RS-10-020, Additional Information Supporting Request for License Amendment Regarding Ultimate Heat Sink
| ML100280553 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron  |
| Issue date: | 01/25/2010 |
| From: | Simpson P Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| RS-10-020 | |
| Download: ML100280553 (206) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:www.exeloncorp.com Exelon. Nuclear Exelon Generation Generation 4300 Winfield Road 4300 Winfield Road www.exeloncorp.com Nuclear Warrenville, IILL60555 RS-10-020 RS-10-020 January 25, 2010 January 2010 U.S. Nuclear Nuclear Regulatory Regulatory Commission Commission ATTN: DocumentDocument Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Byron Station, Station, Units 1 and 2 Facility Operating Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-37 and NPF-66 NPF-66 NRC Docket Nos. STN 50-454 and STN 50-455 50-455
Subject:
Additional Information Information Supporting Supporting Request for License License Amendment Regarding Regarding Ultimate Ultimate Heat Sink Heat Sink
References:
References:
- 1. Letter from P. R. Simpson (Exelon (Exelon Generation Generation Company, LLC) to U.S. NRC, Amendment Regarding "License Amendment Regarding Ultimate Heat Sink," dated June 30, 2009 2009
- 2. Letter fron')
from M.M. J. David (U.S. NRC) to C. G. G. Pardee Pardee (Exelon Nuclear), Nuclear), "Byron Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 - Request Request for Additional Information Additional Information Related to License License Amendment RegardingRegarding Ultimate Ultimate Heat Sink (TAC Nos. ME1 669 and ME1669 ME1670)," dated ME1670)," dated December December 11, 2009 11, 2009 In Reference Reference 1, Exelon Generation Company, LLC (EGC) requested a license amendment Exelon Generation amendment for Byron Station, Units 1 and 2, 2; to revise Technical Technical Specifications Specifications (TS) to add additional additional essential service water (SX) cooling tower requirements as a function of SX pump discharge discharge temperature temperature to reflect results of a revised analysis for the ultimate Reference 2, the NRC ultimate heat sink (UHS). In Reference NRC information to complete requested additional information complete review review of the proposed proposed license license amendment. amendment. In In response to this request, EGC is providing the attached information. information. Attachment Attachment 1 provides provides the response response to the request for additional information. information. Attachment Attachment 2 includes includes revised markups markups of the affected affected TS pages. Appropriate changes to the TS Bases will implementation of the proposed also be made upon implementation proposed changes. EGC has reviewed reviewed the information information supporting a finding of no significant hazards consideration, consideration, and the environmental environmental consideration, consideration, that were previously provided to the NRC in Attachment Attachment 1 Reference 1. The additional of Reference additional information information provided in this submittal does does not affect the bases bases for concluding concluding that the proposed license amendment proposed license amendment does does not involve involve a significant hazards hazards consideration. In addition, the additional information information provided provided in this submittal does not affect the bases for concluding that neither an environmentalenvironmental impact statement nor an environmental assessment assessment needs to be prepared prepared in connection with the proposed amendment. AOO( Ll~.
January 25, 2010 January 2010 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Nuclear Regulatory Page 2 There There are no regulatory regulatory commitments commitments contained in this letter. If If you should have any questions questions concerning concerning this letter, please contact Ms. Jean M. M. Smith at (630) 657-2813. I declare penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on the 25th declare under penalty day of January January 2010. Respectfully, Rctw! R Manager R.Simpson Patrick R. Simpson Manager Licensing Licensing Attachments: Request of Additional
- 1. Response to Request Additional Information Information
- 2. Revised Markup of Proposed Technical Specifications Pages Technical Specifications Pages
- 3. Additional Additional References References .
ATTACHMENT ATTACHMENT 1 1
Response
Response to Request for Additional Additional Information Information NRC Request 1 - Operator Operator Actions Actions NRC Request Request 1.a 1.a Based on the revised design basis analysis analysis for the UHS, itit appears appears that there are two manual actions being credited: 1) manual initiation of cooling tower fans at the 10 minute mark of a loss-accident (LOCA - scenarios of-coolant accident scenarios 8D and 8D1); and 2) shedding shedding of half the heat load at or prior to the 30 minute mark of a LOCA. Are these the only two manual actions being credited in in the new new UHS analysis? If If not, please please identify all manual actions being credited UHS credited in the UHS analysis.
Response
Response Three operator actions are creditedcredited in the UHS temperature temperature analyses:
- 1. Operator Operator action action will be taken within ten minutes minutes to align the service water cooling tower tower (SXCT) to maximize maximize the heat removal removal capacity. This action action includes:
includes: 1) Opening riser valves, 2) Closing hot water basin bypass valves, 3) Verifying/Starting Verifying/Starting cooling tower fans fans in high speed, and 4) Closing the associated associated riser valve of any fan that does not start in in high speed.
- 2. IfIf a bypass valve fails to close, operator action will be taken within 30 minutes to manually close the bypass valve at the cooling tower.
- 3. If required, operator action will be taken at or prior to 21 minutes to turn off two of the
- 3. If required, operator action will be taken at or prior to 21 minutes to turn off two of the containment fan coolers (RCFCs) to shed load.
four reactor containment load. Request 1.b NRC Request Have any available available times for significant significant operator operator actions accident actions been reduced for other accident scenarios and events, such as anticipated anticipated transients without scram, due UHS due to the revised UHS analysis? If If so, list the operator actions required and the completion completion times assumed in the the analysis.
Response
Response proposed operator actions for this proposed The proposed proposed change do not reduce any available available times for significant operator actions for other accident scenarios scenarios and events. Request 2 - Operating NRC Request Procedures Operatinq Procedures NRC Request NRC Request 2.a 2.a Describe any changes Describe changes to operator actions in the emergency emergency operating procedures, procedures, abnormal procedures, or other procedures operating procedures, procedures required by the proposed proposed LAR and how these these changes will be integrated integrated into the operator operator training program. program. Page 1
ATTACHMENT 11 ATTACHMENT Request for Additional Response to Request Response Additional Information Information
Response
Response No change No operating procedures emergency operating change to the emergency procedures or abnormal operating or abnormal procedures are operating procedures are required required for Actions Actions 1 and 2 listed in the listed in the response response to NRC Request 1.a. above. above. Steps to take take these actions actions were added to the emergency operating the emergency procedures as part operating procedures part of the 1992 1992 design design basis reconstitution basis reconstitution andand associated Specifications (TS) changes. Technical Specifications associated Technical Action 3 listed changes. Action listed in the response to to NRC Request 1.a. NRC Request above will be added to the 1.a. above appropriate emergency the appropriate emergency operating operating procedures. The procedures. procedure changes The procedure associated with this changes associated amendment will be this TS amendment included in the be included the Training. The associated Operator Continuing Training. Licensed Operator Licensed associated tasktask involving implementation of involving the implementation primary emergency the primary operating procedures emergency operating requiring operator procedures requiring actions for this accident operator actions accident scenario is already scenario already in the Licensed Licensed Operator Operator Continuing program at Continuing Training program required two year at a required year review of the Licensed Operator frequency. A review Continuing Training Operator Continuing program identified Training program identified that over the six year period from 2004 through through 2009, Large Break LOCA response was included Large Break included in 19 19 simulator training scenarios, because simulator because that event event is one of the three major emergency procedure major emergency procedure accident scenarios. accident NRC NRC Request Request 2.b 2.b annunciators, or other alerting What alarms, annunciators, mechanism will be used to cue the operators alerting mechanism operators that required? actions are required?
Response
Response The operators would be alerted to failures of required alignments via feedback/cues feedback/cues from current main control board (MCB) indications (e.g., trip alarm when fan start is (MCB) panel design indications indication does attempted, valve position indication does not change when MCB manipulation is attempted, These cues would inform the operator etc.). These operator that "Response Not Obtained" actions are required. All the valves involved in the desired requirements have open desired lineup requirements close open and close indications and controls on the MCB. An alarm and MCB amber indications disagreement light are the amber disagreement the current indicators of when a fan control switch is positioned for fan start and the fan breaker is not closed. Request 2.c NRC Request Given that the assumed actions for UHS occur during the first 10 minutes and the first 30 minutes of a LOCA, what alternative actions are possible ifif an operator error of omission or occurs? What feedback or cue will alert operators to the fact that a required action has timing occurs? not been completed? completed?
Response
Response If an operator error of omission occurs the increasing essential service water (SX) supply If temperature alarms. The immediate temperature will cause various high temperature immediate operator action response procedure for the SX pump discharge header specified in the alarm response temperature header temperature alarms directs the operators to procedures 1/2BOA 1/2BOA PRI-7, "Essential Service Malfunction Service Water Malfunction Unit 1/2," and BOP SX-T2, "SX Tower Operation Guidelines." Both of these procedures provide provide guidance on opening riser valves, starting all SXCT fans, and closing the bypass valves. Page 2
ATTACHMENT 1 ATTACHMENT Response Request for Additional Information Response to Request Information NRC Request 3 - Control Room Controls, Displays (Including the Safety Parameter NRC Request 3 - Control Room Controls. Displays (lncludinq the Safety Parameter Display System), System). and Alarms Alarms NRC Request 3.a 3.a Describe any changes, additions, or deletions deletions to the main control including control room interface including setpoint setpoint changes and alarms.
Response
Response No control room changes are required. NRC Request 3.b 3.b What, ifif any, plant specific modifications will be required? specific simulator modifications required?
Response
Response No modifications modifications of control room controls, displays, or alarms of the reference reference unit, Byron Byron Station Station Unit 1, are planned. The simulator is modeled after the reference reference unit; therefore, no no modifications modifications to the simulator will be needed. needed. NRC NRC Request Request 4 - Control Room Plant ReferenceReference Simulator Simulator NRC NRC Reauest Request 4.a4.a How How will the licensee licensee verify the plant simulator's fidelity after after the proposed LAR-related LAR-related modifications are made? modifications
Response
Response There are no modifications modifications planned. The simulator will continue continue to be tested according according to, and verified to be in compliance with, with, the applicable applicable ANSI Standard (i.e., (Le., ANSI/ANS-3.5-1985, ANSIIANS-3.5-1985, ANSI/ANS-3.5-2009 "Nuclear Power Plant Simulators ANSI/ANS-3.5-2009 Simulators for Use in Operator Operator Training Training and Examination"). Examination"). NRC Request Request 4.b How have credited operator operator actions been validated validated as feasible and reliable? Include Include aa* discussion of both in-control in-control room and ex-control room actions.
Response
Response The credited operator actions are considered feasible feasible and reliable based on the following:
- 1. Operator action action to align the SXCT to maximize maximize the heat removal capacity is directed removal capacity directed by 14.g. of emergency Step 14.g. procedures 1/2BEP-O, emergency operating procedures 1/2BEP-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety associated task involving the implementation Injection." The associated implementation of the primary emergency emergency Page 3
ATTACHMENT ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Request for Additional Additional Information Information operating operator actions for this accident procedures requiring operator operating procedures accident scenario is already already in Licensed Operator the Licensed Operator Continuing Training program at a required required two year frequency. A A review of the Licensed Licensed Operator Operator Continuing Training program identified that over the six period from 2004 through 2009 Large year period Large Break LOCA response was included in 19 simulator training scenarios, because that event is one of the three major emergency procedure accident procedure accident scenarios. scenarios. Time testing on the simulator indicates that Step 14.g. is reached in approximately approximately six minutes. The actions to open open riser valves, close bypass bypass valves, and start fans in high speed can be performed performed from the control room and can be be completed within ten minutes.
- 2. Action to dispatch an operator operator to manually manually close the bypass valve at the cooling tower was validated by a combination combination of simulator time, actual measured time to dispatch dispatch thethe operator to the valve, and estimated time to manuallymanually close the valve using the the handwheel.
handwheel. The total time was conservatively conservatively determined determined to be 20 minutes.
- 3. Operator action to turn off two out of four RCFCs has not yet been specifically specifically added to the procedures procedures or time validated. The procedure procedure changes changes and implementation implementation are planned for 2010. As discussed discussed above, the step to start all fans in high speed is reached in approximately approximately six minutes. The action to turn off RCFCs can be taken from the control room. It It is reasonable to assume that with the appropriate appropriate steps added to to the procedures, the control room operators can recognize recognize that fans did not start and take action action to secure secure two RCFCs well beforebefore the assumed 21 minutes used in the the analysis.
analysis. NRC Request 5 Attachment , "Analytical Basis for Proposed Changes to TS," and Attachment Attachment 7, "Evaluation of Additional Scenarios Scenarios for Postulated Postulated Single Failures," of the June 30, 2009, LAR provide provide the the scenarios scenarios for postulated single failures of electrical electrical circuit circuit breakers serving SX system breakers servingSX components components occurring concurrent with a LOCA and a loss of offsite power on one unit with the occurring concurrent the opposite opposite unit in normal shutdown. Provide a detailed discussion and supporting shutdown. Provide calculations supporting calculations why the scenarios scenarios analyzed analyzed in the LAR are bounding, considering considering both active and passive passive failures.
Response
Response Previous analyses analyses for the 1992 ultimate heat heat sink (UHS) design design basis reconstitution reconstitution and March March 31, 1992, 31, 1992, license amendment request amendment request (Amendment 54 approved on May May 17, 1993) evaluated aa variety variety of initial conditions conditions and single active failures. failures. Postulated single single active failures analyzed analyzed included: 1) Containment Containment Spray (CS) pump failure, 2) SXCT fan failure, 3) Emergency Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) (EDG) failure, 4) SX pump failure, and 5) SX bypass valve failure. For comparison, the following results were obtained in the 1992 revisions of the UHS calculationscalculations for the different different single active failure scenarios: Page 4
ATTACHMENT 1 ATTACHMENT Response to Request Response Information Request for Additional Information Initial Basin Calculated Peak Calculated Basin Peak Basin Single Active Failure Temperature (OF) Temperature (OF) Temperature (OF) Temperature (OF) CS Pump 96 96.5 SXCT SXCT Fan 96 99.1 EDG Failure 96 96.0 SX Pump 96 96.0 OA OA SX Bypass Valve Fails Open 70 91.4 91.4 0B Bypass Valve Fails Open OB SX BYQass 70 90.9 90.9 EDG Failure which prevents prevents 70 89.8 70 89.8 Closure of an SX Bypass Valve Closure Valve Subsequent revisions of the analysis analysis for Steam Generator Replacement and Power Uprate Generator Replacement Uprate focused scenarios of cooling tower fan and bypass valve failures. focused on the most limiting scenarios For this license amendment request, analyses analyses were revised to address address postulated passivepassive electrical failures that could result in the loss of two SXCT fans. Calculations Calculations UHS-01 UHS-01 Revision 4, "Ultimate Heat Design Basis LOCA Single Failure Scenarios," and UHS-04 Heat Sink Design UHS-04 Revision 3, Heat Sink Design Basis LOCA Single Failure Scenarios for Cool Weather Operation," "Ultimate Heat Attachment 3 of this document in Attachment were prepared to identify the bounding electrical document were electrical failure failure scenarios. Additionally, a number of variations of scenario scenarios. (i.e., two fans initially out of scenario 8C (Le., service) were run to determine determine the bounding scenario. considered bounding, because The scenarios for this analysis are considered because two SXCT SXCT fans are assumed to fail with the full heat input until operator action can be taken to reduce operator action reduce the load. This scenario scenario is more limiting than an EDG failure, because an EDG failure results in loss of power to two SXCT fans and two RCFCs. Thus, the heat load is lower for the EDG failure scenario. NRC Request 6 Analytical Basis for Proposed Changes to , "Validation of Assumption 3.1 of Analytical Attachment Technical Specifications (TS)," of the LAR discusses the validation Technical Specifications validation of Assumption 3.1 from the the calculation Attachment 4. Assumption 3.1 states that the fraction of water cooled for SX calculation in Attachment cooling tower cells with fans not running is assumed to be 0.10 (i.e., (Le., 10 percent) of the water water delivered to that cell is effectively delivered Assumption 3.1 also states effectively cooled. Assumption states that the cooling tower manufacturer provided 10 percent as a reasonable estimate for minimum cooling manufacturer tower cooling tower Attachment 5 assumes an initial service performance without fan air flow. Attachment performance temperature of service water temperature 980 F (Section 2.3), and the resulting maximum basin temperature temperature is 113.7 0 F, when percent 98°F 113.7°F, 10 percent Attachment 5, Section 8.0 concludes that, in comparison, cooling was used. Attachment greater than 10 comparison, greater temperature of 1 109.3 0F Ceramic percent cooling was used to calculate calculate the maximum basin temperature 09.3°F in Ceramic Cooling Tower Company Engineering Report NCT-683-55, Company Engineering NCT-683-55, "Response to Sargent Sargent and LundyLundy letter of 11-17-81; 11-17-81; Complete Complete Loss of Fans," and hence, 10 percent cooling is conservative. COOling conservative. However, Report NCT-683-55 Attachment 5) states NCT-683-55 (page 115 of Attachment states that the initial SX temperature temperature 91 OF and, after the first cycle of cooling, the water leaving the fill area is entering the plant is 91°F 0 F. NCT-683-55 with 92.8 92.8°F. Provide a detailed explanation explanation of the assumptions used in Report Report NCT-683-55 regard to the SX temperature explain how the calculations are correlated addition, explain temperature used. In addition, correlated different initial conditions (and can be compared) when different comparison of conditions are used, and how the comparison Page 5 .
ATTACHMENT ATTACHMENT 1 Resp~nse Response to Request for Additional Information Information the calculations calculations validate the 10 percent percent cooling. Furthermore, Furthermore, is the value of 10 percent cooling cooling affected by weather weather conditions such as outside temperature, temperature, wet bulb temperature, or humidity? humidity? If so, provide a detailed explanation If explanation of how the 10 percent value is conservative conservative under under different different weather weather conditions.
Response
Response Report NCT Report NCT-683-55
-683-55 was prepared to predict predict performance performance of the SXCT with the postulated loss loss of all eight fans. The analysis performed by CeramicCeramic Cooling Tower Tower Company Company assumed an initial basin temperature of 91°F.
91 OF. Original construction construction design design criteria indicates indicates that under normal operating operating conditions concurrent with 78 OF wet bulb, the maximum maximum Byron SX temperature temperature was expected approximately 91 expected to be approximately 91°F OF with fans running in low speed. The The expected maximum maximum normal operating temperature temperature was specified as the initial basin temperature temperature NCT-683-55 analysis. for the NCT-683-55 The NCT-683-55 NCT-683-55 calculation determined determined aa predicted operating equilibrium temperature temperature of: Hot Water Temperature (HWT) Entering Water Temperature Entering the Towers 112.2 112.2 OF OF Cold Water Temperature Temperature (CWT) Leaving the Tower Fill Area Area 109.3 109.3 OF OF Heat Dissipation 150 x 10 1066 Btu/hr For the same heat load, wet bulb temperature, temperature, flow of 13,000 gpm per cell, and an assumed assumed ten percent percent cooling tower performance performance when no fans are in operation, operation, the MathCAD model calculated calculated an operating operating equilibrium equilibrium temperature temperature of 113.7 OF for the cold water temperature temperature leaving the tower tower fill area. The calculated calculated equilibrium temperature temperature is independent independent of the initial basin temperature. temperature. The The MathCAD file was changed to use an initial basin temperature temperature of 91°F; 91 OF; Attachment 3 of this this document document contains the MathCAD MathCAD file. After the first cycle of cooling ('t1 (t1 = 1.068E6 1.068E6 gallons/1 04,000 gpm = 10.27 minutes) the MathCAD model predicted galions/104,000 predicted temperature temperature is 93.6 OF, which is slightly higher higher than 92.8 OF predicted predicted in NCT-683-55. NCT-683-55. The calculated equilibriumequilibrium temperature remains 113.7 113.7 OF. comparison of the equilibrium temperatures The comparison temperatures indicates indicates that assuming ten percent percent of water is cooled in a passive tower tower using the MathCAD MathCAD model provides conservative results. provides conservative Performance testing of the Byron SXCT was performed Performance performed in 1987. A copy of the test report was was submitted to the NRC on February February 1, 1988. The NRC retained Idaho National Engineering National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) to review the test procedures, procedures, test data, and results. The NRC issued a Safety Evaluation on April 24, 1989, endorsing Safety Evaluation endorsing the INEL INEL Technical Evaluation Report Technical Evaluation Report that concluded the tests done were conservatively concluded conservatively designed and resulted in a reasonable estimate estimate of the cooling tower's capability capability over the expected expected range range of conditions. Cooling tower tower performance performance test data data from the 1987 1987 cooling tower test program included three tests of a fan cell with the fan off. Comparing Comparing the tests with no fan running to tests with similar outside air air conditions and water flow rates when the fan was running indicates indicates the heat removal removal rate with the fan off was between 16 to 21 percent percent of the heat removal removal rate with the fan on. This provides provides additional basis that the ten percent percent assumption used is conservative. conservative. Page 6
ATTACHMENT ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Request for Additional Response Information Additional Information performance with the fans in service is calculated using the MRL Cooling tower performance MRL Corporation/Environmental Corporation/Environmental Service Corporation Corporation (ESC) model for the Byron cooling cooling tower. The The performance performance curves used as an input to the analysis generated for the different analysis are generated different assumed weather conditions. When a fan is not running, performance curve is used, but only running, the same performance ten percent assumed to be cooled. percent of the water is assumed cooled. From "Cooling Tower Fundamentals" published by SPX Cooling Technologies, the percentage percentage performance with fans off versus fans on does get smaller as the wet bulb of cooling tower performance bulb percent value used in the analysis is considered temperature drops. The ten percent considered conservative conservative under different different weather conditions, because the analyses analyses were performed with assumed assumed wet bulb temperatures of 70, 76, 78, and 82 OF. The cooling tower test data from the 1987 cooling cooling tower test program that showed heat removal rate with the fan off was between between 16 to 21 percent percent of the heat removal removal rate with the fan on was performed performed when wet bulb temperatures temperatures werewere between 67 and 68 OF. Thus, at the higher between temperatures used in the analysis for this higher wet bulb temperatures this proposed change, the heat removal rate with the fan expected to be slightly higher off would be expected higher than the 1616 to 21 percent of the heat removal rate with the fan running. Request 7 NRC Request dependent on the SX pumps' discharge requirements of the UHS are dependent The fan requirements discharge temperature. temperature. requirements and defines New TS Table 3.7.9-1 states these fan requirements New Limiting defines the associated Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO). Note construed to reduce the fan Note (a) of this table could be construed requirement when in Condition B. Since this note is associated requirement associated with the column of the table that specifies LCO requirements, interpretation of Note (a) could imply that the fan requirements requirements, an interpretation requirements for the LCO are satisfied ifif in Condition B B and there is one less fan running in high speed. Then conclude the plant is no longer in Condition B. This could present confusion one might conclude confusion as to the the actual condition condition of the UHS. . Furthermore, Condition A explicitly states that if Furthermore, if one or more required cooling tower fans are not running in high speed, then actions must be taken immediately correct the condition and, ifif immediately to correct corrected immediately, then Condition J should be entered not corrected entered and the plant must be shutdown. This would mean that when the plant was running high speed fans to meet the LCO LCO requirements of requirements Table Table 3.7.9-1 with the other fans out of service, failure of one or more of thethe running fans would cause entry into Condition J and Mode 3 in 6 hours. The same situation temperature increased such that an additional fan in high speed was required would exist ifif SX temperature required in accordance Table 3.7.9-1 and an additional fan was not available. accordance with Table Per discussion licensee via telecom on November 18, 2009, the licensee stated that the discussion with the licensee the if in Condition B, to keep the remaining fans running in high speed during the 72 intent was, if intent Condition B. The intent was also to exit Condition A, ifif also in hours that the UHS was in Condition hours in Condition B, and only one required fan (not more than one fan) was not running in high speed. The licensee needs to explain how Note (a) of Table 3.7.9-1 and Condition A are not subject to to possible misinterpretation reword/relocate Note (a) of Table 3.7.9-1 and Condition A, as misinterpretation or reword/relocate as applicable, such that the intent of the LCO, Condition, applicable, Required Actions, and Completion Condition, Required Completion Time Time of Conditions Conditions A and Condition B are not subject to possible misinterpretation. misinterpretation. Page 7
ATTACHMENT ATTACHMENT 1
Response
Response to Request Request for Additional Information Additional Information
Response
Response In response to the concern concern for possible misinterpretation with Note (a) possible misinterpretation (a) of Table 3.7.9-1 and its relationship to Conditions A and B, Note (a) has been eliminated eliminated from Table 3.7.9-1, 3.7.9-1, and Condition A has been reworded to read "One or more Condition more OPERABLE OPERABLE cooling tower fan(s) not running in high speed as required by Table 3.7.9-1." 3.7.9-1 ." The proposed proposed note for Condition A has has also been eliminated. defined in the TS Bases, an operable eliminated. As defined operable cooling tower tower fan must bebe capable operable cooling tower fans to be capable of running in high speed. IfIf Table 3.7.9-1 requires operable be running in high speed and one or more more are not, then required Action A.1 would direct actions to immediately to place those required operable be initiated immediately operable fan(s) that are currently currently operable operable in in high speed mode. IfIf Table 3.7.9-1 requires operable cooling tower fans to be running in high high speed speed and one required fan is not capablecapable of running in high speed, then the fan is considered inoperable. In this case, Condition B would apply. Condition A would not apply apply to this situation, situation, since the fan is not operable. operable. IfIf Table 3.7.9-1 requires requires operable cooling tower fans to be be running in high speed and more than one required fan is not capable of running in high speed, then these fans are considered inoperable. In this case, Condition J would apply. Table 3.7.9-1 has been revised to encompass encompass all SX pump discharge discharge temperature temperature ranges. Subsequently, Subsequently, the word "ADDITIONAL" has been removed from the heading of the second second column of Table 3.7.9-1, 3.7.9-1, and SR 3.7.9.2 has been revised to read "Verify cooling cooling tower fan requirements requirements in Table 3.7.9-1 are met." The LCO statement has been been revised to state "The"The UHS UHS shall be OPERABLE OPERABLE and the SX cooling tower fans shall be OPERABLE OPERABLE and operating as specified This specified in Table 3.7.9-1." This revision ensures ensures consistency consistency with other LCOs that contain tables that further define define the LCO LCO requirements. In addition, a typographical typographical error was corrected in Required Required Action B.2; the wordword "fans" has been changed "fans" changed to "fan."
"fan."
Condition Condition C has been modified to read "Two inoperable inoperable cooling tower fans not required required to bebe OPERABLE OPERABLE by Table 3.7.9-1 that are powered by the same electrical division." Attachment 2 provides provides the revised markups of the affected TS pages. NRC Request Request 8 Each accident accident scenario described in Attachment scenario described Attachment 4 to the June 30, 2009, LAR specifies that half of the reactor containment containment fan cooler subtracted at 30 minutes. The "UHS cooler (RCFC) heat load is subtracted "UHS Accident Accident Heat Load Profile L42" for each accident scenario shows the slope of the decreasing decreasing heat rate (MBTU/hr) input input into the UHS becoming less negative negative at the time (approximately 1800 1800 sec) when the RCFC heat load is removed removed from the UHS. Intuitively, it should be more negative negative because because a set of RCFCs RCFCs is no longer providing providing heat to the UHS.
- a. Explain why the heat load profile shows a decreasedecrease in the slope of the decreasing decreasing heat raterate 1800 seconds. How does this relate to removing one-half profile at 1800 one-half the RCFC heat load to the UHS?
UHS?
- b. What is the cause decrease in the heat cause of the rapid decrease heat input at t = 1400 seconds?
Page 8
ATTACHMENT 1 ATTACHMENT Response to Request Response Information Request for Additional Information
Response
Response The calculated calculated total heat load to the UHS with load shedding is as follows: Time Total Heat Load to the UHS UHS (seconds) (Btu/hr) 1,299 1,299 8.04E+08 1,799 1,799 5.27E+08 2,399 4.52E+08 4.52E+08 The large decrease decrease in load between time 11,299 ,299 and 1,799 1,799 seconds seconds is caused caused by the reduction in assumed to be complete RCFC heat load assumed complete at time = 30 minutes. The smaller decrease decrease in load between 1,799 and 2,399 secondsseconds is a reduction in decay decay heat input to containment results containment that results in lower lower accident accident unit heat load. MathCAD uses a linear interpolation of the heat load MathCAD load and time data points to generate generate thethe curves curves in Attachment Attachment 4. With a linear interpolation, interpolation, the MathCAD curve shows a rapid decrease decrease in the heat load starting starting at time 1,299 seconds seconds ending ending at time 1,799 1,799 seconds (i.e., (i.e., the RCFC heat input starts to reduce at time = 1,300 seconds and is complete at time = 1,799 seconds). The slope of the curve becomes becomes less negative negative after the RCFC load reduction is complete at time time
= 1,800 seconds.
The technical evaluation evaluation for the previously previously submitted proposed proposed changes indicated indicated that action to to shed heat load by securing securing up to two of the four RCFCs would be taken taken within 30 minutes. minutes. 'Based on the method inputing and using load method for inputing load in the calculations, the time to complete the complete the action action to shed heat load load is actually 21.6 minutes. As discussed discussed in the response to NRC NRC Request 4.b. above, the operator actions to secure secure RCFCs are expected expected to start and complete complete well before 1,300 before 1,300 seconds (21.6 minutes). NRC NRC Request Request 9 Assumption 3.3 in Attachment Attachment 4 of the LAR states that, for scenarios scenarios 8D and 8D1, 8D1, no cooling is credited prior to fan initiation initiation at 10 after the LOCA. 10 minutes after Cold weather scenarios 10 through 13 weather scenarios 13 require fans to be started and riser valves to be opened within 10 minutes of the LOCA and bypass valves to be manually shut within 30 minutes. NRC NRC Request 9.a Request 9.a Explain Explain the existing or planned processes processes and procedures procedures that cause the required number of fans, the required fan speed and applicable valves to be open or shut within 10 10 and 30 minutes minutes after the LOCA such that UHS basin temperature temperature will not exceed 100°F.
Response
Response Emergency Procedures 1/2BEP-0 Emergency Operating Procedures 1/2BEP-0 Step 14.g. directs the operators operators to open the riser valves, close the hot water water basin bypass bypass valves, and verify/start verify/start the cooling tower fans in high high speed. The Response Not Obtained directs the operators to dispatch Obtained column directs dispatch operator(s) to Page 9
ATTACHMENT ATTACHMENT 1 Request for Additional Information Response to Request Information close any open open hot water basin bypass valve valve and ifif any fan does not start in high speed, then associated riser valve. As discussed in the response to NRC Request 4.b., these close its associated these actions support the assumed assumed action times used in the temperature temperature analyses. NRC NRC Request 9.b Specify Specify what operator actions actions from the control room and outside the control room, and their time time completion requirements, are necessary necessary for each scenario.
Response
Response Three operator actions are credited in the UHS temperature temperature analyses: Operator action
- 1. Operator action will be taken within ten minutes to align the service service water cooling tower tower (SXCT) to maximize maximize the heat removal capacity. This action includes:
includes: 1) Opening Opening riser valves, 2) Closing hot water basin bypass valves, 3) Verifying/Starting Verifying/Starting cooling tower fans in high speed, and 4) Closing associated associated riser valve of any fan that does not start in high speed. These operator operator actions are taken from the control room.
- 2. If If a bypass valve fails to close, operator action will be taken within 30 minutes to manually close the bypass manually bypass valve at the cooling tower. This action is taken outside outside the the control room.
- 3. If If required, required, operator action will be taken taken at or prior to 21 minutes minutes to turn off two of the the four RCFCs to shed load. Actions to turn off the RCFCs RCFCs will be taken from the control room NRC Reauest Request 9.c9.c Explain the basis for assuming assuming initial basin 0F Explain basin temperature is 74 74°F in scenarios 10 through 13.
Response
Response I The cold weather scenarios scenarios evaluate the cases cases when the SXCT bypass bypass valves may may be open to to prevent overcooling. overcooling. The bypass valves are typically controlled manuallymanually but will auto-open auto-open when SX pump discharge temperature drops below 52 °F discharge temperature ~F and will auto-close auto-close when SX pumppump discharge temperature temperature increases increases above 70 of.OF. An initial basin temperature temperature of 74 OFof was was selected to provide margin to the bypass valve auto-close provide margin auto-close setpoint. NRC Request Request 10 10 The LAR specifies specifies a new Surveillance Surveillance Requirement Requirement 3.7.9.10, which will check check outside outside wet bulb bulb temperature every every 12 hours. Discuss what instrumentation instrumentation will be used to obtain these these temperature measurements. temperature measurements. Page 10
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Request for Additional Response Information Additional Information
Response
Response Three temperature for the surveillance requirement Three options for checking outside wet bulb temperature requirement (SR) are planned. Option 1: Obtain the outside air dry bulb temperature reading from the plant computer (input computer (input is from the met tower). If If the outside air dry bulb temperature temperature is below the SA SR temperature temperature then the SR requirement is satisfied satisfied (wet bulb temperature temperature cannot be below the dry bulb bulb temperature). temperature reading Option 2: IfIf the outside air dry bulb temperature reading is above the SR temperature, computer (input is from the met temperature reading from the plant computer obtain the dew point temperature tower). tower). A website-based temperature website-based calculator will then be used to obtain the wet bulb temperature using the outside temperature and dew point readings. outside air temperature Option 3: If the met tower data or the website is not available, a hand-held instrument will Option 3: If the met tower data or the website is not available, a hand-held instrument will measure the wet bulb temperature. be used to directly measure NRC Request 11 Attachment Method of Analysis, refers to the "ESW [essential service , Section 6.0, Method service water] cooling tower transient model" from Appendix Appendix G NED-M-MSD-009. calculation NED-M-MSD-009. G of calculation NRC Request 11.a 11 .a current licensing basis of the UHS. Discuss the origin of this model and how itit relates to the current
Response
Response The time-dependent, time-dependent, two-cooling-tower developed as part of the 1991 two-cooling-tower model was developed 1991 Byron UHS UHS Design Basis Reconstitution Reconstitution effort and is described described in a January January 9, 1992, report to the NRC. The model has been used in support of Byron's March 31, 31, 1992, and May 6, 1997, license license amendment requests. The model amendment model was used to develop the current Technical Specifications Technical Specifications limits on basin UHS temperature. temperature. NRC Request 11.b 11.b For the cooling tower transient model:
** Define and explain the cooling tower transient model; include discussing the governing governing variables; include identifying the input to the model from various equations and process variables; various accuracy of the model by comparing predicted model calculations. Discuss the accuracy operational data.
performance with actual test or operational performance
** Discuss how the model accounts for varying SX flow rates, as some accident scenarios scenarios have closed riser valves and/or open bypass valves.
Page 11 11
ATTACHMENT ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Request for Additional Response Information Additional Information
** Discuss how the model accounts for time varying LOCA heat loads from the SX system to the UHS. ** Include Include how the model accounts for varying number of fans running in either fast speed or slow speed.
- Explain how the model accounts for varying dry bulb temperatures at the maximum wet
- Explain how the model accounts for varying dry bulb temperatures at the maximum wet bulb temperature.
temperature.
- Discuss how the model predicts bulk UHS basin temperature, which is limited to 100°F. 100°F.
Response
Response Please refer to Calculations Please Calculations NED-Q-MSD-1, NED-Q-MSD-1, "ESW Cooling Tower Transient Model: Tower Transient Model: Part 1," I," and NED-Q-MSD- 6, "ESW Cooling Tower Transient Model: NED-Q-MSD- Model: Part II," this III," in Attachment 3 of this document for the governing equations document equations and variables. In the MathCAD model, the solution to the the time-dependent basin temperature is approximated time-dependent approximated by a first-order Taylor expansion. expansion. TheThe MathCAD model results were compared to hand calculations MathCAD calculations based on the exact analytical solution of the differential differential equation equation describing describing the transient transient response of the basin temperature. The comparison showed only small differences, differences, and the MathCAD MathCAD program was judged to acceptable results. Subsequently, the MathCAD provide acceptable MathCAD model model equation equation was enhanced enhanced to account for bypass flow in both towers. The following inputs are used used in the transient transient temperature model:
- performance curves The cooling tower performance curves (Thot (Thot vs TTcold) co1d ) are generated generated using the MRUESC MRL/ESC model for the Byron cooling tower. The following descriptiondescription of the MRUESC MRL/ESC model was was provided in the January January 9, 1992, Byron UHS Design Design Basis Reconstitution Reconstitution Final Report submittal to the NRC (Note - refer to the JanuaryJanuary 9, 1992 1992 report for quoted reference reference documents):
Cooling performance is dependent Cooling tower performance dependent upon the three parameters; parameters; ambient wet bulb temperature, temperature, heat load, and water/air water/air flow rates. In turn, values for each each of these are dictated dictated by features features of the specific accident scenario under accident scenario under evaluation. evaluation. This section describes describes the program undertaken undertaken by CECo to to determine determine the performance performance of the Byron UHS cooling towers under the under the postulated accidents accidents discussed above. The heat transfer modelmodel used to evaluate evaluate and predict predict the performance these performance of these cooling cooling towers was derived derived from the Merkel Merkel theory developed developed in 1925, as as modified by M.R. Lefevre (Reference 22). As water Lefevre in 1984 (Reference water passes through the the fill region of the tower it is dispersed dispersed into a large numbernumber of small droplets so as as to maximize the heat transfer surface area. Merkel assumed that at a given elevation elevation in the tower eacheach water droplet has a uniform temperature temperature and is surrounded surrounded by a film of fully saturated saturated air at the same temperature. temperature. Heat is transferred from the water primarily by evaporation transferred evaporation from the film into the air. Additionally, because the air is cooler than the water, some degree degree of sensible sensible heat transfer transfer takes place as well. Using several approximations approximations Merkel showed Page Page 12
ATTACHMENT ATTACHMENT 1 Request for Additional Information Response to Request Information that the total rate of heat transfer droplet-film to air transfer was proportional to the droplet-film air difference. This relationship was then incorporated enthalpy difference. incorporated into an integral, integral, which could be used directly to evaluate referred to as the demand integral, evaluate tower performance. M. R. Lefevre's M. Lefevre's contributions improved upon the earlier approximations improved upon approximations with thethe end result that more accurate conservative predictions of tower accurate and conservative tower performance were performance achieved. Using these principles, the MRL Corporation were achieved. Corporation developed a general computer developed computer program, program, which as used extensively in the UHS extensively UHS reconstitution effort. The Byron UHS COOling tower test program was completed in 1987 and had as cooling tower as the main objective determination of the tower characteristic, (Ref. 3). A total objective the determination of 33 separate temperatures, water separate tests were completed, with varying wet bulb temperatures, water flow rates and heat loads. Simultaneous measurements of the air flow allowed Simultaneous measurements allowed relationship of air-to-water flow to be determined for the relationship determined as well. The tower air-water curve are required when predicting characteristic and air-water characteristic performance at predicting performance conditions other than those directly measured. These Byron specific cooling cooling tower functions were then incorporated into the MRL computer tower functions program by computer program Environmental Systems Environmental Systems Corporation. Corporation. Before using a computer programprogram for safety-related applications it must first safety-related applications validation-verification process undergo a validation-verification undergo procedures. The validation process per CECo procedures. plan utilized plan utilized aa hand calculation to hand calculation to independently independently verify the accuracy and reliability of the code (Ref. 23). The results of this comparison comparison are documented documented in the validation report (Ref. (Ref. 15). The hand calculation used the MRL heat transfer model, together with the Byron characteristic and air/water UHS tower characteristic air/water flow relationship. differences relationship. The only differences calculation and the computer between the hand calculation program methodology were as computer program as follows:
- 1. The MRL program used a multi-point Simpson's integration Simpson's Rule integration scheme to evaluate scheme demand integral; the hand calculation evaluate the demand calculation used Gaussian Quadrature to complete the alternate method of Gaussian complete this task, and and
- 2. The program used an iteration scheme to determine determine the sensible sensible and latent heat transfers separately, instead of assuming fully saturated air upon entry into the tower, as was the case in the hand saturated hand calculation.
calculation. Page 13
ATTACHMENT ATTACHMENT 1 Request forAdditional Response to Request Information for Additional Information A total of nineteen comparisons between the MRL comparisons between program outputs and the MRL program the parameters were varied over calculations were made, (Ref. 9). The main parameters hand calculations the following ranges:
-ambient wet bulb temperature: 50, 70 and 82 of OF Twb
-water flow per cell: 6,000; 8,000; 10,000; and 16,500 gpm
-cooling tower range (~T):
(AT): 4, 20, 23, 30, 38 and 40 OF of enveloped the conditions required for parameter variations enveloped These broad parameter evaluation of the accident evaluation accident scenarios. agreement between The level of agreement between the MRL program predictions and the hand calculations was shown to be very high. Values of the predicted cold water basin temperature agreed to within - 0.40 to + 0.02 OF with an averageaverage difference difference of - 0.09 OF. Additionally, for all but three cases, the hand calculations yielded cold calculations yielded cold temperatures below temperatures program. The MRL below those given by the program. MRL program, program, then, as calculation, was seen to give judged by the hand calculation, conservatively high values of give conservatively spectrum of flows, cooling tower ranges temperatures over a wide spectrum cold water temperatures ranges and wet bulb temperatures. In summary, this reanalysis performance testing of the Byron cooling reanalysis of the performance cooling towers confirms the results obtained in 1987. Therefore, Therefore, the tower characteristic characteristic resultant predicted performance and resultant unchanged from that given performance remain unchanged the given in the ESC test report (Ref. 3). Further, the successful validation of the Byron specific specific MRL computer program allows for its use at conditions specified MRL computer specified by each accident scenario. accident
- New New total heat heat load versus time input was calculated for scenarios scenarios where RCFC heat load was shed at 30 minutes. Please refer to the response to NRC Request 12.a 12.a below below for additional information on the heat load input to the model.model. The MathCAD time dependent dependent two cooling tower model usesuses a linear interpolation determine the heat input interpolation function to determine input to integrating to solve for basin temperature.
the UHS for each time step when integrating
- Total flow to the towers, flow to the individual risers in the towers, and RCFC flows are generated for each scenario using the Byron SX PI generated PE-FLO model. The flow model PIPE-FLO accounts for the varying flow rates for each scenario due to closed riser valves and/or accounts and/or open bypass valves. When operator bypass action is assumed to close riser valves or bypass valves, operator action calculated and used in the MathCAD separate inputs are calculated separate dependent two cooling tower MathCAD time dependent tower separate time intervals (i.e.
integration is split into separate model and the integration (i.e. ti = 0 to 10 minutes, ti = 10 to 30 minutes, and ti > 30 minutes).
- " SX water inventory determined based on the TS minimum inventory is determined level.
minimum level. considered to be active with the fans running in high speed or passive Tower cells are either considered passive with fans not running in high speed. When fans are running in low speed speed the cell is conservatively assumed to be passive. conservatively Page 14
ATTACHMENT 1 ATTACHMENT Response to Request Response Request for Additional Information Additional Information The cooling cooling tower performance performance curves are conservatively conservatively based on the limiting wet bulb bulb temperature temperature and a relative humidity of 75 percent. This results in a constant air inlet dry bulb bulb temperature temperature for the event. For the design wet bulb temperature temperature of 82 OF, the dry bulb bulb temperature temperature at 75 percent humidity is 88.9 OF. For a mechanical draft cooling tower, the percent relative humidity the wet bulb temperature temperature is the primary primary driver of thermal performance. performance. NRC Request 11.c 11.c Page H6 refers to "Eq (3)" which is not defined in the LAR. LAR. Describe and define Eq (3), and and discuss discuss how itit relates to the essential service water water cooling tower transient model which which predicts UHS UHS performance. performance.
Response
Response Calculation NED-M-MSD-009 Page 12 of Calculation NED-M-MSD-009 defines Equation Equation 3 as: Tbi+1 = Tbi + (ATbi + Lt1B + C)H Where: Tb i = Tbi = Basin Temperature Temperature at time titj A, B, and C = Intermediate Intermediate constants constants Lt, = Lti = Total heat load at time tj ti H = time step size used The MathCAD transient model uses this formula to calculate incremental incremental changes in in temperature for the time increment. temperature NRC NRC Request 12 Attachment , Section 6.0, Methods Methods of Analysis, ItemItem 1 refers to the revised total heat load to the UHS curve and Item 3 refers to the new flow rates and tower performance performance curves. NRC Request 12.a 12.a Discuss the reasons why the total heat load to the UHS had had to be revised for this LAR. Discuss Discuss the conservatism and design margin of the revised total heat load to the UHS.
Response
Response For the postulated postulated passive electrical electrical failures, preliminary preliminary runs were made made to determine the the temperature for 0, 1, and 2 fans out of service. required initial basin temperature service. The preliminary results with the existing existing total heat load indicated indicated that for some of the postulated postulated scenarios the required initial basin temperatures temperatures to keep the peak basin temperatures temperatures below the design temperature temperature of 100 OF would be too low to support plant operationoperation in the summer summer months (the required required initial Page 15
ATTACHMENT ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Request for Additional Information Information temperature was below typical summer basin temperature basin temperature temperature ranges}. ranges). Thus, itit was decided decided to pursue pursue load shedding for the passive electrical electrical failure scenarios. scenarios. The primary conservatism in the calculated primary conservatism calculated heat heat load is in how the accident accident heat heat load was was calculated. For the first hour of an event, the heat input for the time dependent dependent accident accident unit is the bulk of the heat percent of the total heat load). The calculated heat inputfrom heat load (78 to 91 percent input from the accident accident unit is maximized maximized by:
** RCFC performance performance is maximized by assuming: higher SX flow rates, higher airflow rates, and an SX supply temperature of 32 of. OF. In actuality, the initial SX water supply temperature is typically near 70 of OF and will quickly approach approach the design design temperature of 100 temperature 100 OFof during an event event with failures that minimize minimize UHS heat removal.
** Assuming earlier switchover to containment earlier switchover containment recirculation recirculation phase phase and corresponding corresponding earlier Residual earlier Residual Heat Removal (RH)
(RH) heat loads. .
** Component Component Cooling (CC) Water and RH heat exchanger performance heat exchanger performance is maximized maximized by assuming the clean heat exchanger exchanger transfer rate and maximum maximum water flows.
Additionally, the design heat load for the heat exchangers exchangers and coolers served by the SX system was used to maximize maximize the constant miscellaneous miscellaneous heat input input to the UHS. For this LAR the heat load from equipment equipment that has been abandoned abandoned reduced the constant miscellaneous miscellaneous heat load. heat load. NRC Request Request 12.b 12.b Discuss why new tower flow rates and tower performance performance curves had to be generated this generated for this LAR. Discuss the conservatism conservatism and design margin of the new new flow rates and tower performance performance curves.
Response
Response Cooling tower performance performance is dependent dependent on the water water flow rate through the tower fill. Previous Previous analyses assumed assumed that for an active fan failure, operator operator action action would be taken to isolate the isolate the associated riser valve to optimize heat removal in the cooling tower. Postulated breaker associated breaker failures failures would also result in the loss of power to the motor operated operated riser valves for the impacted SXCT cell. IfIf the riser valve for the affected cell was open prior to the postulated breaker breaker failure, operator actions to isolate isolate the riser valves and redistribute SX return water to active cooling tower cells is not practical practical (the riser valves are in tornado protected protected enclosures). Thus, new tower flow rates had to be generated generated for the postulated postulated breaker breaker failure scenarios. scenarios. Additionally Additionally the amount amount of assumed assumed riser and bypass valve leak-by leak-by was reduced reduced based on new acceptance acceptance criteria for valve leak-by monitoring. monitoring. New tower performance curves were needed tower performance needed for the revised water flows through the cooling tower fill. fill. New tower performance performance curves were were also needed needed for the scenarios scenarios where two fansfans are initially out of service service on the bus and a lower outsideoutside air wet bulb temperature temperature was was assumed. A PIPE-FLO computer computer model was used to determinedetermine total tower, RCFC, and individual tower cell flows. The Byron SX PIPE-FLO model was previously calibrated based on system test data data to more accurately accurately predict actual Essential predict actual Essential Service Water Water system flows and pressure conditions. conditions. Page 16
ATTACHMENT ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Request for Additional Information Information SX pump performance performance and flow through through the CC heat exchangers exchangers were biasedbiased high to maximize maximize flow to the cooling towers. A higher flow through through the cooling tower cells conservatively conservatively reduces reduces cooling tower performance. cooling performance. NRC Request 13 The calculations for each scenario in Attachment 4 use the terms M11, M1 1, B11, B131, M12, M1 2, and B12.B132. Discuss the meaning of these terms and how they are used to determine determine model performance.
Response
Response The cooling tower heat exchange exchange process is modeled modeled as a linear function. Hot water water enters thethe fill region of the tower at a temperature, Th, releases temperature, T h, releases heat to the counter-flowing counter-flowing air by both latent and and sensible heat transfer, and enters the basin at the cold water temperature, temperature, To. The Te. The resultant rate of heatheat transfer for a given mass flow rate, m, is given by the product of m and the the temperature temperature decrease, or range, R = =Th - Te. T,. The dependence dependence of T Tc,e, upon T h, is the relationship Th, relationship approximated approximated as a linear function. M1 1 is the slope, and B11 M11 B131 is the intercept intercept for a line that determines determines Tower 1 performance performance for first time interval. interval. M12 is the slope, and B12 is the intercept intercept for a line that determines Tower 1 performance performance for second time interval. See the response response to NRC Request 15 below for additional additional information on the method method for calculating M1 1, B11, calculating M11, M1 2, and 812. B131, M12, B12. NRC NRC Request 14 The calculations calculations for each scenario in Attachment 4 use the terms B1 31 and B2 32 and define them as as the fraction fraction of load to Tower 1. Explain why the fraction is defined defined in terms of flow to the RCFC only.
Response
Response The peak temperatures temperatures occur early in the events (e.g., the maximum basin temperature temperature in Scenario Scenario BC 8C occurs at 40 minutes). During the initial time of the postulated postulated scenarios, the heat input to the UHS is dominated dominated by the accident accident heat input, which until the accident accident unit goes on RH recirculation, recirculation, is from the RCFCs. The miscellaneous miscellaneous heat loads are generally generally split evenly evenly between between trains. Thus, the RCFC flow fraction provides provides a reasonable reasonable input for the fraction of heat load going to Tower 1. heat NRC NRC Request Request 15 For cooling tower performance, each scenario scenario in Attachment Attachment 4 uses temperatures temperatures Th1 Thl through Th4 and Tcl Tc1 through Tc4. Explain how these values are obtained and how they are used for predicting predicting cooling tower performance.
Response
Response For each scenario, scenario, two points were selected from the applicable tower performance performance data to to provide a linear linear approximation approximation of tower performance over the range of T tower performance THOt Hot and T TcOld Cold Page Page 17
ATTACHMENT ATTACHMENT 1
Response
Response to Request for Additional Additional Information Information temperatures. temperatures. These points are listed as Th1, Thl, Th2, Th3, Th4, Tc1,TOl, Tc2, Tc3, and Tc4 in the the MathCAD models. example in Accident For example Accident Scenario 8A, the following points taken from the tower performance performance data data are used (a curve of the data is shown in Figure H-1, H-l, the actual actual data points pOints come from Calculation Calculation BYR97-127): Tower 1 (THot, (THot. T co1d): (119.02, 91.02) and (111.8, 89.8) Tcold): Tower 2 (T Hot. T (THot, Co1d ): (118.79, 90.79) and (111.6, 89.6) Tcold): In MathCAD, MathCAD, the data is input as a matrix matrix format: (119.02> 119.02) (91.02> 91.02) Thl := ( *F Tel:= Tcl: ( 89.8). *F TChl : 111.8 ) 111.8 89.8 (118.79> 118.79) F (90.79>F 90.79) Th2:= *F Tc2:= ( *F ( 111.6 111l.6)" T 89.6) 89.6 To generate generate the linear approximation, MathCAD calculates approximation, MathCAD calculates the slope and intercept intercept of the line line generated generated by the two points for each tower. M11 M1 1 is the slope and B11B131 is the intercept intercept calculated calculated by MathCAD MathCAD for Tower 1 in the first time period, and M21 and B21 are the slope slope and the intercept, respectively, respectively, calculated by MathCAD MathCAD for Tower 2 for the first time period. To accommodate accommodate actions that change the water flow distribution in the towers, the MathCAD model is setup for two time periods. In Scenario Scenario 8A, the first time period is time = 0 to 30 minutes and the second period period is time ~ 30 minutes. Th3 and Tc3 provide the tower*
> tower performance performance data for Tower Tower 1, and Th4 and Tc4 provide the tower performance performance data for Tower 2 during the second second time period.
period. MathCAD MathCAD uses the input to calculate calculate the slope and intercept for each tower for the second time period (M12, M22, B12 and B22). For Scenario Scenario 8A there is no change in water flow distribution in the tower, thus Thl Th1 = Th3, Tc1 TcO = Tc3, Th2 = Th4, and Tc2 = Thc4. Thc4. Adding the MathCAD generated linear interpolation MathCAD generated (Ml 1=0.169 interpolation (M11 =0.169 and B11 = 70.909) to the the applicable Scenario 8A curve, it can be seen that the straight-line applicable Scenario straight-line interpolation conservatively interpolation conservatively envelops performance curve; i.e., Tcold envelops the tower performance conservatively high for a Thot Tcold is conservatively T hot input value. Page 18
ATTACHMENT 11 ATTACHMENT Response to Response to Request Request for Additional Information for Additional Information Figure Figure H-1: H-1: Scenario Scenario 8A SA 100 100 F8A - - 8 A Tower Tower A,A, 7727 gpm, Twb 7727 gpm, 82°F Twb 82°F 99 99 98 98 ..... 'Tc
------ Tc = 0.169Th + 70.909 70.909 97 97 96 96-95 95 94 94-E.., 93 933
..~
0 92 92-91 - ~
90 90 ~ 89 89 ~ 88 88- -
..~
87- ..- 2 2;,/" 87
.. ./'
86 86-85 85-90 100 100 110 120 130 140 150 150 Thco(°F) Page 19
ATTACHMENT ATTACHMENT 2 Revised Markup of Proposed Technical Specifications Specifications Pages Pages Byron Station Units Units 1 and 2 Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-37 and NPF-66 NPF-66 REVISED TECHNICAL TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGES SPECIFICATIONS PAGES 3.7.9-1 3.7.9-1 3.7.9-5 3.7.9-6
UHS UHS 3.7.9 3.7.9 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS SYSTEMS 3.7.9 Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) (UHS) LCO 3.7.9 3.7.9 The UHS shall be OPERABLE OPERABLE and the SX cooling cooling tower fans shall shall be OPERABLE and operating as specified in Table 3.7.9-1. 3.7.9-1. APPLICABILITY: APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, 3, and 4. 4. ACTIONS ACTIONS CONDITION CONDITION REQU I RED ACTI REQUIRED ACTIONON COMPLETION COMPLETION TIME
,A Oner ire oVePng J\Ar1 Ver M A~ A§,
IJerHJ' remaii1ng 1 hour
~:~e:e2~!ri~o~g~!~~5.
II
)4. .1 rema~
toer.- an enper-able, reE1u~ reEl OPERABL r-equired QP~Rfl,gb~ EOO~~A§ tower faAs cooling fans are capable
-are Ea~a8~e of being 8e~A§
~ov~ereEl powe r.ed SJI a-R by aA QP~RJ\gb~ emer§eAE:Y OPERABLE emergency power sourEe.
~ov~er source.
AM) AN-D
,A..~
'A.2 ~estore Restorer7e
- pd reE1u~reEl 7~ hours hqi tower faA to EOO~~A§ tower fan to coolDDI QP~R~gb~ status.
OPERBLEstatujs.
- g. One or more basin
-B. basin -B-A B Restore both basin basin 6 hours hours
~ level(s) < 60%. levels to Ž~ 60%.
b level(s)
\ (continued)
(continued)
\ \--E. I
\ IE I I I
E.1 I Replace with INSERT 3.7.9-1 BYRON - UNITS 1 & &22 3.7.9 3.7.9 - 1 Amendment 106 106
INSERT 3.7.9-1 A. One or more OPERABLE OPERABLE A.1 Initiate actions to operate Immediately Immediately cooling tower fan(s) not cooling OPERABLE OPERABLE cooling tower running in high speed as fan(s) in high speed. required by Table 3.7.9-1. 3.7.9-1. B. One required cooling cooling tower B.1 Verify Verify remaining required . 1 hour hour inoperable. fan inoperable. OPERABLE OPERABLE cooling tower fans are capable capable of being being powered by an powered OPERABLE emergency OPERABLE power source. power AND AND B.2 Restore required required cooling 72 hours hours tower fan to OPERABLE status. c. C. Two inoperable inoperable cooling cooling C.1 Restore cooling tower fan 72 hours hours tower fans not required to configuration configuration such that be OPERABLE by Table Table two inoperable inoperable cooling 3.7.9-1 3.7.9-1 that are powered powered tower fans are not by the same electrical electrical powered powered by the samesame division, division. electrical electrical division. AND AND Outside air wet bulb bulb 0 F. temperature > 76 temperature> 76°F. D. Essential Service Water Essential Service D.1 0.1 Be in MODE 3. hours 6 hours (SX) pump discharge discharge 0 F. temperature>> 96 temperature 96°F. AND AND D.2 0.2 Be in MODE 5. hours 36 hours
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEI LLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEI LLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.9.1 Verify water level in each cooling tower hours 24 hours basin is ~> 60%. SR 3.7.9.2 3.7.9.2 Veri Wný fy essenti
-Px nF nn, al olc~~tin servi ce c-y'v,%i
'dater pump 1-n i.in+tiv, ni imr, hours 24 hours discharge water temperature 4is:
A 4 ,-k , - n-
.,+ ,n +----^nn,+r, , ,
- a. <gO°F; b.
b !~ gO°F, 990P, withw4th all required cooling r.equired coolin tower fanh to96e fans running ruRning on on high Speedi speed; or or
- c. c. ~
*96 0F with Ž!
96°F, ~ 7 cooling tower fans running on high nr -- IJ 1ý "4-k lI~
ý rL J ,II speed.
I rA SR 3.7.9.3 Verify river water water level is is > 670.6 ft MSL 24 hours and ~* 702.0 ft MSL. MSL. SR 3.7.9.4 Operate each required cooling cooling tower fan on 31 days high speed for Ž~ 15 minutes. minutes. SR 3.7.9.5 Verify each SX makeup manual, manual, power 31 days operated, and automatic operated, automatic valve in the flow flow path that is is not locked, locked, sealed, sealed, or or otherwise secured otherwise secured in the open position, position, is is in the correct correct position. position. SR 3.7.9.6 Verify that each SX makeup pump starts on a 31 days days simulated or actual simulated actual low basin level signal signal operates for ~Ž 30 minutes. and operates minutes. (continued) (continued) "----I requirements Verify cooling tower fan requirements in in Table Table 3.7.9-1 3.7.9-1 are met. BYRON - UNITS 1 & &2 3.7.9 - 5 3.7.9 106 Amendment 106
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEI LLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.9.7 3.7.9.7 Verify each diesel driven SX makeup pump Verify 31 days days fuel oil day tank level ~_>47%. SR 3.7.9.8 3.7.9.8 each testable Cycle each testable valve in the SX makeup months 18 months pump flow path through at least one one complete cycle of full travel. travel. SR 3.7.9.9 3.7.9.9 Verify fuel oil properties are tested in in In accordance accordance accordance with and maintained within the with the Diesel limits of the Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Fuel Oil Oil Program. Program. Testing Program Testing Program 3.7.9.10 --------- SR 3.7.9.10 ----------------~(),_E:---------------- NOTE ---------------- Only required when two inoperable cooling tower fans inoperable fans powered by the same are powered same electrical division. division. Verify outside air wet bulb 12 12 hours temperature temperature is ~< 76°F.760F. Add I~SE:R'_ INSERT 3.7.9-2 3.7.9-2 as a new pagepage BYRON - UNITS 1 & &2 3.7.9 - 6 Amendment 106
INSERT 3.7.9-2 3.7.9-2 Table 3.7.9-1 (page 1 of 1) Cooling Tower Fan Requirements Requirements SX PUMP DISCHARGE DISCHARGE REQUIREMENTS TEMPERATURE TEMPERATURE REGION
< 77°F tower fans are required to 6 cooling tower to be OPERABLE OPERABLE
> 770 F and < 82 0 F Either 6 required OPERABLE cooling tower fans running in high high speed, or 7 cooling tower fans are required to be OPERABLE
/'
82 0 F and
> 82°F < 84 and.:::. 0F 84°F 6 required OPERABLE cooling cooling tower tower fans running in high speed
> 84 0 F and < 91 OF 7 required OPERABLE cooling cooling tower fans running in high speed tower
> 91OF and < 960 F 8 required OPERABLE OPERABLE cooling cooling tower tower fans running in high speed
ATTACHMENT 3 ATTACHMENT Additional References Additional References Revision 4, "Ultimate Heat Sink Design Basis LOCA Single
- 1. UHS-01 Revision Single Failure Scenarios"
- 2. UHS-04 Revision 3, "Ultimate Heat Sink Design Basis LOCA Single Failure Scenarios
- 2. UHS-04 Revision 3, "Ultimate Heat Sink Design Basis LOCA Single Failure Scenarios for Cool Weather Weather Operation" MathCAD file for NRC Request 6
- 3. MathCAD
- 4. Calculation NED-Q-MSD-001, "ESW Cooling Tower Transient Calculation NED-Q-MSD-001, I" Transient Model: Part I"
- 5. Calculation Calculation NED-Q-MSD-6, NED-Q-MSD-6, "ESW Cooling Tower Transient 111" Transient Model: Part III"
ATTACHMENT ATTACHMENT 3 References Additional References
- 1. UHS-01 UHS-01 Revision 4, "Ultimate Heat Sink Design Design Basis LOCA Single Failure Failure Scenarios"
CGAA-3o9-1 001 Revision 3 iTACHENT I Delg Aiayi MjrevIsion Cover Sheet 06091: of 5
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'StatJ()n(S)::~ .. ~tatfn~1s:'Bon "Symn,\ CMpOnen1(s): i~~~ Ow.sCrp.
