RS-16-039, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding the Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 50.55a, Codes and Standards, Paragraph (h)(2), Protection Systems.

Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding the Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 50.55a, Codes and Standards, Paragraph (h)(2), Protection Systems.

ML16029A408
Person / Time
Site:	Byron, Braidwood
Issue date:	01/29/2016
From:	Gullott D Exelon Generation Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
CAC MF6079, CAC MF6080, CAC MF6081, CAC MF6082, RS-16-039
Download: ML16029A408 (60)

Text

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Amw ExeLon Generation,, 10O,>7,)000°fII(o RS-16-039 10 CFR 50.12 January 29, 2016 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-72 and NPF-77 NRC Docket Nos. STN 50-456 and STN 50-457 Byron Station, Units 1 and 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-37 and NPF-66 NRC Docket Nos. STN 50-454 and STN 50-455

Subject:

Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding the Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 50.55a, "Codes and standards," Paragraph (h)(2),

"Protection systems"

References:

(1) Letter from D. M. Gullott (Exelon Generation Company, LLC) to U. S. NRC, "Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 50.55a, "Codes and standards,"

Paragraph (h)(2), "Protection systems," dated April 6, 2015 (2) Letter from J. S. Wiebe (U. S. NRC) to B. C. Hanson (Exelon Generation Company, LLC), "Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, and Byron Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Request for Additional Information Related to Exemption Request From 10 CFR 50.55a, 'Codes and standards,' Paragraph (h)(2),

'Protection systems,"' (CAC Nos. MF6079, MF6080, MF6081, and MF6082) dated January 20, 2016 In Reference 1, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, "Specific exemptions," Exelon Generation Company, LLC (EGG) requested a permanent exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a, "Codes and standards," Paragraph (h)(2), "Protection systems," for Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, and Byron Station, Units 1 and 2. Paragraph (h)(2) states: "For nuclear power plants with construction permits issued after January 1, 1971, but before May 13, 1999, protection systems must meet the requirements stated in either of IEEE [Standard] Std. 279, 'Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations,' or in IEEE Std. 603-1991, 'Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations,' and the correction sheet dated January 30, 1995." Braidwood and Byron Stations are currently committed to the requirements of IEEE Std. 279 1971; however, a discrepancy was discovered such that the manual isolation signal for the Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) bypass valves does not conform to the requirements of IEEE-279.

The exemption is being requested in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) as the application of the regulation in this particular circumstance is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule.

January 29, 2016 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 In Reference 2, the NRC requested that EGC provide additional information to support their review of the subject Exemption Request (i.e., Reference 1). The response to these requests is provided in Attachment 1. It was agreed that EGC would provide the requested information to the NRC on or before January 29, 2016.

EGC has reviewed the information supporting the Environmental Assessment that was previously provided to the NRC in Reference 1. The additional information provided in this submittal does not affect the conclusion that the proposed exemption will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment.

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, "Notice for public comment; State consultation," paragraph (b),

EGC is notifying the State of Illinois of this additional information by transmitting a copy of this letter and its attachment to the designated State Official.

This letter contains no new regulatory commitments. If you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact Joseph A. Bauer at (630) 657-2804.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on the 29th day of January 2016.

Respectfully, David M. Gullott Manager Licensing Exelon Generation Company, LLC : Response to Request for Additional Information cc: NRC Regional Administrator, Region III NRC Senior Resident Inspector, Braidwood Station NRC Senior Resident Inspector, Byron Station Illinois Emergency Management Agency Division of Nuclear Safety

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Request for Additional Information In Reference 1, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, "Specific exemptions," Exelon Generation Company, LLC (EGC) requested a permanent exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55x, "Codes and standards," Paragraph (h)(2), "Protection systems," for Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, and Byron Station, Units 1 and 2. Paragraph (h)(2) states: "For nuclear power plants with construction permits issued after January 1, 1971, but before May 13, 1999, protection systems must meet the requirements stated in either of IEEE [Standard] Std. 279,

'Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations,' or in IEEE Std. 603-1991, 'Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations,' and the correction sheet dated January 30, 1995." Braidwood and Byron Stations are currently committed to the requirements of IEEE Std. 279 1971; however, a discrepancy was discovered such that the manual isolation signal for the Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) bypass valves does not conform to the requirements of IEEE-279.

The exemption is being requested in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) as the application of the regulation in this particular circumstance is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule.

In Reference 2, the NRC requested that EGC provide additional information to support their review of the subject Exemption Request (i.e., Reference 1). The requested information is provided below.

NRC Request for Additional Information (RAI)

By letter dated April 6, 2015 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML15097A123), Exelon Generation Corporation (the licensee) submitted a request pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR)

Part 50.12(a) (2) (ii) for exemption from 10 CFR 50.55x, "Codes and standards, " paragraph (h) (2), "Protection Systems, " regarding Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, and Byron Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Facilities Operating Licenses. The proposed exemption would eliminate the requirement for manual system level initiation of the main steam line bypass valves isolation per the criteria stated in Institute of Electrical & Electronics Engineers (IEEE) [Standard] Std. 279, Section 4.17, "Manual Initiation. " The technical review branch for instrumentation and control has identified the need for additional information to complete the review of the exemption request:

Response Introduction Prior to evaluating the RAI responses below, please review the following figures to become familiar with the Main Control Room (MCR) panel layout and controls discussed in the responses. The below information is also provided in the response to RAI 5.

Note: Figure 1 and all photos are of the Byron Station Simulator, Unit 1. The relative location of the controls is applicable to all Byron and Braidwood units.

Figure 1: "Main Control Room" Illustrates the overall layout of the Byron Station MCR area. The Byron Station and Braidwood Station MCRs are common Unit 1 / Unit 2 MCRs; therefore, both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 control board layouts are shown. Note that only the Unit 1 indications and controls are labeled. Identical indications and controls are also located on the associated Unit 2 panels. Although there are some minor differences Page 1 of 20

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Request for Additional Information between the Byron Station and Braidwood Station MCRs, for the purposes of the below discussion, this figure is also applicable to Braidwood Station. Please reference this figure for the relative panel and control switch locations discussed in the RAI responses.

Figure 2: "Main Control Room PM06J"

- The Manual Actuation switches (one of which is the "system level" manual Main Steam Line (MSL) isolation hand switch) are located just to the left of the Instructor (see Figure 4 for a close up view).

- The MSIV and MSIV bypass valve individual control switches and position indication are located on the far left side of PM06J (about 15 feet away from the "system level" manual MSL isolation hand switch).

- The Trip Status Light Bulb (TSLB) indicators (Group 6) showing the MSIV and MSIV bypass valve closed position is located immediately above and to the right of the Manual Actuation switches (near the Instructors head).

Figure 3: "MSIV and MSIV Bypass Valve Controls PM061 Close-up of MSIV and MSIV bypass valve individual control switches and position indication (far left side of PM06J).

Figure 4: "Manual Actuation Switches PM06J" Close-up of the Manual Actuation switches (one of which is the "system level" manual MSL isolation hand switch) on PM06J.

Figure 5: "Manual Safeguards Actuation Switches PM06J" Close-up of the Manual Safeguards Actuation Switches (one of which is a redundant "system level" manual MSL isolation hand switch) on PM05J.

Figure 6: "Manual Actuation Switches and MSIV TSLB Panel PM06J" Manual Actuation Switches on PM06J and the nearby TSLB MSIVs (MS001A-D) and MSIV bypass valves (MS101A-D) closed indication status lights (upper right hand corner of photo).

Figure 7: "MSIV and MSIV Bypass Valve TSLB Panel PM06J" Close-up of the TSLB MSIVs (MS001A-D) and MSIV bypass valve (MS101A-D) closed indication status lights (Column 3) on PM06J.

Figure 8: "MSIV Bypass Valve (Typical) Electrical Schematic"

RAI 1

As the request states, the exemption would eliminate the requirement to meet the criteria stated in IEEE Std. 279, Section 4.17, "Manual Initiation, " only for the main steam isolation valve (MSIV) bypass valves manual isolation function. However, the criterion of Section 4.17 consists of three statements. The first concerns the system level initiation; the second the single-failure; and the third the manual initiation function depending on a minimum of equipment. The questions below will address these three sections by addressing the Regulatory Position of the NRC staff in Regulatory Guide (RG)1.62, Manual Initiation of Protective Actions (October 1973).

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ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Request for Additional Information

a. Regulatory position C.2, states: "Manual initiation of a protective action at the system level should perform all actions performed by the automatic initiation ..." and provides examples of those types of actions.

Provide a list of all actions that are done at the automatic initiation, how they are done, and how they are confirmed, at the manual level initiation of the MSIV and bypass valves.

Response to RAI 1.a Automatic Main Steam Line (MSL) Isolation As discussed in Reference 1, Section 11.2, page 3, an automatic MSL isolation is initiated by:

• Steam Line Low Pressure (640 psig);

• Steam Line High Negative Rate (100 psig drop in 50 seconds); or

• High-2 containment pressure (8.2 psig).

The automatic MSL isolation closes all four MSIVs and their associated bypass valves. No other actions are initiated by an automatic MSL isolation.

The operator confirms closure of both the MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves by observing the open/closed indication immediately above the individual valve control switches on MCR panel PM06J (see Figures 1, 2 and 3). Confirmation of closure of the MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves is directed by the Reactor Trip and Safety Injection Emergency Response Procedures. In addition, the operator can confirm closure of the MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves on the TSLB indicators (Group 6, Column 3) located immediately above and to the right of the Manual Actuation switches on PM06J (see Figures 6 and 7). Note that there is one TSLB status light per loop and both the MSIV and MSIV bypass valve must be closed to illuminate the "closed" status light.

Manual Main Steam Line (MSL) Isolation There are two ways to initiate a manual MSL isolation as discussed in Section 11.2, page 4 of Reference 1:

1) There are four individual MSIV control switches (one per loop), and four individual MSIV bypass valve control switches (one per loop), mounted on MCR panel PM06J (see Figure 3). Each switch, when actuated individually by an operator, will isolate its respective valve. The valve position is confirmed by observing the "open/closed" indicator immediately above each individual switch or the TSLB status lights as described above for the automatic MSL Isolation. No other actions are initiated by a manual MSL isolation using the individual valve switches.

2) There are also two manual MSL isolation "system level" switches (i.e., each switch provides an "A" and "B" Train close signal). One switch is located on MCR panel PM06J (see Figure 4) and the other switch is located on MCR panel PM05J (see Figure 5).

Operating either switch will close all four MSIVs; however, neither system level switch will close the MSIV bypass valves. The fact that the manual system level switches do not close the MSIV bypass valves is the subject of this proposed exemption. The MSIV position is confirmed by observing the "open/closed" indicator immediately above each Page 3 of 20

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Request for Additional Information individual MSIV switch (see Figure 3). No other actions are initiated by a "system level" manual MSL isolation.

b. P.5 of the exemption request states: "the existing individual MSIV bypass valves manual control switches are single train switches such that a single failure of a switch could prevent the manual initiation of the protective action (i.e., prevent closure of the MSIV bypass valve). "

Provide justification for the current configuration not meeting the single failure criterion 4.2, of IEEE Std. 279.

i. Has there been an analysis done to determine the effects of one or more MSIV bypass valves failed open?

Response to RAI 1.b.i As discussed in Reference 1, Section 11.5, "Safety Analysis Assumptions," all analyzed steam line break scenarios, either inside or outside of containment, assume that one MSIV fails to close. Due to the relative line sizes (i.e., -30 inches for a MSIV and 4 inches for a MSIV bypass valve), failure of a MSIV bounds a failure of a MSIV bypass valve. Steam line break scenarios inside containment are discussed in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Section 6.2, "Containment Systems;" and steam line break scenarios outside containment are discussed in the UFSAR, Section 15.1.5, "Steam System Piping Failure at Zero Power," and Section 15.1.6, "Steam System Piping Failure at Full Power." Note that only one MSIV is assumed to fail open in any accident scenario. A specific analysis describing the consequences of a MSIV bypass valve is not documented in the UFSAR as the MSIV bypass valve consequences are bounded by the assumed MSIV failure consequences.

Reference 1, Section 11.6, "Exemption Request Safety Consequences," also provides a summary evaluation for each of the accident scenarios that credit closure of the MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves. For each scenario, there is a specific section entitled, "MSIV Bypass Valve Failure Consequences," that discusses the impact of a MSIV or MSIV bypass valve failure. As noted in this section, the Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) accident credits manual closure of a MSIV or MSIV bypass valve.

Section 11.6.d, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR)," page 10-12, presents details of the SGTR analysis assumptions and conclusions.

In summary, for the Offsite Dose Case, (on page 11 of Reference 1) the following is concluded:

Supplement 1 to WCAP-10698-P-A, "Evaluation of Offsite Radiation Doses for a Steam Generator Tube Rupture Accident," specifically evaluated the dose consequences of a MSIV failure to close on the ruptured steam generator and concluded that a failed open [Power Operated Relief Valve] PORV on the ruptured steam generator remains the bounding single failure, as assumed in the current

[Analysis of Record] AOR. Note that the failure of a MSIV bypass valve was not explicitly analyzed; however, the steam flow to the environment through an MSIV bypass valve would be significantly less than the steam flow through the analyzed MSIV failure simply due to the much smaller line size (i.e., the MSIV bypass line is 4 inches in diameter whereas the MSIV line size is approximately 30 inches in Page 4 of 20

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Request for Additional Information diameter); therefore, it is clear that the dose consequences of a failed open MSIV bypass valve also remain bounded by the current AOR. Based on this discussion, use of the "system level" main steam line manual isolation switches to isolate the MSIV bypass valves is not needed to successfully mitigate the consequences of the SGTR Offsite Dose Case; thus, conformance to IEEE Std. 279 may be exempted.

In summary, for the Margin to Overfill (MTO) Case, (on page 12 of Reference 1) the following is concluded:

For the MTO Case, similar to the Offsite Dose Case, the analysis assumes the MSIV and the MSIV bypass valve, on the ruptured steam generator, are manually closed to isolate the steam generator. The MTO consequences of a failed open MSIV or MSIV bypass valve on the ruptured steam generator were specifically analyzed in the Byron/Braidwood SGTR Margin to Overfill Single Failure Assessment. The analysis concluded that failure of one of the intact steam generator PORVs to open remains the bounding single failure.

As can be seen, use of the "system level" main steam line manual isolation switches to isolate the MSIV bypass valves is not needed to successfully mitigate the consequences of the SGTR MTO Case; thus, conformance to IEEE Std. 279 may be exempted.

ii. Explain how the containment isolation function is single failure proof and the current configuration is acceptable.

Response to RAI 1.b.ii The MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves are both considered "containment isolation valves;"

however, the only "containment isolation" signal the MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves receive is an automatic MSL isolation signal (i.e., "MS") as shown on Attachment A, "B/B UFSAR Table 6.2-58, 'Containment Isolation Provisions,"' (reference highlighted text on pages 6.2-196a and 6.2-198). Specifically, neither the MSIVs nor MSIV bypass valves receive a Phase A or Phase B containment isolation signal. Note that many other valves on this table are shown to receive a Phase A (i.e., "T") isolation signal or a Phase B (i.e., "P") isolation signal.

