded-Case Circuit Breakers, which are seismically rugged; and DC power distribution is via non-vulnerable disconnect switches [38). The only circuit breakers affected by contact devices (not already covered) were those that distribute power from the 4160V ESF Busses to the 4160/480V step-down transformers. A chatter analysis of the control circuits for these circuit breakers [52, 53) indicates the transformer primary phase overcurrent relays 50-51/A, 50-51/B, and 50-51/C; and the Ground Overcurrent Relay 50/G all could trip the transformer primary circuit breaker following the seismic event. The 480V Switchgear breakers do not use separate protective relaying and control of these breakers is via rugged devices [54, 55,56,57,58,59,60)

Page 12 of 49

1SC4343-RPT-002,Rev.O Correspondence No.: RS-16-179, TMl-16-084 2.6

SUMMARY

OF SELECTED COMPONENTS The investigation of high-frequency contact devices as described above was performed in Ref.

[18]. A list of the contact devices requiring a high frequency confirmation is provided in Appendix B, Table B-1. The identified devices are evaluated in Ref. [17] per the methodology/description of Section 3 and 4. Results are presented in Section Sand Table B-1.

Page 13 of 49

1SC4343-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-179, TMl-16-084 3 Seismic Evaluation 3.1 HORIZONTAL SEISMIC DEMAND Per Reference [8], Sect. 4.3, the basis for calculating high-frequency seismic demand on the subject components in the horizontal direction is the TMl-1 horizontal ground motion response spectrum {GMRS), which was generated as part of the TMl-1 Seismic Hazard and Screening Report [4] submitted to the NRC on March 31, 2014, and accepted by the NRC on January 22, 2016 [14].

It is noted in Reference [8) that a Foundation Input Response Spectrum {FIRS) may be necessary to evaluate buildings whose foundations are supported at elevations different than the Control Point elevation. However, for sites founded on rock, per Ref. [8], "The Control Point GMRS developed for these rock sites are typically appropriate for all rock-founded structures and additional FIRS estimates are not deemed necessary for the high frequency confirmation effort."

For sites founded on soil, the soil layers will shift the frequency range of seismic input towards the lower frequency range of the response spectrum by engineering judgment. Therefore, for purposes of high-frequency evaluations in this report, the GMRS is an adequate substitute for the FIRS for sites founded on soil.

The applicable buildings at TMl-1 are founded on rock; therefore, the Control Point GMRS is representative of the input at the building foundation.

The horizontal GMRS values are provided in Table 3-2.

3.2 VERTICAL SEISMIC DEMAND As described in Section 3.2 of Reference . [8], the horizontal GMRS and site soil conditions are used to calculate the vertical GMRS {VGMRS), which is the basis for calculating high-frequency seismic demand on the subject components in the vertical direction.

The site's soil mean shear wave velocity vs. depth profile is provided in Reference. [4], Table 2.3.2-1 and reproduced below in Table 3-1.

Page 14 of 49

15C4343-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-179, TMl-16-084 Table 3-1: Soil Mean Shear Wave Velocity Vs. Depth Profile Depth Depth Thickness, Vs1 Vs30 Layer (ft) (m) d1 (ft) (ft/sec) d1/Vs1 I [ d1 I Vsi] (ft/s) 1 3.048 10 10 5,002 2.00E-03 2.00E-03 2 6.096 20 10 5,007 2.00E-03 4.00E-03 3 9.144 30 10 5,012 2.00E-03 5.99E-03 4 12.192 40 10 5,017 l.99E-03 7.98E-03 5 15.24 50 10 5,022 l.99E-03 9.98E-03 4,944 6 18.288 60 10 5,027 l.99E-03 l.20E-02 7 21.336 70 10 5,032 l.99E-03 1.40E-02 8 24.384 80 10 5,037 l.99E-03 l.59E-02 9 27.432 90 10 5,042 l.98E-03 l.79E-02 10 30.48 100 10 5,047 l.98E-03 1.99E-02 Using the shear wave velocity vs. depth profile, the velocity of a shear wave traveling from a depth of 30m (98.43ft) to the surface of the site (Vs30) is calculated per the methodology of Reference [8], Section 3.5.

• The time for a shear wave to travel through each soil layer is calculated by dividing the layer depth (d;) by the shear wave velocity of the layer (Vs;).

• The total time for a wave to travel from a depth of 30m to the surface is calculated by adding the travel time through each layer from depths of Om to 30m (~[d;/Vs,]).

• The velocity of a shear wave traveling from a depth of 30m to the surface is therefore the total distance (30m) divided by the total time; i.e., Vs30 = (30m)/~[d;/Vs,].

• Note: The shear wave velocity is calculated based on time it takes for the shear wave to travel 30.4m (99.8ft) instead of 30m (98.43ft). This small change in travel distance will have no impact on identifying soil class type.

The site's soil class is determined by using the site's shear wave velocity (Vs30) and the peak ground acceleration (PGA) of the GMRS and comparing them to the values within Reference [8],

Table 3-1. Based on the PGA of 0.227g and the shear wave velocity of 4944ft/s, the site soil class is B-Hard.

Once a site soil class is determined, the mean vertical vs. horizontal GMRS ratios (V/H) at each frequency are determined by using the site soil class and its associated V/H values in Reference

[8], Table 3-2.

The vertical GMRS is then calculated by multiplying the mean V/H ratio at each frequency by the horizontal GMRS acceleration at the corresponding frequency. It is noted that Reference [8],

Table 3-2 values are constant between O.lHz and 15Hz.

The V/H ratios and VGMRS values are provided in Table 3-2 of this report.

Figure 3-1 below provides a plot of the horizontal GMRS, V/H ratios, and vertical GMRS for TMl-1.

Page 15 of 49

15C4343-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-179, TMl-16-084 Table 3-2: Horizontal and Vertical Ground Motions Response Spectra Frequency {Hz) HGMRS (g) V/H Ratio VGMRS (g) 100 0.227 0.8 0.182 90 0.228 0.82 0.187 80 0.230 0.87 0.200 70 0.234 0.91 0.213 60 0.246 0.92 0.226 50 0.279 0.9 0.251 45 0.302 0.89 0.268 40 0.324 0.86 0.279 35 0.348 0.81 0.282 30 0.378 0.75 0.284 25 0.404 0.7 0.283 20 0.430 0.68 0.292 15 0.457 0.68 0.311 12.5 0.465 0.68 0.316 10 0.463 0.68 0.315 9 0.449 0.68 0.305 8 0.430 0.68 0.292 7 0.405 0.68 0.275 6 0.373 0.68 0.254 5 0.335 0.68 0.228 4 0.276 0.68 0.188 3.5 0.242 0.68 0.165 3 0.202 0.68 0.137 2.5 0.165 0.68 0.112 2 0.145 0.68 0.099 1.5 0.116 0.68 0.079 1.25 0.097 0.68 0.066 1 0.079 0.68 0.054 0.9 0.074 0.68 0.050 0.8 0.066 0.68 0.045 0.7 0.058 0.68 0.040 0.6 0.049 0.68 0.033 0.5 0.040 0.68 0.027 0.4 0.032 0.68 0.022 0.35 0.028 0.68 0.019 0.3 0.024 0.68 0.016 0.25 0.020 0.68 0.014 0.2 0.016 0.68 0.011 0.15 0.012 0.68 0.008 0.125 0.010 0.68 0.007 0.1 0.008 0.68 0.005 Page 16 of 49

15C4343-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No. : RS-16-179, TMl-16-084 0.50 - 1.00

- VG MRS

- HG MRS ,,

0.40 - - V/H Ratio (B-Hard) t ,tt- \

\

0.90

,' \

I \

\

\

30.30 +-- _ , _ 0.80 c +;

0 0

+;

ra QI a;

ta Cl:

c

~ 0.20 0.70 >

<(

---

1----

0.10 ~ - 0.60 0.00 0.50 0.1 1 10 100 Frequency [Hz]

Figure 3-1 Plot of the Horizontal and Vertical Ground Motions Response Spectra and V/H Ratios Page 17 of 49

15C4343-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-179, TMl-16-084 3.3 COMPONENT HORIZONTAL SEISMIC DEMAND Per Reference [8] the peak horizontal acceleration is amplified using the following two factors to determine the horizontal in-cabinet response spectrum:

• Horizontal in-structure amplification factor AFsH to account for seismic amplification at floor elevations above the host building's foundation

• Horizontal in-cabinet amplification factor AFc to account for seismic amplification within the host equipment (cabinet, switchgear, motor control center, etc.)