ýSiolftyiIQA 06"kei~ywrd-Claess:"
,~¥ N01_______
;i'~1Y~~~}~Iij~):::~
Safety RElaIýIe
;;:I~'~I'
.System Code."
;::~ __ ."-".,
S-W ucilurp. NA__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ CONTRILEDDQUEW1T.REFEOENCES!'_____ Uth Is Design AA6ala'a~.Sfga~sIfraii Yds: {3 No 4M l[yes see SY-AA-1 -1408 DVoes 1Mml Design Anatallal'conl~ain Univermfed. A wutOptOi.u' :Yeso C7 No 0 Ityes, A.T]I/ARI: NA This Design AnalysisSUPERCEDES. - NA~ In Itsenwtirety, Qewdpltun of Revision (ist affeted F:Rges for pagV61iý. "Rlep~eed pagei IAu an wfith New Goý;r Page, ana Owner's Acceptam~e Aevie~w Ctovklirs (page 1a). Added Atua'tnmeni 83 Hevjsed pages 1b, am~ 2.
,'rils isthe tni"aI iasup cl Attachment B to Cz~ct4atlon UHS-01 AttacbmneiI 6 ks acloed to adafes a~ftnar Gcffiano.: for pa*twate'd s9ingle fairure! s ooiated wOU elect.6-al hreakers serving the E-qseri~ai ServCe Water o3K) qs--emn~npn~e ,Parep ~ t~lo4 &
- =rr.w:~
- Rovrewer. .~:t:~
B,1. Anrawrs S&L
- -:-iCoi:~Od)[]T-;~_~_
ThetIng 0I
**i(i' ~~l~~¥'~: '~d~~~~J~t' "',~~;~~ltl ~
4f - 1 4 Review notes.~ l~ndepende#~t revIew ~ Pe'exMi CWQ 71".
,fF<< E:4iIITW ~~, , ,Ex~M'.~~~'
Extemol Appro"ir, "';"';"~";;';;;;;~irIr.::~~---t4 Exelan 7A-I MOM Inc5iondent P,,,Piir't RbV [OFW Rij 1146 Z` tq-'L
~"""-""-~--~-'--:---"'----------f---------------~------, IANALYSIS N.IlSO REVISIO.NGN. 4. PA!GENofý CC-AA-309 ATTACHMENTZ2 Ownes Ac~panc ReiewChe,001 f6W Eý#"fa Ceaign Analysis
'Page I ofIl DESIGN'ANALYSLS NO, I/IS e0
'No
- lJ' 32;, A. Qu m-hupte ms K aye l stiffiertim raon~ahe?' ,(]
I;
..*~~
..~:..'
CI ti;*
':t, Am dw
-!p i mpi, cropaime t~i Itiway Ithe plavtis ~1eF
-94. .t;]
0 D a i ted v e thd Ji. a li'f'1h
,LB*'
G;,; *;~iE~Judg~~~~and~:.~ j D cq *Pt' 7, *::ArQE~~.l'WGrnent&*~ Ar E ewnop" JW~nwt cmokt ~IbIheYliiy th ba~.way Wl pt.ifam 11M!! ~liI!~ d~IPew~ 7., :a~d:tit.~b3s1s?,* :' .. ' .*. . / .**..' .[J :.q }!l..'
<Qy"~.~lln(..~ ~**~fltlrp.~~~Qf,l:M}
,,:~,::
t1tisigi:J\AIt~ . .~; .J) El
;'~;; l'UfJits~dl!oo~~r~.~.ftI.~
- Are fto .reeults xnd ~n1Mwacz~ th ~way o ~.~r.rtI$.DFmr:IIIL\)(t 4ha pIom iqltd ..'~
foQ(...*...
".q "d
\'. ~. ,
'Ul;;
t,0 seDn Analeis itA~e te wk I, aei~i a~s c~urs~t~Ml K "0 CJ i>
.~
t( t Aeifiowyvve"d
- -urnbSD
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"ti:
an, ci ofrh D. t2 310 Soul tteuaeomv-rlpt ~am~nd' olt4ýx o Au
, k mv!ýiTodc w t hropfr iickw wIiii
")(:.?
~- '0 Dotmicastrxcaeonrf t1pumem4ayhqwm aku tbiiA mmm miItd a . *~.D Jj Wcmix mcr cnuI t$ iadcovýn?~f i nu au~.o URFs) bccn r iwmd whniwn eoary?' )(*.<O~.:n:J EM ,REVIWER,1~5 -3:::::.L...;.;:;;;';";;';;,;;";z.=;;;.;;J~~~~;;';"::;;;::~",,,--
~ '2 .. ~Tfl;if/j~f:t.9" Ah_
..--....-~-
.,..--, ' ... ,,,.....- .... ~. '"
.'IEihbiht E;dUhlt~' 0:
. NIEJl'.*12-1la
~4' Nývifief 4
\'">,,\>~ :<.::.. ~. '
(-TflMM~OSWRALTH EDISON C4MFkNY., _______ _______ ______ ROKECT NO NA_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ TALCULATPDCNU4OUfl-O{II ~4 Na. PA O. lb
~)Esc~r~iiS, uAT aQ-4ilAE -N0.
TITLE PAME TAJli[Jl,iJF:,~**"
*.*ýTAULE, OF~ O-OI(FENT lb
."~~~'"
'!4s~~~:NS" tAP-NRI FSCF4XS .2
~~.....mi";;';T:;a.,.EIMlDftIl
~1'lJ!'fDA'.FA.l'REFERENCES
'.'b6NERV AIilUWý . 16SDRDlATAEEED~
'(X)NS6RVATISM$' ](j I~
jfi FIGIURES [1 17
.i3
.*.;p~;~i~ '24** .
~~~~',~~~;~~.;,
ý,mxu~l LOY AND ACX'71WAKnC CRITEREA 2
.~~~CXNS" miSli(if\1'/l'iil'Uf ~
.~:: 2t)':
<~m~cALrCUtATM NS ~~1;
',:, 4" ':,,,'::'.;<:
**S~j;ANP<JON~
SUNftklMRY AND CODNCIUSIONS
-'", ""'",?, "',)"/.' .;-{,.. :".; . " .
,17'*
,;i3:~
'~I**,,)~~M~[iQbi~~'~i;i:~~~
;11' . .*"~~~~~~,~,~~~s.~,~;
M kIL eifI cM(didni OLRS Plon-LOCA Sinj~Fmtr 131
..*. ' 0 Ptt~~~* Ci~etatNo. L934&"3 Rqvýojef 4
;;;=~~,=~11:::;:~~O~;;:~:~:t~~;,
The purps ofhis ackulation L5to docurnent the, post LOCA siwJ fnilurc mi frsduiti~ wil Ihe aral~yz by, Coammnweathi Uisojn Company Nuclear Izwcnerng Dep-cartmrn
~:f.orlrrcm*UlUmrt(d{_Slm.(l1Hs}:desr "~5~~M;*'TbcfoUoWj.* .... 'i~
'fbr,....
... Byrtm U1himate '....
"1 .' '........... H~em ......VHS)ýdcsiLg
....Sin), .' '.' . "'" ill., bnais
............. rconstitution
".. ........... " .*The,............
falovi~hwng ClJ.., PTOv
~ *.
a discusskion of tbe~cddeoc.(sc~(ls;dW
**3.'d~u~ioo..of the ucitkm ýcemsktOs th-at \ym:be,mwy?# will beanlye Jwtlie' UHS,;" These for t1he tJlfS TheSe~ onrs v.~*~,*as*dlscussooiu werm cho'kn*as dis-cossed at rthe ~*~~~:~~.(~m~1ft~*s,po~s
'el1es of 1991 mtweetij~s itn CE('S Dowtie's Of6ve;Q(~ GJrove ofruce hetwftin Byron between 8)'1:'00. Sciltlo Opcmlatig, . Tech ..... Staff, .Regudatoty '., . tattify~urance.'PfoJe~rs;CEC-O*
As~uirnce, Pfojecis, CECo
;!~****i~l~t NMFS N1 iDSystems, NED) - M,&- S,Licensing. West ieghouNe, Siuymt &-Lundy and an Indr- ndcnt Consultnt ford CL r&'n ddition, omnments from the June 17, I1 d491 srimn~n cetiing lield at Byroin Swaimn bctwcz ,Byron Sltmon Opacratine T1.xh Smtff, Regulalory Assunin~c. P~ijccts, NED System-, NED-M & S and Licetasing
-have been incetor awrd'bonln,** Thbte:L
- .1l1l\~.~irli::Q~d'~in Tabhe I providzs "*~alis.tfulofthei5C~JClreasiof:':
a listing of the scenarios forea4oif
- '~~t'sOil:,:~,,~~bs:~:~~;~Y¥~"#,de~'ijn~ted~i~uelUial,riu~~l,chl copal~.Base c-.etIuIios chuwsen foranalysis ýue design~ated by sequertfial onuerial.
rtd&&these
~xes.,These'~rlose:ach~te'i'itOOA stvi each postiflate a LOCA;4s illS die lite h'atijd~ig td Loss of; evemnt oodLOss ifiiilatlfigevem off i!~lti**117J.f
'Offiiie Power (LOOP) tin udie accide nit {T~eferrnte 4). Unit I *is cotnslswe'dy ehuoseft as the zc-~n unit futrttt of ctonventkion Thr base ,Len mius %verepustlufied by assuminmg vauisingle failures Varnalons d( echd bais scenario uarCansicdteid since, cuntem Technical Specifications andu Administrative controlis predicate unique. setsf inrtialUHS:c6riiditions'buedorillHS'coJd:'wntcrbaSin' initial tMS cm~xitions .** * : *on..*'**,
' *. ,.**,.**.*.'.*.v*,,,*., .. *.* based UH~S....cold water
'., .. '.*,,. .....< basin tenqijl~rni Ox.c above or hýdow ..
**{i:.e~:a1:JoVcOrbC:~DW
......... :~....... " . . . , ......*.
f ."
***WF);"y~~,~r~Sin8te~*~*~fJ#i.~i~~Si~~.I!i~tjl~sid'fi"~~~
RVI). Variaxi-ons of eacht single failure %Lenario are djignted by al~pha sufflxcs4-Ad41tiomll~~~~;(¥;!~:~narlosS.6~a.~ Addigiomil svcemualis (i~e,, scnarkios 5,6(. and *,f~"~ri~*~"1~gesW3~~ 7) ate described on pages 1-4-33.
\l\ttac~m~nt.A~~¥S:~*~tfmm~of~~aJ*~M~:w_coolml:~OWeir~~Xcr)
Attachrnen A pirovikics xi estimation of RThessential service, water cooling toter XCIT), . fise vave eakae usedin scenmarios 5, 6, and 7.
- t1ser"*aJ:\i:eI¢fLb~I.r'~~:ifi~fI&'10!I~6~:p:fI'h.,.:,
- , * . ,'," .. ". ',.. ' . ' . .: ' ' .. '" .., , .' * . . . . , *. l **. ,
;.i~~i~~~~~~~
Aichmennt B tO sclcUla;0io1nd&ý WMd'1eaddtlnil sc105l ( AU~i~tted single
,fad=-,;s assuchinted wt c ab srvnihe EssftIii Servce WareSq' IT, :;\S!illmgti_*~;.
As Nu -mptiona
- ',i** *:':~,s~~~l~'I~:~().~;~)~t9i~9~~~,:j~~,~~~~,
1.The silngi faiILure scenarios iiss-nim the fbtloW*Vgnt ip~lConditions: c,~, ATwo ';"~¥9:~ti~if;:~4~~~ti.1AQit:":,,,,.., unitperatingaw. ull powmer with; a>One FSW pump uning on uch1hit,
'b~,
b). The ESW puimp, The:ESW' 'mdiscl;("emiln~ie:ViIW8' discharge trajin c~ai ae
. (~X~~~X~)~:,"",':,"
ilV28X033 and IrSX034) kpen ..'
;~. c.The r~ 'SSW' ESWA PllrtlP~i~~.,
pump disc~harget ubit~~~e~~ives unit mcrieiwalves .
<A
- .e~'
6" fi_"'t:;,:.i#,,(~liil(' (IPZSX0()) closed
- d. The ESW ret=n header crosstie .-ilves'(IM2X 136, t/21SX0IO. I/2SX~ll),ojen EsWflowbc{"C'"
ESW flow Ibeing pmvidedP Videi'ftodte'f(.jli) tohe following ..; :htiieic ihrz exchanges ' .... rs
- \R~~;
G-C()U IA
-It2COIA
"~'~tAli~U~ij~
CC Hix (Aligned 'to Unit E) CR'
~ II2YA9J~~
i'VA4lSI5SNS ... ;; .s. SX ,~.C:!lP'Ci~* Putnp Cubicle Cooc-lrs OOl~r$i
'. ~1~))tJl~~\Ir::
If2SXM AA(Afi ~X'~.mpPla~m*" SX Pump Oil Coolenm .
.* *lnwOOtcAICB;CMtiIirlll~Btl1lmets*'
I*,-I2WQ0CICA/CBP Comtainment Chi Hers
~1t2Siofs:AiSB~/";
42S8I0lSAJSB)
. '.. " . SI SlPum
.'. ....Pomp ',Berng!IL
. Jt. 'Beru:1'
.Ilg"*<bnCoolers.
Coolers
- Paq8 2 d 23
* * ... <::lI~VAQ4S.!\I~.ll
- /2VA04SA/SB Project lio px.-0ject CalCulation No.:
.Calculatlon
'Reviaion,2 , : > .' .
1t~~islol"i':'~
- SI',PUtJP:(:Ctlbicle'coclei:~
31 Nnip ~Cubicie Coolers No.~f:UJ9.~;:73aa93-~3n/39 No. 'UHS-01 813 9 UHS~Ol
,--Jl'W90l;CA1~B:: - OWOIC/CBControl " :PbntroiRoom:,Cbi'llers' Rtoom Chillers' ".'
,,~.:,*:,~*~*;~tg*~*~.~~=*
- l/2VAO2SA/58'
ýýý- 1/2CVO2SA/SB. '~.;.,:='a;:;~~~d~*~*¥~**
RH Pum~p Cubicle Coolers, CV Pump Gear 'Coolers
';;;',1.:j2CVO;3SA/$B
- ZI2CV03SA/8SB CV ,~~'
¢V Pump Lub'a Lube 'or1 oil Coolers 112VA06~l~
****i....-1/2VA06SA/sA c:v CVJ ~. Pump Cubicle CO01$t"Si Coolers
-l/2VA05S
"'li2VA()5~:'" " Pump Cuibiclo C,OOlUSi PD ~,cubicle Coolers
;:':'!*:,+1~VAo3~l~Bcs.
-1/2VA03SA/Sq CS <p,Ull!iSt:
Pump c~bicle Cubicle 'coolara ~Coolers
- '+/-/2'VA07S FC Pum=p Cubicle Coolers
,~::tiJ~~g~;Aa/A~jAD'f9':
l/12VP(0lAA/AB/AC/AD ,~~~f'(!ila'~l~:r.,f!\' RCFC's
":~/:;t~!~m:~~~~t post accident ~~:~~ai?'~£9X~ant
*Automatically bypassed on acc~ident unit based on; ESF siqnal. .~it::liaaM::;qri,
. i'_>~Id~~~ri~~j::~=;l:;:l=~i;:
f.ESW flow isolatedl-to ,the"'following hieat,
-,,];'
exchangers:
/2AFO1AA
., .,'. l1\B<,
-1/2AEFOAB, MDAF~Pump oil Cooler's UDfA. Pump Oil Coolers .
DDAF~P91lCpc;)1~;s
.;.:::~/2SX02K
. ;X'; DflAF Pump Angle Gear Oil:
~:~f~~~',M'11e::<:;~~1:\~H~,~
~'112~XOlI~::
- l/2SX01K. ,~QA'l1::)~ij¥P:'EJj91fie'Cl:ofiiE!~",eoQl~j:
DDAY Pu~mp Engine Closed Coolers6 l/2VAQSS
- ...- '1/~VA08S" ODA? Pumup Cubicle Coolers DDAP'PUmpCUbicle'Coo'let-a>' .' ,;,
-~ 1/2AF02APti.\J1' 112A.?02A DbAF ,~p:,;qe,att:Qit'.
Pumup Gear Oil. ,!;o.q],;'erli' Coolersv. 1/2DG01KA/K13 ,
- 1/2DG01KAlKB'
'.... DG, Jacket Water Coolers
.,*J)9}:I1,a(!Jc~~'waterCC?oler's:
ESW Cooling Tower cold water basin level . i~"'a~atmled
"'~W:;~~~,!~~:;*~i~:ig~e~i!:s~~~~~,.:'I@V~l:
- AFW Pump Soctioxn Su2pplies Bi-B; is assiltod
* ' '.,'. to;;,oo '. d-e/thEi:**"1'echhfcal st?ecifJcatioh':mmlliWlit to be, at' the TFechnical specification minimaum.*... '.~.' "
Ad'Diiri-!s1:ratlve' 'coitt:i~ls::t&f,the:uHs::r
'¢ ...C.Admiistrative controls' for the UI{S rquire .*. . *"ireunit.;, Unit Sb\l~,~.§~"if:'.tJia**~ov~r<~.~;l~~."a~ti;!r" Shuitdown' if"the 'tower cold water *})aal~emp~J;at\1;.~ basin temuperature
,ia.oy~r;.;~~.~f is; over 880F.* ..!tler~for:!.;.)l~:analx:s~~", Therefore no analyses ~il,l will be ]:)Et, . . ' ... '.
,'. perfrm~assuning ~q~;~,a,~e~~l}rl;l.ll~tliifl:cold',water:basin initial cold water basin
" 'temj~eratures eratttres*.at)ov6 above ;8aLF;. 88 0 F . ". a".'//, i '. ixi ". '
P,+; .A,ctm~il~$':tfii~i;~:e Adia~nistrative 'coritr()~jT;requi:l:'~:' controls require At:<>lea/3t aleast s~:' si ~~,; ansý-.
.goperating .erat'in '611'/111 on high 11 speed . eeaiwhen~>th8'ba8int:.e*li1er.tuJ;e when the basin temperaturte
'i~'~a];c;Jt({or is equal to or ~e~m:i:than:';'aoOt~':::rt::wttlP greater thani'80 0 F,. it will be ba '. '.'.
** assumed ass\l:med*that}:th(i<risu.* that, the riser ~valveS'(/associ.afid -valves~associated .**. with w1th,tha,:. the-,
- )jinn;inr;l:*fa.l'is:*'/~Ei;<.oP.QI}~
running tans are open ,ilji~'ii and all bypass. valves are~~ ..*
~1i . ~yPilss;~valVi:iaara;,:
ýclosed.
.olosQd:::!.:BaSed'(on\ad~I1.;nfstra Based 'on ~administr'ative, tlvei'ccntrols co)ntrols i'>tlletwQ the two
'fans';'
fans th'$it~:are'6u;dfr;/stYice that arfe out of: gervice . (OOS);';,in; (003) in thi~ this ....* '........ ' ... :' ..
'~ntconfiguration i9.:.r~1:1?il) ~a:t'be:jp~:er~/f:~.9.~:}.dif mrust be powered ifrom 'different fe*ell#:>W1I~f~ unit's power supplieo.
P'OW$l;" euppll.es:*~*:
- It*, It will be assumed that *ttterisar wJ.:'}:l<be*.ass~<tbat the riser valves.:*assoclated.wltii',:1fue.oos valves associaýted with the 00S fans faM are are '<:ilos~'~
closed. .... The; ThO,
;:r:~~~:~1;~~f~~~<!!i~~.~~~~~!>~.:':~Ri!~:~**,*::.*.'**,'.
various single failure searios will be analyzedi
'assuming ,an /initiali b~an', tmp'rat'ure of 880F. a~nd
'either one ifan . . . 005
'.aither<ona~fan pOS**.Qn* on' .. each, tower' or two fans E!~clf: :tQW4;¢~Or f*ane . :OOS' C0S 'on oh O. .n*.<a.*. . :/~'$~.<~.:'*.*. d,.e..*pe,'.n. . I~l~p
'one'tower ideperdinq on whichever, is more limiting
- .:,.',for the specific . tjO. n.*:W~~.Ch.e"er.,;:~:rS'."lI!I. ore.'. '. ibil..*t. i~<<'
scenario. fO):',.ttfi!lt*specit i~ ;seenArl0'~ ....., .. ,; :... ..... .",.'
,~!~:~~r~r;~*~*~~~~f=~2g,:**~;<;)~1~~f.~~=:~:t¥~::.£s 19.
If.. * -Administrative controls do not ,require any fans runni.ng on high'speed when the basin temp~erature 1is less iess :than tb.<<ma.OO,F 860 F.
. . . . . . /:' ~<""
'l'h~r~fo:r.:e:,tbe
..: Thereforeo
';",f,*,>:**~;;:*~*,*'.*:i~,* "_,!.,
the . single: sincile ;failu:te~;
*.*.,/:,,:,.0.';,*<_
-fai,lure~
Pagea 3 of0~
proj:Qct~No~ Projiet.. 8.89l~~:e:t39 No-. 8893 -38/39 dilcultiond
'.ri'aiculat ionN()NO.*.*,.J.l UHS-01
..H . . .*.f. ***.*.O.. l...*
...*S
- R~:YI6 i'61,:":'2"
*e**** .
"~'
ftevis ion ý-2 " scenarios, will .*. als~'?&analyzed
~~a:rJos:*:\)!lll also he analyzed assUming assuming an:~initi an initial al
*ba$in*t~.p~riltl1ie'\d't~:;So()¥:and, bsntemerature of> $0OF and assuning\no assuming no ." fanS: fans, 'are' areý 1nitially:)~tunninq.
initially rtxnning4 . .. It',will. 'It will be as.5umfidthat be .* assumed that the
.bypass . valves are closed and at least
*valYeef:areclosedandat least four riaer riser valves .' .... . 8n:*:*~~~abhi:c,~.~~a.~eopen.\
on operable cells are open. *;ti.lias~ttmed. It is assumed
,ýthat that: th8r:i:~valv@s:. the riser valves associatad"W'ithth~ associated with the two two 09S COS
. fans~*.aJ:"~::~l~~'.\.:~@se fans are closed. These .. scenarios sc.e~riQII*wll;l. will 'not not ,taR~
~take credit for UHS ambient
',cr@(!t~~pt\>~~' ambi@nt*be~t heat . ,".d:l.s!9-~~~tiQn dssipat ion '~ui~~'1:p*~t until post. .
LOCA operator actions are initiated for **:ays
*LQg\,;qpG;r:(l~OJ:*.a~tlons.are:!*.j:n.J~~~t~.~;*~o~ system re-alig""me'ntý.
;}r.@~.alT~nt~** ............ . . ...... '.................. , t~
~:~..
.24_ Wheri*>.o*~e~a~~~i<~q~i.bJls>.aj;:e:
When operator !actions are *:h~qui£~il;.!ffi:~::tb~:jf~Iri* required. ,K,,the,e :iain .. q6htfol Conttol Rocn'll;,.*.*.*.~t:*-;t's Roomi i~asue *;*asswited*thQse,actfons}*.c.an;~:ba:;:*H'llt these actionts' c~a*n*, a"eiitiatedff!., fat*M<:tO.;: mirnutes mijulitcnit:fol'lowli1'-: <followisnq safeguards .saf.r* . ai-ds sil~ sl'na'ls'..
..::.':<.:.".".... v'< ..:- .. :*-,:**, *. : ... ;,.< .. c,.,.:"" ... :}l,.** ...: ...,..,.,:.~.; . >.: .. !...* ,: ..... ~.. \,:.::,.:.,';. >!
It .. i,a;\~Els.~e~;;,;tll~~ 3.it !s assumed that (ln~.y:.'o~~ only one .
- 1l:9"~4\\(:c.i:4~1i~)init;*:S~<:pump non-accident urdnt 'SX puimp . i~ isý r,u.rt11.tn9~"*1n ruhniftq in .the tlt~/~~st:a(1:~l'dehtmoc1~~SI
~post accident n~ode since in~eiJ;l),~ ~on-running
,the non-running pump would not pump*>would not~recei receive w~:a.n an .*auto~st'art**s~~;#uil~..
auto-start signal. ...... .
- 4. t.1.~9i@!~:~~~':*~.~~::~~t.
An 820F ambient wet :lllJ,~~l,:t~ara~tir~:.\llti*~. all scenarios.
*. bulb temperaturo will be assred as~~~i:i'for' for
- 5. It is assumed . ;:~at j,tis.:assumad* that the ." thenoh-accident:.unii:..isinitI~li~
non-accident~ uniLt io initially a~' at pcrir~~')op~~t;!~h:}t.iid*pr.o power operation and preceedg .ei&d,~\tcii~n to an ',di:d~t orderly..:. 'Sll1j~d6wn shutdown ;. . : '00': J.Ol.~~wi.I19.~.*~.~.P,9:s.tulattMt';,'IA~'*pn::~b~*:~~(;ta$lt::un1t.:I.t.
,following the~ postulated ILOCA an the accident onit. I-t
,1sassQedthat;:.:the*,
isasure that" the non-accident nort!"-'aceident,. unit uti':it))w*oUld achieve would . not achieve
~~,~~~~~~~~~r~:i'~.~;~~S.*.':tTAVG~'~*;i,~:~6,.~t:(~.:::~t;_:i:l: ~9>:tlotg.s .
hot sbUtdown ,condi'tions (TiV6o- 35(i9#),-Vntil '10 hourks` page, 4 0of1-,23
I'roj~dt.No~ge9J"":lIJ/l' Project No~* g93-38/39 Calcu'lation No'!':;:tlHS~Ol Calctiliilti'on' No. UlUS-Ql Revision 2 Rfiisiona I~l. JI14 ScenariooeagriRtions t ions 14 qai 1.runai:iQl.A(riqure -A(iue1 1.) A. Single '~ailure-Single Failure The ~iMl.;;*fa.J.lure Tbe' single failure consltim:ed considered for for this; .' scenaricr
'., this acen~ario .iethe is the .h(qh:f!ir;t*capacity; higher capacity C01'lt;ll;:i:rtment:
containmelnt spray sp~ray pump pumip on the accidifibt:\*unit;.* on the accident unit. ........ .
.'~'.~
B... . In! tialCondi Initial tiona -Th.1S Conditions - This seenar scenario ic,".a.ssumaa ass.;ures Jan an ......... initial cold vater
'. initial.oold. water .bastn.~ater*t9p,raturEf*of basin wateinr temperature' -of.S.O°p'. 900F.
Al;1 All . other ini conditions are tialconditions initial ae described in are aatJesc;ri}jed in S4ection II
~ection 11 for C1col(l;.'W'i!
a cold water terba.ainwatertempera!;ur() basin water temperature 0 of l@ssthan
'Of less than BOOF 80 F. **. It.,,ls*a$su~thatciJf.;'.SX It is assumued that one SX pump
.' iJ!Ii/runn!ngoli;eachn.f,1lt(
is, rw'nihqt on each unit. and .eaoh tower :bas each .to~,+/- has ..~wo two ,'. . .... passaive cells o~at;;ng-:~It passive operating. It is is-aSt;Y.:IBi!d assumied 'tbAt:t:Wp.; that two . towar>twrcells are out o~ cells' areo1J.1;:; of lie" service which is p~ermitted '. by icewhioh'~is.~tted administrative controls. It is assuimed that th,,ýe . two adntinistr~tiveeontrol$*~:r,tis;assumedthat.the R~;~lla':t;'$ 008 tells are .*. on; on Ule':i:sau the ýFame '*. towe1:" tower ... si~*<.thfs since, this . may>:,*mtay *..***. .. r'esult In;'aJ'i19Ijer:*rate9f:t.~perAture
- .*.~e~ult. in a biqher rate of temperature l.;.iSE! rise- In*:thein the affected tower basin. . < , , ....... .
a;tt'e~Ud::~QV~rr.ba~'~I;l~: 'J.'. . ........, . C. .'A~*~f~eH(*'t?~~It:f~ri.*,:*~***~f1~\:1X):it:1afi# C,, 'Accident Conditions - The initiating 'eVetl1; 1 LOCA and a coincident' Unit event """i~' a. is . a Unit 0 111 t
'l'LOCA.anda.colnci4:ient.<"'Unl t'lI loQss l.oaa . of 9ff of f 91. te.:
site. power (LOOP). ,. c:'t!i~ainq~e;.~ai~
*:~W:~#,J~t.
ti"case
~The single failure in'.tll:e.
the hiqhe,r;:capaol:ty!.(;:.onta ll,I"e:f8considered higher capacity containment ons idered:. for t:or
;th:is/" oaae:il!l" inment .* sprayspray, onl the accident JiJlit.~
,pump. onthea.Cdideltt; ujnit.*.*. 'this; taximizes the *. '
This _ximi~eath,&: injection phase heat load
.. ,io;npll(lse,heat load on the UHI8 ~in.:,e t.he: UHS* since fo"ir four
- RCCswould "3 would. be be . removing removing heat hl!!!atfronafrom the accident acc:ident>uni unit. t.
and both and both Unit;.Unit 1 alll~~gem~lI' dles~law9t).ld* 1 emergency diesels would be be:~n.ij~nq,. running. In addition, itl~:::.~~~:
- r~,.il~d~ti.().!'l/. it is assumed ;tba~~(tnon-aoc:ri:qe31'~*.*
that the nion-accident .. '. unit proceeds to an orderly shutdown. unl.tprooe.~atoi!:\n*:orderly i;thutdQW *. Following FollQWingthe> the
.pOstulate.dl:.ocA,no*:
postulated LOCA, no iue'diate*credUf'.is*** 1=nediate credit i3 taken taken;ifor"'" for U115 ambient Ji,e.;./'\j,s$ip~tlontunti;l.J?pel:~tor;;a~lQn
;~'~l@n;: heat dissipation until operator action initiated to open /addi'tional.
in ... initia.t~to>'Open
.is additional riser ris.ar"valv.ea.*and valves and
>stm:t't'~:':ftj;n.~~/*Th~
start toWer fana. T1he .post a:cCl.di~t;.* .Gyataltlineup post: .* accident Gysatem lineup consists of consist5 of *thr:~; three *SX SX pumps supplying P\l!Ipssupply ing.**aui:oma automaticallyti<=a.~11* aliqned post accident ESW loads. . Theh ali . .~tacQidentEswloads" The twotwoa~¢ldeht: accident unit uniSX OX pumps umpsWould would start start\a:utoMt.ical1y automaatically based basea:on. on . safeguards safeqUar ..sigrials signals.**. Th$n9ri-ac¢identunit;p~thit::
,The non-accident unit pumip that
.was runn.in9initially,would~r~mai~~.rlniriq~***tt was running initially would remain running. it is ia ..
assumed aSliumed that. thethat t.he other Qth~r:,*.n(Jnnon-accident unit pump
....~¢c=.*dent.:'.'uni1;.pump. '. '.' . . ;
remains r.@mainsotf since Jt of f aince it would not receive an auto-start wo';;ld/:not*::rec.eiv.*ari.Auto ... st.art signal. . Tower
*signal.. TowarA;;~ll,l" A will have ~"v:e .two actlv~ ..**cells*
two
- active cells *(fan (flll'i**. .'
running on high
;~nnillq*on., lt~qh . and riser valve open) and
~Il~'.;i~~t**.**Valve<~en). and. no pa~fSi"e:;
no' passive cells (fan not. running and riser Valve,
.c~lI,s:A:fartllOt:*:t'UMinq~nrlri~erva 1ve .openr."'I'~$r",
open). Towders B will have four active Bwillr.*havefo'Ur:aoti ve' cells calls and andnopassi no passive- ve:eells:;,' cells. *.. Pae5 Of 23
llroj~'C:t.NO", Project Non. t3~'9l.~~.8/;~9 8893-36139 Calcula:t:io:rlc" NO' .:*UH~-,()l
,.Re1jisiciii<.2."'
Revision 2- '- "h" .d.""
- 2. ag~rjo
'A,. ',' slnqle,'Failtire<,
3i~e aIue-~single' ;;.!*Tlle}:sirrqle::fa];'lure.,*conside'red:,lri*,;. failure 'considerdi
'" '.':~!§~;~;f~~:*:;~~~~l~~t~t~~~~~l~Y\':~i~:ntalnment:"
thias ce~nario i :s the hfi-her -capacity dontainment s..pray pump on the, adciadeh1' unit. . .
]~~~'~i'~f~~I!~i~i.~~lili!~~~
1§' 'InitialJCondit ions -~ This: acenario assu-me~s an in'itiall 'c"old water basin' water temperature of 880 F. Aloheri.-nitial ~conditions a~re as doescribed in ect ion IIor,ý a cold water basin water temperature equval .tcf'>
""'al t or ,cr~reatp(er *X'ij,at$r'thair'.soOp-<It:ls'a.asrnned'that tha OF It is assumed that o sxsrni~reach .. e unit and. tower A hazi two'ac y ~el~ ndtower 5 has' four active ceUs op~atiq~It hold "be, noted that normally eight faswould,~b" operting "in'this condition, howeVelr it: is assumied..thtt tower cells are aOS. it Ala-assumed 'that-the. two'.ODS cells are an the same towear, since this m~ayý1 'reu t. in a high~er rate of
>te "*e'ratur@'~Jse'if{th'aatfac£~;:triverbaain.
temiperature
;*,>.:;:~~:~R\. . . *,:, ':.:"'>:~""....~:::'.'" "'.,".ris iA .>."the
,t)..',':":': ',\',' 1\": .,'
affecte tower
"-,:,_. ':'; ","'. ":.'.<,", ., .. ,' /.\,".\ ,/.,..-:.: \ \'.:.'" -.:. ,>"
basin.
.,',- : l /.,' ".,~>'. ,
C: .. * *,;~9c'i~~~~':::~~~~~i.~l§1'l~,:<t,':'J:~~::i,~~ti;atln9*:eY:¥t:*f~>:~, Ci. ccidn 'odtons - The initiating event is a . . ynlt;. Unit 1 andC
" 1.LOQ.\and:.:':a: a4 :~Qlne1aent>'un;tt,1 c oincident' Unit 1 *los&<of** 1Josa( of off~itEJ':: off-site ... **
- ýýpower
. owat"tOOP\," (LOOP). *'the'}:s:in'1;:ea'1,lurec,6hsl.dered:
The single' failure considered in in this;
'~Sili;.J~
c4ýase is, )~i(j~'irr'#~!;f$+9.1l;i:h'cijpJ'9i tY;"~~ld:ainim.ent\'*~* this' again the higher capacity c'ontainnent spray / .... y.
'tim. as in Sceniario ~1A. Following'the ....
,pump 'a$~'in,*;'*Sceriario,;:lA~:,Fol*lowln*~'tbe 'stUla postulated Evclcred.l.t£fi!{::t:a.k~jffOr::*riHs.
LOCAgr credit is taken for UBS hea~':/ra.6~1*. heat reumoval '.'.. .
- '1.~e.4t~t;el,Y'*~lnc~;<~~
immediately since~ the '.' tower' t~~#ftan~t.~ fans that .*f.'.#ere:. were rtlnhinq runninq
- ',i!lltf~I::;y;~ill>>e*/aut~~~,i9.a!lY:!':r,;+:e;n.,er9tz~,
initially will be au~tomatically re-energized, ........., > , followin1g a LOOP and . . subs~equent
- ~.~l:;1~tWi.t:'~;>:a**;LPolJ*<Incl ~~J?Eif~':1~fI~.'>~1~sel diesel st4U"'t:fi*.j;)efora/
starts before (tlle*.~ESW;;P\lmps,:are
.the ESW pumyps are ..automatically automat:lca.lly:;.sequenced sequenced '011,; on. . NO No . ....
. ,Opel7at~r'~!AAi9ri':,J~/
operator ~action is assumed ~s~~:tq:r;~this,'cai@ for this case.~ ... Th@'" The PO~t* post.. < accident. lineup ~consists, of <three . . SX acr:;:id,en~ii:l.i~~\)~;:~t:.~;Qsl~~;:,.o.~;**~l1i'e~ S>t:.pumps pumps . SUfP suppgyi-ng ;ying:' auto1l.'llatically*;al.lgned~.pos:t',accident';:;B;SW::loads.
. automatically ,aligned pust accident ESW loads. The
>two accidejft*:'unlt',:Si
{two' accident unit SX .'. pumps~ "Wri. .'., *~*:would.'s.f8i-.t:.aUtoma would start auitomatically ticall"Y. . . sbas~:on based on sa~*:"aids* safeguards :G~n~s'~/ sign~als. . Theindn;:accld** The ,non-accident ,. *t:unit unit .
;p:~~;:
pump ~lja~.wa~1l~r(tn9Yl\i't:~all that was running initially'i~~uldrelDa~~ would remain .". .,. . runninq, 'I~
- ,wm*~129
- ~;.** It isa.SiSt.Utn~dtt.ll~
is assumed ,thatt:. the '>~J~'; 'other n"on~acci:d~,A:~ Qtber .. non-accident unit~ pump remains .off
~.fl.1t> p~mp::,re~in£i\ since it would .. not*
of~:s):~.ce;'J;two1.l1d not r@ce receive i v@i:an~, an
*~ut()~~ta~~,i9~g:naI~"
auto-start, signal. .,,~()~*~r:* A..~ill Tower A will have two active .. hav~t.wo a.cti ve'. .' ce;~~s:\~~¢f;,p,?:::'p~,:~l,¥;!I': cells and no pa~ssive ,c,~;til:~.~ T~ower B will have far' . cells. .* *** .**1'ow@:t:'il}will.l'iaVea*tour active act].vel 'cells' cells :':iutcl'.,no and no pa,sS'i passive vEfcalls~ cells.
\ ~ ~ ".:
Page 6, o~ 2~
,P:rojec:t:~'N~i>:,
'Project No.~ la93~l,el3~,
8993-38/>39,
,Calculatl'on , Ro'. t1HS~Ol
,ijevi'~l4)tj)"'"
ýReviaio~n 2. '.;:,<
- 3. ~<!~hari(l2A Scenario 2A t~,~~S,>2:;r~;~~
(FiqU~res 2 an~d ,i) 3)
'A'~'
IA,, ::s~~l~" Single "~'t~':tfE!,:/t,'::~~:,,~~ln9,l:~}ffa:1~~,, Failure - The single rh'ilure ,CS~",~~c;1eJ:ed"~fo;":,t congi&ered 'for*>ý
"<,, 'thJ.,s:~~~nar:l.o:,1SJ::;~:n<:eJs;sentl.~1;:s~rv:1:'C?e\:'~i11:,~;t>eO(Jl1,lng this scenario is an ,essential, service. water coolin
;;tower
,tow~:,':tal{~i;:
fn ~",',,"', " ",'" , , ' " """" ',,' " ' , ' R., Initial Conditions -This scenario assumes an initial cold water basin water temperature of 8O0 F0i" All other initial conditions are as describad in: Section 11 for a cold water basin water temtperature,
,of less than 3 00F. It is assumed that one 5X pump
".Is running' on eachW unit and Gix passive cooling tower cells are operating. It, is assumed that two tower colls are OOS wbich is pe-xritted by
>administrative controIs
- It 6' ~asumE that the two c-ells are on the siiw tower since this mnay result in,
,,a higher rate of teipearature r~ise in the a f fected tower basin'.
C.Aczident Condi~tions :- The initiating event is a Unit 1 LOC.A and a coincident Unit 1 LOOP. The
~single failure considered for this cage is an EzSw
-tower fan'. initially, the corresp-ondinq::riser valv@Fe 1s assumaed to be open. ~The injection phase heat'
- load Impose~d on the UnS ,would be~ less In thisa
ýscenario' than in scenarios l-A and 1B since both'CS
,pu-nps would be running on the accident unit. Both, trains of' the accident unit SX, system heat loads are,,
assumed to be align~ed. In addition, it is assumetd
-that the non-accident unit procee~ds to an orderly suhutdown. 1 F'ollowinq the postulated' LOCA,. no credit"
,is taken for Uil48 aminbent 'heat~ dissipation until operator act ion is.'initiated to open riser vailvesjý,
'start tower~ fans anid close the riser valve corresponding to the fai'led fan. The post accident
.system lineup conisists of three SX pumps running and,;
Jsupplying the additional automatically aligned ESW l3oads. The two accident unit Sx pumps would startý
,atomatically based on, safegu~ards- signals,' The npon-accident u~nit pump that was running' initially~
would remain running.' It is assumed tha~t the other non-accident unit, pump remains off since it would
~not receive an auto-star't signal. Tower, A iwill have'
,one active 'cell and no passiveý cells1. 'ai'hr, B will'!
.have four active tower cells.,
Page 7 of 23
I .~. I ProJect
,Px'oj No. 8891-18/39 e¢ No,.S 893:-3 81'39 calculation No.UHS~OI talculation I
i ~
.R~visi~n :2 No. t3H1S-01 I
4.. cnai 21B (Figurel 2 and
'A.. S hinglei Failr I Thsingle failure' conzideted for.
ths s c.e ,nario is an esIsential service water coaling B.tiilConiditio"ns. - This sidenario assnumes an-inritia'l cold, water ba sin water teumporature of 89, F.,
",A I,"othe~r 'initial conitions, are a-, described i
."Selation'11 for a cold' water basin water .temnpariturae VqUAl to' or' greater 'than 80F it should be noted
'that nrmll eight fans and risers would be ope~ti in, thi:s con4ition~, however it will he
~ssmd~that two :twe -Cella are QQO.. It isa~suned
~tha tw th ()S cllsare on. th~e .5ame tower since' thi may*result 4,(ýin ahigher rate of 'temperatu~re riise Th~th. ffected 'tower basin..
C Actidan tonditions9- The 'initiating event is a tOC& WflUnit' l_,and a coincident unmit I'LOOP. The single
, fAxiure 'conaidered1 ln this case is again an ESW
,+6ier, fain. The corresponding riser valve is assumed Kt6 remain open until operator action is initiated- to' close the valve. Following the postulated IOCA,.
credit is taken for UHS heat remioval' immediately
.since the, tower fans that were runninq. Initially will he automatically re-energized, following a 'LOOP and subsequent diesel starts, before the ESW pumps
,are automatically sequencd on. The post LOCA
,accident l+ineup consists of three SX pumps rixnninzq sand 5upplying the additional aotomatical ly alig'ned ES loads.. both accident' unit SX pumps would start automatically based on safeguards signals. 'The non-aecidenft u~nit pump that was running inittal
.would remain running. it i~s assumed that theote non-accid4ent unit pumip re~mains, off since it would not receive an~ auto'-start signal. Tower A will have "one active cell and no pasistve, cells. T~ower B will hbave four, active ~cells.
Pageý I of.'_2,3'
i:
;~*,oj.~'C,t:l'l0'.'
Prjet, a Ba893;;;;3813? 893-38f ,39
,C4i-cl41,tion
;Calculation N~USO No ~ 'QH:S~O,l eViso ;'2'"
R~vi'afoii: 2 .
- . ~;i"-:: .:Sclnatio~1,\~,'(r*~t. ~: r:
A. A~ Single SI inqlaFailuro' - The single,"failure considered . .*fpr.; Failure ..;..***Th@slggle<fa~lu.r~c:ofulJldered for this "1lc@Jl!\rio scenario is is IIIa LB1B'ml1ergel\cY~teliel energencii diesel failur~*.,'.:>~* failure. As i.! a result,. a:r@sul t,.~he. the twodiyi~j:onl.,2:t~e:r*, two division 12 tower> fa.ns fans a.re*are assu:ined assuned
~C??,f.~11 to fail to t.~~tart start .. and and~.ttl~:,¢~r);:~~~,~lng*
the correspondi nq ***r1ser: riser v.a~X~.~ valves I I (,\\~.~:~ssumed
.. ,are
. assum~ed assumed :'t:ofaill.n~t:tte:9P,~taJ.l*~!'lit:lon.;
'to fail in"the ope~n position. .It:.
that' essential dlvJ.siots., assumedthat,'ess:ential division~ :1'2:'1cOlIponenta
'12 conponents a.r:e it ~SI: is .....
rare
~~tit't:~~d~ .(~:.~~~~~:';g~~t"!
Al-igned to' relcei~ve ESW flo.0..hqwever, _no, heat loading is, assuimadfrmteennenrid 1
*.*B:~
B.ý . .* I:rit'ttal<,.condi,t.l*ohs:~-Th1s(:*sde.nat+/-o\::*DsumeS** Iniia cdibinig- This scnroasmS an an,. , .... . i,ni:t:1at. ¢Pl~*",ate~,*.basif{*~w~~~r',~,~tii~att"t~,*of*>~Q()t initial.:6,ld, water basin waterý,teiperature of 8QoOFM .. *
'**All..<rtih~*,
kl1l other, in1 'tialcond1t1ona?;~rEf:,ai!f.ae$er:ibed.in initial conditions ar .eao described in
'Section se9t.,lbn, ,II 11 .for f:~j:a'eold* ~at~J;' ~~S.~J(:,~at~
a cold . . water basin water t.~ex:~t..~r4;l temparatur~e 0 F., It Of':l~~\ :thana,ooF., of less than 80 .~~~Il'a~~\U11E!~' is asumed ~atone that one SX sXP:umP:'~ punp_
,.i:~
.p~!~Jv~
. running on e~.C?b.*lln.!F'~>:~~9h:<:1=~w.l::has i's ::rutri1ill<j*CJl\.
passive cells each unit) and~ each tower has . three oe,11.: s .op~a:~il\9~ operating. :+:t~ It ..~~.~.~.s~~~baF:~' is assumed that two
- t1lr;~~};
t.0:w:el.\'i~,a tower~ ll~:are cells' out of .servi,cawhiob;\is are *. "C)u.t.ot:)f service which, is. permitted per;mi~t@d. by aditinl~tratlve controls. administrative conu61'S *. 'It.ds 'it is .assumed assumed .that::"one that one
**oell,itlr':out*;o'f.
cell ,Is out of 5ervice s\~tv1ee' 'on'.~.a¢li oftti:e:i;tw~{*tow:ers*.
'on< each *. . of the two towers.
..!~lA~l~~~,i~~'~~~~~ ~;X~~~~~~~;riO"t
'This ~will result~ in the mnaximum number of cells out K:i..;
of ser'vice diesel."ueof after the postulated faillueo h h cC.. ~',t~~~*~~~:~2!~~f~g!~;h~f3~f:~t~X.tt1~;/~;~~f~~~~*+# Accident conditio'ns 1 AjOCA and,~acoincident Unit' 1 LOOP.
,The iniltiating event is, 'a unit
.failure Conisidered, for this"'case ,is~ a 1B emergency.
The single
*.fail'U:re :'cons*idered:for'this":casCl .,'is'~a.* ..1B' uier '6n'c" .
- ~6:~r~lf!~;t~;:%~tf&~~:i!:~:t,h~~~~i~:~~~:.*.'*ig~if@:~ . ,'
di~ese1'fa{iue., This, f ailure will'2resu~lt in~ a"lesa than maximum Injection phase heat load on the UTHS becaujse only .t~o*
.bec:;ati~~)9;nrr** RCFC fans will b~e fanctional onth two *RC:rc.;~an~}ji\l*:Hl.~~;-.,f'ijli(:titfn~l*~,>.~~.
acqident unit.'~'. ..In
~~p ~~f;!~t;/l,nlJ.~ addition, the lB train SX heat In..'ad~l~;,on;th~'l:B!,:;r;,~in<>,SX beat .
exchanrers and cubicle .~~olers~o~ltt:;~ot;"
. *~~cl!ap~er:ilail4C19~J.,cl:~* coolers would not '.',. >; ,',; . '
*fU,:9~:ifloa.n~.1yoo~tribu1:e siignificantly contribute 'j:.o to JjHShea~;.loac:h UMlS heat load. .Tb.~.:1$ The i1A diesel failure en~velopes di~s~L*fat.,,l:i,lr~. ~l\v@llop~~::tn~:~,~f.s@l/J~ailtU:tl::'*
the 1A diese I failure .
- because the UHS will r~~ive:heat.:load;t'trom***b'oth" l)aQ&uao:.*the:Jffls:wlI1 receive heat load from both
'**'aj:!¢,ld~n~'}~n;i~'i~,u¥illa~1:~~ill~~~/;'*""*~~~:,'2~b,tbe*.
accident unit auxiliary' feedwater~pumps. In the
,case a'f, a~ 1A J~.:i~sel.faJ.lur~i"t:.h'.(~;:"
',c.a,~e",p~;,;;a,::~ diesel failure, the UHS would~ only .. , .'
..1<1\*.QJlIy receive'heat
~~~.~,i,Y~?h:t;!,a\~;:,lQ:~~" from ' ~,:llt',~P:W<pump:e;aln:AA*,the*
load 'f'.r::Qm the 1B AFW ptuVp since the . 'l~ 1A AF¶V pump Is motor driven.,....:In;*addlt19n:
- .*AFW"~p,<ls;Jmot'o~.'~d:rlven.:~ In addition,ý .. lt'W'ill it will be- be
- ,:~::e;~{';~:ia~}~1~~~@!~~~~~:~a~~i~~:~:;}~~~
orderly~ 5hutdown.i Pollowiny the 'postuJlated LOCA, . no' a~sumned that, the non-accident uni~t"'P eds to an credit' 'lis"'taken' for UHS ambient heiAt J no:
- credit';;1'S*'<takerr ,for
- tnis:'a,11i.bYent*heat;.:dlssi*** dssipation atiori r~~~~t~~k"i~~~f~~~!~G~~~~~~~~i~~f.
until 'operator action is initiated to start tower fans. Trihe past accident system lineup consists ofý two SX pumps rwnning, and the additional
*.~;io::t~*~~iY~¥~~~d~g~~~*~~~~~~~~::~~'Y~il~~ie outomatically aligned, ESW loads. 'The available' .,.
accident unit pumpi would . . sta~t:.:a~;.p1mati~.lly
- ac:t:ident;,un~t;p~Pi"YoUl.d, start autoinatically based. based" on safeguards signals. The non-accident unit pump,.
ons;afeguard~s1'9."al.s~:~h.nonf~~¢lde~t'unlt.pump,
.that was running initially
,tba;t,was.ru,nt:*lhg,'ini tlally:\"ottlc:l:r*~a would remain running. ;'It.:'
lnrunn1ngo, I is assumed that the other .ilon~aeciderit is.;asst.lm~\,t,b,at:*.t,b~'oth~:r non-accident unit. unit PwnP pump would :r~m.a:,~;
,wQul:d' remain of f since~
o~f': aln¢ej,lt,~*it'~Ot,lld.'n()t/,#:eee would 'not' receive 1ve' an an', . Page 9 of 23i
Px'oject;Nc)'. PoetNo: 88.9:3--38139. 8893-38/39'
- C4ilculation No "Calculation .1o... ,*UHS:"-Ol*
VXS7-0O tt~viBlor'::<2.':' RevisGion, 2; .'. .).'... w>:.~ authst6r-t sig'al. 'Tawer it will aeteeatv
-lsaýnd no :assivec!o Tower B,-w'ill have.1 one-aciecell and two passive cel-ls,'.
A.Single Failure -The ~single :fai-lure~ considered' for%-
.thi:d scnario is a. 1B emergenciy diesel f ailure. As a r~esult, the two divirsion 12 tower fans are assumed to> fal to zstart and ~the correspondinq risier valves are assur.ed to fail 'i.n the open position. It is assumed that essential divis on 12 components ares aligned to receive SW flow, however I.no heat loading Is assumed fron these non-enerqfzed B. Inithia C~onditiofts - This scenario assumes an initial cold water basi~n watr teMperatura of 588F.
A~ll other initial. conditions are as describod in~ section 1I for a c~old water basin wiater teme~rature equal, to or greater than 80 0 F. it~Its assumed that one SX pump is. running on each unit and that each
- tower has three active cells operating. It should
ýbe noted' that normally eight fans would be operatingl in this condition, however it will be assumed that' two tower cells a~re 003. It is assumed that one.
.,cell on each tower is OOSQ.,This Will result in the
.,%most cells> OOS in ConjunctionI with t~he 1B diesel, f1a ilue.
C. -'Atcident Conditionis -Theinttigentia Ui I.iýLOCA and a coi**cident Unit I LOOP. Thie!&siPngle faiui >considered is again the 18 emergency.'4ieseli fallur6 as in Scenriod~ 3A., Followinq h owae
*iLC,7redit is ta.ken for UHS ambientheat, -
Ai sipation immediately since the. tower ,owha. A.nsh. a
.were running initiallyv will be at~aial re i-energized following a LCOOP'and sub sequent, di1esel, 7,:tarts before the ESW pumps are sequeencd o. . 0o operator action is assumed for this case. -Te4post accide,_,nt lineup consists of two SX pumps I*rnning Iand supplying the additional automatically align~ed. FS
- ,lods.The available accident, unit pump utould start'
,automatically based on safeguadssigna s. The
.!non-accident unit pump that:was running..........
>would remiain running. it is assumed 'that the' other, non-accident unit pump would remain off since ,it, wouald not receive an auto-start signal. Tower A will have three active: cells and no passive cells'.
Tower a Wil..have. one active cell. and two passiv Cells. Page 10 of 23
troj:~¢1;<No.. P+/-"ojec6t No. 8893-138/39 8893 .... 38/39 Calculation Calculation No No.*. 'tfflS-Ol UHS-0l ReVlslorl.,2' Revision .2 . ,','. . . ., A. Single Failure - The single failure considered for t~his scenario is a 13 emergency diesel failure., As a reu~t~the two division 12 towers fans are ass-umed to ailto, start and, the, corresponding riser. valves
-fkre 'assumed to fail in the closed 'position. It is ý..assrumed that ~essenrtial division 12 'components are ýaliqned to receive ESW flow,, however, no heat loading is assumed from :theoe non-energized B~IiilConditidns. -' Th'is"scenAro'assum~es tidl'Cold Water 1basin water tempoerature an.,OFof 80'F ,A-1 other initial 'conditions are 'as described in Sreution 11 for a 'cold water basin water te~mperature less than 800 P. It is a~suinýd that one SX pump is running on each unit <and ;tower A has three passive i6ells and tower B has one< passive 'cell operating:.,
It is assumed that two'tower cells~ are out of.
,.servi'ce which is permitted by advinistrative, controla. it is assuzed' that one 'cell is out of aexvice on each,'of the two towers. This will re~sult in'the mnaxcimum number of cells out ,of service after the postulated failure of the diesel. ",.AccidentConditions -The initliating event saUn it' I. OCA anida coincident', nit I ILOOP. Th sInal ý.failure' considered for this case is again 'a, 13" ,emerqency diesel failure. This scenario is -the nano, .as Scenario 3A w*ith the exception of the failure Position of ~two riser valves, Tn thi3 Scenario it' 'is assumed that the two,affected riser valves, fail ýIn the'c'loseýd poaition, as' opposed', to the open~
postition. Following th6'postulatfed LOCA, or3i Is taken for UHS heat 'dissipation until 'opetýAtor
.actions are initiated. -The post accident sysetem lineup consists' of two SX pumnps running and s.Eupplyingj the' additional automtatically, aligned E&W, loads. The available accident un-it pump would start 40ionatic~ally based on safeguards, signals. ~The "non-accident unit pum-p \that was running initially.
wvould remain running.7" it is assumed that the', othearý hon-accident unit pump would remain off since 'it, would not receive 'an auto-start signal. Tower A will have three active cells and no passive cells.
'Tower B will' have one active cell-and no pass;i~ve cells.
ýPage 11 ~of 23
Project 'No., 8893-0'38f3ý
- ia laulati on No. _UrS- 0i 8~Sqpnario_.,4A (Figure 6)
.A~:' Sinqle
- Failure AA4 ',sl:hq~a Fat~~r:~.;"i.i.;:Tllef':ai'n9bi'>~~1:1rira::~'ohs Thie, single fiue id.er.~d';,for: <:.
oieedfore this .scenilr.~R;~~:' th:is unit. s~cenario
. , ,..is,' ,.'a.n;E~
anh ESW 'P\;.J1l'p;.;f:~ilul:'e.*oJr*,:thlie,::",~~ident pump
. , .' failure
... ' ,on the.. ,., accident unit.
13 initial Conditions, -:Thissciriasue an, initial cold water~ basin water tempe, irat-ure of Ro09F. All other initial conditions, are as described, in Section 11 for a cold water basin water temperature of less than 800 F. It is assumed that on~'e SX pump is running' on each unit and each tow'er has two passive cells operatini. It is assumed that two
.tower cells, are 008 which is permitted b~y ad~uinistrative controls. It, is assum~ied that two celIls are' out of service on ,the samte tower since this~ may result in a. higjher rate of t~emperatuire rise in 'the affected tower basin.
C. Accident Conditions -The initiating :qvent< is a unit. 1 LOCA and a coincident' Onit 1 LOOP. The single. failure considered for this case is an Sx punp f~ailure on the accident unit. T'his failurewil'
-result Is a less than naximum injection phaaa heat load on the UriS because twat$C puw-ýs wioulId be:
functional on the accident unit. Both trains of the-accident unit SX system heat exchangers are assum~ed to, be aligned. In addition, it will be assum~ed that
,unit 2 proceeds,. to an orderly shiitdornq. Following
~the' postulat ,ed LOCA, no~ immediate credit is taken for ,UHS ambient heat, dissipation until operator action is initiated to start tower fans and open rise'r valves.. The post'accident system lineup consists- of two 8x paumps ~running 'and the additional:
automatically alig~ied'ESW' loads. The availalble accident unit, pump would start automatically based on safeguards signals. The non-acceident unit pump that was running initially would remain running. ,tý is assumued that the other non-accident unit pump would remain off since it would not receive an auto-start signal. tower A will have ~two active cells and no passive cells~. Tower ,B will have-.four, active cells;. Paqel12 of 23
W>
~t:0j,~ctl'!0 Project No.(" a~9}~lsl~9 Re'vision :2" R~v*is*ioIl";*
.2',,:
8893-3t/39 Caliculation, No. 0118-01 Calculat.lon;No';,..tJRS'-:OI
'>-;'.': '.':,,~.~'
Sq?UarAsiA,'_V'f~" ~);, A. .,'sl.riij:tl!:,:~~11~:~r:',Tbe' Pt.::' siinq'l fa~ire6 considered for . ,. single Failu~re -The si#gl~'>'f'a!1~a'.co*,-slCJer9Cl<fbr::.* this tqenario t:h;is":~rio***ts:'an
*jin:ft~
ig
, , ..,.' . " ..... , dn ESJT:,:p~;fl!i'lura ESW pump faillure
.'.",'. on
.., the
, . . .on*'t:h(f.'.acc'idant
, ' accident 0B. Initial Conditions -Thisz scenariob assumes ýan
.initial cold water~ basin r4atýri temperature of 88S9r, All other initial conditions are as described in Section 11 for a cold water basin ~water temperature
,,qual to or greater than 80 0 F. Itt is assumed that
-one SX pump is running on each. unit and tower A has two active cells and tower 8 has 11four active cell's opeaig Itsould be noted tha~t nornally eight faswol beoprating in this condition, however, willi1 be assumied ~that two to~wer ~cells are 003. I
,is ass~iied that two cells onl one- tower are. 008.
'This,maresult in a higheir rate of tezpereature kisei in the affected tower basin.
C. Accident, Conditions - The initiating event is; a Unlit; 11,LOCA and a coincident Un it I LOOP.* The "siingle failutre considered is agJain one SX pwuip on'the
>accident unzit. Fllbn ~the postulated iLOCA, credit is taken for UHS ambient heat dissipation 4.m-madiately since the tower fans 'that ware runin
^jh~itially will be iauto-oatically rte-eriergized
,following'a LOOP and~su~bsequent diesel starts ~betore'
ý:the SX pumps are sequenced on. No operator actioný is required for this case'. 'The post accident lineup consists of two SX pumps running an~d the.additional automat~ically aligned SX loads. The available a~ccident" unit pump would start automatically based on safeguards signals. The non-accident unit pump.
that was running italywould reanrunning.it is assumed that the~ other~ non-accident unit 'pump would remain off, since it would' not receive an
',auto-start signa'l. Tower,'A-will have two active
,,cells and no Passive cells. Tower~ a will. have Louir actýive Cells.
'1'.t\cjr¥"13*'~f?,23 Page 13of 2.`ý3
/. , ," , '"<'"> <, .- --":,';',
':El ro ject,:,NQ;:aS9'3;+38'1l9'
.CaH::ulatioJlNQ.:'*:UHS-:" 01**,
.Revla10n,,'2:!
ReviS~en 2~
- O~S;:.o;~i- Rr4Yto':}3:'
- 5~;5.
- ;:i4?,~j(:'PRi'I'":7:;;~Y;'~:~ ;*';~~~f;i.~'(;::~~~~¢~~.~at~i:
1, 2OA PRI-7 ReVt, 3 "bS~entii 49ervce Water'
.tilfWtot
%ilfunction" ;on~ ... ta 6.
6.:: ;i~~\l~>,::ti?~3:.~~?{~~";~~ BAR 1/2-2-B2 Rev. .~:? 52 ~411nuhciat.~;
"Annuzitiator R~sponse: Response P~oceiiure:~* P'rocedure,"
77.**. : ;~~~~~t~5 O0BOS 7 .5-1a ..ia.~i:.,:2;*rigB~;*teClini~1.Spaciticiltion Rev. 2 "MIS TIechnical SpecificationLCOý . tcpJ 8-, 1~;9~resp:~nC1erio~.fi:~*.~~i:J~,. 1\;. t.-Correffpondence from K. D. :eI:erin~n: Brennan, *~fCECO),:.(CECa):,to to .. .
