PNO-II-96-060A, on 961004,licensee Notified NRC That Extended Shutdown Was Being Initiated to Accomplish Design Mod to Increase Safety Margins.On 960902,plant Was Shutdown Due to Problem W/Turbine Oil Sys.Meeting Scheduled on 961009
| ML20141D144 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 10/04/1996 |
| From: | Mellen L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20141C196 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-97-144 PNO-II-96-060A, PNO-II-96-60A, NUDOCS 9706260330 | |
| Download: ML20141D144 (137) | |
. . .- . . - . . . - -- . . _ - . -- - - _ _ -._. - ~ . .- . - _ =
e t I 4 October 4, 1996 PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE PNO-II-96-060A This preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or public interest significance. The information is as initially received without verification or evaluaticn, and is basically all that is known by Region II staff (Atlanta, Georgia) on this date.
Eacility Licensee Emeroency Class'fication _
Florida Power Corporation Notification of Unusual Event Crystal River 3 Alert Crystal River, Florida Site Area Emergency Dockets: 50-302 General Emergency X Not Applicable 1
Subject:
SHUTDOWN IN EXCESS OF 72 HOURS l On October 4, 1996, the licensee notified the NRC that an extended shutdown (initially thought to be two to three months) was being initiated in order to accomplish design modifications necessary to increase design safety margins. These modifications (not yet defined) !
could affect several safety systems such as high pressure injection, i emergency feedwater, and the emergency diesel generators.
i The plant had originally shutdown on September 2, 1996, due to a problem with the turbine lube oil system. The outage was extended to resolve potential unreviewed safety questions concerning the emergency diesel generator loading and emergency feedwater starting logic. On October 1, 1 1996, the licensee identified a single failure vulnerability that could j render the emergency feedwater system inoperable.
A meeting with the licensee has been scheduled for October 9, 1996 in order for the licensee to present further details of their plans.
l The State of Florida and local government agencies have been notified.
! This information is current as of 12:00 noon, October 4, 1996.
Contact:
L. MELLEN (404)331-5561 i
9706260330 970620 PDR FOIA CAM? BEL 97-144 PDR t
4 l September 4, 1996 1
PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE PNO-II-96-060
! This preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or public interest significance. The information is as initially received without verification or evaluation, and is basically all that is known'by Region II staff (Atlanta, Georgia) on this date.
i Facility Licensee Emeroency Classification i
Florida Power Corporation Notification of Unusua' Event Crystal River 3 Alert Crystal River, Florida Site Area Emergency
- Dockets: 50-302 General Emergency X Not Applicable t
i
Subject:
SHUTDOWN IN EXCESS OF 72 HOURS Florida Power Corporation removed Crystal River 3 from service due to a main turbine lubricating oil problem. The licensee experienced a decreasing oil pressure at the turbine bearings during the period August 30 to September 2, loco. Subsequent inspections noted a cracked 1 lube oil line inside the main oil tank, causing a loss of some of the l normal supply flow, and lower than expected bearing pressures. A five 4 day outage is scheduled. )
The licensee is not issuing a press release. Some media attention is expected.
The state of Florida has been informed. ;
I
Contact:
L. MELLEN (404)331-5561 1
July 3, 1996 PR3LIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE PNO-II-96-047 This preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or public interest significance. The information is as initially received without verification or evaluation, and is basically all that is known by Region II staff (Atlanta, Georgia) on this date.
Facility Licensee Emeraency Classification Florida Power Corporation Notification of Unusual Event Crystal River 3 Alert Crystal River, Florida Site Area Emergency Dockets: 50-302 General Emergency X Not Applicable
Subject:
CONTRACT FOREMAN SUICIDE Region II has been notified by the licensee that a former employee, a contract painter foreman, has committed suicide.
-The circumstances surrounding the suicide are under investigation by the licensee and are being followed by the NRC resident inspectors. The licensee has not received any media interest to date, but media interest is expected.
The state of Florida has been notified. This information is current as of 1:30 p.m. on July 3, 1996.
Contact:
L. MELLEN (404)231-5561 ,
WD \ }-
. . . I April 15, 1996 PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE PNO-II-96-027
! This preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE l safety or public interest significance. The information is as initially l received without verification or evaluation, and is basically all that is 1
. known by Region II staff (Atlanta, Georgia) on this date. i l
Facility Licensee Emeroency Classification l Florida Power Corporation Notification of Unusual Event Crystal River 3 Alert Crystal River, Florida Site Area Emergency Dockets: 50-302 General Emergency X Not Applicable
Subject:
CONTRACTOR HURT I l
On February 12, 1996, at approximately 3:54 p.m., a licensee contractor slipped and tell injuring herself descending a permanent ladder inside containment. The licensee dispatched EMTs and site medical personnel to the containment building. An offsite ambulance was summoned and the person was transported as potentially contaminated to the Seven Rivers !
Community Hospital. At the hospital, the person was determined not to be contaminated.
The extent of the injuries included a broken right ankle, a broken and dislocated right elbow, and severe cuts to the upper arm.