The in-structure amplification factor AFsH is derived from Figure 4-3 in Reference [8]. The in-cabinet horizontal amplification factor, AFc is associated with a given type of cabinet construction. The three general cabinet types are identified in Reference [8] and Appendix I of EPRI NP-7148 [13] assuming 5% in-cabinet response spectrum damping. EPRI NP-7148 [13]

classified the cabinet types as high amplification structures such as switchgear panels and other similar large flexible panels, medium amplification structures such as control panels and control room benchboard panels and low amplification structures such as motor control centers.

All of the electrical cabinets containing the components subject to high frequency confirmation (see Table 8-1 in Appendix B) can be categorized into one of the in-cabinet amplification categories in Reference [8] as follows:

• TMl-1 Motor Control Centers are typical motor control center cabinets consisting of a lineup of several interconnected sections. Each section is a relatively narrow cabinet structure with height-to-depth ratios of about 4.5 that allow the cabinet framing to be efficiently used in flexure for the dynamic response loading, primarily in the front-to-back direction. This results in higher frame stresses and hence more damping which lowers the cabinet response. In addition, the subject components are not located on large unstiffened panels that could exhibit high local amplifications. These cabinets qualify as low amplification cabinets.

• TMl-1 Switchgear cabinets are large cabinets consisting of a lineup of several interconnected sections typical of the high amplification cabinet category. Each section is a wide box-type structure with height-to-depth ratios of about 1.5 and may include wide stiffened panels. This results in lower stresses and hence less damping which increases the enclosure response. Components can be mounted on the wide panels, which results in the higher in-cabinet amplification factors.

• TMl-1 Control cabinets are in a lineup of several interconnected sections with moderate width . Each section consists of structures with height-to-depth ratios of about 3 which results in moderate frame stresses and damping. The response levels are mid-range between MCCs and switchgear and therefore these cabinets can be considered in the medium amplification category.

Page 18 of 49

15C4343-RPT-002,Rev. O Correspondence No.: RS-16-179, TMl-16-084 3.4 COMPONENT VERTICAL SEISMIC DEMAND The component vertical demand is determined using the peak acceleration of the VGMRS between 15 Hz and 40 Hz and amplifying it using the following two factors:

• Vertical in-structure amplification factor AFsv to account for seismic amplification at floor elevations above the host building's foundation

• Vertical in-cabinet amplification factor AFc to account for seismic amplification within the host equipment (cabinet, switchgear, motor control center, etc.)

The in-structure amplification factor AFsv is derived from Figure 4-4 in Reference [8]. The in-cabinet vertical amplification factor, AFc is derived in Reference [8] and is 4.7 for all cabinet types.

Page 19 of 49

15C4343-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-179, TMl-16-084 4 Contact Device Evaluations Per Reference [8], seismic capacities (the highest seismic test level reached by the contact device without chatter or other malfunction) for each subject contact device are determined by the following procedures:

(1) If a contact device was tested as part of the EPRI High Frequency Testing program [7],

then the component seismic capacity from this program is used.

(2) If a contact device was not tested as part of [7], then one or more of the following means to determine the component capacity were used:

(a) Device-specific seismic test reports (either from the station or from the Seismic Qualification Reporting and Testing Standardization (SQURTS) testing program).

(b) Generic Equipment Ruggedness Spectra (GERS) capacities per [9], [10], (11], and

[12).

(c) Assembly (e.g. electrical cabinet) tests where the component functional performance was monitored.

(3) The existing station procedure is used for contact devices where operator action can resolve any inadvertent actuation of the essential components.

The high-frequency capacity of each device was evaluated in Ref. (17) with the component mounting point demand from Section 3 using the criteria in Section 4.5 of Reference [8).

A summary of the high-frequency evaluation conclusions is provided in Table B-1 in Appendix B of this report.

Page 20 of 49

15C4343-RPT-002, Rev. a Correspondence No.: RS-16-179, TMl-16-084 5 Conclusions 5.1 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS TMl-1 has performed a High Frequency Confirmation evaluation in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [1] using the methods in EPRI report 3002004396 (8].

The evaluation identified a total of 82 components that required seismic high frequency evaluation . As summarized in Table B-1 in Appendix B, 64 of the devices have adequate seismic capacity. The remaining 18 devices are adequate despite their seismic capacities' being unknown or less than seismic demand because any chatter in these 18 devices can be resolved by TMl -1 operator actions.

5.2 IDENTIFICATION OF FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS No follow-up actions were identified.

Page 21 of 49

15C4343-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-179, TMl-16-084 6 References 1 NRC (E. Leeds and M. Johnson) Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees et al., "Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident," March 12, 2012, ADAMS Accession Number ML12053A340 2 NRC (W. Dean) Letter to the Power Reactor Licensees on the Enclosed List. "Final Determination of Licensee Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessments Under the Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 "Seismic" of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident." October 27, 2015, ADAMS Accession Number ML15194A015 3 NRC (J. Davis) Letter to Nuclear Energy Institute (A. Mauer). "Endorsement of Electric Power Research Institute Final Draft Report 3002004396, 'High Frequency Program:

Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility."' September 17, 2015, ADAMS Accession Number ML15218A569 4 Seismic Hazard and Screening Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic for TMl-1 dated March 31, 2014, ADAMS Accession Number ML14090A271 5 EPRI 1015109. "Program on Technology Innovation: Seismic Screening of Components Sensitive to High-Frequency Vibratory Motions." October 2007 6 EPRI 1025287. "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic." February 2013 7 EPRI 3002002997. "High Frequency Program: High Frequency Testing Summary."

September 2014 8 EPRI 3002004396. "High Frequency Program: Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation." July 2015 9 EPRI NP-7147-SL. "Seismic Ruggedness of Relays." August 1991 10 EPRI NP-7147-SLV2, Addendum 1, "Seismic Ruggedness of Relays", September 1993 11 EPRI NP-7147-SLV2, Addendum 2, "Seismic Ruggedness of Relays", April 1995 12 EPRI NP-7147 SQUG Advisory 2004-02. "Relay GERS Corrections." September 10, 2004 13 EPRI NP-7148, "Procedure for Evaluating Nuclear Power Plant Relay Seismic Functionality", 1990 14 NRC (F. Vega) Letter to Exelon Generation Company, LLC (B. Hanson). "Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1- Staff Assessment of Information Provided Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Section 50.54(f), Seismic Hazard Reevaluations Page 22 of 49

15C4343-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-179, TMl-16-084 for Recommendation 2.1 ofthe Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident (TAC NO. MF3905) ." August 14, 2015, ADAMS Accession Number ML15223A215 15 Recommendations For Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21 51 Century, "The Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-I chi Accident" July 12, 2011, ADAMS Accession Number ML111861807 16 NEI 12-06, Rev. 2. "Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide" 17 15C4343-CAL-001, Rev. 1, "High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation of Relays."

18 15C4343-RPT-001, Rev. 1, "Selection of Relays and Switches for High Frequency Seismic Evaluation."

19 Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1, "Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP)

Report" December 17, 2014, ADAMS Accession Number ML14353A194 20 Not Used 21 TMI Drawing 209-780 Rev. 8, Electric Elementary Diagram Reactor Coolant Vent System ChannelB 22 TMI Drawing 208-452 Rev. 9, Electrical Elementary Diagram 480V Control Center lC-ESV Unit 3A RC to DH Remote Block Valve DH-V-1 23 TMI Drawing 209-503 Rev. 4, Electrical Elementary Wiring Diagram Engineered Safeguard Actuation A Low Pressure Injection Actuation 24 TMI Drawing 208-413 Rev. 3, Electrical Elementary Diagram Selector Switch Developments 25 TMI Drawing 302-640 Rev. 84, Decay Heat Removal Flow Diagram 26 TMI Drawing 208-453 Rev. 10, Electrical Elementary Diagram 480V Control Center lC-ESV-Unit 3B RC to DH Remote Block Valve DH-V-2 27 TMI Drawing 209-603 Rev. 4, Electrical Elementary Wiring Diagram Engineered Safeguard Actuation B Low Pressure Injection Actuation 28 TMI Report 990-1745 Rev. 27, "Fire Hazards Analysis Report (FHAR)"

29 TMI Drawing 208-454 Rev. 5, Electrical Elementary Diagram 480V Control Center lC-ESV-Unit 4B RC Outlet to DH System DH-V-3 30 TMI Drawing 209-779 Rev. 4, Electric Elementary Diagram Reactor Coolant Vent System Channel A 31 TMI Drawing 208-426 Sheet 1 Rev. 8, Electrical Elementary Diagram 480V Control Center lC-ESV- Unit SC Pressurizer Relief Block Valve RC-V-2 32 TMI Drawing 208-750 Rev. 2, Electrical Elementary Diagram Remote Shutdown Transfer Switch Panel BX System 33 TMI Drawing 209-034 Rev. 4, Electrical Elementary Diagram DC and Miscellaneous Pressurizer Electromatic Relief Valve RC-RV2 Page 23 of 49