,Rý Pleniewicz (CECo)rt~a R~, ~A~~l.~.!~Z,JCEC::O dated teg .Apr 1:*1:;22" April /22, ,,,991 1991 reqarcl:i;nq" regaredingd' "Deihýqn "Ile~t
'.'.,,' *.y.9!L,.o :" :,Ct' Criteria !t:etl;~?
............. " . 'for- tor>
_ ,-'., Ultimate UJ.tijia.te:~.;a~~t';si,:iik
......... ,., ." ,.;,.......Heat ............. (OilS).',!,
' ..... ,.,.,Sink (UHS)."-
9.2 (,c,~e;: &d 3?,fFea:et;al;:R~~~t~'g~B coe f Federal Regrulations 10CFR50 A~ppenixk_ Jdnuary 1, 1990 Edition
*~a~~1/199Q::Eq,1t.10n,>***
.ltf~10.
- Reqt(i4tQry Regulatory Guide'1.2"
,"".d*".'/":"0"/;-"'.-':
Guide 1.27 ..~ttiT:~; Rev. 2
.~.>' '.>\.
January 1976 11.
*;11.:
~.">";
Byron~ Electrical Schematic Drawings 6E-1-4030SX15 Rev. F: 6E-O-4030SX01 Rev. 6Eý-1-4030SX16 Rov. F, 6E-0-4010'SX02 Rev. AI 6E--40ReX1 . T 6E--430w0 Rev. It 6"E-1-4O3OSX02 Revc U, GEO46,3SX04 Rev. S GE-2-403~0SX15, Rev. k , 6E-46`00S`XQ5 Rev. S 6'E-2-4030SX16 Rev.: E GE70-40~30SX06 Rev. R 6E-2-4030SX01 Rev. N 6E 0-4030SX07 Rev. T 6E-21-4030SX02 Rev. M 6E-O-4030SX08 Rev. T 12, Correspondence
~ort:espoDdeJ;',c,~:,t;,c?~:T~,.:,I(. fromi T. K. '. 'scbuaterID.>.Chr:~a~Or;tskl;<<;!'ECo Schuster/D. Chrzanowski, (CZ:.o),,'
- tQ,G .... ~Corr~£ad:'T::
"to'G'. Contrady :IqBCd)~;:JI~te4 (CECO)> dated ,.AU.U:$,t,.:2#'1.991,;,~eg;i:td,i:~q" AU u~ 2, 1991 re-garding . "
."8
,'Byron
... yr." on:, Station Sa~10ii-:1)1t:llria:te5HeatslnkZ~Desl""~'"
.. .. . . Ultimata~ ' ....... H4fet '. .... Synk~ . Des .9:11 .
, . iqW'. . *'d" *.....*.*
. . i~:., , 13.
*~m~f;:~~m;;iif!~itI~~~~tl!~~~¥£;;*i~"~i:tf yrc/~ad~od2~Updated Final Safety Analysis4 Ropor (UFAR)Rev~ision' 2 iiubxnitted Decemnbaz 17, 1991,
')',:~"(".,~. ",,,,,< . . . , ., . . \.>. .,,';.,,.... :.<.:">. :.'~~:,,:'-"'.:< ::. :'.;' . ~/',<: ':,/" ,. ~',.: **4*..*.'>"* :/..'i,:'
- 14. ANSI/ANS-58.8-1984 ANSI lAHs... 58~'8c:"1~:8 4 American American' NucleilrSoc~etytllDe Nuclear Society time
~a!lp.'~nt.-~. ~,.de.!i1gncr.*
response deesiqn criteria it*eri~,.:f,~~'\ nu¢leilr.safe~y for nuclear safety related, r~la~,~/ opoerator actions. '. . .' . . . .
~p~.t:~()rac". ,~:ns;. .. .. .. . . , . ' .'.
- 15. ~~* .*}~.;(fT~
BOP t7X-T2 **,*~~i~,:,'i~):f;*.~~}:'1oWe~ Rev. 1.IOS Tower Opp-ration ~#.~l!r?~,'~\l;~~~~n~~:." Gudellna"., 16, I1aFP-0 18EPfO;Rev*.' Rev. 3 3.~~~*~;~~~,\Tt!R*'
"Reactor Trip 'ot:i*~~,~.~~1i¥;'*~~j~i~p> br Safety Injecation ;;..
-~
'Unit 9i}~~j\J~~'~ 11. '.
pale, 15:of 23
;Project tNo,.. S893;"381l,~
Pi::oj'ect,NO 8893-38/139 Calculation No..
'$llc\ilation gfo. ~~$~,
DUBH-0 nevis,ion :22 Revislion IV.Othr Filues~Considered That Art knbvela e, 1I... Riser
'Riser Valve valve Failure to open Sln9tll!":~~li~$
Sinqle failure Of"on~ of one t~e~.r1s,er tower riser valva valve *. to?:~., to open is ia . enveloped env~loped.:bY- 8cenarios 2lt.<,~nd2@. by Scenarios 2A and 2B. ,In, l,unl'.of
-Inlieu of ,one riser one rl.s~~
valve,fa.ilurQ,Sc:&narios'2Aanc,r*28 valve failure, Scenarios 2A and 2B Postulate postulate fa,ilure failure 6f of' onetctn
,one fan and assume thati and 'assume that t.ti'e, the associated assQciat.ed ~l~erv,alVfnJ<
riser valves " ' close. This results intbQs~. clQse.":rhisresults in the same ccmfiqurat'oion configuration (five (five' active cells and no passive act1va:calls passive cells) cells)' as ar tser valve a rider valve ',' ',' fa*ltll:"e~ failure. ,',,' The heat 'heat load\lJij)os~':onth~ load inposed on the tower tow~er 1a tbesa,m~' isa the samue for 1both scenarios arul,cc)1:;",sPQpds
'for.~tlta(;:enarlos, and corresponds to to,tw(J"cs,pwmpa,i'lr'ttl,'"
two CS pumps anid four RCFC'a RCYC's C?peratingoperating ara:the::accidant'un'it vfl the accident' unit... 2.Station$" t:i' "'**>>i';';r.""2!:
",$1 2;0 BlaJckout wva Y.=", ,'", " """,,,,' ",", i '
11-02-90 CECo res-ubujittal to ,\',ueNRC;):>f' Tbe.:l'1-';;,02,~9(),\C£CoresulJRlt.tal.:to The the '.4RC of ..the- tbe Staton Station Blackaut',Aria'lysi5addresi~Sd~~lqilad~c' Blac~kout Analysis addresses design adeqi~acy~'for' BlackqUt: for Blackout cQ~.~it:J,~!l~,~;\,;,<:':E99.' conditions. ~CECO ltE~.;~i~:lbe*r@sp<>n'i1>le',., N~ED will be responsibile for reviewing
'", reviewing" the iti~pct of SBO on the tha'Jjfipact:.Q(BBq,on ~@);~s.>~ UHS by .MareJl*.* March . 11,~ 1992 as
'" '199:2 as dis.c;U~~ad discussed at. at' the April, Aprtl:2'9 29,, 1991:.*i!t~~i,J;lg 1991 meeting ,in in Do~liI!I Downer's .
Grove. G~rove.
" . "",' "~
- 3. C ;_y Fa'lreof the containet oh 11er erbYPass(and.lsolation byass, and isolation valves is significant .\jfo'.addltlonal:.beat,\loaa is- not ~significant. No addit'lanal heat, load
- would, b~e would be; imposed iuposed on the UHlS due to these .'fa1.1ute~ifi's;in.ea UHSi*(iUQ*;'tc;;'th@iI!Ie 'failures Gsin~a the cont;aimUrit:li1!101at;ion.~,,a'lvet(WQuldisola t.b'E!I' containment 'isolation valves would isolate chilled t@*. chilled wa.t.er.tlow water flow t.ot.he to the cont;airiment;cc.rls:~
containment coils'. *.. 'In addition, 'it in addit.ion' if' .
'~.~' chiller bypasil!l*valve,:~,~Jl~d"'ln the chiller bypass valve failed in .the . Cl~~.cltp~~lt:~on, closed position,,-
the
-the uas UriS would only receive heat would onlyreef,!!,l:'l*'!. beat:' .' load,tl;'qllt one train ........ . .
load from ':9"~,,*1:.ra;ln; (2.RCFC {;2, RCFC's. / svs vs.... 44 RCFC'S)"of RCFC's) of Rcrc.':s. RCFC's. .., ....
- 4. airofCCorAWPusoColr Failure of ECCS or AF-W pumps would result in lowe'r U)S
'heat 'l'oading~.
Tnout Data /Rfefrences
- 1. Piping riqandInst~en~t~onDra:wi.nq5 and Instrumentation Drawing5
. M-42-IA
'. -lA'a:n4'"lB'Revo'<'Z,**
and' lB Rev. Z '.' . . *'., . , ... " .', 21-42-2AA'and.2B*Revi*
"M:~:'a-2 and 2B Rev. *AC' AC M~'42-3ReV" 14-42-3 Rev. AL' M~4'2 M4-42-4 ... 4ReV.
Rev. AH Ali M4-42-5
.' M':'4 2-"~ Rey. Rev. .,'1.Y 1-42-6 M
<14:-42";:6- R~.
Rev. >AHAlt M-42-7 Rev~
,M"','2~<}' Rev. '1M1 K1-42-8 :Rev
,**,K-42-.8 Rev......!t. K
- 2. ' Byron Technfcal 2.. Technical ,speetd.:cations Specifications Amendment: Amendment:.,39 39
- 3. 'lZ2BEP-.(i;'~OE~U l.. 1/2BEP-CfWOF-IA ,~v Rev..',l3 itIIR04ctor ReactorTrlp Trip ,or safety, safety
.. ' InjeotIon"
'Injection"'
'. Page 14 14 of '23 '23.
~~ .' ; : "
Project
.Proj~ot>. No.~e889 No 9 9 J~3~.jJ'g 1-48'/319
.' . ..mtS~O.l
- CaCalculationNo ldUlillt.'ionNd hSO
- ~:vfsiori:2',
Re'vision 2,. ..' .., ........'. VI .* ' .C:QJj~e.fYAAf~,.: 1.The6 folIlow ri1 are conservative'ly aSsumed.,t.0-o CCUrý
",1:!!: I.~.~:~!~~~t¥~:~~*~;~~;~t::t~t~~:::~~4<~?::';'99~*~
.'6jcienaly for analysis prpss
;:~.~' .. ~*~:~#.~a.~~~:~
ptlated
- t. LOA . .
;l?:~ b.losslosS:c)fof Of~a1te::power:~~t>}o:fi offaite power (LPOP) 6A. ,~~tdQ~~.~Urii~~~:* a~ccideint onIt.
- wor~'h:oa5§l;:~ingIe'f~iiure'
,-V orst case single failure {~.aMition in a~ddit ion' to t:O*hav:i~ ..g.... : two havinqtw tower cells
- toWer**celhfOOS.
pI" ,,< ","", OOS. i',, *8i~~.,
'42 0 F ambient afub{ent: wet bulb. temperatu~re.'
w@,t','bulb.*tempEU:af,-ur:e/
~ ~<, , . . " .,' . "
~~~!~ii~~i~()~~~~e!7Yi~:W~~~~:t!~~r::~***.
2.Wen the cold. water basin water temperature~ is below Boot, it is consrva~etively assumed that 'no fan~s are rtnninq. A5 a result, ...,no r\lnf;lif!iCl"*1\3;~r@sult.~ hils anbient heat dissipation no.' *tmfj;;:;l!l'I!f1b14:,ult1tea~;*i41ss1J)a~l0t1
.is credited is':credit@o: until~ after . ope2-rator oparat:dr actions .h.ave~en*
have been lnit,j:atea;. in itiated., unttE'after
. " ' "'.' ." . ' .; act;idn5: .',"<,.<.' . . . ..;. ',:.,: .
It,is assumed that 'twD,>!eella
- 3 'It.isassumedthat two clsare are 00s when . the OOS* ;Whai'l cold woater t.he*coldwat&r.:
b~asin temperature is ~between
~~J,if,i:'~ce~pa~at1U:'eia: 80OF and 880P. ."Norma:1'ly/
~t:W~:.8Q~P'::~ridSQ°F:.~;' Normailly, ,.,.~
all a cells would ,~c::t~ll:y:JJe
~]jl";::~Y:cell~::;wpul,d actually be in. service with in *serviaa,*wl tb;"r riser iSQr' valves o~pern and fang rutnning.
y~p;e,;'~*:'~~:~~i,~.~':i!,;~M:*";~l1..~~9',~;' . 4.The maininum Technica~l Specificatio' basin lvl~ )i
~~~,~lrlim~: "l'e~, . :qcfrSp@eiffe~~l.ol'(:tj~i:1ri;:.Je~~!i.l~.O;~r *'~::
used' for .ilI,ni:'. lJ:~~$1\'J:9;' analysis . *.. purposes to iconservativey 'minimize
£lUl:'P()S~f;;.t;..q~~:c;9n~~r:.'V.a.:t,;}*,:e~~'llDl;,~lJl~*:Z.
the passive UJIS heat capacity. w.~~:J?~JlH~!'IlE!l.~~!j<.I:lQ~t.*.*. pa.pao,~~y:~;' . The basin is,'norm~ally Tge:bas.~Z1.:*J,:!:'*~onnll:l~ manintained ,at,
~~~f,~;Jl.E!4., at or above? 7Ot (lr* :a~9:V~> which would provide',
70~.~hiCh**\i9¥J;d,; p.roY1~4i!:: .'.
#dItonajtower heat c&apacity. ' , '
~AA~;.t~n~~;~:~ef,h¢.cl~~;:Qapa~l.ty.i' '.
*=~~~t~'e!{1:m:7~~~dW!~iY.i:#c)cj:;!.~,:;::;~,~#~;J'9~*t:1::
5~.NO reit isa ta~cen for passive cooligtwrel ambint hatissipation.
ý'6 :~os:~~ad~~,
.,t~dc*d
. ESWM~a`eup Esw,*malteup",to:
taken dit ist~' taken 'for to the.
'for'.,t~~.:cooir~g',
the cool-ingqconributinfo tower. basinis'. the':,tower basina~ c:Ql1~ibution ('fr~~t~~/ thed
***:~t,i *.;:;cbncihSlt?n, tsfilq~~i,~fii1l:-9~~:~!sd~il~rIQs:'w~t~.'*g~veiop6lc:iz*:~::'a~s~'r~!~
single 'falurk6 sceqnarios were developed and describeýd, *. ,jn in section;I sict:tonC:;'I1:'~"'*.Ft' Fligures 'e$. :tthIouh,"6: through 6 provide 'ovide:,:sm simpllitled:dia' ified diagrm rams;: ld illustrate' to fllustiat,e\,:tmffjcenarlos.~.Th.i~daleulatl~n the scenarios. This calculation will, **wlll'.be be'~'s'ed\ u'sed. *. . as%
'as £.nopt to CEiCo for detailed
~;npu~\*t:~~*;'c!:Co,:';f()#:.: 4#!t:~i;leite*va':l~~ticin evaluation . ;>o.f':tms .
- perfomanca~;
of tilS ,pe~rforlmance.
.Page, 18 Of 23,
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FIG-CUR£ . ,
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-38/39 Calculatibon
'Calculat'fonNO. No. UIS-Ol UHS-Ol Revi~ionr
'Rev 2 iaion' /2,,:
page 22 Page of 23 22 of 23
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II II IINITIAL N I T I A L TOil TOWER T T ABL ER A 8L EI E CONF 1 GU RAT I ON CONFIGURATION II POSTLOCATOWNERCONXIGURATIONFOLLOWINGOPERATORACTION I POST LlICA TOWER CDNFI6URATION FOlLOWING OPERATOR ACTION II IITI* , S%, PK I, I I-* E R1\ umUIL Slll\ll\llS II l\l \I E 1\A T T bO IHI) E E R1\ bII 11 II 7lOWER 14OE R A A TOWER lOll E R B II II HEAT
!£AT TOWER TOWER RUNNING RUNNING IIII RISER RISER RISER RISER II II RISER RISER RISER RISER II INIT. SINGLE BASIN POST INIT. SINGLE LOAD LOAD BASIN POST IIII FANS FANS VALUES ACTIVE VALVES ACTIUE PASSIVEPASSI UE II FANS FANS VALVES UALUES ACTIVE ACTIVE PASSIVE PASSI UE IIII FANS FANS VALUES VALUES ACTIVE PASSIVE II FANS ACTlUE PASSIVE FANS VALVES UALVES ACTIVE ACTIVE PASSIVE PASSIUE II SCENARIO EVENTFAILURE BASIS TEMP CELLS DOS LOCA II RLINING SCENARIO EUENl FAILURE BASIS TEMP CELLS DDS UlCA II RLtlNING OPEN CELLSOPEN CELlS CELLS CELlS RIJlNING OPEN II RIMING OPEN CELLS CELlS CELLS CELLS RUNNING OEN IIII RUNING [JlEN CELLS CELLS II RUNNING CELLS CELLS RUNNING OPEN OPEN CELLSCELLS CELLS cELlS II
---==--=======- ---- -===--=======--=====---======
CS PLO ICS U-I ICS PUMP *II 6II 22 JA 86oF 2 II III IH CS PIlIP PIJ!II 80°F A/D AID 33 II II II 2 6II 22 1 2 II 2 22 2 6II I 4 4 4 6II II II LOCA ONACCIDENT LOCA UNIT
~IT 4 RCFC1S ON ACCIDENT 4 RCFC'S PLUS PlUS ORDERLY ORDERLV II II II II II II II II
" " " itII IIII U-2 SWJTDOAN II II IIII U-2S111T1l11WN II II II II III II I IB U-I CS PmP CS ON ICS PIlIP ON 4 B 4
IB U-I ICS PUNP PUMP 88i 8S"F F A/D AID 33 II II 2 22 22 aIl I It It II II 22 22 22 6II I 4 4 4 611 II LOCA ACCIDENT 4 RCFC'S UlCA ACCIDENT UNIT
~IT
" RlFC'S PLUS PlUS ORDERLY ORDERLV II II II II
" II II
" " " II II U-2 II II u-2 S9TDOUN SIIJTDIIWN II II II II II II 2A 2A U-I U-I COOLING COOLING 2CS PUIS 2CS PIJIIPS 864F A/D 33 IIII 22 B 4 4 II 4 4 6II II AID Il Il 2 II II LOCA LIICA TONER TIliER FAN FAN 4* RIFC PLUS RCFC'SS PlUS ORDERLY ORDERLV 811°F II I
II
" " " II II
" " " II II II u-2 SIJUTDOI U'-2 SIIJTDIIIj II II II II II 2B U-I COOLING 4 ,4 6 2CS PIWS 2CS 881F A/D 33 II 22 22 4 II 4 4 6II II 2B PUIIPS Il6 1 4 U-I LICA LlICA COOLING TOWER TIliER FAN FAN 44 RCFC'S PLUS RCFC'S ORDERLY PlUS ORDERLY 8S"F AID II II 2
" " II II II II II
" " " " II IIII J-2 SIMJTDO* II iI IIII u-2 SIIITIlIIWN II II II IIII II 3A U-I 06 6 3 3 II 33 1 22 D6 FAILURE IIII 3A U-I FAILURE ICS ICS KPIP PIJtP 88F 8Il"F A/H AlH 2 II II II 33 6II 33 1 II 3 II 3 II 33 33 33 aII I UmC (IB) 22 RCFC`S II IIII tOCA UBI RCFC'S II II ON ACCIDENT PLUS ORDERLY II IIII III ACCIDENT PlUS ORDERLY II U-2IJ II II UNIT u-2 ITDOWN IIII
~IT SIlITIIIIIN II II II IIII II 3B U-I D6FAILURE ICS PUlP N6F A/H 22 III 3 3 3 6 II 33 1 22 IIII 3B U-I OS FAILURE ICS PUIIP 88"F AIH 3 33 33 aII I 3 3 3 II 1\ 33 33 33 6il I LOCA (10) 22 RCFC'S II II IIII LlICA UBI RCFC'S II ON ACCIDENT PLUS ORDERLY IIII II IIII IlN ACCIDENT PlUS ORDERLY II UNIT 1H- IIII II IIII UNIT u-2 SIUTDOWN SHUTDDIIN II1\ II 1\
IIII II II 3C U-I DG FAILURE ICSPUP 88*F A/H 6 1 1 II 33 33 6II IIII 22 IIII 33 6II 33 1 II 33 6il I 3C U-I LCa D6 FAILURE ICS PIJIP (11) UlCA UBI ON ACCIDENT 22 RICFS PLUS RlFC'S ORDERLY 811°F AlH IIII II
" " li II 1\
IIII III IlN ACCIDENT PlUS ORDERLY IIII II UNIT U-2 9SIJTDOWN IIII II II
~IT U-2SHllTD111N II II11 il II 1\
4A U-I SxPNP 2CS 6 2 6 2* II 4 4 6 II 2CS PumPS 86*F A/D 22 IIII 22 6II 22 1 22 22 22 a6Il I Il 4A U-I LOCA UlCA ON SX PIlIP III ACCIDENT UNIT
~IT PIIIPS ACCIDENT 4" RIFC'S PLUS RIFe's ORDERLY PlUS ORDERLY 811°F A/O III II II il 2 Il 2 II II II II II
" " " II II U-2 II II I u-2 SJTDOdW SIIJTDIIIj II II II II II I 86-F A/D 2 II 4B U-I Sx51 FLIP 2C5 II 4 4l 6 II 4 4 6II 2CS P1S 22 22 a6 I -4 22 22 22 a8 I 4 IIII Il 4B u-t UNIT
~IT PIJIl LOCAONACCIDENT 4 PLUS PWIPS RCFC'S UlCA iii ACCIDENT " RlFC'S PlUS ORDERLY ORDERLY 88°F AID II II 2 Il 4
" Il II II II 1\
II
" " IIII IIII L-2 II II u-2 SIHUTI SIIJ1DIIjN 1\
II1\ II II IIII II Project Projrct No. 8893-38/39 No. 8893-38/39 Calculation Calculation No. No. UHS-01 IJIS-tl Revision Rrvision 22 23 ofof23 23 23
.~inibitE Exiibt E
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* ;C-OMMONWEALTH EDISON' COMPAýNYý ';-' . ',< . <, "','. ~~ .
CA4LCULATIONNO:.; U4SHOl .... PROJECTINO. NA PAGE. S. 4' PUtQiW.V9~~iv,,:~ J~~\puWqse'!ri~'ReJ,~fon)'~I~::tQ,dOC\Jment*.~'dlfi~n~I**Po9t.(ocj;'sing:~~I)lJre\modeS~ Th pups f Reiion 31sftodocument additional post-OAsnl fir oe that;WiI~(b~':a,rialy~ed:fQr:,tfieiUHS~
.' that wilL be ,anaqlyzed fo1r 6he UljS ,1jl~',additional:scenafios;a~:,sf3:lfJ~dtO,boq"d; The addiftinal scenarios areý selectled to bound3, . ' .* ,
~****r3te:ntriJ,'
potential val\k:leak:;t)' ValIe lek-by" 'Of:ffiejQ\Yet'~r*and:b*<;a~s\,falve";arid::admiolstfath.iErcontroiS of the tower riser and bypass valves ,andal~nsft~ecnrl
.. ".'.,,, ,<' . .":.,~:, ':':, :'\":';"'.:"", /'l ","'.:'~"\'>".'.'.";; ",'/<";" ,.;"".:.,..",,::,yp, ;.',"." : ' . .',', ... >.:.,". ',". :;/: .. :';'-'> ;.':;""',:': >,'.* ' :,::' .," .:.,.
, to maintain 7 SX~algtowelr fans operable. 'TI1'eS'e, tomaintalll*'7!;SX::cOoling;to\IVEn:faO'S::6~rabfe~' These Oew, new scenarl6$:supple'men(tnt'f',
scenarios supplemnent ther
~~~~~~~:#Rfflm~~t~~',i~;~~\ri*i(jO:~'(j!:~I~i~Ic,~#~~?~}
scenarics'documnented in Revision 2 of t-his calculaton, ". '.','"".;.', ,., , ':\.',,,(~... :> .', .
'. . MethodQlogy .ri<I'~nCeCattclit"
.. ~;. ;-." \/'
,. . ,. rhiwQl"St:ciiSe~scen~o,;will.bek:leritifled The worst ,case'scenaiho will be identified .from .the'bas[i( the basin temperature::caroolStron< temperature calu~latoný (Re~,~h~',1f,::,:t.B'~\~()~~ca$eseenan~:[i~~tiP.ti~~:~~i:~te\I~~
. (Reference 1), the wo'rse case scenario desci-ption will be revised fdt;t~~HiW; for the new ,.
conditions (i~e.., valve ciQndltibntl(i::e.;~::'{, leakage, number of fans initiafly out of servicel. Scenarios willI be,
.. )~akage.numberoffaM*.initiidIY,;'9Ut;ofseMceF'S~narl~~illbe"*
dooe doefrteuaiitle~
'fortti~~as'if: ,~J~d".* c:ondltion odto with ith 3/4" ritser drain 3.4"l *.riser. [ines, and the proposed
~rallfjlij~andthe proposEi!d:~~.rls~r, 2W rise
,>ari.jf:n drain linies. I,in~'~; Simplified
$i~R~ijiS:<J,~'~i~9~rn~willb~ge~tedtqln~str8Ie diagrams will be generated to illustrate the. the new newsee,n~~; scenarios. ;;'W:~,:; The.
',: ~~:~[t~:o'J~I~f~I¢~'~tiP,rj,wi',1 results
,fJ~ff#~~~j' of this calculatfon .. "'.' beus,edJ~s,iriPi4frJr:a@,iti9nal,analYSis will be used as
. '.' '. .,.,""input for additional
' . ' .', . analy~sis . ,....of .UftS: UH-Sý ... '
performandce.. J ,&iliu'Olptro"n$i:; Au ss~rnitins romR '16in 2 of-the calculation are used in thi's Revs nxeC" as
.', AJJaii~~tO)tfq~s)ftgm'
>;fillr6w~~;"""')' ',.: ~fr!i$iPri,?pftne.:.,t;aJcul~~iori*
,.';~." '."',, :, ", "', . ':"'.' '. .... ,., ...,. '.~'u~.fililit~~;fttivj$~J'(f#,~ia~ . ";'.'. ,.,.",": '."'."/.. ' .';,' . . """""./"', . ' J,"."" 'i..""
'. ),. ,";'-:;: .>:(:/!
- 1. ýRe1virsion'2 6,assuma d a maximum initial cold wator bsind tempratrnf 5
ýAmenindmen~t ,5,4 tfo~r.Tech Spec 314.7.5 changed the SX pump disc~hatogb tenprtur liitAto 9611F with all OPERABLE fans ruin niln~ nhg pe~ U temiperature onalysi 11l be performed assuming an initial maximum od ae basin temperatulre of 96.
- 2. ;~~s~.~.;~>a;~~~~;,~c)$X.CQOlirig*t~t,*tan"~q~;§:~~~~.~'~tV~;;
Revision2 assurmed two SX cooling tower fanfs OQS wfth the riseer valves a~&OOiated*Wilhtfie~OOSfans.closed.,'Additional:sceriadOS'*Win;be"analy.ied asso-ciated withb
;';) -' :.';, /~<:- ":-;:.<,,~",
the 00$ fans <.uclosed.
.... ; >: < :". '.~: .,,~.~. '~,~'yN : ' : ** ~ '. ""/'
Additional scenarias
'.;' ,'", </ ,,:":>", :. -' :,> '..'~'i'.-::/:;, N*.' j~~" .. ,
will be analyzed
,/,.:>>.; ,',:' , ,,' . '/ :' ..':> .... "",', . ;; ,/' "'" '.'"
assuming administrative controls which require 7 SX'cooling tower fans to be
- as5um.il'1g/,a~",[ni;Stiji~e:controlswhichrequire?7:;;SX,.:coonngtowar;fans'to~be o~rati~(ontypoe;1jr.(OOS):
operable (onl one fan 00S), '. . .
- 3. Based Base'd.::orythe;.fQ~ridreak~forlhEih:i6sedbypass:and*rise:rval~
on the as-found leak-by for the closed bypass 'andriser valves {Ri:if~re:r1.b.~~~;:fan<tC:3)';'~'fpllqWing,~ak..bYfl~.;6:lt~:Wilf (Refoere nces 2 and 3), the following teak~by flow rate will be'cxiru;eNBtNe,1Y be conyservativel
~rned;fOr;:1hed(,sedrlsEu'
ýassumried for the closed riser and and bYpassvah.r_('
bypass valves: ' . ' '. ,....
-Riser Valves:
RrserVaJiles::'E$~:gproNaJYe 635 gpmlvalve
'~,Y~¥#,:V#~~;*~:;9.PQ:~prriNalve Bypass Valves: 900 gpnT~vlve j REVISION NO.: 33 R.EV!SION I
'*.Eitiil)ffR E~iibit E
., NEP:!l:;{)l' NEP-12202
,"iIAlviSiim 4:
o El COMMONWEALTH EDISO'NICOMPANY;! CALC"UTION NOM.: UHSM!,S " PROJECT NO.ý NA
*O*7. PASE 41 FTo Referne1(g~~-Q the toweribypass flowthroiugh the propo'se.d 2 iýnch rerinineý is asumed to be 250 gpm per open riser.
S~ account for thea bypass flow for the 3/4" drain lines, the riser valvllba kb iw A14 be conservatively incie~ased from 635 gpm to 1000 gprn per valve anid'niofbw wilbe assumed through the 3/4" riser drain linie. 'The flow inthe3I4* drain line. can be ,estimnated fwrom the 2"' line flow., Using Eq 3,19 &3,24 from Re, 5: Q>nd4ar addifferent pipe 1.0-Kýý =Kb) For 2" pipe d, 1.939 in (assume schedule 80 pip#) For 3/4" pipe d6 0.742 in (assume schedule 80 pipe)
=~~~~ eeec 25 age 1-202-Qb '62-Q =S'X 9pmo
~~I~ir~=~Irst,"w~~~~~~t~!~mWAidi, Wi'th7open-risers,-teelotal bPypass flow would be approxi'matel 256.gpm-WfildWh is
~ ~ GP nease
~ boneMyth'i5 cm in assumed fiser valve Ieakby,,,
,~I' .n:Jnput::,
,', . :,.~;.;<.",<,.":,,.'
1:;"f&m,~~~,Ifi~'ehi;~~~tf1,~~P*~~,tllerTl~:*liiij~Q,~*:b.~i~':~P#'~fflJ;,c¢tJJii~ Fnrom alculatilon NED-MMSID-9 the most lhniting SX basin temperature ocbulrsý. for'sceiiario 2B which corresponds to Figures 2 and 3 of Revjsikin 2of,thhr: for,:S~natiO\2B:Whi¢h:Cori:~spondsf,tQ*Fi9ur",2;and:3'QfRe~siOn 2ofti
- haicillaudn:~;:""
,calcu lation. '. ",: . ,f," , "</,' ',' "'.',,' . ' , ',',', '
;>':~'\; ;-'. '" %"';:, ',>,
- '2.
2'; j~iSer,v~Iy.Jeakage*i:sobtainedWom*:*Reference2.' Riser valves leakage is obtained from. Reference 2.
'*3.3. 8a :;"'aQ'vruve:
,ypass leak"efiSbbtSiried valve leakage from R&femncij3~
is obtained ftrom
. .VP:./.",:.<",.::.>.,: ~, *. :,.".,;.~1l/<. :';"'".""., .. ..' .'
Reference 3. .
,",';0:>,,' **.:4~The;,flow 4The flow *r~t&. fortile2~nch rate for the 2-inch. riser drain dt~iniineJs* o~lned,fromRe~rencej line is obtained from Referencel1,~;.
I RE~VISION NO.," 3
Exhibit E
.E:ddbitB
~. NEP-12-02Z NHP*ll..:Ol'
'COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY,-
'COMMONWEALTH'EDISONCOMPANY:
CALCULATiONlNw:k UHS-01 PROJECT-NO. NA PAGE N4* " t;
- 1. ýCaulafltion NED-M-MSD-9, Revision 3, dated 446-96; L2:
2.** Letter from Mike Robinson to'Kevin Passrnore,' dated 11-1I8-96.. *.,SLAlJ~:*
*:'~~ttet*~'frAlk~c~9ijin~orntr*Ke~h*~~~rhd(~;:,:~~d***:1*1Hj.:a~9S Subj~at;
~Estjmation.ofESsentJal.SeNtCeWatef~'GoOJjn'*
~Estimation of Essential Service Water Cooling . (SXCT) (SxCl)RrserValv~i-leakSge' Riser Valve Leakage
;:~~~:~~f:""": .,.*i... ...* .:.<."~"\ g, . .,,><;.. ...... . , ".,<" .....
S3 ýCalculati.n BYR9Pg281, Revýsjqn 0, dated 1212019.6, "DeteerMilnaion of SXCT
*3; ~rr..?i!~r~~;:~~~~l\'O.'datll.d"212Qi1l~i"biljfiiihlrialioo.!lisk<;T Vaive Leakage."
8ypass
***'4~ 4. .~yrpo:'J~n1p~.:S,~iClO.:3l~~7::5~>
Yrbrf76echn Cal Speci ication
" , ~':~ .;- . : _,' ___ ' - _ :.", ,'t.~ ." ~ "<~: ' .. ,h,.,~"~ ," h,'
3141-5,
>:....:-:....... :~ ~\~ : "<' ',. ' .
\;~. ~"
Ultimate
':~.'\, ,', ". *\~2*~
He-at Sink, 4~jfe*I1~~tS~Q~::*~t1t~~hJ~.htNo
... ;--.,' .,:':' , .>~::~. ,,:. '" .
~,'
AMendmenht
~.,.:.\'.>d,,: ':' "., "/.r.: ~,' '< .... ,
~
No.*..54.
- t. ~':.
54;;
- ..... ./ .
5" fcfine*~iechhicaJP:,~~r Crane Te-chnical Paper No, Nci!(4~.h;:fr~:~fF.\J~'s?fhrOU9hV~tVes.*. 410, Flow of Fluid's Through Valves, F~~g*s.*ahd~. Fittings andý "Pi' Pipe,
.... ,PE!lr.*l9BOEdltion~:
198O ..........Editid6h. >.' ,',,'
- CalgUratiQbl;~\
':"," . "~1:-:': l ;:, . ;, :", . ¥.'
-Fromn Reference I Scenario 213 is m~ost limiting. Use the sam~e initiating eqvent, s~nlng,1
*:ffOrri.;R~~~ri~:f,;$~~~,6:~,i~:;~()~tl.~t1}iti~9i::qs~:(~~:~~~Jn~:~~g(i~&..~.iri9~:*
failure' heat:fhlid'and:numbefcjfSX:"-"iim'
. failUre
"',.1.";'"
helat load and number of $X
*.;*.i.< ..-'/ ...*,.*.**.* ( ..," .':' ",*c.*, ' . ' ........ *c*." ''ppumps runn("rofthe*new/scenanos.,
runOning
.... p'"'s:. ,...... ,~ ....... fot-the niew'/-/'~.',.
'i.**C.* "'/o.'
scenano.s., " ........ .
".3~hnari5 Scenario5:
'. (3/4rd~ajri (3/4" drain lines,
. '. '-:'./: -.:"': '" '.,', ,".. ."..
Ore One;'fanOOS) fan 00$),. Initfal Tower Basin Temp* 96F (Assumption 1) Cells, OSS: 0 (Assumption 2) Initial Tower Conffguration r e , :.:... Tower Aý 2 Fans .Running, 3 Riser Valves.Open, 2 Acdive~ells, 1 Passive., Coll To.:werB:. 4 Fans Running, 4 Riser Valves Open. 4 Actie Cells:0 Passivea Cells. Po st-LOCA ToWer Configuratlion After Operator Actioru Tower A:, 2 Fans:Running, 2 Riser Valves Open. 2,Actve Cells, 0 Passive: Cells~ Towera: 4Fans Runnindgý4 Riser.Vatves Opn 4 AcreCls,0Psie, Cells Ris-ierValve Leakby "00 0.gprNalve (Assumption 5) 1()oQ,gpmlv~jveV\~mption.fi) Bypass~ Valve Leakbay ~i~pmv~!V~.(A#umpti9r>~x:~ 900[gpm valve (Assumptbon 3) "< .', .. < Drain, Line Bypassi Flow:,=;: 0 (lncludedjin p, (lf1c;1ud~;jn/Rlsf.ir;~a~by" Riser,Lkby,Asupon) ~~lJmptiQf1'-~l' REVISION NO0:
','. REViSION N().:'~. "*3 :3
. brtdbii'
. NEP,;1:2:.m*
COMMONWEALTHEDISON COMPANY
.~.~likl.~4*."
,CALCULATION NO. UHS-01 . :PROJ.ECT PROJECT NO~ NO. . NA PAGE Na.'7 s~na[j9;~~.(Case*2B; (Case 2B1, *~}ttsf~.lin~t:~ndV~,vet~.~py)
I~ rai nsad Valve0 Leakby)
!~iliei.Toweri*e~sin*Temp,;
WOWi~ TovWer'Basin Temnp, =9SO*{AssumPtiOn:1:r' 961' (Assumption I), c~lsds's:.:: CelsOý: 8::&\0" B &D ***.x in~1 T~iict~~~~Rij~t~i~~~~~r~~?~~~~f~~~1~!i~a~1~~~" InRtWa Towver Configujration.- Tower 'A: I1Fan Running, '2 Riser Valves Open, 1 A~tvtejCeU1l".-Pa"S"sive Cell Tower B: 4 Fans Run ning', 4 Riser Valves Open, 4 Active Cells, 0 P'ssilve Cells r;'i)$t;tl}l~h~~~~~~~~.~';';'t~9I!n;~~~~,~e;R'1Q! Past-LOCA Towe Con-ffguration After Operator Action. Tow'erA. "1Fan Running, I Riser Valve Open. 1Active Cell, 0 Passive CeilIS I.' 7~!r'B::"4' Fa,n.s:~:~f1nfrig~~rRi$e"val"~J:~~.n.:4.~~i'ij':G~~ls~;QP.~ive Tower 8: 4 Fanis Running, 4 Riser Valves Open, 4 Active Cells, 0 Passive C
.... ' . . .*Cerla Cells . .... -
RiSf3(,V~lv,~¥eakby,*:. Riser Valve Leakby .,- . 3;;; = :a~5:gp 635 gpnwvalve . nJVSJ. We;(~ss~mp~;g) (Assumption 3)..., B.ypastiyalvet~~~y_::._';:: dypass Valve Leakby *~qOg~tWv~~.*(~$$urnptiOij\~).* 900 9pri-i~lve (Assurrption 3) i" r~f~lnp.~~~~~I)~J;;*r§\V:*:;?c. DrIn Line'Bypass Flow =250 ,~§9g*Piij(~P~f1 gpml open . riser ~~f*~~~~~rnP.~lQri~,): (Assumption 4ý',
, ScenariO tr':{O~;:tafl 7. (One Fan bOS;:;2~drt.in:llhe$~ancl'ialve:
OGS, 2 drain lines and Valve Leakby) teaJd)y)
. ',:. ":" *~.:'*t""':*:'*'*>*:h**'. "':"', ; ,':" ' .. :..... ,., ,,>.~' . . . """ . ': ..'~'
~t~;'~~;~;;K;R::~9;'3'R:~!o~~ni2iAdI~Ced~' P~~'~1 In491a Tower Basin Temp = 96'F , (Assumption 1)'
Cell OSS: I) (Assumption 2') Inftial Towver Config'uraton :. Tower k `2 Fans Runnihg, 3 Riser Valves Open, 2"Ac~e Cells, tI Passive
..,.,'.. " Cell
'Cell..... ..... .'" "................. ' ' ... "
Tlowe r B:' row~,r B: .*t1:*,f~n~.~u.nt1lni#A*:R~t:Y~iv~(Qp~!l~*4;~i'ile.::'C,~n~1.9PB~ve,:. 4 Fans Runnipng,,4 Riser Valves Open., 4 Active Cells, 0 Passive Cells
- CeU~
PGSM~:QCA;Towet:,:C:&ri1f:ijratiQoAfterOperator:Adion: Post-LOCA Tower Configuration
....... ;-.-.* ' *.... ' ......:-'> .... '.:' .* :. ,.. / ..' ..**** ,~: **/ ** v ** , * *
- After Operator Action-. .". ' .... . . .
. "'.' . TowerX Tower;',A A: .' ***;.~'f:~ns'RUnning~:2RisetVafveS , _ .')' ' . "'."'-.".'"
2 Fans Running, 2 Riser' Valves Open, 2 Active Cells, 0 Passive 9pen( 2:*Adive:Ce[1s;O Passive,
'Cells/
,Cells i f9w~J~F' Tow~er B: ~4 :~ ;f~~~:~'tJririihg;::4~r~~fValV~:~p~r Fans Running, 4 Riser Valves Open,..4. 4/AcH~.¢eb',.0p~#i'l/.e Active Cells, 0 Passive Cells R~~fV~lve; Le's;J(.t)y(
R4ser'Valve Leadkby' .,. . ".';; 635 gpm/vAlfe (AtssUmtption '3)z Byp~Valv$"leakbY".F Byýpa.SS Valve Ceakby 900 gpml~valve (As'sumption 3)
,.[jmin'Uri~BY~~fl,~ff1.QW/
,Drain Line Bypass Flow 250 gpm/open riser (Assumption 4)
New scenainios were developed as described a~bove. ý:Figures 7 through 12 provide. simp ited diagram toIlustrate the'sceniarios' REVISION: NO0.-- 2
~" .~'.,> .
-POSTLOC2Ž
>, " , . , . '. .' . : : ~t~VR};*\r:::
FIGU'RE 7 ..' "':" . . . . CONFIGUR,.ATION(PRIOR To OPERATOR ACTION),
'POS1"J~(}(:'k*CON;FJG~TIQ~**(f:~()Jtro.O'EJlA:r:oR*ACT.IONt*
. SCENARIO
- ~~~~Q';~:;5 B AA::
V"'..*O.c>Si ~RavisidI 3
FIGUJRE B PIOST LPCA,CGNFtIGU1CATION (AIFFTER1 OPERA-TOR ACTON) SCENAIO A: 01
- , f B,
':ir$:j(~'.'**';':~l.*",;
'~ .n,St'*'B"
, ,:~:l:f',1~;, ~'j"',.
,*crt*.*. 'r'cn{ ,,,,.: . :'~. ..,..
, ~.
,~.(.,:
- m. '
n,'- , .:",:. . ',.<<
,~... -.
*'~timi*~.fms..ol':
c~ut~tioju N~ UHSAfl
~.tgjooj;3 ." *. ' .... " ;
Pg~~3 p~t1>U'53
.' /~l?:lqJlltE', .... ..........
LOCACONFIGURATION:(PIURTO OERATOR
*POSTLO<lt,\:CO~GUBArJO~:(P"01lt.TO;OPEIl
.POST ACTION)
.\TO.R.AcnO~}
, .'. . '~~~(l~ SCIENARIO .
6O
- 8;. B ::A A
FOM S
ý.0: OSS 22 2 '12 12 iT `i21 2,1
* "' t 1>
a n [A-RO .... C F C iRCFC: R*CF. 2~~'AL~iDo No~ lr.'Hs;'ol "Cakuia1:i4n\N'(i. {.
- '~s1~.~.':33' K
ý30,0(
FIGURE io POSTf LO"A,CONIFIGURATON (A~tR OPERATOR ACTIOf), SCINARIQ 0 ."* . B .. A 22K 2,
,acalclation N. ISO 1,avi~~ 31
FIGURE, !J POST -.A COWNFIURATION (YRJOR TO OP1ERATOR CIN SCENARO 7
- B A FAýLCD 00 7
'Caubktia Na. UflS~44 Rcvis of3?
, , " , ." "<,,~ "
rOSi.~.*CO~Fl~>>Oit'RAToRAtriON!*
%FIGxURE*121
**.POST LOCA CDONFIGUtATION (AM' ~OPFURTO RACTION)'
SCENARIO .. B. li;:',;A:
,. : A FýAILCD 00 22 2 1:2 12 3Sl,'I,",',
"S"
{OJ Al "j :;~:;;<~;?m~r
'Calclation No. UHSA)I
'Pago33 of 33, Page 3.J'oi"3:;J
Novembcr 18, 1996
- \
. . tO~*Kevin:P3sSrn:oic.
KcAvin sSMOre ..'. .' .
>S~ti~ti' Swdotio S~~PQJtEugineerhig;Su~.rri~.
Support'a EnkeerugiSuperviucw
'SU 133fCT:. "&1imauon(}fEssenti3IS~tCe>W~coor":r6'~i'{SX:C1)~er;:V;ij\~
':SU13JECT:' Estimnafi~onf Esscial~
".' . . ' . '. :'.~i,e.;:;* .
Si~rvk: Wilet Coin
".:.""., ...... " .*. '..... .~.:.:Twe (SXCT RieVav
. : ...,;."'; ......<.:. ... * ...*.. *i*. ' .... ">":"
Lra "-ge-Oi I118-96 datiAýýcoi"Ctecte at the OA'XC in ardeto pmvideimcan L m ofrn wtive lEakagc, 'Visual observation of the four, OA SXCT`Cellý indicales that the C cell (riscr valve OSX t 63C) is laaking the worsmý followed by A asid B (maghly the Saine), alie
.D with the ImaM 1eakagc, Dtam was collected in the Cceit to providie the most conservative e-stimaics.
;i."I~~~~!im~
The method used was to record the time to eollI';t'two gallwts of w.var froii eaaliof tiie: fl~esray IioztZcs tested, Thtee tziuLs we= riii for emth of the f4*"e Aitloii, "therc is someo variadioii mestimatcd flowrate beween the five nozAL9, they apipeafed visually tio provide a ntpkativesazhpleofthnozzles intheC tell, The attached bQ'" '*otamWiri***M;90:O*S~25***indic_ihe*~of"tbei~*jRt:ed{$B':c.6mer
- ,';,::~~~~~ii)..
copy of drawingM-900, Sheect 25 indicate-S the fleafton of the tt~te tested (SF- corner g......... ..... ..... . . . , "' .. ". . . ' ..... ,'.'. ......... , ........ ' . of C cell).
,;T~~led<bei~W}l~JIi~!S~~r~emcondj,ti~.~ril11 Thblulaed below.,are ie, SXý, ytm conditions duting, ~* the . ~,cotl.;:
data vlkctwi
'; ~A*,:r9wet.,.:. .;. *. ;....'" < '. ;;i;"
Riser Valves
- ' RJser 1.63A1JJ1C1D)~.:~I(llosed{:
(OSX16,3,AjWII3D) Valvu (OS?, - all dosed'.
.*:B~"V~lv05(OSXr62A1C) ypsVal'ves (OSXt 162AC) ,..~~e~ -both c~losed.
';ier~~'~f~~£
,u 'erValves (OSXI163WJFIG/) - atl open U~Valves (OSXj 62BID) bt ls 2A -off I2B - on ( 146 amps;),,,
ýSX Disharge Header Pressutre IPI-SX07 -9lr7 psig IPP-SXOOS - 98 P4Ig.
,2P1-SXOO7 -99 psig.
2IPI-SXOO&- 97"'sig
,~
t.** . Rev~io'NO ~ a ý4,;AL-Pigc o
~~gn~(~~~~';~MC@;\y~:q~lin8J*~et:(S:t'~\ruBer.V~ve:.~~e.
Estimation of Essntial Service WAkTe Cooling Tower (WXC) Riser Valve Leakage,
" " " ',,' ,.. .' ' . ' .'.,.""".'. ; , .. - " , ' " ".-. " ;.. ' . , " ; ' '/N-.' . :." ~." ,' .* , , .. '. " .' ", -:. '."". : : "", '.',_ .
Note 6a~t during normal *ys~ttm upermiion plc.Ssureupsttean of the riser and bypass valves is high~er than during the systein post-LOCA afigmucrit, In pQ-st-LOCA alignment: w~ith higher system fl~ows, -sy~sein prýssures wo~uld be lower. Thus the n'qrisr akrates Caculated fromi this dalta coldon lud ecoervadve with reigard w1Ieakites during r-at-LOCA alignment, Using the avera o'f the five noazzc flowi'tes, and applying that average~ to all 144 nozes,(reference altached drawinig M-900, Sheet 25), lhcz 9SX I63C tcAaka' is cstl maoed at 4,7Ogprn (360 gpm using Jowest no-Me leakrate,65 ~p uIng hgetn~~ ReviWwed Date:-,/1A1 cc: . G~arkste
'D.Sayrrvot
- ~ ,
,~."
.1 i Ju.tacbrnenf_. . -dA[d'.........._ _ _---:...---:...
.' CBBcnlatiriri$ititUHS' ~ cl
'. Calculaton Pg Ž~A.
, ;' ; -: /"'. ',,~->,' <',".:', '.
I No,3
~siooWJ.~a:m,.P.No, A2..
TABLE I1 SXCT RISER VALVE LEAKAGE ESTIMATION NOZZLE D
.NOl.zLEID lRtAL*1.~~2<.
TRIAL I TRIAL 2 ..~~3 TRIAL. 3 AVERAGE
'A\lWGE AVERAGE .
AVERAGe: r---~'-*--~~-3-.~-*~~.-. 2.>. 271
;{~)(~. .
3214 ~---;~31~/~~"~.~--+I---3~~1~?~~*.~--i 27.13" 31..22.31.1
. :~:~;~;, .
~~;
~2!;~
27,2 229
.(1~i
=_.~:~~~:~_
.50 3..
*:V.2S' 27ý28
, t~-)*
+-_. _***.~3.a_t_:
a __4
~4A4Q
..4~.
3 ; .49.62 40,62 ****'41~11 4121t .'
----~~-+--~----~r-------~
- 4";2~'U::O~.
41,29 41,04,
.. 2;9~t Z25 4 48.47 48,29 47.57~ 4811 T2149 2.48
- 5 44.14 44.74 ~.79 44,19 *.*** *. 46,99 457 T 66
~~:1)TM&tlmeB~~_.th8to~~~rlli)ljim*th~
Nn0-Es& 1, Tfiaf timesa repr strl wrmto ci~s wogallons fnmm the ind~~. indivzduai nozzis.
. '" ... ' ...... *~R.,.,f 2FReercto* ~.~ m.ttached wpy tso copy afM-OOO. he. '2£j' of WM'54"fS~e b~b:stlOfl$:
25 !vT fwzze x~abafis.
*i ' * ,* .. . * .. . .. . :*.*3
..A~rlm..;..**..;..L.JAi...,-'..,--i...,--'-'-_ _
,. calculation No;* iJI:(S~OI
~tslotiNo:
R-isorl No, 3
- 3 ~1'f~A3 lwN
- ~.'
I <~~; :.................~....;.;.
*,1.
.** ~'lt-,--,,-~:'.'. . . . . . . ......1
--""""'-.;",;"...ij,...........,;"",;,.".;, , ,* ..:.....:.1.
J...,.,. . . . . . . . . . I1,;:". i*..... *,*!**i* * *
- I LL9
. 1'
';:1'1'
"~ ~-t V-XEV43=
I. a -u I - I- - ~4 z I..,
- l4~4 U#4 Ii Q
- 7 - -~
-I
'~-*~
I I
~ ..
!NALSIS NO, UHSAI . REvtSlON<N().4 RERVSION
". . . . . . . . . .NO. 4
, .' ". NO. B1 PL\(jENO.Bl PAGE I 0
Attachmenita Auik~yi~sofAddiitional TIJUSPost-LOCA SiungjeFalr vdu Scunadol', I
Table ofC Conew "ANALYSISIX.O. UNS-01 OEVNO.4 PAGE NO. B2 SE~fON~PAGE ~rAOENd.,NO, "SoB~PAGE SUBWPACE
"';'N'6',,'"
BE
" '>:~':'>J..'\
"'f~Je:~fCIDlttmts .12
'rO :l!iJl'po~, Bl
;iQ:~~urid
,3O Pw
" ~\, ',"
0 B4
'24.O ,pes3~:;lnpttts:
- 3J) 'T~u~ '.B5 B
~():~~,r,nkti~S;i .~
I*','*
~,O Rd~e.5:, B1 ~~Q,~~~~~Accept~dilerl~.
Nfethodolloa mid Ac~cq(ame Criteria ..~~ 7iJ :s¢~fts;, lItQ.*' Ifo' ':~i~I@ JUS A~~~:;i
'Ap~~(Ui~;~.~~5:1.Ii.~,:~!YR.C601~',
'AppendlixA; Refetence 5AI DIT S040-BYR-6Q,74-(O 520-B'23
I I', I. I! )}~:l~POSE} JJ);:I"o'PVURPOSE i i
~ ,
.Attac~'B*.'<<;;c~~\t~@'i~.t~(.d6C.~~t!~~l~~~P~~~
A~ttchtienm Rto Cackalohio UHSAII do~u~nwrs .'ddiiKUIoI pPOAx0-S of.~bOlafit\~~~);s~gie kCf oo I~ wc~idenft (tLOCX) Ingle
.fsU~sceruuio.!lduit.win"~*,,Ii1laJ~f~~
failure y-cuianius dwat wilfl bc amly~edI for Ehe IJlt~:~ Ultimate l-at Sink SinkJUHS):ThCJldilEtlomf~i(li;~ (UfIS), The additinal sctnwiom are
.~~.~: tQbouDd rckte No bond the ~Jl~1¢et)Ii~Urii~~f~~tl~'.~.thee~isd~sli~e~5ing po4cntaI impaid; of s~ppleltntinglii th~e emisIing licensring baslssjngte.:~}!.u~ a;sis s~iogle fa]Iue ( . ..,' " .
'i~" " ' Ktnswitb'ilddioomtr~u~,**,,*}thirfO(.'3.:mHureof**"*
ýUsswT~umpns with additional failui~r ~assmpions, that ofa f~ailure of any .:onefiJ£tht:i*~*eliCtiicfd'Ii~;
one of the severul eectrnicd bre~ake (t~#h?~:ijQ~j~ich*~;:t~x~f*l~*P,~1~<<)~~a¥~1.
- lp`t 480 V~w B~uses) wVhch~arc 'fxd ýn ptace' foithe inccideat, These . ~6~~'~.~.sUPp.~~~,,::,,,
new sceuarius sup*Wlem~en i ... .;, . . ,
ýsreriuds dc~u~nled inRevisio~n,2and
- scerumo,*,nf6cUrittasliediriRevisiOii
\'~,l, :,'," " " 1 ' ",\' " "'" ,. ,~o.,.""
limd 3:1(j I to ca:JcuJMiQra:UHS::Ql.
. :-~" . .'>;,~.~,' "
CaculaticuU-n
~.h ** ~ ** **
O-1.
>';.'\~'\,\>'>""\,':">,>" ,':,/,".~" ..' ,;.
~: ...
/
A N A L Y S IS... ................. .......... ........4T .............. A ilTlTr .. . .... ......... ... .
***.*.AriACHMENT.*S
~~E NO* 84 of EW'"
,;~:BI".t~g~9~P U. kBACKGROUNI) 1_11lJ1:;f~iiml
-Me UilHS for the Byron stalia'n consists, of two (2)rdnatesiaievkwtr(SImacE'af CVoling Towers (Crs),n lte dI rmakeop systenm to lheie M-s Eacit of fite tWvo QC 2ý fety-tetiied Urs consists of awaV-ter szonrge basin, four (4) fims, fLour (4) riser davcsantd two ('2) hypass valve." (Reference 5.1), The basins of the Ewro (2) C-'s are comineced by ati overflow, Normal makeup is provided frot 111e Circulating water systen Safcay-,relatqd makrup pumnps automratically st=r on a tow waler level siffal to purnp Wzaler rromtilt::nvcr~'; fro tn~ the't~ntof-tbei~ablOjnaxinjimj:nooa.
te v&In iecynlo~te ttUlk~;t(fdiieibasiri'~>:!';:" ,. ,' ':./ . . ... >:.,roab&maimm lodthcere .~**are are .de~" dep~lpumtps WeH**** .****IlI\*aitUli',ro availaible to ......
.*.*:c..... :., . ., ....;." ;, ... ,.:; .*.. , .*:.*,,':.,.>,... ,....... :,'. ,.~ .;,':~'" ~;... '" J':~. ....., ..... <;" :,Pfil','? ..:<.'
ptoiwde"(Ii: MakJUP Mo Ohe baSiO;'ý
~~ ~ ~ ~r UW The nclatCs
- 'J:It:*~t,Lani.(:a~oit:ifiU:t:qs*are,:used:~*'i.hen:l~.at:8IrikiJo'f~:$X'sySl.~~'oolirtg*~,Opci-atbori.*md*thCjnte::
sda 1he he'4t sk for die SX system duriftg notma wpe~ratlon, and they ame
,'. :~9M@:f~\~*~~~AAi~~~;~'na~~@s*i.s~c~,~,~PtRil~!.;~ct#unJdurinJaLQy\*~~~.1tt refdrdLT Y-Oe, UI4 15hutiow-i Th-*- e~fprioidif adeqwie ccotipa during a LOCAtaiacWcni
. 'W'jUf'ilossOf:Qffsmf'"
With a lass of aositc power werl1.00mlit*;tnuru"rubd**asimuJ~sshLltdO\\rn (LOOP) in'oný 1J)unyitnd a sitnultaawous shutdown *iilid~n;otttte6t.b& and ukuldown of the other
*UI1~f.£(Q~~:~(~jl~~w~r~t~~~~~e.:*~:9~lrtg'~~~~~:~~;~Jl~:<
- -udil fCrr mmiLnmm power to Mode55 using. gotruil shutdown operaion Procedtnms. ,'" , ...... .... :'. .<
~ . "'. .' , ", ,. . '.,,,,'", ,'" '." " . ' . , ,.> ~ ': I N . ,,' , '. . <_. ." . < * .'_" :' ;
,*tjkll1g,th~\200SNRC,'Silf~tYsystemll~~:aitdPerf~rmIi1tt-e~abJiiiy,
,Dufing the 21005 NRC safety systiems desi~n pefrtatapabty 1ttspietyu ~oo.'tbcj~ the inspectos ootal' noted
.,' **th~;fu:T~~~C~~;~~t~~(;t~j~~t::~~~~
thatiinTrebri~cit Spethification 'ITS) Akrnendme,-nt Na. 4S.;fpK~:.jJ~,~~ri{~fumgc:~:*iO:~:tJl~~~,,: far the'[yrun St oni~hansgesq to ihr Wflirav het, sieik to support.4,a enrao rephieemmif), them l104iI
'. Shrit:to;~W9ri;_m*~4tOTrepl4t&mem).;ihe:mOS(lirrutlijl.si6i1e'f3ilw'emJumtid"w3li:.dtie iting single fai lure eIadwaslie . failure r~(jfJ*:* of
'i.~* *!~.~i~.li~r;
-~iv a~k~ys ot wilches in the 480 Vat-SX CT bus which rt~ie II the failure of one semcie watrx CT
- Thei ins'P'ctors 'noted that the Iicenw~e did niot address the 48G V-ac feed tweakcn hetwe n the 4! 0Ti480-Vac trainsforamer ind bus 13 1 Z (fRiexatnk*), The iitspecors Almo rioted that a simngle fzailure of e~ither of these breakers would de-netgjize the busand result' in a power loss of two SX CT fans (Refrriegc 5.)
- TI,ie.llcelL~4,~~.:~~U~t~)~~rs*~~i1~JY:.~tf'~~~.~~ia~~.fai1tJte
&a~hg te brak~wer nom~]y closed and dierefaie, a passive failure, netd The iceseedisgree, not nced.llCIt.*.
- be be icosidered.
oi::J[1ii~;>.Tb The configuratian of the breakm
'. ooQf:dW breakers and nridrlb6l~1S~!I!jcssmcnfdmt the fic-emwees asses~smcnt that Passive riVefaiLureS.need" Vailurcs rneed
,,'~t~~'~'ii~d(~~:<
rjot be c~onsidrcd was ~i~r9,:reYi~w'ed~ridU:PP~try~~t~fNRq::/*~*i~W::~t~~~*
. pceviou~sy review~e8 and appro'el by qthe NRC. The isaue was unrtesulve-d pending
;,ddetmlmJsiooonWhetbtfttbeIOSsotthe4160~VoII'br;480:voo*ftedb~
ndtirtticmmo on whether the lo-ss of the 4160 volt or 48A Var fee-d breaker . Shouki*have.Dem~OOside~M' should hiave been considered a.4
'~*.#<~~~~tC*f:¥tllrc;l(*~~~.~1lJ~*****:,',~:i11~~~?i,,~{~~:!~ti~~ri;t!1~iRS~~ne~:~~t' 1he sinple failure. Subsequent to the initkation of thýe uresolyed ite-Ta fURI), the iftspeclorsceencluded that although TS aJrn.oogbJSArt'!eDd~t;~5 Amendment 95 &d not adequately d~itinguish
'~adeq~a[~lY'dl~~li SII1"eflillw-e~f e~lrl(!idC~[l~{nctlve:vs* sirngve failmre of lctvrical cmniponents (active vs,
.*.*.~1~~~f~~~;*~~::~~:~(~~t~a1~;~1:~~'~~~~~r~~,,~f passive),' consistent with the definition of a single failure presented in 10 CVPR Part 50), Appeniidi A, and Gcmreal Desin Criterion U, the failureof the 4160Wvol o4* Vac feed beakier showuld have (W.0
- ~(;~I~:.~:;~~I~.~'Si~e;ra.itpte:
Corisiderd a yalid sivglefail~ure itnd.~~~J~#.ere~:.~t~). anid mwssesd (Reference 5-3).
ATTACflMENTB PAG£NO.B5ofBl3*, DESIGNi INUT.S "D.