A Phase A containment isolation is actuated automatically by a Safety Injection signal (generated from any one of three signals: 1) low pressurizer pressure (1829 psig);

2) low MSL pressure (640 psig); or 3) Hi-1 containment pressure (3.4 psig)) or manually by either switch on PM06J (Figure 4) or PM05J (Figure 5). A Phase A signal prevents fission product release by closing non-essential process lines penetrating containment.

Since it is desirable to maintain a heat sink during this time, it is appropriate that the MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves do not receive a Phase A signal.

A Phase B containment isolation is automatically actuated by a Hi-3 containment pressure signal (20 psig) or manually by either set switches on PM06J (Figure 4) or PM05J (Figure 5). An automatic MSL isolation signal is generated on a Hi-2 containment pressure signal (8.2 psig) and is actuated prior to receiving a Phase B signal which is generated on a Hi-3 containment pressure signal (20 psig).

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ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Request for Additional Information Main Steam Line Isolation Function The MSL isolation function is thoroughly addressed in Reference 1, Section 11.6 on page 7 of 16 (Discussion); followed by additional detail on pages 7-12. As discussed on these pages, the automatic MSL function is designed to withstand a single failure as there are two trains (i.e., "A" Train and "B" Train) of MSL isolation signals generated from the solid state protection system. Neither a "system level" MSL manual isolation nor individual MSIV or MSIV bypass valve isolation, using the individual manual valve control switches, is credited for the spectrum of steamline breaks analyzed in the UFSAR as two independent failures (i.e., both trains) of the automatic MSL isolation signal must fail before needing to rely on manual isolation actions. Failure of both trains of the automatic isolation signal is beyond the Braidwood Station and Byron Station design basis.

As described in Reference 1, Section 11.6, (and summarized above in the response to RAI 1.b.i) a manual MSL isolation is credited in the SGTR analysis. Manual isolation of the ruptured SG MSIV and MSIV bypass valve, using the individual manual control switches, are procedurally addressed in Emergency Operating Procedure 1(2)B(w)EP-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture." The consequences of a failed open MSIV bypass valve are discussed in Section 11.6 and shown to be bounded by the existing AOR.

Therefore, Section 11.6 concludes that the current configuration of the MSIV bypass valve is acceptable and conformance to IEEE Std. 279 may be exempted.

Additional detail regarding closure of the MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves is given below.

MRIV C'In.qurP An automatic MSL isolation closes all MSIVs and is single failure proof as both "A" Train and "B" Train signals are actuated. A manual closure of a MSIV is performed by actuating the "system level" MSL manual isolation switches on either PM06J (Figure 4) or PM05J (Figure 5) and is single failure proof as both "A" Train and "B" Train signals are actuated. A MSIV can also be closed by actuating the individual MSIV component-level control switch (one per loop) on PM06J (Figure 6).

MSIV Bypass Valve Closure An automatic MSL isolation also closes all MSIV bypass valves and is single failure proof as both "A" Train and "B" Train signals are actuated as above. A manual closure of a MSIV bypass valve can be performed by actuating the individual MSIV bypass valve component level control switch (one per loop) on PM06J (Figure 3). The component-level control switch for each MSIV bypass valve only interacts with the "A" solenoid for its respective valve; however, it should also be noted that each MSIV bypass valve has its own positioner, current to pressure transducer, and valve position demand controller to allow opening/closing its respective valve. This arrangement allows a MSIV bypass valve to be closed by turning the component-level switch to "CLOSE," which de-energizes the "A" solenoid and bleeds instrument air from the valve positioner; or by turning the valve position demand controller (see Figure 3) to "zero" which also bleeds instrument air off the valve positioner, independent of the solenoid. Therefore, although manual closure of a MSIV bypass valve does not have redundant closure signals (i.e.,

an "A" Train and "B" Train), there are two independent methods to manually close the Page 6 of 20

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Request for Additional Information valve. It is also noted that the MSIV bypass valves fail closed (i.e., in the safe direction) on loss of power.

c. Regulatory position C.4 also states: "The amount of equipment common to both manual and automatic initiation should be kept to a minimum. "

Describe the equipment and circuitry, or portions thereof, which are common to automatic and manual initiation, whether it be component or system level initiation.

Response to RAI 1.c The Engineered Safety Features (ESF) MSL isolation signal is initiated from Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) cabinets 1(2)PA09J for Train A and 1(2)PA10J for Train B. ESF closure of the MSIV bypass valves comes about when either train's slave relay K623 energizes, opening its contacts in series with the associated solenoid ("A" Train or "B" Train.) The manual component level control switch will close its respective valve by rotating the switch to the CLOSE position which de-energizes the "A" solenoid (see Figure 8). Additionally, the manual position controller can be used to close its respective MSIV bypass valve. These position controllers receive power from 125V AC power and are independent from the manual single valve control switches and have a different power source than the automatic MSL isolation signals. The MSIV bypass valves are end components common to both the manual and automatic closure signals.

RAI 2

Consistent with RG 1.62; "Manual Initiation of Protective Actions," (dated October 1973),

Regulatory Position 6 states, "Manual initiation of protective action at the system level should be so designed that once initiated, it will go to completion as required in Section 4.16 of IEEE Std.

279-1971. "

a. Explain the additional actions involved with the MSIV bypass valve that would be necessary to be equivalent to the automatic initiation described above to insure it has gone to completion.

Response to RAI 2.a The only action necessary to manually close the MSIV bypass valves is for the operator to turn the switch for each respective valve; i.e., one per loop (see Figures 2 and 3). To ensure the valves have closed, the operator would verify closed indication on the "open/closed" indicator immediately above the valve switch on PM06J (see Figure 3) or the TSLB status lights (see Figures 6 and 7). The actions to confirm closure of the MSIV bypass valves after a manual closure are identical to the confirmatory actions the operator would take upon receiving an automatic MSL isolation.

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ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Request for Additional Information

b. Describe the type of switch, the positions available, any spring-return actions, and what is required to manipulate it. Also include necessary indications that confirm the actions have taken place.

Response to RAI 2.b The component-level control switch for each MSIV bypass valve is a Westinghouse type OT2 control switch (see Figure 8). This is a 3-position spring return right to center switch. The available positions are "CLOSE," "AUTO," and "OPEN," (see Figure 3). If the MSIV bypass valve is open; to close the valve, the operator will rotate the switch to the CLOSE position. As noted above, to ensure the valve has closed, the operator would verify closed indication on the "open/closed" indicator immediately above the valve switch on PM06J (see Figure 3) or the TSLB status lights (see Figures 6 and 7). The actions to confirm closure of the MSIV bypass valves after a manual closure are identical to the confirmatory actions the operator would take upon receiving an automatic MSL isolation.

RAI 3

Review by the NRC staff of manual controls as required by IEEE Std. 279-1971, Clause 4.17, includes confirmation that the characteristics of the controls allow plant operators to take appropriate manual actions during plant conditions under which they would be necessary.

Is there a time limitation to manipulate both sets of switches? Is this identified by procedure and part of a drill or exercise?

Response to RAI 3 If a manual MSL isolation would become necessary (i.e., manually close MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves), the operator would turn the "system level" manual MSL isolation switch on PM06J (see Figures 2 and 4) to close all MSIVs (note that there is a redundant "system level" manual MSL isolation switch on PM05J see Figure 5); and then turn each individual MSIV bypass valve component-level switch to CLOSE (if open; however, the MSIV bypass valves are normally closed), also on PM06J (see Figures 2 and 3). The operator would verify closure of all valves by observing the open/close indicated for each MSIV and MSIV Bypass valve on PM06J (see Figure 3) or the TSLB status lights (see Figures 6 and 7).

Again note that a manual MSL isolation is not credited for any accident other than a SGTR; however, if a manual MSL isolation becomes necessary due to failure of the automatic MSL isolation, Emergency Operating Procedure 1(2)B(w)EP-2, "Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, Unit 1(2)," Step 1, "Response Not Obtained" column, directs the operator to manually close all MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves. No time requirements are specified in the procedure.

The SGTR analysis credits manual closure of the ruptured steam generator (SG) MSIV and MSIV bypass valve. Manual isolation of the ruptured SG MSIV and MSIV bypass valve are procedurally addressed in Emergency Operating Procedure 1(2)B(w)EP-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture," The time to manually close the valves (and additional valves discussed in the response to RAI 12 below) must result in consequences that remain bounded by the consequences of the assumed limiting single failure for the Offsite Dose Case (i.e., a stuck open Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) resulting in offsite dose) and the MTO Case (i.e., a failed closed PORV resulting in a prolonged Reactor Coolant System (RCS) cooldown reducing the Page 8 of 20

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Request for Additional Information SG margin to overfill). The timing for manual MSIV and/or MSIV bypass valve isolation has been fully vetted in Calculation BRW-10-0161-M/BYR10-127, "Byron/Braidwood Steam Generator Tube Rupture Margin to Overfill Single Failure Assessment." During the mitigation of SGTR accident the operator will attempt to isolate the ruptured SG using the individual MSIV and MSIV bypass valve control switches. If this first action fails, the operator will use the system level MSL isolation control switch to isolate all SG MSIVs; and the MSIV bypass valve individual control switches to isolate all SG MSIV bypass valves. If the ruptured SG's MSIV or MSIV bypass valve is still open after these two actions, then the MCR operator will dispatch the equipment operators to locally isolate the downstream valves using field operations within the 30 minute execution time. The calculation concludes that the MSIV failure (or MSIV bypass valve failure) is not the limiting failure.

RAI 4

Page 3 of the Request for Exemption states that the MSIV bypass valves are also containment isolation valves.

a. Since the main steam line manual isolation switches do not operate the bypass valves, do the group-level Containment Isolation switches operate the bypass valves?

Response to RAI 4.a As noted above in the response to RAI 1.b.ii, the MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves are both considered "containment isolation valves;" however, the only "containment isolation" signal the MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves receive is an automatic MSL isolation signal as shown on Attachment A, "B/B UFSAR Table 6.2-58, 'Containment Isolation Provisions,"' (reference pages 6.2-196a and 6.2-198). Specifically, neither the MSIVs nor MSIV bypass valves receive a Phase A or Phase B containment isolation signal; nor do the group-level containment isolation switches isolate the MSIVs or MSIV bypass valves.

A Phase A containment isolation is actuated automatically by a Safety Injection signal (generated from any one of three signals: 1) low pressurizer pressure (1829 psig);

2) low MSL pressure (640 psig); or 3) Hi-1 containment pressure (3.4 psig)) or manually by either switch on PM06J (Figure 4) or PM05J (Figure 5). A Phase A signal prevents fission product release by closing non-essential process lines penetrating containment. Since it is desirable to maintain a heat sink during this time, it is appropriate that the MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves do not receive a Phase A signal and therefore, do not receive a close signal from the manual (group-level) Phase A containment isolation switches.

A Phase B containment isolation is automatically actuated by a Hi-3 containment pressure signal (20 psig) or manually by either set switches (i.e., "CS" switches) on PM06J (Figure 4) or PM05J (Figure 5). An automatic MSL isolation signal is generated on a Hi-2 containment pressure signal (8.2 psig) and is actuated prior to receiving a Phase B signal which is generated on a Hi-3 containment pressure signal (20 psig); therefore, the MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves do not receive a close signal from the manual (group-level) Phase B containment isolation switches.

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ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Request for Additional Information

b. Was the original intent of the MSIV bypass valve manual control switches to be used for testing only?

Response to RAI 4.b The primary purpose of the MSIV bypass valves is to allow a slow and controlled pressurization of steam lines, permitting the warming of downstream lines during startup and during MSIV stroke testing.

Specifically, the manual control switches perform three different functions.

1. Facilitate MSL heat-up if the MSIVs are closed.

2. Allow for ease of Inservice Test (IST) required valve stroke testing. Specifically, the control switches prevent the need to remove the fuse for the circuit containing the "A" Train or "B" Train solenoids.

3. Requires two independent operator actions to open the MSIV bypass valves; i.e., turn the individual control switch to OPEN; then turn the valve position demand controller to open the valve (see Figure 3). If there was no manual control switch that de-energized the "A" Train solenoid, the failure of the current to pressure transducer, positioner, or air leakage into the AOV could result in inadvertent opening of the valve.

~

i j Regulatory position C.3 of RG 1.62 includes: "The switches for manual initiation of protective actions at the system level should be located in the control room and be easily accessible to the operator so that action can be taken in an expeditious manner. "

Explain, or illustrate by figure preferably, the relative physical location of switches and indicators used for the system level main steam line manual isolation and the same for individual MSIV bypass valves switches and indicators.

Response to RAI 5 Note: Figure 1 and all photos are of the Byron Station Simulator, Unit 1. The relative location of the controls is applicable to all Byron and Braidwood units.

Figure 1: "Main Control Room" Illustrates the overall layout of the Byron Station MCR area. The Byron Station and Braidwood Station MCRs are common Unit 1 / Unit 2 MCRs; therefore, both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 control board layouts are shown. Note that only the Unit 1 indications and controls are labeled. Identical indications and controls are also located on the associated Unit 2 panels. Although there are some minor differences between the Byron Station and Braidwood Station MCRs, for the purposes of the below discussion, this figure is also applicable to Braidwood Station. Please reference this figure for the relative panel and control switch locations discussed in the RAI responses.

Page 10 of 20

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Request for Additional Information Figure 2: "Main Control Room PM06J"

- The Manual Actuation switches (one of which is the "system level" manual Main Steam Line (MSL) isolation hand switch) are located just to the left of the Instructor (see Figure 4 for a close up view).

- The MSIV and MSIV bypass valve individual control switches and position indication are located on the far left side of PM06J (about 15 feet away from the "system level" manual MSL isolation hand switch).

- The Trip Status Light Bulb (TSLB) indicators (Group 6) showing the MSIV and MSIV bypass valve closed position is located immediately above and to the right of the Manual Actuation switches (near the Instructors head).

Figure 3: "MSIV and MSIV Bypass Valve Controls PM06J" Close-up of MSIV and MSIV bypass valve individual control switches and position indication (far left side of PM06J).

Figure 4: "Manual Actuation Switches PM06J" Close-up of the Manual Actuation switches (one of which is the "system level" manual MSL isolation hand switch) on PM06J.

Figure 5: "Manual Safeguards Actuation Switches PM061 Close-up of the Manual Safeguards Actuation Switches (one of which is a redundant "system level" manual MSL isolation hand switch) on PM05J.

Figure 6: "Manual Actuation Switches and MSIV TSLB Panel PM06J" Manual Actuation Switches on PM06J and the nearby TSLB MSIVs (MS001A-D) and MSIV bypass valves (MS101A-D) closed indication status lights (upper right hand corner of photo).