15C4343-RPT-002,Rev.O Correspondence No.: RS-16-179, TMl-16-084 34 TMI Drawing 209-069 Rev. 10, Electrical Elementary Diagram DC and Miscellaneous RC Pressurizer Switch RC3-PS8 35 TMI Drawing 208-430 Rev. 4, Electrical Elementary Diagram 480V Control Center lB-ES Unit lOC Pressurizer Vent Valve RC-V-28 36 TMI Report, "Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR)," Revision 21, April 2012 37 TMI Drawing 206-011 Rev. 55, Electrical Main One-Line and Relay Diagram 38 TMI Drawing 206-051 Rev. 36, Electrical One Line Diagram 250/125V DC System and 120V AC Vital Instrumentation 39 TMI Drawing 208-163 Rev. 24, Electrical Elementary Diagram 4160V Switchgear ES (1D2)

Gl-02 Diesel Generator lA 40 TMI Drawing 208-218 Rev. 6, Electrical Elementary Diagram 4160V Switchgear ES Diesel Generator lA and lB Differential Relay Connections 41 TMI Drawing 208-172 Rev. 7, Electrical Elementary Diagram 4160V Switchgear ES Bus Back-Up 42 TMI Drawing 208-164 Rev. 28, Electrical Elementary Diagram 4160V Switchgear (1E3) Gll-02 Diesel Generator lB Breaker 43 TMI Drawing 11865841 Sheet lA Rev. 29, Electrical Schematic Diesel Engine Control 44 TMI Drawing 11865841Sheet1B Rev. 8, Electrical Schematic Diesel Engine Control 45 C&D Batteries Drawing NBC-404ME Rev. 4, Schematic Diagram Three Phase Model Arrangement 46 TMI Vendor Manual VM-TM-0160 Rev. 13, "C&D Batteries Autoreg Battery Charger" 47 TMI Vendor Manual VM-TM-2999 Rev. 5, "Ametek Solidstate Controls 15KVA Inverter and Weschler Bargraph Tricolor Digital Meter" 48 TMI Drawing 11865841Sheet3A Rev. 30, Electrical Schematic AC Auxiliary and Generator 49 TMI Drawing 11865841Sheet3B Rev. 19, Electrical Schematic AC Auxiliary and Generator 50 TMI Drawing 206-022 Rev. 21, Electrical One Line and Relay Diagram 4160V Engineered Safeguards Switchgear 51 TMI Drawing 206-032 Rev. 18, One-Line and Relay Diagram, Engineered Safeguards Screen House, Reactor Building, Heating and Ventilation 480V Switchgear 52 TMI Drawing 208-159 Rev. 4, Electrical Elementary Diagrams 4160V Switchgear ES (1D5)

Pl-02 Transformer 53 TMI Drawing 208-161 Rev. 5, Electrical Elementary Diagram 4160V Switchgear ES (1E6) Sl-02 Transformer.

54 TMI Drawing 208-287 Rev. 3, Electrical Elementary Diagram 480V Switchgear ES (1P-1B) lP-02 ES Bus Feeder Breaker 55 TMI Drawing 208-295 Rev. 4, Electrical Elementary Diagram 480V Switchgear ES {1P-1C) lA ES Control Center Feeder Breaker Page 24 of 49

15C4343-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-179, TMl-16-084 56 TMI Drawing 208-263 Rev. 1, Electrical Elementary Diagram 480V Switchgear ES (lP-lB}

Typical Incoming Supply Breaker (E.S.}

57 TM I Drawing 208-255 Rev. 6, Electrical Elementary Diagram 480V Switchgear Control Switch Developments 58 TMI Drawing 208-254 Rev. 5, Electrical Elementary Diagram 480V Switchgear Control Switch Developments 59 TMI Drawing 208-291 Rev. 5, Electrical Elementary Diagram 480V Switchgear ES {lS-lB) lS-02 ES Bus Feeder Breaker 60 TMI Drawing 208-296 Rev. 5, Electrical Elementary Diagram 480V Switchgear ES (lS-lC}

18 ES Control Center Feeder Breaker Page 25 of 49

15(4343-RPT-002, Rev.a Correspondence No.: RS-16-179, TMl-16-084 A Representative Sample Component Evaluations The following sample calculation is extracted from Reference (17).

Notes:

1. Reference citations within the sample calculation are per the Ref. (17) reference section shown on the following page.

2. This sample calculation contains evaluations of sample high-frequency-sensitive components per the methodologies of both the EPRI high-frequency guidance (8) and the flexible coping strategies guidance document NEI 12-06 (16).

Page 26 of 49

15C4343-RPT-002, Rev.a Correspondence No.: RS-16-179, TMl-16-084 SA S&A Cale. No.: 1SC4343-CAL-001, Rev. 1 Sheet 10 of 22

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Prepared : FG Date: 9/29/16 Evaluation of Relays Reviewed: MW Date: 9/29/16 Stevenson & Associ.ates 6 REFERENCES

1. Codes, Guidance, and Standards 1.1. EPRI 3002004396. "High Frequency Program: Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation." July 2015.

1.2. EPRI 3002002997. "High Frequency Program: High Frequency Testing Summary." September 2014.

1.3. EPRI NP-6041-SL. "A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin (Revision 1)." August 1991.

1.4. NEI 12-06, Appendix H, Rev. 2, "Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide."

1.5. EPRI NP-7147-SL, SQUG Advisory 2004-02 . "Relay GERS Corrections", September 10, 2004.

1.6. EPRI NP-7147-SL, "Seismic Ruggedness of Relays", August 1991.

1.7. EPRI NP-7147-SL, Volume 2, Addendum 2, "Seismic Ruggedness of Relays", April 1995.

1.8. EPRI NP-7147-SL, Volume 2, Addendum 1, "Seismic Ruggedness of Relays", September 1993.

1.9. EPRI NP-5223-SL, Rev. 1, "Generic Seismic Ruggedness of Power Plant Equipment."

1.10. ANSI/IEEE C37.98-1987, "An American National Standard IEEE Standard Seismic Testing of Relays.",

January 15, 1988.

1.11. ABS Consulting et al. "Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) for Seismic Verification of Nuclear Plant Equipment." Rev. 3A.

2. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Documents 2.1. Three Mile Island Seismic Hazard and Screening Report Rev. 1, NRC Docket No. 50-289, Correspondence No. RS-14-073, TMl-14-026

3. Station Documents 3.1. TMl-1 UFSAR Chapter 02 Rev. 19, April 2008.

3.2. RC-5536, "Seismic Qualification Report 87M 3cjJ Differential Relay.", March 23, 1977.

3.3. Not Used 3.4. C-1101-900-5320-025, Rev. l, "SQUG/USI A-46 Seismic Evaluation of Relays for TM I Unit 1."

3.5. TOR 1185, "Relay Report for Three Mile Island.", February 28, 1996.

3.6. Drawing 208-163, Rev. 24, "4160V SWGR - ES (102) Electrical Elementary Diagram Gl-02 Diesel Generator lA Breaker."

3.7. Drawing 208-164, Rev. 28, "Electrical 4160V Switchgear (1E3) Gll-02 Diesel Generator Breaker."

3.8. Drawing 11865841, Sheet lA, Rev. 29, "Electrical Schematic Diesel Engine Control."

3.9. Drawing 11865841, Sheet lB, Rev. 8, "Electrical Schematic Diesel Engine Control."

3.10. Seismic Qualification No. SQ-Tl-EG-Y-OOOlB, Rev. 2, "EG-Y-OOOlB."

3.11. Seismic Qualification No. SQ-Tl-EG-Y-OOOlA, Rev. 2, "EG-Y-OOOlA."

3.12. Seismic Qualification No. SQ-Tl-1D-4160V-ES, Rev. 0, "1D-4160V-ES."

3.13. Seismic Qualification No. SQ-Tl-1E-4160V-ES, Rev. 1, "1E-4160V-ES."

3.14. TODI 5971-2016-037, "NTIF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Project-TM! Relay Supplemental Info.", July 7, 2016.

3.15. Seismic Qualification No. SQ-Tl-EE-INV-lA, Rev. 1, "Station Inverter EE-INV-lA."

3.16. Seismic Qualification No. SQ-Tl-EE-INV-lB, Rev. 1, "Station Inverter EE-INV-lB."

3.17. Seismic Qualification No. SQ-Tl-EE-INV-lC, Rev. 1, "Station Inverter EE-INV-lC."

3.18. Seismic Qualification No. SQ-Tl-EE-INV-lD, Rev. 1, "Station Inverter EE-INV-lD."

3.19. Seismic Qualification No. SQ-Tl-EE-INV-lE, Rev. 1, "Station Inverter EE-INV-lE."

3.20. Seismic Qualification No. SQ-Tl-EE-INV-lF, Rev. 1, "Station Inverter EE-INV-lF."

3.21. ECR 13-00070, Rev. 0, Attachment #22a. "Flex Diesel Generators (DG)."

Page 27 of 49

15C4343-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-179, TMl-16-084 SA S&A Cale. No.: 15C4343-CAL-001, Rev. 1 Sheet 11 of 22

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Prepared: FG Date: 9/29/16 Evaluation of Relays Reviewed: MW Date: 9/29/16 Ste...enson & As.sedates 3.22. Seismic Qualification No. SQ-Tl-1P-480V-ES, Rev. 1, "1P-480V-ES."