~1!~f!'l~~~~t~1;~~4;r~=-QOi 0~ 41114V!241/242) mr, found on' Design Information Tranvmittal (DriTNo. SOOf-IYR-i07ý14.0tY Reference 5.4) uird cza be scen in AppN1ix A..
.:.J._
'32) ~~2~,;~~~~~i{s~~':"oo41~$~
The 4,SQ Vac fecd ý,mcm associato lo.&ti gs . canbe"~'*ilfDraWiUp:6s~1400.iA<*(~ereoo~*:S28): and 6E-2400 IA (Referenoee 5.9), cati be sual in Druaw ings GE-1 430 1A (Refetv, nce 5, ) i: 3.3 ,'Pf.\~irig:~t~~<~~~~~~iyp~~I~<~,~1~,9'~Jlj~{~:¢r1**Tb1;':~~*,i~~~;\.tbi~h'~~<Cr.i.~ Drawing M-42, Refewm 5 1e&) pov&vdeiadiapgxn ipf Lh&S X Cr. The diawging tsiows~whkichsX CTr fan ...
. "ls~~',,11h\\'Hicb:~U jsasociated v4dit which oell Hsef"ml,,~'.aii(r'iheUsoci3tcifi' fist&vain and the ssoxted pipingt .In ':foi:dic::SX'Ct~Dtawin 'M41w{l,'S farthe SX CT. DrawingM-142 was, ,
- ,~:)9:~i~~:~~)n'j,~*i~~k.1I~~~~wti~~~,s.'~9W:~,~~~::~e:n;U19:c~'nJati()M/"
wsed (0 nnoxel thp flgW n ~tis h *-tcuo 1ciiidn 4IePo"OA UnM\a~o vntl .,' ;
EANAMLYSISK1Q. UKS-0l ý'IEVIMON NO. 4~ ý,AITAtHPMENT 9 S .to'ASS,,~~~ PAGE N0. 86 of 823
- 6If4~~~~ Al Lsm~~fuRciw ~~~Y1~,~:,~;:~AtQil~twoopj:ls~:it~t§.~"io,ihis;~#ijt~~I.:~~~t:'as'f&ll~~i; 3 oCcýak ivaO UlHSMV:,iruscd in thii tattýchmnia .nt' atIs f~filws 4,1 .~~I~~~~h¥6;?2f@~~:c~14,,*~~\?tfB~~~*~~f~.F~Dd\i6~,r::/~:~::
Revis~ion' 3 assumted two (2)initaial cold water SX CTr Basin ~trT" so90 F and-4'. These sernved as the minim~um anid mnaxbimum %alues. rcspjlivegy. The current Byron TS B 3-7.1 (Refercnce 5-5) forT ltz . :
'asCl1eri\in.t'numWld*mUi~\'al~,~~:v:eIY~"Th!;'c~nt,SyronTS,'B3*7~?(tif~~5~)'TW:~*,
.UHSare'lJ~oowIiQus~hlbtDietiotmot&ns'in:
UHS are hasedeo arit cobn~~o in s ~~~'~'fijdal~n erice mo and inta b0nep ~mperniuresQf~;~.3M;*9613' aireo , 9O'. aoid 961 f.,"~~,~*~~,~~~iU~:~}t~~~SJ~g F.Theý-ý tciperuures -willvused asa stafin- poi-,¥t~,~ point ýir tiie t'ltW new Kc.awioSblJt~~~.tQ~' mckmarios but maui need tolie k.l~~)~iL' kowered kin sepr~ nalsi
,~iW:ly~$:t9'(jbWn~n,aCte~bk'l.pak'bm!.inre~TO.'Thi5.wJYSi$:tsped'ormedillCalculanon toobtinan p~bI~pek bsintenpea*~e.This analYSisi efme nCkito .
- ~~~l~~. ;, 'J " ,
!.~~;~~S~W~~l:~~~~~~~~¥~
4.2 Lx~ek-by flow raies foi ctosed S'XC1T bqass yn'lervlesand total b)ypas-s flow rates wifll be accourited for in detaild VIHS analyszrs performred in sepuarn calculations (Calculaiio'ns NEt)-M-MSflOO anid BYR96-2S9)
~:~n*~~,earinlinih~:Mo~~(1~~irtg.~~::ibc\"~~,'~,.~~*$x:e-r~~C)f ri~r,~~~i.r.
~
4,3 Basod on th Fern nteIY0ifokn entelm fpwerto an SX CT bypass of riscr valve wil..
.cause:ttie','i:aI~-e*to*tetmiiliJHhe.~tiM.iM,\'alVe'ti~Jnw~"me.,'foss.Qfp~:OC6Ju2; C~aiLAe PAW Val ,.,W
" .....>. . .... ' ",' , \..
~ ,~,,'
to Nean%111 it)1he ,.,'3,
...'... :.:.':': ....,' ,'.. " l" .~':'-,:-',';
positio~n die vakveis in wh~iei die ..'_,.',>,.,.,
'," ' . ., , ' .... ".,', ," ,',.... ' . ',,:.y ':,.,,'," '.
loss of power O~cIýurs.~
\1~_II.~l.!tCI~;
4.4 Revision 3assumed det dite twoQ() ou-,f-serice (00,S) SX CT fans are powered fmm opposite uniiis power Nipliw& Hlo~ever. Ziis a~ssumiption~ is not suipoxted by the *ay the plant'is; opera-Lted. MabffteýMUe Ices/ tformdin &~cubcal that reusin two (2) fanq 005 ftum the sare-unit power sqtppy, Therefore, i~t'will Ike a&StmeA thiat die,cse scewario in which two (2) 00S fans ame poweted from. (he same unit' power 'Upply
- brienttqr,A(;d~:,
,~~'~;:~~!b~a~f.ilt~TO*$q:n;ri~,t~
for die, bus breakeT failitrc: %jmario&s the . following CQlI~l~(lgermQf;~OOIl~~*~i:~!.: operqaofto iwslarm
. zrvited:.
~~ii~.~~~;:~Oj~~~~"i~~~~~~!
1)C aftkmnot nnin- initizlly, which don't tose 9dWer frdm the sihgfe Liailure, k reremel stted 10 Mille~iqe6~~wiing die LOCAILOOP (Refeience £7). Riser vahves for correspojdiing cells jr-e also ooened1 a: I C)mimlic~:, 2)Riser valves to ~which power is lost frorn;the single failure are ),SnX treaf ite' n"iaPoblir rollw~n theLOC-VLOP wth o opratr acian- Th rier alves are nut .sisily',acctssibl~t and therefore.,. no *~reoratlioni (Mrnkote or Matlual) iscredited,
IANALYSIS NO. UIS-O RA, REFERENCES RIEVISIO4NNO 4 "ATTACHMENT 9 PAGE NO, 87of 1323, I 5A "E;(~~:~~~:¢~v.LLc.~~~t~tklt1~TJruf$"4'1:~z~,tlm,w~g'M~~;~;P~~~f, Exelcml ete1ti Cmp LW. , Byso Sttia~n, Unit Wo and 2. Driwiiig M42 o~~~~f.
~ooldSeri:iCeWatert
',- Eseiiaf
'., . Serv~icr
' , " "" Water,-Shect SItcetNo>'hRev~iIfl:AS
. <.\:", ..Nov.
/"<",<:":?, RevisiminAE
;.":'-:/'>.'.,>':'".,(\,:. -:*.l:.
i.2 S~;~n,S,~,lTnlt$t,:;~~:~'~#t~~tii~~~~~~~~"(~S~)'M~,~*~:ll Byron Stnaiont Units I imd 2, Upd-aid Final Safety Analysis k&prt 411PSAR), RtVk~in I I
- ~rit~$~~,~<Nu~~';~~~iilt~)~~~.~~'a1.~t'.t~~~:::,t;~~~:();,~'(~~!9nNu(.erit)~",
en~i~lci.t;~,~liy,:ooS~~, cm n Sluficon, (tnJ~ Units l~\2:f",llQW;t;prn'~Qn~'of,Ui:lTDre50rVed I ani 2 Follow~ Up Incieciotvofnucnrcsol1wdInUI [tem{iJiU)' ",', ',,'
~~~~~8,;.~~;:~~~/,~~
0544I0005~ 0W439Y2G0S00&" May 5 W ", 5,4 Pes[gnliif~~t~~{i~'dti~'(DmS~Bl'R.oo!~;,~Siifety:'~13ted Designnfmto rsnti (Drr S041BYR.-6074 4OO.Safeiy related cqilpmerto eqldpmemthiHmfiY that may ~ a,ostl~in". lv 10-t
~~\~fs.ffmil~l~'~:,;,I~V:S~i~pbreak~*t)~i~))ateDlXerilber22.,2006
~iuff failure of Ore 4. 16kV Switcfigrr brcAkmtT5* Is~ue Vte Dtrcember 2-1 206m (iudtidedru(
ctnt (t~mciudd as, ,
- 't\~{l(fiX:A))';:'
'wm~tdi x A) "," , ," ,
~~,lI:~~~9Cncmti~:~~~'t txdb e Giencration Company, ~,~;~~t£~£H~It~~~{~~:~t;~pPenab;ito:th,~,~~~'j~,.
LLC, Byron Stztion, Unit No- 1 &2, Appendix A to'th FcxfityO O~rati",I:':, Ojcrat[igij
,EItem.e'*'Te:ctmiC4l,~S Licenmew.'Technici St N-cifictions " ':ifie3tiooS:B@e~!"'Amei:lded'thrOO~'
Bxse&" Amended throtgh Nnendrnet'ltNo.',:I54.'BJ~1.9')*" Aniendmemi No, 154, B 3.7.9 '" ,':';;
.'>.' .\\;',--\,.,'.'. '~" " " '.\ :.,V".~<~:~". ::.>~~\ ./;','~. ',~.~;, ." ,:',' " ',',~~ ,,'. ',' ,". , '" '. ", " ,',. . /. '\ ,..,: "'.",'. :' . ". > ' .. ' , '.'> r"". ',' .-,',." .. '. '
5.6 ~'bfg~oeti~~P~¢O.Y1LLC; Exelon Gencratioin Corrany, 1-LC, ByN>nScatmn. Byron 5t1ation. d~it'~~l'&>i Unit No. I & -2ApPendixAtQtbeFKU~tY~~~:' Ap~ix-rdix A ta the Fazility OpNrafing Li~eli1se.:':"Te:cjinioClfspecmcatloos;.~~:Aineiitted'~.Ajtietidment.No.I5.tLd:.fJ;1;i Lic TehniaI~ecilcaiozs,'Amededthrough Axiiendnment No, 154, LCO.3.79.A fA:' . . -,'" ...... '.
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5.7 Br<m*N~leafL~:ei'15f yrNalv N-V Lnng ,. :Aanutlist~'tetijirlo-Mr a~imnstrauoLetier toM NfJaz;y *. o.a . . .:C~,:(B** Contfnidy {Byfon',' "~;MW.' Pmo~ MAigemwnit) . 'nt);:'
;J~~~:PlJy~:$d~*t.i~~~liiruitei:!~irt:~i~~~":A)J:i:"~J9?~9=~*11~::;"';~'<'
eitd8ynStioUlimat eatSink Dein-Ags , ,Y ,Cuc 17016* 5.8 ~j6n'~~;e" Exeion Gei-nrsrmi Ck*%pany, LLC ~B):~):$tMion. 1 Byron Statlflm, Unit UfijtN4:X,,~~itil.~I.~r~~;'ScfrtIOn No. 1, Drawing 6E-.1-AO0t A, "Seailo" Otte OneQ~ Une Dii biaggOm&At)I/95, * .. Oi&fO'iJ9S;:R'e'Q.>
,/>;:~ ',,:,\,':;'/,;,i,"";,>;,',. '/,':: ,."
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5.5 Rekou GewCit0mmny, LLC, Byo tain Unit N2.Diraweg ~6E4AOOI01A -Station One line
I
'ANALYSJS'NO~::uH&oi AALYSIS NO. IJHS;-Q1 I,
REVIJO~N NiO. 4' ATTACHMENT 8 PAGE NO. 139 of,9231,
&.0 MEIThODOLOYAND ACEPTALNC E CRITERIA, AIETHODOLOGY" The SX sysieur, is~d si8cdW ~to esu thatwfficieat cupaaity ks availlable wo provj& deiveqale ýCmfog during nomth and aecidertt ConidhitionS TharSX svscm is a two (2) unlitshard sys~tem with %riousicross Ile heders on both punp suviio n4 discharge si~des for both divisionssid units App~priate, (rdudau)ctss Ue, isolatton ýýdvsare pwoidrd to a~hIirN various systein aliLgmmnts nresesaTy w ithin.
Vte 4eknNi~ng anAdcsig b;s. Heat i~rcete~d by the SX system via~ two (21 mechanicaldnaft crs,
'Each CT consists Of, ror (41),clts with each &Lv,1 seirve4l by a singte.1two (2)'-spedl fibn The cold water basin for eachCT serves a pair of SX puis n,( ,fonec nt Th'e cold water basins for the two 2.),ltw ars arm Iis%-'cunmxtad by what is %emsrd, a" overtlowv-pathway in the UFSAR, Deplmdirtg tin am.bient i~ond ltiwis (i.e. sutnrnter or coUl weathr conditinsthe ruv rs-epuritdto haveone ( ) o tw.o,(2) fransO00S -whiles iljI bcin~g cosidered to hecerbe The %,rsVcasesceaxio6 will be idcntlicid fniteeitiglicrmsingba-sis singte faflure a.9sumptions
~.vth te S assoiate cTprto Each .cna'66 will b~e revised for the ncw. ckmditloni (LIe., failure of any orxe of ,thei'4.kV 6r 480 Vac electrical bhra~kers4 &xnarnics will be done fai- the most timiting design codtions.-.- The icsualts of this calcujation will h'e used as inpot for addition;si detiled iinaiysis of VUHS pet~rm~iance e~rforrnud m a s ~iat ~aktaitidn(Calcuilatio~nNE.D-M-NSD-fO9
'S~~s:2~:~;,3Cmd Somwleos 2A to 3C wWn *. 55¢o7trQm~mls'cil~tllatij)I((R~\rilii9m;~'llJWI3)~e::~'asfj{e~,LtI'deflnlrii;the to 7 ftom thi~s calcoktil (Revisiorts 2 and 3) are used as reference indefirdng thie
- ~~~1~~t~;~'~~~~~~~~~~~!)~~~~:~~?~,i;~~~W1:;.
lIniting set' of serviceable cqui~pment, alipxiinent and atciderii condititiini For the new ca W'scmarias, Tht s-ano inidatirig neve used in this calcudarilon (Revisions 2 and 3) will apply forthe new ca--cse cnamios Le,~ LOCA and LOOP on the acetident unit). The new, sinigle ailiue, tOCAaridLQOP'ontbe~iMiltufdtj>'The:>new,:girfSiei failure CoMiitkin c~onditiovt is tM.f8llure*of ~i'fdtthe.: the failure of a breaker far thie
~;'Y,~'~:~~~~Qt~~~b~.iiK:t¥~~;
39 a Buses U&V-ociate~d with thSX ct- Eaich ,." . " ":"~Pf~/foU1.H)B~'( tj2Z.Ul~llIJd212ZjiJiC: al?; 1-122.7Zad of the four (4) Bu-ses ( 1314 32-r '.
~~uinQdtQfancl.u.pto' aissued to faitdueto"afau ."~.9f;i\J ikiota fe hzk d . l [iA.;;:l~l5z,:J~1Zt:1425'~
ie., 1415Z,, 13 IZ, 4254127, 23 4 1?2Z;141.Sz,!l1 l,ý2,07 <ir 2,57- or Z;l425Z;. 23 22 (Reference 5.4. 2~~iR'ff~~~~i~*~;!!~. ":5;~)lf~'j~;,~~9:ya9:B~in~~c~~(3'Siftg~b~,ls:~t~,t~~I*. 1,8 and 5,9)f for thei480 Vac.Bus in, qzwsfian. Only a singl bLAke rsatd Iofl
,at a timel.
at $:.t1me;; The failure sixeari~os xssurne that up to twoa (12) SX CT fansaive OCS at a tirmt. The TS, Reference 5.6, LAY) 3,7-9 A, stares that Lf uri (1) of thet required CT fans. is inoprable, then within 721 b urarestore the icquired CT fait to opcrahble ý4atvx, The T'S BaeReferience 5-5, Sec4tion R 33,9, -tates that thle de-sgig btasis atAlyses assume two,(2) lower tells (ixe, two (.2) fans or wajtr distribution to, two (21)cells) are OO&- Thus, =i least si (ý)cif the ei~ht (it) $X C7' fans imust tbe *prabla. TheC scnro"assume either nio SX uT fims am~ wCs, one t i) sx cr fan is QOS, or twoi (2) SX d-fans are, 008 wAhen ihte ing~le failurte occurs The SX Crfan(sý) that is/Yarc 00$ s/r nori the sanle as, file SX cr fAns that 1*1 for athe breaker failuire case. An cati be seenm in the DflT S044IYR-60740) (Refetence 54) and drawings 6E- 1,00IA (Reference 5.8) andi &E-2-4001A (Re rvnce 5M9, failure of a fe~ed breaiker to one of the four (4) 480 Vac Buses wll Trcsili in lthe flower loss of two (2) SCfans.. thez two (2) SX riser valves, for the Mells zksociAted with the lost SX ffns,, and the power loss of one (1) SX Basin bypass valycv for the SX CT that has the, mAt SX fans andi asuxiatred Tivlvs-Thurega~d~tss
*c of whch on-coftheeight (8) 4 k-V or 480 Vac feed brcakcr%that fail, the effect S CTsysitem is the same-.,that is, the powver loss of 1V, (2) SX fants, the two (2)SX ri~strvalvoes un oe mi ead wth hccans.ndone (1) SX Basin bypass valvc associated with thec failed SX fans, Thcrefore,,.
~. thescnri oonly of 1)fecd breaker needs to psernett r ýsince the falf foeof the other seven-(')feCdL br~rwduld haetesi~im~pa t. C' SYSIC.tm
'ii~SX,
I I I., i ANALYistg N.O~KS-d. REV1SION NO.,4 The, fiaium o~f biraker 142-5Z a'I dthc4160V us I 42`will- be dis4micd b~tin auitu. h ~un bivakers (14 Bl57- 1317- 1,12A- 15412317- 2,425Z.~i and 2Z) will nottv icse i hsc~~o ATTACHMENT'B' A TACHMEt "
- "AGE'NOi'eJOf'~"
PAGEM r O8oo t 82346t II
;m th die UerilH tffecL,; to the, SX CT sy.Ncem is.the. satim rt~garxIesi of whkh beikewr Pals
, '. ." '.' , . ,. <:. ' . '~,." ". . ' .' '<".". ' . ", " . ,.,? ,": . ,_ . .* '.' ." ". "". . I ". > ',>'
E,adi;,~~~;ts:(fe~~ fn,lN:tesults~,ct,tO,ri()ftbls:~utatloo:an.d ri~.ili~ ~1)y1dOO)on,I,Wt:mfe .
~,~ch:~.,~:~s~,** '. '.,..., . ' '... ., .... .. . , . ,........... , .... ,.. .
catch of(the scmahws. iLe t t sr,
;4;cCEP1fANcEClU1UJA.
ACCEPTANCE~
<< ,~ ,.> ":":.,<<.": '
CRITERIA
~'O~~~~~~.retia~.provid~f~~l~~~~,L#a~#.~::;~
Noueptancie cr1ikera are providcd for this calcmiatioft. This calculatiran
~,i,os~~wUtHheSXCT:op¢ratm ., ... '.
f#lt:i..~~:ldcmif~:~~~~~f~J~" identirifcs new-sin-oie failurc liosmi,=ocd with dv.eS.X C per-atitmu
\' ~:;
IANALYSIS NO. UHS4Ot 'REVISION, NO. 4 A'TT~H ATTACHMENT
- PAGENO~BI00f
..ENt~ El '",'
B23
'.;~." '-, ," ... ...
) ,
'.. .~ .' 7.0 RESULITs
;Th,e'~~.1~~;lfi8'i~A~iipti<ip6f~~~~~.~~~'1:ib The fo4Ilo-win is a &sdinwkmof h s~cenarios associ"ted wihli di dtc:'SX~~:f~.#§r~;~Y~.,*~~~Z.
SX CT and fmi~lurc of d~c4k Vac B'uses,
'Ss;ej11iri8Af:.~
fu1tWtiwdttiQ(t
'GT:'~asih,tempern,wf1x C7 Basin ten-~wnte: To be d~tTBI)(96~F:stm1tUJpoint)'
b-, determitrd (TBD) (960. F sýtafti~ng point)
~~,~~~
cvcI 00S: wnu fm sqvcJ: high ** ,...* , . , '., . . ':<",' s~;:!l)!Jttnt~:~t1e. SX yurinpsý one (I )rul1riing,
) er-nnigon ~.~~~.:p:~.t each Lhtht 1!r~~~:~~,:~z::~~tI~~~\;gz:r~~=!i~
Tower4 Tam mnningý 4 dise va~ts, opiený ~riv 'I66 4'as~i¶e oellTh.. O1ý'pssvdeo
,Towevr. 13, fans~ nrninp ~,ýFr val 4%i "Ivq 4 actn e Cells, 0 paisiv~ elCI5s .A)-yPasvya1v 0.Pon.
~~jure.~(?oridiijqqf' Faiur Contjit
~~gi.~;.r!l~J~t<~,~i~at41.\tltis'1.:i6.ns'.Q';';
single failure: breaker 14252 at 4I6WV ~dv142 NUa'Opeu - )~'{l~wertticrcejl 00werto po5. crccil 13 &FEiams. IE&k ~fmsý
~~~~~,~~(i.~~~Cfm (OSXO2IIC -nd PeSX03XF) .
A.1~l~:~:~~~~~ A Iso himi of pow-er ro 480V Bu4s tl:2z . 480VBus:.,Ei32Z 4sOv:~1tCf32il 48Wo MICC t32zI
~~fen~,:Q~(jI~ln9n~!f);e,:",.
Peep Well Rirq, ONWWOIPn (no~n p-ESF ESS Servi4ce Water MakeUiP Valve OSXI57A'"
~SS~.~rVleew:a~~~*Yllya)Ve~~lS:1A,
~JER~V~.OSX163E*.:,
Cell E RiK-r Valve USX 163E , 480V~~1ctij1i)A~n~.ESF}* 480VYNCC 132Z1 A (non-EF)SY carf Celi P Riser Risi:t:Yalve(}SXI63F< Vajlve USX I63F,
,,~Ir,t.,~c* ....*
I 4;nBypas, :Vsln~riSXI6ia
'tk!:;~ Volve GSXl62B
. *....... h.'" ..
StA4i~ROOmVet1t.FM Switchgear Roo Vm WRa In lVX06C" I:VX06C~ Ii2&iri8Vac;f.)i~tn~iti()Ji:NrI~l~;.'
,2 S/()Var, Distnb~tidcm Panelbo~ard, l~l1~~~~~,
-- l- , )(CE Spaefar HYAC Local Coftrolp PN, e[ IVXO6J Damperf Staner Panel 1VX99-1 ESW CTrf 8}Ra~sl i LevelI SW-i Wh 01-5 5XO97
~~.,~~~~b~~SWit~hJJ~~X~)9?:
Motor CJSX03CF Space Heater MbV;6SX:I:6jiL=SWi~S:~ NMV SXfK5XI3E Limit
, ; ' .. ,;' f'.*o"",*,: ... >;<, .' .
Svvilcb Space
~';'"Hnat~r MOV MOV:OSXI63FUmitOSX l63F Limlit Switclt.S~Heatei*i Switch Space Heater,"
Aceident condition (TFhc post cii liuu oo,~o hee()S Cyt~ ps, ruimning two (2) onacietunit, one (1) on postýLOCA Cr "nfiig,ýuatibq CTA: 4 fiats runnng 4 rsrvle pn ciecfs asv el, yasavsoe C 2 fansý runin~g, 4 rie aleGpcn, 2 'actile A~Ls, 2 paNive rels., Gbypms vailve%'oPen
*ANAL V_NO:. UHS-ot REVISl()NN()~4 ". AllACtIMENT B .
..' PAGE NO.8Ut)f~
NO. 811 of 823 {Fb)k}~~II!.~'~~ti~~*:~~*~*:~~,f(,l"iJ~!.~~t
ýXbaklovdng thr pomtilatcd LOCA, citdit i,4 iaikri fbr UHS amnbien~t ~{d~!i.paikln he-at d-isspattiou i~~J:r:jimiediately.)
Sululri~m:"
~1pdifiWa C-T Ban tewýrTueTi) 9 FWin, peifd)..
;C'FB,~in:~,~tur(i:TBD,(96~.FS:WtI~'pQillltr, Cii\~!~~:¥i.ti~g;~~JW1;;"
fain spoed: bi~h.
"~~~~~J!i#!~~~;~¥~ffJ!li~~i#;~l!li~"~~.~
Towr B;3A64um iiom:
'Tow-ei.'B:'lJam.J'mutj~g;:'l:riser,v:lIYes~pen,"3'~tive;cellS;Q.passive*ce:U$j:Q.~J'~valvesopeil" N'a ,vs open, 3 xtive eI ~sie~1,0bps avsoe ,
~, \~'l' (,: \; ~:~,.
ijinSJ~laij#::~~f~1~Z'at4160V qinih91C f~iIuiur:breský 142$ R416WV BDS:t41.,t!db"(J~'~ 96i W4 rauls OP~t -7 I~Qf~r*to.cr fpwrtCh ~1!B&Pfw odsI 15-&"F f
.(Q!)~03~:~d,9~~(t~qL (OSX03C-.E and OSX.03CF) "',., ..... . '.' ". ,. " . , ,'< "
.~~J~:'i.~,?iPo~eT~~:,:
'Altio loss of power to,"
'480V Bus 132ZZ .. ,
4S0V]}tisH'2Z'; 4S0\ijwcc:.}j2ii 480V MCC 13ýZ l)~-'~~W~~p~l.rB,:(n;~~Pj Devep Wel I Pumnp WW.01P6 (ncwt-ES-F) . ',".' '.' ESS Service Warwr Mfake-Up VnJveOSXH1A*.;
*ESS'smjre*W!1l~,M~Up Valve.OSX157A
!ciDl"B~s6,'ial~OSXf61S:
Cefl E Rsr Valve OSX163E .
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484W MCC 132ZlIA (non-ESF)' C&F Riser Valve OSX163F Rasin Hypass Valve 0SNX 162B, Swith'gearRicei Vent Fan Iv'X(*C I2Oi t2G:Vak, Dis~tributiwt Pawlboard M],otor TSX03CE Spice. Heater HYAC HV Local Contrul Pitnrl lVXOOji ACi.oaJOcmtrolPimeJ IVXO6 DazlMStat4IrPanel IVX99J .,' ".' .
'~fS~PaOetlVX991 ESW SW CT crOBBasi8<LeVers';"itdt'oLS~SX097 OB Basis L&Vvel Switch OLS-8X0947
~tO,t~~~*':3g;~i~,;"",
Mlctor ODSX03CF Space Heater .. ,,,,,,',..... '. MOY.,05NI ....*. 63E Unmit MayOSXLi5lBUmitSwitafS'arHatef'
,/.,.'.,
Switch
..,.':": Spacc
.. ,......~ .. ,.,,, fleter MOVOSXl61f, N1OV 08X163F Lbnit Etm1tSw1lcJi$pooe~r SwildSpucweflew AsciC#'!j'§J~iliijClQ;,
~i~~~~
(Thepo_4accid-eait stm; ~~n;ti~p~/n!ii~Q(~'6);~;~~m~t:YIQri)9P~~'uni~ Lnwu consists 6f Uhi~ee l 3 X runn~ing, two a)n accidca unit, ~(t) one ([) an, on; noný:idcina unit.)
'ooi:1~dent ul1it~}
- /:~';<'";)~)">/':';""".';
~~~gr::~~~~~;> ............ " '.' .' .: .. "'.. .',
CT A: 4 fams i'ttn:Qm~4;~,Vt,tl~' qr:"k:4'J~ running. 4 ri~ser vavsoek ~{4 ~ti\'e:¢llil{Opas,si~ 0iecet,( cells~Ob)'pass*.~/Il[ passive celts, 0 bypass valves- open-
\idope!l'
,g.U:'I;t~;~~;~:~;~Y~(~;<~~~ ).'~~;ve:,~I.~,':~.P4~~~e~i!~,9,~~li-~va.ve9*ijpell B:
CT I ~u &-3i nnrscr "ve 'open. I q~ti yqlls, 2psive cells, 0 byPQs avsoe Q1~'~#:i~~~*~~t~fj;p¢~~'~@~i~~;~r~t,;ir~;~~~'@t9~~.~:1~~lti!cBy:) (Thiowin ~s or isipaior9fy ..
ANALYSIS.NO.US..... ,AEVIStiN'~ REWSION NO+ 44' <ATTACHMENTS
'AACHIMENT 0
*PAGENO~8J%"~*
'. ':&e~:8C=:.;
In3~at()Ddltt<m cr*liasi~.I~~re:>moi~ CT Ras'in tcm~vraturc: ThiD (WO, ~"~illg.poic~.), F smariing pmnint teiISiOOs?~£l cels,4S: crU AcdlO A. xil G .
~ti fan. ~~'~~b.stvM: high *..* ........... ,...,." ....... .
sx< SX
*... ,' J)~ "'. *****.cme{.)ruririitl pumps: o1ýe (t)ttalfli
.,.... ...."C*, . Jh*OO~*Urttt ..Otcachuiiit g~~~I~
't##~~~£lfw~~.;,~,~~~~#~;.~,*.~i~~:~~n~*
T6wer A: 3 rams unnin~ I risr alvcs oprai, 3 a'aiN'r cdjlB.0pssiecc. . o~~j~:cc~.I.sLO~;v~.~s:(]pc~ 0 bypa~ssy vavs apen TOwer IJ:.3.Jam . mnnjng",~;rjSet.*':a1.~~ opell~~3a.tJire~Us..4).~i~~UfI.,'(J.bYJlaS5<"al~*opcil Tower Bi: 3 fmn Tun~.i 3 ner výI~ves ,peo, 3 actýive ciý11s., asl0 0 y"svNsoeni f'SinUreCorutniqq: Failurc Caiidition
"'~' , ,".",.' " ,,, ,'., ~ .,'.~ \.':'
~!~~~':~4iJci~;:~#e"r)~#t:4t(lOy,'~;J~~:f~;~~r~.~;*~~~.til;cr:~~~N~:~.<~~~,
'kinkir ýfhilure: breaker 142SZ at 41[60V 1u 142, 6"i ojp#p -toss" f oý ';-rcl 1 ~ai
~QSX03CB (X0C-Eand OSXOTCF):
3Jn!OSXOJCF):*.
,Alq6rss~power tixo
- AI~.~~sijf:eY.~rtO::*
480V Bus 132Z . . :.'. 4sOV~BllS'l32Z>'
~VMCC:tl2Z.
480OV MICC 13771
~p.w~irPull1PoWW()ltlB*(~~ESF}
D.p Wel]N~c1 Pum~p0WWAIIAIP (naa-E5F) .* ESS.~ree::W~i{ei'.~fiike~Ujl:Viil.~~ r-SSSnc%,iee
! 61Riser Valve CSX103E.
&~I~~l~~~~;"""'"
,4@OV MCC 13271IA (rnoiftESF)
V61ii FRiser Vatwc OSX 163F, Waite Make-Up Valve0SXI57A: OSX151A.:* Ba~sin Bypisq Valve GSX 1628 BMin*fJ)i'Ras.tValv@QSXJ62B Switc6~;R.OOmy~t\f*F~id;VX06C' SivitchgezrRoom Vent F-at IVXV)6C,
- ~~~~~~~~H~:taxd" 120)2O~iVa~c Distibudwio Panelboard.
MNo to r 0,6XW0C~E 5pac e H~~e HV,Al.~Cbnarol*Piinel;lVXO@'*: 14VAC Local Control Pnnel IVXO6J
~:'~r~~(X:'i~t**::~~
PaperStarterrand I 1VX991 ESWYCr ES\y~crOB 09 Basis Levt1 Switch OLS-SX09,7. BaSiS:t;e'~t:Swllcb'OLSfSX097
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MAtc~ OSX03CF Sparce ffrailer <.'," .'. MOV:*QSXl{)JE:*[;;;imitS~.~b*Space~~ NIOVf05X163E LimiI Switch 5pace Hcnter
~()VQSXHi3f'Umit MIOV
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OSX163FLimit Swiich SWitch Space
, ~ , ~ . '; " ~ ' . ' . '
S~e Hfeaer
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'Aacidnt Conditionz (The post Paccdent systeniflibbup wvnaistslb' (11Bt;:~~mtilit:#8rem;liriiiupronsl5t!iOf'iIiree{?:/SX.pumps:rtiiiiUi:Jg;lwo(2lrin*mccldcri.fLinit;o.ru:(l}on: ýý)S up udnAO(Y~~bdftdA e()
~:~~j'~e}iulUt) non-Ai&,tit unL ,." .:.,'. . ~msrnan~to~)o
*.. . . > Ffiu~S ' . . .cietuioe(.'.: .. '
po~ticiCt\cr.~~fipra1I~: prros-LOCA CT configurationi gt*~:*:J::~!:rf~t$J~~l~~~~~.~~~O~~I~%°ti~::~~~~?*** CT A, 3 fans rannitig, 3 rlier va qsopn. 3xtve c~etls, 0 Vpssve cells.' 0 ypasi y;I~vs 9wn,,ý (iT 13: I fan running, 3 riser valves open I active cedlls2 rpassive- vels. 0 bypa "ss valves ope
*~ * ." < * .- *
... ~.. :~ c~Ltbwi[Jg,Lhe (,FbUowrig tbe,postultrttd:toc..\"credft PostufmtedLOC A'4credit 'itHaken fOi:ttHSambiehlhtM;dlS$l.,:anondmmed1UetY;;) isfknfrUSabetha ispto n iatety.)
" '.' N * .i
.. P... NO... 2 ANALYSIS Nd.,UIIS.l "REvISION"NO;i'ATr~~~~t AEVISION NO.4k ATTACI4MENT 8 . "
.PAGENO~Bt3,:Qf~
Scenario W;
':jQjililft~lUiit19p, ';
- CrBasin'~JnJ)Uawre?l1l6;(~~;~poind*.
C7rai tem-mumur 1130 (8O F~ qtr point),
~cm,OOs:ceui\.cdHJ C'dIS OOS. CelIC LcejU G . .
f~ Fan S~:nD spcd: nu fa1tSl:mmillg. tans nuimirng '. ". . . . ' . . . .'.
'SXpU~~:onei SX Pu mps.ý one (IJruimingQn~iiVriii (1) onmnirig
. " . . " .. : ," ." '. ;.'. ,"'.:' ". :: ~""
pa e~h Uoit.
'.".". '.' ..';. <' ~ , '. "<."
CT tonhi gora*i cm: Towff A; I)fans nmrning. 2 ri~iet valvs ckpex, 0 ýcdclI,2 v'4cehps' 0 ~byp' vtdvs i Tqover B: 0 fans minnin' 2 fiscr vakves open, 0 acw~ cdki, 2 paosim cel1s, 0 bypess %avak~s op singe failure,; breaker i425Z at4160 V Bui12fil p os fpw V CT ceilYB& F funs AIll s616s of pmvwer tuo 480V 1w32Z 48O)VMNCC 132ZI flcjp W pump fWONVI~ PB fnon-ESM) SSServiec Water Make-Up Vakv 0SXt57A_,
'(:el E RxyVaN~eOSXt63E
'486 MCC 1327Z IA (nIon-ESF)
,CeIF Rise-rVW~ve OSXl63F Bojsin Bypass Valve OSX 16n, sw~ilgig=a Roomn Ven Fosn !VXIXIC
]21"082V~ac Distrbution anelbuatid MflnOtr 0SX03CE Space Hetiter, FVCLocail Covilmrol Panel IVXO6J
'Dnmpes Siartr 'Pand VX*99J
ýESW C-7 PH Ba~si Liz Switch OLS-SX097 Mlotor OkSX03C Space Heafer NIOV 0Sx I63E Limnit Swicb Space 14t-wer MOV W5X 163F 1"r'Lit switch space Heate; AccdntCmitivn (The post bo;Jdemtt iepcn~~ 6y~n (f;bcprj~,~derllsystemlineup'eoi1sl8lgOflMeei(JrSXptt.;ruiUljn~;two(2)oo f.thrvee (3)SX unng w 2 aup n aci:ideri(unLt~eme{Uoo accidei"[un dne (0) on.
~flc~~~i~~,i~f 1)0 ntaccident unit) ' . ; ' . ' , , ; . ' ," .' ".': .;,,', . . ..
paoit-LOCA CT cmi~figura',ik (prior t~o 10-imimute operatur actirn): CT A, 0 fans.runninig, 2 riservhts cab Pen' 0p~ 4) clive cecljs 2 PwLssvc Cids. 9bypass% vakws LIPe"n
'CT B:. 0 Cans rnniing. 2,r~rae optft, 0 acti-ve cells, 2 pjsslovl ceils. 0 bypass valves opeft:n
ANRNO.4 'ATTACHMENTB AGEN T B4of I PAGE NO. B14 of .~ PAQENQ,'Bi4of 823 pos-LQCA CT iconflgw-.Wo (f~l~oking I0-ifrnijwW opwattorac~i~n~n -i4140 roinu~ea, start 0he >pmribl~ fans im hihsedwdotn ise avs-CT A, 3 fons rwuiinp'. 3 riwr v--atwS kjvvi 3 0~lv ve 1h-. 0 thypss vailws ýopn cdspsiw urTB-. Vfus rnrihiii3 riseTwles open. 1,acive cels, 2- osive cells 0 bypass vaUvvs open (Fko1k~wing the postubxted LOCA, nco ctrdi is takewfo(r lIES otihikmt4 hnai diss~jiPU66 until, oeratchrucidknjhs oitimiad to stahrt um-cr fans and k7,c riscr valvcs~).
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AUI:~!WbilitiesftlrtbeSCcilBri6:$C'and$OC()ilf'i~00s1tre~wn All Po~abilitics, fur the scnario SC and SID coni~m uaiox re shown in in TabI~jD TabheI. Ce~h 008" Cela fti~d AD3 EF.orGM AC~~~ ~~ __ __ D___ __ __ __ __ AE~CD.& HG Af C7D orHGF __ __ __ __ __ __ __ C Or M _ _ BD__ __ _ _ _ _ _ EE or H ____ __ __ __ __ __ _ CD or.GII CD 0'rEF
.' . . > B H f * : ; * * * .... '~.' :CO.'6f;CP:
13Wk, CToEP CF ABoAr GI CG. JARB ~rEF , .:'~. DE AB omOi DF, __ ____ __ __ __ __AB iw -F. flH~ABor EF TP "
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.. 'EH" EU , ., ; , A R AB:orCD ....ir.J::tt
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IANALYSIS NO. UHSO0,1 REVISION NO.>':.' REVISION NO. 4 ATTACHIMENT B
- A1TACHDlENT
- PAQENo.
B BIS of 823 PAGE NO. 'SlSofB23 &0@ CONCLUStONS
***'*'.O~ . ~ .weJQped~D.'~~~
New -,nadosiwere &-vcopcd aý, dcsribcd 3~~;f#r'~~:f~lufeofthe ahove for the fai lurco the d~l cliectical f~d~~'fofl~ furd f reor,(r h 480)
'. . Vaci Bttss'.' ~iated\"ith'~J}Xcrs;"fi~s~l:l~
wtsA-ciated wahth d SX CTs, fig.ire 13 kkaui-g] .US 16 pro .... idesiMVli~~d Ptwvide, ~it-piffled, dim~jtO. diagr1s to .' . mu~~.~05. iHustra~et1eihcszcio&. .NotetlmtvarUttUoit5canbe:rmadetDeach.cue:occnariG,*IL'i~trowninIableJ Notce that vaiiafi ons can be maldc to ea-,ch case ýiccnaio, as -ýov in T.able I. tmd a~nd
~ttl~~~
isdkl tisd ".1:0 ihe resulL~~liOn.:ih. jin lite ruiists eciom th body ~dtl$cillcula:tlOO. iti tfiebooy o~f dds hO, cah::U]~tROft; Thls caiulamo wlI.I,
-duPtom w be.u~
be u'ic s il!i~art rpu ,~ (md~icd e\*a.1wIDoo()fOfJS~~~.;* . . . . . . , " . \ < . .' . .'
c. '.\0
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- ~'
- ':: ,'}:'ti;(i8e:/,c',"
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MbST LOCAtOCACcN~/&).jAATJ(iNZ1";I;J CON CYRATOi"(x4J~q,, CJ44+iý 04)
.'::.".NAIl'.lO*II~'** ' ~t~
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fA~¥i~l* ....... .co;';:
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1~ II
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- .i POST~~~ LOA 'F3tRfT/Afl ic.4 A, ~mro
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n' L
'oi ACFC Y4FC A#&cAw*tii *L
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~eviuJon ~ -
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POST LOCA C-ONPIC-URATMAI proSTI..OCACCNFlGtJRAT/OAl,
, SUAfAitr.:"Co,; ,
$~~jv4 00'sc fAILfQ'oo.S' f:
ReVISon _ 0-ASfytW
FOST LOCA CONPICWUATION AFTJR I~fZA~. A
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RCFC ".- i',' 1Ii* *IIJIiii. . . . **~: ****iIi*.* .~
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c. CaIf.4mat Jor.-N.tSO P.~soll *-
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.- VJe A, %3~.7 /i Ld~t
.'MALYMS. ANALYSIS NO. UHS-01 NO. Uf+S-01 REVISfONNO~4'; REVISION NO, 4 *ATrACHMEtfr:S** ATrACHMENT'S
- PAClENCKaz<<fiij:813 APPENDIX A' ToAACMIENT B to Cakculation (HS-1OI 1111 S040-HYR-614.O0
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A tri Arwdnmp Il! C-ii=--ion JH41
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~~EDEStGN INFORMATION RA?4M rrMITAL S~ ~R~a4 Q,,.O ',~.
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Qý8tfN INFORMATION TRANSMITTED AND PURPOSE OF ISSUE ",
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oIngTwr ESWCoOllnlgrowW::fanO~~CA:(ttlg~"l~Speed)< 0S Fan 0SX03CA (High &Lcow speed) esw CoofigI'dTower Fan D$X33CB (Hig &Low Spee) ESW:COoI~;rOiM:tf'F8n()SX03~'(Hlgh$laWS 'ered)" Non;.eSf;O** oriýE$F, Deep 'Wet~Pi.iOWw01PA Well~ Pump IW*WOI PA .,:",:~ .*..... ,
<t~~~W~.r~r\4riC~13'tZl,(1AP93E) 480, ESW Ccd&1g TwevrsiMCC t31Z1 (1AP93E)
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- oibv 0SX03CE Space 8eeýter HVAC LocaE Control Pa~el 1VX06J
* ~~miper Sref Panad IVXqq1
,w ESWCoolino Tower G3 Bash~ Level $wilch OLS-3X097.
*Mola OSX(G3CF Space H=eater
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'480V E$W Cooling Towav MCC Z31Z I (2AP93E)
ESW tMtke-Up VaNve OSX158B
.ESW Ser.,ice Water Cooling Tmwer 0A Bfls~ Bypass Valve 03X 160 ESW Cooting To-wr OA COl C~ Rý.et~ Valio.0SX1 63C IESW Coa-Nig Tower Di~sin 21 Swithgoer Room Ventiftio Pan 2VXD5C VXCC 231Zt 120,(20OVer DIisdrbutba Panelbocvd and Auiiades:.'
Motor OSX03CC Space Heater SI{VAC Local Cont-d! PInl2X05J: Oamper $tartet Paneý2VXG9i
*Moteir 0SX03CD Space Heaeir M~OV USX163C LIMA Switch Heatat
.4 NtOV 0SXf 63D U*Io" Switch H~ezva Nim.ESF 480A MCC 231Z1A (2-AP8OE)
T loss of ltreaker 2425Z at 4160V Bus 242 would reinkI the kG3sof 480V ESF Substatiwi Bus 232Z (2AP98E) E-SW Codon Tower Fan CSX03CG (HIig &Law SPON94) ESW Cool~ng Torwnr Fan,0&Xb3CH1 (High &Low SpeeO). 4OVSW CcofoiTow MOC6232Z11(2APK2E) ESW,ba~ke-Up Valve M~S1 570 E$W`Seryica WaterCoolintg TowaroB Basin &,pass Valveo 118I20f EW %;Caollng Tower 09 Cell G Riser Valva OSX163r. E$WV Cooling Tower0 C-9 Cl HAloer Valve GSX 16314 ESW Cooding Toym Divskio 22 Switchgeer Roomi Ventilaielon Farn 2VXOC$ MCC 232ZI 1202M8ac Oistrluibon Parolboard and Atiize
- NlACor LISX03C;G $pace Heater
*HVAC Local Control Parmal ZVX08J
*Damper SlarterPanel 2VX99J MOW OSWCH Spa~ce Heater CSOVGX163G Limil SWf44 Hcbatr
*MOV~ OSX163H Lkrilt~witch Heoaler No-ES§F 4WV MCC 232Z1A (2AP88E)
*$!W~B~~ p(jJ;:dCIC;
,~ iRitv,oal!t'ilIf~t_;
". m. qtjliii. (12:.15-1999 -.' F{','"
~,..'":
ATTACHMENT 3 ATTACHMENT Additional References Additional References UHS-04 Revision 3, "Ultimate Heat
- 2. UHS-04 Scenarios Heat Sink Design Basis LOCA Single Failure Scenarios for Cool Weather Weather Operation"
CC- AA-309-1 OGI Cc.;Akao.1001;
. <RevisiOrl,~f Deign ATTAcHME?4T i Deig 4alysis Maijor Revaison CovqT Shoot Raq I Of s OUlriAnalpifi Design, Armlysis (M8jor,Rfitaion),
(M~a*,R~vtuian). f
,lastPa9~,
Lat Pe.NoqP~::ez(\ ' 84
~1~N~~f\*'J~~:.,**.'.,..
Analyst$;No..' LIM f~G\ti"ota:l!<:3~:
". ,. "," Rvutn 3. " '"", " . , . ,. '
l'itf41:,i~<: ~
.Title: -Ultfmazl liNt' Jjltlmate: Hfrett SjM:~n~' SinkDesigf amsWIsLOCA LOOA:Sin9teflllJUf6,sOOn.
S111gi *
- I tol'~
Oo Co WikneSeu W WGlUhMOPetsitiOn Weatrtw OpfeTa~finý'
- IEViECS N 4:, EC, 371386 Revtisin: " 0 Stat ion(sy
. Sblt~&~~, 'B~ Byron Cmotn(_
Unit '~~:;.. ui'dt iNo, ,~:,~a.fi ___________' _________
'DiGC~IM!' ~',NUOe>
D~~se~pI~n~ NIUC _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
*:~~~:~~k.~d~~t~:l'.
JDes4cu1p Cod,*Kcy"!ftk NOl , ________ _______ ,. ';~'r.~:,~
,Se'etYi.:Q~CIt~try,}
Saletyl'OA Cgass. ,::~tYRElll;1ted. Safery Reiaete ______ ______ 8ytem Cadir Sx _______L_____ S~ruct~r~i~NA~ ,$)(' _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ CONTROULD DO0CUMENT ~~NE Document1 No,.* NED-.M.MVSO-011 1
~YR~-2S~ j IFrcfthTo To TO Ij Docuwnent NO.: From~tr 181~1t0asfg:n lj fille Design Ai'ialyas ANlJYsia$afeguarda Safeuard8 InfOrinfrtion? 1nonuon? ' I i , >Veo.*:
Yes [J Nol8I: NoM ~1f'~B£!fiii'SY~M-10t~tOO; If y ae ,iSY-AA-101 408
~:thr$,tJt$~,*_I~~_~Un~.A$$U""11~7,}"(,'*,,vM.D*
Dom~ this D*i~gm Analytiv contain Umvertfl00 Atsunm#tlcns7 Yea.C0 ý.No, "~:I8J' :*!i~~?AnlJ.Ul~', 1f ise,ATVAFl#: NA' NA . . Th"'::~~~~~su~eRcmES;)\":-NA
,ThIs eVeIg' Anally-as SUPERCEDES: N~I~A . " , , , .")~*~fIt1t1"",,,i*
inIt nflketW,
'.~f~:;~~~~~:~~~~~~~~~~~~~~:=~~~':~~~~*~~C:~'*'
DObcrlfpuon of Re'vislon (list M leJotd peges Tor paflle3 " Replaced pages 1, 1A, I5 nand 1C wilh Niew I F:
.Pag Ownor's A~ccbplrnfc Paylew CtteckI-Ms (page, a.), and Tablieof Cantents (palge 1b). Added Anacrtment.ý
- 0. Revi~sed piqc2. ncorporatoi item#11, #2,~*1¥50#0CA1if!Ol,3EJ(EC.~~Ol6):,Of1pageslb.4iIlMl2fk 9.>AM~.pa~O*.Z:'drtO~fDM:ffoom.t11.#2,
" " '. ~"/: ,'v'. " .' '_/' 'c' ' , ' j ',?" .. ; , '," '/ ";, _
ard 45 o cVI 70136(EC91616) on 0,ges 113,4, Iffd 25.
,..' , "" . " , . i .... ,,-. '" J,'.', ,,;.,' .,,' "'>' ",' . (.", " ' : . : c, ,
=tanaiioý,Crx posgulated 'single faiures aeeodatedtvit eleotric-a I~r-akers se~ring Mhe EswinlaI Service Water PS) y~eprmcmoetA., c-8& ,-~
Metho~d of Review:., Detailed Re~vlm Afent~k~~L Testing O Reviewer~ 8.1 Arztews - S&L i1ndepe~~de.fl review ~ Peer reylewO
;rw ~xu ~mp ~
Exteinall Approv~er. A
- 11oý .1ý V ýI J Indepmendwf PwWt Review Reqd? ý I
ANALYSIS. NO. LJHSý04 RE IViSION NO. 3 PAGE'NO~.Ia "C(:;;'~:'.. ,
, 'Ri;iv.l!OOnS*' I p~e:1i'0I':11;; I.
ATTACHMENT 2, Owilers AcceptW"c Rftevw Checkis~t for ExteMWI OeIgn Ahajsg Poo1 oftI DEINANA'YsilS "Oý. 0il.4... .- .I*-....... RE~ 3
,'No: .N/A<
- 1. GO 4tsumpfitf It%- suffiti~ml rafta%7a 'tl'O ElJ
',2, ' :[] "0
;'3.,. 4. AreWarpad ns mavarbA Ntj "pwl sce~ h C3 . D iII' 04*
I.. ~ic
]:J: ,C]
- '~~,~;
'~<:
",'r;\': 6.~ Are a Wa IF I{',O,\, :0
,:~~,.;, j.~*d:,[j
,vowith 1Mqkan Then¶dn~i~~ Affefr 14; Ulttirc Li andAOU cmdmzm saatisf 1d Ccp1u~pnra~tlw~mnc
",,";1:.;
0 : 0* ,;(
)~ [] F W" t
~.
~
D
;13:: tf
[] :j(', J~j~ :'j(~ til , ,1:1 GOthe temaef of itnPuts mtd 3njl=Yit is u&V tdnd4dft4 tuhni wn~ad O~w ~ The lw o Ok O [inita
.)(~
t:5':;
. ~ .;-:-
Ils wftW~lyair nrýývl baed nin3-Q1 datdi []'
'ttl
~ideb~mi rectfmiaikta ny Lmruquyed J thn s-I ha m cnmftt.'LdetaA
'VM ORF&I Lb*enfieý,~d wh" tujeceu? ':It "0;' ,'D
~.I,QHREV~J>.i~~(jEiJt,~7fl~iirt XewLbN REV1~ER- ?I -D:J~r . OAte:i~J'.~ril;',O';' a
.' C~tULILN Q.~SO4RHVý
~~jA&.11ImsaNciiij~~*:
VCft4MWtNWEALTH EVI13tN 470NIAN~Y
'~~no~T"',8~,ot~
NO; L PA(.TI NO. l b "Q~~.~~~kl!~\~'
'NAbLEO CONIELNTS
,TMJlm.OF:OO~ , l
~~~
AmrM~S AiStIMPIMNS S~AluO~~ ".> ;'
~~~~m.0~~:~~,n4i~~J;~'
O,4DTER FAIARES CVNNTIYR TR~AT ARE ENV1TWEDt
,.lNP'V'tflATAiItER1RI!~;.
,CoNSERVA1i~~::
CIYSERVATIYMS' Is:
;*r~~/
kLVL~fON2 _________
, jl:t*t!i*4)61Y()O:mGmiR' <,ij
'~I!*:AN~'Mi;~.~~'~.~~ A AND AV-CF-PTNLCfRMEMAA ','#'
\ij "t";
."h .}<,,~:;< :~~;:'~, .:.~-::;~':'~'~ <.'.
~,DtiS~'~: ;,i~
R~E!NCI:!S :;-' '>'U
- CJi.Ltu'LA'rociNs,
'CALCIUiATMIOKS ':14
*~~~'~~t;W~~Fsi~!t", ".;i
, , >' ~ .
'" '~ ... :,
TIGUIRES
- XllGUlU,iS;, ~ . -~~
ATA; IMPU ___________
:--,----:--:--"~~--
P~No.,~~:: praý-ad_ No i-1jl1 C.aiiau~ihin Nm UHS.04' CalGlilatkmNd, IJHS-4
\'\"~.:f The putmse of ihis :ýalcuktion is to dm-umez the~ post LOCA siprgf faiture mnodes that Witt banalyzed by Cittowealh dis Company Nudcar, D Dc armint
&r. Byron Ultimante Heat S~iA (U11S) desii basis w~omsiikution fer cool wzxhter OWT=011. -RdIS clulauion suppleknisCalclation UHS4Ol wh0ich dcv~unewis sirtgta ai~~ se,~o~s po~ti~to an ST armbient wet bulb itmperiture. The following tprovkfies a 'nsw-sson of ik co w4 ehr accident scc-naziosi that will be ýutzdyztA furt thie iHns Mth~sekewo wQN, ctto~, as dscd at Lhe Scptcmbr Iv 2, 3Y9 I rnreting bcE%ýenIByi'-rozi Statin peratlng, Tech Sraff .Rýgkilftory AsFsuranee, Projeccu, Licensing' I ,ana'Sar-efit &LAudy Base scenariios cheseifbr aiwalysis afe witrd~qeify Tfirse smmaros eah~i at LOCA as the' iii3latling evant aw4 lxrss of (Jffsiti Power (LOOP) on te ýIc-iýcideut unit (zrnference 4).' Unit t w~as c~onsisterilly chosett a's the
~vie~tii~i~fo mat~ f udi.The base sctmarioisivre po~mukated by at,.Urndng_
va ioui~sming1: (ilur6~ami4inombuinationwit ~iihifferm sets of inital conidifons. Thfe,
,scetwrios.fcu So'n Wtefcts offailcd opn b~ypass vales.wbich dihut flow frurn active t~lr~~.1Jt;~~~~.~'rg~~
Add~taI eitalos Le6,scenarfos 8 and 9) are dlescrihc4 on pals 23 Attachm~ent A povkesa io'oftheessittalser~e esli ateeooi~towet'(SXCrT)s~risvalve pp in s&enzrioA and 9. 1L.~~¥~,~~~~~~~ Attavhmrnt B,to this caktxlati-on addresses additkirnai qenaiios forpostuAxiedJsingle i~t asocate w~h lemi-riat breakers servin~g dtheE&sential Service. Water (MX.
- IV 'AuJ;lmpCjem<
~
1: , *~~itl~ef~iure~"en The singie failure scenairio ..05:~~me,,~eft);IQWli1g'i;idaic~;: assume thc following initial caonditlonsr
'A, A.< ~:rWO\U~t&'~irig.~11 Two units op1erating at full flOwef.,wl1h~'. pwer w~i'b .
- ~~.
aM (~~w:.~~ji.:#tll1t.~:ijcbiun~.. One ESW pump tumnleg oin ea4ch ignit .. . zb.
;bi':: The ES;Wputttp'dillChqigelrrulli
.~.'1'Ite. ESW pump discharge train Cl'QS8Cie cosstie ~Iwsvalve:s
,;<;t~X03~~;I~~>~\.
(tiISX033 and II2SX034) upeii ."'. c.C (;~: Th ESW piirnp diischarge kknit ctvikýie
*:'Th.C:.ESWjNmpdisdW_"LuLt crosstie~veS' valves,
\(lt2SxOo$'ic;IQSed".,..*
(1t2SXOG5) cloed .' .' .'
.' ki.
Ii. ' -theESW return
'1"heESW retumbCUd'c header... crstivalves ct'OSstJe. valvu ( 112SX (lflSX130, 136; '.
1~~x9~9!;f~*.~I~.~;' . ".' " " 4,
\ei;'I?S\Y, ESW flow fIO~: being. being pro"idedto~followit1~heat~~B.
provided to &xdie ~lowing heal nhagr
~OCcPl;A
-O3CCOQA .'" q::-:lb(AJ1~J({~T.tlll)'"
CC (4xAfiged to Unio I I
- .'*:~$~\:NSB::~:KX*S
.I2A(VAS SX Pup~p. *Cuhic~::~~ten.**
CubcleCooIcr~s .*
'~'I'mX6iANAB~S){~()ifc6filmi l/2.SXOlAA(AB SX Pump Oil COOICrS ....
,;~/~:V2;WQ01CM;B;:: 'gln~jri~:gui~*.~
IflWOO I CA/C1 Con racinr-iChMIces
~: 1125101 1I~,olSN§J!....... SA/SB SI R wp RCasn Oil Cofflcm In,pu~Beuil1,OU~~m:'
'7"IJ2VA~AlSB
ý'11/2VA(14SAJSB
'........ ','" """ .. , SI Pup
'SIPU
,,,..rnp... .'" *~i'1e*COoIeO:*
CibicleColcr ."........
'.'~-OW'OOICAICB OWOO1CAlCB.'COr!croiRoom QmInvol Roo11 Chillers ChUlers'. * .
- lnVA02SAJSS':,
I/2VA02SA/SB
' . ' '/.' ' * * * */ N~'~ .'.',< .,,',',
RH~CUbiCleCo~" IH.uI P Cinbicte Coollers
;'1:, ..:<
.Ploatr 2,
-: ., .., ' 1, Project~:1IO\889l-38139;
. ProI#ect We. 8893 m-3<8/ {¢~~~i.!;~~ion}fO calcula -tion W- *. Ui~O uas+04
.*.., Revisibn R~Vl::fuon;;O
.(,.
>:;;.;:.1. ':.'.2 I. tvn
.. " "'".2.*.BA.***.***
.1/2CVO2SA/8ý .. \*J.s.
f B.*.'.*.*. cv
.: 6V t:hnw" GeeC Pump
. ' .'. 'f~.>> . .. '1 .... .. ...: ;
Gearr :.:*:00illt'"lli::, Coolers
- .
- ",,112C'lQ:~$AlSB..
1/2CV03SA/SB,
- ';.lt2VA09~JSB;'
1/2VA06SA/WB
- . g~:~:*,:'~~i CV Pwnp
........ ~. Cubicle
- y.\.U.I' C%?Pump Lube ,OIw'!"~'C.**;COOO"*";'*I;!rEl:~II' Oil Coolers.
.... ...... Coolers
. ~\;lI2VAQSS*.':
1/2VA05S "ODPump
- 1'0 PWiip J:~~i~le,;CQolera Cubicle Cooler4 U+/--,;>l.l~V.~.o.~~r/#SB.
1/,2VA035A/SB: ;c;s* CS Pump pump' '*CU:bi*cl~ Cubicle.Coolers .. :cool.ers
~ : ....' .'1:J~V~O,1S\*:-*.:.<
112VA07SC .r.", <.:>.'.~~PUmp' CI.il?,i*~l:e: ,<;!oolers Pump Cubicl6 'Coolers 7;.::112.~f)~J~ttCliiPt"*'::1lC1i'¢*r1iJ'" l./ 2VP0144A/AB / iC/ iRCFC~s' .." ".'" ....
'~***A~tomt!t.le~i'~y:l,
*Autonatibally"'b4ypassed .*bYP~[#;~C1.* *on.**;~~P':l~~#t.:']\#i~t on accident u~nit base'd:.tiff:** b~ased on
*.post 'post accident/ESP::
accident ESP slghal.:** siqnal.. " '" .. '.">,
ýf .ISW'
.f. ESW 1'1 owisQi~t.e,ti't~;'<thet~
flow ig-Qlatgd to the fallowinq ll..~"!i~gi'li~it heat exchangers:
. .:eX¢bange~s= . . ,. ,.,' . . . .. ',... '.
. -... *;112AF01AA~~'*:~u,mp~:1:1\.c;~1~~
l/12AFO1AA MOAF Pump Oil Coolers
- "" -~:*1/.2AF'Ol.~S 1/2AF0lAB DDAF DDAP:':PWlip: Pumup O+/-il Coolera O:1.~:.::~prj:l~~
- 1/2SX02IC
,;;;';";1,V~S)C,02~;;DP~F'~WJlP>~~levqea'17'o DDAF Pump Anqle-Gear 0+/-1' ~l'
. :,q~~~~~~; ~J~~*~fa!~#=ii~~ooierB Coolers
-1/2SX01K OflAF Pump Engine Closed Cooler S 112VAOBS. DPAF Pump> Cubicle Coolers~
*:-:-:*lI2AF02~'
1/2AFOZA Pu4p Gear oil, Coolers PPAF ." Pt.nnp*~g~:~:iP;i:t,j.P~o.l~J:'~
,QDAF
.:"~:>11:2pq9:1.~I:~..., ...C)G,
-1/2DG01KAfKB DG Ja¢Jt~t~~te:r>,doolars Jacket water Coolers
- f*A.rw MFW .~l,t:PP~:$~~ti?jl*;,Sj;J.pplieeJ:
Pump suction Supplies ',' .... : ..... *C. ' - , .'.