Figure 7: "MSIV and MSIV Bypass Valve TSLB Panel PM06J" Close-up of the TSLB MSIVs (MS001A-D) and MSIV bypass valve (MS101A-D) closed indication status lights (Column 3) on PM06J.

Figure 8: "MSIV Bypass Valve (Typical) Electrical Schematic"

RAI 6

The exemption request states, in part, that the description of the modification to eliminate the non-conformance with the requirements of IEEE Std. 279 is that it will be "costly. "

Describe the major modifications to the systems, structures and components as well as the impacts on the schedule and operation of the Byron/Braidwood Station units.

Response to RAI 6 The below information provides details of the modification scope, modification cost, and operational limitations resulting from the subject modification.

Page 11 of 20

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Request for Additional Information Modification Scope

<< New wire installation between PM05J and PM06J.

<< New wire installation in PM06J.

Addition of new train level status lights in PM06J (at MSIV bypass valve control switch location); and additional wiring to new train level status lights. New train level status lights on PM06J would be used to verify each solenoid ("A" Train and "B" Train) de-energize on manual MSL isolation from the system level hand switch. New train level status light will prevent multiple component cycles to verify each solenoid de-energizes.

Modification Cost The modification to include closure of the MSIV bypass valves on a manual MSL isolation signal is estimated to cost approximately $155K $170K per unit (i.e., $620K $680K total cost for all four units). A budgetary estimate (per unit) is as follows:

$28 $33K Generation of complete modification package

$4K Exelon review and approval of the engineering change

$3K Procedure changes

$65 $75K Modification installation during outage (includes package preparation)

$40K Installation of train level status lights for solenoids

$3K Operator training

$12.5K NRC License Amendment approval charges ($50K total for all units)

Operational Limitations Byron Station and Braidwood Station perform MSIV hydraulic actuator overhauls during refueling outages. Due to the MSIV hydraulic operator overhaul, the manual MSL isolation surveillance testing is scheduled toward the end of the refueling outage when all four MSIVs have been returned to service. If the MSIV actuator overhaul is delayed until after unit heatup has started, the manual MSL isolation testing would be performed with the MSIV bypass valves open. Having the MSIV bypass valves open prevents depressurization of the main steam piping between the turbine throttle valves and MSIVs and prevents opening of the SG PORVs during MSIV closure when performing the surveillance test. If the MSIV bypass valves are required to be added to the manual MSL isolation hand switch logic, surveillance testing would need to be performed in MODE 4, 5 or 6. Therefore, any delay in returning the MSIVs to service after overhaul, would result in an hour per hour outage delay.

It is acknowledged that if the MSIV bypass valves were modified to close on a manual MSL isolation actuation, the testing procedure could be structured to test the MSIV bypass valves and MSIVs separately. However, testing the MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves separately would require multiple jumper installations/removals, installation of bypass/defeat switches, and/or possible field alterations of the instrument air supply to the MSIV bypass valves to accommodate the testing. These options create an error prone and complicated test procedure and would require additional testing resources (from Operations and Maintenance) to be expended during refueling outages.

Page 12 of 20

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Request for Additional Information

RAI 7

Per discussion in the Background Section of the exemption request, the conclusion is made that the TS are consistent with actual plant configuration from inspection of Table 3.3.2-1, Function 4, of the technical specification (TS) and the bases. However, the NRC staff noted three inconsistencies between the TS and actual plant configuration, as described below.

a. Based on a review of the current TS Table 3.3.2-1, Function 4. a, "Manual Initiation, " Mode 2 and Mode 3 have an associated Note C which states, "Except when all Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSI Vs) are closed. " While the MSI V bypass valves are unmentioned in the note, it does not preclude them from this TS since the main steam isolation function is accomplished by closure of the MSIVs and their associated bypass valves as discussed in Section 11.3 of the exemption request. Further, when the bypass valves are open and the MSIVs are closed during startup, you need to have manual initiation capability of the bypass valves. Therefore, actual plant configuration is not consistent with the TS.

b. Related to request for additional information (RAI)-1 a, Note C for Function 4. a, "Manual Initiation" applies to Modes 2 and 3. It does not apply to Mode 1. Since the main steam isolation function is accomplished by closure of the MSIVs and their associated bypass valves as discussed in Section 11.3 of the exemption request, manual initiation of the bypass valves are required in Mode 1. Therefore, actual plant configuration is not consistent with the TS.

c. As discussed in RAI-1a and RAI-1b, Function 4.a, applies to the bypass valves.

Function 4. a. requires two channels to be operable to meet the limiting condition for operation. However, as discussed in the exemption request, the manual initiation of the bypass valves are single-train; therefore, actual plant configuration is not consistent with the TS.

Explain why additional TS revisions are not necessary given the actual plant configuration Response to RAI 7 Response to 7.a The position stated above in 7.a; i.e., "While the MSIV bypass valves are unmentioned in the note, it does not preclude them from this TS since the main steam isolation function is accomplished by closure of the MSIVs and their associated bypass valves..., "warrants further discussion. During conversion to Improved Technical Specification (ITS) format, any deviations from NUREG-1431, "Standard Technical Specifications, Westinghouse Plants," Revision 1 were identified and justified. The ITS conversion document identified changes required to TS Table 3.3.2-1, Function 4, "Steam Line Isolation," to reflect plant specific design and safety analysis information. The following Justification for Difference (JFD), P63, to NUREG-1431 LC4s was provided:

"ITS Footnote g for Function 4, Steam Line Isolation, in Table 3.3.2-1 has been revised to state 'Except when all Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) and MSIV bypass valves are closed.' This change is required since both the MSIVs and their bypass valves receive an automatic Steam Line Isolation signal."

Page 13 of 20

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Request for Additional Information Note that no changes were identified with the following note in NUREG-1431, Revision 1 associated with Function 4.a, Manual Initiation:

"Except when all MSIVs are closed and [de-activated]."

No changes were identified since the Manual Initiation function does not isolate the MSIV bypass valves.

Similarly, the TS Bases were revised to indicate that the automatic isolation signals also isolate the MSIV bypass valves; and the following Justification for Difference (JFD), P44, to NUREG-1431 Bases was provided:

"The Bases for ITS LCO 3.3.1 and LCO 3.3.2 were revised to reflect plant specific RTS and ESFAS design and safety analysis information consistent with the UFSAR and CTS."

Note that the Bases discussion associated with Function 4.a, Manual Initiation, was not revised since the manual initiation does not isolate the MSIV bypass valves.

Based on the above, the footnotes in TS Table 3.3.2-1, Function 4, "Steam Line Isolation," were intentionally revised during the ITS conversion to reflect the actual plant configuration; and subsequently approved by the NRC.

It should be noted that when the MSIV bypass valves are open and the MSIVs are closed during startup, manual isolation of the bypass valves is available by the individual control switches.

EGC concludes that the TS are consistent with the current plant configuration.

Response to 7.b The position stated in 7.b also warrants further discussion. The discussion in the TS Bases for Item 4.a states the following: "There are two switches in the control room and either switch can initiate action to immediately close all MSIVs," (underlined for emphasis).

Based on the verbiage in the TS Bases, it is concluded that the "Steam Line Isolation Manual Initiation" function addressed in TS Function 4.a applies only to the MSIVs, not the MSIV bypass valves. As noted above in the response to part 7(a), manual isolation of the MSIV bypass valves is available by the individual control switches.

EGC concludes that the TS are consistent with the current plant configuration.

Response to 7.c Based on the responses to parts (a) and (b) above, it is concluded that the "Steam Line Isolation Manual Initiation" function addressed in TS Function 4.a applies only to the MSIVs, not the MSIV bypass valves.

In summary, EGC concludes that the TS are consistent with the current plant configuration and no additional TS revisions are necessary; however, it is acknowledged that TS Table 3.3.2-1 lacks specificity. Should this Exemption Request be approved (i.e., exempt the MSIV bypass valves from the requirement to close on a system level manual steam line isolation), a TS Page 14 of 20

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Request for Additional Information revision would clearly be unnecessary as Note (c) in TS Table 3.3.2-1 would remain accurate as written since it does not mention the MSIV bypass valves; and the debate regarding the applicability of TS Function 4.a to the MSIV bypass valves becomes a moot issue. The TS Bases could be revised upon approval of the Exemption Request to clarify that Function 4.a is not applicable to the MSIV bypass valves.

MSIV Bypass Valve Testing The MSIV bypass valves are tested as part of the TS 3.6.3, "Containment Isolation Valves,"

Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.6.3.5; and are included in the Inservice Test (IST)

Program. The implementing procedures for this Surveillance Requirement include stroke timing the MSIV bypass valves on a simulated ESFAS actuation signal and manually using the individual MSIV bypass valve control switch. In addition, a valve position indication test of the MSIV bypass valves is performed using the individual MSIV bypass control switch. The MSIV bypass valves are also verified to close automatically during slave relay testing, performed in accordance with TS 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)

Instrumentation," SR 3.3.2.8. The slave relay test ensures that the MSIV bypass valves will close on a simulated automatic actuation signal, i.e., Main Steam Line Isolation signal. The implementing surveillance procedures for Braidwood and Byron Stations are listed below. Note that although the Braidwood Station and Byron Station test titles may be different, the tests are equivalent.

TS SR 3.6.3.5 Containment Isolation Valve and IST Program Testing Braidwood Station: 1/2 BwOSR 3.6.3.5. MS-1, "Main Steam System Containment Isolation Valve Stroke Surveillance" Byron Station: 1/2BOSR 6.3.5-19, "Main Steam System Containment Isolation Valve Stroke Test" This is a "Fail Close/Stroke Close" test which includes stroke timing the MSIV bypass valves closed using the individual MSIV bypass valve control switches, performed in accordance with the IST Program.

Braidwood Station: 1/2 BwOSR 3.6.3.5.MS-4, "Main Steam System Isolation 1/2MS101A/B/C/D Valve Indication 18 Month Surveillance" Byron Station: 1/2BOSR 0.5-2.MS.3, "Main Steam System Valve Indication Test" This is a position indication test to verify proper open and closed position indication using the individual MSIV bypass valve control switches, performed in accordance with the IST Program.

Page 15 of 20

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Request for Additional Information TS SR 3.3.2.8 Slave Relay Testing Braidwood Station: 1/2BwOSR 3.2.8-623A, "ESFAS Instrumentation Slave Relay Surveillance (Train A Steam Line Isolation - K623)"

Byron Station: 1/2BOSR 3.2.8-623A, "ESFAS Instrumentation Slave Relay Surveillance (Train A Steam Line Isolation-623)"

The MSIV bypass valves are verified to close from "A" Train automatic MSL isolation signal, performed in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

Braidwood Station: 1/2BwOSR 3.2.8-623B, "ESFAS Instrumentation Slave Relay Surveillance (Train B Steam Line Isolation - K623)"

Byron Station: 1/2130SR 3.2.8-623B, "ESFAS Instrumentation Slave Relay Surveillance (Train B Steam Line Isolation-623)"

The MSIV bypass valves are verified to close from "B" Train automatic MSL isolation signal, performed in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

RAI 8

Per Section 11.3 of the exemption request, it is noted that individual MSIV bypass valve switches are single train switches. Per 10 CFR Appendix A, General Design Criterion 21, Protection system reliability and testability. The criterion states, in part, that (1): "no single failure results in the loss of a protection function. "

Since the MSIV bypass valves are included in protection systems, discuss how GDC 21 is met since the manual switches are single train.

Response to RAI 8 IEEE Std. 279, "Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," defines a "protective function" as follows:

"A protective function is the sensing of one of more variables associated with a particular generating station condition, signal processing, and the initiation and completion of the protective action at values of the variables established in the design bases."

For all steam line break scenarios, the protective action to isolate the faulted steam line is provided by an automatic MSL isolation signal (i.e., a protective function). As previously noted, the automatic steam line isolation signal generated from ESFAS provides redundant closure signals (i.e., an "A" Train and "B" Train); and is single failure proof. Therefore, compliance with GDC 21 is met for the automatic MSL isolation function required to protect against steam line break accidents.

As noted in the response to RAI 1.b.i above, the SGTR accident relies on manual closure of a MSIV and MSIV bypass valve; however, closure of the valves is not generated from a Page 16 of 20

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Request for Additional Information "protective function," as defined in IEEE Std. 279. As discussed in the SGTR Emergency Operating Procedure, 1(2)B(w)EP-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture," after the ruptured SG is identified, the operators manually close the ruptured SG's MSIV and MSIV bypass valve. Since no "protective function" signal is generated in a SGTR scenario, GDC 21 does not apply to the MSIV bypass valve manual closure. However, as noted in the response to RAI 1.b.ii, there are two independent methods to close the MSIV bypass valves; i.e., by turning the component-level switch to "CLOSE," which de-energizes the "A" solenoid and bleeds instrument air from the valve positioner; or by turning the valve position demand controller (see Figure 3) to "zero" which also bleeds instrument air off the valve positioner, independent of the solenoid.

In addition, as shown in Reference 1, Section 11.6.d, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR),"

should a MSIV bypass valve fail to close, compensatory actions specified in 1(2)B(w)EP-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture," are taken to close downstream valves within an acceptable timeframe. The consequences of a failed open MSIV bypass valve are shown to be bounded by the analysis of record.

Per Section 11.2 of the exemption request, it is noted that the MSIV bypass valves are also containment isolation valves. TS Table 3.3.2-1, Function 3, governs the containment isolation function. From a review of this TS, there is no indication that manual initiation only applies to the MSIVs and not their associated bypass valves.

Provide justification why it is not necessary to update the TSs to reflect the lack of a system level MSIV bypass valve switch.

Response to RAI 9 As noted in the response to RAI 1.b.ii, the MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves are both considered "containment isolation valves;" however, the only "containment isolation" signal the MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves receive is an automatic MSL isolation signal (i.e., "MS") as shown on Attachment A, "B/B UFSAR Table 6.2-58, 'Containment Isolation Provisions,"' (reference highlighted text on pages 6.2-196a and 6.2-198). Specifically, neither the MSIVs nor MSIV bypass valves receive a Phase A or Phase B containment isolation signal. Note that many other valves on this table are shown to receive a Phase A (i.e., "T") isolation signal or a Phase B (i.e., "P") isolation signal.

A Phase A containment isolation is actuated automatically by a Safety Injection signal (generated from any one of three signals: 1) low pressurizer pressure (1829 psig);

2) low MSL pressure (640 psig); or 3) Hi-1 containment pressure (3.4 psig)) or manually by either switch on PM06J (Figure 4) or PM05J (Figure 5). A Phase A signal prevents fission product release by closing non-essential process lines penetrating containment. Since it is desirable to maintain a heat sink during this time, it is appropriate that the MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves do not receive a Phase A signal.

A Phase B containment isolation is automatically actuated by a Hi-3 containment pressure signal (20 psig) or manually by either set of switches on PM06J (Figure 4) or PM05J (Figure 5).