3.23. Seismic Qualification No. SQ-Tl-1S-480V-ES, Rev. 1, "1S-480V-ES."

3.24. Drawing 206032, Rev. 18, "One Line and Relay Diagram ENGD. SFGDS. Screen HSE., Reactor BLDG.

H&V, 480V. SWGR."

3.25. OP-TM-AOP-020, Rev. 24, "Loss of Station Power"

4. S&A Documents 4.1. 15C4343-RPT-001, Rev. 1, "Selection of Relays and Switches for High Frequency Seismic Evaluation ."

4.2 . 14Q4239-CAL-004 Rev. 1, "ESEP HCLPFs for Relays."

4.3. 14Q4239-RPT-005 Rev. 0, "TMI ESEP SEWS."

5. Other Documents 5.1. Farwell & Hendricks, Inc. Report No. 50090.8, Rev. 1, "Seismic Qualification Report for Joslyn Clark PM120 VAC Relays, Joslyn Clark PM125 VDC Relays, General Electric Static Time Delay Unit, and Westinghouse MCCB." (See Attachment D for select pages) 5.2 . Trentec, Inc. Report No. 2T238.l, Rev. 0, "Seismic Qualification Report for ABB Relays." (See Attachment E for select pages) 5.3. QualTech NP Report No. Sl214.0, Rev. 1, "Seismic Test Report for a QualTech NP Differential Pressure Alarm System, Omron Relays, Joslyn Clark Relay, and Ashcroft Vacuum and Pressure Gauges." (See Attachment F for select pages)

Page 28 of 49

15C4343-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-179, TMl-16-084 S&A Cale. No. : 15C4343-CAL-001, Rev. 1 Sheet 13 of 22

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Prepared: FG Date: 9/29/16 Evaluation of Relays Reviewed: MW Date: 9/29/16 Stevenson & As.sedates 8 ANALYSIS A detailed example analysis of two relays is provided within this section. This example is intended to illustrate each step of the high frequency analysis methodology given in Section 2. A complete analysis of all subject relays is shown in tabular form in Attachment A.

8.1 Equipment Scope The list of essential relays at Three Mile Island are per Ref. 4.1 and can be found in Attachment A, Table A-1 of this calculation.

Page 29 of 49

15(4343-RPT-002, Rev.a Correspondence No.: RS-16-179, TMl-16-084 SA S&A Cale. No.: 1SC4343-CAL-001, Rev. 1 Sheet 14 of 22 Title : High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Prepared : FG Date: 9/29/16 Evaluation of Relays Reviewed : MW Date: 9/29/16 Stevenson & Associates 8 ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.2 High-Frequency Seismic Demand Calculate the high-frequency seismic demand on the relays per the methodology from Ref. 1.1.

A sample calculation for the high-frequency seismic demand of relay components and MU-V-003\20X and MU-V-026\20X is presented below. A table that calculates the high-frequency seismic demand for all of the subject relays listed in Attachment A, Table A-1 of this calculation is provided in Attachment A, Table A-2 of this calculation.

8.2.1 Horizontal Seismic Demand The horizontal site-specific GMRS for Three Mile Island is per Ref. 2.1. GMRS data can be found in Attachment B of this calculation .

Determine the peak acceleration of the horizontal GMRS between 15 Hz and 40 Hz.

Peak acceleration of horizontal GMRS SAoMRS :- 0.457g (at 15 Hz) between 15 Hz and 40 Hz (Ref. 2.1; see Attachment B of this calculation):

Calculate the horizontal in-structure amplification factor based on the distance between the subject foundation elevation and the subject floor elevation.

Foundation Elevation (Control Building): Eltound := 278ft (Ref. 3.2)

Relay floor elevation (Ref. 4.2): Elrelay :-= 338.5ft Relay components MU-V-003\20X and MU-V-026\20X are both located in the Control Building at elevation 338'-6" per Ref. 4.2.

Distance between relay floor and foundation : hrelay := Elrelay - Elfound =60.50 *ft Page 30 of 49

15C4343-RPT-002,Rev.O Correspondence No.: RS-16-179, TMl-16-084 SA S&A Cale. No.: 15C4343-CAL-001, Rev. 1 Sheet 15 of 22

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Prepared: FG Date: 9/29/16 Evaluation of Relays Reviewed: MW Date: 9/29/16 8 ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.2 High-Frequency Seismic Demand (cont'd) 8.2.1 Horizontal Seismic Demand (cont'd)

Work the distance between the relay floor and foundation with Ref. 1.1, Fig . 4-3 to calculate the horizontal in-structure amplification factor.

2.1 - 1.2 1 Slope of amplification factor line, mh := = 0.0225*-

Oft < hrelay < 40ft 40ft - Oft ft Intercept of amplification factor line, Oft < hrelay < 40ft Horizontal in-structure amplification factor:

AFsH(hrelay) := I (mh*hrelay + bh) if hrelay 2.1 otherwise s 40ft Calculate the horizontal in-cabinet amplification factor based on the type of cabinet that contains the subject relay.

Type of cabinet (per Ref. 4.1) cab := "Control Cabinet" (enter "MCC", "Switchgear", "Control Cabinet", or "Rigid"):

Horizontal in-cabinet amplification factor AFc.h(cab) := 3.6 if cab= "MCC" (Ref. 1.1, p. 4-13):

7.2 if cab = "Switchgear" 4.5 if cab = "Control Cabinet" 1.0 if cab = "Rigid" AFc.h(cab) - 4.5 Multiply the peak horizontal GMRS acceleration by the horizontal in-structure and in-cabinet amplification factors to determine the in-cabinet response spectrum demand on the relays.

Horizontal in-cabinet response spectrum (Ref. 1.1, p. 4-12, Eq. 4-1a):

Note that the horizontal seismic demand is same for both relay components MU-V-003\20X and MU-V-026\20X .

Page 31of49

15C4343-RPT-002,Rev.O Correspondence No.: RS-16-179, TMl-16-084 S&A Cale. No.: 1SC4343-CAL-001, Rev. 1 Sheet 16 of 22

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Prepared : FG Date: 9/29/16 Evaluation of Relays Reviewed : MW Date: 9/29/16 8 ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.2 High-Frequency Seismic Demand (cont'd) 8.2.2 Vertical Seismic Demand Determine the peak acceleration of the horizontal GMRS between 15 Hz and 40 Hz .

Peak acceleration of horizontal GMRS SAc3MRS = 0.457*g (at 15 Hz) between 15 Hz and 40 Hz (see Sect. 8.2.1 of this calculation)

Obtain the peak ground acceleration (PGA) of the horizontal GMRS from Ref. 2.1 (see Attachment B of this calculation).

Peak Ground Acceleration of Horizontal GMRS: PGAGMRS := 0.227g (Note that this is the acceleration at zero period)

Calculate the shear wave velocity traveling from a depth of 30m to the surface of the site (V 530 ) from Ref. 1.1 and Attachment C.

(30m)

Shear Wave Velocity:

Vs30 = ~[ di .J VSI where, di: Thickness of the layer (ft)

V si: Shear wave velocity of the layer (ft/s)

Per Attachment C, the sum of thickness of the layer over shear wave velocity of the layer is 0.0199 sec.

30m ft Shear Wave Velocity: v 30 := = 4946 *-

s 0.0199sec sec Page 32 of 49

15C4343-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-179, TMl-16-084 SA S&A Cale. No.: 15C4343-CAL-001, Rev. 1 Sheet 17 of 22

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Prepared : FG Date: 9/29/16 Evaluation of Relays Reviewed : MW Date: 9/29/16 Stevenson & AMociates 8 ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.2 High-Frequency Seismic Demand (cont'd) 6.2.2 Vertical Seismic Demand (cont'd)

Work the PGA and shear wave velocity with Ref. 1.1, Table 3-1 to determine the soil class of the site.

Based on the PGA of 0.227g and shear wave velocity of 4946ft/sec at Three Mile Island, the site soil class is B-Hard.

Work the site soil class with Ref. 1.1, Table 3-2 to determine the mean vertical vs . horizontal GMRS ratios (V/H) at each spectral frequency. Multiply the V/H ratio at each frequency between 15Hz and 40Hz by the corresponding horizontal GMRS acceleration at each frequency between 15Hz and 40Hz to calculate the vertical GMRS.