- IH ~.ESW
- ESwcool Coolinq Tower cold water basin level.
'. **ow@t::.cbld,watarJ::r8sirf level is assumed" assumed t~o be at' the ,Technical
- 1:~*~tJa:' :*hn.i~~.:spaalflcatiori);.min.imum~.,
Spe~cification minimum.~
- ~:~:
C. '-I:~,z:lS::Af,!}~~ It is ass.umed. ,\t,1'l~t:<:~WO\fans:,~:t~:init,r~:t:lyoutof
~that two fans are initially out of
*'~~"*~
service . . H)OS) (00$),for ad~ininstrative~ control.s,.* *'t.ba~,tv:o
.... f(J~::,~",~:ot.~a::~cGn.~los;.
8ao-h of the scenarios. .. Based fans that are 'out:> the two tan-s:<*thiEiit.ai'e Ba.s~d* *. oný. out on
*. adJilinisti"at!ve'!;*con.titQls
!11'1!~:I~t;i~=~:::;"
.of' service in this cnfiquration must be 'powered
.from,different, unit's power svppliea. it will. beý.
- 4ssumjed that 'the riser valves associated with theý Qos fans are 6los'ed senroswllb
.4he various tsing1e' failurescnrowilb analyzed assumiing an~ Initial ba~sin temperature of,
;"10Hp' 70OF and:'eltherand either one one;*,f,anOOS,:or'l*)~a:cb fan 00S on ~each .tQw~r/ot two,
- >fa:nBO()S::'on:ion.t~erf:*
~fans OCS on one tower. ',' . '... ,. . , towerr
. ' '.' ....r two. ._..... .
E. ::Ad:rIfnf~tr~t:.f~E()cOntr<iis Administrative controls don-ot"reqllire' do not require any any fans fans
;:rili'min'>.on:'lif"h running onx high s@@cfwrum-the'basi.ri:.t speed w~hen the basin temperature "erature.is' is
?i~SS;~;#Iln:;;:aoel~:
,'.Jss thtan 80 0 F., ...Th ~~erij,~.~}J~~
' refore, .*;f;:t:Jie,'sj:l\ci~effil,~ure;;
the single failure " '. '" sc,ý,enarios will be analyzed assum-ing no fans .~e,
**~j;qen.~i,C)s.:,w:i:.1"l,ba:'a:"aly~ed>lul;s\ml.ina.no;fEuls are ..... , .",
- dri,it:ia.Il' initaflyrunnting ::r:tihli;iji.q::,:'and:;.varfous;:~,cOiiblriations land various combinations . ' ote/tower' of tower cl~lJ~~t~~.~~~~!~~~;~~~~~~~
- r-i.sex and bypass, valved alignments 'are present.
Tea scenarios will not take credit for UHS ambienti
ý-h at di~ssipation until ~otLC'control.room
,,operator actions are" initiated, for, system
.1,re-alignment.
Paqe 3
;".**'A'
***** Project N40* 889 3-3/3,91 icalculation Ole. ýtms-0o4,
..... ~
- 2. hen, operator actions are required, in' the aIn ot DOMltisa~inumed these act ions ca b jitiaýte4 10 xiiainutes following oaf eguards signalis
- 3. Wai~n manual valve realiqnzorit is required, it is assumed
- thýeze actions can bae initiated 30 Mfinutes followinq Otif~equards signals.
- 4. Xt Is assumed that only oina non-accident~ unit SX puipp is r~unning in the post accident' modes. since t"e notn-runnin ould not' receive an auto-atArt signal.
4p~
- 5. A 7007 amubient wet bulb tamparature and a 700? cold water basin temparnture, will be aasfsume for all se rissince admin'istrative controls require by ass't valves clased whien,, the old 'water.,basin temperatea*
'above 700D'.
;,,'It is anssued that the noin-accidentý unit is initially at..
=ower operation and proceeda to an orderly sbaatdcwn 6olowi-ng the postulated WCA on the, accident unit,. 1j:
is a:Eoumed that the non-accident unit would -ntot achieve hot ahutdown condition's (TAvG 3500F), until~ Ithours
, ; "<4
~
~.'
- Page. .4*
,.' j" i ..
.~~j.~t,::'::r:!0:~
ýProject No. a89J~}313~ 8893-38/3.9 C'a'lcula-t16in No..
- Calculat:um' 'No.LTHS-04 OOS-04
.~Vi~lqn.;
Revis~iOn0.4 Q; .' .;.,
- llt">::L~,~hiiFliiJl,~i@:,+~*it~
ir. en~aglo qeciiin
... '1';" ~*~g.en~l:i~ ,1 ....(Fi'\JUre'l)'
;'A:~ A.singqle
!lih9~,a.*~:~~i:t.\lr~*-,
Failure '~ 'rhE!<!ll~~:ia\~f'£iii~l:'&"~~~Elid(R"~.t;<?;;;
-The Single~ failure considered for . '.'
tbis' scenario ,***is.*.an'}i~j;s.~,ll1;i:al;.:s,~rvl~,B' th1s,~,aetana:r,io is an #essential -service :w:at:;,Br cooling water <.:ooll.Dq, tawer bypass valve. t~'bypass,,,alva.,' '.V'.'." .. ' , . . "',"'" , , ' .
~. . B:~ condltlQn~.:,~~~hiriit.~a{.~#ndl~ioMara.
Initial Conditions
-5. ]:,nitict1 '-Initial conditions are as as
~~~~,:j.b8d>
described inS.c~iqit::IJ:,.in Section IL. 'In:iaadit:ion In addition,..It. it isisassllmed ags4UUed , ' that.,two
'that cells are out of two cel'lsfare:*'out service on one tower.
oi'servicG',,'on' tower. ,It* It ..*
,l~\;assum~~
is' assumed .~hfl~~*o~iir:sxp~p":)~'/Q1l1n that one ~SX pump is running on each ing:Qn, eacl\ un1:t unit '.
. ~rt4.. adany any colJlljfna~io~§;~f combination' of **.re~i,~~nq remaining . "riser, riser valve valve and
,. bypass .V~IVe;\:::2.al~9~a,.t.'!'tl~'
valve alignment is p~sa,nt:
,'X ','.', " "~,.:",,, " " " ' '" ,,' ****** ,. ".', '" , ** ',
present... ,
* ,;--" ".~'. '". '," "..... ..'
C.Accident Conditions - The, Initiating event ir. a Unit
- 1. WLCA and~ a coincident Unit. I loss of offsite power (LOOP)., The single failure considered -for this cas~e
,,s an open essential s-ervice water coolinq tow-er bypssvalve on the tower, with two cells ou~t of service. The injec~tionir phase, heat load on the UHS corriýs ponds to four RCFC' s And two' containment s9pray pmsoperating. in addition,, it is assumed that
- 'the non-accident unit proceeds to arn orderly shutdown. Following~ the postu~loatd LOCA, no
.- imimediate credit is taken, f~o UI[S'ambient heat dissi.pation until;ctrlom initiated to open riser .valve6s; st'art tower fans an'd operator action is close bypass valves. After 30 minutes, manual operator action is initiated to'close the failed qjpen tower bypass valve such, that all towrer flow is directed through risors. The post accident system lineup consists of three SX pumps supplying alltoMatiCally aligned Ipost a'Coident EEW loads. The,
,two accident unit SX pumups would start automatically-based on safeguards si~nals. The non-accident unit pump that was running initially would remain runni.nq. it is assumed that the other non-~accident u~nit pump remains off since it wo~uld not receive an auto-start signal. Tower A will have four~ active cqells (fan running on high. and dise~r valve open) and,
;no passive cells (fan not, running ,and riser valve
'opn).Tower B will'havca,ý týwo c~tive cells and no "Passive cells.
Paq.::'5 Page
.' "/
~5
II i .'
'/ .
j I" L. l'
'.'~
.~~.'
Calculat~ion. No. R~evision 0 UHS-04 Slng;te;:~"a.i):ur8;.~ A.Singqle Failure - ..Tfi:e*'**s:ih9~e.~~ The "slirjl failure a.~~ure'~'~c.on:sidet'ed; dondidered~ '.i~*:; irtý.. , .. this scenario is *tJii*
~bis)§ceria:rJ(t*.,ifJ an .*. essential a~tln~:i~*¥;i3.~tYJCi~.~:w:a-tfU:"ooolirii:J**:.
serice water cooling-,; to\Mr*bypass*:Alalve~.~* '",' " .., ..... >.... .... '.' .'. .. '.' .. " .... tower bypass valve. B.
~:!~t~a~~~!~~tBh:*t~~~~f:~!*\::~~rl:i':It~i~a::.s~_:*
initial Conditians
~at:ona that
- Initial conditions are as described in Section II. in addition, ~it is assumed,:
c,,11. :isout:~*o.*f**~rylc*illoJ:*f."cti.;tower one .cell is out of service on each tower."".It,.;: It,
~i!~1i~iQ'Ji~:i~~;i'~j,;:t~~~'
ia assumed that one SXIpump is running' on, each unit,, and any combination of'ri~aininqn riser valve and bpypass valve alignment Is presant.
;f~=1~~~t~~i~~f~~~~~~~i~~.!:?;~~~jsf:;~~*.~:
C.Accident Condition's (LOOP) .. , .~;,:me\S (LOOP). The singlee.~failure
- The inaitiating, ev~ent is a Unitý 1 LoCA and ~a coincident unit 1 loss of offsite power failure* considered in this
,:considered.:;:in. thi case S<Cd.se.<
ls.\:~n:()~t:::~~ is an open, essential ..............alj.:.se~i\~/wa 5ervice, water ter<~~,J;1M cocoling 'b?We,r tower .'.
**byp~99;::v:al~~
bypass valve. .. ' Thei The injection . c~;Jon.pha>>e'<t~'il!,at.19a.cl* phase heat load ontl1e\ on the
- tmS:)~orrQ~:orias JJHs corresponds to-fo to*;~f 'ur. ICFCsaCF¢sanu and \Ctwo:>containment:
'two containnent,
**f;i'~~l~!mt~~_l;~~*~~;;'***
spray pumps> operating.' In addition' it' is assumed", Ithat the non~-accide~n't. ainit 'proceeds toa'n orderly-
- shutdowin. Following tý,he postulated LOCAF no imjaediate . cr.adit.**.ls~.*ta]unl*
iUediate** credit is> taken ..for:]ms*heat: for LTHS heat, :dhJD.1pat,1on:*: dissipation~r,
*.;!~lr~~~e!i~~~{~*);~~.~~t~~~~.~~~.~,:~~~¥~;~~.
until control room operator action is initiated to open riser valveg, st~art tower fans and 'cloae bypassE
'valva5~
valves, .)if~~>>~,O*:.J;'@:te5 After 30 minute5,t;*.*manual ma oporattor action> isl nna roper~:t.o~,:,ac:t;19r1'~'.1~~
.initiated to close the failed open *"~ypci.~s.
".inA~i~tE@,"i~::9J;9~ej,~l!~:',:t,~1.~~dopen* valve suich bypass xalve.eSu~
that all tower f
.t.,ba;t,d]:]::,,t,Q!,r: f,lO:W;(:l.,tjI'~~r,e,e:t.ed*th:r;ough' low i~s directed through'..*rimersrio,~ risers. *.T.he The.
'ost.'acacident
-post accidentlineu lineup*';;conslsts.consists of *.,th'tGej:SX"**
three'SX' pumps .. , .... :8,. ..
?~~~~:~;r~~~~~ti'-~lI~~~~~~
1..upplyinq automiatically aligned post' accident ESW loads'. The t-wo accident amnt SX~ punnps would start: Automatically based on~safeguards sig~nals. **Tbe,'*
* .automatioally;ba'5I~;:'on,5afe9U,.ardaEu,gn,als.*::; The
'Ilon~acc i,d~n~~'i't>: plump non-ccientunit pump:>~ba that~wa;Jn1nnlng;:
was running :tnit.i~ll'Y;
'initially .
remain running. w,~l~ .. rell@l~K~~Mm~;f/*'
. ;would It is assured that the other "
+t.~s,:'a,1i5lumetr:~;~the;~tb~~
non-accident unitt:"pump
';n.cm~a90~(lent::ull~ pump . remains
.r.eJllai:~>off ouff since it :wou,l~'
sllJqe.:::J.;:t:.** would .
!.;ricrt:receiv&:*anaut:O~st.artsi>'*
not receive an auto-start signal.,
*:~hre.~p~;.tV:Cji:*:,:(;:~i.J.
three active cells. and h,iYE!;,;Wt.ee,ac Wil.hve
- ,will>
..~ .. no n9:::pil~ v.' Tower~*A.will
'1.. .,T,Wer>
passive 'c;eJ1fl.'i;, veý,oejll, and no pa4A-tye thee act,1ve:¢el:lJi;F:;arid;:no*\:p, A will . 'ba.'ve cells.. . / TowerTellier s:>:
**s.lve:QeXl.s.'~*
eells. have B l'aijti!:'6'; Page
'~". /,'
6
rject N~o.'89-83 calculation Nod. UHS-04 Revis'ion 0 A. single Failure The' single~ failture cons idezedd- for this scenario is an essential service w~ater co~oling tower bypass valve.
ýB Initial Conditions -initial conditions ~are a41 described in Section XIl in addition, it is.assumked that 'two tower cells aire OOS on one tower. Jo i
assumed that one SX 'pu is running on each irnit and any combination of rera~nn rier.,valve and bypabs valve alignment is pre'sent. C. Accident Conditions -~ The initiating Vevet is a uniit 1 LOCA and a coincident Unit I LOOP 4 Thbe single failure considered for this case is an open essential service water cooling tower bypass valve on the tower with no cells ouit of service, The injection phase hieat 'load on th UkS corzrespond-S to6 four RCFCs and two containment spray pumps operating. Both trains of the accident uinit SX system heat loads are arsumed ~to be aliqned. In addition,4 it is a88ume4 that the non-accidont unit pr-oceeds~ to an orderly, shutdown. Following the-postulated LOCA, no credi is 'taken for UaHS ambient, heat dissipationi until control rodm operator actionL is initiated to opeil'riser valves, start tower fns,
.and close bypass valves. 'After 30 minutes, manu~al operator action is initiated to clo~se the fa~iled o~ntower bypass valve such that 'all tGowr flow is divetedthrough risers. The post accident system
.lineutpcnsists of thre SX pumps rumnnin and
,supplyingqthe additional autom~atically aligned ESW lJoads. The two accident unit SX pumps would start au~tomatically based on safequ 4rs,,siyjnals. The nlon-accidenlt unit pump that waps,,runnin iitially would. remain running. It is assuned that the other non-accident unit pump remains off since it would not receive an auto-s~tart signal. Tower A will have two active cells and. no passive cells. Towerý B will" have four active tower cells.
Page
<Ptojee;.~o:*;,;
Proje2-t o.8893'38/39 . ~893';';3813g'*
.'.' Ca lculation No cal¢ulatl'ori" No"'_-
.~'UliS';;';:04
'. ':Rev:l,S:ion:""i<*'* ""'/~" "-\ '.' "';' .>
a: 4.- -- Figurt )
.A.. Single Failure - The,B~9:J!:\failur~
$:i.Dgle,f,ai!urtl. The single failure . considered ~~ns.~der~;:.:~<?r:". for
~~88C()]:u~rio:i~
this scenario is aa:lB:,'~g-encyd~~l>;failure~:: 18 'emergency diesel failure. '~.: As
.resU:l:t*~" . th8two**dhd5ion:,:1'2 aa'ý',result, the two divisison 212 ;.*.t(')ljfEJr:;'fano**;are:j,i'ssumsd<
tower fans are assumed,, to'/fall to fail and ,the cOrre$~inq~:'i*lser::valves the . . . corresponding riser valves .. a:nd., and
. h~$$\)yalve,ai~~ias'e#l~<*to::(ail'*ln;~;tliE!
Vy~pass 'valve are assumed to f~ail I+/-n the . ;O Ot-'.. "... ,. '. pOS:lt:ip.:i~. position. ', . :t~;is:. It is as.~~>:t;hat,.;;*~s~E!ntial; assxumed that essential dm s*~'or(')i2*:.'
- d. vision 12 ca' comp ., 'rients:a'r~'ali etB are aliqned' ' '. ea<l\tO'.'r.e,ceive::tsW:flow*.however:;;
ýto' r~eeive E$W f 1614 however~
n~~ilt*';ioadlnq;*.**ls~sBum~d<:;from':*:tb~ nohat- loading is assumed from 'these .. nQn~.ni1:qfze;d'~' non-ene0rgized ciom~,;:,i,\'*.:
"nants~
i" ;'" B.. It:l:tti~l Iitial conditiohiO .~:I)ittl8:1*<;pnd.l~fons::'at.*
- condlt:i9l\s - initial conditions are .. as, ~f!i:>.; . ;.;".:
**.*4~s*cribed"ifl*
described in Section section:'. !.!'.'II. : '.*;,In.additl911~ In addition, ,It'**.1s.* it is assuzed ~~sume4,
- 'that that ,one cell is out one cell;'is out,of of 'eervi~:
5ervice o'ri each tower,> "., This on ,.~ch'towe.r'~,'*. This .
>w.~;l.l'i:'~eule swill result intbe in the .malCJr~l~m\ra~mJ)~r of. cells out of~
maximum numuber 'C)f'.;'t:~lla>.~t..{rit service "~.fter
*. Ji~rvice after.. the pvotulated failure of .the,",.(ti:e:~el
~he.*,po~,~;tllated';.f;~.i~ur:e*'o:f the diesel...
,It, is assumed that one
,.;~;J':s*,' '.as~umed ..'. tbat.o#":t~S,~.>p~~.i<4S\~i,Il:~:,(m.:'~a,~h,:
SX pump is running'-on each .,', .
.*~it-;t.~~
unit, the ..division' diyision'.*'l.?'i;r"'s.~r:.Y~Jv~d!.'~<J,~bYP~~:::,V,Ba.y@ 12 riser valves. and,.byp~aiss , Valve .
- _,Aare open and any *.')?('J¢~~.n~~,'1.C?V:'\~
<:~t~.;;.9pen~~*~nd*:ttt* combination of 'r~in fj't9*~iaar.*::and:'*,*
remaininq,-riser,,. 'and,
- ':J)y~$Er: val. V~'2l~r9Jl~(!~~!~1,~i'P~,~S,~~'~:
byasvalve al igrnment, is pr~esent. ..
~15~J;~~~~,:~titt~t~~~~eif~f~'~!£r:it C,-:Aqq. A ident Conditions -The initiating'Aevent isaUit, 1.
OCAanda coincident Unit I LOOP.~ Thei single~ failureo considered for this' case is a 13 emebrqency diesel ,fitllure;
'dlf!sel failure. .. ,*.Tftt':S;:>ta:ilu.raj"d:lI.
This failure will resultlrt,a:less'" result in a less
.*.*tli.~'ni;J#',¥.i~*
than maximum .*Uijedt:J;6#:pl:i,a.~E.t::';Dj:at injection phase heat .. !(la¢t::.():Ii.'~i:te,~s**.** load on the UHS * *.* because
, .b0 accident:;liri accid'ent unit.
only
. ofll)$,e ...0.,.'.n. I.I'*' . two 1RCFC-.fans two:>l{(:
t'. In
. i!,~.<fan,~:<. will addition, Irt',addi i.11 bbe TJI.
tidii ,.tnelB functional
.* ,f the 1B .. tr'a.'i:nSX train SX heat;* j heat on the
. un.. ct. . ional.*.*.*.'q:n:i,the
".~f~t~~~~:~t~~Ji~~i~r~~~~~~~\*.~~d.:. *,:,;~;" . ,~~t exchangrgs and cubicle. coolers would not sinfcantly contribute, to UHS heat load.k The 113 diesel fallure:envelopes"tb'e::1A
- 'd1es'el failure envelopes the 12A diesel,*failur~'::*; diesel failore "
;iil~I~~li~ri~~fi~!~;t**.
because the UHS will receive he-at load frOnu *both accident unit ainciliax fdedwater. pumps Inh
.6'azel, of .a 1A diesel. ai _re,< the 015 would- onl-T:
'roceiVe heat loa4 frowth '1B' AFW pump sIcNt l '
...pump Is motor driven'.' .In 'additijon, it-will' he non-accident unit proceeds to an ..
'assmedthat the ' non~acCidElrit:unit:;proceeds~::t6(':ari';
;ass~:t.hat.the order'ly shutdown. . . F~~~~@~:,fhe
. orc:tet;l¥<shutdow. F61flo'winq the :pC)s!=ulat~postulated :tp~'~;~9 LOCA, no credit is taken tor;;~~,:J;~l\t ored,iFiil,.taken for 01iS ambient heat hea~ **d!ssipiI,t*0p,i:
dissip ation ..
*.U1'l~il until ..control co.ntrol.rC)(m:?opeZ"~~:~aot;ionl.s room op'eratdr action is ,.:u1itiated initiated ~to, to *.
- 9pan:"tJ~etvalve:~flf.'s~~rt, operiervalves,, start ~.ar tower *:flUj~' f ans .* and close bypass l\nd.*closa;*. bypass
- ,,valves. it is assum~ed that the ", dies~el va'! ,($21'/' *'
- tt.:ls;a~siUlied',~t.';:'the dtes~el< failUre*'
failure . . ;
- '~4t9t:~'r~~t:~~".:~~:!O~Ji~~~~~i;,:;ein.~~a~~;,;,op~::: ,. . .
~affects two division 12 riser valves and one "division 12 !bypass valve, that' were initially opený suc4h. :J;h.il
- Ji~u¢li~ thatt?;t;l1,eY'"reJIa1n,.:p~
they remain in ;:PO!iJ position after control ::room.
;L:t1,9l1:*aft~':c::~:::m1;.ro:l:, room
;:*o*'erator:*jlo'tlo1i o.pe~rator, action is:>lriitilefted~:,After;JO is initiated. After .30 minutes*. rn~hutesB,
;~i~J"$~?~~~~;~~4~~~;I:,~lli~~~*~~tk.
Aiianul. operator action 'is-initiated to. close the-failed ;open tower bypassý vav suchý that all fower' Page 8
~():)e¢'NO~ a893-38.lJ~' <
Calculation"
.Calculatl:OD N0, No .. UH{S-04 URS~04*.
ruiivision:o' Revision 0, '. . . . . . v" fl&i directe through risears. Thie. pQst accidenti.
!ýi$4em inup o tw S pupsrunning and" onist available accident' unit ptunp would start, automatically based on safeguards signals. The nion-accident unit pump that was running, initialIly' w,ould;remain runininq 1 it A's assumed that the other-non-accident unit pump would 'ronain'off. since it would' not receive an auto-start signal. Tower A will have three active c~ella and no passive cells.
Towe~r B will, have onea active ,cell and two pass.ive 5.Scenario 5 (Figure 5 A.~ Single Failure. -"The, single' fIr conido-red fr this s'cenario Is a 1B eiuergency diesefl. fa'ilure4 . As-a result', the two division 1i twowr' fansB are assumed to fail, the. correspondingiervvsaeasmd to fail in the cloe poiion and one bypass valve fails in' the opan position. It is assumed that' "essential division' 12 components are aligned 'to receve SW flow,. however,,,rio h~eat loading is' 440umed from th~ese non-energized com~ponient's. Bý. h'nitia41 Conditions - Initial conditions arc as
'described in Section II. in addition, it is assumed4 that one cell is out of Ge~rvice an each tower. This will. result in the maximum~ number of cells out of:
service after, the. postulated 'failure of thedisl Itis assuned ,that one SX ptu'm'p is, r~unning on each6
,unit, the divisioni 12 riser"'valves 'are cl'osed, tlie--
diviion12 bypass valve ir. open and any combinationi of remaining ri sex and bypass valve Alignment ig present. C. Accident conditions. - The initiating atvent i~s aUnitI 1ILOCA anid a coincident Unit 1 LOO~P. The single.ý failure considered for this ,case i's datan a lB emergency die~sel; failure" This- scenario is the samea as Scenario 4 aijth the exception of thie failure position of two~riser valves. In this scenario 'it is a~saued that the two @iffected riser valves fail
'in' the closed position as oppoued to the open
,position. Following t~he postulated LOCA, no credit is taken for tIHI,heit dissipation utlcnrlro opierator actions r ntae t~o ope :-riser valve-s,;
41
~----,,...----.,---------------'----~
"noj~q1::.;:lfo. 889 3~JJU39 Calculat Calctila'fion ion No. No. UHS~04 UIIS-04 bVlatQri':*;O* , . . '. > .. '/.>'
. ~ . tower *. ~~.s. start t01ffer;** fans and CiO~:f;i:./bypass:v~:~ves close 'bypass va~lves. ". It;~;*.l~;, It is~ ........ . assum.edthat.<the diesel failtire affiects the division:
.assumed that the :dieaeltall:\u::Ekaffactst.hed1v.l.s.Lon 12 ciser
- 1;2r1. S.'~"i:. valves
'S~QP 1,2tJ:iypass:valv~"tli~~was division t:J.i'at.. *;.:. were V" a.l.v.,.8.:'.S"'. 'that 1~2 bypass valve that was *.tnit~aJly:.ope:n~
w.* Initi~ally~ ..~.l.Y.\J:t:lo.,s
...r.e.***.*;;;.:.;[.n.*:.*.it.*.l.:al
*.f.il closed initially open~
and
...ed.* an
.... *.*. d.;.......... .... .'
.",. '.' ,.:J~l:\~t:*th*ey:'rem~iri:in::Rc;;~~ti such ,that they rem~ain in position o;ri;i,af;t~t:i~()!\tl:~):";'room aftier control room-. . .
o~rator' 'elation operator action is ig ini initiated. tial:;eCl:. .*After* 30 minuteg1 After '30:,mintl;teS., litatlual.:>*:<:Jpeta m~anual operator t.or aot.ionitl;:~l.ril action is initiated4 tiated 0 to .c!oSe,::the c~a~the fal1ed.9pertft"Q:Wer failed open tower bypass**iY$lve. bypass valve Wf.;h';tliat,: such that all all::flow flow is is
,.tl~~c~e:s5~ ~o~qh***rlsal:"s*~.
directed through risers,. :'*11ie:po~t.<;;~~t~el\t* The post acfzident sy~~iim system llrieu consists of two Sx pumpss'rurufin lineuip;;consi:ste(~of:*twi):iSJ'.***- running,'Sand and ,. .. .... .. SUPPl~fn9*;fbi"aadittona:l.aE~~atlcaliy;~aliCj1j~ci:\;EStJ,::; supplying the additional automnatically~ aligned ESW " .', . .
;lo.ad~.~*' ." "fh~:.;~vililable~*a~¢~~~'nt;;u#1t!pUmP.
leads. The available accident unit pump:*.would2~~~it'*. would start a~t'c:Smaticall'Y .based*oll$a.fe9uardS*si~als. automatically based on safeguards signals. "rhe The '.' . '
~i~!~i~*;~~~i~l~r~it~~1i~f!~l$~r non-accident unit pump tha~t was running initially would rem~ain running. It~ is assumed thot the othe non-accident unit pump wouild remain, of f' since it would not receive an auto-start' signal. Tower A, will'~a.veone will have one acti. active cell' and no passive vei>:ce11:'an('t::>:nQ paasive~el'l:s:~> cells. .' .....
~~~~:I}rirlill Towe' r-S will havQ**fJ#~~>.~c;:ti'Y:~*:
have three actitve ...::&lia,*a#~;Jic)*~~~sive ceallf;',nd no pas~sive cells. Page 10'
,Project: 89-3/9`
N4o. a.8~3,,~3,8,1:39"', lproj ect~ t.ro~,
~,calcUlat':ion t:I~ .*,;:~;.-,O~<
"Calculat~ion,No.VS-04_
'Revisio6n%0
- Re:vlslon~ 0,'
A., .Sfiigli;t~!lU#~:i"" Single Failure - Th~; The '~~ng.le,,:f,~~:~tire single failure "cid~'s,id'U"ed"t0-r"" considered1 for. s~ariR':4i~ this <scenario
,this:, 1LB3 emergency diesel. failure. ,,}j;S:':-.:
a lB~.'p14}rgQJlPy/,~i~se~:;fail1lt"e.
"is,Ill,' AS a~,r~$\il result, the two div~sloll'l~:.:.;.t:owe+,(.:fanEJare" e'i::~e<~"two:. division 12, tower fans are ,;~ssu:med,> assumed,-,
t~',~a:i:l' to fail and.':tl\~. and the ~t":espoMU( corsonding' ":;:rfser::;,~al~f:lll"a:ri~ riser valves a~nd' baypass valve arec':asswned. b>ass;:::valve' are assumed to<Jalliri':theooen' to fail in the' Oye..n , p~lLt:I(jl:l~' position. ",:It It i8~"~d is assumed *thatesS~1:!al'd~v'if;:tQn,.:t2, that esstential d vision 12
~gmP9~~!tt;s;:;ar~,i components are ~liqn~',~9 aligned to ~ec;~i.va,J!j~',;tlow;r receive ESW flow, ,~9'rII,e~4ttr.,
however, nC?"}~~il~\'tl~adin,:~r,'is,a&sUmedc"from,."tln~sa'non-ener9~z;ad\: no ~heat loading is assumed fromu thesei non-energized. components. Qcmrpon~n
'",,' '. ' . '. '.,\'.,'"
,S.,
',"h~' d B. Initial Conditions - Iinitial conditions are as' described in section 11. In addition,, it is assumed that two cells are out" of service on,the tower.
6posite~ from d3ivision 12. it is a'ssumed that one S'X pump ig running on each unit and the division 12,, riser valves and bypas5 valve are open and any combination of remaining riser and bypass, valve alignment is, present.. C. Accident C~onditions The initiating event is a Unit,ý,
- 1. LOCAL and a coincident Uinit 1 LOOP. The single failure considered for this case is a 1B emergency "diesel- failure. This 'failure will result inaY less'
'than m~aximum "injection pharse heat load on the URS8
,because only two RCFC,fans will be functional on the
.accident unit. In addition, the 13 train SX heat
%exchangers'and cubicle cool~er5,would ~not slgnificantly contribute to UtIS heat load. The 1B diesel failure ~iivelopes the 1A diesel failure because the' UHS will receive heat load from both
.acci'dent unit auxiliary feedwat~er pumps. In the case of a 1A diesel fa'ilure, thee UIIS would only
'receive heat load from'the _1B APW pump since the 1A~
AFW pump is motor driven.' In addition, it, will be assumed that the non-accident unit proceeds to an
'orderly shutdown. Following the postulated LOCA, noý,' -credit is. taken for UHIS, amibient heat. dissipation un~til control room operator' act~ion is~ initiated to 'open riser valves, start tower ~fans anid cloae' bypass-.',
valves. It is a~sawed. that the diesel failure affects two division 12 riser'valves and one diviion12 bypass valve that w~ere initially. open suhthat they remain 'in posit'ion after control rooMi'
'perator action is initiated.~ Afte'r 30 minutes, matnual operator action is- initiated to close the ,,.failed open tower bypass valve such that all tower "flo0a. is directed through .risers . hepstaccident.
jPag&' 11
Pr:9j'eC~';KO'~8,~ Project> Noi. 8893:,38/,39.r 93:~3 813,9" Calculation Calculil,tion:No.* o *UHS~OA* UHS04, .
- R~viEJiort<p*'*
Revision- 0 ",",.>, '"',.,, > ..
- a:
syste lieiuip "consihs of to. S pinup uiig n the adiinLatmtclyaligned ESW'loaids. .The, available acidenit 'unit ýpump would start au~tomatically~based on safeguards siynals.~ The non-accident, urnit pump thbat was ruwnng intially would remain running. It is assuned that, the other non-accident unit pump would remain off since it would not receive an auto-start signal. Tower A will have. two~ active cells and no passive, calls. T~owe~r B willl ii~ve two active cells and tuto p4s~ive~ cells.
- 7. do ario (Fgre
>':\<',': . v(> (.~." :'?'\<~\ ,~.'-:~'. ,,;. .: ~ '.'/.~ .. ><<,<?,. .~<'.~_,: .,<. ,. ': .. '_:'.:'." .: .......... ~ ,.:.-";... y-: .... j :'.'
- A..
'A.. Sinqle*Pailur,8}~:
Single Failure -The Th~:::slngle: failure qonsi4e'red .-"foQr,, single .failure,:'cohsl'dered:':for:
.. t:.bis::s.~a+/-,f~':;;:l,~,:~.a;:~;,lB*~e~:tqen~'
this, scenarioK's ~a .18 em~ergency 4~~5,~,l diesel .."f*a:;i~l ailr.A4!" ~~.~\ ",~;,;
..a:a .r~ul1;,.
resulttetw divis ion 1.2': til:1,~"J~wi?: 'dl~vJsJo* t~,er" fans 12 tower fari~, az:~: a;r-e ),~~~ed' assuiued'. td~,**fa11 to' /" the" ~orresP9n:d~ng~ fa il,"theý'Z es8pondingq '~1sar,' riser~ valve~rr valves *ar~.',a,~~Wl!~d are ass:umed'I
,. 'tot,o. fail f~il 'in: in~ ~e:,'~+,o'S~:d, tfh& closed pO~,itiC?n poe ition ~d and one one J:Wplilsa>va~.ye*
bypass 'valvea fails .ih,'~~:p~~' fa11s in the-open position. p(),$i,t~o~., it It. is is:,: aS~um,~(I: assuzoa that th:a~ . essential division 12 components . ,a.t".e/al;i9'"ed:*tc)'
'ea.li~ntial:,<div.i~:1,oif::12,>,cqmpQnel:lt...S are aligned to..
'. r'Qcf!i receive ESW flow, . however, YeS~~i:;f.l:o'N: h.Q:W'f,l~r:~'nQ ll~)I~?**:l~d.ingt.sr no he~at loading is .:
assumed f.rom~*.these.,*:non assUl!l@d. from 'these non-onergized ... energ~z.Fcom,ponentsi' components.
'B'~: Initial .Con:ditl()ns--:ii~itI~l.CO~alfi~n~
B. .. 1n1.t..fill Conditions - initial coniditions ditSCitbed;'tn\S~etiori,::;t:t descr~ibed. in section Ii.~**In:::;a*ddft.lon,: in addition, ...1it are. are as'
- t. '. is ,'assuud:
asý afssumed .
*' that..:.t:wocal111*are::outot that two calls are ~out of ,serv,lce;on*one* service on one tower;~,.(I;t;.; tower. It
- f~~~i~*:1'B~t~*.*,#~:~~Xy~~~~t::r~~7~~~~n~6;o~:.,::~~,~
is the
.~1.:V::lS;~~:
assuned that division 1.2
'division 12, one Sx pump Is running on each unit,,
riser valves are closed, the. li?:~~~~'~}':;~~;~Y~:'~~;'; bypas's valve is open9P.eJl and ~ncl:aniyc9ULb,i;~C\ti9n;, any comb ination; of remaining
.*,of.'rEmlam riiser and ,bY'Palili:valveal ng:;:r.](ser:"a.nCl biypAss valve" aligqlmenit .gnment >ýis~ 151 *.:
present. .... <.
;'pr~sel'l~* .. ' '. ' " . " ; ,
,C. C'Ac¢id~nt::'tofidltlon*s?'~;:iI'he>:lnltiat.rn Accident Conditionis. Th6 initiating'**,:'-:av'ent, iývent_. ,lii>'a.)Jn1:t isi Ut
- ~lt.;.* i.;I~~lr.~!;~i~1iN~.!~i.~I~.~;:~.:~ .
-ý 1'LOCA and a' coinciTdent Unit I Loop. The- si6ngqle failure conside red for 'this case is agadi~n-a- '18
.,crnrgency died'elý failure. Thisq scenario` is- the sain'e as scenari wiht the'exception o~f the failure pOsition ofto :riser valves. In this scenario it' is assumed i t1i8:t.*
'*;rs'::'asswed that 'tl'iEf.tW()"*
the'two affected affectedrl.seli:'Valves;:~;*.faii* riser> valves fail ii:t;:~lle.~los~f.2/' in the closed position ~S,.i.;~9n:~ ~~ as*.~9PP,q;:I~<i£0'~8 opposed to the open opel\'" ,.,.... , ,'., i()~lfiti9n",.*<,:F:Rl,19i!;n;C;r/*;n:~* positioh. Following the postulated l>c:'~~ul:~~~.~CA., LOCAO .1l9* no cre credit c,ti'4;,. is taken for UMlS heat dissipation until control room
*1:Ii*tak:en*f.orOBSheat>;(b.5sJ.~tlQnunt:il~ntrolroom Qper~t:();r;,;aq~iol1a operator actions ;.~r,~2iini ares initiated ti;Cl~~St, .~'.,to . QPe:nx:;lS;et:';,val,V~/
open~ risier valves., start tower fans and close ibypass- valves. It is ".' start*tow.er.fansand,*c19S(il!.'bYPasslIalvee'",'*'It;;ifJ
*. . .~;silit~:iv!:'~@;~~:~i!~~~ta~i~1~i:~~~~~¥~slon assumed that the !diesel failure affects the 'division 12 riser valves that were initially closed and~
division *12byp~$~%;:V~lV~:**that.
';4iyls1on. 12 bypass' valve, that wa..~t~.i:~1:1Y:OP~ri\: was initially open such that they . r~,afn'.1n:<:p~~t1on**af~et'.c~l1tro.l.,::roam
**$:4~tJJ~t:~*tl:ley,., remtain in position after contirol room
.oper:a.t6raction operator action is>.iriitiiiited;. is initiated. ,Atter,30':m,inutee; After 30 minute~s- ., .... ,
.manual operator :actlo~;',l~f;:ini~iatE!d,t9rclcie:eih~:
**mariu:ar*,.Q~rat:Oi;; action, is' initiated to clo'se th .... '
',fa failediJed*6pen:*LtQWel;'.:byp~$,~*;'Va*l,Vflt,;~.':lCh;l:\a.t~"a:~
open~ tower bypas~s valve such that' all1fow l' 'f:~o~>is i
'dirctedthrgh r ser;ý The post accidetste *sY.~t~."
'd ir~*~Cl;~::tib,r,~1l91)~:r~~~t~~;,*:~EFPQ~t;,/;a~~.i9~%l~,
lineup consikst's ;of ~trjo
*linQli~,c6risist&',:*of;:' -two 9X SX'~WnPB rumhi'J..~*and pumps. running,ý,ii 4n Page 12
. .**~~je~;
,,rOjeeQt ,N'o,~:**'8891';-3.Qj~9; No4 86893n-ý839/
. .
- Caiculation eel lculat,ion>No~' tm:s6i:04::"
No IJHS-04
. Revi'liicn*::O;:
ftiviiion a0`'.,' ~.' ,.. . ,'. " ',auppiy~~g:,.th,fI Suppl1yinq the addi.ti~~'~t'~u~o.a i addition~al automaticallyticaiiy':.'~~~~it{~~, aligned" .~~,~, ESW . loads.... ,,'The
- ,loads The a:vailable<za:ecidant'*unlt available accident unit .' pumup wou~ld strt, uld.star,t automatically blJs.d,9~~>:~f~ards.sf,
- >~lltiam:~~j;¢a;tlY based on safe-guards sigqntal.'.' '... The Tb~,,; ...
non-aecidenit 'unit pump. that wasa running
~o~~a~,~~~tiuni't;~~~~FJ:.l~tdw!1srunn .', ,:iOi~l.a,+~y:'
initially ... would renain running. would,* remain it is assumed that running *.: ItisassW'lted, ,.t~..tbe the ot.b,er
'other
- n~n7:a:9ifl,~nti unit R~p)f'W:Q~ld:;~ai:n
.non-accident 'AAi1:' pump ~would remain off:sl$c:~
offr since i~,:'it .Vould recaive_ ari\\auto-start:a;iqnal.';
'not :i:e,c~tve" wouId:~riot': an~auto-Start~ signal. . , 'Towei:, Tower A A:~;
'~~l~l~~:f;X:l.~~~h:e;t{~~~:~~~v;<~~~i~~~:~:t~;,::~:~~t<V~.
*ill, have two active cells a.ard no passive cells. .V6d siý'Tower~~~
ee*s.'. 1B il av aelw.woaie -1 els and no,,- passive. Page 13
*,'1"
,PX'Oj!q~i'.l(:o;;,
Project-.No.. B 89~-J~l:~, S93-38/39 ~ Ca:lotilation, iCaldula~ti6n No'.. No. .UHS,.,;o04 UHS-04 Revis:t'pri/O';;'" Revision 0 ',",,' IV. OhrFi~rsC~iee htAeE~lce other;::'fallnr other~ failures ** *th:at>we:he\ that wereo considered; considered are are enveloped.
~nYei.lo~d. via via:
,:9!~,99,;~~~:~p<~s-i9:~,*'
Calculation URS-~01. ,':;. < ., ...;:,';::<:~" .,',' ,'" ,.,'",; , ' v. V. :inQut;*
}:~ :-., " -
nuLftLe.eeie
- - J_ -'" ' ","
ooaiRtif'tK1!ncli1§f:::
* ',':, ;, -',:0 ' '-, ',-- _ - -_ __, ',/
l?.lpJl:\q;~:an<:t,;InStx:WII,ant:at 1~Piping and Instrwnentat iphn i'on DrawDrawiij9's ings 14-42-l.A and 1B Rev.Z M~,42:~:lA::,;'andlB ~V'.'Z:Y' . ,.'" ,. ", M~4 X,-42-2A 2;';'2A,,:and. and 28 2B .Rev.,, Rev~: ,:AG~ AC, M':'42'~ji:Rev.>AI{ M-42-3 Rev. AL
,:tt~t~I'[;I;~r;~,:.
M'-42-4 Rev. All X-42-5 Rev. Y, H 1~-2-6Rev..
,42,6,ReVhAH AH
- S
- ~'~,~"'*~';~J~.,,,:,:***t 4-ý4,2-7 jRev. M4 14-2-8Rev. X
'2.:,'2. Byr6n'::'reehnicaispeci:rib'at16ris\':Amend1lilent~:l yr,66-Techn ical1 Specificationrs AmendmehV" 39,' gr,
<,' "<.:'.,>> ....' ,..,.... ,:",,',,', "., " .,.<':, ,:,.:, .\,', :' ,. ," ':":'.' .: . :",: ,':": :(c.:
- 3. i/2B~~()i~F-1AR.'V:.'::3}>'1,:Re~ctQr'T'J:':~p::Qr'::Sa.f.:ty 1/2BEP- 0 WOF-1A Re~v. "Reactor rr~p, or ýSafety Injeii~i:Q*:~'
Injection"
, ',~', ~, ...
- 4..
4, OBOS 0.1. OBOS.:'.O~:~\:+\Rev~":J - Rev. 3 5. 5.. iii~Q~'~:PRI~1;':~Y~~>:!~'~~$:eO~J;a:lservl¢~i¥ab~i: 1/ 2BOA PRI-7 Rev. 3 "E nilSer'viqe water Ma>lfunol:ion";' 1Malf
.>, ':'; unction"
- ~,,'~",;~\'" "'.> '<~;~,:,
,6. BAR';,.l,:j,2~2~B2>;Rev~
,6.. BAR',; 112-2 -B2 1ev-.: 52/ 52 *(~,nnunc.fator;ReSpOnge;;':J?rO¢eaUre~
"ý'AmnuncfatorResponse Procdure ,
- ~7;~g~~~~i:t;:~~1~:RE!V~'
7~ bOS 7.5-la Rev. .~'~~::~i~nie~i,:s~J+/-t,tea*t~QqI+O;:: 2 ~UffS, T'th~h1 'pei4aton LCO, 8..
- 4. ¥~x:respOndence:,:fto~K\::,P~.
Co~rrespondence from K. Dl. Brenn~;;/(~~:), Brennfan. fC~c) .. ,tQ:' 'to.... '.".' ." R'~:Plelliew+cg: R. Pleniewic-z (CECo), d~~
~~DesigJlCr1ter, "Design lCEcor'.*
Criteriaa.for:.,t1~t~ma:c,e,~~tiii¥{J!QHS)" dated . April, for. Ultimate Ifat Sink' (MIS)" Apr J;l,i2~,">~~9,+ 22, 1991. ,regarding, regarding
- 9.'
- 9. Code of Federal 11egulationis ,'l.ocntstJ c(;)de:,ofveaeral,.R~).a#ibns IOCFR50 {) .App~n~~x, nixAA" J':anijaryi',1~.~0E11it:i,9n\
Jýnury1 1990) Editi ',',' ,""j}'. Appendix
",';,7>'".;',
10..~,
,:~p Reultr Gid e 1 .2 7i
~~.~litirY:Gu~q,e1;!~2i:'~ (~Y.::2,Janu~#::i:~:~i'~ ev. 2 Janluay16 iii..1.Byr<on Electria Sceai l~aings-
- ~~~'g~~~ir;~~v~f~~~~g*~~~t~fg~~xdi'.Rev 68-1-4030SX15 Rev. 'F, 6E-0-4O3OSXO,1 ,Rev.. . ,:,.*.R. R.
6E~,t;';4030S'X16::hv.;:F; 6E-1-403OSX16~ R~ev. F' 6E~'0';.;;4'030SX02:iReV~"'R GE-0-4O30SXO2ýRev. It 6E'~i:~:4:~3}~~~xQi'dijiy:; 6E-1-40308X01 Rev. :'}r6Efd~4 T 6E-0-4030SX03 03 o£;XOj::~ey:., Rev. "~. R1 6E-1-4030SX02~ 6E~1~4 030SX02"Re,,~:::P';6E~07"4 Rev. U GE-0-4030SX04 030SX04'Rev., Rev. ,S S
~,~+~H:4:9:~ 9~X~5'1l~V.:~ .6~;.;'O'!"4030SX05,~R~V. " S 6E-2-4030SXIS Rev. Z 6E-0-4030SX05 Rev.
6E-4-4030SX16 6 Eif2,"".tO l 05X16" R'ev Rev... ;g, 9 6E-0-4030SX06 Rev. R 6~O,~4030SX06,:'Rev. 6E~i;4:o:30SX()1~R~~:"N;: 6E-2-4030$XOI Rev. N 6F<r;;'4030SX07i'>Rev):T 6ýE-0-40305X07 Rev. T
. 6E'i2:~40j/O~X0:2Rev'~~zti
'//
62-00X2Rev~.'14
- ."-';." ,":'.'.<.,N, ""'." ,,~ __ ' " , ,", ' ;- .' ',. " ,
6E-0-4Q30SX08 6g7'O'-'4030S)(Oa,:Rev.
", .' . - . - . ""/",' " "
Rev. T
,,/"' ... ,( "N',
T,
- 12. .,Qc?rr~~P9l,19;~ce Crr'sonrjence from"
- ,tQ'><;i~'" tG"Conti~ady .C~:mtradyJC:ECo)"'~at:ed ir9nt~;,1.'\;,~;:
(CECo) 'daited AU9J.jst
.K Schusterl D": :~z S~chuster/D.
August 2'1, 2, 1991 Chrtanowski 1991" regardiinq
~n~;;ski. (C,E~Q rcega:rd1nq' (Eo t
*~~Yt()J1.
"Syroný $;at~~ntJlti~,at9/H.Qat;:SJ/~
'.~ :::.....,,'...:;.'
- station UltimAte,' beiat si~nk ~~sJ:gn,~';;
Defig~n.
- N ; ' -;; ", Hi.... . ,,~. ,~
P'age 14
.;; t"" -
"Calctlation MaUJR2-O4 .
Revision 0 13iyo/ra dwoodd UpdAted F ndl S'afety Analys,ýis Repor]t
,*jyl:'onj'~~~i~d**.;.*.tiPdat:~Firi~,~~*:saftlt~,;Ana~y~:~s\*~P~it:
.'. IUFSAR)
{Ul"$AR),\<R,i!yision2 Revision 2 submit,te4\:'~~,>, sýubmittad December It,;::>199,1:~ 17,. 1991. '" " , .
'-:",\. ":" . . . >,:,~:~':""'" -"'< . """",:, " '~"'.""."',,/ ->: ' ,\:,", ,"'" ".:"" ~ *.. l .... , . * : * . ' :-. _:=-.-: "';-'>' .. _,' :--.,
- 14. ~SIltW~~58.Il~i'S4:,:'Al1i~fca,i:I
`ANýI/A.NS-58. 8'-1994 ~American N.\tOl~:t7" NucleAr Society Soe1~~y: ,t1~,: timel '...
- ~~~~t)rt:~~*>:d:~~!gn\:¢riterla"for',*nuclear.'.$afety;related" xpsponsd' designcitiafrnleraft eatd operatol:\,actJ..ons.
operator.... actions.
>'" ,". , .// :..".,~ ~".':< .. ;,,"'.'
"1:5~"15 :BOP' BOP 'SX~T;2: SX-T2 :'Rev\;:':1-::,~sxiToV$r<qp!3rat.:10:~:'Gu1'de.'11rie's~;;::
Rev. 1 rSX; Tower~ Operatiah'Guidilinesl AS.
.1.6. '~:~~krV' l-BEP-0 Rev,. 3'
'Unit 1".
3 .Rei1ctor*~il" "Reactor Trip- ~"SIlf~~r,Iii.i""'iio~,.~ or Safety, lnjection VI!';.: ,CgnjjtyAt,iSm§;:
"'1~. ,:*hei~~i<?w!n9:.are Thiflown a,"consrvaively.cOrlS~a*i~~l~~~~:u_d':;tQ, assu~ed ,,to,oocru¥': occur,
,C()ln,e~,(tertt~11y:**~,o;-*~n.lysl~pu~()s~~J
,~"., ... '
,cinidotll fr naysspuposes:
d"~,,.;~*,,".l ..*' .. , .. ,,~.<;'," . . . ~, .. ' " ' '.,'... ,'.:,":"': ...*.., .. ,\':". ,':, .. ,'" .. ;.'-'~.,:,.,. l.~: ,..
- ~,,:: :postulat:~d.~iLOCA;'
a.postulated LOCA...:, b:~:i ~l:~~Of l..~oss of' ofi~it:~:poweJ;:h:.o;opjQl:,l_ off site power (LOOP) on, accident ~eciident. uni~., unit.ýL,,
,C-. worst case single f~ailur~e in addition-to having two tower calls 003.
2.It is assumed that initially no fans are runniný,. As a result,,, no ,UHS>3ambiont heat, dissipation is credie u~ntil after control room operator actions 'have bee~n initiated.
ý3. It, is assumed that two cells are 003. Nor-Mally, all a cIells would actually be in service.,
- 4. The minimum Technical Specification basin level (50%) is, us~ed for analysis purposes to conservatively nininize i~he passive UHS heat; capacity~. 'The basin-is normially mhai,,ntained at or~ above' 70% which would provide additional tower heat capacity.
';h'
,5..
,>. ~':
?to credit is taken for~ passive cooling oercl a~mbient heat dissipation.
G. No credit. is taken for the cooling.contribut ion froma tha, ESW makeqp to the tower basins. VII.: ,;conbilisldo'
,'; vli~, conclusion
,sirt' sing la-~,farl\tre','acenAt-1Qs:,)~e:r~':<day~lop~d<a,nd<de$"¢f:i~<in" le failure scenarios were developed' and de~cizbe-d_ ii ."
- s~d~tQn,.,!Ir~/F'lgUres<
Sectiton- II. ,Figures, -1 through 7l:';:pro~laE!i'::$ I tbl:'Otigl'l provide ~simpli ilI!lplifiied ~d<6ia9rams: diagrams, to illustrate the scenarios. .:' Tlli$calCitifa'ti'oriwill-t>e:usEtd:
<toll1Ustl"aee-;:thet<~Ci;mu'iO$;~ Th¶is calculation will be used as input,tO as input perfomanc.~.
CECo for detailed 'evaluatiollof:UHS to:'CECo,'fo:r:deta:i:led.
". ./ ".' "' . .-, . ' "evaluation " . --, -.,": of -/ ' UHS
.perf ormance.ý
*~~~T .~--------~---~~~~
n'."tJfinl e1ewa w~s' :a~e~'lnplls.,d<:iji ciicomoi~shed by a d.lid~wof Idebifod Mritw of ,1M. thte milo' 06031a ** taurm.:
.*CakIaIUMM.
. . <~.. ,',
Page IW ~~_ .*.r!Cfw..<" 5
7GV~ L~
;,£lfj{JfJ,c-,<'l:,,<~m" . i ; ,
POST' toc~, t~OCA 'C:Cf&EIG Co,4F/GU~ATION URA Tl'QN, 'r;
~SCENAfl.rO.
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Project N~o. 8893~-38/39 CaldUlation 'No. UHS-04 Calculation
- Revfslon~:.,
ReVision 00 PPag:e;l:6:; age 16~ , ... ,
{'""J: j;)&CfJI$!?.,2,
,,#i:iSr ifkJ.'**d.CN':IG"ul~,.:rip-,,,;;
4~~eT ~N(URArIOMl" I.c
<"$CE:NAi!,;()'~
$CENA/O 2.
"i"~'"
, ': 'i~iY>>ASS"VA~VEA a VP 5$ VAL V45 A
,;e",r;.tp~Eb. M.N:H!4U:.'I':
.;~ -30MiNUr£.S
. :AF:tiiA.~'l;~:d~
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- .~
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'P~oject"&o.' '~'~~;j'~l'S't3g Calculation Calculation, N~US~.No'.' ,'emS-c)4' RevlsionO'"
'ReVision 0 ",'
pa~e'11' "
POT L OCA COMFIGrUAr/OkA/ 0i
ýs 6A910 3
.~ ..
'2:S'j fS
.Retc: . Rt:FC Projte-ct NO 883383 C~alculatiLof No. UBE-04 Page 1
FIGURE 4 PO`JýT IOCA 0eONFIG4JfRAr7o? SCENAR'IO4
'~:
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.' ,~
I 3,A)'PA5 VALV"ý' 5 CLOs6D ArAWUAiZY ý 36 .(T1rE AFrýA4C
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Prj~et 11o. 8893-3B/sj9 Calculation No.. UHSý-04 Re'vitsion"' 0
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COhIUA-o sc£,iiMloG 0l
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BPA 5S , ALV 0 LILSED MAPAUALL'YD A'r10g L-4oLAT
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ProjectNci.ý 8893-38/3,9
'c'aictuatign No0. JRSr!04' Rev+/-<siown 0' JPhqe 20,
... " ~
F~IGURE~
.p(;STi~~*c.c/IJP:IG-uIliATlI)J pair7 £.OCA COModpclUrt)Kr/OA ..i .'
"<. SC:£NARIO;:'
. ',. .. ,'" . . .... ~
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ProjE~at No. 8893-381 Calculation PAge 21'
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- ~SYPASS"
~8~AS5VALVý<8" vAi..rr-e.;,:s;{,
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- 18
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Project No. 138913-8,139 calculait-ion NO.. UIIS-04 Tage 22:
, ,*.*h**'" '.
,Embit,E
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- COMMONWEALTH DISO94N' COMPANY CALULT1QN NO.: LJ04", PROJG 0NAP ",PAGE E NO O.3
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Purpate/ObIctfive: Pu@selObleCtive,;',
" ',.', '.' ~... , ',', .: ".;' ,
The purrpose ofRvso sto ddocument additto" al cool weate operation po-LC single failure mdstawilbe analyzed for the .JHS. Trhe addit'ionial scenanios are sefecfted to bound poten.tia valve leak-by of thie tower niser ,and bypass valves, These new scenarios supplement the scenarios documnented in Revision 0 of this calculation. Miihoolqoy arnd 'Aiceptance Criteria:, Ref renice 4 will bo reviewed to d'eteriiina the, scenaio(s) thiat reulted in the high~est 3peak basýn terrpetrature for postulated accidentsý that occ-ur during cool weather opieration (SXCT Bypass valves initially open), The worse ease scenario descriptions Will be revised for the new con~diions (iLe~, valve leakage). The new seaiswl iinclude tower bypass associated with the proposed 2' riser drain lines- SimplIfied, J,
- dagramrs will be generated to illustrate the new scenarios, The results of this'- -:1 calculation will be used as in~put for additional analysis of UHS perf omnce.'
- ~'~!I~tJtmpticW~Jf9tn':B~~lsiph~'f9.,"~~~~I~~.~~:usec(~riithii;R~~,i~n;~x~t;~;"
All .assumpcpftions fr Rvision I 0:of the calculation are used Inthis Rvso'~eta
,,,':', .i,.'<;~ ... ;._,'.f"
- 1. Revision 0 assme a maximum Initial cold water basoin, temperature of 7DF.
,The Bypass valve setpolintwas changed from 7flIF to 740 P via Reference 5.
Therefore, the additionall cool weather operation UHS temperature analysis will be perfonried llassumriing aii-initial maximum cldwte I basin: temperature of 2Z Based on the as-found leak-by for the closed bypass and riser valvesý
- (Referencels 2 and 3), the following leak-by fPow rate will bs-pconservative'lyý assumed far fte closed riser and bypass valvs:
~j~rVa~::,
Riser Valves: 635 g~pmjvalvea Bypass Valves:
~ypa~s v~tve~: 900 gpmfdvaIVe 31' '3;: 'JfrornR~9rel1oe:f(pg~.1'~2Q2)~,1h&'towat~ypa$$,~/ib~Ugh.theProPOsed2:
From Reference I (pgs 198-202), the totwer bpas flow through the, prpoed-2 inch ihch.riser"q~,ii;t~IJp~Js"li$$uiniKf riser:drain.,llne is assumed ,t() OO'250:gpm:pet,operfnsei/' to be 250 gpn* pgr open rsr ',", ",'.'" '" ,; "' , ' ,', ',' ,
,': .!"~~ ~
- 4.,
'4:: The timne t reach hot Th6.tlme:tQ,(eaeH shutdown conditions' in hotsnutdoWri,conditiori&~ inU1ethe non-accident unit is assumed OOn28CCident,unlt'is*'s&sumed
, to*be8hOurS nOt1 OhOu($i:lSs:tat6din~~m~tone,~/~'vi'~ton 0-to be 8-hou~rs i not 10 hours as stated in Ass mption 6 of Revision O:Th~S%s,9' This was a REVJ04Nai.: 2'
COMMONWEALTH, EDISON( OMPANY CALCULATION NO . UHS-04 PROJECT NO~" PROJECT NO. NA .PAGENO ... PAGENO.24i4 .. ::1 wpogr-ilPhi¢af{eni>ran¢i~s typograph qM8 er ra d w snnotus~
'1'2: 'ofRevIsion01UStlfieS:ttie'8'.hatit{tirfie:*
'12 of. Revi'sion' 0 justifiesý the 8hour ie.
tU dJnhe 1rttheanafy~isJTl R~Vh~iQn o. Refereoo~ anallysis
. '...,.. ::. . :..::'..'~:'
ih .RevisIon .........0., .Refierencei
' .". , ... ' I
. Disigri {CRUt.' 1I
*1<Ff()rrt* From,. ~~I~~i.on catculation N;Q~~Q:;Jtm!:;~~:I.imj~r~g,':9~1 NED-M-MSD-1 1 the most himiting cool *. \IieS~~r()pE!~or(i~X. weath~er operation SX basinl*6mýperature bash1;tem "fattJre\'occurs]ofScerlartos ocurs for Scenarios . 2 (MaX (Max . T)by Tb byp+ass .'. "ssef" open) ., l'and3(Max:;t and,3 (Max ,+6 '.'
- .~~~;~~:>3P*mi6):
bypass cký'sed >30 mpin) ýwhich *W6i~:~:SPbt#~:J9~:~b~*t::2~~:~:~~.iOhg*~~ conesponds to Fi4g~re'qs 2 and 3 of Rev~isigan 0 of1 this calcoufat~oo. U1is:~~cul~tii:Jh.
' ** C ,",_ ,". ',,,',:.",.' .:,.2}
22ý '*Risetva,~~'t~~~:*IS:qbt8Ined:rrrirn.,~i.reren~::~:i Riser~ valve leakage is-obtained fromReference 2,. ypa" e leakage iAbtim lVdli alred' teference 3,. <3~B\' .au;~arvEfleaR .' e:ls';ciblalned*fiOrrfR8f8fenC8~3 *..
......... ':":~':"':<:':,""':"'>:':" .~ ..,..', .. ,).., :.....""...>.,., .. '.<': '.',.:,...,-,.,,.,,\ <,'::'.";','.,":'.
- 4. 4The The flow flowL rateforlherate forthe 2~t~ch:Aser.drajn 2-inch riser drain ~'line:js',obtarnedfmm~rence'1; kine is obtained from. Reference 1.
- .**.*Reteren~r:
~ ~,~" :':.....-\.~; }~7< ~.,'-< .* ':'*'*A,".> .., :':.,>~' . :.)"" ......, ,,:>~.>:.. ;.;, . ',."'>;-:":"":',J'~.\ ,',' . """"". ,~,;-:~, :,:.: -, '1':*:;
1i "to, 'Calcurlll,tI()rtN~;,~§~;Revis4o~t3;"BYrOra:l)HS;
-Calulation NEn-M-MSD-9, Revision 3. 'ByranUHS Cooflng CooUngTower: Tower Bamn' BaSzn Temper~ii~:*¢~I(ijaati()~:.
Temperature Calculations, Part. Part: IVWM;dated;.p1~OO. dated 4-16~-96, . Leltsvterf . Mik$.;R9~j(l~41,Q1,(),:~~ihJ~~.~f!1Rr!".*,9~1~/:11*t1~~.I<S~~.~
- 2. ,~~jj~,m:?rn* Mike Robinson to Kevin Passmtiore, ae' 1-18-96, Subject Esti mationof Essentiial, Service Waler .Cool ing, (SXCT),Riser Valv ek
,1;:l$tfm~o(r9fEssermal,se[Vice,Water:Coolin9,(~XCJ);:Risef,Valva'leakage (Attach'mentA)k.