The licensee immediately restricted all access to the containment, pending an investigation on the cause of the accident. The licensee's investigation determined that the primary cause of the accident was a cross beam located behind a step on the ladder which did not allow the full foot to be placed on the rung. Corrective actions include briefing of all shop personnel of the accident, determining if similar obstructions exist on other ladders inside containment, prevent use of the subject ladder and other ladders determined to be unsafe, require the use of retracting lanyards on climbing harnesses for all ladders equipped for them, and several other changes to address contributing factors. No press release has teen made on the incident.
Local newspapers have contacted the licensee and an article on the accident was included in the local newspaper.
This information is current as of 10:00 a.m., on April 15, 1996.
The State of Florida has been notified.
Contact:
T. COOPER L. MELLEN (904)795-7677 (404)331-5561
%U>
AwwMT 4
< s January 11, 1996 PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE PNO-II-96-002 l
)
This preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE j safety or public interest significance. The information is as initially i received without verification or evaluatica, and is basically all that is j known by Region II staff (Atlanta, Georgia) on this date.
Facility Licensee Emeraency Classification l Florida Power Corporation Notification of Unusual Event i Crystal River 3 Alert P Crystal River, Florida Site Area Emergency l Dockets: 50-302 General Emergency X Not Applicable 1
i I
Subject:
FORCED SHUTDOWN IN EXCESS OF 72 HOURS i I
On January 9, 1996, feedwater system chlorides, sodium, and conductivity I i were indicative of a condenser tube leak, allowing seawater intrusion
, into the secondary plant. By procedure the operators began a power j reduction. The-"A" waterbox had been previously removed from service to
] permit scheduled maintenance so only the B waterbox was in service.
1 i At 4:51 p.m., with the reactor at approximately 18 percent of rated power, based on reports of rapidly increasing chemistry readings, the decision was made to trip the main turbine. The decision was subsequently made to go to mode 5, Cold Shutdown. I Inspection revealed a large condenser tube leak in the center of the tube bundle, approximately 10 feet from the tube sheet. A guillotine break was found on one tube. No obvious cause for the damaged tube was found.
The licensee does not plan to remove the tube at this time, but will wait until the refueling outage scheduled to start on February 29, 1996. The licensee plans to eddy current test approximately 200 surrounding tubes to check for possible damage.
Based on the projected time to clean the secondary systems, anticipated restart is January 17, 1996.
Followup by the Resident and Regional staff is planned.
The state of Florida has been informed. The licensee has issued a press release.
This information is current as of 8:00 a.m., on January 11, 1996.
Contact:
KERRY LANDIS (404)331-5509 i .- - -- - ,,
'.. T oll lo} D o.
l
( l~ O f ~
l THIS DOCUMENT WAS PRODUCED BV TH U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSI@
NUDOCS I
l 4
i i
OPERATED BY i STATISTICA, INC.
UNDER CONTRACT NO. NRC-39-88-21d i
5/ 2/97 PAGE 1 U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DCS PARTIAL RECORD FORMAT REPORT I
9602140330 Submits summary of work performed by INEL at plant site during wk of 951218.
)
FROM: KELLY,D.L. Idaho National Engineering Laboratory TO: CHUNG,J.
ISSUED: 960102 AVAIL: CF 9pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: CLINC FPAC: 9602140317B TASK: ODID: DIN: 960102 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 72802 341 72802 351 RIDS:
9603290266 01 Forwards agenda for 960212-15 IPE Senior Review Board meeting in Rockville,MD to discuss contractor-developed technical evaluation repts for listed plants.
FROM: HODGES,M.W. Division of Systems Technology (Post 941217)
TO: MARTIN,T.T. Region 1 (Post 820201)
ISSUED: 960122 AVAIL: CF 5p p. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMO FPAC: 9603290266 TASK: ODID: DIN: 960122 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000285 05000302 05000320 FICHE: 72841 039 72841 043 RIDS: DFX2D 9601260050 Forwards SE re util ltr dtd 951103 re proposed amend request for one-time TS change to defer insp of flywheels in reactor coolant pump motors from refueling outage. Changes found ecceptable.SALP input also encl.
FROM: WICHMAN,K.R.
TO: MATTHEWS,D.B.
ISSUED: 960123 AVAIL: CF 5pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMO FPAC: 9601260050 TASK: ODID: DIN: 960123-03 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 72775 249 72775 253 RIDS: DF X2D 9601300330 Requests that enc 1 RAI re plent Second 10-Yr Interval ISI Program Plan Request for Relief 95-030 be forwarded to FPC &
informs that response required within 45 days.
Raquests that licensee be instructed to send copy to INEL.
FROM: BAGCHI,G.
TO: WUNDER,G.
ISSUED: 960126 AVAIL: CF 5p p. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMO FPAC: 9601300330 TASK: ODID: TAC M93755 DIN: 960126-05 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 72783 171 72783 175 RIDS: DFX2D l
9603050036 Forwards SE which finds licensee request dtd 960111 to use ASME Code Cases 2142 & 2143 under provisions of l 10CFR50 55a(a)(3), acceptable.