See Attachment B for a table that calculates the vertical GMRS (equal to (V/H) x horizontal GMRS) between 15Hz and 40Hz .

Determine the peak acceleration of the vertical GMRS (SAvGMRs) between frequencies of 15Hz and 40Hz.

(By inspection of Attachment B, the SAvGMRS occurs at 15Hz.)

V/H ratio at 15Hz VH := 0.66 (See Attachment B of this calculation):

Horizontal GMRS at frequency of peak HGMRS := 0.457g vertical GMRS (at 15Hz)

(See Attachment B of this calculation):

Peak acceleration of vertical GMRS between SAVGMRS :.,.. VH*HGMRS - 0.311 *Q (at 15 Hz) 15 Hz and 40 Hz :

A plot of horizontal and vertical GMRS is provided in Attachment B of this calculation .

Page 33 of 49

15C4343-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-179, TMl-16-084 S&A Cale. No.: 15C4343-CAL-001, Rev. 1 Sheet 18 of 22

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Prepared : FG Date: 9/29/16 Evaluation of Relays Reviewed: MW Date: 9/29/16 Stevenson & AMociates 8 ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.2 High-Frequency Seismic Demand (cont'd) 8.2.2 Vertical Seismic Demand (cont'd)

Calculate the vertical in-structure amplification factor based on the distance between the plant foundation elevation and the subject floor elevation.

Distance between relay floor and foundation hrelay = 60.50 .ft (see Sect. 8.2.1 of this calculation):

Work the distance between the relay floor and foundation with Ref. 1.1, Fig. 4-4 to calculate the vertical in-structure amplification factor.

2.7 - 1.0 1 Slope of amplification factor line: mv :- = 0.017*-

1OOft - Oft ft Intercept of amplification factor line:

Vertical in-structure amplification factor: AFsv(hrelay) := I (mv*hrelay + bv) if hrelay 5. 100ft 2.7 otherwise AFsv(hrelay) - 2.03 Per Ref. 1.1, the vertical in-cabinet amplification factor is 4. 7 regardless of cabinet type.

Vertical in-cabinet amplification factor: AFc.v := 4.7 Multiply the peak vertical GMRS acceleration between by the vertical in-structure and in-cabinet amplification factors to determine the in-cabinet response spectrum demand on the relay.

Vertical in-cabinet response spectrum (Ref. 1.1, p. 4-12, Eq. 4-1 b):

ICRSC.V := AFsv(hrelay)*AFc.v*SAvGMRS - 2.96 *g Note that the vertical seismic demand is same for both relay components MU-V-003\20X and MU-V-026\20X.

Page 34 of 49

15C4343-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-179, TMl-16-084 SA S&A Cale. No.: 1SC4343-CAL-001, Rev. 1 Sheet 19 of 22

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Prepared: FG Date: 9/29/16 Evaluation of Relays Reviewed: MW Date: 9/29/16 Stevenson & Ass.oo.ltes 8 ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.3 High-Frequency Seismic Capacity A sample calculation for the high-frequency seismic capacity of MU-V-003\20X and MU-V-026\20X relay components are presented here. A table that calculates the high-frequency seismic capacities for all of the subject relays listed in Section 1, Table 1-1 of this calculation is provided in Attachment A of this calculation.

8.3.1 Seismic Test Capacity The high frequency seismic capacity of a relay can be determined from the EPRI High Frequency Testing Program (Ref. 1.2) or other broad banded low frequency capacity data such as the Generic Equipment Ruggedness Spectra (GERS) or other qualification reports .

The relay model for component MU-V-003\20X, a Telemecanique J13PA20 relay perTableA-1, was not tested as part of the Ref. 1.2 high-frequency testing program. GERS spectral accelerations from Ref. 1.5 is used as the seismic test capacity. The seismic test capacity for J13PA20 relay mode is 14.2g per Ref. 5.1, Table 3-1 The relay model for component MU-V-026\20X is a Joslyn Clark Control 4U4-2 relay per Table A-1 , was not tested as part of the Ref. 1.2 high-frequency testing program . Seismic capacity is derived from the 4U4-2 relay model test response spectra (TRS) within SQURT Test Report 50090.8 (Ref. 5.1 ). Per Ref. 5.1, pg. 25, the 4U4-2 relay is qualified without chatter in the de-energized state to the fragility level of test #14. Pg. 336 to 341 of Ref. 5.1, provides TRS for test #14.

Per Ref. 1.1, Section 4.5.2, a conservative estimate of the high-frequency (i.e., 20Hz to 40Hz) capacity can be made by extending the low frequency qualification report capacity into the high frequency range to a roll off frequency of about 40Hz. Page 339 of Ref. 5.1 provides a peak low frequency capacity of 5.59g at 7.9Hz, which is extended out to 40Hz to serve as the high frequency capacity.

14.20J MU-V-003\20X J Seismic test capacity (SA*): SA' ::: g

( 5.59 ( MU-V-026\20X 8.3.2 Effective Spectral Test Capacity GERS spectral acceleration and qualification test report for the relay components MU-V-003\20X and MU-V-026\20X are used as the seismic test capacity, respectively. Therefore, there are no spectral acceleration increase and the effective spectral test capacity is equal to the seismic test capacity.

Effective spectral test capacity (Ref. 1.1, p 4-16):

SA *- SA'1 T .- ( SA'2 J - (14.20J g

- 5.59 .

MU-V-003\20X )

( MU-V-026\20X Page 35 of 49

15C4343-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-179, TMl-16-084 S&A Cale. No. : 1SC4343-CAL-001, Rev. 1 Sheet 20 of 22

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Prepared: FG Date: 9/29/16 Evaluation of Relays Reviewed: MW Date: 9/29/16 8 ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.3 High-Frequency Seismic Capacity (cont'd) 8.3.3 Seismic Capacity Knockdown Factor Determine the seismic capacity knockdown factor for the subject relay based on the type of testing used to determine the seismic capacity of the relay.

Using table Table 4-2 of Ref. 1.1 and the capacity sources from Section 8.3.1 above, the knockdown factors are chosen as:

MU-V-003\20X )

Seismic capacity knockdown factor:

( MU-V-026\20X 8.3.4 Seismic Testing Single-Axis Correction Factor Determine the seismic testing single-axis correction factor of the subject relay, which is based on whether the equipment housing to which the relay is mounted has well-separated horizontal and vertical motion or not.

Per Ref. 1. 1, pp. 4-17 to 4-18, relays mounted within cabinets that are braced, bolted together in a row, mounted to both floor and wall, etc. will have a correction factor of 1.00. Relays mounted within cabinets that are bolted only to the floor or otherwise not well-braced will have a correction factor of 1.2.

Per Ref. 1.1, pp. 4-18, conservatively take the FMS value as 1.0.

Single-axis correction factor FMS := 1.0 (Ref. 1.1, pp. 4-17 to 4-18):

Page 36 of 49

15C4343-RPT-002, Rev.a Correspondence No .: RS-16-179, TMl-16-084 SA S&A Cale. No.: 1SC4343-CAL-001, Rev. 1 Sheet 21 of 22

Title:

High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Prepared: FG Date: 9/29/16 Evaluation of Relays Reviewed: MW Date: 9/29/16 Stevenson&~tes 8 ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.3 High-Frequency Seismic Capacity for Ref. 1.1 Relays (cont'd)

8. 3. 5 Effective Wide-Band Component Capacity Acceleration Calculate the effective wide-band component capacity acceleration per Ref. 1. 1, Eq. 4-5.

Effective wide-band component capacity MU-V-003\20X) acceleration (Ref. 1.1, Eq . 4-5) TRS := -SATJ *FMS = (9.467) *g ( MU-V-026\20X

( Fk 4.658 8.4 High-Frequency Seismic Capacity for Ref. 1.4, Appendix H Relays 8.4 .1 Effective Wide-Band Component Capacity Acceleration Per a review of the capacity generation methodologies of Ref. 1.1 and Ref. 1.4, App. H, Section H.5, the capacity of a Ref. 1.4 relay is equal to the Ref. 1.1 effective wide-band component capacity multiplied by a factor accounting for the difference between a 1% probability of failure (C 1%* Ref. 1.1) and a 10% probability of failure (C 1 O%* Ref. 1.4).

Per Ref. 1.4, App. H, Table H.1, use the ClO'A. vs. C1 % ratio from the Realistic Lower Bound Case for relays .