(t'tl~'E3tlt,J\}. ,.,;,:,;~; " N ' 3.m Calculation B'YR98281,is'+ n0d+dIZ12+098 ' iete minatono SXRT CarculauOhrBYR9S~28'f>':Revlsi6ifO;~,dited121201OO'~OriJterminauor(OfSXCT BypassVav By,p~'i~Jvfjte~~~'~~'; Leadtdkage."~leemiaono .. ,<.::.<;,,,,-';;,,,' '" .' .
- I ' ; ~;, .. '.,<.' ;,',:'>:' '/, SC >>">
A. ¢~tCaJa~m¢h:NED.M~$g;1)f',R;~(Si.qQ!pt4~~'j~~j,t~n,.;~.By1-qn:(jBs:'COoUog:'. Calculation NED-M4-4SD-11, Revisionm0, dated 12t117191 "Bymro UH$ Cboling Tower Ba'sin Temperature Calculations: Part V T~~~'~i,~;,.,mp~~14t~:'9~lciuja~~~i"P,~rt (~#lass"'QP:~t~(i~h)~~ V'. (By"ss Qperation) Mý'
- 5. NDII:'~o:~*~~.L1~,1;6,\dated4l1 NDIT No., dS~401,ated ý41181$4,.aJ94.:~8yroo:UHS;"Bypas$,\i~ve*:SetPOint Byran UHS'ý Bypass Valve Setpoint Chane Ctiange'
".g.... ' EvSJuatloo'l',...
E 4aflua
*d'.'
tion ,:,'car&Ulations: .
, "',",';i "'.">',',,;'.
,'.ft~.*R~~~se,:~:,:':~~na?~::~;¥<i Fr4om Reference 4,, Scenar'io's"i2and . 3,*.~*m~~r:I.Im,!Ii~/.l)*~~~1!1~/~~~:.~njtl~*~ 3 are mno~st lIitniing. Use the same InfiaUang . *eveO~" event1 , I'
- ,!1.~I~Jallur~,~.~~t~cI,.,.(j,J'.~~,r Slgl faiflure, heat Ioad and niumber of of:~~::p~~I'QnOf{1g:f4?f':th8*n8'fV',~nari~.:<
SX punips runining for the new spcenaiios~.-I '.. ", I REVISMON REVfstON NO.:.. NO.:>, 2/ 2 1
~
Edikdb 2. NIWP 1Z202
.~lJ42
\~~.
qOMMONWEALTR EWION COMPANY, ICALClJLA-nON NO:.: UHS-04 . PROJECT NO~ .
- PROJECT NO. NA PAGE NO,~ I PA
. oos;;'~@dqe;~(~~:~:~J~): (S661ario 3+ leekby
. . A*Jt~~;:'",. '**....~/ea$in.f~::~:*i4Of*,*,(Ai~~~1:lfi):.* AI4>1~i~eTovver Elasin Tmp 744F'(s~tpii) S#,i:4M Cells' ," ," A.C:*:, o/i/tCells'GS& A-&C
****'n~ai;~~~~.c!.riSli~;.t~~~;()*
Inifial Tawe Conhigurt' o
!i Tower k' 0= 2 Riser) alves IasRunng, B~~s '6M av Open, 0, Active CeIlu,, 0 passive calls Tower TowerS! Wk . 0p.F~,h5R~.r.,gt.'4Riser::V~9,i>M;:,2 Bypass Valves OrJen.
Fans Rurin~ng, 4 Riser Valves Open, .2 BypauV_vett, Open,*. 0 O
.>','" ::A~V.*ceJrs./op~c.nl Activo Cells, 0 Passive Cells .' .,.' '. .. .. ,.. ,.
POst~OCA,I~~~:AfteroperalOf~~;(t~=10rni~IJI8I): Pofst-LOCA Tower Configuization After Operator Action (t'-10 midnutes) .. , ....*...... < ..
. ..... toWiM'k*.~2:F~RUi1riing.~~IHrValv Towar A 2 Fans Rurinig 2 Rber Valves ... ~.
Open, 2 Actdve Calls, OP 2~~,Cen., 0 Passive. . .*: C;~I~**Qsypss~:V~8fa:opan<
.Cells OBypass Valves Open . '; i:: ", '. , . , '
T~:B='f:F"8, Tower B: Rwmlrigq, 4 Riser Valves Open, 4 Aclivý CeLs, 0 Pass"v 4 Fans ~~no.4J~fs.V#Jtves,OPtJr1.*AAdi~:C.II$~.OPaU~:
'. *Cetf~,.,1ByPasa'laIjeOpen Cells, I Bypass Valve Open (SI"g"f~ifiUt8).~>*
(Single Faliwrs) '. ..... ' . , J ' .. >.
".Pd*LOCKTo'WtWConfiguraflon After Manual Action (t 8 30 ,mfrwtes)
Tcwor K: 2 Fans ,RuhnnWng 2-Riser Valves Open. 2 ,Actt, eQOIKs, 0 Passive Celts 0, ypass Valvs Open Tower 8: 4 Fains Runinng, 4 Riser Valves Open. 4 Active ,Cet1,, 0 Passw.m Caltt#, 0 0Wass Valves Open RAiser Valve Leekby 535, gpmhalve (~A~mm n2 0ypaa. Valve LesicbY 900 apm~lveve 2) Scop (Scenarblo2+ leakby), 04oI~IT~I~werBasin Temrp"7F Aainlln I ower conflg9urat IV,
'r~da Tawer A: 0 ,Fanz Running, 3-Rime Valves Open. 2 8ypas~s Valves, Open~
a'Actve ,Calls,'0 Passiv9 Cels 0"t IL4/ I-REVISION NO.1 -= r II,
' I-
Eiit~.lt** N£;.~l
'~vId~:1 0 :GOM.'O~rnJ~DI§QN
~~COMMONWEALTH
** ' , , ."- ' *. '. " .~ . . . . " . . '. DISON C;Q",.,.Atf(
* * * >,
- COMPANY
.* '". '" , < **** * ~ * * ** *
[CALCULATION ,NO.: UHS-0 PROJECT NO. NO APAGE NO., Post - tOGA Tower CoT6% uraton After' Operator.Actfion (t 10 minfutes) Tower Xk **~F~l~u;ri.h~g~;;3**.~.~ 3 Fans Runnf n,ý'3 R~pser .*Valves Va~~'~()pebg~A~#0rJ;~tt!i',;*:o,*p~'~;~,ive: Open, 3 Acflve Cells, a Passive Celf~0:1 Cells, I BypassBypaSs;ValVll.dperi;(~iriQle*Fai.~tJte)"V Valve Open (Single Failure) '...... , .'. ', . .* . . > " . .
-Tower E6: 3*Fan~:Ruordhg,.3*~~r.v~~s>Oper)i,,:~ACtiye Fans Running, 3 Riser Valves Open, 3 Actlye qell~;-:O,Ptissl~e.' Cells,.0 Passive Catlls 0 Bypass Valv~es Open' ..'. .... " : ,".,'.
'CeU~~:([Bypass>ValYe$~*Qpen';. .,**i.,,",
~ti~l-*lg.~I\TQ~f'Cq~tQ~tati~.,~'e!,~"ua,I:~~~.(t~:'~n,jnQt~)::
Post - LOCA Tower Configuration After Manual Aption (t 30 minutels):-
*.TOwer Tbwer A k;, >;3F~n$RUnnlng;*3RJservalves~6pen~3'Ad*ivec~ISiO.P~'V8J; 3 Fans Running, 3 Riser Valves Open', 3 Active Cells,,0 PassIve
;C~I~~;9'B~:::Vaf~~::O~n, CellSr 0 8ypasks Vaives Open ." ' ; ,
. . ,'Opaimve;:
Thwer B*" T~ B: Fa-:ns Running,1 3Riser\la'v8s()pen~'
*33 Fan;sRunfiioo 3 Riser Valves Open.' 3:AdiW:Cenis~ 3,Active'Cellso 0 Passive
> >~, <""':C~II~fO B~~s'S\ValVeS:6Ren:
Cells, 0 Bypass Valves Open
- ' ..... .....' .,'.....; , '. ;,.\:.'.
Rii9rValWte.ak@.~. Riseir VYa-lveLaaby - 635 gpm valve (Assumption 2)
~~s~'.Valve,leakby:'
Bypass Valve Leakby ::'.
= 9,00 gpmlvalve (Assumpt~n 2)
Dmjn'Li;'~Byp~: Drain Line Bypass FIO\y.:Flowq, ;:;, 250 gpnilopen rtse
"' \/;'f: , ,~.I}~~I'I~r(~:~E!,!;~;~~ge~:~
The new scenaros were developed as d~~i~~t~~()Ve'<:.fi@Jre$e~1*I,a~2~.9~1,. described ýa~b~ve. Figuresý 8-1, 8-2,, 9-1, and' and:
.9-2 provide simiplified diagrams t6 illustrate the Scenaio .' *.~?'/p'rPy'!(;1~;slmP1i"@,a!~~~:t~illu~',It1e,,$oeriafio~\ ." ',' .
H*FmAION N'O.'ý I . .. [ IREVISIONNO,: 2 ii
0 .FIGURE 8 OST LOCA CONFIGURATION (t=ýj10to6 38 nun. SCENAX10O 8 6 A
/~O~.N(k.~
Caladibiin Nao,.:: tJHS0O
,Re'\'lIlU()IF 2*;*." . '. 'Page';~<ofl:1>,;
PgVof~o
" ,., ".F'~JJ~:*8:~;":.,,., ,',' ,
0 P.ST L,.O.CA. CONFIG'UATION
*~~"LQ(;~.C9!,nfl(;:pJL\T-IQN
,,, , " .SCENARIO
'sCENAIuo8~ 8 (t> 30 i...
.. (t>'~~\'"dn.)
F
,1" t:
22 22 12 12.
'=~rL'~:;~~~"
Calculatio No- UhS$* i v- i ie 2a o q PaFiaof3o
LOCA FIGURE 9-1 POST. LA.CONFIGURATION (t= `1048,30 -miii SCENARIO9 oos A
"'-----+-./. ýCwjItioun No. TS ~tro1Irlht1HS~i*.* ~Oft:i .' '.. "\,'.,
1o (i Jia8~':~1'Of3C,
POST
.l?IGW FIG,URE 19~1'.
9.2 PO~T:L()CA¢p~G~TIQN'(~~~.!"niliLl LOCA CONFIGURATION
'. 'i~J'l~()"
,SCENARIO 9,
... " .)
3..
~OS;'
,\~\.~~;.,~:6~'
**~~~*JR6t';§9.(~.t~(tt),
pipe 30of e (~44
Ntwern~cr 18, 1996
.to:
10, Kevin Pusmore 1`4assmore
;:StationS'
'Sit
. , t l pSuppr ion p o .....
'. rt EnEniering i' ';s':'~iSor';
g.~"~" uerio ......, STIJIJECT:'. *EsumauCm
**8UBJECT$ Esfilmtion oiEs~iSe~~~WM-er~()*I*jnl:rO}~r(SX&}R.~er~i~f~
of E~senial ScvJ . aerCvigTwdr ('SXC71j Ri5i %Vaive,
. . ;. **<Le~.. .. . .
Leakaee-., On I1148-96 datwa folad at the OA SXCtinoir to povide antsuiwate of rtser yalvc tkakagge. Vikual obsemration of the four OIA SXCT ctlls indicates thinthde C cell (riser Valve OSX1631C) is,leaking the wonst, followed by A and B (ro-ughly the same), ýthen
\. D)with the heasst leAasge. Datm was collectecd in the. C cell to prmidde the most consenrative estimates.
Thew u'ithod Li.-e4 was.to reorid the timne to collect two ga~lotis of water froma each of the five spmray wozzies tested, Three trials were run for e =-h of the Eive nwoz4.Although, there is some vari-ation in Cestiunifed Ilownate between the five noazzles, they appeared 19'4sally to provide a Treprseciative sample of th~e niozzlc.3 in the C cl.The attace copy of drawing M-900, Sheet 25 indicates the locations of the nozzles tested (SE corne
ý"of C'cell).
Tobultwd bctow are the SX systemn coutditions durng the data colleewion.
" .. ' . ;'.-':: ~
"'OATo,,"w
- ,Ri~V~~'(~'~'§~~ICID)"
Riser Vatlves(O'S 163A/BiC/D) - .an..,.... ail c~cysed, .. .
**,s.~$;y~y~(Q~~i~2AlCl Iypass Valves (OSXl62A'C) ~- OOtIIe .. .e¢"
both closcd-
'. ~ /.,; ,*-;.':*.,**:";* .. '~l",*.\ '::"'/-'-'"'::'_' "'~': .. ;::.' ;"- "",,' '.,'>.':~]-
'.*2e;,T~w¢if*
Riser Vai~es
- 'RiSer Va1es (OSX 'OS*163EiF{;.'at)o*
1,63EF.T/G)1) - all upen ..
;:*~_~~.Y~.I~.~;(O~'l62B~~\CJ~~.
Hypass Val vc5 (OSXJI 62B/D) -buth Jokd.
- ~~~tfL. -; . .
'1 B'~- oo(146mIlp5:)~'
l',B on (1.46 azmps).:
.~
2A'::Qf£: 2A -ofE.
/j~~~dOJ.~~~~tl1"~),~
2.M - on (14 8 ap) : f~~~~~~:~'; SX DshreHe-iesr 1PP-XOO 7 - 97 p4ig I,PF-SX():08 - 98 psi&.
>;1P,FSXoo.~::':9~*psitt.
"2~I-SX007';~
21P1..SX007 99 pswi. Psil~ 2PI-,SX(OS
.'. ~~I,.gXQQ8::'fJ1 psl~. -97 psiý".
Ailchn.xmct f
>: ..c.......
f; I
November to.,
,November 1996 18~1996' E$umationof&~tial
/&-fimation o~Esserdia serivic serviceWnter,C(diIi8~T<WI'et
, ,.,~; ','
(~xcrrRiser Water Coolling Tower (SXCT-) Vahfe:Leak~ge~' RiserVaW6eLeauka ge- , c,N~~ No~te that during during'@rmar$)'stemopm.ttoo~~$Sureu~of'ilie normal systern oparak~, pressure Upstream ucfte riser and byPass " " ti&er.andbyPflSS, Valves is higher than du rný the systcm post-LC aBenInps-LC ainent
'~M;~t~=~]=~#~~~~~~~,!~~~~!~~l~~~l; Nvlth higher system flowg system prcssuýes ould be lower. Thui the'riser lec-krates calculted fwirn th~is data collecticon should be conservative with regPAr 6:tlcUt~~niaij$:~~tifColl~ion~~be'Cj)~erv3tive"v.jtb to 1,ieekrates uring regahlt()l~t~iduring" post~-LOCA allgnnieht.1 post"~OCAali~ent.""*'"' ,""
Us'ing the awncrge of tb- five no~~e focae and applying that average to all 144 , ,,',
"tJSinI~:3lr~~~tijt~~~~~~,tt?~~;~~Y~~'~t~f&as.~loaUl~
uarttchedi dnwiru2 W9OO, Sheet 25), the OSX16-IC leakage is5i~,~Stimjtea
'1l~~;(re:(~~a"~~~~~~f900;;$be~t:2?)~theOS~1~~.leakagei nu~zzle- (rcFcrrc cstimated% '
4 7 at 0qpp (1360 $gpmusing lowet nozzle jeaikrate. 63 Lpm usng-ligigbs Dozzle
.::at,.47{)sp~(360:~'UsiliI.JQ~t.~eJ~,:63S,gp,.,.;~i~g'Jli&h,~.,no¢~
'l~akmteX' "', "
fJ~~~~#f~tf, Preparteday . Jjate:':lli~ti3b'
,Date:
~~~~~bI.¥}>tlhl/§!. Datc:~______
cc .Gackwamtr.
,,,D;Sar gent S1 2Z. calku aticm No-,, .
RmJto No. ~ o A21
TABLE 1I SXCTRISER VAL.VE .L"EA'KAGE ESTIMATION NOZZ1E, jlb
*'N.Om..EJD: TRW:.. 11'.
tRIAL TRIAL. 2, TRIAL
;~a\ 3 AVCRAGE A\feRAGE:AVERAGlf AV. AG ,\'
'~: {$ti¢)j'
,', '(~c) ," ,t~
1 32,14 3.211531 50 3~81 227-13 2.6 ZIZZ 27ýa 4,4G a40162 ý41.21
'*:41\21'". 41-2a 41,,,O4 . ,','
- '41'.04 . 29
'2:92; 4' -48,47 .:4&2S 4, 48,11 2.45
. ~' 4474'
'44,:14' 44119 45sg4617 NOTES. )Ta ke ureel i's~ oI~stt hfi ri~ ~ id~da ~
,ý2)Rdftf to the attadwab cupryaf NI-wOO. h~e ~~MZJwOaJ$
I AtacIh1ti A RCV4901) No, P;197 No
- .~
I 1<*
...*.. ~ '
I . fý
\
. ~~
J' JTI
- i II ~#?t7 M.. ~.
a ~i U :.'J!f'F6' '?ft _Wi" 1
,,,' .. , '.' .' ' , " **L
"~
"~,,~.'i"" ."\\';** .**... ~;'.:x\::.
tk 0 -- K
£
~',
I '---1j~*~-~~ I
~ ~
9 I
I ANALYS4S NO. UH504 '~I$I()" REVISION NO.3 NO. 3 PAGE NO, Bi1 Attachmnent B, 4nnulrsla titAdditlwmI Cool Weather Operation UH-S P~ostOLCA Singlie Failiure. scenaro
Table of Contents S1 ANALYSIS N~O, UBIS-44 RIEV.:NO.:3 PAGE NO.BZ U ~ - PAGE NO- ,SUIW,PAGE CovWr ohoen
*C()v~r .Sheet 1;1
. Table~f*Cooterq B2
;i~u'~ 83
- U}B~
2ý10 Bakg~ond. 84
,134 3,0 ,~i~lnPuls' .J,O Deýsign Inpulsý a:$
4-17
, . ': <' '.':'~ "'
Assmnot '.'
.4,0 :*tUsumpcICIM 16 iOR~f~n,"
5.0 Rcfmrmnis F*~.
'oi
- (6#MetbodoloIY~d.
6.0 Metactology and Acceptai~.':e:~~: c~i Criten 'B9
- 89 7.0 .~~:
7-0 Results 1311 8,04 .
~:o Conclusions C~I~[ora Btn4' 14 .
Figures fig##::. _~:s 1315
~~~rt~sS A ppox!ies
.AP~i~'A':1W~5;*k:D~ $o.ID.BYa.4l7+Oo)
Appeodix A, Rý!famxmc 5A. OPITRWDO4YR-MYY4-Of) 81.) 8,24 I
'puRPOSE:
.~.! !O PURPOSE' I\ ArtaettmentB'tociJ~JilQIl\iiHS~dooumet'llsadffitlotmlcoolw~her~6n'~~losS.~f~~nt;:
;~i~:(~)}~;Uhgre@J#',~~~,9s'~.~~~,':L\cGD1JJ~IOr:,ibA;,~t~i~~,l##.S~~~~.~).."'!h#.':;'~"
",cidcLOCA) si~ngkf fil=,u scenarims that will be ~uanahzd fur the Uttimztr Hn~t Sink (UIS). 'me ,
Additlonal, sýcnarios arc seleocdtcboufd ihldjdorulLStJ:nariosare'!Iele~ttt b{;uimd thewpownfial impnut of sIAppleem~uin thecexisting Ikevsing basis! ttl~ ~~n~allm,a~,<<;sup;;l~~nJtooe:d:slhta;I.~~lng basis. cQ01,~slng£e 6001 wrteasingt faiiure.~'tlilIPrio.iswimnddiii6ruUrm)ut¢~~~:funt;oftbe sh f"Ilure amuations wit~ h additiorma1 faullrr ussuumptitms that of t-he fwJltie:~f~y~:( fmihirec of any unte (1) 1)
,tit'the:~veral;eitdricld~~~
pf 1he -svra'lc~cticalt bc~wrs (f(lf~:VrufBuses)"which::~re*ft~W:iJ)"pl~\fOr;trne~idit1iThese.oow (for 4W V~ic Buw:s) which ire TfIwd in pt,ýe' fo h ~Ime These nmw
~.~~,~PPi~~~,the~~,ri$d~~rif~'i#;~eVi~i(jjj:k'~~t*,t~f~~u~(;d**lJH~~:::
kcnarius siutolemcntef 4he s'ato Aids dicniezad in Reviskmo I and 2. to Cdcoiaiion UHISf4k4.
ANALYSISM'.1UHS-04 REMSM NM:40 ATTACHMENT 8
.,PAGE NO. B4 of W4 0 ::
L.0 IBCKGOtMA)
***<~,:ij~fi)rdle~Y!Oli~.~tsts 1'ht U1HS for the B3yron rstatrin consi~sts o£two(2j.~ of two (2) redundaint ~'~bimi~~C'oo'inl,[~rs SX rrxchaniczal-dTzft Coolin?"Towers, and' Owe ad lDe
,:,'makeup':SYStem'(tllbe.QeCOOliQS3td~s; CLe~.Ec Coolin ..E3(h*M.atehwo(2)S:U:~ret.rueatOOllng1'(}Wm*,oo~(lfi, ftetw 2 a~yrl~ Cooling Towers conists Utl ii.I~~~t~~~~~g~!~~~~~il;~Qi~~~~i~~~~:*¥;:~e:::'
\vater sturave basLn. ~four(4) fans~, four (24) riser valives, andtwiof2 byas vac(eeec 5. I The' hasinm of~ther "o Q2)Coln oesaecnetdbi in ovetrflow. Niorrwil mak~eup is pirovded from the "j:;i:&U1lrttng.:~tets}*st~m.S~)'-teJruedmakrupp~imiomarlclllly*stntoo Iia Loww:iL~r Circulating wzatr svystcnt- Satey-irlatod irzkeup pumnps autormaically slanttin low water Ievel~lUaJt(i" level- signal to
~pump wamtir From the nvcer. Inthe even of The probabtle Maximumw floDw. 3tiere . a~.~~\'~en.*~'tTI~
,:,t=~~~~~~~plf~e:Jf~*p~~~~;:'in#~~~~~j~~ are dee'w~ell pumnp PialeArovide aakeip to the basins,
~ ietn-Vdrift Cooiling Towýers itte ktsetd as 411w heat sinik foir the SXSYSLter during normal G*"iartný . .
,TtIe.ttlti.chani(!.I~m(t.COOll~*r()~~rs.~'.~'~"'~'~~1l1Si~:r~:.Jte.sx:sjilt~t'O,d~g:rjcirmaI.,*~~*,
.,U5id:,ue*reUiriid(br.snre'kbUtdcwn;:*.'nlc:UHS~tScaBbtc'of andtt~ ':,'>
*.. >c*.: ..... "
cninci4dcm ~iitb'~ ar .reuincd for safe 'hE~dowrL T1he LtHS capable
* }l.. , ,.,"'." .. ". *c,:-.':">*,.*.* ." ..."....< .',. >."i':'-'.'is"",,:P los of offsitc ~t'('LQ9P~~OiLe.,O)1ujjJ~'
with a 'lo~of:Offsite'
.> . '.<.' ,c.pro '. : *. ~:~.
of p706iding , uate, .. cooBrri:wti:ri'
.vidiri:'adequate .g"'a.LOCA,
- .*. ",s., ',,' ng covUrigiri amd a Fimultaneon%sfiwtdawn and cooldown powerf (LOOP) in oMe M1or, afjd'as5multaneotisstLUtdo.WlfruuiOOoldown a........
T-CAlc,.
- . coincid¢Qt of dl~~t,L'ter unitQ ~ronlg maxI.imumLO pUWCT to Mdei -5utiig 1nrmal sinxidoyn Lqtaidon procedures- '" ,."
thie oCihee ualit,fromMa:dmum:po,~:~~'~.:5,l!li~t'Ig~!ftlillOOri.ratioo*~s_\., ,
;~rl~g:,~~.~C~,~~*~itf~y:*sY,~~filS'~~:~,pe,rl'O~'~iLity)~~t~
DuigteO5 R aeyssctsdIIaind perffortance capbiliyl spectiunt .* ~~.,~'El(Jwd"., the inspectors noteid . . that in'rechnical ~~irU:lIIt~ri,(1'S)~mmt;No~9$lc,rthcJJyiml
- .thltti&'tl~tnti~til: Spreificntion (B5) Arnmndrnent *,.- 0 for the SyrTon Stato S,~~~(Chapgesio~~~'l~
(changes to the' Wtitnal hut-. ll~;* ..
* . sinIl:Jo:cW~skamgc:f1eratQf'!'q)1~\~at)rthe*most'1hllitibgslnJJefmlwreewtUa~.W3s.hefaUureof",
si A to suppo.-rt stearn generator replacz nmvu4 the oiost Iintiting si n&~ failuire ewtluated vwas 1the rtditre of
'~~E~J!'i;!~;e.~ll~.~f~!S;~~
,,raave breAlers or switches in ~the -4SO yVa SX CT buis'Which rvsltted in the failure of one (3) sevcc water
-Crfan- The. inspectors notecd that the Iice-nsee did not address the 4WK Var'tecd b~reakers cEtweecn the 416.V4,90 Vic 1TrnstkiorroLer aind bus 13 IZ (for etan~pte), ThRe inspectors, alIso notod diuat a single failure Gf, either of :~~swmpd:<Je:.eoergJ.~
*egllier,~ th~break-eys would dc-energ~ize .~,IbUli,.,#wl,:r;s~~ the bius and result ]1111 power\I~¥tw~(2),~X in a pinverlomsof two (2) SXCT fan.%
,CJfan;t
- (Refe~,n9~.~.3)<t\':"*
(Refetrence 5.3). " . '," ",.; ' ..> < " ' . \ " ..... ,,,,, , *. ', I *. ,..." The Ilicenseet disagreed, stating the breakers wvere normally ctosedl xnd therefore. a pasaqivc failIure nco4 not. Nz dcnivder The cnfig-uration of ihe breakers and ihe Ilicensee's assesýs ment tha'I pass ive failIUres need otbe tconsidered wns previul ryeviewed and appsoved by dfie NRC. The issue was umresolvcd pending detennhadon whether the tos.9 of the 416 volt or 4WQ V= feed breaker should have been consiered as trhe singoe failIure, Su bse-ptte nt to t he init iation of Othe unre~solved Ilem (URAI). Ihe in~spec-tors, conec uded that
,Afiuhugh TS Arnindmene 95 did not adequately distinguish sing-le failur of electrical components (active vs, lmssjvc,. consistent with die'&efinition 6f 4 sing3c foiLurc pre'sented in 10 CFR Part M), Appendix A, and General N~sign Criierlon 44, the fajlu~re of the 41t60 volt or-480 Vfc frtd breaker should have, een cocnzidesed a valirf in'gip failuir and assessd f(Reference -34.)
**a.*,
IANALYSIS NO. US-04 REVISION NO'.3, "ATTACHIMENT 8a
;'ATfAatMENT
- PAG.E NO. .,01:1124' PAGE Nci 8S of 524 w>
3)DESIG;N INPUTS, J.1I toodfug oo4160\.YottESFBti.~,.~ Lw-ding un 4161O-Vc~t BlSF fusr - The '~ing loading oneuh;~~'(ofJ.d4):4f~VEsF'8U5"C,~;; 6-n each Of thC fOUr (4) 416V ESP Buc f"41114zt241f.i4:i}3tefOO0d6ilD~'* (14 bLu4'2/24]I,2) lire found timn Desin***.**mffi~ti6il:::tra~R.atIDrn,No:'so4O~BYR~~6674.00: Infomiati~oi Tr-asistaiu (DMT Nok. SO40-HYR.6074A-i0
- (l~.ert'lren~~.4l~e~~~in':~i~k<~'
fReivr~ee 5.4) and can be, soe in Appczdix A- .', "";';::::":'~':' " c ' , > " , .
- 'TIt~.~9Y4c:,~~h~~,and~:l6.ciUlbesem;i1i<Otn~'iE~14{JO'iA(Reierclic:e:~.S)0
".2The480 VaC fe breakers -andassrc~ciated. toadhj~sý can*be isbmiu Dw-M 6E4-14t00 A fterficrcic 5A)
;mid 6ai'2~OOIA,tRefaa8cie,5.9)~
-And6E-4OIARftv5.)
lý Drmwing M4A2(Rd~cfince 5.1) p~ayide aidialgrar of thn SX CaolngiiTower,, ThýC drawing Aqws wh!A:h SX Cocki ng Tows fnim ~isoiated wk~ith "wichcetll tLka valve aod the a~smicatd piping for the SX, j;
,Af*AYSIS NO. UHS-04 REVSIONKNO.43 ATTACHMENT ATTACtiUENT 8 B3..... .
PAGEHO; Be 01824: PAGENO, B04of 824 4.0'" .~~p~i~,~.':.*
.. ~\~ro~t~n~*r~IP*~Y:ision\i llass t'onRein2...[~
Ilnpio f6 dUC~i1~£otl:~:~.~lnlhlsai~.e:x.tepl*~foiIOws~ Calcularior UH&S04 mkared ktt~Iihis awf nem xep fuw
- Ltli:~b~i1OW LeAk-bv flow ~es.f~ wines f~t dosed:;~~'c~)Oh*~:Io~~t:~~aOO.
cdose SX Coofiog Tower 1)y Lss and ~set.~~es~*futf.J;~}'passjlOlN:mteg\W.m riser AvaIes nxtJ totahl byrilsg flow rt~aes wLl be: bt
;, m~~:f;.it~~~:H~~~}ll~~;Ii#f~'i~~~#1ctii~~(lns*(¢a,JC~~t~~;J~~~*~tsb~
accouncd far in the drtaitzd UH, inalysi peirfomed in s-eart cnul-ations (Calcmeo ~NELO)-NVNSD. 011 and RYR96-259,1
ý,*2~ Based on (tie 8,ring it)Ile NtfOVs (Ikhi gea), ~w opwromX fbps rrsrvlewl cause the valve to repain, in the e voiint jlk.
lýp whe h o~o oe ~r
- 4,1, Re-vision 21assumed rhar the two (2u~f~~ie(OOS SX CT fas aepowerod Cu oposile unit's-pow~r Mwppt %L'eaL Hwvr, his iassutti ais not suipported by the way the plant is oferarri- M3dinic~iance is jN'eftorrnd on qIWiriAI tht 'esuilts lit two6(2) faasOOS frorn die sante unit power su.pplJy. Therefore~, It wAi11 b.asumred dhzi the asc.sceo'xio' i'n wh~ w()OW fans~armpuwered fromn Ohe smeunrt~s po-wer supply' is possi b4-4,A,4 1*6 6
. .*.~~.~~.~.'#.,~~e.iI,~I~J~~~~'~~.,m#~~i~*;,~~;~!!.tis~CE~~:;':\
For itze bus' breaker fiailfur s&~au~tef1oi~oirir~kn x credited, If:crfwfiOt'mhi1fifilU~lr-~':whicltdon't
- 1) CT Tfats utot runmnginiftlially, which don't lose poNwe 'lose: "'w:rromtMsifi~flillure;;~
fromr the sigefailure, are neowy remeR' **s~.o: staitd 10 ...
*~1m~fug.~~l~(Rd~n~t~:;~~i'~t;'~~fot*.~~
minumtes following thp.LOCA/LOOP (Reference 5..). giscr val~ves for correspmiding cells ccllii*~*;il~*\Pi=nOdat; arm also opened at .
.:.'/
InInutes,
.~.:;.',/{ "... ;./<....,:'/;
.~2J.~i~r*."a.I~~'t(,~.~!pb:~~
- 21) Riser valves to which pou~r is. ~#*~;~~/~~~*.*~t~~*~*~~th.re~n.in*~f**it4iii:t.l**~itl~~
Ilos &oi the single failure mr-assurnct to remzIn in fthir initial Position .
.fýOiowing the LOCXA/L(X)P wihn'-W ouln folLow'inB:.he'~()C~*Withill.~*;~f,;uQr(acttori.* 'I1IirlMf~lves Thwr.ef ri-ealves are accessible and theretiarr n.otearsity ~s&ible.w.thmf01'C artire ncasily
.*~no *.*.~.*~(ip~(~,9r*~fls~i§J; Gmaturantotahn rrmote or manuarl) iS Uredittdý .
*/~~~~~~i~~~sv~.:~~~~~~.d~~:l~.th~b~fatl~~.*~.~
- 3) ]it the event iha; Lpower is lost to the byl-ass valve dlue uto the breakeri fallure, operator; actOion mtay be credited to close the bypass valve within 30 minuztes-
. ~on*may"beE
, >.. /. ~ ., " ..,,> , ;',,' '>';', ;..: '.;
- . ~.~W~::~~~~~~~C~~~:!!.~:~~.~:**t¥.:*2020)ml-fute A 30 nneilune uperator nt-4xinse limeto Cluose atbyposs vidie is 5(1%
NUIREG 09E0, Section 6.3 'IEinergency Core Cooling~ Sys-tcinL prite~r thai the vaueu&taed in nilim.re.*vaJu¥i~ed*.lri
*.:Sectl~n6j;:J1L.
Secfivn 6.3 tlL- 199.QfNURE(i~XhferenoeS.iO}~es.l!w: of NUREC O)S0 (Referrnce 5.10) states that:
"The com-plete sequence of E-ACSS(oer-atior
~~1'¥;c~LI/!(e*seque~c.e.()f~**' *. from accident oocute'nee through1 t1iliOii:fro:m*.*.~idel:lt.~~*lhtoulh J~g:1.~~';.~:#~i~{ts:~;t~~.~:~'ah3t*~
long-em core cooling is examiined to ser that a . :rmEUmu.1,1J:*Df/~lir muinimumn of manual action ~oo is is
~!.Iimr apnd.
roquircd ., ***.wbere: where tinal acti~oni is used, a suffcient time (-greaw~ ¢han* ml~f'actwtrjs;usijd;il5Ufficient:dme'(gmt4Ar 20 7Mhan IV
~~r.ItY~.~I4!(~.~~,:~to:~~t*'
Niniiites) is aVai'lable forr the upurator to respondl. ...*. ..*. .., ,,: .
***TbeB),f9rrp~cfutes.~,~tifY,p'Yperl;e.swnseofthea1)~nmtlcp~t!onsYst~lJlSf~I(t~fng.*m;anual*.CJt.*
TIe Byron pVocdkures to verify [proper reqpons of itheantomatic pr",ection systers following mandual or
,:~~~'Bft~~~~~li%i~L~~~~~~~t:J:6~~=~~Ide~.~.*
aiitonatic actuation af a Rea-ctor rip'o Safety injec-tionto ass&sp~at cuditions, and to identify the appropriate,~~ poeu~ ctisteps nco~yto manutl 40!14-t6pen UJWS basin bypeas'. valvcs,-
.;,~ . .
-STe I 'OU ofB EF-0 QtRefcrirý9:5;1 l0nd 2BEF4(RefeCfl=9 5,2 sa that:
i*ACn03X1EXPECTED REPONSEf
0' IANAMLYSISNO.~UHS$44
'4urol~~1~~a;'~\I3~~~:~§~~~:~I.~,~
REVIBIQNNQ.3
,All FOU~R Htf Watetr Riin Bps ~vsL~g~SED' OSX162A
.. *x oS}(162B ATTACHMENTB8 PAG-E NO S.BoB2 GS 1, c~~
. (KSXI6ZC:
Csx 162".
;*O$XI6W"
"~~iil'~f~~"~'1V#",Bas", B~,;ii!~:
-RESPONSE NOT OliT~dNTED
)Disipitdc is~)o cdo', any open Rua Waker Hwas6i ypxis valve:
'OX 162A (872 F,6SXCT)
COsx!2 (S72 A6 SX'cr)
~~16~:(~~~.~~,SXc:t),
<~E6.2f(S72F6~.
(SX 162C (&?2 V~6SXCT')
- Q#'f(@:OOI~6:~J"
A.*:**::**.* 0 .' I ANALYISIS NO~ U*IS-04 REVtStONNO.3 . REVLSION NO 31
'ATTACHMENTS .
PAGE NO, 'B$'QCB24:
- >PAGf;NQ.
- ATTACHP.¶ENT138B8 .08B4 I 5.0.
. . if:
5.1 :g:(l~ltm:~~)i;~}l1~~nY.llC.BYi'Ort~I~~ Eketun Gctiraimkut wbmary. LLC. Byi-un StaLtion,.. ,Qllit:'~;:l.~~£Dfu~ibl'M~£i1);a~~i, Urnit No. I aitd 2, Dt~wn 4.~i~ano ESSenliaasco;i(:¢ Fssenmial Service ;\t~.", Watc-' . Shccl Stwet, No. 7~ No;. 7,.l<<:Vi~io'n?)\E> Revision AE . . .
;'~, ..';'"~,,,'.: " ,',:*.~' ....~,',\\>.".:,"~ :".';,"."', ",";'.< ~". ,~,~'."":
5,2 *~~*s~'lJnl~fnOO*iH~A~~~~~:~i~.~:~~**(lJfSA.aXR~visiori*l:r: Byron Station Units I urrI 2. Updated Final Safet~y AnA~ymia lRpr~t (UF~SAA), Rewiio~n 01 5.3 .tj~j@)')~~s~ai~~~j.~~(}~.~~~)O~~~~~.O.})~:~.(f#~l1:~~I~b: United Stats Nudrar kcgulatony Cormmissiuni L&tter to Mn Chiuik.G C Pucitd (ExedonNudIýr)
~~i.illed.~"l\yrooStUioo:*Vn.i(S, k:eni4t1tA "'Byro-n Stalion, Ullits II' :lIDd::2:f:oIlowJJ1"1f'l~i611:of bilnk 21Follow UP rospeoion of anU:mre9Olvedlt,crn(URO).
aft Unnisolved Itemt (U;RI)
- ~S~8.0s000455l2~"*"-~bi*:;;5;2008 (150(X)4S412O(1tMSkV8 , "0500N' 55)-OOW0,'" May 5, 2tXYS
. , : ,," .".',.'.,..: .......', ....... ~:.:.. " ,
54 fltsiga IfTionl, ikn W 6f44 Safety te'ate e-quirient that mtay be oiin
- ~~*~OOnaai~;T~ttir~:(Drm;:$~~~~j,~:~;skfdY~la~equ'lP~th'at'~y:~,l~~:'h('
.UlCle,.~of'.(mEureo(tbe4;.16ty U~~tof failure of the 4-16kV Switch~ar SWt1C~Jl,~":':~ breaktrs.' 1ssue Dare. Date Decle~.l2..lOO6 1December 2Z-2M06C (Includecdas (1nc1wkd'u!
A~oo,lli;~J~r,**"*':":.:<' A~redLIA)
- ', '; , . :.:,,: .. " .::.:,,\:.' , . .." " '" ',',
E!(e~¢t1O':ru:~:f~alpll11)'~:tL(:;:'~}'rol1Si~tion. iS EelonC nenticn C~npay, LC, Bron taton. Unit No- I & 2. Appendix A wo the Fax ility Operatn urii.t.io., t, .2~Ap~di;l4A .c:o.:.~:f7acHit)'<:lpemUng . tt~~~>::'1~~~f~~~~)l0I1~~~*
'LikCnyt "TechaleI'Sptefcutkitonii Buis~es,",NAmended .. l~h~,:~~~~':t~~~,d~pt:No;:
thr~uh Amendment No. J5~~j:!~/< t,54, B 33.9 :', 5i6.
~~~~~~~&C§:~i~~!i~:~~b:~~~~t!f~;tJt;~~1J~'~:t!~,
Exteln Genieration Com)pany, LLC, Byron Station. Unit No. I & 21,Apipendi A uo ihe Facility Operntýing License, -Tecbnkcal SpL-cifications." Amended thm-uh Amendmnent No, 154. LCO 3.7AA Y
~Ll:
. 5.7 ;,B~tmt.N~Le.irU~lfij}\dit:ririistrrifOf'L.ettef:f~"~~':~qm~~(By~~j~~:~~~~~~'"
1Byrozt Nu~dear Lcezti jig Adzniirusrtnuz Lenuer to Mr. Gar otrd (yo rjctMneiw)
'" \
Q~~itled'~I1~ cmtitted HByron ~9littttiffl!l~,~~t:~iAA~~gD.. Sta~iion Ultimate Heat Sink Desigi:L ""' Au~.2,J~h,~,j.J7m~~V August ',1 1091 Clurn # 70ý ., ..'" ...J',,:
'548 Bf~!~~~~r~~~/iy~*s*~t~I1.Ulli~::NO' Exclon Generatdon Comnpany, LLC, Ayro Station, Unit No, .* I.I)mWlng~E~I-4(I()~A.;4,.g:la~l~n<me'iij1~ t, Dra-wing 6E- 1-4001 A, "Sutkibn Ont! Lhine .
Dingfrjrv" (1811) 9~5, Rtvisioii0
'."'>;, ~.", .' :c.. . '.':';>? ... ': :;'j:/":': .:
rt~~t~7~=~~:a~.~:~~,t!~(~o..2.~~~~;~.i;#.4"S~~:~*i:~~. 59 Excln Gene-tration Coffpany, LLC, Byron Station, U~niut~ No., N awng 6E-2-A0t1A. 4 'Stati~on One. Line Diagra n" 0 U0i6/97 Revision N 5.0 NUREG-0W00 Standard lR&vitw Plan (SRI') tfr tlie Revie ofsardy. 5;Hr.~~~:~00jc!amReVieW.P1an($RP)fuTAtieRevieW of SaetyAhblysis Rq mks fmr Nucni; Arialy!iuhpOrtS'for Nuctcar~
,a?o,~}jJ~9,t~'Ma~h;<~,7 PoerPlnt, arh2(W) ..... '. .'. '.' ',' " ." ...... '. .~i,>,. '. . . . . ,
..~:(I5.1 *1*BEP-().:~ellCi[}fTriPQfS~f~h1i~#~,ti~i~I~:liev:,(~;W~JC:
1BEP-0, Reactnr Trip or Safety Injection Unit 1, Rev- 108, WOG- IC
- ,~J'i::,
5.12 *iB~~.iieo.ct01"frlp.01':s~6&;*lnj~~onuJJiti/iev~iQ8tiwOG;llEj 2BEP-0A'='entur'Tiip or Saifety Injection Unit2, Rev. 108, WOO-IC, I
AN ALYSIS AN0. UKS-04 REVOSON NO'*3, .ATTACHMENTS 1AHMN S .
. PAGE:NO~B90'B2~'
PAGE.14Oý 89 010824: 6J):~mmoOOtOGj:~~Accm~~CRri,~ 6.0P MT11ODOLOG.Y ~NASO AMWANCE CRITM~IA
~tEmowl:ilG:J ThiSis;'stent:i!k~~dtl)msure TheSX system is deiged to en~that th~at suhlclemidufficien t(;3~lty.s;av,mtable;t()Pro\'ide.
cnmelly is,avitaiable toý Provde :Ildeq1m1ecooUng adequate coWling
.~];r~"!~Si!~~1!t~.!C=
during aunonxml and accident condiltins-The SX sYstem is a two (2) unit shared system with various crovs fle hesnders on Nbet pumpmmsicmli and discharge sIides for Ixith ivisiosand onrdle. Apropt-Wiate (Irdndant) cross tte isulation wabo-s are prnvided to achxvc~ variouss st~em a~agnm.smts iwcess-aryv wi~thin the. ithe ti¢~nsjJj*.~n,4*.d,~!~~.~.:H~~~.js"re;~1ed:~Y:.'Biesx"S)'~,~mYial~,(2I,~.~nl~al-dtaffcoo]j~:i I censiog rind de-siga h~svs- Heat isý vejectked by die SX systiemt via two f.2) rmeeh:2nlcaklfaft COWlini .
;:r~~ ~"'
Trowe~rs, fan, fan;:;*The 'Pic
. cofd
. Cool4igTower consists of fouri (4)cellS,,with ach Cell Seroed fly. ~.*~.~g1e't'A'~Xf:~'
Ead ~H~~1~werti9~~d(~J4)c~'I~~~.itK~~ce[l*~.~ coldwlIJet.fumilftlf water ha~qir (or ilttbC'cioIl each, Cooliiig . ';TQwermvesa:'" Tvvcr Pcerves 3 jpaifif of'SX" of SX .'.' pumps, one a Single tw&2kce c*
'}~{nrnmf~bulti!;:
(1) from.....tach uniit,.
* * ,', , ....... .... " .* > .. " ..... ". Jli~t.".. . '.,,,\ , . .,pa..... . ..P~.. ..' .'. .. .......
The uold watjer baslns f76T the two (2) towers, atr, cross.cOnniected by .wh0At
,*rlie:,cotd"W:aI~r.bilSilij\fOt.eltl/l.t"I~(2).tti:Wtrsat:'e*e~~~.bY is teormed, an "Overflow"
*,i~,.~M;:~~W'~:*
~~~Y,iritq~.,tJf~~::q~~~gPn'~~,~'~j.~~)~~i~&:::?i.~~tc~iti~)~*.~
path~way in the LFSAR. .Depending on ambicni comditi~ois (ti.e kumrnmror opol weather conditions tle
*d~~iI£epemii.Ued'to (Weqaffe purnilued to MV'e have oheJI) one (I) or or. tWo twoi (2) (2) faM:oot~Of~M~(OOS}wlii1estHn~ingcomide:OOdm farts Ot6ofier&VAe O(COS) while -StiI being consldered to
~.9~~~:
,be eprble, ..... .
Thev vIrt 6,%, scenarios will be identified fromt the exis~lng hticensilg bai ol4dersnl ~lr
'Th~~~:Otst~:~~iri~*,WiJ1.~;*ide~~t~tii~::~~f~i,ftj)~iIsl;~~~~~:*.#~~*~~llf~.I#*:::
2assu pTxi~naissmated WiffitheSXCoolin" i,;sbJll(l'Dom~~imci{ with the SX Coolingratowr :~iri~on:..EadI~lirio bperation.. Each socnarjo wilJ~ %willb,, rbV:iRdlm revrised tr the ncw< new, ooniijtions(b::~~::fjilmeo[i'; C~oodifions (l'e. fail"re of".flY,....,...
.' ' " . " ' . ' w " . ' ,..........
any. one h.{d,'<>f ( 1)of tbe~:kV;,01'480*V1id~:bte~keiS) the. ,4.. kIV or 480 Vic electrical bteakers.)... ,~'~~n6e.~"
,y " . ' , .. ,.. . .. .... ,. '.'" .' ", . . ,,'.' .. ....
iewo will be done~
"fQr:th~*nto.S1HmitH~*'
for
" the. mc.is Ilintitingý ." g.. :de$j-'c&dH:loo&',;<.n1cresi:dts d,ýi..go....... conditions, ..... '" The.,..results '(jf'~ " '.".clilcu!liUoowill'oo:UStd' of.. ...this ctatl ..'0ttin-
.... ' . m'willI.. be. "" u-,;ed
', um'" ' pqrt.:ftY[,
asinvttt ,. . i1dditfurtal for additiunaI deti\il6d~' detailed
~lj,~ . .". Y'f! . ,
araly-sis <15'0::r.WS:~~n~h~rfoJ11w~fin~ of UHS puforinnize,. '.. .. ..' performed
...., in a . ,.'
se;parateiir.ll.¢,(c~tatioo
.. iSep . . . . calculatian (Cah:ulJlliooNEP~M;MS~:'"
(Calculation
. ' " . '. . , NIED-M-MSfl,
~~~!~~~~t;!~~:~~;~:~~~~~~~~#;~i~i~~ng.~.L:"K':~~:~
Secriarios I to 9~foroni his calculation (Reviskins' I an~d 2) are wsed as rcfcrvncc indzf;:ninjg the Iimiting %ats of *&r~icerbl equipznent, aligrnmentts, and accident conditiuns for thie new case stvnuri~os. Tbe same
.initiating ini~ijLtiii ;:'evenf~
....... ,... Jf ....event used.. ';iii
,., ..... : ""' this'(:~1il4i0#{aeviS_:-1':Brid'21WiU; in.,*,'this calcuanaio
...,,';.*.*"* ..0*.'**.(Revisions
"'~, ... ". . . . .I. . , and 2) will apply ..... CfQi~ticw~~o$
for die new ca-w s-cchaxis (tc}'I;:OCA,
....,.,.... :,. ; ..... "~.r,'< .. ,, . ... ,.,..... ; .....;',.,.,,,...','. '.' .. :.. ".'
(LC. LOCA .' and'. ". '. LOOP IifidlOOP:oo'dte:accldeM . on 4he ic~cidCM unit'). The ýingle W\iO.:,~sillgli:fruluN'cOOditLoii<U;;.he;.. :.'" failt're condition....';.) is the ...... faHureOfabmkel' failuim; . of ,..... a brea-ýker for the tl1e48Q 4130 V Vac{W:;:\ ..' Buses B,ll.~~.~~iil~~ wilh thelSX Couting Tower. Each assc~iated .Withj~;,SX,Cop,li!1g,rpvrer. of thefou .(4)Bgusts( Path ..~!:,t1l"folfr: (f1.) BU.~M t~ t31IZ,l~" 132413~ ,~J~AJld2~22.)iim 213 4aind 2324) are lk~mc~U.o',WI
;LStried
" ! ".../' ,"i:
to frill ~tQ'1{
-', ¥ ~ ; dO due to a f*ailuye
.i.i,I~:ij{
'-"~; ~ : ".> '" ') -.' :, '> { :
me f~l)feabr;[i;e~' ofibcfeed
','" ~', .~ .'.' : ' ". ;."
breakrr .,;--:lix>e,
" ~," ',..' ,,"
i41~J 141,5Z4 3 317.tz.;}4'2S~*J32Z; 14257- 1327- 241
.... " ,.' .. ' .,. ::__ .'::" ___ ;-,.,,' "'/..-.': ,'. '., .. ,."
~.' .~ ~
241-57
."~. "> ~ ' " ' ' "
,zJ:lJ
.n 2317 1Z;2415Z;:Qf..;,,*
,~ ' ***
-24Z57-
'. "<' .. .' .. ' tr)
'.~' ", ,. . . "'.~"
132Z (Refevence,5,4, 5X8 and
;lJ~.\~f~~:~.4i.~;8;.~~;.~.9'n Cor. tbe,~y~B'4~:iDq1J.e,s~~Ofl;:~.t]i.asingl~!,~ri~ 5.91)] for the 4W( Vakc Bus in question, Only a siagle brveAker iS. asmumted ~~* .*tO t<>'faiE fail ".
at atiHj~~ a time The failurve scenarios assuate thaf Up, to two (2) SX Coolin-gTower fisa~re 003 44a uhtý. TheW TS",,
,nte:J#t~t¥}~.~Hild~*.~s,~we~Vff~$t.t~~J2}~X¢~li~\~§~rrMS[~po~*Al*.:a.*I1#-**,~'TS>{.,
Recfc-remce Rd~*5;6~LtO:t1;g.A. 5.6, 1120 3.74A stntes ~~.ifQneH) that if one (1) olih" of the . *.ired Cool"' ~ToWeT:rans 4turdCooding Trvov- fans is in inoprable.
.' nble.tbl:!l1 tlhen
;~11~n7l.et~rS;fjst~::t~e~~;~J~~~;Jo~r:~#~I~Sr;~<N.~.,B~.~e,N~~$:~,~~
Section B17.9, within~~~~~~~~ 72_o~srsoet giates that the design basis eurdCoig Tovwr fa i o upmrale status. Thea TS Ba;-ses, Reference 5,5, analyses, asssurre, two (2) tower cells (Le., twu (2)j funi or~ water, .**
~.eCtLOJ:l:R:3. 7.~~;.Si~[e~rtJ:lltutieaesig!i b8s[S~y¢S-:~tW();(2lt()~tc:US(Le;~twoJ2) ~'ot;w4ttI'.*
~~r*.~~K~(~t#t~j.~*0()~;::*~~:~. :~,~-:SJ~t6).:Of,~eigbt'(~) *. SX:~iDs"t~f;m$n,~:b@
diskt ri bali n ; 0 t WO (2Pe 1S) are 005.- Thus itt least (6) 4 ih' e ight (9) S X Co.o Iling Towe'r fans miut hie Si ce thiScm¢ij,a.ti~j~**pefiJi~~f(if Since,dlis Cail, ýati on is-, bci ng donc fo rveOOl:~eame~'¢~.itfons:~n.tbo/~JUiriQs~me:~(l)SX 0ol we~ e ~nitlons all the svv~io smIw() $XColg 9~ltrig' Towcr T0'WC' funs fur's are 00OS when the singte failuies areOOS~t!i~;~~gle (mJ~:~~~;.~:SX-C§Uilg occur. The SX Cooling "p~ Towerx rGn thaut are 003 art no~t the ' .. rtm~tb.'II!re:()()S~no,t*tlit: saime as I-Le SX Cooling ITower fans that fail for the breaker fahure case.
~*~ilieSX~iri*',ToWer*'fwthatfa:U*(6rtM*Ibn:w:rlaibimCuc:.
'i,::*}:";*/-,.:'<":*"':*- ,', :;..-: ,,:,. ,,~.</.~~:;;<.::,,~.:,..,,:>:;,,:;,~~,:(,/. '!~.,,)":..,h,~'>' (( .. f*:"~.*;<_'<:);'":':>::'/:-');"~/""" :~ >";."
~/9~,J~,~;~~
As can be sterntn the-flIT [)IT:~.~¥:lt:~?~(lkf~5AX**failufc:~~.~:tt@.~.~:~#:X~)'o~~.' S04O-BHfR-Wt74.-00l (Refereice 5A), failure of a fcrd bireker to one( l) of the four (4)490 Vac Birscs will result fou~:(~)4~Yac:~.wIlJ ~5l.ij~ in 19JbC the power po~el'JO$S:6ftwo(2l loss of two (2)SX SX~*:tbetatthe two IIWOcn (2) SX iser valveýs forT SX rnser~'.""eSJw:* ttie;c#~:aij'0.e~J*~*.wi~~.*iDstS~f~~.~~.the the cells associaited with the lost SX fans, Lind the *.powetr` pO.~-erI~Si loss
- of one (I) . .SX
()6jae.(J) ~x:~mbj;~.~\iC*.ful'jl~ Basin bypasis valve for thLe S;(CooiiDig SX Cooljng Tower !oW,i#r*ihatfi~t~J~SXthat has the loty- SX f~fiii'~rid fains ýnd associated ~i~';ri_'~ve5~Th~$, riseT "alveg, Thus, .mregaless ~Prdi~10(Wti[g;h(IDe:;> of w-bich one ... (t}ijf:,~c.~tgb~(~jf~JYi>tffl*¥acfeed f(1) uf the eighc (8) 4 kVor 4830 Vac feed . ~~~~~(f#a'tbe¢"~()tt,!~h~;.S~C;~Llng brerikers that fail, the effect on1 the SA Cuolitig Tower TOW~~)~~e~~::. svystem is tne!i3ine; thsine.
~m :thl1t;is/
that is, the me* power . . ' loss of two (2) SX J:m:iir poWtt*I~'*o(twO.(2).!SX . ". fansL thetWOJ2.).:SX. thwe (2) SX riser riSi!t:v.at~ val ves associatedwith ioisooistedWi.lli' those~t-ibm;:e; .
IAtNALY$rS '~LYSJSNO~'UH~ NO. UIS-04 REV*ON,NO~,]i::'
ýREVISOQN NO. ,3,,. ATTACHMENT 8S
'ATTACHMENT
- ,P~E: Nri;~'iQ:OfBi4\~
PAGE NO. BIG of 924_
,~~:::~t:rfill':=~:;:I~~~~ii~~t~~~~~~t~=!**fQr faýnq, ~Ild otse (1)SX ltsrn bypxtis -Vaheftssociat wilhoitiefai1cd SX fawii. Thicrc~fcqa,-the sicnanq [or t(ny tine 4ý I ) ree breitket 5weed to be, ptvscnkd, -- shte 4be, f~ailure of [he oibawemee (2) feed btneakes- .
*w.~ld.
w"VI~ud bav'c ~~;:.~.~¢\~~m~),~~:9n,~hc the -,same im~mc~t an ;he SX S~.:,,~QOHna'.,T~f~:~t~~)f~~ ComAing Tower sytm ~> "".;,':-' N ~, ",~'"
*i~e*faij\ll'eof'~r.:i~2SZ:lltthe416Q.\'8u!li4i~iii,"*d~indri5ca1ctrl~iore:The.mmairiing" The fail~ure of brezker 1425Z at the 4 160 %1 Bus 142 will hc discu-s-wd in this icaculatigim. Tha mrmnining ,bteilk~ts.(1415Z.,Ejiz.j32i')l4f5Z.2J1Z..~i\3j,nf23lZ)~ilinot.bedl~~;ifi:thl~chlifuBlJjijM blreakers ( 14 15Z, ,37 13I U27, "2415Z, '23I'Z. 2425 Z, and "327,)wiLd ot btvd iscu~ In chiS lugai all
- s~~:.~*QYmill'ef~i~itta~sXCool.ng1"~\\:et'~:;i!$'t~'~**~ba:ijf:~h;¢~b~~faii~
.,rcc the- oeral I effccts to the SX Cooiing ThN~ct ,ys~rin Lr the sxmne reýgxdkssi of whtic breaktr f~ailt. '.
Eacftcaiu irk tscr inth r'il
~,?~.~<<(~id~~'inYtbe~liisemmfc.filiis'ciJ.JcWmti(jlfmidf't!~.fire*pnMdcil:'to'musti.ate.~ o alf ddtacaklatio ic'n' s and rkgures are Pmoved. tosillusitrit6eýh
~;tbe~%\'
of Ih sIetmios " ,y" .... ", .
\:"< :: ~<-:: ':'- ~~'>>.' ~ <'\-" "'\'l . . . :...\.. ,'.:>\ >.:'. :::,.,','
Acr:EP:TAN(:l:3.~,1J'ER1A ACCEPTANCE C:RVUERJAKk ..
'No.acc~~:~n:t1c~~
No a e4-ptmnc criteria air provided ~vldalf~.~~.~al9l1~tip~.;~~;cJi1c~)ationktenlifEts,~:;~!~d1ulum:. cTo thi~s ealculatibn- 'Thiis calculation Ldendfi1 ewsl,,,iný fimure
~1iriC$:k~~~d:wiChi~SXOxlUn s a~r~ios as~ociated wth uh SX (coalitig*.To,,'ej**c'**.
. \......" .. ,.'" ..* ::<.. ',.:...... *..
To%~ Oet,
,1 ...... ~41I, ~ '*00,;i .
.. -::;.\
'.ANALLYS4IS NO,. UKNS-04 'REVISI ON NW.3 ATTACHDAENT B .
ATTACHMENT
.P~E:NO*~.B1"mB2.4 PAGE-N'. Bij of B24 70 RES1LTS, Thie following is 3 decrgipriin 6f ther %cenarios Ssce~dwihti X Coai~ng Tnwei and failure o b 8 vac Bu~vs.
wltIIJ~~~iQ*'
¢aol:init~F:ll~l!~t~;7.46F*:
Ca- n Towcr Basinrpniue 74 'F
~1800s:'CeIlA;CeUG" cdlIs O30S: cell A, ceel &G .'. ...
~:;~i(.~f)~""~&I1"'\
fan spxed: no fans tu'iralit SX punrjpsýone (I) runniing an e~wlch Unit
~~r~!;t~*~~~~~£ . . ... '.' ........ >,' .,..>
To\V~.A::~qJ~.:.fUi'mjfll,,;Q*rt~v~lws*ope:D~O.*lW:dv.e.~T~;JJ:pruisjveceUs.*2~::val.ves.oper.l Tower A: 0fuýms infl~ng, (1riwer vilves Open, 0 active Ca~lk, pasal'qve cells 2lbypass valves open
~~~r:.~~~~l~~~~:~g*~~.r~~l.\~:~~Q,:~~:.#n~\Wi~#l~.~.lI';2~[~~.~~
Towver 13: 0} Fans runninhg, riser vabkes open 0 =bv ce~ll-%0 pussive cels, 2 bypwsi vdul-sopn flil!**~jiioo.:
~iglJefa.l~~~;:~_l"UZ~:~~~YB.~.'1oQ~.n'":':
single fadure- bireake t47.57it4T69WI3ku 14ZTN open - 1.~*.~:~~coCelqS~:F'blil!i~~~* lo~s f power- To CeTl 34ndFliastinb'yPiss valve. fjSX 162B und Cell E
\'~J~~J(I.§~:.~.(:'.d1 widF~Cbt-Ikn~q Ikns (GSX03CF- =d OSXO3CE}. . . . . ...*.. > *.*. "
E~fl"E'#lmg:TQ\\~'.Fi1InS.(OSX~;~:OSXQ~P~).::/: l\}sol~"Sof~r, Also, lcyss of power .Wo: *o::* 4aOV' Sui*1322>: 480V B~us 132Z . ' 4~~V ~tC~j?~f. 480V MCC 132ZI '... ' ....,.. .... '.'
~:Well.~.QWWOl~lrt.o,~~~F.f:.
rDt~p Weill Pump fWWOI PB (non-FSF) .' ..' ES'WServlSC'W'at<<*.Make:,U ESW Smrice Watcr Make-Up'YiilVcOSXEi1
.r*' . ":." ";;f/. co> '<"'.'. ... ",.~.
Valve USX15 7A, A (ce1l E RI~scr ValvO
~Ij~",,~~ .. ,~t~:e~?C~~.§~Fl);.: SXIOE3ý 480VMCC;ll:2Z1:A/(ii~ESf):
480V MCC l32ZIA (tnonESF). CdIF1Ri~VSJvcOSXI63f::
-cell F Riser Valve OSX I63F .'