An automatic MSL isolation signal is generated on a Hi-2 containment pressure signal (8.2 psig) and is actuated prior to receiving a Phase B signal which is generated on a Hi-3 containment pressure signal (20 psig).

Page 17 of 20

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Request for Additional Information Since TS Table 3.3.2-1 Function 3, "Containment Isolation," addresses Phase A Isolation and Phase B Isolation, it is not associated with the MSIVs or MSIV bypass valves. Initiation of the containment isolation function for the MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves is addressed in Table 3.3.2-1, Function 4, "Steam Line Isolation."

See response to RAI 1.b.ii for additional discussion on the containment isolation design function of the MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves.

RAl 10 When determining the limiting single failure for the safety analyses; Was it assumed that the MSIV bypass valves had a manual system level switch in addition to the manual single operation switch? If this was assumed, provide additional justification of the limiting single failure determination.

Response to RAI 10 As discussed in Reference 1, Section 11.6 and the response to RAI 1.b.ii above, neither a "system level" MSL manual isolation nor individual MSIV or MSIV bypass valve isolation, using the individual manual valve control switches, is credited for any accident other than the SGTR; therefore, manual isolation of either the MSIVs or MSIV bypass valves is not discussed (or assumed) in the accident analysis for:

• A HELB inside containment

• A break outside of containment and upstream from the MSIVs

• A break downstream of the MSIVs

• Other events (i.e., feedwater line break)

For the SGTR event, the safety analysis does not assume that the MSIV bypass valves have a manual system level switch. Calculation BRW-10-0161-M/BYR10-127, "Byron/Braidwood Steam Generator Tube Rupture Margin to Overfill Single Failure Assessment," states the following:

The MSIV on the ruptured SG is closed during the event as directed by the 1/2B(w)EP-3 procedure to limit steam flow from the ruptured SG and limit break flow. The single failure considered for this scenario is the failure of the ruptured SG MSIV to close when demanded following a SGTR. This single failure affects the MTO analysis by potentially increasing the operator action time to perform the necessary actions to respond to the failure. A two minute delay is assumed for identifying and responding to the MSIV failure by manually activating Main Steam isolation (to isolate the intact from the ruptured SGs) and closing or verify closed MSIV bypass valves which isolates major flow paths from the ruptured SG and includes initiating actions to isolate minor flow paths from the ruptured SG. This action permits initiating RCS cooldown consistent with the note prior to Step 5 of 1/2B(w)EP-3.

Discussions with Byron and Braidwood Operations confirmed that the delay to initiate cooldown is less than two minutes. The minor flow paths from the ruptured SG are required to be isolated prior to initiating cooldown and can be completed in parallel with subsequent recovery steps. Discussions with Byron and Braidwood Operations confirmed that isolation of these flow paths can be completed within 30 minutes from initiation of cooldown.

Page 18 of 20

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Request for Additional Information Additional discussion of this issue is presented in Reference 1, page 11:

After the ruptured steam generator is identified, Emergency Operating Procedure, B(w)EP-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture," directs the operator to isolate the ruptured steam generator by manually closing the MSIV and MSIV bypass valve on the ruptured steam generator (only) using the single train individual valve isolation switches; not the dual train "system level switches." The ruptured steam generator PORV is assumed to fail open at the time the MSIV is closed and release contaminated steam directly to the environment. This is the most limiting single failure from a radiological standpoint.

If the MSIV and/or MSIV bypass valve fails to close with manual operator action using the individual manual isolation switches, the "Response Not Obtained" column in B(w)EP-3 directs the operator to manually actuate main steam line isolation (using the system level switches) and manually close the MSIV bypass valves (using the individual manual isolation switches) on all steam generators. Note that the MSIV bypass valve individual manual isolation switches are used since the "system level" main steam line manual isolation switches do not send a close signal to the MSIV bypass valves (i.e., the subject of the IEEE Std. 279 non-conformance). This action serves to isolate all intact steam generators from the ruptured steam generator. The "Response Not Obtained" column continues to state that if the ruptured steam generator MSIV or MSIV bypass valve is still open, then proceed to close a number of downstream valves to isolate the ruptured steam generators steam flow path.

RAI 11

Is there a single failure that would cause all four MSIV bypass valves manual initiation function to fail? If so, provide justification this is an acceptable condition with respect to the applicable safety analyses.

Response to RAI 11 There is no single failure that would cause all four MSIV bypass valves' manual initiation function to fail. There are two independent methods to manually close each MSIV bypass valve. Each valve has its own manual component level control switch; and each valve has its own manual position controller. The manual position controllers are supplied from two different AC power sources and will cause their respective MSIV bypass valve to close on a loss of the AC power; i.e., in the safe direction.

Page 19 of 20

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Request for Additional Information

RAI 12

Elaborate on what components are credited during the steam generator tube rupture event if a MSIV bypass valve fails to close on the faulted steam generator. Are the credited components safety related or non-safety related?

Response to RAI 12 As noted in the Byron Station SGTR EOP; i.e., 1(2)BEP-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture," if the ruptured SG MSIV or MSIV bypass valve is open, the following valves are verified closed (note that similar valves are specified in the Braidwood Station EOPs, 1(2)BwEP-3):

- Main feedwater pump turbine high pressure stop valves

- Steam dump valves

- Main steam reheater start-up purge control valves: 1(2)MS067A through D

- Main steam reheater shutoff valves: 1(2)MS009A through D

- Gland steam isolation and bypass valves: 1(2)GS001 and 1(2)GS004

- Steam jet air ejector isolation valves: 1(2)MS052A, 1(2)MS055A, 1(2)MS052B and 1(2)MS055B.

Closing the above valves isolate steam flow in the event of a failed open MSIV or MSIV bypass valve. These valves are not safety-related.

REFERENCES Letter from D. M. Gullott (Exelon Generation Company, LLC) to U. S. NRC, "Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 50.55x, "Codes and standards," Paragraph (h)(2), "Protection systems," dated April 6, 2015

2. Letter from J. S. Wiebe (U. S. NRC) to B. C. Hanson (Exelon Generation Company, LLC),

"Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, and Byron Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Request for Additional Information Related to Exemption Request From 10 CFR 50.55x, 'Codes and standards,' Paragraph (h)(2), 'Protection systems,"' (CAC Nos. MF6079, MF6080, MF6081, and MF6082) dated January 20, 2016 Page 20 of 20

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ATTACHMENT B/B UFSAR Table 6.2-58, "Containment Isolation Provisions"

B/B-UFSAR TABLE 6.2-58 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION PROVISIONS TYPE C VALVE LOCA- LEAK DISTANCE TO ISOLATION GDC PENETRA- LINE TION (INSIDE TEST OUTERMOST VALVE REQUIRE- TION SIZE ESSEN- REFERENCE OR OUTSIDE (YES ISOLATION VALVE NUMBER MENT MET N-.TIMBER FLUID (in.) TIAL* DRA;;IT:G CONTAINMENT) OR 110) VALVE (f t) TYPE CVCS 1CV8100 55 28 RC 2 YES M-64-2 Outside YES 2.6 Globe 1CV8112 55 28 RC 2 YES M-64-2 Inside YES N/A Globe 1CV8355C 55 53 RC 2 M-64-2 Outside NO 4.0 Globe 1CV8368C 55 53 RC 2 M-64-2 Inside NO N/A Check 1CV8355D 55 33 RC 2 M-64-2 Outside NO 4.0 Globe 1CV8368D 55 33 RC 2 M-64-2 Inside NO N/A Check 1CV8355A 55 33 RC 2 M-64-1 Outside NO 4.0 Globe 1CV8368A 55 33 RC 2 M-64-1 Inside NO N/A Check 1CV8355B 55 53 RC 2 M-64-1 Outside NO 4.0 Globe 1CV8368B 55 53 RC 2 M-64-1 Inside NO N/A Check 1CV8105 57 71 RC 3 YES M-64-3 Outside NO 2.9 Gate 1CV8106 57 71 RC 3 YES M-64-3 Outside NO 4.75 Gate 1CV8346 55 37 RC 2 M-64-3 Outside NO 3.2 Globe 1CV8348 55 37 RC 2 M-64-3 Inside 110 N/A Check 1CV8152 55 41 RC 3 YES M-64-5 Outside YES 2.9 Globe 1CV8160 55 41 RC 3 YES M-64-5 Inside YES N/A Globe 1CV8113 55 28 RC 3/4 M-64-2 Inside YES N/A Check Chilled Water 1W0020A 56 5 Water 10 YES M-118-5 Outside YES 3.0 Gate 1W0006A 56 6 Water 10 YES M-118-5 Outside YES 3.0 Gate 1W0020B 56 8 Water 10 YES M-118-5 Outside YES 3.3 Gate 1W0006B 56 10 Water 10 YES M-118-5 Outside YES 3.3 Gate 1W0007A 56 6 Water 10 YES M-118-5 Inside YES N/A Check 1W0007B 56 10 Water 10 YES 14-118-5 Inside YES N/A Check 1W0056A 56 5 Water 10 YES M-118-5 Inside YES N/A Gate 1W0056B 56 8 Water 10 YES M-118-5 Inside YES N/A Gate 6.2-191 REVISION 2 - DECEMBER 1990

B/B-UFSAR TABLE 6.2-58 (Cont'd)

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION PROVISIONS TYPE C VALVE LOCA- LEAK DISTANCE TO ISOLATION GDC PENETRA- LINE TION (INSIDE TEST OUTERMOST VALVE REQUIRE- TION SIZE ESSE11- REFERENCE OR OUTSIDE (YES ISOLATION VALVE NUMBER MENT MET NUMBER FLUID (in. ) TIAL* DRA7r'I11G CCNTAII7N*IEiTT) OR 110) VALVE (ft) TYPE 1WO079A (Byron) 56 5 Water 3/4 14-118-5 Inside YES N/A Relief 1WO079B (Byron) 56 8 Water 3/4 M-118-5 Inside YES N/A Relief 1WO091A 56 5 Water 3/4 M-118-5 Inside YES N/A Relief (Braidwood) 1WO091B 56 8 Water 3/4 1,1-118-5 Inside YES N/A Relief (Braidwood) 6.2-191a REVISION 8 - DECEMBER 2000

B/B-UFSAR TABLE 6.2-58 (Cont'd)

SECOND-ISOLATION PRIMARY ARY ISOLATION VALVE GDC VALti`E POST- POD ER CLOSURE ISOLA- MODE OF MODE OF VALVE NUMBER REQUIRE- OPER- NORMAL SHUTDCPZI ACCIDENT FAILURE TINE** TION ACTUA- P_CTUA- POWER CO3'7FIGU-(Cont'd) MENT MET ATOR POSITION POSITION POSITIC27 POSITION (sec) SIGNALS TION TION SOURCE RATION CVCS 1CV8100 55 MO Open Open Closed As Is 10 T A RM lE 1,5 1CV8112 55 MO Open Open Closed As Is 10 T A RM lE 1 1CV8355C 55 MO Open Open Open As Is N/* N/A RM M lE 5 1CV8368C 55 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 5 1CV8355D 55 MO Open Open Open As Is N/* N/A RM M lE 5 ICV8368D 55 N/A N/A N/A NIA N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 5 1CV8355A 55 MO Open Open Open As Is N/* N/A RM M lE 5 1CV8368A 55 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 5 1CV8355B 55 MO Open Open Open As Is N/* N/A RM M lE 5 1CV8368B 55 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 5 1CV8105 57 MO Open Open Closed As Is 10 S A RM lE 8 1CV8106 57 MO Open Open Closed As Is 10 S A RM lE 8 1CV8346 55 M Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A M M N/A 7 1CV8348 55 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 7 1CV8152 55 AO/S Open Open Open Closed 10 T P_ RM lE 2 1CV8160 55 AO/S Open Open Open Closed 10 T A RM lE 2 1CV8113 55 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 5 Chilled Water 1WO020A 56 MO Open Open Closed As Is 50 T A RM lE 1 1W0006A 56 MO Open Open Closed As Is 50 T A RM lE 5 1WO020B 56 MO Open Open Closed As Is 50 T A RM lE 1 1W0006B 56 MO Open Open Closed As Is 50 T A RM lE 5 1W0007A 56 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 5 1W0007B 56 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 5 1WO056A 56 MO Open Open Closed As Is 50 T A RM lE 1 1WO056B 56 MO Open Open Closed AS Is 50 T A RM lE 1 6.2-192 REVISION 2 - DECEMBER 1990

B/B-UFSAR TABLE 6.2-58 (Cont'd)

SECOND-ISOLATION PRIIARY ARY ISOLATION VALVE GDC VALVE POST- PCW.ER CLOSURE ISOLA- MODE OF MODE OF VALVE NUMBER REQUIRE- OPER- NORMAL SHUTDOWN ACCIDENT' FAILURE TIME** TION ACTUA- ACTUA- POKER CONFIGU-(Cont'd) MENT MET ATOR POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION (sec) SIGNALS TION TION SOURCE RATION 1WO079A 56 N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A lA (Byron) 1WO079B 56 N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A lA (Byron) 1WO091A 56 N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A lA (Braidwood) 1WO091B 56 N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A lA (Braidwood) 6.2-192a REVISION 8 - DECEMBER 2000

B/B-UFSAR TABLE 6.2-58 (Cont'd)

TYPE C VALVE LOCA.- LEAK DISTANCE TO ISOLATION GDC PENETRA- LINE TION (INSIDE TEST OUTERMOST VALVE REQUIRE- TION SIZE ESSEN- REFERENCE OR OUTSIDE (YES ISOLATION VALVE NUMBER MENT MET NUMBER FLUID (in.) TIAl,

• DRAT,' II:G CONTAIII IEIIT) OR NO VALVE (ft) TYPE Component Cooling 1CC9414 56 21 CCW 6 YES M-66-1A Outside YES 2.9 Gate 1CC9416 56 21 CCW 6 YES M-66-1A Inside YES N/A Gate 1CC9534 56 21 CCW 3/4 M-66-1A Inside YES N/A Check 1CC9437B 57 22 CCW 3 YES M-66-1A Outside NO 3.1 Globe 1CC685 56 24 CCW 4tt YES M-66-1A Outside YES 3.1 Gate 1CC9438 56 24 CCW 4 YES M-66-1A Inside YES N/A Gate 1CC9518 56 24 CCW 3/4 YES M-66-1A Inside YES N/A Check 1CC9486 56 25 CCW 6 M-66-1A Inside YES N/A Check 1CC9413A 56 25 CCW 6 YES M-66-1A Outside YES 4.9 Gate 1CC9437A 57 48 CCW 3 YES M-66-1A Outside NO 6.8 Globe Containment Purge 1VQ005A 56 94 Air 8 YES M-105-1 Inside YES N/A But. Fly 1VQ005B 56 94 Air 8 YES M-105-1 Outside YES 6.0 But. Fly 1VQ003 56 94 Air 8 YES M-105-1 Outside YES 9.0 But. Fly 1VQ002A 56 95 Air 48 M-105-1 Inside YES N/A But. Fly 1VQ002B 56 95 Air 48 M-105-1 Outside YES 2.9 But. Fly 1VQ004A 56 96 Air 8 YES M-105-1 Inside YES N/A But. Flv 1VQ004B 56 96 Air 8 YES M-105-1 Outside YES 2.0 But. Fly 1VQ001A 56 97 Air 48 M-105-1 Inside YES N/A But. Fly 1VQ001B 56 97 Air 48 M-105-1 Outside YES 2.9 But. Fly 1VQ005C 56 94 Air 8 YES M-105-1 Outside YES 3.5 But. Fly Containment Spray 1CS007A 56 1 NaOH+BW 10 YES M-46-1 Outside YES 3.3 Gate 1CS008A 56 1 NaOH+BW 10 M-46-1 Inside YES N/A Check 1CS007B 56 16 NaOH+BW 10 YES M-46-1 Outside YES 3.8 Gate 1CS008B 56 16 NaOH+BW 10 M-46-1 Inside YES N/A Check 6.2-193 REVISION 14 - DECEMBER 2012