C10% VS. C1 % C10 := 1.36 ratio Effective wide-band component capacity 12.875) MU-V-003\20X )

acceleration (Ref. 1.4, App. H, Sect. TRS1 4 := TRS *C10 = ( g ( MU-V-026\20X

. 6.335 H.5)

Page 37 of 49

15(4343-RPT-002, Rev.a Correspondence No.: RS-16-179, TMl-16-084 SA S&A Cale. No.: 1SC4343-CAL-001, Rev. 1 Sheet 22 of 22 Title : High Frequency Functional Confirmation and Fragility Prepared: FG Date: 9/29/16 Evaluation of Relays Reviewed: MW Date: 9/29/16 Stevenson & As.sociates 8 ANALYSIS (cont'd) 8.5 Relay (Ref. 1.1) High-Frequency Margin Calculate the high-frequency seismic margin for relays per Ref. 1.1, Eq. 4-6.

A sample calculation for the high-frequency seismic demand of relay components MU-V-003\20X and MU-V-026\20X is presented here. A table that calculates the high-frequency seismic margin for all of the subject relays listed in Section 1, Table 1-1 of this calculation is provided in Attachment A of this calculation .

TRS (2.192) > 1.0, O.K. ( MU-V-003\20X )

Horizontal seismic margin (Ref. 1.1 , Eq . 4-6):

ICRSc.h = 1.079 > 1.0, O.K. MU-V-026. * .20X TRS (3.195) > 1.0, O.K. ( MU-V-003\20X )

Vertical seismic margin (Ref. 1. 1, Eq. 4-6):

ICRSC.V 1.572 > 1.0, O.K. MU-V-026 . * .20X Both the horizontal and vertical seismic margins for MU-V-003\20X and MU-V-026\20X are greater than 1.00; therefore, these components are adequate for high frequency seismic spectral ground motion for their Ref. 1.1 functions.

8.6 Relay (Ref. 1.4) High-Frequency Margin Calculate the high-frequency seismic margin for Ref. 1.4 relays.

A sample calculation for the high-frequency seismic demand of relay components MU-V-003\20X and MU-V-026\20X is presented here. A table that calculates the high-frequency seismic margin for all of the subject relays listed in Section 1, Table 1-1 of this calculation is provided in Attachment A of this calculation.

TRS1 .4 (2 .981) > 1.0, O.K. MU-V-003\20X )

Horizontal seismic margin (Ref 1.4):

ICRSc.h = 1.467 > 1.0, O.K. ( MU-V-026\20X TRS1 .4 (4.345) > 1.0, O.K. MU-V-003\20X )

Vertical seismic margin (Ref 1.4):

ICRSC.V = 2.138 > 1.0, O.K. ( MU-V-026\20X Both the horizontal and vertical seismic margins for MU-V-003\20X and MU-V-026\20X are greater than 1.00; therefore, these components are adequate for high-frequency seismic spectral ground motion for their Ref. 1.4 functions .

Page 38 of 49

1SC4343-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-179, TMl-16-084 B Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Component Evaluation Floor No. Unit Modol Build Ing Basis for Evaluation ID Typo Systom Function Manufacturer ID Typo Elev. (ft)

No. Caoacltv Result Close MU-V-3 if MTlH*

Process Control Auxiliary EPRI HF 1 1 MU*TS* l Core Cooling temperature Barksdale M1S4S* N/A 281 Cap> Dem Switch Cabinet Building Test greater than 145* F 12-A Hold MU-V-26 MU-V- Control solenoid in Joslyn Clark Control Control SQURTS 2 1 Core Coollng 4U4*2 XCL 338.5 Cap> Dem 026\20X Relay energized state to Control Cabinet Building Report keep valve closed MS-V- Transfer control Control Struthers 219BBXP NNI ICS Control Control 3 1 004AB* Core Cooling of MS*V*4A/B to 338.S GERS Cap> Dem Relay Dunn 33 Cabinet Cabinet Building AR23 BU loaders Hold MU*V-3 MU-V- Control solenoid in Telemecaniqu Control Control 4 1 Core Cooling Jl3PA20 RSTSP*A 338 5 GERS Cap> Dem 003\20X Relay energized state to keep valve closed

• Cabinet Building Engine AC/DC Power Diesel DG* Control DG*lAAlarm Mounted Control EPRI HF 5 1 Support Amerace E7012PD Generator 305 Cap> Dem 1A/T3A Relay Delay Relay Relay Pane l Cabinet Test Systems Building A

Engine AC/DC Power Diesel DG* Control DG*lAAlarm Mounted Control EPRI HF 6 1 Support Amerace E7012PD Generator 305 Cap> Dem 1A/T3B Relay Delay Relay Relay Panel Cabinet Test Systems Building A

Engine AC/DC Power Diesel DG* Control DG*lAAlarm Mounted Control EPRI HF 7 1 Support Amerace E7012PD Generator 305 Cap> Dem 1A/T3C Relay Delay Relay Relay Panel Cabinet Test Systems Building A

Engine AC/DC Power Olesel DG* Control DG-lB Alarm Mounted Control EPRI HF 8 1 Support Amerace E7012PD Generator 305 Cap> Dem 1B/T3A Relay Delay Reloy Relay Panel Cabinet Test Systems Building B

Page 39 of 49

15C4343-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-179, TMl-16-084 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Component Evaluatlon Floor No. Unit Model Building Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manufacturer ID Type Elev. (ftl No. Capacity Result Engine AC/DC Power Diesel Control DG-lBAlarm Mounted Control EPRI HF 9 1 DG-1B/T3B Support Amerace E7012PD Generator 305 Cap> Dem Relay Oelily Relay Relay Panel Cabinet Test Systems Building B

Engine AC/DC Power Diesel Control OG-lBAlarm Mounted Control EPRI Hf 10 1 OG-1B/T3C Support Amerace E7012PO Generator 305 Cap> Dem Relay Delay Relay Relay Panel Ca bf net Test Systems Building B

Engine AC/DC Power Diesel OG- Control OG-lB Crankin& Mounted Control EPRI Hf 11 1 Support Amerace E7012PO Generator 305 Cap> Dem 1B/T2A Relay Time Delay Relay Relay Panel Cabinet Test Systems Building B

Engine AC/DC Power Diesel Control DG*lB Cranking Mounted Control EPRI Hf 12 1 OG-1B/T2B Support Amerace E7012PO Generator 305 Cap> Dem Relay Time Delay Relay Relay Panel Cabinet Test Systems Building B

Engine AC/DC Power Diesel OG- Control DG*lA Cranking Mounted Control EPRI Hf 13 1 Support Amerace E7012PO Generator 305 Cap> Dem 1A/T2A Relay Time Delay Relay Relay Panel Cabinet Test Systems Building A

Engine AC/DC Power Diesel OG- Control DG-lA Crankin1 Mounted Control EPRI Hf 14 1 Support Amerace E7012PO Generator 305 Cap> Dem 1A/T2B Relay Time Delay Relay Relay Panel Cabinet Test Systems Building A

AC/DC Power Control BUS 10 lockout 12HEA6 Control 15 1 86B/10 Support GE 101 Switchgear 338.5 GERS Cap> Dem Relay Relay lC Building Systems AC/DC Power Control BUS lE lockout 12HEA6 Control 16 1 868/lE Support GE lEl Switchgear 338.5 GERS Cap> Dem Relay Relay lC Building Systems AC/DC Power Control DG-lA lockout 12HEA6 Centro I 17 1 86G/102 Support GE 102 Switchgear 338.S GERS Cap>Oem Relay Relay lC Building Systems AC/DC Power Control DG-18 Lockout 12HEA6 Control 18 1 86G/1E3 Support GE 1E3 Switchgear 338.5 GERS Cap> Dem Relay Relay lC Building Systems Page 40 of 49

15(4343-RPT-002, Rev.a Correspondence No.: RS-16-179, TMl-16-084 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Component Evaluation Floor No. Unit Model Building Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manufacturer ID Type Elev. (Ill No. Capacity Result AC/DC Power Protective OG-lA Differential Brown Boveri Control TMI 19 1 87M/1D2 Support B7M 1D2 Switchgear 338.S Cap> Dem Relay Relay (ABB) Building Report Systems AC/DC Power Protective DG-18 Differential Brown Severi Control TMI 20 1 87M/1E3 Support 87M 1E3 Switch1ear 338.S Cap> Dem Relay Relay (ABB) Building Report Systems AC/DC Power Diesel DG* Process DG-lA Overspeed DG lA Skid 21 1 Support N/A N/A N/A Generator 30S GERS Cap> Dem lA/EOS Switch Switch Mounted Systems Building AC/DC Power Diesel DG* Process DG-18 Overspeed DG lB Skid 22 1 Support N/A N/A N/A Generator 305 GERS Cap> Dem lB/EOS Switch Switch Mounted Systems Building Engine AC/DC Power DG*lA High Diesel DG- Control Mounted Control 23 1 Support Crankcase Westinghouse BFD Generator 305 GERS Cap>Oem lA/CCl Relay Relay Panel Cabinet Systems Pressure Relay Building A