SWb~1t/'
.*.,Swkrchgear
; *.... ,,~ .RokomR~in.'reric.
. . . .Veni Fan
. . . IlVXOWC
. . .fanlVX06C. . ..........
[ 2WIC2SVac Distribution t20f.WSVao Dktibdutior, PmicIIJclard. Parielbeard
~ot~*Q~~S~~ate.et,;~;,:.
Motor SX(XCE Space H~eater HVA'C~rC~:Pafiel;:IVX06l*** HVAC Local Conirol Panel WNWO6
~~:*"***;~;tt;t~~~kvel**.s.~[~h'.~:
Damper Starler Panel IVXA9j
ýESW Cooling Tower (1113 Ra'siV Lvlswi~tchi 0lSýSX097
~{6t~OOX03CFS' Moktor {}SX03CF Space ;;Rea~>
Heater .. .. MQVOSX'(63E';(~s~ifhS MOV GSX I63E Limit Switch Space !lCeH~ Heater
~{OVM)ti63F,
&M1V OSX163F urilii Uiniit S~itdlSP Switch Spoce .' '.'
....... '.;........ ',./...;.-;....... . . . . *......... ~ .. ~v>,."
. HiM.er Hleater
- Aci~de~nt Comlitiori
{Tbe pl!!t,~id;rd.
*{ýTbc post actident ~yllt~11~,uj;'AciltMmo,f~Jn~XpWnps system lineup Cormsls.s df Lhree (3,)ISX pumps na~g.~two (2)o~#i~U[ii~
rnumiing, two 42) on wrcident unift,*.On.e.(:.I.l one (I) ozn m
;,lloo-accLdootuni(l" ,,," .. . . . . c , .. ' .. ' . : , '
po*tLOCA CooinTowcr co rifgrticon i'i tol0rinwxcoc~ato~
.' '1" Coolin, Towxer A: 0 fanms rinnlng, 0 riser valvei open, 0 liefiv&eClls, 0 pas~wtellsý 2 bypass valves open Cooling Tower Bý I) fans munning. 0 riser valvcs opei, 0 activeccllis. pas-sive cels, 2bypass valvcq open
- 0 :'
AAY I.... ............................. UH -0 jx~~~st-LOCA~n oper-able fans Linh[iv pooe Toe ie v ands filain Ioln i. 0iuato NO.............................' Punulte operato acina iidClose byj,ass VAWvS)ý 3, irrlnr . .... .... ......
,:O ,*Ai2AC HiE2T-8 8 1 2 :~
itematt 0 24r,rrr'l Coaling Towcir A: -3fans rurtnin-, 3 riser Valves 'Open 3 active cetts, 0 Passive Cell% 0 bypass val'wT- open Cotoinig Tcower 13: faonwoing. I fiser ae po I active ctll 0 Yjssiive ceB~s~, I bypass v'al -.e qpe post-'LOCA CoolingTT Co nefi )eatrck t 0~l~srawl J14wg3mine dloae faded, o~vn Cell E and F basir by pass valve (,'SX1628)- Coolin~g Tower A: 3 fans runniing, .3riser~vak~cs open,~ 3active edb. 0 passive rcd1%,O0bvpass valyces open
.CmtlkngTower B: I f~rt runrnlqg. I riwr vave opetri, active ce)). 0passive celk4, 0 bypass Valves openm l~~~*=t7~~~~t~=:'~:~~~~~~"~SsLpaJiOO'~:t,~:,~~;
tFoI~oitr~q the po-,sudiw LOCA, mio credit Ns faken fr~U~S ambItnu heat d[sp)taiti unER opein~gactiot arn~tiatcd s ssa t-uwer fans. op4pen iar vaIN~s,. and do-se bypass valves.) . ~.~¥:~:,, o~in s
~Stenari~'ii';\,
~1~~oJi$lhn CoolI ng Tmv,- Basin teniprar-ure
- WIi.J18<r~~.fJasin ~~:14\Uf\i 74 PP, 00115 L'tell OOS:'ceUA, OOS cell A,celiO "fl G3.*.. .,,
,r~,~~i:riPif~~:~i1ij fan, speti: nu fans rniniing .' ,';" :
.SX ~mpS:O~O}rWUling
.~. pumrps: one~ (I) runxiing one!l~b.~lnl~: on eczr Unit
¢~j~ l'oo'el'ooflfi~i~:",.\,q"",
Cooling Tower configurafion: To~we A: 0 f3JlS Tow~r,A:9 mrm.np. 3 riwr vmyeso~~ fans fWi"jng;;;3,J:I~ V'alyecu open, 00 acti
"..,'\"
ve CeýqK 3 r'-4N-v a<<i~ceUs.3pas~\l~cell$iQ 0 bypkq`assY~ve b~'Yilyejj,Op.:ff::
- rO:WerB':!O Tower B.,0 faJis ru~:jriSd'Nai~;~~O fans runnitge, 3 miser val ves pehL Gacti-ve :ae:tiye:reti~l*pWivetiU't:~;~;il~:~.,'***
crlh: 3 pwsi-veoefls, 1 bypass valve O~pen
~li1sl~,faij~::~~~:I:~~:~"4i~9\<~~,;,14~'f~'~;'T.j~.ofPQ~!.~:!;~~I.~*~:~~"**b);~~~:
singJe faillkfC: breaker 1423Z at 4160V B~us 142 fails open t, o 5of power to Cell R and F bo~sio byAm.U
;~~1(e,()~~;hJ~B*'~eeU'E:afidfg~tbijT~'e,J:*~*(()S~03(!F*,~.QsxrocE);':.
valvye )SX 1629 and Ceti E and F Cpol1ng TuOe Fas (4)SXO3CF and OSXO,3C-E)..
,," <" "~. .:", ',,' ".';;",,' "',.- ,/ ,".-. ,', ,~').' * , ','. """:-.'-,';",' ~'-_'c' , * * , **** ,:" " ,:~ **;~* * ,
A.~,~~~fP9w~r*~: Allsoc lois af power tcy 48ilv:Sw; 480V Bus 1'322;. 132Z :': .....
'~v MCC l:lZZI 4U0VMvCC 13221
$p:Weii:~inpOV(woIPB(D~Es"l:::
Deqp Well PurnpOWWIFB(n01,SF .. "
'ESw:s&vi&W~
ESW Suvkeo Waler Make-Up M~tr"Val~'05XI~7AValve, OSX 157A.
./,.>,'.*,'"y . ..;./" ../ . . . . .... ' . . " P:'j _',j ... , .* :", *. ,.","
&~L1 E Riscr Valve GSXl cen.~:Rj$(:rcV.aJvcosxl~a;:: 61 . '. .' ...
~y.M¢9>d~IA*(~l1"'Esh
-%WV McCC 1312Z0A (non'BESF)
Cell F Risef Valve OSX163F
~H,FRmValVe OSX163 "
~~tC~'~ilotlmVentFimlvX#~
Sw illigear Room Vent Fan IVXO11C, E20/t108Vac Diirbutlon Par.-Joaz'd IWl20SVtieDlsttibuUtm P~OOUd/
.~1;r;~*. . . . . . . . . .
N1mor OSXO3CE Spac r Hea ter IIVAC Lix-o Cocirarl Pjaiw IVXW~ Darnper'S~tarttr Panel IVX99) ES:WC.~tJrig.T~\!;erOB B~ts' ~JS,ljJ{itet(9L$.;,s~7 MB~,g..;;'~~{}l~~~~~er: MarOSX03CF Space Hear er . ," MYOS-X 16-1E Limit Switch Spac, E4Qtcnr
.>.':,;" ,'3: .<. , <
M{)Y:~l63lltjmitS~i~tl.~p~ Ff~~ MOVOSX 163F LimitSwitch Space MOV'QSXf6lF,'Limii'Swilclt SPa&*Hehl~. H=eare
ANAýLYSIS NO.' UH$W4 ýREVISIION REVISION NO.3 NO. 3, ~,j\1TACHMENTa> ATTACHMENT B ..*.* I!A()~Nq~B13ofB24
'PAGE NO. B13 of B24 *~~'!l!nl,,~9fWifj~;,:
(The po A.c~ident sNmInvti~ "'tsi4 of alme~(3) SX pum-ps runing;twi () n~civt nt oe(1 (1'l1e,p(154;~~~~~;.sy*m:a~ ~OO;Si~ of.h"jdjs~pnmps:runriinJtt'i1lO(2)Qn accident uRit;*.ooe.lt}00: ri~mtddefil:u'itlt),' ~" ~
',< .'- "':.-:,:,.~.:,.'."'\~ .. '_\:.:\ ~"':.'~': .. '
ýposi.-LOCA Coolint aTower i~oqfiguntir OtIi~ prtrato}4plrt
ýCoxi jn'uvcT ~A-- 0 fans r~unnin& isc vave oxO ati ve o IIs I passiveccdIfi 0 bypass v'alve% open,
,7cktdisV Tower B: 0 fams furnnttq 3ýrist vailves ojcn 0 zacilve cells, 3 passive Cells, I byp'asq vwal ve opep p"s4-LOCA Ctxling Tower config8umration (follo wi ng I0.mi nuti opmrtor nct inn,-at 10)minutes,Isart Ihc 0enbefuims U12 higLh sperd)-'
C6oW**gTovier A: 3 fbýris running.I ie e~ tv e~0psiecls yasvle pr n
,CýOlrig ToweV 13-t fain running, 3 64~e val I ainive ceil., 2 j.ssive calls, I bypass vakve o.pen pcosz-LOCAk Cooing Tofiralv(f o~ne,30'ýMjftute op raraction at 30 mliirageS, 11ywtu.aly clckse Eai!L oe Cell Ezind FP snbps vahbe OSX t62B):
CMolng TtowerkA 3 trans, rnning. 3 riser v~alves opactvc3 active passivec ells, 0 bypass valve-s open'.
ýCopfirig Tower 8: I fin rnitning, 3 rsrvwab~s oven, I active 4-01, 2 pa~ssive celts, 0 by[Niss, Ivaks optn (Fillow f~ng the poslialatot LOCA, no credit is 1ak' for 11115 amh~i e a i I ton u il j rt raci i Initiated Ll la to-ei fanisý). .:..,~~,:. '~'.<: .. ,- \:';- ~>'~ ':.':~ ,: ::::.: :,':\ :<~ . " .. < ,',,<'. :.' - :.:.'~>
(Note that (NOte thillseveralcas@~do'f'jfwjOOs several cas-e- s~celOONAri Lul~ions ellri cmn be 00 *1Ifiade* tbOise'scenarios. made to thowe listed ~*SoolfvarlaUol1S.
'cenarios Hsted abeve S4ueb variatiois,
_~~=~~4~~S.lt ircludre toc-afon of ce[Ls 008. number and lcxatlon of Tier valve-, open, numnber and locatio~n of open bypa-% vallves, nakmber of SX pumips running, equipmentl fail ing in nion 'fixed in place' poitions, and lcction of clmtricai breakers failitig open, lHowf wr, these varlatotis, are livaitng in the amontooi of fultherrimpacqtlI~ey will have on UH'4Sdesiign and can be, analyzed further, as desied,, in the drmiled evaluation of 1-I4S
~~~iE~ti~.~o;tt¢~q'J(}~
All[ pos~sibfities Atl foyr the scenaria 10 and . Ill<:oo~~H(Jg~.~~";';iitTable*l. I configurations are shown in Trable 1.
;:AlTACHNlENTB P~ENO.B1401S24, Table ,I-.Scenario 10 and 11 Configurations CeI~i00$ CII Fniled'.
AC, F~GH AB C) or Gi AF CMor (A AG" 'CL) uoEF" AH C"D (11 EF __ __ __ __ __ __ ___3CoG 13 V ~EF or GH:J BE. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ BF CD..Or GOR, ___ ___ ___ ___ __CD, uO EF
'sa<
BHl - ' ,," -",' - . ,,~CDo{£f"--
ýCD ra'EF ,
-D 'AB or FF (orGH CEASirGf
_ _ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ AB or GH: Ca: ASu FI CLI'ABar EFP D F. ~AB Ur 0,H DF ABr Gil, __ __ _ __ _ __ _ __ _ A-RaT E F
- off.O f f , : A B AB "Qf liF ",
or EF All xCD-Y wG14 EOG AB oixCD FEl AR no CD U14 A1 or CD 16 CONCLUSION'S
~e\\\~.~o~'w~re,~~l~:~
INIw iccarias were developcd is..;~ri~.,abl)'fefC;i;~fit1J~:~'tbeel~f'~~b~ersf~r)hi desv-citwd bove o h aueo the e~ecarnv~ ;'ed~ breaikers ftir tftt 480Vac 480Vac:Jfuses Busse'sa~miW-wh teSX Coo ing-oIxlA
~sQcWed;Wlm'theSXCoonn8, Figuires41Othiugh 05 pmovide' irnphflted Towers. '8~1Othrtru,ghI5~vide~siinpaified
~~~','~/jl~4~,:~~~~i:,N~~har~~~4w.,~~':W:~~~'ca.,~,,~*~~~,_~~,ili¥'~
diagrams qo ilusmtcLrsortpa cemos- Note that vzriarion can~ be mrade~ Eo cac'b cas-e scnariio. as discussýed i~n En,mefr?~]~s:5&ijoo,:"Thjs 1he resu1i ."seiwm Thj- ~~tMjoo "kulion ikm wilrJ be usod a;s inpiot fQt~detaikld,e~liJatiOnOf1.1HS
~used,asi~piit fokldletaired ewaluaiofi," of peif~;,
URHS prformanue.
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P3$T LOCA cANFI~ p.ATIOM (i*~.~~L ~ ~) SUMAXTo W ___ A
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ANALYSIS NO UHS44 ".REVJSION,NO~3*:
.REViSIONNO.3% -ATTACHMENT B ......... '. .
'.~1"T~HY.EN'!~
PAGENO~
- PAGE.
B2tofB24;; B..21 .~. ' 24...
- h" '
APPENDIX'A; APPENDIX A
~TO;~:rtAt~NT,jf~*c.~i~~ti()D,@$~M*.**
T.OAttACHE.NT B to CaklilationUHS04
'Dtr\S~BYR~tOO
,DIT S04#4-YR-W744O
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ový.=w . '- ,.' OESIGN'I~FORMAnONTRANSMITT DESIGN INFORMATION TRANSMITTAL At. Ia-Related .....
... e.Restd r N. 8Y4374O tl~ -'"i'!w.Bo~.*
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,~bj~~: Subjd reitedeau~mie~tthatmaye S~ev leost nir the werin of Ifelwef then 4 1 W% S~~iciri~har bra akbr~g M4OIFICATION OR DESIGN? CfAN(3 NUMBERS: WAM STATUS OF INFORMATION, This Wwtznfiwi befng b-40wittsd W60~ve fordassa requhsn frth YG6901ifci.
LDENIMtAT-IM OF,THE SPECLFIC 6ESJIGN ~NFORMAM1N TRAN4SMITTED ANO PUIRPfOSE OF ISSUE j~Unt arvy upctr tojrT~It$ atsached to wr ITy ls Effe r.Disioozntvo fs~ua dI, an¶d llital rwil~o o pag=,Woath eas pOii This clesp Infrmation truiunrrttJ ýdentifies ithe equipment (by name arný equ,ýmermt nuwnbet} Mhal wxud be lost Lfpon: fbikeesut opnnwofteuaben4 food arpelke3, 'This informalA1i 4aing pxovded fo use in 4twe uhlimele heal sink equipmwentIo'ueaatls
,qk pagais 2 and 3oV ',lie deg nomaf iws w~a the qetdsVIoo nmni -31u-0c-f6IF JNF030AATION, CaNo, ~ _____ _____ ~W~** ,--------'-frw~A:=,-:'_:_.-------:------",.".,.., ~.i.'****~.~<:ijf:'.1.~"RiwIs16~H .~eE~~~t~B1tm~ka'E,.i~OO7C~j~J eE.1~::1F;,'~l!IlOn j etM~008A.G;'~IOOPm:-t4bOOAN.
6E-144OfOaAGinw Roni P E 40osA N, Rlwlsitm'RSE--24C1OM, R v~ifn R R4WisIOnEE '6E-2"'(}OO9(~lOftE 6jE-2-40(*A, Raelslcn 6E-2-40061, Ravsicn~ E-SE4l4OO1C~'Rl1i~ GE-2-400'7C.00*lot Ii' H ;zE.2-440O7F Ravi!06l K ie'*2~7F. RevtSiOnK" 6~2-,4OOOAG.Ro~I<' 8L-Z4W4W~G. 6e~~.~N ROMiONlq K, 6Ek2-AOO&AN, w Rtn~iais N
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,.DESIGN-INFORMATIOIN;TPANSMrrTAL-0 TrN.' 0R4O o: 1~OO2 P 2 ~ f The Th'iUpj(g! ~et1415Z inn-jkfbe GOV Bus 141 wouildrelt 141 5Z at 41 OOvBu&H:tWOUlci ~lIfQ' m&l~; h i 48We:~"S,~r1~1'3~t(1~,
486V ESIF Sk-blaio Bus 131Z JIAP919E) . ESwCC9lin9t~~*fan~~CA(~.&~Speed) ESN CooliT~Taww Fan 0ISXO3CA fK'O &Low Spoed) E~W ESW Coolijg ~1~,J~FI,!nOSX{)3CS(~"L.oW Ta~m Fan OGSX3CS fl~ WO Low SpMd): Speed) Non.ESfJ'~JP~E!lPutriP:,.d)WW01PA; Non-ESF DapWe-g Pump OWWO1PA v.' 4aoVe;sW¢~g I480V E$WV Coi~ng T Tower ',' NtCC, }1~111 131 ZI (tAPOOE) (1AP.3E,) 5.$0 Mafte-Ip Valve OSX E~~~MI!~~;~Y~ . "1'.'5A E$W*S~W.co~)1:0lMtr.,tlA;9as'n,S)'Pl!tstCvmve()$162A' EVSW ervice Water Coolling Tower OA Basin S~pass Valve X1A ESW . . Coauling
..ESWCOOlr' .",tIC",T~*OA*~A Tcw#er ,',...GA .07Al. A Riser
' RlHrVatW.OSX,1G3A.
.. '. Valve OSXI63A PSW Cooling ThwerOA Cell B Riser Valve OS 11838 ES'W*COoliri(l;TowerOACell,B.RlHr.Val¥e*OSX;,1638::
~~~~[:~S~~~~~~~~~~:WX05C' 1ESW Goo ing Tower Wvsa 11 Swi~8t rQmVI1eAflFnV)S MOCC 31Z1 12W12U0Vac Distrtut-oi Panelbomrd dw~t.els
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*oo 0SOX3CcA Spae Heate-HALocai WA Coirlro Paine 1VX05J
*v, pion r S~rWePanelI1VX98J-
*F ESW Oooling Tower QA Bas~in LeVelSvIIch O-L&.SXdi~
*tldr X03CB Space Heater 4fMOV OSXt63A Limit Swlith Healer
,'., ,MO:\I'OSXldUmltSNItmH08tet' Nan.ESf~
Non-ESf 48GV MCc*131Z1A MCC 131V A (1AP8ee) (IAPE89fl
*'lhtW2t~ker i4m*aj'41iWaJii'j42WcYltlrjtllir'l6el(!$.'~t
- 4!oVESf$1,I~_,tm(1~BE>>.
480V ESF Subsab Bus 32Z (1APDBE) '.v' ...... . ESW Cooling TOWerfa~~~Qt!f(flfih~tiWt~PMdf eswcOour,g Tawer Fan CSX03CE (High &Low Spaed) eSW;Coollng.T~FinOSX03t::fS:(fillg,h&l:OW~,:, ESW Cooling Tower Fan CSX03CF {IWih 9 Low Speed) NonESF 'ESfO"W Deep Well. Pum Pump OWWN1 OWW'O PS~ PS" ." '.',
~E~~;~4lfjT4MCC1~k{(t~~f'
.460 ESW Cooling Tcam MCC 132V1 (tAP92E) '.
EtSW MalkeAUp Valve OSX157A
!!,lifli'~1~~~~~1~<
ESW Sericle Water Cooling Twwer 08 Basin Byparm vatvs dSXI 825ý E,4W Coollng Ttowe'r O CGe E Risr Valie G3X163E' ESWCOolliig!Ti:l'War:OeCeUfRiwVOM){)SX 163~:: ',,' ... ' '. .., .. ', ,'.'
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E§SW Coaling Tower tOusi12 switoh~a RotomVrhti on Faro61261C MCC-132ZI 112O?20IVic Dsilbuflln P&ýIuaboýar grdAixlakros'
- Polor OSX03CE S C's Heater
~:
- HVAcLOcatControJPanOll'VX06J; 1-VAC Local CoiiWPanei IVXOOJ,
.,;;* Dmpel oarn~'S1iu1.;P31~1vXOOJ".,.:y.
5tauief Pwmel IVX"9j . "
.*>*ESW '~SW'¢'~!ngt~O$~tri~$_Q~o91 Codin~g Tows 03 Basin Level SwitchI OLS&8XO9? ~, *Molor ~OIorOSXOOCF'S OSX03CF Space Heater'*., Heale " .<
- M6v'~163eUiril..
#4V GSX163E Lkrit aWkth "'H~'Heater j( MQ\fO$X163fJ:JmRS!IIlterlHoatar, NIOQV GSXI163P Umlli Swldi Heater NOn..ESf'48lovMcC132Z1A.(tAPI'BEl Ncm-ESF 4OV MCC 132Z1A (IAP86.4-) -O," 8 "UR4C W PGdc.
Rmv Eotrn 6iW254,t
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~ .DESIGN INFORM -ATION TRANSMITTAL DIT No,:' 904-BYR-80T4-1 P ~No,: 113-G1 3
-480V' ESF Substation Bus 23 1Z (2APBE)
ýESW, Cooling Tower Fan OSX03CC (KO~i Low Sp(ied)
ESW*C~oding Tower Fanl"OSX03CD (Hi'h & Low Sp~ed). 480V.,SW Cooling To~we MCC 231 Zi (iAO931ý) SSW P.ae~-Up Valo 0,SX15B B ESW Service Watax Cooling TuworA Baes p Valve GSX 1 2C Rye iESW Cooilx TawtrGACel C Riser Volvo 0SX1163C EW Coing Towvu OA Culf 0 W~sor Valve OSX1630 ESW CocAlig Tower 'i~slon 21 Swithgoar Room Ventflatin Fan2VX5C,
ýMCC 231Z1 12Q1208VaC Glstrbu~Ow Pane-boarti wtd Auxhir~a69
- otoi GSXCC Space Hetr
* -IAC Local Caowttol Panel 2VXOSJ aamper Star~er Panel 2VX9$I
*Motcw GSXG3CO Space Howler I FO'V OSX*U63C LIMit Switch 1-leelr
",uNiOV.OSX163D ILimit Switch Heabur
.,Non-ESF 48WV MCC 231 ZIA (2AP8SE).
The kiss of b~-aker 2425ZjaArnftLOV 242 n i 1681ru oe t
;,460V ESF7 Substation Bus 232Z (2AP-98E),
ESW Coalfing Tower 5an 0SX03CH (High &Low Speed) 480V ESW CmoItg TcmweMCC 232ZI (2AP92E) ESW Maka-Up Valve O$XT1S7Bl EtSW Service Waler Cooling, Tower'O8S Basin 8ypzas Valve SX1 6201
ýESW ~oelhing Tower OB C61l G Riser Volvo 0SX163G ESWNCooingTowerOB80(Ce1 RisrVa~e 0SX1 63 pSooling Tower Dtvislon 22 SWiletigwa Room Vertlalto a VOC M~OO 232ZI1 20MZOac lsrbionPanelboard ana Auxr a4
*eMooO$X03C( Space Hesater
*HVAC Local Control Panel 2VXOGJ
*Damper SUavter Panel 2VX919j
'1 04ata CSXO3CH Spaca Heater
*MOV OSX163G knlt wltch Healer
*MOV 0SX163H Limit Swi"c Heater Nori.ESF 400V MCC 23971A (2AP89E}
004tJ;By~44J(II FI'(U;O:xii . Dat9:(Jl~29:~_
- Ri!ti':Date.,
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. A'TACHMENT ATTACHMENT 3 References Additional References
- 3. MathCAD MathCAD file for NRC Request Request 6
Page 16 16 Design Verification Two Tower Model - (Heat (Heat load for Power Uprate) gal 6 ORIGIN I in:;; ORIGIN;: in IL Ibm =IM Ibm;: F IQ sec 1M F;: see;: IT gpm:= gpm:= -
- . BTU :=Ibm.F BTU:= Ibm*F MBTU:= BTU 106 BTU. 10 min mfO Cooling Cooling Tower Performance Performance 144.26) (:=104.26) 104.26 .F
- = ( 144.26/.F Thl:= *F Tel:= ( *F (136.54 136.54 (102.54) 102.54 104.26)F 144.26) 104.26)
Th2= ( 144.26) *FF Th2:= Tc2 := (,102.54)" *F Te2:= ( 102.54 (136.54 136.54 T 144.26 144.26) Th3 := ( *F Te3:= To3: T(104.26).F 104.26) 102.54 -F 136.54 136.54 102.54 144.26) 104.26) Th4:= (n144.26 ( 136.54 *F F Te4:= ((104,261.F*F (136.54) 4 102.54) 102.54
17 Page 17 Up~rate Heat load Uprate Heat (L42) load (£42) 150, 150 0.00 0.00 150 0.17 0.17 150 0.35 0.35 150 0.50 0.50 150 0.75 150 2.00 150 2.17 2.17 150 2.33 2.33 150 2.50 2.50 150 3.32 150 4.98 150 6.65 150 8.32 8.32 150 9.98 150 11.50 11.50 150 11.65 11.65 150 150 13.32 13.32 150 150 14.98 150 16.65 150 MBTU MBTU 18.32 18.32 L2:= L2:= 150 hr T2 T2:= 19.98 19.98
.min
*min 150 21.65 150 23.32 23.32 150 29.98 150 39.98 39.98 150 150 49.98 150 59.98 59.98 150 83.32 83.32
_150 116.65 116.65 150 166.65 166.65 150 333.32 333.32 150 480.00 150 480.17 480.17 150 540.00 150 600.00 150 627.50 150 660.00 150 660.17 660.17 150 732.00 150) 150 732.17 732.17
Page 18 PagelS SX System Flow rate QI 104000-gpm QI := 104000'gpm (Total flow to Tl TI and and T2 gpm) 104000.gpm Q2:= 104000'gpm (Total flow to Tl TI and and T2 gpm) Basin Basin Mass Mass 6 (Design input 2.1) 2.1) V:= 1.068*10 V:== 1.068.10 *gal.gal Ibm Ibm BTU 6 8.33.- p:= 8.33*- Mb:= p-V C p := 1 1.Flb
*-- Mb=8.9x Mb = 8.9 x 10 6Ibm Ibm gal F*lbm (Active/Total)
Fans (Active/Total) Time Constant Constant V V T2 := - V rl:=- t2:= fl 1:=0.156 fll:= 0.156 f12:= 0.156 fl2:= 0.156 QI Q2 f21 :==0.156 0.156 f22:= 0.156 fl2:= 0.156 Ti=== 10.27min rl 10.27min T2 r2 == 10.27 min min Fraction of flow to Tower Fraction Tower 1 Fraction Fraction of heat load to Tower Tower 1 al := 0.5 0.1 0.5 a2 := 0.5 0.2;= P1 := 0.53 (31 32:= (32 := 0.53 Find Slopes and Intercepts Intercepts of cooling cooling towers 1 and 2 MI1 := MIl := slope(Thl,Tcl) slope(Th I , Tc I) B iI intercept(Th II,, Tc I) II := intercept(Th I) M12:= M 12 :=: slope(Th3,Tc3) slope(Th3, Tc3) B12 B 12 := intercept(Th3,Tc3)
- = intercept(Th3, Tc3)
M21 := := slope(Th2,Tc2) slope(Th2, Te2) B21 := intercept(Th2,Tc2) B21:= intercept(Th2, Tc2) M22 := slope(Th4,Tc4) slope(Th4, Tc4) B22 B22:= intercept(Th4,Tc4) intercept(Th4, Tc4) M I I = 0.223 MIl Bit =72.119F BII = 72.119F M12 MI2 = 0.223 B12 = 72.119F BI2=72.119F M21 = 0.223 B21 = 72.119 72.119 F M22 = 0.223 B22 = 72.119 72.119 FF
PagelS Page 19 Calculate Intermediate constants Calculate Intermediate Constants ALI := (- Al ~I (---.[l- al.[(!- - f-l)
}[I - al*[(1 fll) + fll*MII]
flIt.MI ] - (I - ctl).(I al).(1 - f21121 + f21.M21)] f2t.M21)] A2:= ~2}[1 A2 : (- V( "[- - a2*[(1ca2. [(I - ft 2) + fl2*MI2] fl2) a2).(I - f22 + f22. fl 2. M 12] - (I --(2).(1 M22)] f22*M22)] Dt.(1 - ffllI + fll*MII) pl*(I ft I.MII) + (I - pl).(1P3t)-(1 - f21f2l + f2t-M21) f21*M21) Ol:=~~----------~~--~~----------~ Dl := Mb'Cp D2 : p2*(1 f12.M12) + (I - P2).(1 D=2.(1 - fl2 + fl2*MI2) p2).(1 - t22 + f22.M22) f22*M22) 02:=~~----------~--~~~~----------~ Mb'Cp Mb'Cp al*f11*BII + (I - al)*f2I.B21 Q alfl-Bl + (I - tl).21.B21 CI := QI*--------'---~-- C V V C2 := Q2.,0.f12.B12 a2*f12*BI2 + (I - a2).f!2. (2)*f22*B22B22 C2 := Q2*~----'----"--- V A = -0.0 1-L1 AII =-0.01- 01 9.88 x 10 DI ==9.88x
-8
- 8 F 10 - - F min min BTU BTU -= 1.1-Cl =1.1-min
, I 108- 8 F F A2 = -o.o A2=-0.01- - 02 = 9.88 x 10 D2=9.88x --
C2 = 1.1-1.1 F min BTU min Integrating to Solve for Basin Temperature Integrating Temperature
- cC~je.. ka,ý, e~- ~
3 ,V\.: h J +e-vvtf 91.F UbI := 91*F i:= 1L..299
.. 299 H:= .1-min
.I*min st.:= i-H st. :== i*H
+0 9
+0 \ F.
c~o~0 I use uprate heat load Ubi+l := Ubi+ [(AI.Ubi) + (linterp(T2,L2,sti).DI) + (CI)].H operator action at with operator at t=30 minutes minutes to reduce reduce heat load i := 300.. i:= 15000 300 .. 15000 H:= .l-min
.I*min st.:=
I i-H j*H I use uprate uprate heat heat load Ubi+1 := Ubi + [(A2.Ubi) + (linterp(T2,L2,sti).D2) + (C2)].H with operator action at at t=30 minutes minutes to reduce heat load
110 Page 110 Results,: i := 1,20.. 1,20 .. 15000 15000 Results 130 130 125 120 120 115 115 0 Ubj Ubi 110 110 105 100 100 95 90 0 2.25-104 4.5 *104 6.75.1044 6.75.\0 9.104 sts Basin Temperature Response vs. Time (sec) Basin Temperature Response vs. (sec) uprate heat load use uprate maximum:= maximum +- 0 for i E( 300 300.... 15000 15000 max(Ub) = = 113.71 113.71 F maximum +- maximum +-- max(Ub.) max(Ub j) if max(Ubi)) ~ if max(Ub >_maximum maximum j Ub 300 = 97.8 F Ub 300 maximum = 113.71113.71 F Ublo0 Ub = 93.5 F 100 index:= index := index 4- +- 0 Ublo3 Ub =
= 93.6 F maximum maximum 4- +- 00 lO3 for ii EE 300 15000 300.... 15000 maximum +- +- max(Ub) max(Ub j) ~>- maximum max(Ub j) if max(Ubi) maximum index + i if max(Ub ~ maximum max(Ub.i)j) Ž:
index== \.5 1044 1.5xx 10 index Ubindex Ub. d = 113.71 113.71 F In ex Stindex st. d = In ex
= 90000 90000 sec
Page III Page 111 Temperature and UHS Heat Load Basin Temperature Load vs. Time vs. Time i:= 1, i:= 26.... 1000 1,26 1000 . linterp(T2, L2, linterp(T2, S\) L2, sti) Ub. Ubi MBTU MBTU
= st.
St FF I
--hr hr min min I
91 150 150 0.1 91.66 91.66 150 150 2.6 92.3 150 150 5.1 92.93 150 T76 7.6 93.53 150 10.1 94.12 94.12 150 12.6 12.6 94.69 94.69 150 15.1 95.24 95.24 150 17.6 17.6 95.78 95.78 150 20.1 96.3 150 150 22.6 96.811 96.81 150 25.1 97.3 150 27.6 97.78 97.78 150 30.1 98.24 98.24 150 32.6 98.69 98.69 150 35.1 99.13 99.13 150 37.6
112 Page 112 ii := 1,20 1,20.... 6000 i1000r---------------------------------------------~ AAA 800 600 600 lintcrp(T2, L2, lintcrp('r2, L2, sti) (M:~U) (MBTUJ 400 200 O~----------------------------------------------~ 0 o0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 6000 sti stj Post LOCA Time (sec) UHS UHS Accident Heat Heat Load Profile L42 L42
ATTACHMENT Additional 3 References ATTACHMENT 3 Additional References
- 4. Calculation NED-Q-MSD-001, "ESW Cooling Tower Transient Model:
Part I"
- 4. Calculation NED~Q~MSD~001, "ESW Cooling Tower Transient Model: Part I"
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'16769576 95 ENGINEERING DBPARlMENT NUCLEAR ENCDfEEIlINC DEPARTMENT Exhibit D TABLE OF CONTENTS CONTENTS ENC-QE-51 .D ENC-QE-Sl.D Revision 1I Page 22 of 2.Z CALCULATION NO: lJeIJ-q-A/eP--M*-- MSl>-{ REV.
REV.- 0 PAGE Z PACE 2 OF 2'- 2-PAGES DESCRIPTION 1I CALCULATION TITLE PAGEPAGE 22 CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS 3 DATA HISTORICAL DAtA 4 CALCULATION
SUMMARY
SHEET CALCULATION StMUllY SHEET 5 CALCULATION CHECKLIST CALCtJLATIOlf CHECKLIST 6-26 6- 26 CALCULATION BODY OF CALCULATIOlf ATTACUMENTS ArrACBMINTS
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!RC-Q!-51.D Revision LI 18.181011 Page 22 of 1.2 Paae PREPARED BY: 3AuA1/.- DATE: CALC - NO: A140 - Q- f9.fp - (
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SUMMARY
SHEETSREET Revie Revision ion I1 Page Page Z2 of of 22 I CALCULATION CALCULATION NO: NO: NJCD NeD -Q-"SD--
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~I/DWAJ.. cc..r REFERECES RU'EUNCES I. EJoJVI/lt)~""<<~A-t- "Syn'"~s CtD~l'. C~$G) fl!'S'T' ,.fEr/,t!)~.,. z>.+rl!"P 1/l.¥I~; ~'IUIol AJlk:."~ &-1!i)./eT/....rl,I.J&- ~.,.,f-7'IOIJ I!S'6/ffAJ1"I.t/L ~""'CG
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COIWITS Pa v'zT CCIImNTS P~ARDt::7) DA~"'/91 7 REVIEWER DATE DATI
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"APAPf DATE
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DATI
.f/ ~;J.II'I QEQI -51.D
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Exhibit G Exhibit
" NUCLEAR2 NUCIJWl. ENGINEERING EHCIHIDINC DEPARTMENT CALCULATION CHECKLIST CALCULATION DEPAa'mENT CKEcnIST 167695 167695 ENC-QE-51.
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CALCULATION NO: A1EO - A --NSD
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YES NO YES NO INA NA REMARKS 1.
- 1. IS IS THETHE OBJECTIVE OBJECTIVE OF OF THE THE ANALYSIS CLEARLY CLEARLY STATED?STA1'ED1 ANALYSIS /'
2.
- 2. ARE AU THE THE ASSUMPTIONS, JUDGENTS ASSllMPtIONS, JUDGEKEHTS VALID VALID ANDAND ENGINEERING ENGINEERING DOCUMENTED?
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- 3. ARE AU THE THE ASSUMPTIONS ASSlJIUITIONS THATTHAT NEED HDD V TK(~ ~~C. /'10 ,Iolf!.
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- 4. ARE AU THE 1m! REFERENCES UJ'EUHCES (I.E. (I.E. DRAWINGS, DRAWINGS, CODES, CODIS. STANDARDS,)
STANDAlDS,) LISTEDLIStED BY BY REV., lEV., EDITION, EDITION, DATE, DATE, ETC.? ETC.?
- 5. '7
- 5. IS IS THEt i l DESIGN DESIGN METHOD Ml'mOD CORRECT COUICT AND AND APPROPRIATE APPROPRIATE FOR POa THIS tHIS ANALYSIS?
ANALYSIS? 6.
- 6. IS IS THEt i l CALCULATION CALCULATION IN DI COMPLIANCE CCllPLIldfCE WITHWITH DESIGCD CRITERIA, CODES, DESIGN CRITERIA, CODES, STANDARDS, S'rANDAIDS.
AND AND REG.R.EG. GUIDES? 0 7.
- 7. ARE AU THE GUIDIS?
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- 8. ARE AU THE TBB DESIGN DISIGN INPUTS mVlS AND AIm THEIR DEIR SOURCES IDENTFIED AND SOURCIS IDINTI'lI>> ANI) All IN ARU IN COMPLIANCE CCllPLIAMC& WITH WIm UFSAR, UlSAI., TECH
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167695 167695 NUCLEAJ. NUCLEAR QlGDfUlIHG EI ETINR NG DEPAll'lMlNT DEPARThDIT Exhibit Exhib it II CACUlATIaN SlUT CA.LCULA.TIOH SHEE ENC-QE-51.D ENC-QK-51. D Revision tI RevidOD 0 Page Z Pale 2 ofof 22 PREPARE BY:l,.I,_ DATE: CALC. NO: VEZ - - -#WS -I PREPAUD BY:J'.- ~,_ DAT.!: ~/JI"I CALC. NO: Nc/:) - ~ -HS/)-I PAGE NO: PAGE NO: 6 OF 2(P2(. REV IEWED BY: ~ aATE: .r "4 REV 00 REV DATE: DATE: ~.:l/~I
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EXHIBIT II ENC-QE-5l.D ENC-QE-51. D CALC.# NED-Q-MSD-1 CALC.# NED-Q-MSD-1 Page 77 of 26 26 JI hý 7695 769 6.0 Body of Calculation 6.1 OVerview of Model Development Overview Development or Background Backsround This section discusses discusses the background background and reasons for the development development of aa time-dependent time-dependent model model of the ESW cooling towers. towers. The The model is model is then presented presented and applied to two straightforward straightforward examples. examples. As discussed discussed in Reference 3, in Reference 3, the early preoperational preoperational testing of the towers indicated indicated that their heat removal capabilities capabilities were significantly less than the original original design values. values. At a wet bulb temperature temperature of 78*F 78°F the basin temperature temperature was was-not not to exceed the design design value of 98°F 98*F for for loads of up to approximately approximately 1040 MBtu/hr. MBtu/hr. Although the required required heat heat removal rate removal rate for similar constraintsconstraints was close close to 600 600 MBtu/hr, MBtu/hr, the extrapolation extrapolation of the test test data resulted resulted in in aa slightly slightly lower value (z 570 (:::: MBtu/hr). 570 MBtu/hr). If subsequent If subsequent testing verified verified the aboveabove preliminary projection, projection, hardware hardware modifications modifications and/or re-analysisre-analysis of the design design bases would have have to be undertaken. undertaken. This situation provided the motivation to develop the time-dependent motivation time-dependent cooling tower model. model. The highly transienttransient naturenature of the LOCA load load suggests suggests that the basin temperature temperature would not exceed 98*F even for significantly exceed 98°F significantly degraded degraded tower tower performance. For example, performance. example, although although the peak LOCA load is is close close to to J600 600 MBtu/hr (Ref. 2, 2, Fig. 9.2-7), 9.2-7), the average load for the first first hour is is approximately 400 MBtu/hr approximately MBtu/hr (Ref. (Ref. 2, Table 9.2-6). 2, Table 9.2-6). At two hours into the LOCA the heat load has decreased decreased to = :::: 350 MBtu/hr, MBtu/hr, and at this load, load, the corresponding corresponding steady steady state state basin temperature temperature is is approximately approximately 92°F. 92°F. Thus, Thus, it it appeared appeared reasonable reasonable to conjecture conjecture that if if the ESW cooling cooling tower tower response lagged response lagged behind the imposed imposed load the corresponding corresponding steady state peak basin temperatures temperatures would not be be reached. reached. The total water water inventory inventory of the ESW system, system, including the basin and associated piping, associated piping, is is approximately approximately one one million gallonsgallons (see Ref. Ref. 3, 3, App. App. C, e, Part D). D). If the LOeA If LOCA load was imposed imposed on the cooling cooling towers towers with with an initialinitial temperature of 80°F, basin temperature 80"F, the allowed 18°F 18*F temperature temperature rise, together rise, together with the above water inventory, inventory, represents a thermal thermal sink of approximately approximately 150 MBtu. MBtu. In In turn, turn, if if the towers were completely completely inoperable, inoperable, and all all of the LOCA LOeA heat was was dissipated dissipated in in the ESW water,water, the allowed the allowed basin basin temperature temperature of of 98°F 98°F (Tech(Tech Spec) Spec) would not be reached reached for at least 16 minutes after after LOCA LOeA onset. onset. This thermal capacity capacity was was thought thought to be be sufficient to introduceintroduce adequateadequate lag in tower response in the tower response to to the the LOCA LOeA load.load. The following following section presents a time-dependent time-dependent model of the ESW ESW cooling towers.towers. The major major features of this treatment treatment are the inclusion transient LOCA load and the thermal capacity of the ESW system. of the transient system. 6.2 Model Development Development
- Development Development of of thethe model proceeds proceeds from from a discussion of of steady state cooling tower performance.
performance. Conventional terminology is Conventional terminology is introduced and specifics relating to specifics to the the Byron ESWESW cooling cooling towers are presented. presented. The The
EXHIBIT rI ENC-QE-Sl.D ENC-QE-5 .D CALC.# NED-Q-MSD-l CALC.# NED-Q-MSD-l Page Page 88 of of 26 26 167695 transient transient LOCA load is is then briefly discussed and approximated approximated as a piecewise linear function. piecewise function. By performing a heat heat balance, balance, including including the transient transient heat heat load and ESW water inventory acting as aa thermal inventory acting thermal reservoir, reservoir, a general general firstfirst order differential differential equation describing describing the time-dependent time-dependent tower tower response is is developed. developed. This equation is is then solved analytically solved analytically for the case of an operational operational cooling tower. tower. The The final applications consider a partially partially non-functioning non-functioning tower tower as this situation may be present at different times during certain accident accident scenarios. scenarios. 6.2.1 Coolini 6.2.1 Cooling Tower Heat Remoyal Removal schematic shown in The schematic in Figure 1 I serves to illustrate illustrate the features and terminology terminology required for the developmentdevelopment of the cooling cooling tower tower analytical model. analytical model. For a total total mass flow rate ro, rate of m, (in (in lb/hr), lb/hr), circulating circulating through the system, system, the temperature rise, rise, (in (in OF),
*F), in in the coolant is is given by by ATL = L/mCp (1)
(1) where where L is the applied is the applied load,load, (in(in Btu/hr). Btu/hr), and and Cp Cp is is the specific specific heat heat ofof the water. water. steady For steady state loads, dTL is loads, ATL is normally referred to as the referred range; that is, range; is, under equilibrium conditions the temperature equilibrium conditions temperature rise across across the the load temperature decrease load equals the temperature decrease across across the tower. tower. For aa basin temperature temperature of TB, T
- the hot water B water temperature exiting the load is temperature exiting is Th = TB + ATL (2)
(2) and in in turn, turn, Th is is the temperature temperature of the water entering entering the cooling tower. tower. As the water water passes through the tower, tower, heat is is transferred transferred from the water water to the air, air, and the water water drops in in temperature temperature from Th to T T ,* the cold water temperature. water exit temperature. The relationship relationship between Tc and Th Is one one that depends on that depends on the air the air and water flow rates,rates, actual actual size and physical physical characteristics of the tower, characteristics tower, and the ambient weather conditions. conditions. Reference I1 discusses Reference discusses the extensive test program program undertaken undertaken to determine specific thermal characteristics the specific characteristics of the ESW cooling towers. towers. Typical Typical performance curves performance curves are given which which show how Tc varies with wet bulb temperature temperature under different different heat loads. loads. For development development of the transient model this information transient information is is best displayed displayed as shown shown in in the attached Figure 2. attached 2. At a given wet bulb temperature temperature and water water flow rate, rate, Tc is observed Tc is observed to be a slowly a slowly varying function of Th
- Th. To facilitate the facilitate analysis then, analysis then, this function is is approximated by a piecewise piecewise linear linear function:
function: Tc = MiTh Bi (3) ( (3)
EXHIBIT II EXHIBIT ENC-QE-51 ENC-QE-5l.D .D CALC.# CALC.# NED-Q-MSD-l NED-Q-MSD-l Page Page 99 of of 26 26 167695 slope and intercept constants for the ith 1 6 76 95 where Mf where and Bj Mi and Bi areare thethe slope and intercept constants for the ith interva. interval of of Th:T : h Ti_1 5 Th 5 Ti Typical Typical valvesvalves are are M. M. zz 0.4 0.4 and and BiBi =z 49*F 49°F in in the the range range of of Th of of interest, interest, (See (See Ref. I). Ref. 1). Thus, Thus, with with these these constants constants andand an an example example of of ThTh
=::: 100°F, 100°F, the the exit exit temperature temperature is is Tc Tc == 89*F, 89°F, i.e.,
i.e., the the water water was was cooled cooled 0 by by 1l 11°F F as as itit passed passed throughthrough the the tower. tower. The The size size of of the the temperature temperature interval interval chosen,chosen, (Ti (T i -- TilTi - l1),), dictates dictates both both the the accuracy accuracy of of the approximation approximation and and thethe computational computational complexity complexity of of final final calculations: calculations: smaller smaller temperature temperature intervals intervals are are clearly clearly moremore accurate, accurate, but,but, as as will will be be seen in the following, require significantly seen in the following, require significantly more calculations. more calculations. 6.2.2 6.2.2 LOCA LOCA HeatHeat Loads Loads Under Under accident accident conditions conditions the the loadload imposed imposed on on the the towers towers is is given given byby the the sumsum of of thethe LOCA LOCA load load fromfrom one one unit unit and and aa contribution contribution from from thethe other other unit. unit. The The values values of of these these loadsloads are are derived derived fromfrom both both actual actual plantplant performance data and performance data and the application the application of of models models to to various various accident accident scenarios. scenarios. UFSAR UFSAR TableTable 9.2-6 9.2-6 givesgives aa LOCA LOCA unit unit heat heat rejection rejection summary summary listing listing results results at at specific specific time time intervals intervals (see (see Figure Figure 3). 3). For For example, example, at at 45 45 seconds seconds after after LOCA LOeA onset onset the the heat heat rejected rejected isis 515 515 MBtu/hr, MBtu/hr, and and at at 100 seconds 100 seconds the the load load has has increased increased to to aa peak peak" 556 556 MBtu/hr. MBtu/hr. UsingUsing thesethese results, results, and and adding adding the the NON-LOCA NON-LOCA unit unit load,load, thethe total total load load isis expressed expressed as a piecewise linear as a piecewise linear function: function: L = Mjt + Bj (4) (4) where where LL isis the the total total load load at at timetime t,t, (in (in Btu/hr), Btu/hr), and and M., M., (in BiYh~r) (in m n and Bj, (in BTU/hr) and Bj' (in BTU/hr) are the slope are the slope and intercept constan and intercept constanis s for the for the jth jth time time interval: 1n terval : tj -l ;9 t tj tj_l ~ t ~ tj Using Using equations equations (1) (1) andand (4) (4) then then gives gives thethe temperature temperature rise rise across across the the load: load: ATL = (Mit + Bj)/(mC p)
= mjt + b* (5)
=m*t+b*
J J (5 ) where where now, now, m. mjJ and and b. b* are are thethe slope slope and and intercept intercept constants constants th characterizing the ~emperature rise characterizing the 4emperature rise inin the jth time the jth time interval. interval. mj = M. M.J1, °F/min. m*J = ~. OF/min. m!Cp mC p bj b =::: j ~, J_, -F mCp OF mC p
EXHIBIT I ENC-QE-51.D ENC-QE-51.D CALC.# NED-Q-MSD-l CALC.# NED-Q-MSD-l Page 10 of 26 0 6.2.3 Time Dependent Dependent Heat Balance Balance 167695 16 76 95 Figure 1 schematically schematically displays the parameters and variables required for the following development. development. purposes of this For the purposes analysis it it is assumed that the ESW water inventory, is assumed inventory, M B, is MB, is a constant. constant. This isis aa reasonable reasonable assumption since the safety-related assumption since makeup safety-related makeup capability exceeds capability exceeds the losses losses due to evaporation, drift and blowdown. evaporation, drift blowdown. The makeup waterwater enters the basin at the ambient temperature temperature of the Rock Rock River. River. In the interval of time ~t, In quantity of water m~t At, the quantity mAt both enters and exits the basin.basin. Because the entering and exiting temperatures temperatures are Tc and T TB, B , respectively, respectively, the quantity of heat added to the basin in in time At is M is AQ = (mAt)Cp (Tc - TB) Further, differential change in Further, the differential in basin temperature temperature in in time ~t At is is given byby ATB = AQ/MBCp Taking the limit as ~t Taking At goes to zero zero yields dT = (Tc - T M/M dTB = (Tc - TB)m/MB dt dt Letting TT ~T = = MB/m yields dTB = (Tc - TB)/tT (6) (6) dt where TT ~T is is recognized recognized as the time required to replace replace the total total inventory MB when the total flowrate is is m. 6.2.4 Time Dependent 6.2.4 Coo1ini Tower Operation Dependent Cooling Operation effect of heat removal The effect removal in tower, together with the transient in the tower, transient nature of the LOCA nature LOCA load, incorporated. Combining load, will now be incorporated. Combining equations equations 2, 3, 2, 3, and 55 yields yields Tc = Mi(TB + mjt + bj) + Bi (7) (7) and this applies to the ith Th interval interval and jth time interval. interval.
EXHIBIT II EXHIBIT ENC-QE-51 .D ENC-QE-5l.D CALC. # NED-Q-MSD-l CALC.# NED-Q-MSD-l Page 11 of 26 16 769g, 167695' When this expression expression is is inserted into (6) (6) and terms are re-arranged the final final differential differential equation equation describing describing the response response of the basin basin temperature to the LOeA temperature LOCA load is is obtained obtained (see Appendix A): A): dtT + D Ki(mjt + bj)/ti + (8)
= (i8 dt T where Ki ===
K. M. M*
~ l-Ai and Ti =
1:i = 1:T (l-Mi ) Recognizing that Recognizing Mi' Mi, Bi'Bi, mj.min, b bj and j and LT tT are constants. the solution that are constants, solution to (8) (8) is is straight forward and given by by TB(t) TB(t) = Cije= -t/-c*1 + Cije-t/i mjKiTi(-l
+ mjKi'ti ( - 1 + t/'ti) t/-i) (9)
(9)
+ K*b*
Kib 1 + 1 J
+ Bi Bi (l-M i )
where where Cij Cij = [TB(tij)
= [TB(t .. ) mjKi¶i(-I +
-- m.Ki't*(-l + tij/Ti) tijh: i ) -- Kibj K*b*
1J J 1 1 J Seie] e(tijl/i) (10) (10) B. ] e(tij/'ti) l~i and tijtijJ is is that time when the solution solution has to be re-initialized re-initialized due to to transferring transferring to to either either aa different different time interval interval or a different different Th Th interval. interval. See Appendix B. A brief explanation explanation of the initializationinitialization constant constant Cij is is warranted warranted at at this time. this time. As As indicated earlier, m. indicated earlier. mj and and bbi represent represent the constants constants for for the piecewise linear approximation the piecewise approximation ?o to the LOCAtOCA loadload for the jth jth time time interval. interval. For example, the For example. the first first set set of of constants constants only describedescribe the LOCA load for LOCA load for the the time interval interval of 0-45 sec. sec. At the end of this interval interval the constantconstant Cij Cij is is re-evaluated re-evaluated and inserted into (9) (9) for the next linear interval. interval. Note Note that in in thethe subsequent subsequent interval interval the next set set of constants constants are also incorporated incorporated into (10). (10). Similar re-initialization is required is transferring from one tower segment required when transferring segment to another. another. In In summary, summary. the constant Ci' the constant Ci- will will be be evaluated evaluated several several times, times. and its its application provides application provides continuity continuity in in thethe final solution solution for TB(t). TB(t). 6.2.5 6.2.5 Cooling Coolini TowerTower HeatHeat Removal Removal with FaultedFaulted Cells.Cells. There There are four four separate separate cellscells in in each each of the Byron ESW cooling towers towers and and water water flow from either either unit may be be diverted diverted to either either tower tower and and any any of the eight available available cells. cells. Depending Depending upon the operational operational alignment alignment at at LOCA LOCA onset, onset. and and further, depending upon further. depending upon the the postulated accident scenario, it accident scenario, is possible it is possible that for some period period ofof time time the imposed imposed heat heat load load will will be be deposited deposited directlydirectly into into the ESWESW water water
EXHIBIT EXHIBIT II ENC-QE-51. ENC-QE-5 1. D D CALC.#II NED-Q-MSD-l CALC. NED-Q-MSD-i 1 2 11gZ Page l2t5 Page '66 95 9. inventory. inventory. Further, it Further, it isis possible that that for for thethe duration duration of the the LOGA, LOCA, some water may some may be passing through cells cells with with inoperable inoperable fans. fans. Although Although will be there will be some cooling cooling of water, water, via natural circulation circulation of of air, air, a conservative conservative analysis analysis assumes assumes zero zero heat removal for for such faulted cells. The following analysis The analysis considers the three three cases cases of:of: a) Zero heat removal for for the initial portion of of the LOGALOCA b) b) Normal heat removal with with operational cells cells concurrent concurrent with zero heat removal in in faulted cells, cells, c) c) Normal heat removal with operational operational cells concurrent concurrent with partial heat removal (natural (natural convection) convection) in in faulted cells. cells. 6.2.5.a 6.2.5.a Tower Response With No Coolini Tower Cooling With no heat removal at LOCA onset, onset, the full LOCA load is is deposited in the ESW water inventory. in inventory. This condition could arise, arise, for example,example, weather operation when all ESW water is during cold weather is bypassing the cells cells and isis being diverted diverted directly to the basin. basin. The water entering the basin is is then at the temperature temperature given by Equation Equation (2): (2): Tc = Th = TB + ATL
=
= TB TB + mjt m*t J
+ bj b*]
Equation (6), Equation (6), describing describing the time dependent dependent heat balance of the basin, basin, then becomes then becomes dTB_= (mjt + (11 ) (j)/11) dt +b)t for the jth for the jth time interval. time interval. The solution solution to this differential differential equation equation is is as follows follows (see(see Appendix Appendix C): C): 2 TB(t) = Cj + [mjt /2 + bjt]/TT (12) (12) 2 where Cj = TB(tjl) - [mjt j-i/2 + b jtj.l]/T (13) (13) and t> tj_l1 isis that time which which defines defines the end end of of the (j-l)th (j_l)th time time interval, interval, (or equivalently, equivalently, the beginning beginning of. of. the jth jth interval). interval). As with with the initialization initialization constant constant Cij Gij for Equation Equation (9), (9),Cj C. allows allows for for transitions transitions from from one one linear linear segment segment of the LOCA LOCA load load to another. another. Evaluation Evaluation of of C.Cj at at each each cross-over cross-over pointpoint constrains constrains TB(t) TB(t) to be, be, as required, required, aa continuous continuous function. function. 6.2.5.b 6.2.S.b Operational Operational and and Fully-Faulted Fully-Faulted Tower Tower Cells. Cells. The conservative case of zero heat removal in faulted cells, The conservative case of zero heat removal in faulted cells, together together withwith some some number number of of operational operational cells cells will will nownow bebe discussed. discussed. Water Water enters enters thethe tower tower at at ThTh and and exits exits operational operational cells cells at at TcTc as as given given
EXHIBIT EXHIBIT II ENC-QE-51.D ENC-QE-51.D CALC.# NED-Q-MSD-l CALC.# NED-Q-MSD-l Page Page 1313 of of 26 26 167695 16 76 95 Eby by Equation just Equation (3). (3). ForFor zero zero heat heat removal removal cells cells thethe exit exit temperature temperature is is just Th. Th
- Defining Defining f as the the fraction fraction of operational operational cells, cells. thethe average average temperature temperature of of the the water water entering entering the the basin, basin, TelTe , is is given given by by the weighted weighted average of cooled and uncooled average of cooled and uncooled water: water:
Te = fTc + (l-f)Th (14) (14) Following Following the the development development of of Equation Equation (6), (6). using using TeIe inin place place of of Tc, Tc ' then yields: then yields: t= Te - TB (15) d~~ = Te TT ~TTB (15) Using Using Equation Equation (14)(14) with with (15) (15) and and following following the the previous previous development development which which led led to to Equations Equations (8),(8), (9) (9) and and (10) (10) itit is is found found that that the the present present differential differential equation, equation, (15), (15), and and its its solution solution are are identical identical to to those those given given already, already, provided provided that that two two constants constants are are redefined redefined as as follows: follows: Ti = TT/(l - Mi)f (16) (16 ) Ki = (-1 + 1/f + Mi)/(O-Mi) (17) (17) Although Although formally formally identical identical to to fully fully operational operational towertower response, response, when when faulted faulted cellscells are are considered, considered, the the response response isis slower slower as as shown shown by by the the inverse dependence of inverse dependence of the system time the system time constant, constant, xi, upon f.f. This 1:i' upon This is is expected expected of of course, course, because because the the tower tower asas aa whole whole is is now now removing removing less less heat heat per per cycle cycle through through the the system. system. In In summary, summary, the the tower tower response response to to the the LOCA, LOCA, for for situations situations with with ff << 1, 1, (i.e. (i.e. some some water water passing passing through through zero zero heat heat removal removal cells), cells), isis given given byby Equations Equations (9) (9) and and (10) (10) together together with with thethe constants constants defined defined in in Equations Equations (16)(16) and and (17). (17). 6.2.5.c 6.2.5.c Operational Operational and and Partially-Faulted Partially-Faulted Tower Tower Cells. Cells. The The benefit benefit of of natural natural convection convection cooling cooling in in faulted faulted cells cells will will now now be considered. When hot water passes through a cell be considered. When hot water passes through a cell with a non-operating with a non-operating fan, fan, the the local local airair heating heating that that takes takes place place will will induce induce aa certain certain air air flow flow through through the the cell, cell, i.e. i.e. natural natural convection. convection. Although Although the the resultant resultant water water cooling cooling may may be be much much less less than than that that ofof aa functional functional cell, cell, anyany level level of of heat heat removal removal may may be be significant significant underunder certain certain accident accident situations. situations. Given Given thatthat the the range range of of an an operable operable cell = cell isis RR = Th Th -- TcTc for for given given conditions, conditions, assume assume that that the the corresponding corresponding temperature temperature drop drop for for aa non-operational non-operational cell Rf == 1R, cell isis Rf BR, where where 00 5~ RB1~ 1. Clearly B
- 1. Clearly 3 == 00 isis the the zero zero heat heat removal removal case, case, and B = I1 corresponds and 3= corresponds to to aa fully fully functioning functioning cell.
cell. Incorporating Incorporating this this benefit benefit into into Equation Equation (14)(14) yields: yields: Te = Te = fTcfTc ++ (l-f)(Th-Rf) (l-f)(Th-Rf)
== [f
[f ++ (l-f)OITc (l-f)BJTc ++ (1-f)(1I-)Th (l-f)(l-B)Th (18) (18)
EXHIBIT EXHIBIT II ENC-QE-51.D ENC-QE-51.D CALC.# NED-Q-MSD-1 CALC.# NED-Q-MSD-1 Page 14 Page of 26 14 of This relation could now be used with Equation (15) 167695 167695 and new constants This relation could now be used with Equation (15) and new constants
~i Ti and i , could be derived and KKi, derived as as before.
before. To To avoid avoid thisthis additional additional analysis, aa new factor F analysis, F is is introduced: introduced: FF == ff ++ (l-f)~ (1-f)0 (19) (19) and the and the average average temperature of water entering the the basin basin is is now now Te= FTc + (I-F)Th (20) (20) Note that this relation is is formally formally identical identical to EquationEquation (14),(14), when ff is is replaced by F. F. Whereas Whereas f was was the fraction fraction of operable cells when when no cooling takes place in in inoperable cells,cells, F can be viewed as an effective fraction of effective of operable cells, cells, when natural convection convection cooling effects are considered. considered. The earlier earlier derived solutions, solutions, including the constants of Equations (16) (16) and (17), (17), apply directly to the natural natural convection case, case, provided that f is is replaced with F. F. Consider one example demonstrate the potential benefit of this example to demonstrate effect. effect. One accident scenario that may have to be evaluated evaluated is is that of of passing water through through 3 cells, cells, 2 of which are inoperable.inoperable. Assume that that 1 =
~ = 0.1, 0.1, i.e.,
i.e., natural convection convection cooling only removes 10% of the load that an that operating cell removes. an operating removes. Equation (19) (19) yieldS yields F = 0.4, 0.4, an improvement of 23% over the f == 0.33 case. improvement case. With R =a 0.2, F == 0.47.
= 0.2, 0.47, an improvement of* of 40%. .