B/B-UFSAR TABLE 6.2-58 (Cont'd)

SECOND-ISOLATION PRIMARY ARY ISOLATION VALVE GDC VALVE POST- PO'r;ER CLOSURE ISOLA- NODE OF DIODE OF VALVE NUMBER REQUIRE- OPER- NORMAL SHUTDOWN ACCIDENT FAILURE TIME** TION ACTUA- ACTUA- PO-,%-ER CONFIGU-(Cont'd) MENT ATOR POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION (sec) SIGNALS TION TION SOURCE RATION Component Cooling 1CC9414 56 140 Open Open Closed As Is 10 P A RM lE 1,5 1CC9416 56 140 Open Open Closed As Is 10 P A RM lE 1 1CC9534 56 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 5 1CC9437B 57 AO/S Closed Closed Closed Closed 10 T A RM lE 11 1CC685 56 140 Open Open Closed As Is 10 P A RM lE 1,5 1CC9438 56 140 Open Open Closed As Is 10 P A RM lE 1 1CC9518 56 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 5 1CC9486 56 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 5 1CC9413A 56 110 Open Open Closed As Is 10 P A RM lE 5 1CC9437A 57 AO/S Closed Closed Closed Closed 10 T A RM lE 11 Containment Purge 1VQ005A 56 AO/S Closed **** Closed Closed 5 T2 A RM lE 2 1VQ005B 56 AO/S Closed **** Closed Closed 5 T2 A RM lE 2 1VQ003 56 AO/S Closed Closed Closed Closed 5 T2 A RM lE 2 1VQ002A (Byron) 56 HO Closed **** Closed Closed N/A T2 A RM lE 1 1VQ002B (Byron) 56 HO Closed **** Closed Closed N/A T2 A RM lE 1 IVQ002A (Braidwood) 56 HO Closed Closed Closed Closed N/A T2 N/A N/A IE 1 IVQ002B (Braidwood) 56 HO Closed Closed Closed Closed N/A T2 N/A N/A lE 1 1VQ004A 56 AO/S Closed **** Closed Closed 5 T2 A RM lE 2 1VQ004B 56 AO/S Closed **** Closed Closed 5 T2 A RM lE 2 1VQ001A (Byron) 56 HO Closed **** Closed Closed N/A T2 A RM lE 1 1VQ001B (Byron) 56 HO Closed **** Closed Closed N/A T2 A RM lE 1 IVQ001A (Braidwood) 56 HO Closed Closed Closed Closed N/A T2 N/A N/A lE 1 IVQ001B (Braidwood) 56 HO Closed Closed Closed Closed N/A T2 N/A N/A lE 1 1VQ005C 56 AO/S Closed **** Closed Closed 5 T2 A RM lE 2 Containment Spray 1CS007A 56 1:0 Closed Closed Closed As Is 30 T1 A RM lE 5 1CS008A 56 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 5 1CS007B 56 1:0 Closed Closed Closed As Is 30 T1 A RM lE 5 1CS008B 56 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 5 6.2-194 REVISION 14 - DECEMBER 2012

B/B-UFSAR TABLE 6.2-58 (Cont'd)

TYPE C VALVE LOCA- LEAK DISTANCE TO ISOLATION GDC PENETRA- LINE TION1 (INSIDE TEST OUTERMOST VALVE REQUIRE- TION SIZE ESSEN- REFERENCE OR OUTSIDE (YES ISOLATION VALVE NUMBER MENT MET NUMBER FLUID (in.) TIAL* DRAWING CONTI'AI1Z=AT) OR 110) VALVE (f t) TYPE Essential Service Water 1SX016B 57 7 Water 16 YES M-42-5 Outside 110 3.2 But. Fly 1SX027B 57 9 Water 16 YES M-42-5 Outside 110 3.2 But. Fly 1SX027A 57 14 Water 16 YES M-42-5 Outside NO 2.8 But. Fly 1SX016A 57 15 Water 16 YES M-42-5 Outside NO 2.8 But. Fly Fire Protection 1FP010 56 34 Water 4 YES M-52-1 Outside 1110 3.3 Globe 1FP345 56 34 Water 4 YES M-52-1 Inside NO N/A Check Instrument Air lIA065 56 39 Air 3 YES M-55-2 Outside YES 3.3 Globe lIA066 56 39 Air 3 YES M-55-2 Inside YES N/A Globe lIA091 56 39 Air 3/4 YES M-55-2 Inside YES N/A Check Instrument Penetration 1VQ016 56 I3 Air 1/2 M-105-3 Inside YES N/A Globe 1VQ017 56 I3 Air 1/2 M-105-3 Inside YES N/A Globe 1VQ018 56 I3 Air 1/2 M-105-3 Outside YES MIN. Globe 1VQ019 56 I3 Air 1/2 M-105-3 Outside YES MIN. Globe I1 Silicone Oil M-2046-2,4 I2 Silicone Oil M-2046-2,4 I3 Silicone Oil M-2046-2,4 I4 Silicone Oil M-2046-2,4 1RY075 57 I5 Water 1/2 M-2060-6 Outside YES 1.0 Globe 19 Water M-2060-17,18 6.2-195 REVISION 3 - DECEMBER 1991

B/B-UFSAR TABLE 6.2-58 (Cont'd)

TYPE C VALVE LOCA- LEAK DISTP.NCE TO ISOLATION GDC PENETRA- LINE TION (INSIDE TEST OUTERMOST VALVE REQUIRE- TION SIZE ESSEII- REFERENCE OR OUTSIDE (YES ISOLATION VALVE NUMBER MENT MET NUMBER FLUID (in.) TIAL* DRA;VING CONTAII7.= T) OR NO) VALVE ( f t) TYPE Make-up Demineralizer 1WM190 55 30 water 2 67-49-1 Outside YES 1.6 Globe 1WM191 55 30 Water 2 14-49-1 Inside YES N/A Check Main Steam lMS001D 57 77 Steam 30.25 YES M-35-1 Outside NO 14.8 Gate lMS101D 57 77 Steam 4 YES II-35-1 Outside NO 20.0 Globe lMS021D 57 77 Steam 3 M-35-1 Outside NO 15.4 Globe lMS018D 57 77 Steam 6 YES 14-35-1 Outside NO 32.1 Relief lMS013D 57 77 Steam 6 ICI-35-1 Outside NO 39.1 Relief 6.2-195a REVISION 4 - DECEMBER 1992

B/B-UFSAR TABLE 6.2-58 (Cont'd)

SECOND-ISOLATION PRIMARY ARY ISOLATION VALVE GDC VANE POST- POWER CLOSURE ISOLA- i-:ODE OF MODE OF VALVE NUMBER REQUIRE- OPER- NORMAL SHUTDG Z1 ACCIDENT FAILURE TIME** TION ACTUA- ACTUA- PO",-,ER CONFIGU-(Cont'd) MENT MET ATOR POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION (sec) SIG?7ALS TION TION SOURCE RATION Essential Service Water 1SX016B 57 MO Open Open Open As Is N/*S (Open) A RM lE 10 1SX027B 57 MO Open Open Open As Is N/*S (Open) A RM lE 10 1SX027A 57 MO Open Open Open As Is N/*S (Open) A RM lE 10 1SX016A 57 MO Open Open Open As Is N/*S (Open) A RM lE 10 Fire Protection 1FP010 56 AO/S Open Closed Closed Closed 12 T A RM lE 6 1FP345 56 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 6 Instrument Air lIA065 56 AO/S Open Open Closed Closed 15 T A RM lE 2,6 lIA066 56 AO/S Open Open Closed Closed 15 T A RM lE 2 lIA091 56 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A_ N/A 6 Instrument Penetration 1VQ016 56 M Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A M M N/A 4 1VQ017 56 M Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A 1,1 M N/A 4 1VQ018 56 M Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A i; M N/A 4 1VQ019 56 M Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A M M N/A 4 1RY075 57 M Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A r, 1.1 N/A 6.2-196 REVISION 2 - DECEMBER 1990

B/B-UFSAR TABLE 6.2-58 (Cont'd)

SECOT7D-ISOLATION PRIi, 1P12Y ARY ISOLATION VALVE GDC VALVE POST- POT*7ER CLOSURE ISOLP_- NODE OF MODE OF VALVE NUMBER REQUIRE- OPER- NORMAL SHUTD0~717 ACCIDENT FAILURE TIbOJ** TION ACTUA- ACTUA- POWER CONFIGU-(Cont'd) MENT MET ATOR POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION (sec) SIGNALS TION TION SOURCE RATION Make-up Demineralizer 1WM190 55 M Closed Open Closed N/A N/A N/A 14 M N/A 7 1WM191 55 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 7 Main Steam lMS001D 57 HO Open Closed Closed As Is 5.0 MS A RM lE 10 lMS101D 57 AO/S Closed Closed Closed Closed 6.0 MS A RM lE 11 lMS021D 57 M Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A M M N/A 14 lMS018D 57 HO Closed Closed Closed Closed 20.0 N/A A RM lE 13 lMS013D 57 N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A N/P. N/A 13 6.2-196a REVISION 9 - DECEMBER 2002

B/B-UFSAR TABLE 6.2-58 (Cont'd)

TYPE C VALVE LOCP_- LEAK DISTANCE TO ISOLATION GDC PENETP.A- LINE TION (INSIDE TEST OUTERMOST VALVE REQUIRE- TION SIZE ESSEII- REFE=ICE OR OUTSIDE (YES ISOLATION VALVE NUMBER MENT MET NUMBER FLUID (in.) TIAL

• DR.A ; IiTG C0I.iAINI,1EI7 I') OR 1-0) VALVE (ft) TYPE Main Steam lMS014D 57 77 Steam 6 14-35-1 Outside 140 36.6 Relief lMS015D 57 77 Steam 6 14-35-1 Outside NO 34.1 Relief lMS016D 57 77 Steam 6 bI-35-1 Outside NO 31.6 Relief lMS017D 57 77 Steam 6 1I 1 Outside NO 29.1 Relief 1MS001B 57 85 Steam 32.75 YES 14-35-1 Outside NO 10.0 Gate 1MS101B 57 85 Steam 4 YES M-35-1 Outside NO 17.7 Globe lMS021B 57 85 Steam 3 I4-35-1 Outside NO 11.0 Globe lMS018B 57 85 Steam 6 YES M-35-1 Outside NO 16.5 Relief lMS013B 57 85 Steam 6 M-35-1 Outside NO 38.8 Relief lMS014B 57 85 Steam 6 M-35-1 Outside NO 36.3 Relief lMS015B 57 85 Steam 6 M-35-1 Outside NO 33.8 Relief lMS016B 57 85 Steam 6 M-35-1 Outside NO 31.3 Relief lMS017B 57 85 Steam 6 M-35-1 Outside 170 28.8 Relief lMS001A 57 78 Steam 30.25 YES M-35-2 Outside NO 14.8 Gate lMS101A 57 78 Steam 4 YES M-35-2 Outside NO 20.0 Globe lMS021A 57 78 Steam 3 M-35-2 Outside NO 15.4 Globe lMS018A 57 78 Steam 6 YES M-35-2 Outside NO 32.1 Relief lMS013A 57 78 Steam 6 M-35-2 Outside NO 39.1 Relief lMS014A 57 78 Steam 6 M-35-2 Outside NO 36.6 Relief lMS015A 57 78 Steam 6 M-35-2 Outside ITO 34.1 Relief lMS016A 57 78 Steam 6 M-35-2 Outside NO 31.6 Relief lMS017A 57 78 Steam 6 M-35-2 Outside 110 29.1 Relief 1MS001C 57 86 Steam 32.75 YES M-35-2 Outside ITO 10.0 Gate 1MS101C 57 86 Steam 4 YES M-35-2 Outside 1140 17.7 Globe lMS021C 57 86 Steam 3 M-35-2 Outside NO 11.0 Globe lMS018C 57 86 Steam 6 YES M-35-2 Outside 1.40 16.5 Relief 1MS013C 57 86 Steam 6 M-35-2 Outside 170 38.8 Relief lMS014C 57 86 Steam 6 M-35-2 Outside NO 36.3 Relief lMS015C 57 86 Steam 6 M-35-2 Outside NO 33.8 Relief lMS016C 57 86 Steam 6 M-35-2 Outside NO 31.3 Relief lMS017C 57 86 Steam 6 M-35-2 Outside NO 28.8 Relief 6.2-197 REVISION 4 - DECEMBER 1992

B/B-UFSAR TABLE 6.2-58 (Cont'd)

SECOND-ISOLATION PRIMARY ARY ISOLATION VALVE GDC VALVE POST- P0V,ER CLOSURE ISOLA- MODE OF MODE OF VALVE NUMBER REQUIRE- OPER- NORMAL SHUTDOWN ACCIDENT FAILURE TIME** TION ACTUA- ACTUA- P0;.nR CO::FIGU-(Cont'd) MENT MET ATOR POSITION POSITION POSITION? POSITION (sec) SIG1TALS TIOIJ TION SOURCE RATION Main Steam lMS014D 57 N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 13 lMS015D 57 N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 13 lMS016D 57 N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 13 1MS017D 57 N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 13 1MS001B 57 HO Open Closed Closed As Is 5.0 MS A RM lE 10 1MS101B 57 AO/S Closed Closed Closed Closed 6.0 MS A RM lE 11 lMS021B 57 M Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A 1.1 M N/A 14 lMS018B 57 HO Closed Closed Closed Closed 20.0 N/A A RM lE 13 1MS013B 57 N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 13 lMS014B 57 N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 13 lMS015B 57 N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A. N/A N/A 13 lMS016B 57 N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 13 lMS017B 57 N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 13 lMS001A 57 HO Open Closed Closed As Is 5.0 MS A RM lE 10 lMS101A 57 AO/S Closed Closed Closed Closed 6.0 MS A RM lE 11 1MS021A 57 M Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A M M N/A 14 lMS018A 57 HO Closed Closed Closed Closed 20.0 N/A A RM lE 13 lMS013A 57 N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 13 lMS014A 57 N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 13 lMS015A 57 N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 13 lMS016A 57 N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 13 lMS017A 57 N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 13 iMS001C 57 HO Open Closed Closed As Is 5.0 MS A RM lE 10 1MS101C 57 AO/S Closed Closed Closed Closed 6.0 MS A RM lE 11 lMS021C 57 M Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A M M N/A 14 1MS018C 57 HO Closed Closed Closed Closed 20.0 N/A A RM lE 13 lMS013C 57 N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 13 lMS014C 57 N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/P. N/A_ N/A 13 1MS015C 57 N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 13 lMS016C 57 N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 13 lMS017C 57 N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 13 6.2-198 REVISION 9 - DECEMBER 2002