Engine AC/DC Power DG*lA High Diesel DG* Control Mounted Control 24 1 Support Crankcase Westinghouse BFD Generator 305 GERS Cap> Dem 1A/CC2 Relay Relay Panel Cabinet Systems Pressure Relay Building A

Engine AC/DC Power OG*lAHigh Diesel DG- Control Mounted Control 25 1 Support Crankcase Westinghouse BFD Generator 305 GERS Cap> Dem 1A/CC3 Relay Relay Panel Cabinet Systems Pressure Relay Building A

Engine AC/DC Power Diesel DG* Control DG-lA Overspeed Mounted Control 26 1 Support Westinghouse BFD Generator 305 GERS Cap> Dem lA/EOR Relay Shutdown Relay Relay Panel Cabinet Systems Building A

Engine AC/DC Power Diesel DG* Control OG-lB Overspeed Mounted Control 27 1 Support Westinghouse BFD Generator 30S GERS Cap> Dem lB/EOR Relay Shutdown Relay Relay Panel Cabinet Systems Building 8

Engine AC/DC Power DG*lA lube Oil Diesel DG* Control Mounted Control 28 1 Support Pressure Low Westinghouse BFD Generator 305 GERS Cap> Dem lA/OPl Relay Relay Panel Cabinet Systems Relay Building A

Page 41 of 49

15C4343-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-179, TMl-16-084 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Component Evaluation Floor No. Unit Model Building Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manufacturer ID Type Elev. (ft)

No. Capadtv Result Engine AC/DC Power DG*lA lube Oil Diesel DG* Control Mounted Control 29 1 Support Pressure Low Westinghouse 8FD Generator 305 GERS Cap> Dem 1A/OP2 Relay Relay Panel Cabinet Systems Relay Building A

Engine AC/DC Power DG*lA Lube Oil Diesel DG* Control Mounted Control 30 1 Support Pressure Low Westinghouse 8FD Generator 305 GERS Cap> Dem 1A/OP3 Relay Relay Panel Cabinet Systems Relay Building A

Engine AC/DC Power DG-18 High Diesel DG* Control Mounted Control 31 1 Support Crankcase Westinghouse 8FD Generator 30S GERS Cap> Dem lB/CCl Relay Relay Panel Cabinet Systems Pressure Relay Building 8

Engine AC/DC Power DG-18 High Diesel DG- Control Mounted Control 32 1 Support Crankcase Westinghouse 8FD Generator 305 GERS Cap> Dem 18/CC2 Relay Relay Panel Cabinet Systems Pressure Relay Building 8

Engine AC/DC Power DG-18 High Diesel DG- Control Mounted Control 33 1 Support Crankcase Westinghouse 8FD Generator 305 GERS Cap> Dem 1B/CC3 Relay Relay Panel Cabinet Systems Pressure Relay Buildine 8

Engine AC/DC Power DG-18 lube Oil Diesel DG* Control Mounted Control 34 1 Support Pressure low Westinghouse 8FD Generator 305 GERS Cap> Dem 18/0Pl Relay Relay Panel Cabinet Systems Relay Building 8

Eneine AC/DC Power DG* lB lube Oil Diesel DG* Control Mounted Control 35 1 Support Pressure low Westinghouse 8FD Generator 305 GERS Cap> Dem 1B/OP2 Relay Relay Panel Cabinet Systems Relay Building B

AC/DC Power DG-18 lube Oil Diesel OG- Control EMRP 8(18 Control 36 1 Support Pressure low Westinghouse BFD Generator 305 GERS Cap> Dem 1B/OP3 Relay DGCNPL) Cabinet Systems Relay Building Engine AC/DC Power Diesel DG* Control DG-lA Shutdown Mounted Control 37 1 Support Westinghouse 8FD Generator 305 GERS Cap> Dem lA/SDR Relay Relay Relay Panel Cabinet Systems Building A

AC/DC Power Diesel DG- Control DG-18 Shutdown EMRP 8 (lB Control 38 1 Support Westin1house BFD Generator 305 GERS Cap> Dem 18/SDR Relay Relay DGCNPL) Cabinet Systems Building Page 42 of 49

1SC4343-RPT-002,Rev.0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-179, TMl-16-084 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Component Evaluation Floor Na. Unit Madel Building Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manufacturer ID Type Elev.(ft)

Na. capacltv Result Engine AC/OC Power DG-lB Lube Oil Diesel DG- Control Mounted Control 39 1 Support Pressure Low at West1n1house BFD Generator 305 GERS Cap> Dem lB/OPL Relay Relay Panel Cabinet Systems Idle Relay Building B

Engine AC/Dr.Power DG-lA Lube Oil Diesel DG- Control Mounted Control 40 1 Support Pressure Low at Westinghouse BFD Generator 305 GERS Cap> Dem lA/OPL Relay Relay Panel Cabinet Systems Idle Relay Building A

AC/OC Power Protective 105 Ground Control Operator 41 1 SO/G Support Westinghouse C0-8 1E6 Switchgear 338.S GERS Relay Overcurrent Relay Buildin1 Action Systems AC/OC Power 50- Protective 1D5 A Phase Control Operator 42 1 Support Westin1house C0-8 1D5 Switchgear 338.5 GERS 51/ICS/A Relay Overcurrent Relay Building Action Systems AC/OC Power 50- Protectrve 1E6 A Phase Control Operator 43 1 Support Westinghouse C0-8 1E6 Switchgear 338.5 GERS 51/ICS/A Relay Overcurrent Relay Building Action Systems AC/OCPower 50- Protective 1D5 B Phase Control Operator 44 1 Support Westinghouse C0-8 105 Switchgear 338.5 GERS 51/ICS/B Relay Overcurrent Relay Buildin1 Action Systems AC/DC Power 50- Protective 1E6 B Phase Control Operator 45 1 Support Westinghouse C0-8 1E6 Switchgear 338.5 GERS 51/ICS/B Relay Overcurrent Relay Building Action Systems AC/OC Power 50- Protective 105 C Phase Control Operator 46 1 Support Westin1house C0-8 105 Switchgear 338.5 GERS 51/ICS/C Relay Overcurrent Relay Building Action Systems AC/OC Power 50- Protective 1E6 C Phase Control Operator 47 1 Support Westinghouse C0-8 1E6 Switchgear 338.5 GERS 51/ICS/C Relay Overcurrent Relay Building Action Systems AC/OC Power Protective BUS 10 A Phase Control Operator 48 1 518/lD/A Support Westinghouse C0-8 101 Switchgear 338.S GERS Rel*y Overcurrent Relay Buildin1 Action Systems AC/OC Power Protectrve BUS lD B Phase Control Operator 49 1 518/10/B Support Westinghouse C0-8 lDl Switch1ear 338.5 GERS Relay Overcurrent Relay Building Action Systems Page 43 of 49

1SC4343-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-179, TMl-16-084 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Component Evaluatlon Floor No. Unit Model Building &sis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manufacturer ID Type Elev. (ft)

No. Capacltv Result AC/DC Power Protective BUS lD C Phase Control Operator so 1 SlB/10/C Support Westinghouse co-a 1Dl Switch1ear 33a s GERS Relay Overcurrent Relay Building Action Systems AC/DC Power Protective BUS 10 Neutral Control Operator Sl 1 SlBN/lD Support Westinghouse co-a 1Dl Switchgear 338.S GERS Relay Overcurrent Relay Building Action Systems AC/DC Power Protective BUS lE A Phase Control Operator S2 1 SlB/lE/A Support Westinghouse CO*a lEl Switchgear 33a.s GERS Relay Overcurrent Relay Building Action Systems AC/DC Power Protective BUS lE B Phase Control Operator S3 1 SlB/lE/B Support Westinghouse CO*a 1E1 Switchgear 338.S GERS Relay Overcurrent Relay Building Action Systems AC/DC Power Protective BUS lE C Phase Control Operator S4 1 SlB/lE/C Support Westinghouse C0*8 !El Switchgear 338.S GERS Relay Overcurrent Relay Building Action Systems AC/DC Power Protective BUS lE Neutral Control Operator SS 1 SlBN/lE Support Westinghouse C0*8 lEl Switchgear 338.S GERS Relay Overcurrent Relay Building Action Systems AC/DC Power Protective 105 Ground Control Operator S6 1 SO/G Support Westinghouse ITH lDS Switchgear 338.S GERS Relay Overcurrent Rel11y Building Action Systems Negative Phase AC/DC Power DG- Protective Sequence (Phase- Control SQURTS S7 1 Support Westinghouse COQ 1D2 Switchgear 33B.S Cap> Dem 1A/46G Relay to-Phase Fault) Building Report Systems Relay Negative Phase AC/DC Power DG- Protective Sequence (Phase- Control SQURTS SB 1 Support Westinghouse COQ IE3 Switchgear 338.S Cap> Dem 1B/46G Relay to-Phase Fault) Building Report Systems Relay AC/DC Power Dresel DG- Protective Field Overload ALM/CNPL Control SQURTS S9 1 Support Joslyn Clark 714UPA Genercltor 30S Cap> Dem 1A/76FX Relay Relay (lP*DC) Cabinet Report Systems Building AC/DC Power Olesel DG- Protective Field Overload ALM/CNPL Control SQURTS 60 1 Support Joslyn Clark 714UPA Generator 30S Cap> Dem 1B/76FX Relay Relay (lQ-DC) Cabinet Report svstems Building Page 44 of 49