6.2.6 Characteristics Characteristics of the General Solution: Solution: As presented, presented, Equation Equation (10)(10) appears appears somewhat complex due to the presence of numerous terms presence terms and auxiliary auxiliary definitions. definitions. The purpose of of this section is is to demonstrate demonstrate that this this solution solution is is fairly fairly straightforward and further, straightforward further, that for easily visualized transients, transients, Equation Equation (10) (10) yields yields physically physically acceptable acceptable results. results. The The solution solution givesgives the the time dependence dependence of of thethe basin basin temperature temperature for for the the specific specific case case where where both both the load and the tower tower characteristic characteristic are approximated approximated by continuouscontinuous piecewise piecewise linear linear functions. functions. Transitions Transitions from from one one linear linear segment segment to another, another, for both both functions, functions, are are accomplished accomplished by by evaluation evaluation of the initialization initialization constant constant Cii.Ci ** To demonstrate demonstrate the characteristics, characteristics, (i.e. (i.e. nature), nature), of of the the solution sOlutIon we we first first discuss discuss the governing time governing time constant constant and then examine examine the system response system response to two two idealized idealized loads. loads. For For thethe present present discussion discussion assume assume that that both both the the LOCA load load and towertower response response are are given given byby single single linear linear segments: segments:
~TL =
ATL = mtmt + bb Tc = MTh + B
EXHIBIT EXHIBIT I ENC-QE-Sl.D ENC-QE-51.D CALC.# CALC.# NED-Q-MSD-I NED-Q-MSD-l Page Page 15 15 of of 26 26 167695 167695 where m, m, b, b, M M and B B are constants. constants. The overall system system time constant, constant, given in Equation (16), in Equation (16), is is comprised comprised of three three factors all all of which relate to global tower performance:performance:
= TT/(I - M)f First, the time required First, required for all all of the system water water to pass through the tower is is given given by LT =
TT = MB/m.MB/M. Intuitively, larger the system Intuitively, the larger system inventory inventory or the smaller the mass flow rate, rate, the longer the time for the tower to respond respond to a changing load. containing M, (with load. The term containing typical values of 0.3 -- 0.5), reflects the rate 0.5), reflects rate of change of T T with respect to changing T respect Th. h . Lower values values of M M indicate that that even lor
?or large changes in changes in the hot water water temperature, temperature, the corresponding corresponding cold water water temperature change change is is less than the change in in Th.
Th
- As a result, result, the time for the tower to respond respond decreases.
decreases. The third term specifies specifies the fraction of the tower which is is operable and available for heat removal. removal. example, if For example, if only two of the four cells cells are functioning, functioning, the heat heat removal rate is is decreased decreased significantly from that of a fully operational operational tower, and the response time, tower, time, accordingly, accordingly, isis increased. increased. In In the discussions that follow, follow, f is is set to unity to simplify simplify the analysis. analysis. The The extreme extreme case case of of a step change change in in the load load is is now considered. considered. Assume that that a non-zero steady state state load load isis present present and that at time t equals zero, equals zero, the load instantly instantly increases a increases to a new steadysteady state value: value:
,ATL = bo, t < 0
=
=b, b, t ~> 0 Equation (9)
Equation (9) then simplifies to the following TB(t) TBOexp(-t/.) + [(Mb ++ B)/(I TB(t) = TBoexp(-t/t) B)/(l - M)][l M)][I - exp(-t/.)] exp(-t/x)] (21) (21) where TB0 is where T BO is the steady state basin basin temperature temperature corresponding corresponding to the initial initial load load boo bO. The The final steadysteady state basin temperature temperature is is given given by by TBI = TBI = (Mb (Mb + B)/(l B)/(l -- M) M) This is is easily easily verified by using Equations (2) (2) and (3) (3) and recognizing that Tc and TB are equal at times much longer .than.. than T. Employing this Employing expression for TBI in expression in the above solution yields the following TB(t) = TBI[I - exp(-t/T)] + TBoexp(-t/T) (22) (22)
EXHIBIT I EXHIBIT ENC-QE-Sl.D ENC-QE-51 .D CALC.# NED-Q-MSD-l CALC.# NED-Q-MSD-l Page 16 of 26 167695 167695 In In this form the basin temperature temperature response is is recognized recognized as that of a classical first classical first order system with a time constant T. ~. The second most easily easily visualized example is is that of ramp load. load. Assume that a steady state Assume state load of b has been applied \0 %o the towers for aa long time, time, and that the basin temperature temperature is TBO ' At time t equals is TB0. equals zero
- a linearly linearly increasing increasing load load isis then imposed on the system: system:
I ' ATL == b,
- b. t < 0
=
= mt + b.
+ b, t ~ 0 t 0 O
Equation (9)(9) can can then be arranged arranged as follows: follows: TB(t) = TB(t) = [met [m(t - ~) + b]M/(l T) + b]M/(l - M) + + B/(l Cexp(-t/~) B/Cl - M) + Cexp(-t/t) where C == T b)/(l - M) - B/(l M(m~ - b)/(l TBO + M(mt BO B/Ml - M) As was the case in in the example of the step change in in load, load, for time larger larger than ~. T, the exponential exponential terms in in the response to the ramp rapidly decay away: this is is the expected expected response of of,aa first orderorder system. system. The The basin temperature thereafter basin thereafter is is linearly increasing increasing with slope Mm/(l-M) Mm/(I-M) and delayed delayed in in time by the characteristic characteristic time time ~.T. The preceding preceding discussion demonstrates, that in discussion demonstrates, in principle, principle, the system system response response to specified specified loads is is easily evaluated. evaluated. Further, interpretation Further, of the responses responses is is fairly straightforward. straightforward. For more accurate, accurate, and and therefore therefore more complex, characterizations complex, characterizations of the load and tower tower performance, performance, the solutions become burdensome. burdensome. In particular, particular, it it is is the evaluation of initialization evaluation initialization constant Ci-, Cij , at each transition, transition, (typically more than 30 times),times), which prompted development of a computer code to prompted development to complete the calculations. complete calculations.
EXHIBIT II ENC-QE-S D ENC-QE-511..D CALC.# CALC .# NED-Q-MSD-l NED-Q--MSD-l Page 17 26 17 of 26 Appendix A: Derivation Derivation of Equation (8) (8) 1167695 6 76 95
- equations which have The equations have to be manipulated manipulated are:
are: (6) dTB = T - TB dt TT (7) Tc = Mi(TB + mjt + bj) + Bi
- Evaluate: Tc - TB = Mi(mjt + bj) + Bi - (I-Mi)TB - Re-arranging:
Re-arranging: dT dTB + (l-Mi)T (l-Mi)TB B= ~(mjt +
= Mi(mit + bj) bj> ++ Bi Bi dt B 'TT dt ~T ~T
'TT ~t Tt
- Define Define new new time constant:
constant: Ti = TT/(l-Mi) or TT = (l-Mi)Ti - Substituting: Substituting: dT ++ TB = dTBE = 1_k6Mmjt + b. + B1 dt-B Ti dt ~i - Define new term: Define Ki = M - Obtain Obtain final differential differential Equation Equation (8): (8): dTB + !a = Ki (mit + bi) + Bi dt Ti Ti
EXHIBIT I ENC-QE-51.D ENC-QE-51.D CALC.# CALC.# NED-Q-MSD-l NED-Q-MSD-1 Page Page 18 of 26 26 Appendix Appendix B: Solution Solution to Cooling Cooling Tower Differential EQuation Differential Equation 1 6 76 95 16 95
- Reformulate Reformulate EquationEquation (8) (8 ) as as follows:
follows: n dTS + aT5 = kit + k 0 (5.1) (B.l)
+ aT B :: kIt + kO dt dt with:
with: aa =::: I/Ti 11[i kI= kl = Kim./Ti K.m*h:* 1 J 1 k= ko = Kibj/-i K*b*/T.* +
+ Bi/(l B*/O -- Mi)xi M*h*
1 J 1 11 1
- Equation Equation (B.1)(B.l) is is aa first first order order linearlinear differential differential equation equation and and several several methods methods are are available available for for determining determining the the required required solution, solution, (e.g.,
(e.g., Method Method of of Undetermined Undetermined Coefficients, Coefficients, Laplace Laplace Transforms, Transforms, etc.) etc.)
- The The left-hand left-hand side side of of the the equation, equation, with with constant constant coefficient coefficient "a",
"a",
requires that the solution requires that the solution include a term of include a term of the e-at the form e-at. Further, Further, thethe right-hand right-hand side side of (B.l), with of (B.1), with k, kl &&kkO 0 as as constants, constants, suggests suggests that that the the solution solution. include include terms terms in in powers powers of of "t".
"t".
- Consider Consider the the following following general general solution solution for for (B.1): (B.l): TB(t) TB(t) =::: Ce-atCe- at ++ At At ++ BB (B.2) (B.2) where where thethe constants constants A A and and BB cancan bebe determined determined by by reformulating reformulating (B.1) (B.l) by by use use of of (B.2) (B.2) - Take Take first first derivative derivative of of (B.2): (B.2): dTB . -aCe-at + A (B.3) dTB = _aCe-at + A (B.3) dt dt Formulate Formulate the the left left hand hand sideside of of (B.1) (B.l) using using (B.2) (B.2) and and (B.3): (B.3): dTB + aTB -[-aCe-at + A] + a[Ce-at + At + B] dTB at dt + aT B = [-aCe-t
+ AJ + a[Ce- a + At + B]
dt
=
= (aA)t (aA)t ++ (A (A ++ aB) aB)
= klt + k0 , from (B.1)
Equating Equating coefficients: coefficients: aA aA =::: k,kl -----
---~ AA =::: kl/a kl/a a~(kO = a~ - a~
AA ++ aB aB =::: k 0o ---- BB =::: l(k 0 -- A)A) = k0 - kl kO ---~ 2 a a
EXHIBIT I EXHIBIT ENC-QE-5l.D ENC-QE-51 .D CALC.# NED-Q-MSD-1 CALC.# NED-Q-MSD-I Page 19 of 26 Appendix B, B, (cant'd) (cont'd) 167695 167695
- The following general general solution is is then obtained:
obtained: TB(t) = Ce-at + a--t + (a - ) (B.4) - The constant C will now be determined. determined. Recall Recall that the three constants constants kQ and kkj,, kQ and a, defined in a, defined in (B.1), incorporate the LOCA (B.1), incorporate LOCA load for the jth jth l t1me 1nterval, time interval, and tower heat removal for the i-h i th Th interval. interval. - Assume that Assume that the initial initial basin temperature temperature is is T TBO. ' The temperature rise BO across the LOCA load load is characterized by ml and bb, is characterized l and these apply over over the interval 0 - 45 sec. sec. The Th interval interval characterizing characterizing the tower tower heat heat removal removal is evaluating Th = is determined by evaluating = TB + ATL. ~TL. As Th increases or or decreases, different decreases, different linear linear segments, segments, TiI Ti - 1 ~
- Th ~ ; TTi, i , will be be encountered, and re-initia1ization encountered, re-initialization of the solution is required at each is required crossover. At a minimum then, crossover. then, re-initia1ization re-initialization is is required at 45 45 seconds, seconds, although it it isis likely that earlier earlier re-initializations re-initializations will be be required due to crossing into new Th intervals. intervals. At this re-initialization, re-initialization, new values of mj & & bbj,j , or Mi and Bi, Bi , will have have to bebe incorporated, incorporated, and in in doing this the value of C must be updated as well. well.
- Assume Assume that at time tii ti .a a transition from one LOCA or tower interval to to another is is required. required. The Ihe basin temperature temperature at this time is is T~(tij)' T (tij), which evaluated in which was evaluated in the previous interval. interval. Because Because for t :! tij' tij, the LOCA is in the jth j~ time interval and the tower response is in the ith is in i~ temperature interval, the basin temperature temperature interval, temperature is is given by (B.4), (B.4), with C yet yet determined. Requiring that TB(t) to be determined. TB(t) be a continuous function yields: yields: TB(t=tij) = TB(t=tij) = TB(tij) TB(tij)
-at , + kl
= ce-atij kO k0 kl kI
= Ce i J + a-tij + (a- - -
+ -tij + (- a 2))
a2 Solving for C: Solving k, k0 k1 at.j C = [TB(tij) - i-tij - (a- a) 2 e tiJ a
= Cij
= C**
1J Note that C has been redefined as G Cij ij because it it isis to be used only for for the jthjib time and ith tower intervals. intervals.
EXHIBIT I ENC-QE-S1.D ENC-QE-51 .D CALC.# NED-Q-MSD-1 CALC.# NED-Q-MSD-l Page 202.0 of 2626 Appendix Appendis B.B, (cont'd) (coat"d) 167695 16 7695 - Transform Transform the solution to the solution to the the original original constants, constants, MiBi, MiBi' mjbj,mjb j , etc; etc; aa =I/i
= 1/1:: 1 kI=
kl = Kimj/ti Kimj/"ti k= kO = Kibj/"ti Kibj/Ti +
+ Bi/(l-Mi)Ti Bi/(l-Mi)"ti ka a = kiTi = Kimj , a Kimi a2 ko= Bi k0 ti = Kibj +
a Bi t j T Cij = [TB(tij) - Kimjtij - (Kibj + B1 - Kimjti)eJ ti
= [TB(tij) - mjKizi(-i + - Kibj -
Bile tij I/-i 13 XzyI This This isis the the initialization initialization constant constant given given byby Equation Equation (10). (10). Evaluate Evaluate thethe remaining remaining two two terms terms ofof (B.4): (B.4): 1c0 _kI m+~. Bi ~ mt k-It + - =-K imt + Kjbj + Bi - KimjTi a a a2 I-Mi Bii
+
= m Ki~i(-l + t/Ti) + Kib Equation Equation (B.5)
(B.S) isis then then given given by: by: TBtt))Cje-t/Ki Bi TB(t) = Cije + mjKi.i(-i + t/Ji) + Kibj + l-fi This This isis the the general general equation equation for for the the basin basin temperature temperature as as aa function function ofof time time when when the the LOCA LOeA isis characterized characterized by by mjmj &&bjb j and and thethe tower tower by by Mi Mi &&Bi: Bi : Equation Equation (9). (9).
EXHIBIT EXHIBIT II ENC-QE-5l.D ENC-QE-51.D CALC.# CALC.# NED-Q-MSD-l NED-Q-MSD-l Page Page 2121 of of 26 Appendix c: C: System System Response Response with with No No Cooling Cooling 167695 167695
- This appendix This appendix gives gives the solution to Equation Equation (11), which is is a differential equation differential equation describing the the heat-up of of the ESW water inventory when subjected When subjected to aa LOCA LOCA load when no heat is is removed removed by the cooling cooling tower:
tower: dT = (mjt + bj)/T (11) (II) dt T
- Integrating both Integrating both sides sides of this this equation with with respect to time time yields:
2 TB(t) = (mjt /2 + bjt)/*T + Cj (C.1) where Cj where is aa constant Cj is constant to to bebe determined determined by by initial initial conditions. conditions. is This is Equation (12). (12).
- Assume that Assume that at LOCA LOCA onset the basin temperature is is TBO.
TBO. The constants ml m1 and bbIl characterize characterize the LOCA during the first first interval: intervai: 0TB(t) = (mlt 2
/2 + blt)/TT + CI
- Evaluate Evaluate this this expression at time equals zero: zero:
TB(t=0) = TBO = C1 2 T(t) (mlt /2 + Blt)/TT + TBO where where this this expression expression applies applies only only for for the the first time time interval. interval.
- Equation Equation (C.1)
(C.l) describes describes the the basin basin temperature temperature heatup heatup during during the jth jth time time interval, interval, and and Cj is is yet yet to be be determined. determined. The basin basin temperature temperature at at the the beginning beginning of of this th1s interval, interval, at time tj t j _.1l ,* is is TB(tj1), TB(tj_l)' p nd is gnd is determined determined by by evaluating evaluating (C.1) (C.l) with the LOCA LOCA constants constants of of thethe j-lth j-l1- interval. interval. TB(t=tjl) = TB(t~tj_l) = TB(tjI) TB(tj_1) (mjt 2j-1/2 2
=
= (mjt j_l/2 ++ bjtj-l)/TT bjtj_l)!LT ++ Cj Cj
- Solving Solving forfor CjCj gives gives Equation Equation (13): (13):
Cj = TB(tjI) - (mjt 2 j 1 i/2 + bjtjil1/tT
EXHIBIT I ENC-QE-Sl.D ENC-QE-51.D CALC.# NED-Q-MSD-I CALC.# NED-Q-MSD-l 26 Page 22 of 26 Appendix D:: Apyendix Tower Response to Step and Ramp Loads 76 9 5
.1 h 76 95 - This appendix provides the arithmetic arithmetic manipulations manipulations required to produce produce equations (21) (21) and (22).
(22). These equations equations give the basin temperature temperature as a function of time when subjected subjected to a step change in load, and a ramp in load, load, load, respectively. respectively.
- As stated, the tower temperature response is approximated by a single As stated, the tower temperature response is approximated by a single linear relation:
relation: Tc = MTh + B Figure 2 shows the quality Figure quality of fit fit when using a single single versus several several approximation: linear segment approximation: interval of Th shown, over the 48 degree interval shown, the single approximation introduces single segment approximation degree introduces no more than a one degree error error..*.
- With f == 1, 1, Equations Equations (16) (16) and (17)
(17) then yield: Ti ------ > T Li------> L = =TT/(I-M) LT/(l-M) Ki ------ > K Ki------> = M/(l-M) M/(l-M) - For the the tower tower response to a step change in in load: load: tij-....>t tij----->t = 0,0, mj-----> mj] -> m =
= 0,0, b 3- - - >b, br----->b, TB (t i j ) ----> TBo TB(tij)----> TBo and Equation (10) (10) yields:
yields: Cij....> C = TBO - Kb - B/(l-M)
= TTBO BO (Mb+B)/(I-M)
- (Mb+B)/(l-M)
- Using the preceding, preceding, Equation (9) (9) yields: yields: TB(t) = TB(t) (exp(-t/T)] + Mb/(l-M)
= C [exp(-t/c)] Mb/(I-M) + B/(l-M)
B/(I-M)
=
= TBO TBO exp(-t/T) + [(Mb+B)/(l-M]
exp(-t/L) [(Mb+B)/(I-M] [l-exp(-t/L)], [l-exp(-t/l)), and this is is Equation (21). (21).
EXHIBIT II EXHIBIT ENC-QE-5l ENC-QE-Sl.D.D CALC.A NED-Q-MSD-l CALC.# NED-Q-MSD-l Page Page 23 23 of of 2626 Appendix D: Appendi D: Tower Response to Tower Response Step and to Step LQads (Con't.)
& Loads and Ramp (CQn't.) 167695 167695" - For the tower For the tower response response to to aa ramp ramp load, with load, with non-zerQ value aa non-zero of mj, value of mj' the the above identifications, above identifications, (Ki, (K
- tij, t ij
- bj, b j
- etc.),
etc.). are unchanged with are unchanged with the the i following exception: following exception: mj ----- >m
- 0.
- The The initialization initialization constantconstant given given in in Equation Equation (10)
(10) isis then: then: Cij C ij ----->>
---- = T -- MmT CC = TBO BO Mb/(l-M) -- B/-M),
(-1)/(1-M) -- Mb/(I-M) Mm~ (-l)/(I-M) B/(l-M). and Equation (9) and Equation (9) then then yields: yields: TB(t) = Mm(-l ++ t/T) Ce(-t!~) ++ Mm(-l TB(t) = Ce(-t/T) Mb/(l-M) ++ B/(l-M) tIc) ++ Mb/(l-M) B!(l-M)
= [m(t-t)
= [m(t-~) ++ b]
b] M/(l-M) M/(l-M) ++ B/(l-M) Ce(~t/~). B/(l-M) ++ Ce(-t/T), and and this this isis Equation EquatiQn (22). (22). ZMECH/1432 ZMECH/1432 SP/tb SP/tb
BYB1APf r U K3C-QE-5I. DC:-QB-5LD CALC".. 'lmD-Q.-MSt Page Paqa 24 of at! 26 F GURE i 26 "F1GURE .1 @-'~ SCHEMATIC SCHEMATIC OF" OF BYRON BYRON ESW ESW COOLING COOLI NG TOW- lOWER66 769 ? 699 s
,I \ ".;
P. ~TL IJTL Ha -* mass "B mass of water inin the of water syscem (lbn) ESW system the ESW (lbm)
&i -
total mass
- total mass flow rate to flow race to tower tower (lb/hr)
(lb/hr) Th Tb - temperature of
- temperature entering tower water entering of water tower (*F)
(OF) TTc - temperature of
* *emperature of water leaving an water leaving an operating cell (OF) operating cell (OF) 4TLh ATL
- increase increase in ESW water in ESW temperature due water temperature to Load due to loael (2F)
(;)F) T13 TB w* temperature temperature of of water leaving tover water leaving basin (OF) taver basin (OF) entering tower basin (oF) Te Te temperature of
=a temperature of water water entering tower basin (OF)
NOTE:
~OTE:
The distinction isis made The distinction between Te made between Te and Tc inin order and Tc simulate the order toto simulate the effect effece of bypassing one or more cooling cower of bypassing one or more cooling tower cells. cells.
Ela I B I '" J: EHC-<m-5L.D' CALC. #NED-Q-4SI CALC. 'NED-Q-MSl Paqe 25 of 26 26 FIG=R nGO:RB 2 @7) 16 7n 76 9,' 9' '0 ESW Tower Performance Performance T Tcold ( F) As A Function Of Thot T hot co1d (F) 105~--~----~1----~1----~--~ 105 I I 1 i i I ' i 100~------~------+---------------~--~~~ 100 I J Twb
- 718 F I
12,500 gpm/cell 95 95~------~------~------+-~r---~----~ 90 90~------~------~+-----+i--~--~!------~ One-Step Linear approx.
; J I !
85 85~------~--------------~------~------1 80 80~------~------~------+---------------1 75 75~------~------~------~------~----~ 80 80 90 90 100 100 110 110 120 120 130 130
- Reference Thot F)
T hot (( F) Reference 1
R3XHIBrX? EXBTBI'l'" J: MiC-QR-51..0 ENC-QE-51..D CALC. #NED--Q-M1D-CA=C. L tNED-<l-KSO-l. FIGURE FIGURE 33 Page 26 of Page 26 o:t 26 26 1.,.76 9*5 LOCA Load LOCA Load Profile vs fme Profile vs Lfihf1J x 10 6 )6 Heat Load (BTU/HR. Heat Load (BTU/HR. x 10 ) 600 600~------------------------------------~ 580 580 556 556 500 500~~~---------------------------------4 LOCA LOCA ++ 400 400~----~~------~--~----------------~ operatmg unit operating unit heat loads heat loads LOCA Unit LOCA Unit 300 300~----------------~~---=~---------- 200 J - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 200 100J---------------------------------------1 100 II A O~----~----~------~----~----~----~ 0o 20 20 40 40 60 60 80 80 100 100 120 120 Table 9.2-6
Reference:
UFSAR Table
Reference:
UFSAR 9.2-6 Time Time (min.) (min.) UFSAR Figure 9.2-7 UFSAR Figure 9.2-7
ATTACHMENT 33 References Additional References NED-Q-MSD-6, "ESW Cooling Tower Transient Model: , 5. Calculation NED-Q-MSD-6, Model: Part III" Il1"
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Fxhibit B COMMONWEALTH COMPANYY
.EDISON, COnPAN qOMMONWEAL'l'H, :EDISON" ENc,~:QE'i5:ll';.tl ENC~-UE-51 . 1)
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TABLE~ OF CONTENTS <~
':,j.E *REVIsION .SUTIVAY
'. REVISION sm-l1~~:' 'S'
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kEFEREN~a I E'RE n-McE If* At*ta~iunentg Attacfrnqits ri,C;nl:re ,.1 Figure 1 /s~ Fl:"'re'2
,.911 2.
.Figure /4 Figure Fiqlire3 3 /1 Figure
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'. Revision Revision 3
**'~~g~:::':2:\:q.~2
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, REVI SION ýSUMMRCPY REVlSION, 'CSt:nemIt.r Page 2 of 2 cALC~AT'tO ýNd, 7ET-Q5-NMSD-6iý jAE 3 OF I
* *CRI, .... OP.R'.'..'NS'.E'FOR. C- A1. G,
.' The
'The.rea:sA:r\-fortil;lfi"qhai:lge reason for this change is is*,**to,',:l'eVi~et~~:::~nalYticai:modei::to:
to revise the ana*lyrtical .model- to.,, i
.a?:coimt":for'byP.as~fed<Wico.oled,*wa.t~r;~ir(:'boli~,:t.9Wer.s.
'account
-"';,> -,:;.")", .,'" for bypassed, Uncoolad water ~in b~oth towers3.
,.:.'"" . l ' . . . . . ,. . ,
AVFE~CTEl PIAGRSV PAGESI
~REV~ ~cI~ O 55, ," .....
I1 ". *Ptlri5:9~e/Qbje;¢.~'fv~*;s~¢t:lon
'Pupose,/Objective sect~ion *rl2'v,i~ed~: revised ..to ~Q .c*a(:cou#~'
adcr-iint~ bypassed uncoo led water in both fotFbypa9~:H~I1:-tincooled'water:.iIL:both* far . ,,', " j;Q~~rsltyp.9:qi"apt1:~,~a18*?~f~~9#,,1f?!l,. towers/typioqraphical correct ion. ." 6
.6 '4
- '~:~+/-'~'a~~~:i:r~t~~~~~,~~~~~**~,,~jjss~~#;~q~'.::~tf::
Model DeveloprI _ent i~ncjudesdjscu2sion of faulted cells ýin one towie-r.
. >>"';' >" ,~~~ ',":'," ....
1. 1 Byp~~~,tlow, Bypass flaow .i~,])ot~;:tower in both towers,coolin s ,cooling *.towet':h:e~.£ towner heat. ,, removal sections revised. . . . . . .
,ri:pti9.1l~1$ectj,.hn~r~vi~~dt '
J.J;};t2' 1l12 1~
~~;~~~~fjH{~
- Time dependent, *"9#L1.#9~§~~¥~AA~~,~*&*"'!!';
,both> towers, coo.in..tower operation in
-12 I *Ccrii8.l.ti~;~.n *ie;v.:~.§;~a,**
ýconclus'ion cevised *.toacc(JtJ..il~*.'*for:'byP.Els to account for bylpas~sed, s~d~*.
1non-cooled non:~cooled*.wate:r::in water in bth
.. btbtowe*r's.
.. . " .:~
tower3s.
,'.-;'. "'.,",':; ~'. ~ .~ "'
'1. I ýReference. 5,
. :Reference S::atid~,~, added,....
.1:" Fi:~ure.;4 Figgure '4 adde&:/fo, added, to,-;efl~d~, reflectbyp6ass, . i~yP~S'~;(t6'ff:;f#A~9'~~: fblownoth t:ower;::f~
towers. '. A I eK!,p' ___________
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.'*i pCAIJCLATION' Na:. NED`Q--MSD--6' CALCUAT ION SHEET PAGE EN~kC-CE- 51. D ReIsin Pae2 of 2, OF; see attach~ed r
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,ERýHoiT E, I ~.I I I ....... J I
- "ElHli!IIT f.
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N-ED-Q-MSD-6: REVISION REVISION*]:*, 1 PA<$"5"
'PACE. 5 OF \QF,:
010
...*. I;'* ****21;O;~t29 2 T0 29
- To'~~lop/a
- JI1Odel:~~I~pndidsthC$~t)~fi1l1~#~dmt'*reSp~m~~.of To develop a model W4iiCh Predict% the same time dependent rcsponse of the the* . ES.W' ESW ..
.* Co9Irng:T~~rs.bMin;'temperntlJre(Byr41l}~ijiion}.tO~
CoolngTowers basin temperature (IByron ~Stauioio) to a time dme,.vMyilig(OCAh~;,'*~Jh!l:,
ý/aryting LOCA heat load-.
'ThUcaJCu1iW~'illIgmentscat~WhonItNSb;Q-MSDrl.
This calculationt augmlents caictilatinn ii NED-Q-NISD-1, CBRON' CHRON # 'i(i7695,,<and;Nm-' 167695 and NED-
~'Q:MSD..6~:~~.o"CHRON#*1 Q-MWSt).6, Rev, 0, CH1RON # 172315. n315.~~~;.~~u.I~~,C)nb~
This calculati-on has becezn beCnrtWt$ed~ revisedic ~:*~coUntfo*r: toaccount for the Possiblt of.bypissing Uneoeled:Water:m,DOihtowen;.; the possibm't}t:,of:b)rpas$iog unmcooled water in both towers, ,< '. . . , .
~_~l' :Amlm'p;fiijn:~~iBD'lliR.J~';::
- ASSumPri()nS>Ah.*~um'ptioM.n*lndi*cated;~l1.eath\apiH*~priate.sedioll;d'me:.~:
Assuptins'Al 1assumptions ar i dicatd ft~ eh prrite section o h
":Cidc~rilioA; .CialcutatioIL " "
UIsgn 11iputs. The parameters used for modelling ftnd generaling tde saple xlues i die calculation. Were based on ref~ern'es shown. 4.:2;
~Jit;ji_~~~~WIS~~~~l~'*
T-he ftimedenet model of the ESWý: (lsntiiil Servke lWater),, c~ool'uing towarsý. developed ion RcFercncc (I.)incorporated heascassumption that the total water flow
-. w ~to the towers wats equaly partitioned amonogst the ccib rctoveng flow, 'The accident scenanos'descnbed scenariois describ~ed in 'In.R~fereiteo Referentce (2) ('2),* .ogettu~r,~~hlheaiOQm~,Mytt.l:ex~ctod*f1oW$
taetedier with the acvompaying expected flows.
. giveo**. ip* .Reff:leJ1ce: (3), demon$..-at~.;~ar:this:,~IJ.npti~n*:i!*noi'aiwaY~'satiS6e~:
given in Reference (3)., demonstrate tabt this assumption -is not alwvays stisfiedý. Because towver p~rf9rmml~ei5Y~IY~p,~ndcnf S'ec:allse.tower, performance is very dependent upon:dl~w~ter load"ing. *th~tfart5i~~;f upon the water 'loadil1l.. the trarislent
)rio~:o~R~f~ce:'(J).is muodel of Reference (1),is eXt9ded extended to~~mftc~'
to accotmt for ~f!fet:ent different ceil ~o,ws ill',ili~~~t, cell flows: in th'e presvent eaJ~uhltion. ',Additionally.
- cadculation. Aldditionially, allowance allowance tor:for an~'uneveti an uneven 'ilismol,ltioll distribuition ,ofof the J.ot;d, to~tal heat heat, load toad to
~~~~~in~~u~~~",t~~;~i~rt;
.the two towers'is also addressed, Further,, the model allows for bypassed flow in theI
ýcelts Tof both .tow~ers. In fact, inchasWi onf by flow is the reasoni fo eisn this, caJ~ulatiQn."
J, ula eean Station EW cooling towers consi-st of two fbuw-,;ll,
. *i11;;;oYrooN~'cl:ear*~eratin, The 4yo
. S.~()D ~~W;,c~olt~.B,.t()W(U'$*.consiifo(~Pfc,ur~U; counter~f1oW~Jnechani~;
counter-floiw, mechianical, *. induCfe4~dntftLOyl~t*se(:~o~ See Figure . Il* fqr~:'Qv:~mew~ induccd draift lowei se"ctions. .Seer-.igy.re** for an ovorviewl A1lho~gndletl~#jii#)aJWi Although die flows through e~~, each orth~ of the ;9'~i~,~':~;~:,;en cells of a given .t()weri~*.b~~*~e,~Jo'}~~ tower may be assumed to be , cqual,, Jh~ftJf)~J0th~~ Jtquai.* tito Flows to the tw.o . towers towers *nutY'~~StfIDitjcantly:differenk may be significantly different, . *f'brm#~~e:'ortiWie< Fuirther, one or more,
.cell$o£~'.Bi~IO'Wetmay cell$ of a given tower may be Isolated, either for 'beisola.t~:.~idi~rioTnorm~*."maanten~~:ortorsom' normal miaintenance or' for some ' ','
'cq~p~n~f,fai'line;*
component failure. .
- Oi\~.:~ple.*from;}{ef~~ce*(J'};.,~hO~:howltlfg~.th.e'flo~.;
One --xaMple from Refereince, (3). shows- how Iage the flo
;~~ty:,~~::'~~:~;
disp~arty can bo, . . '" ." .. .... (J.~:~~,~~~~J~ts~,.tl,!~,~~;r:*~~,~i:I,,~~,Ooo
*Case, 3A prdicts; a flaw-getrtan1,0 . .g~r' 0 6 00 'ýgp p *bel1I~:directe<f'Jo:::~::~i~~~;:CeJ'l
. being directdt sllý',,ingle cell
. of.lo~~r~Jl11dapproxnna1ely' H:~.600;~nt of owr A ad pproximately i t btSUiS *$lUl'd~eo~y.: 4tr~~(tt~~
1 sitneuldrected.,o 4en fOUf'~el1~
- four cells 9f,Towc,'J:l;'
of Tower B- " < ' " w.
..~.'
,', 1~isW'e';2 Figure 2 jUW!*~~~.~eimport~R~:~(~~f*fl9~}~Il*
illustrates the importance. of water. flow... ,..on. tower,performan4: tovwe performance.. e :.At At aa'wet wet
. '" " . ., . ",'." ..' , ," '.' '. : ~, . . . '. ' ',", .,'.'
- ~Q~9-¥,SD.~: .
'REVISION "Jt~~Slq:r'l(l. t .
>' ,,:;:~A,~ PA6, ',,9P';'
.6 .OF olllb,,:'tem bulb
,,'c'., .p;'eutmeOfW'F tempei* ......tuFreIO+'P
""" ..:, .. ' .... alidj<towefrm and ..... ".. range a .towmer ':o{23iFp*'.
, .. ,~,of.. " . . : . ">,,diOeocitin
. thee .....
,' ti,8 'COld:W~~~J'it2i~!"
le
<', '."".,j . . . . .' , . ",.,,',j areapproxftnate!Y"""
are a~pproximately 90TF and and]108TP. 08~F., f~or fotWatert1Q.w'rat.f)f8)3l~dlti.66,7; water tkow ralts of 8,333 and 16,667 gpm, 'gpm,:: ..... . respeeriwly; .'. Clearly respectively, CJea,lir:~8jmPact of Wlbal~e.f~q~to~i~t()~. the imatof unbalanced fwsto i w oes resuligi remtti 118'ip
- such:,({Ur~r~t;:~~
such dil ferent dhernlat perfGrmM~,~~iie~~IIy;;~atua~d.;
*~~lw to the.. tw tower...s., ', ,u mnie must be carefully ev'uated. .
.1'bis~~culatlOll,~ty,p,aoUl~$1hed~ent This falculation dosly parallels the developMent given given in Reference (1) Ihe_ ,
in 'Referen1:e'(l).,"The,
,.m~Ull1g~,1h,~I;Q¢;\,hea(l()ads:Iin~{mtil~~
modelling of the LOCA heat loads and tower theml pformance ~e},s.~c~#~~; is unchanged. _'" '.', flin-iKions of terms and symbols are also unchanged. The major difference betWeen:
~firubons,ot,tehnSad, *mbo.ls*,R; wsouDehan'ed;<lhe . '.* of' \(fifference: betwee.
;~~~~~~;~~:~~~~~i~~!~~~i this 'twa-tower* mt
'ofacb'ate;sep~;':facmied of each are separaidy factored into andrsingie-tbwer, the of the passible differawe in tlows3 and 'lo'a&s to the tower-.,, the heat, removal properties-into**theiunij~s';}:Tbe model of Reference (1)is 'that, because the analysis, The final ~.differell~~!
differential equation ,eq~brin'" . . ,
,de$c~~*~~<m~~;~~Sin:#nperatm~;,~~Jts'.*~I~~"
descri-b ing the basin temperature, and itstsolution. are ~~;to"be'rrif~#:iyt:i~#.tti~* shovm to be formally idetnti-cal to.' to,
,mato]):t:twlt,~,'mR~c:e(t).;
that obtained, in Raefrmce (I)-.
< "'.' .".' <.. . . ' , .. ,' . . . . . .' '" ~ '." ... ,. ., ':'/ ' . , ",,4.3 43McxWDeyel~"m,mtfMIt1d~li,jll;We;ioMr:.
ModelDevelowent Faulted Ceflia anjOna o I ~'" '
'1n:,~~~~~I~t~~!~~~~~;:~~~~~~_
Figuire 3 schenmaicallly displaysý the ESW cooling towers and associate ,d 'wat"er flow,5 and heat, loads, Water is &awn from the common. basin at temperature T CF). ,,, at th mas:; tlCw,r~~Of:~:.,: mss flowriaws*~f .. *(JbmJlu');; Lindb th,.(lbm/hr), and',riff:; ancl:.;mppli~atthose~tU',to,tOwe#~T~ 2 1 and suoppieO at those rates. to towers T- Iand, l Md~
.T,;2.ieSpectiv*elY.,:~_*P.as$ltililhroll.sbjhtheat'l~adi1,:(B'~r);;the:~I1'~t.
T-,respectively. Afhiz passing throtigh the heat load L, (ftuihr). the resultant- . .
- !it~1~?!t~~~t~:IIT~;Ii~~;IJ~t'er i~;##I.l'a)O:.1i1mt;r'1' ternperatur*, of+::u watr entcring T-tI"is Tit Si-Aiarly, water is supplied*t at a temperature of T, after ben heated by the toad 1 woeri,'T.-
. ,.'*Head$removed_diffenmtrBt.Jin::~'pf Hleat is remnved at different rates in each of** thec~_ uownrs ~ due, primariiy.'~tbo;,*
primarily, to tho ',' , dHfenmtcell different cell tlows.,. flows- ':An(;~Ce Allowance as is made:'far,fatdtideellsim:T made for faulted cells -in T-L :-1;' for whichd theo;j~till rot, Whi.cn, the overall
'th~~:~*~~~ci::~jl~esIgDi~~t,~~~~d.*
thermal perfomr+mauewill be significatly reduced. All AII.~t~~~ri,~ hot water en.. .. ..;t~2'i~.* T-2 "s .. assumed. to be cooled The cooled wiu.er;rmm assuritedto&cOolel.-rlte'COoled, water fro+mboth towe. then .ent~".d1o,~ii$iri~S!.d both"tOwets,tben enters .the basinand.
*mi'x~tol',rridu~an~v~rnn;a~"e*'b~~~;*~rtaffire.~-,:~;:,;:
mixes to produc Ain' overall avcrAgc basin temperature1 , T,,.. . ,'" .,.. " .
-43,11 *t;Q9IT6j:)*~Wef:l:ltat;liiMYN C gal n Towdi er F t TeTmL
. ~s'
.' f.unction, As in;R.ef~~~{llUte'~()~I,i~lkJYrer<~~ie~'changep~eessismo~ll~~i.s**adi,near" in efernca (1) the cooling tow, r-,dbeaexchange process ismndelled as d finear Hot water titers the fill region of .o
**tuntti.on:Ho(~(entm1h~fiU.*reJj~D.of'1be*)~rda~etnP~tU~!~'rel,~,,~at* th tow er at a temperature T,, releases heat
.tothe:.cOm'te,.;;f1owml'*jirby.**bothil~t'and':.$lbl~h.,~er,(lUut~t~
to the counter flowing air by both latent and sensible heat tran~fer, and entters th~'ba:Sin the basin
'eftJt~**~~~.*'W~':~pe,~
at the cold w~ater temperhture~, Tq-/'The~~~~t,r3~:~fheat T_. The resultant rite of heat ***wm$r~r.*:ro*~;~;,J~i~,*,~nt~*' transfer, for a given Mawss flow rate~m/i$ flow rate, iii, is *. ~'1!,~;,llio.,pn;du~f~f;~::~:d~e;~~~r6.*d~re&ile+.or':r~g~< givc' by the pomductof ib and ihe tempratwre decrease, or range, .,.
**a::;i AR= Tb'-+ T\I.~T"';Th~r'dlipCndenc.olT~~;
,. The d ce of T, ,Upon.I~*,(iriJum,biliWn upon Th, (intui n, know ioSeStrollg,ruriciioo*.oltoibe Strong funcionof
~);*istbe,'Ji:I~~ship n4is the relationship ~ to '~ be appft)~im~
approxcimated ~:.Jii1¢iu" {~dOf]~ , as a line'ar-funcdon. ".,
'fi" iim:tl):'Md:(ll.;~r*Ref:erence;(4l/
Figures (1) ajid(2) of Reference(4giexnilsotequ "w ;exam;.Ies'oC,the'~i tvfftofasaih ~~f';'fifof3:sftii nt'
- .;1~~~~i~~~~O!:ih!~~~~~5~:~;i~;:!~:; -.
line to' this slowly, vatying function, For the presentcalculation a single, segment linear-approximation will be wed, 1Note that t-he: deve*lpmnftof Reference (t) a.towed f'or a muJti.;,~gDl"( aWi~matiof1:'.'
- multi-segment approximation .lJecause;,the,~~tef;f,1()WS'*ma.y.
Becauase thwater.flows may1be,,different be.diffet~~,f,!~*J~e::t\V9,*' for the two tO~r$.~~!is/mo~#~tlfelY. towvcrs, etachi ismodelled separately. .., . .' .,' . ,., , "... ,.
'I,ý..j
- ~~~,~, ""--'--:---:-----:------------------------------~
NED-QMSD4I-Fo~r T_ etr.w'aiterPpasin rou.Oh opeiat ng elk': "VWisit) I "" PAGE 7' 'Of To INThl +UB1,10 2 Where, as defin.d.. - Rference (1), M. aind ..III are the lop... (liF/ i4te 'cept "d ("F), cýh'rteiizing the dep~endence of T,,,an T, i odadhtwae eprtrso
.TTifrcin, opeirabeecll innT*
f.l.e T-1, chy. h. actah by .rized all;Owed tobe equAl to or less than unity. tf no heat is reenoved from nn-Operble cels ie average iemp!erature of die water entering the hasiii frown -T-is then Tal.ý, T.... , +(1-: )Tk (2)
,/Titif8e~nCr:towet:.:f2:2.,is"auumc(f Thie~second towver T.-2,, Is assumed to b,~;fuJty" be fully open:tion~ willi:tUfwJ~r allwater: b~i~tr,C()Ole{E i
oper"6atinýwith b6ing.copoled
';f~m:'fh;tJ~',TJ':
froim to. T,,, " '.,.. T* 4MT!+B 1 (3)
- t~~~~~.B2 Mand Dý ~~/t6e NI,~ are the slo~i8d'il1tel'Yep4re~ctii~Jh:0'(ih~,$iri8Ie:~irri~~ttinetUr slope and intercept, rcspetively, of' the: sihtge Kegment flnar.
42.1 );OGA'O§At Loads, 4j~2
.pn<<e{~~9dent,~~~~,tigl!,sthe'h~(I~suppUt4>,~';th~~nng,l~~erW!}~!gi'~n.,*by Lindei acciderit conditions the heat load nyppkd to the ezoiing towers ,is given by
**',tbe:;swn'~()f.dle:loao:frC;m't6ff,LQCA;unifan;d~a$tUalMt:corltribuliontr~rii:'tlte;other.'tion-',',.
the sumnof die".< ...... load from the LOCA unit and a smnallr conitribution from~ the :._ _ other,
.,',: .. ",. '.aon-r,
-< . '.';. i/ ", "I:': .'.: ',', ..~ ";""
ýLOAunt ,Follow1ng,t~e':method.8iven,
;];;p,CJ\:,wut FoI " owing <::".: .' '. ':.
~ .'.'~"
the method given injeeec
",,".l,V,", ,".: .' '."', :. . >.' .'~ > ".' '; .:'.:; ** '. ' : ;",".
in;c;Retirenee:<<H~'
",;~ '.~
()1ioal .~, .~~:' d:1i5:~totaHoad:i$:~~~prC$sed I"~ ...sxrse
.. :: :::'1'", c.. ".: ~ '~'/ /~<,~ ~~ ,~" ',,~:" ;'
- ,:as;a.p~~wis~:.ti~ear:tWte.tiQn.;**
- as'ýa p seAlear function : ...... .; /'. ",
*ft;;~ii¥i+'~i ~~~',
~;tiit~,=;4"t~~;f~:~:~fi~~~~~f;~~n~~.d whee 14s.. theiotal load, (Btulir), at time 'T., (
R(Btu/fir `arethe~slop~e andaineCept Constants for the and.in),. M.(Btu 6time intr i an.....
. .Eav~h EaCli:iOWer\ toý6'w'e'r::,:,,>::::
- ~';., ~'.:>.::.~ *.::::;.~:;.*i.::.*>:**
m:cives::;S(jmo' greei'ves wmce
- .\.:<<.<~\c', ~~.>'
fQcfi(jnof';tbi$;Ju~at; fr~itcoon o fthis hfat 1000;(
.:~ ,'.i:;/,~*.***f<,..e/-/* '" "."
load: ..*.'<,~.
"i.;:::C~:T"
,\vh~~::t~!Wdi~(are'tbe.heat where IL, and L,2 are the heat loads loadsstippli~t~fowers\T.fmd supplied to towersN T- ad T-2 T.2.T~e~tiv.~iY:respectively, The 1;Rc'
- tb~~:;~~.:;~~;:&qu~~.J}J Load fi-action f, equals 0 5 when w~~n:dt~;I.~,~Is'equaJJ¥:*i~ividecf,~ot~If;~,~~ry the load is equally divided to the two towers,.* "
- Oth~er,Wi~o::snl~
'Otherwise, 0 ,l~-;andtlteapptop~ate 1, and the appropriate value value :.olll.m~~bed.e;temf~~,ibY:.d1e of 0 must be determiined by the ronstt3ifltSofth',aC.cident;~EUiDbeinJ~ed:""
'consmunts of tho accidenit scenario being examined-.
~~t';clOfiv~1~,£e.~ira;thEs~c~la.ti~n.th'~~rfl6~'*ritte,~;)~,jha;to~~::#~;:~p!#d For convenience. in this calclulation the water flow rates to, the, towers ar~e expreswa, "as as"riiCtions'ot>mefD'tilIflo:w:'
tractions of'the total flow-
* ," ** , __ ?o ",~,,' * " " , ' ,'.. , *
..".""'...*... ".-~.. ----------:------:---------------~------ ......
ri~1 = 4x5i1 (7M PA GE R
** is th w~cia~u isrt e wtioi of flo-w directed to T-1, 4md rh ,1 the totail flow rae s;upplied to the tow~ers. The ternpiratute'dt.o across i~ heat load of the water supptied t- tWfT1, 1,1 (T)1 , isgie :
(I) 2107 29 I.,-? -C~ (9)",
.**.*y;b.r,e.*:~~*,j$the where C, is dieý specinc.;hfitJ~,~~.:*~er.:
speciric heat of water, taken ~i,Oti~:~f.1.iI(lbDi°F) as one Btu!([mWF) in,. in ~~,":~~,,~l~ti.Qn:~: thi's calilation.
';:COmbifiiri8~Eq"'iUion$(9)~;(7).,{~f*Md*(1)yield5:;,'
Comb in'i;nIEqu ations (9). (7)1(5) and (4) yields: , '. , ... ' .'. "... . . ...... ..... . ...'
- -.~:.:' ,. -", :;":", .". . ":, \. :.- , :.r '" ',. .;~
- ~t';~ liti~q~\ lak. .
'..uPL Met::
- ,~
7 1 Where: LjT= Mt+ W (I1), andr isthýavrage temperature, rieoft-waler passinghouhteha Idsfr tliejt tim'e it: vi The slope and intercep1 'for."~in this interval are, respecive1j,ý"K 0 >:.~.' MAWh 1~ ( F/min) nil'" == *M/mCflJ.**(~"/r6in);\:
=in
.bj;~;1I:{/dlpP.(r~r
- Simil~,ffo;;toww*'T~2+th~,;1imperiiturefincreuej~:
Simi lar~y, or, ower T-2, the tempe atture'irOrewe s:1. .
.' ; :: . , : ~.
,i W= O( *ý (12) Equations (12), (I1I),
'. EQu.atl0i1S(r2). (ll)~an(t( vnd (10) lO)'can:,now.'be can now- be .u-ed used to relate rel.!:rte:ýthe. hot water temperatures, to thahot.Wtllet{tempern.iures the basin tathe
~pe~i~;::'"
temperature. '" (L3)~
'fIa :;;T~,:f
=T3 +L, 1;.2;: (14)
'.'. . "\~
.~.
>~~> .. ' .... "~~'~--.----:--:-----:----~~--------------,- .....
"~Q;MSo~
"REVISIONi'>
REVISION I <
- >>Tim.D~pmdmtCQOline,"Tower:()Demri~11
~1{&~12~
,,4':3:;3, 4.~,3Co~i2imeDepndet TwerO~eatLJIPACE 9 'OF
> ~4j;~'ii DD~nHmBaJoo~.
Followa'ing Refcrence (1) ha etwbaInce 1aapled to-the 'basin wateri i~wenorý.a s, follWs.
- kthe interval of time At~, the qu tntiiy bf water iii zt both entters -and ex'its the t asin. The ietieruig wNater temperacures are T, and T,, for water from Towers T-I and T-2, respeovely, and
- the flow rates, as defuned above~, are fij,~ and 641- Because the wat~er exits the, basin a'tha trfttw*u T,, the net heat added in N~s interval is AQ:
AQ = (rhj At)Cp(T.,.T.J4~:;4i)litJ"TtJ
'" li<l=(ml At)Cpmfl - To)+(h t)Cp(T,. -TU)
*>>;Pl~);ci,~~~di#~~~er~nlial'~~~~.<in;,~,~t~.,te;m~.~>~,i~'Si~:~y:,
The e~pdMn differential change in -bisin telDPfrature is gpven by: Ts: &:'AQ<<M~~J~
'AATS, AWNIAQ/MC-ij wbte h oa ai nenw.Tkn i.lmtasW~i 4t soes to zero ýand using Equ'atios
~> :\\,~~~:.~~Uis.:,h~ ,:tollJ.l:'b~n'i~~~olY~ rJi ns >d1e.limit >.U:&:goestQ,.~rQ:~d'~ing;,~u~ti:Ons:
(1):afid(~ryiet<ls,' . . > .. (7) i4,( ) yields CE8 IdTI, + 0 -ax)T TiVtý 5) tit where, as used in Refer-ence (1) aigan, -r is the rccircuisatioz time constant, equal to~M,/zIIr 4~3~3,2 Time-VaryingiBDainTeir~t iajq '1 '
*t~ta~~T.i~!~JI1i~~~~!B;~~~
be mani
, "Sing (1 1),
Tquatian (15), representng~ the, time rue of cha11nge of the basin teperatuzre, mýustno jnd into a usable differential: eua ion. First, eliminate the int-ernediato' qpulated 1Ienilperaftires~, T,,,and T,8 . by uzsing.eq tio~ris'(2), and, (3). Second, eliminate Thl, and T~j by,:
~1ig:'eq~~9J?S"(l3)(,md equations (13) and ,(tJf)~*.fi~,aJb:.'~Il5lituleJgfIiI:Mdli);:w,th'eq~~:,l9);,,(10)':~~:~*
(14), Fina~lLy subtiute brzLI, ant L2 wi th equatis(), i)ad
;'{1))::;:imd'~'#rj~li8etOo1)iairj':~~>f6]~~~~g:
ý-arange to obtain the follow*Ting '" " ,,'
i'
~ +aT~~ kit. + (16 dt m~l~t-tI,)+ 0l41)jtr1
~bjU3(1.f4~J~v+ j+cJ 0'f4)
":*~Zis~~~;;
- PAGE,". 10: OF" 210729 ,'.;":,.
~PAGE' 10 10i~t"-
O 0 d ~ia firSt order. diflbti-Ual cquatin for T,, is now rognized s~ina fovmally identical to Thi developed in -Reference (1). See App",,dix Bu tI~his Reference1 , where Equation (BA) iis prsntdiin de idenftica form' to quatioii.(16),above. Thlesolution"tO_(16), g!yn Equation, C Apeni~ isas foflows-
~(824) a wiierO Ini ializaion cons~tan, for ,the 'Ib LOCA tirria interval. i's g;iven, asK and'"l!f~is~(~"',~atthib~I.pr~\li11ed;,~
"Are Provided, as.:~i(;:::' wIt. ...
'~;~:J Y~5f~Jin~:\!~~~~~.om'
, 'fh~;;T a~;.:g~;ti"ij¥~~~(lli~'~ater:~qg>~~;~asln@~/tF~;
aver": enprbr of the watier enteringfthe basion fromi T-1 is i~;*~,~~ts~~er.:;~X(
-now g-iven by joý =J7I7 + (I1f)TI,19 Ceai y~,,hseuto reduius 1to Equation (2) witnf is replacedw4f` inkK~
't"Prperatue Of the water entering the basin from T-2 i T.1 ýfAT. + 0(1.f)T, (20)
Ff;fA';'.l I *.. 2a~frripJi,cHI)t:wedi1i Pof ipictl ~sd nSettion s~ti6n}6:b.Equation,*(20jred~est.o!~.;:*:t~,~.d,~qu~tip~ 6ý,Eguation (2)reduces to T T."' Mnd Euto
,(~l,~i~:~ev¥~;~tt~.
(3).cives th~e vaie of T.,212 .*
- A , . . . .' . ' ',.'
2) qito 4.4.2,'Ldca Hu iioads
;'tned~lop~~fand The development and *letminoiCtIY terrainolo-o of Section 4.3.2 is ofSei:.iioo,4.J;;:1. direcdyappli~~le;J(ftP,e~jCt~n~ed is directly apoplicable to the extended" ,;
- model. That 1~;Bquatio~$'(4) througll (l4)will be used:" uchinge~d, mnodet, Th1at is, Equations (4) through, (14) will be u~sed~ , WlchangMl.: in in the &foiowfing. "
th'~:loflo~ns;:;' . ',
'" ," '; ¥ , " ~',',
ONiD-Q-MSp.6 KEVISION 1, PAGE 11 O
,!A~4;~,7,tjrtl,eDm~dijltCp.punii'T~\~;()Pe:ri#~b
- 4.k3::r 4,41.1 'Su ga-siiP 'Heat iet IllIjl¢e{ AWM4c AllowihS for:~~.t1QW:'ln Allowing for bypassed flowin, ~th both IOwe,S;",~~.n-e(hf1ilt'8dded towers., th~ene heat added to the lhe basin time in the time.
basin in inte~ tit lnterval At is now no liY~n by: given by:, '
;4Q-=(m.iAt)C{f~i~~}rri)+(mJi)c,(t~"*TBl AQ= (Mt)ICP(Tdj!- TF) + (rh-,M)C (ý
. . 'FMsCAJ7~~!""'\" '.: ,'. iF' ...*. . . . *
,:Ta~JJ1s*th~jm~tt;~~~:~~.;:~i*¥:iQ*.~,~,u~n~;E:'l~~,J~
T4atng the limit as At goes tozr-` d sing EqutOn(1)nd2)yils . ~}"~4;~(20~;~,~d~:..
.;dT."
-dT9 .j: ..""" '" .... *.:U .:<.... ,
(1
<. ai=~t{S/.rQ.+,'(l:~~gi'Qi~'rB]
. !of* ."
Withf, I, T,, T~,ý and Eqauia~n (1) then reduc-cs to (15),
*.~g#~~~1~t.~~;~~fJ~~~~;;~iI~~th~;~~:..,¥fo:;c .
Thee algebra' requiredto, roduce a differcricial equabn'Icide's"crib3n~g-the time rate of chaige of T, w11lI be brieflyj deribed. Note, that the apprpach, lisidenfical to that given in,
~edion.6~22Theonl,~<diffCrene:e(:is*lhatj':is"!1~
.** Section, 62. The ci1 dfence ,is ihatf is replaced '.b~;llt~d/t{~!lC 1 ad by!Asitoue'b~oe i"trq4tice~:fO:(T()~T+/-2:j i-2 '. I
*J~a;~g{~~~.~~((~)'~;.(J~tllqd::(;f~xin~"J!~)*:'I~~~ii9.~;
,Incoioratng E uationls (1), (13) and (10i) into (19) leads to."'
T.t=*:l~J.+fjM;]TD:;+'[fJ'l+jtM~](PI~)ir;*+J;~~
= Irfri~
'./< ..... > ,,;,,',., 1 ', ... : Y,:
+ [1fj
;.~
1 +fMjN~j~kt)f.+T(2 ','<" ',";",'
'~": ,", . '.-, .. ,;",'
. (22),
Thbe correspondi2ng expreskion for T., is then &kve1oped in the siama mmzner-
"f i* .. "'"
'T~;';Jkfi+f~11Tii.*+'. [l::t2:V;fl,I;](CFID/('l ~>>4<+jli;r .. (23)'
" .... ,_, ",.",".',;.'::'." ;', "'~',, .:>;.:;:/ .. </.~... ,;-.,,>/,\ ... / :.;~ ... " c , '.: . .'. ,:: ':;_, "'.',:;
Suibstituting ('22) and (23) iiio (21 leads: directly to:
'dTa+t~T!J~=:,~~,t}f'
,dt ',' ~t:
I dt
't~
,"='lli k, ~ (1 +f1Mt) + (I.j)1~ fM)
*T f 711
+ qfoBt ++/-30 -4BlpJ
N,ljl).~MSJ.l~(,'
", l,
'2.1072.9 RBVISIONT, REVISION PAGE 12 OF.
PAGJl,120P: I' ,
, . l'hiJ,diffeferi'tiaJe Thi" diffi etial eUation wHion is forma'lly the sm attsiuinEquatin 1S!formatlttte'same:a:f1hi\t: "'ivetfm'Hqilation (16). (16 F hr.i it ',.:.
F1lt1hertit>
.. ' "i~:$tNti8ht:'t~fWardta,shol:thilif:t~a'ti~~'L*'a;~}~:(J is StMSgh fýorward to show that &"reduces to 'a in(6,w enh usiuinf 6j<iwh:n,~e:~tri<N1sj.,,:;:jrild: n '. '. .* ';, /~l:;~:'maJa:
f~1ar ad.Sirlarly, SimilarlYytt:an.d,kn.re<looe: k, and i reduce *lOk(and to ki, and k~,~r~gti~~IY~;.~~dhe;same: k ;respectively. with the sarndi
,:~ubS#~U~~s . *ro-r/i)midj~,:I.t'i(tI~.:fuldi,#i#p~:'~:*~~1,~I~ti9:~s substitutions
~ ~ i ~ ts ~ frhroththeolins
~ ~ At "bf ,nf~ , . #r~:~u;~~~,:(i~)!r~J\teil***,~
to E:qualioni (16),(: given by
';um:~;~:J~,~))~: .
s well'to (24), provided the cosont (akJ 4pl eraced by This -analytical model provi~:a This aIlaJyticd prvides a m~dJh>d~.m~e'the, methad to determine the ._ESW' .ESW>b~m bas~in
';r~=~:p::!i"L~~me_T~~=~Jt":~i~~
teperature as a function of fime under accident oonditiorts. Required Inputs are best estimate time dependent LOCA beat loads and actual tower oefrmunce
,**dultaeterisria eharacteristics...1n In ll~ditiQnme.amJljrnciilmoaeta&:OW1sfor~ypaS8ed ad~dition dhe analytical mod" accounts for bypassed .uWiooted water wxweled *water*;
\in:bothJo~'
- ,nbOoth towers. . ,.,
I,
~~~:;~it~rrt:m~4ir~:UiI~,.ij~~::aijli,~~~;~e:,si~gl~'(~Wet.ttl~~1{dev~()p~d The presenlt modal builds upon, atd iiiteJ1lsjh e sýii 'gkWtowar model developed
,ii1"ltereRh&::(lrThi~~3dditiolla.:feafu~:;blV.,b~n<inoo!'
. > / Th~ree
- ,;';:< " , . "ne(1). additional
' ... ,,;:".i,:>> features
. . ',...... :::.,.: , rp orated( .,'. '.'
.* ". ,,'bv:,."been"'.Incorporated,
~'w,~I~t:f.~~~~:~*:~<<~~ri*
- i) each of the m~o ESW to'wers' may, hlave different 4herma. performance Ch Mtifislics. <','
, 1tio:lteatlow:andJlows:8u:
i)the, beat loads, nd floWssu~p lied, iled to each towerm to:;eacb' tower mnay'ba'be'diffm,ml<
"different.
ii)ý . **~P~h~~o~'lil,~';:~i::iliowed:'f6~;Qn'tiOth":~~r~.*****.'*
ýbypassed,, non-c~oold'wte is allowed, for -on laoth towers. ....:. . . .'
Tiw-tiowar. two-load model willpi4eamr aitcdssiponfth
'ESW cooling response under dent conitidiis thanpreviously avalilable.
I.
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.~ "REv:1D;CHECKtIST Revi-iow 3 page 2,,of,.2-W ~CAtCtIlATiO N6O W -qAS Dr6~I PGE / F
'EViT*EWED BY'- f~. DATE: f) f/ J
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'r.- is ThE D3rSIO#4ST4311OCGAKMCT AND A"OPmAImiOj'6thi ___________________
ANALY913
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~~0 1. ThE CACLAML A WIN COOF!% STANODMW5, AND RED. GU[DEW~
COMWIANC WTM4 OESI" UW ______________
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J, Afk[ rt*E UNMI CtIýAREY IDENTIFIED, ADID *QUAK1O14 MoPIlDJ LY DERIVE~D AND APPLUMI
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a , ~AP INCMPA~ D(Iu gSIGN NPUT$ AND MY# WWUM~S (DENTWI WITH USI TE04 ý3Ei4:4 AND _______________
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ITME AE~flEW OF THE M4AN MKPFF DEEDUM CALCU1iA??U?"ýV AS "OV~J$XED BY CNE OMA CO&IDINA1N OF THE
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