B/B-UFSAR TABLE 6.2-58 (Cont'd)

TYPE C VALVE LOCA- LEAK DISTANCE TO ISOLATION GDC PENETRA- LINE TION (INSIDE TEST OUTERMOST VALVE REQUIRE- TION SIZE ESSEN- REFERETCE OR OUTSIDE (YES ISOLATION VALVE NUMBER MENT hET NUMBER FLUID (in.) TIAL* DRAIiIidG CONTAINMENT) OR 110) VALVE (ft) TYPE Off-Gas 10G079 56 13 Air & H, 3 YES M-47-2 Inside YES N/A But. Fly 10G080 56 13 Air & H, 3 YES M-47-2 Inside YES N/A But. Fly 10G081 56 23 Air & H, 3 YES M-47-2 Inside YES N/A But. Fly 10G057A 56 69 Air & H, 3 YES M-47-2 Inside YES N/A But. Fly 10G082 56 13 Air & H, 3 YES M-47-2 Outside YES MIN. But. Fly 10G083 56 69 Air & H, 3 YES M-47-2 Outside YES MIN. But. Fly 10G084 56 13 Air & H, 3 YES M-47-2 Outside YES MIN. But. Fly 10G085 56 23 Air & H-, 3 YES M-47-2 Outside YES MIN. But. Fly Process Radiation 1PROO1A 56 52 Air 1 M-78-10 Outside YES 1.4 Globe 1PROOIB 56 52 Air 1 M-78-10 Outside YES 3.5 Globe 1PR066 56 52 Air 1 M-78-10 Outside YES 2.3 Globe 1PR032 56 52 Air 1 M-78-10 Inside YES N/A Check 1PR033A(Brwd only) 56 AL Air 2 M-78-6 Outside YES MIN. Globe 1PR033B(Brwd only) 56 AL Air 2 M-78-6 Outside YES MIN. Globe 1PR002E(Brwd only) 56 AL Air 2 M-78-6 Outside YES MIN. Globe 1PR002G(Brwd only) 56 AL Air 2 M-78-6 Inside YES N/A Check 1PR033C(Brwd only) 56 AL Air 2 M-78-6 Outside YES MIN. Globe 1PR033D(Brwd only) 56 AL Air 2 M-78-6 Outside YES MIN. Globe 1PR002F(Brwd only) 56 AL Air 2 M-78-6 Outside YES MIN. Globe 1PR002H(Brwd only) 56 AL Air 2 M-78-6 Inside YES N/A Check Hydrogen Monitor 1PS228A 56 45 H;? + Air 1/2 M-68-7 Outside YES MIN. Globet 1PS229A 56 45 H, + Air 1/2 M-68-7 Outside YES MIN. Globe 1PS230A 56 12 (BY) 45(BW) H, + Air 1/2 M-68-7 Outside YES MIN. Globe 1PS231A 56 12 (BY) 45(BW) H, + Air 3/4 M-68-7 Inside YES N/A1 Check 1PS228B 56 36 H> + Air 1/2 M-68-7 Outside YES MIN. Globe 1PS229B 56 36 H, + Air 1/2 M-68-7 Outside YES MIN. Globe 1PS230B 56 31 (BY) 36(BW) H_ + Air 1/2 M-68-7 Outside YES MIN. Globe 1PS231B 56 31 (BY) 36(BW) H, + Air 3/4 M-68-7 Inside YES N/A Check 6.2-199 REVISION 8 - DECEMBER 2000

B/B-UFSAR TABLE 6.2-58 (Cont'd)

SECOND-ISOLATION PRI1,1ARY ARY ISOLATION VALVE GDC VALVE POST- POT.,'ER CLOSURE ISOLA- TRIODE OF MODE OF VALVE NUMBER REQUIRE- OPER- NORMAL SHUTDO11-17 ACCIDENT FAILURE TIi,iE** TION ACTUA- ACTUA- POWER CO2FIGU-(Cont'd) MENT MET ATOR POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION (sec) SIGNALS TION TION SOURCE RATION Off-Gas 10G079 56 MO Closed Closed Closed As Is 60 T A RM lE 1 10G080 56 MO Closed Closed Closed As Is 60 T A RM lE 1 10G081 56 MO Closed Closed Closed As Is 60 T A RM lE 1 10G057A 56 MO Closed Closed Closed As Is 60 T A RM lE 1 10G082 56 MO Closed Closed Closed As Is 60 T A RM lE 1 10G083 56 MO Closed Closed Closed As Is 60 T A RM lE 1 10G084 56 MO Closed Closed Closed As Is 60 T A RM lE 1 1OG085 56 MO Closed Closed Closed As Is 60 T A RM lE 1 Process Radiation 1PROO1A 56 AO/S Open Closed Closed Closed 4.5 T A RM lE 8 1PROOIB 56 AO/S Open Closed Closed Closed 4.5 T A RM lE 8 1PR066 56 AO/S Open Closed Closed Closed 5.0 T A RM lE 6 1PR032 56 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 6 1PR033A(Brwd only) 56 M Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1PR033B(Brwd only) 56 M Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1PR002E(Brwd only)56 M Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 7 1PR002G(Brwd only) 56 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 7 1PR033C(Brwd only) 56 M Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1PR033D(Brwd only) 56 M Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1PR002F(Brwd only) 56 M Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 7 1PR002H(Brwd only) 56 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 7 Hydrogen Monitor 1PS228A 56 S Open Closed Closed As Is 15 T A RM lE 1PS229A 56 S Open Closed Closed Open 15 T A RM lE 1PS230A 56 S Closed Closed Closed Closed 15 T A P14 lE 1PS231A 56 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1PS228B 56 S Open Closed Closed Open 15 T A RM lE 1PS229B 56 S Open Closed Closed As Is 15 T A Rb1 lE 1PS230B 56 S Closed Closed Closed Closed 15 T A RM lE 1PS231B 56 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 6.2-200 REVISION 8 - DECEMBER 2000

B/B-UFSAR TABLE 6.2-58 (Cont'd)

TYPE C VALVE LOCA- LEAK DISTPITCE TO ISOLATION GDC PENETRA- LINE TION (INSIDE TEST OUTERMOST VALVE REQUIRE- TION SIZE ESSEN- REFERENCE OR OUTSIDE (YES ISOLATION VALVE NUMBER MENT MET NUMBER FLUID (in.) TIAL* DRAWIT:G CONTAI17 4*IE2TT) OR NO) VALVE (ft) TYPE Process Sampling 1PS9354A 55 70 RC 3/8 YES m-68-1 Inside YES N/A Globe 1PS9354B 55 70 RC 3/8 YES 14-68-1 Outside YES MIN. Globe 1PS9355A 55 70 RC 3/8 YES 14-68-1 Inside YES N/A Globe 1PS9355B 55 70 RC 3/8 YES M-68-1 Outside YES MIN. Globe 1PS9356A 55 70 RC 3/8 YES M-68-1 Inside YES N/A Globe 1PS9356B 55 70 RC 3/8 YES M-68-1 Outside YES MIN. Globe 1PS9357A 55 70 RC 3/8 YES M-68-1 Inside YES N/A Globe 1PS9357B 55 70 RC 3/8 YES M-68-1 Outside YES MIN. Globe Reactor and Contain-ment Drains to Radwaste 1RE9157 55 65 Gas 1 YES Psi-70-1 Outside YES 2.5 DIAPH 1RE9159A 55 65 Gas 3/4 YES M-70-1 Inside YES N/A DIAPH 1RE9159B 55 65 Gas 3/4 YES M-70-1 Outside YES 1.0 DIAPH 1RE9160A 55 65 Gas 1 YES M-70-1 Inside YES N/A DIAPH 1RE9160B 55 65 Gas 1 YES M-70-1 Outside YES 1.5 DIAPH 1RE1003 55 11 Water 3 YES M-70-1 Inside YES N/A DIAPH 1RE9170 55 11 Water 3 YES M-70-1 Outside YES 1.0 DIAPH 1RE022 (Byron) 55 11 Water 3/4 M-70-1 Inside YES N/A Relief 1RE040 (Braidwood) 55 11 Water 3/4 M-70-1 Inside YES N/A Relief Reactor Coolant Pressurizer 1RY8025 56 27 Nitrogen 3/8 YES M-60-6 Outside YES 1.3 Globe 1RY8026 56 27 Nitrogen 3/8 YES M-60-6 Inside YES N/A Globe 1RY8033 56 27 Nitrogen 3/4 YES M-60-6 Outside YES 1.3 DIAPH 1RY8047 56 27 Nitrogen 3/4 M-60-6 Inside YES N/A CHECK 1RY8028 56 44 Water 3 YES M-60-6 Outside YES 1.0 DIAPH 1RY8046 56 44 Water 3 M-60-6 Inside YES N/A CHECK 6.2-201 REVISION 8 - DECEMBER 2000

B/B-UFSAR TABLE 6.2-58 (Cont'd)

TYPE C VALVE LOCA- LEAK DISTANCE TO ISOLATION GDC PENETRA- LINE TION (INSIDE TEST OUTERMOST VALVE REQUIRE- TION SIZE ESSEN- REFERE14CE OR OUTSIDE (YES ISOLATION VALVE NUMBER MENT MET NUMBER FLUID (in.) T IAL

• DRA;-; Ii:G COITT AINMF-1

7) OR NO) VALVE (ft) TYPE Residual Heat Removal 1RH8701A 55 68 RC 12 YES M-62 Inside NO N/A Gate 1RH8701B 55 68 RC 12 YES M-62 Inside NO N/A Gate 1RH8702A 55 75 RC 12 YES M-62 Inside NO N/A Gate 1RH8702B 55 75 RC 12 YES M-62 Inside NO N/A Gate 6.2-201a REVISION 2 - DECEMBER 1990

B/B-UFSAR TABLE 6.2-58 (Cont'd)

SECOND-ISOLATION PRIMARY ARY ISOLATION VALVE GDC VALVE POST- PC.-;ER CLOSURE ISOLA- MODE OF MODE OF VALVE NUMBER REQUIRE- OPER- NORMAL SHUTDOA ACCIDENT FAILURE TIME** TION ACTUA- ACTUA- POR~R CONFIGU-(Cont'd) MENT MET ATOR POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION (sec) SIM2ALS TION TION SOURCE RATION Process Sampling 1PS9354A 55 AO,,S Closed Closed Closed Closed 10 T A P1.1 lE 2 1PS9354B 55 AO/S Closed Closed Closed Closed 10 T A RM lE 2 1PS9355A 55 AO/S Closed Closed Closed Closed 10 T A RM lE 2 1PS9355B 55 AO/S Closed Closed Closed Closed 10 T A RM lE 2 1PS9356A 55 AO/S Closed Closed Closed Closed 10 T A R1.1 lE 2 1PS9356B 55 AO//S Closed Closed Closed Closed 10 T A RM lE 2 1PS9357A 55 AO//S Closed Closed Closed Closed 10 T A RM lE 2 1PS9357B 55 AO/S Closed Closed Closed Closed 10 T A RM lE 2 Reactor and Contain-ment Drains to Radwaste 1RE9157 55 AO/S Open Open Closed Closed 10 T A RM lE 2 1RE9159A 55 AO/S Open Open Closed Closed 10 T A Rbi lE 2 1RE9159B 55 AO/S Closed Closed Closed Closed 10 T A RM lE 2 1RE9160A 55 AO/S Open Open Closed Closed 10 T A P1.1 lE 2 1RE9160B 55 AO/S Open Open Closed Closed 10 T A RM lE 2 1RE1003 55 AO/S Closed Closed Closed Closed 10 T A RM lE 2 1RE9170 55 AO/S Open Open Closed Closed 10 T A RM lE 2 1RE022 (Byron) 55 N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2A 1RE040 (Braidwood) 55 N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2A Reactor Coolant Pressurizer 1RY8025 56 AO/S Closed Closed Closed Closed 10 T A RM lE 2 1RY8026 56 AO/S Open Open Closed Closed 10 T A RM lE 2 1RY8033 56 AO/S Open Open Closed Closed 10 T A RM lE 6 1RY8047 56 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 6 1RY8028 56 AO/S Open Open Closed Closed 10 T A RM lE 6 1RY8046 56 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 6 6.2-202 REVISION 8 - DECEMBER 2000

B/B-UFSAR TABLE 6.2-58 (Cont'd)

SECOND-ISOLATION PRIbLz~2Y ARY ISOLATION VALVE GDC VALVE POST- POP;ER CLOSURE ISOLA- MODE OF MODE OF VALVE NUMBER REQUIRE- OPER- NORMAL SHUTDOWN ACCIDENT FAILURE TIME** TION ACTUP_- ACTUA- POWER C0.7FIGU-(Cont'd) MENT MET ATOR POSITICN POSITION POSITION POSITION (sec) SIGNALS TION TION SOURCE RATION Residual Heat Removal 1RH8701A 55 MO Closed Closed Closed As Is N/A N/A RM i*i lE 9 1RH8701B 55 MO Closed Closed Closed As Is N/A N/A Rb1 i*; lE 9 1RH8702A 55 MO Closed Closed Closed As Is N/A N/A RM i*; lE 9 1RH8702B 55 MO Closed Closed Closed As Is N/A N/A RM I.1 lE 9 6.2-202a REVISION 2 - DECEMBER 1990

B/B-UFSAR TABLE 6.2-58 (Cont'd)

TYPE C VALVE LOCA- LEAK DISTA1XE TO ISOLATION GDC PENETRA- LINE TION (INDSIDE TEST OUTERMOST VALVE REQUIRE- TION SIZE ESSEN- REFERENCE OR OUTSIDE (YES ISOLATION VALVE NUMBER MENT MET NUMBER FLUID (in. ) TIAL