1SC4343-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-179, TMl 084 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Component Evaluation Floor No. Unit Mod1I Bulldlnc Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manufacturer ID Type El1v. (ft)

No. Capacity RHUlt AC/DC Power Diesel DG- Protective Neutral Ground ALM/CNPL Control 61 1 Support Westinghouse C0*6 Generator 30S GERS Cap> Dem 1A/64G Relay Relay (lP*DC) Cabinet Systems Building AC/DC Power Diesel DG- Protective Neutral Ground ALM/CNPL Control 62 1 Support Westinghouse C0-6 Generator 305 GERS Cap> Dem 1B/64G Relay Relay (lQ-DC) Cabinet Systems Building AC/DC Power Diesel Protective Reverse Power ALM/CNPL Control 63 1 DG-lA/32 Support Westinghouse CRN-1 Generator 30S GERS Cap> Dem Relay Relay (lP-DC) Cabinet Systems Building AC/DC Power Diesel Protective Reverse Power ALM/CNPL Control 64 1 DG*lB/32 Support Westinghouse CRN-1 Generator 305 GERS Cap> Dem Relay Relay (lQ*DC) Cabinet Systems Building AC/DC Power Dlesel Protective Exciter Shutdown ALM/CNPL Control 65 1 DG-lA/Kl Support Westinghouse MDlOl Generator 305 GERS Cap> Dem Relay Relay (lP*DC) Cabinet Systems Building AC/DC Power Diesel Protective Exciter Shutdown ALM/CNPL Control 66 1 DG-lB/Kl Support Westinghouse MD101 Generator 305 GERS Cap> Dem Relay Relay (lQ*DC) Cabinet Systems Building AC/DC Power Diesel DG- Protective Loss of Excitation ALM/CNPL Control SQURTS Operator 67 1 Support Westinghouse KLF-1 Generator 305 1A/40X Relay Relay llP*DC) Cabinet Report Action Systems Building AC/DC Power Dfesel Protective Loss of Excitation ALM/CNPL Control SQURTS Operator 68 1 DG-1B/40X Support Westinghouse KLF-1 Generator 30S Relay Relay llQ*DC) Cabinet Report Action Systems Building Medium AC/DC Power 5-3AH-Voltage DG*lA Circuit Control 69 1 Gl-02 Support Wyle DPR350- 1D2 Switchgear 338.5 GERS Cap> Dem Circuit Breaker Building Systems 1200-78 Breaker Medium AC/DC Power S-3AH*

Voltage DG-18 Circuit Control 70 1 Gll-02 Support Wyle DPR350- 1E3 Switchgear 338.S GERS Cap> Dem Circuit Breaker Building Systems 1200-78 Breaker Medium AC/DC Power Voltage lP Transformer SO-DH- Control 71 1 Pl-02 Support Westinghouse lDS Switchgear 338.S GERS Cap> Dem Circuit Circuit Breaker P3SO Building Systems Bruker Page 45 of 49

1SC4343-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-179, TMl-16-084 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Component Evaluation Floor No. Unit Model Building Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manufacturer ID Type Elev. {ft)

No. Capacity Result Medium AC/DC Power Voltage 15 Transformer 50*DH* Control 72 1 51*02 Support Westin1house 1E6 Switchgear 338.5 GERS Cap> Dem Circuit Circuit Breaker P350 Building Systems Breaker low AC/DC Power Voltage lP Switchgear Control 73 1 lP-02 Support Westinghouse DB*50 lP-18 Switchgear 322 GERS Cap>Oem Circuit Feeder Breaker Building Systems Breaker Low AC/DC Power Voltage 15 Switchgear Control 74 1 1S*02 Support Westinghouse DB*50 lS*lB Switchgear 322 GERS Cap> Dem Circuit Feeder Breaker Building Systems Breaker Low AC/DC Power EE*MCC- Voltage lA Control Center Control 75 1 Support Westinghouse DB*50 lP-lC Switchgear 322 GERS Cap> Dem ES-lA-BK Circuit Feeder Breaker Building Systems Breaker Low AC/DC Power EE-MCC- Voltage 18 Control Center Control 76 l Support Westinghouse DB*50 15*1C Switchgear 322 GERS Cap> Dem ES-lB*BK Circuit Feeder Breaker Building Systems Breaker AC/DC Power Protective Fault Trip Time Control 77 1 Kl Support N/A N/A EE*INV-lA Inverter 322 GERS Cap> Dem Relay Delay Relay Building Systems AC/DC Power Protective Fault Trip Time Control 78 1 Kl Support N/A N/A EE*INV-lC Inverter 322 GERS Cap> Dem Relay Delay Relay Building Systems AC/DC Power Protective Fault Trip Time Control 79 1 Kl Support N/A N/A EE*INV-lE Inverter 322 GERS Cap> Dem Relay Dolay Relay Building Systems AC/DC Powor Protective Fault Trip Time Control 80 1 Kl Support N/A N/A EE-INV-18 Inverter 322 GERS Cap> Dem Relay Delay Relay Buildin&

Systems AC/DC Power Protective Fault Trip Time Control 81 1 Kl Support N/A N/A EE*INV-lD Inverter 322 GERS Cap> Dem Relay Delay Relay Building Systems Page 46 of 49

1SC4343-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-179, TMl-16-084 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure Component Evaluatlon Floor No. Unit Model Bulldlng Basis for Evaluation ID Type System Function Manufacturer ID Type Elev. (ft)

No. Caoaclty Result AC/DC Powe r Protective Fault Trip Time Control 82 1 Kl Suppo rt N/A N/A EE*INV-lF Inverter 322 GERS Cap> Dem Relay Delay Relay Building Systems Page 47 of 49

15C4343-RPT-002,Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-179, TMl-16-084 Table B-2: Reactor Coolant Leak Path Valve Identified for High Frequency Confirmation VALVE P&ID SHEET UNIT NOTE RC-V-42 302-650 1 1 Reactor Head Vent RC-V-43 302-650 1 1 Reactor Head Vent DH-V-1 302-640 1 1 1C-ESV Unit 3A RC to DH Rem Block Valve DH-V-2 302-640 1 1 1C-ESV Unit 3B RC to DH Rem Block Valve DH-V-3 302-640 1 1 1C-ESV Unit 4B RC Outlet to DH System RC-V-40A 302-650 1 1 RC Vent Valve RC-V-41A 302-650 1 1 RC Vent Valve RC-V-40B 302-650 1 1 RC Vent Valve RC-V-41B 302-650 1 1 RC Vent Valve 1 MU to RC Pump Seal Loop A Simple Check Valve MU-V-88A 302-661 1 (no need to be included) 1 MU to RC Pump Seal Loop B Simple Check Valve MU-V-88B 302-661 1 (no need to be included) 1 MU to RC Pump Seal Loop C Simple Check Valve MU-V-88C 302-661 1 (no need to be included) 1 MU to RC Pump Seal Loop D Simple Check Valve MU-V-88D 302-661 1 (no need to be included) 1 MU to Cold Leg Loop B Pump D Simple Check Valve MU-V-86A 302-661 1 (no need to be included) 1 MU to Cold Leg Loop B Pump C Simple Check Valve MU-V-86B 302-661 1 (no need to be included)

Page 46 of 49

1SC4343-RPT-002, Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-16-179, TMl-16-084 Table B-2: Reactor Coolant Leak Path Valve Identified for High Frequency Confirmation VALVE P&ID SHEET UNIT NOTE RC-V-2 302-650 1 1 1C-ESV Unit SC Pressurizer Relief Block Valve RC-RV-2 302-650 1 1 Pressurizer Electromatic Relief Valve RC-V-44 302-650 1 1 RC Vent Valve RC-V28 302-650 1 1 18-ES Unit 1OC Pressurizer Vent Valve 1 Manual Instrument Isolation Globe Valve (no need to RC-V-1204 302-651 1 be included) 1 Manual Instrument Isolation Globe Valve (no need to RC-V-1208 302-651 1 be included) 1 Core Flood Simple Check Valve (no need to be CF-V-5A 302-711 1 included) 1 Core Flood Simple Check Valve (no need to be CF-V-58 302-711 1 included)

Page 49 of 49