• DRAWII:G COI IAII7,,IEI:T) OR 170) VALVE (ft) TYPE Safety Injection 1SI8801A 55 26 BW 4 YES M-61-2 Outside 170 4.8 Gate 1SI8801B 55 26 BW 4 YES M-61-2 Outside I70 8.9 Gate 1SI8815 55 26 BW 3 M-61-2 Inside NO N/A Check 1SI8880 55 55 Nitrogen 1 M-61-6 Outside YES 15.5 Globe 1SI8968 55 55 Nitrogen 1 M-61-6 Inside YES N/A Check 1SI8964 55 55 EW 3/4 YES M-61-6 Outside YES 17.8 Globe 1SI8871 55 55 BW 3/4 YES M-61-6 Inside YES N/A Globe 1SI8802A 55 59 Water 4 YES M-61-3 Outside I:O 3.7 Gate 1SI8905A 55 59 Water 2 M-61-3 Inside ITO N/A Check 1SI8905D 55 59 Water 2 M-61-3 Inside 170 N/A Check 1SI8802B 55 73 Water 4 YES M-61-3 Outside I:O 2.7 Gate 1SI8905C 55 73 Water 2 M-61-3 Inside I70 N/A Check 1SI8905B 55 73 Water 2 M-61-3 Inside I70 N/A Check 1SI8835 55 60 Water 4 YES M-61-3 Outside 170 3.3 Gate 1SI8819A 55 60 Water 2 M-61-3 Inside I70 N/A Check 1SI8819B 55 60 Water 2 M-61-3 Inside 170 N/A Check 1SI8819C 55 60 Water 2 M-61-3 Inside NO N/A Check 1SI8819D 55 60 Water 2 M-61-3 Inside NO N/A Check 1SIB809A 55 50 Water 8 YES M-61-4 Outside I70 3.7 Gate 1SIB818A 55 50 Water 6 M-61-4 Inside 110 N/A Check 1SI8818D 55 50 Water 6 M-61-4 Inside I70 N/A Check 1SI8809B 55 51 Water 8 YES M-61-4 Outside NO 3.3 Gate 1SI8818B 55 51 Water 6 M-61-4 Inside 170 N/A Check 1SI8818C 55 51 Water 6 M-61-4 Inside NO N/A Check 1SI8811A 56 92 N~OH+BW 24 YES M-61-4 Outside NO 1.8 Gate 1SI8811B 56 93 N;,OH+BW 24 YES M-61-4 Outside NO 1.8 Gate 1SI8890A 55 50 Water 3/4 M-61-4 Inside NO N/A Globe 1SIB890B 55 51 Water 3/4 M-61-4 Inside NO N/A Globe 1SI8888 55 55 Water 3/4 YES M-61-3 Outside YES 14.7 Globe 1SI8881 55 59 Water 3/4 M-61-3 Inside I70 N/A Globe 6.2-203 REVISION 11 - DECEMBER 2006

B/B-UFSAR TABLE 6.2-58 (Cont'd)

SECOND-ISOLATION PRIMARY ARy ISOLATION VALVE GDC VALVE POST- PO-.:

- ER CLOSURE ISOLA- MODE OF MODE OF VALVE NUMBER REQUIRE- OPER- NORMAL SHUTDOv,N ACCIDENT FAILURE TIME** TION ACTUA- ACTUA- POKER CO2:FIGU-(Cont'd) MENT MET ATOR POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION (sec) SIGNALS TION TI07 SOURCE RATION Safety Injection 1SI8801A 55 MO Closed Closed Open As Is N/* S(Open) A RM lE 5 1SI8801B 55 MO Closed Closed Open As Is N/* S(Open) A RM lE 5 1SI8815 55 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 5 1SI8880 55 AO/S Closed Closed Closed Closed 10 T A RM lE 6 1SI8968 55 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 6 1SI8964 55 AO/S Closed Closed Closed Closed 10 T A RM lE 2 1SI8871 55 AO/S Closed Closed Closed Closed 10 T A RM lE 2 1SI8802A 55 MO Closed Closed Open As Is N/* N/A R141 M lE 5 1SI8905A 55 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 5 1SI8905D 55 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 5 1SI8802B 55 MO Closed Closed Open As Is N/* N/A RM M lE 5 1SI8905C 55 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 5 1SIB905B 55 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 5 1SI8835 55 MO Open Open Closed As Is N/* N/A RM M lE 5 1SI8819A 55 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 5 1SI8819B 55 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 5 1SI8819C 55 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 5 1SI8819D 55 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 5 1SI8809A 55 MO Open Open Closed As Is N/* N/A RM M lE 5 1SIB818A 55 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 5 1SI8818D 55 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 5 1SI8809B 55 MO Open Open Closed As Is N/* N/A RM M lE 5 1SI8818B 55 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 5 1SI8818C 55 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 5 1SI8811A 56 MO Closed Closed Open As Is N/* S(Open) A RM lE 1SI8811B 56 MO Closed Closed Open As Is N/* S(Open) A RM lE 1SI8890A 55 AO/S Closed Closed Closed Closed N/* N/A RM M Non lE 1SI8890B 55 AO/S Closed Closed Closed Closed N/* N/A RIM M Non lE 1SI8888 55 AO/S Closed Closed Closed Closed 10 T A RM lE 2 1SI8881 55 AO/S Closed Closed Closed Closed N/* N/A RM M Non 1 6.2-204 REVISION 2 - DECEMBER 1990

B/B-UFSAR TABLE 6.2-58 (Cont'd)

TYPE C VALVE LOCA- LEAK DISTANCE TO ISOLATION GDC PENETRA- LINE TION (INDSIDE TEST OUTERMIOST VALVE REQUIRE- TION SIZE ESSEN- REFERENCE OR OUTSIDE (YES ISOLATION VALVE NUMBER MENT MET NUMBER FLUID (in.) TIAL* DRAWING C0:7TAINI.IEI7T) OR NO) VALVE (ft) TYPE Safety Injection 1SI8840 55 66 Pater 12 YES M-61-3 Outside 170 3.8 Gate 1SI8824 55 73 t,ater 3/4 M-61-3 Inside 170 N/A Globe 1SI8823 55 60 rater 3/4 M 3 Inside NO N/A Globe 1SI8841A 55 66 Pater 8 M-61-3 Inside NO N/A Check 1SI8841B 55 66 .rater 8 I4-61-3 Inside NO N/A Check 1SI8825 55 66 grater 3/4 M-61-3 Inside NO N/A Globe 1SI8843 55 26 BW 3/4 M 2 Inside NO N/A Globe Service Air 1SA032 56 56 Air 1.50 YES m-54-2 Outside YES 4.4 Globe 1SA033 56 56 Air 1.50 YES M 2 Inside YES N/A Globe Spent Fuel Pool Cleaning 1F0009 56 57 Water 4 M -63 Inside YES N/A Plug 1FC010 56 57 Water 4 M -63 Outside YES 3.3 Plug 1FC011 56 32 Water 3 14-63 Outside YES 2.0 Plug 1FC012 56 32 Water 3 14-63 Inside YES N/A Plug Steam Generator Blowdown lSDO02C 57 80 Steam 2 YES M-48-5 Outside NO 53.95 Globe 1SD005B 57 80 Steam 3/8 YES M-48-5 Outside 170 61.50 Globe lSDO02D 57 81 Steam 2 YES M-48-5 Outside NO 58.39 Globe lSDO02A 57 82 Steam 2 YES M-48-5 Outside NO 12.86 Globe lSDO05A 57 82 Steam 3/8 YES M-48-5 Outside NO 20.50 Globe lSDO02B 57 83 Steam 2 YES M-48-5 Outside NO 11.25 Globe lSDO02E 57 88 Steam 2 YES M-48-5 Outside NO 62.32 Globe lSDO05C 57 88 Steam 3/8 YES M-48-5 Outside NO 67.29 Globe 1SD002F 57 89 Steam 2 YES M-48-5 Outside 170 46.18 Globe lSDO02G 57 90 Steam 2 YES M-48-5 Outside 170 6.0 Globe lSDO05D 57 90 Steam 3/8 YES M-48-5 Outside NO 12.0 Globe 1SDO02H 57 91 Steam 2 YES M-48-5 Outside NO 18.69 Globe 6.2-205 REVISION 7 - DECEMBER 1998

B/B-UFSAR TABLE 6.2-58 (Cont'd)

SECOND-ISOLATION PRIMARY ARY ISOLATION VALVE GDC VALVE POST- PO-,-:ER CLOSURE ISOLA- MODE OF MODE OF VA?~VE NUMBER REQUIRE- OPER- NORMAL SHUTDOTr7IJ ACCIDENT FAILURE TIME** TION ACTUA- ACTUA- POSER CO1,,FIGU-(Cont'd) MENT MET ATOR POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION (sec) SIGiv'ALS TION TION SOURCE RATION Safety Injection 1SI8840 55 MO Closed Closed Open As Is N/A N/A RM M lE 5 1SI8824 55 AO/S Closed Closed Closed Closed N/* N/A RM M Non lE 1SI8823 55 AO/S Closed Closed Closed Closed N/* N/A RM M Non lE 1SI8841A 55 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 5 1SI8841B 55 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 5 1SI8825 55 AO/S Closed Closed Closed Closed N/* N/A RM M Non lE 1SI8843 55 AO/S Closed Closed Closed Closed N/* N/A RM M Non lE Service Air 1SA032 (Byron) 56 AO/S Open Open Closed Closed 4.5 T A RM lE 2 1SA033 (Byron) 56 AO/S Open Open Closed Closed 4.5 T A RM lE 2 1SA032 (Braidwood) 56 AO/S Closedttt Open Closed Closed 4.5 T A RM IE 2 1SA033 (Braidwood) 56 AO/S Closedttt Open Closed Closed 4.5 T A RM IE 2 Spent Fuel Pool Cleaning 1F0009 56 M Closed Open Closed N/A N/A N/A bi M N/A 4 1FC010 56 M Closed Open Closed N/A N/A N/A M M N/A 4 1FC011 56 M Closed Open Closed N/A N/A N/A M M N/A 4 1FC012 56 M Closed Open Closed N/A N/A N/A M M N/A 4 Steam Generator Blowdown lSDO02C 57 AO/S Open Closed Closed Closed 7.5 T,SG A RM lE 11 lSDO05B 57 AO/S Open Closed Closed Closed 3.0 T A RM lE 11 lSDO02D 57 AO/S Open Closed Closed Closed 7.5 T,SG A RM lE 11 lSDO02A 57 AO/S Open Closed Closed Closed 7.5 T,SG A RM lE 11 lSDO05A 57 AO/S Open Closed Closed Closed 3.0 T A RM lE 11 lSDO02B 57 AO/S Open Closed Closed Closed 7.5 T,SG A RM lE 11 lSDO02E 57 AO/S Open Closed Closed Closed 7.5 T,SG A RM lE 11 lSDO05C 57 AO/S Open Closed Closed Closed 3.0 T A RM lE 11 lSDO02F 57 AO/S Open Closed Closed Closed 7.5 T,SG A RM lE 11 lSDO02G 57 AO/S Open Closed Closed Closed 7.5 T,SG A RM lE 11 lSDO05D 57 AO/S Open Closed Closed Closed 3.0 T A RM lE 11 lSDO02H 57 AO/S Open Closed Closed Closed 7.5 T,SG A RM lE 11 6.2-206 REVISION 13 - DECEMBER 2010

B/B-UFSAR TABLE 6.2-58 (Cont'd)

TYPE C VALVE LOCH- LEAK DISTANCE TO ISOLATION GDC PENETRA- LINE TION (INSIDE TEST OUTERMOST VALVE REQUIRE- TION SIZE ESSET7- REFERENCE OR OUTSIDE (YES ISOLATION VALVE NUMBER MENT MET NUMBER FLUID (in.) TIAL* DRA;-"II7G CO:7TAII7I ;EIT) OR I70) VALVE (ft) TYPE Steam Generator Feedwater 1FW009A 57 79 Water 16 YES M-36-1 Outside 110 13.75 Gate 1AF013A (Braidwood) 57 79 Water 4 YES M-37 Outside 110 73.5 Globe 1AF013A (Byron) 57 79 Water 4 YES 14-37 Outside NO 74.4 Globe 2AF013A 57 100 Water 4 YES M-122 Outside ITO 66.75 Globe 1AF013E (Braidwood) 57 79 Water 4 YES M-37 Outside 110 69.2 Globe 1AF013E (Byron) 57 79 Water 4 YES M-37 Outside 170 70.1 Globe 2AF013E 57 100 Water 4 YES M-122 Outside NO 62.5 Globe 1FW015A 57 100 Water 3/4 M-48-5A Outside 170 46.75 Globe 2FW015A 57 100 Water 3/4 M-121-1 Outside ITO 46.75 Globe 1FW009B 57 84 Water 16 YES M-36-1 Outside ITO 13.75 Gate 1AF013B (Braidwood) 57 84 Water 4 YES M-37 Outside ITO 64.5 Globe 1AF013B (Byron) 57 84 Water 4 YES M-37 Outside 110 65.7 Globe 2AF013B 57 101 Water 4 YES M-122 Outside ITO 57.66 Globe 1AF013F (Braidwood) 57 84 Water 4 YES M-37 Outside 110 59.8 Globe 1AF013F (Byron) 57 84 Water 4 YES M-37 Outside ITO 60.9 Globe 2AF013F 57 101 Water 4 YES M-122 Outside ITO 53.0 Globe 1FW015B 57 101 Water 3/4 ICI-48-5A Outside NO 46.75 Globe 2FW015B 57 101 Water 3/4 M-121-1 Outside 170 46.75 Globe 1FW009C 57 87 Water 16 YES M-36-1 Outside NO 13.75 Gate 1AF013C (Braidwood) 57 87 Water 4 YES M-37 Outside NO 62.1 Globe 1AF013C (Byron) 57 87 Water 4 YES I4-37 Outside 110 63.9 Globe 2AF013C 57 102 Water 4 YES M-122 Outside ITO 55.75 Globe 1AF013G (Braidwood) 57 87 Water 4 YES I4-37 Outside 110 58.6 Globe 1AF013G (Byron) 57 87 Water 4 YES hI-37 Outside NO 60.4 Globe 2AF013G 57 102 Water 4 YES14-122 Outside 170 52.25 Globe 1FW015C 57 102 Water 3/4 14-121-1 Outside NO 46.75 Globe 2FW015C 57 102 Water 3/4 M-48-5A Outside 110 46.75 Globe 1FW009D 57 76 Water 16 YES M-36-1 Outside ITO 13.75 Gate 1AF013D (Braidwood) 57 76 Water 4 YES M-37 Outside NO 65.3 Globe 1AF013D (Byron) 57 76 Water 4 YES M-37 Outside NO 68.5 Globe 2AF013D 57 99 Water 4 YES M-122 Outside NO 57.75 Globe 1AF013H (Braidwood) 57 76 Water 4 YES 14-37 Outside I70 61.3 Globe 2AF049A (Byron) 57 100 Water 4 110 M-122 Outside 170 22.5 Check 2AF049B (Byron) 57 101 Water 4 NO M-122 Outside I70 22.5 Check 2AF049C (Byron) 57 102 Water 4 NO M-122 Outside I70 23.7 Check:

2AF049D (Byron) 57 99 Water 4 ITO M-122 Outside T70 22.6 Check:

1AF049A (Braidwood) 57 79 Water 4 NO M-37 Outside 170 23.8 Check 1AF049B (Braidwood) 57 84 Water 4 NO M-37 Outside 170 23.9 Check 1AF049C (Braidwood) 57 87 Water 4 NO M-37 Outside NO 24.1 Check 1AF049D (Braidwood) 57 76 Water 4 NO M-37 Outside I70 22.9 Check 1AF049A (Byron) 57 79 Water 4 NO M-37 Outside 170 22.5 Check:

1AF049B (Byron) 57 84 Water 4 NO M-37 Outside 170 22.5 Check 1AF049C (Byron) 57 87 Water 4 NO 14-37 Outside T10 23.7 Check 1AF049D (Byron) 57 76 Water 4 NO M-37 Outside 170 22.6 Check:

2AF049A (Braidwood) 57 100 Water 4 NO M-122 Outside ITO 22.4 Check:

2AF049B (Braidwood) 57 101 Water 4 NO Iii-122 Outside ITO 24.1 Check 2AF049C (Braidwood) 57 102 Water 4 NO M-122 Outside NO 23.9 Check 2AF049D (Braidwood) 57 99 Water 4 NO M-122 Outside NO 22.9 Check 6.2-207 REVISION 16 - DECEMBER 2016

B/B-UFSAR TABLE 6.2-58 (Cont'd)

TYPE C VALVE LOCA- LEAK DISTANCE TO ISOLATION GDC PENETRA- LINE TION (INSIDE TEST OUTERI.OST VALVE REQUIRE- TION SIZE ESSE17- REFERENCE OR OUTSIDE (YES ISOLATION VALVE NUMBER MENT MET NUMBER FLUID (in.) TIAL* DRA, 'I17G COI7TAI17:,1E17T) OR 17O) VALVE (ft) TYPE 1AF013H (Byron) 57 76 Water 4 YES M-37 Outside NO 64.5 Globe 2AF013H 57 99 Water 4 YES M-122 Outside 170 54.25 Globe 1FW015D 57 99 Water 3/4 M-48-5A Outside 170 46.75 Globe 2FW015D 57 99 Water 3/4 M-121-1 Outside i70 46.75 Globe 1FW035A (Braidwood) 57 79 Water 3 YES M-36-1 Outside NO 35.3 Globe 1FW035A (Byron) 57 79 Water 3 YES M-36-1 Outside NO 36.7 Globe 2FW035A 57 100 Water 3 YES M-121-1 Outside NO 29.0 Globe 1FW035B (Braidwood) 57 84 Water 3 YES M-36-1 Outside NO 36.2 Globe 1FW035B (Byron) 57 84 Water 3 YES M-36-1 Outside I70 36.8 Globe 2FW035B 57 101 Water 3 YES M-121-1 Outside NO 29.0 Globe 1FW035C (Braidwood) 57 87 Water 3 YES M-36-1 Outside 170 39.3 Globe 1FW035C (Byron) 57 87 Water 3 YES M-36-1 Outside NO 41.1 Globe 2FW035C 57 102 Water 3 YES M-121-1 Outside NO 32.5 Globe 1FW035D (Braidwood) 57 76 Water 3 YES M 1 Outside NO 38.9 Globe 1FW035D (Byron) 57 76 Water 3 YES M 1 Outside 110 41.6 Globe 2FW035D 57 99 Water 3 YES M-121-1 Outside NO 32.5 Globe 1FW039A (Braidwood) 57 79 Water 6 YES M-36-1 Outside NO 20.8 Gate 1FW039A (Byron) 57 79 Water 6 YES M 1 Outside T70 21.6 Gate 2FW039A 57 100 Water 6 YES M-121-1 Outside NO 14.5 Gate 1FW039B (Braidwood) 57 84 Water 6 YES M-36-1 Outside 170 20.8 Gate 1FW039B (Byron) 57 84 Water 6 YES 14-36-1 Outside NO 21.7 Gate 2FW039B 57 101 Water 6 YES M-121-1 Outside 170 14.5 Gate 1FW039C (Braidwood) 57 87 Water 6 YES M-36-1 Outside 170 20.8 Gate 1FW039C (Byron) 57 87 Water 6 YES M-36-1 Outside NO 22.1 Gate 2FW039C 57 102 Water 6 YES M-121-1 Outside NO 14.5 Gate 1FW039D (Braidwood) 57 76 Water 6 YES M-36-1 Outside NO 20.8 Gate 1FW039D (Byron) 57 76 Water 6 YES M-36-1 Outside NO 23.0 Gate 2FW039D 57 99 Water 6 YES M-121 Outside 170 14.5 Gate 2FW043A 57 79 Water 3 YES tai-121-1 Outside NO 27.25 Globe 2FW043B 57 84 Water 3 YES M-121-1 Outside 110 27.25 Globe 2FW043C 57 87 Water 3 YES M-121-1 Outside 170 27.25 Globe 2FW043D 57 76 Water 3 YES M-121-1 Outside 170 27.25 Globe 6.2-207a REVISION 7 - DECEMBER 1998

B/B-UFSAR TABLE 6.2-58 (Cont'd)

TYPE C VALVE LOCP_- LEAK DISTANCE TO ISOLATION GDC PENETRA- LINE TION (INSIDE TEST OUTERMOST VALVE REQUIRE- TION SIZE ESSEN- REFERENCE OR OUTSIDE (YES ISOLATION VALVE NUMBER MENT MET NUMBER FLUID (in.) TIAL* DRA,TING CCNTAIN,1.1E T) OR NO) VALVE (ft) TYPE Waste Disposal 1RF026 56 47 Water 2 YES M-48-6 Inside YES 5.8 Plug 1RF027 56 47 Water 2 YES 14-48-6 Outside YES 4.6 Plug 1RF055 (Byron) 56 47 'rater 3/4 M-48-6 Inside YES N/A Relief 1RF060 56 47 Water 3/4 M-48-6 Inside YES N/A Relief (Braidwood) 6.2-207b REVISION 8 - DECEMBER 2000

B/B-UFSAR TABLE 6.2-58 (Cont'd)

SECOND-ISOLATION PRIMARY ARY ISOLATION VALVE GDC VALVE POST- POWER CLOSURE ISOLA- 1.1.ODE OF MODE OF VALVE NUMBER REQUIRE- OPER- NORMAL SHUTD01T1 ACCIDENT FAILURE TII=IE** TION ACTUA- ACTUA.- POY=rR CONFIGU-(Cont'd) MENT MET ATOR POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION (sec) SIGNALS TION TIG27 SOURCE RATION Steam Generator Feedwater 1FW009A 57 HO Open Closed Closed Closed 5.0 Fj A RM lE 10 1AF013A 57 MO Open Closed Open As Is N/* N/A RM 14 lE 10 2AF013A 57 MO Open Closed Open As Is N/* N/A RM M lE 10 1AF013E 57 MO Open Closed Open As Is N/* N/A RM III lE 10 2AF013E 57 MO Open Closed Open As Is N/* N/A RM M lE 10 1FW015A 57 M Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A M M N/A 14 1FW009B 57 HO Open Closed Closed Closed 5.0 FW A RM lE 10 1AF013B 57 MO Open Closed Open As Is N/* N/A RM III lE 10 2AF013B 57 MO Open Closed Open As Is N/* N/A RM M lE 10 1AF013F 57 MO Open Closed Open As Is N/* N/A RM M lE 10 2AF013F 57 MO Open Closed Open As Is N/* N/A RM M lE 10 1FW015B 57 M Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A M M N/A 14 1FW009C 57 HO Open Closed Closed Closed 5.0 FW A RM lE 10 1AF013C 57 MO Open Closed Open As Is N/* N/A RM M lE 10 2AF013C 57 MO Open Closed Open As Is N/* N/A RM M lE 10 1AF013G 57 MO Open Closed Open As Is N/* N/A RM M lE 10 2AF013G 57 MO Open Closed Open As Is N/* N/A RM bf lE 10 1FW015C 57 M Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A M M N/A 14 1FW009D 57 HO Open Closed Closed Closed 5.0 FW A RM lE 10 1AF013D 57 MO Open Closed Open As Is N/* N/A RM M lE 10 2AF013D 57 MO Open Closed Open As Is N/* N/A RM id lE 10 1AF013H 57 MO Open Closed Open As Is N/* N/A RM b1 lE 10 2AF013H 57 MO Open Closed Open As Is N/* N/A RM bi lE 10 1FW015D 57 M Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A M 2d N/A 14 1FW035A 57 AO/S Open Closed Closed Closed 6.0 FW A RM lE 11 2FW035A 57 AO/S Open Closed Closed Closed 6.0 FY; A RM lE 11 1FW035B 57 AO/S Open Closed Closed Closed 6.0 FY: A RM lE 11 2FW035B 57 AO/S Open Closed Closed Closed 6.0 FY7 A RM lE 11 1FW035C 57 AO/S Open Closed Closed Closed 6.0 Fr: A RM lE 11 2FW035C 57 AO/S Open Closed Closed Closed 6.0 FYI A R61 1E 11 1FW035D 57 AO/S Open Closed Closed Closed 6.0 F:*: A Rbf lE 11 2AF049A (Byron) 57 N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 12 2AF049B (Byron) 57 N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 12 2AF049C (Byron) 57 N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 12 2AF049D (Byron) 57 N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 12 1AF049A (Braidwood) 57 N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 12 1AF049B (Braidwood) 57 N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 12 1AF049C (Braidwood) 57 N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 12 1AF049D (Braidwood) 57 N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 12 1AF049A (Byron) 57 N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 12 1AF049B (Byron) 57 N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 12 1AF049C (Byron) 57 N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 12 1AF049D (Byron) 57 N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A_ N/A N/A N/A N/A 12 2AF049A (Braidwood) 57 N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 12 2AF049B (Braidwood) 57 N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A_ N/A 12 2AF049C (Braidwood) 57 N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A_ N/A 12 2AF049D (Braidwood) 57 N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 12 6.2-208 REVISION 16 - DECEMBER 2016

B/B-UFSAR TABLE 6.2-58 (Cont'd)

SECOND-ISOLATION PRIKARY ARY ISOLATION VALVE GDC VALVE POST- POWER CLOSURE ISOLA- MODE OF MODE OF VALVE NUMBER REQUIRE- OPER- NORMAL SHUTDOWN ACCIDENT FAILURE TIi*'E** TION ACTUA- ACTUA- POWER CONFIGU-(Cont'd) MENT MET ATOR POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION (sec) SIGNALS TION TION SOURCE RATION 2FW035D 57 AO/S Open Closed Closed Closed 6.0 FW A RM lE 11 1FW039A 57 AO/S Open Closed Closed Closed 6.0 FW A RM lE 11 2FW039A 57 AO/S Open Closed Closed Closed 6.0 FW A Rbi lE 11 1FW039B 57 AO/S Open Closed Closed Closed 6.0 FP; A R:*i lE 11 2FW039B 57 AO/S Open Closed Closed Closed 6.0 FW A RM lE 11 1FW039C 57 AO/S Open Closed Closed Closed 6.0 FP7 A Rr*1 lE 11 2FW039C 57 AO/S Open Closed Closed Closed 6.0 FW A R*i lE 11 1FW039D 57 AO/S Open Closed Closed Closed 6.0 F'ri A Fc*i lE 11 2FW039D 57 AO/S Open Closed Closed Closed 6.0 FW A Rid lE 11 2FW043A 57 AO/S Closed Closed Closed Closed 6.0 FW A RM lE 11 2FW043B 57 AO/S Closed Closed Closed Closed 6.0 FW A Rbi lE 11 2FW043C 57 AO/S Closed Closed Closed Closed 6.0 FW A RM lE 11 2FW043D 57 AO/S Closed Closed Closed Closed 6.0 FW A RM lE 11 Waste Disposal 1RF026 56 AO/S Open Open Closed Closed 15 T A RM lE 2 1RF027 56 AO/S Open Open Closed Closed 15 T A RM lE 2 1RF055 (Byron) 56 N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2A 1RF060 (Braidwood) 56 N/A Closed Closed Closed N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2A 6.2-208a REVISION 8 - DECEMBER 2000

B/B-UFSAR TABLE 6.2-58 (Cont'd)

NOTE: Although the data listed are typically only given for Unit 1, the data apply to Unit 2 valves as well, except where Unit 2 data are provided separately.

• Essential systems are those systems which may be used following a containment isolation signal. Essential systems may be isolated on containment isolation signals as noted in Column Isolation Signals, but their isolation valves are supplied with lE power to permit remote manual reopening if required.

• • The valve closure times listed in column Closure Time are estimated maximum closure times. Actual measured times may vary from those listed. N/* indicates that the valve does not receive an automatic isolation signal to close, however, the valve closure time is consistent with isolation valve requirements.

• • • See Figure 6.2-29.

• • • • For Byron, if the normal purge subsystem is used, valves 1VQ001A, 1VQOOIB, 1VQ002A, and 1VQ002B may be open and valves 1VQ004A, 1VQ004B, 1VQ005A, 1VQ005B, and 1VQ005C are closed.

For Byron, if the miniflow purge subsystem is used, valves 1VQ004A, 1VQ004B, 1VQ005A, 1VQ005B, 1VQ005C may be open and valves 1VQOO1A, 1VQOOIB, 1VQ002A, and 1VQ002B are closed.

For Braidwood, if the miniflow purge subsystem is used, valves 1VQ004A, 1VQ004B, 1VQ005A, 1VQ005B and 1VQ005C may be open. At Braidwood, the supply and exhaust isolation valves for the normal purge system (1VQ001A, 1VQOOIB, 1VQ002A, 1VQ002B) are blocked in the closed position in all modes of plant operation.

t Braidwood has gate valves.

tt Valve size is 3 inches.

ttt May be opened during normal operation if service air is required for activities in the containment building.

KEY:

AL = Air Lock RC = Reactor Coolant BW = Borated Water CCW = Component Cooling Water M = Manual S = Solenoid MO = Motor Operated HO = Hydraulic Operated AO = Air Operated AO/S = Air Operated with Solenoid Accessory "As Is" = is the Safe Position S = Actuates on Safety Injection T = Actuates on Phase A Containment Isolation P = Actuates on Phase B Containment Isolation MS = Actuates on Main Steam Isolation FW = Actuates on Main Feedwater Isolation T1 = Actuates on Containment Spray Actuation T2 = Actuates on Containment Vent Isolation 6.2-209 REVISION 14 - DECEMBER 2012

B/B-UFSAR TABLE 6.2-58 (Cont'd)

A = Automatic (Air, Hydraulic, or Electrical)

Operation M = Manual Operation RM = Remote Manual Operation IA = Instrument Air MIN. = Valves will be placed as close to the containment as practical.

SG = Actuates on Low-Low Steam Generator Level 6.2-209a REVISION 14 - DECEMBER 2012