FROM: TERAD,D.
TO: BERKOW,H.N.
ISSUED: 960131 AVAIL: CF 7pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMD FPAC: 9602050036 TASK: ODID: TAC M94527 DIN: 960131-01 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 72786 261 72786 267 RIDS: DFX2D
.- . - . -_~ -. .
S/ 2/97 PAGE 2 U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DCS PARTIAL RECORD FORMAT REPORT 9604030026 Proprietary Books 1-6 of "Rept on Raceway Fire Barriers for ;
Aluminum Cable Tray & Aluminum Conduit Sys." Withheld. l l
FROM:
- Affiliation Not Assigned TO:
ISSUED: 960205 AVAIL: CF SOOpp. DOCUMENT TYPE: TSTEST FPAC: 960403OO21A TASK: ODID: DIN: TEST-960205 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 99318 050 99320 104 RIDC' )
l 9602070227 Trip rept of 960125 visit to plant to review licensee fire l berrier protesm I FROM: CONNELL,E.A. l TO: WEST,K.S.
ISSUED: 960206 AVAIL: CF 3pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: CNTRIP FPAC: 9602070227 ;
TASK: ODID: DIN: 960206 DPN: DRN: !
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 72798 275 72798 277 RIDS: DFX2D 9602140317 Trip rept of 951218-21 visit to plant to develop configuration risk profile using plant operating records from 950401-0930. Preliminary results & list of licensee personnel w/whom visiting team interfaced enc 1.
FROM: CHUNG,J.W.
TO: BUTCHER,E.J.
ISSUED: 960207 AVAIL: CF 23pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: CNTRIP FPAC: 9602140317*
TASK: ODID: DIN: 960207 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 72802 309 72802 351 RIDS: DFX2D 9602150383 Requests FR publication of notice os issuance of amend to license DPR-72. Amend increases surveillance interval on various instruments from 18 to 24 months.
FROM: WUNDER.G.F.
TO: NRC - No Detailed Affiliation Given ISSUED: 960213 AVAIL: CF 2pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMD FPAC: 9602150383 TASK: ODID: TAC M92551 DIN: 960213-01 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 72804 357 72804 358 RIDS: DFX2D
! 9602270318 Requests FR publication of notice of issuance of amend 153 to license DPR-72. Amend allows deferral of RCP flywheel insp until outage 11, scheduled for spring of 1998.
FROM: WUNDER,0.F.
TO: NRC - No Detailed Affiliation Given ISSUED: 960215 AVAIL: CF 1p. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMD FPAC: 9602270318 TASK: ODID: TAC M94098 DIN: 960215-07 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 72838 358 72818 358 RIDS: DFX2D l
l l
. _ . _ . . . _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ . ~ - _ _ _ _ . _ . __ _.._ _ _ ..
t .
5/ 2/97 PAGE 3 U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
~
DCS PARTIAL RECORD FORMAT REPORT 4
i 9603290324 03 Forwards agenda from 960325-28, IPE Senior Review Board
- meeting which will discuss contractor-developed technical ovaluation repts for listed plants.
1 .
l FROM: HODGES,M.W. Division of Systems Technology (Post 941217) i TO: MARTIN,T.T. Region 1 (Post 820201)
ISSUED: 960216 AVAIL: CF- 5p p. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMO FPAC: 9603290324 TASK: ODID: DIN: 960216 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000285 05000302 05000462 FICHE: 72841 109 72841 113 RIDS: DFX2D
, 9602260315 Forwards SE approving amend request to allow increase of authorized operating power level from 2544 to 2568 MWt at
-plant since subj increase has no significant impact on
- FROM
- WESSMAN,R.H.
TO: MATTHEWS,D.E.
4 ISSUED: 960222 AVAIL: CF 6pp. DOCUMENT: TYPE: CMMEMO FPAC: 9602260315 t TASK: ODID: TAC M90593 DIN: 960222-05 DPN: DRN:
l DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 72816 246 72816 251 RIDS: DFX2D
' 960228022S Discusses Itr dtd 951211 re request for non-code repair to fix through-wall flaw in portion of ASME Section III, Class 3,normally buried'line. Staff recommends alternative be cpproved.SE enc 1, i FROM: WESSMAN,R.H.
TO: MATTHEWS,D.E. i ISSUED: 960226 AVAIL: CF 6pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMD FPAC: 9602280225 -l
. TASK: ODID: TAC M94224 DIN: 960226-01 DPN: DRN: 1 DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 72820 012 72820 017 RIDS: DFX2D i 9603060033 Discusses licensee request to postpone surveillance of sixth ,
tondon surveillance scheduled for spring.of 1996 to spring l of 1998. l FROM: BAGCHI,G.
TO: MATTHEWS,D.B.
ISSUED:. 960229 AVAIL: CF 2pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMO FPAC: 9603060033 TASK: ODID: TAC M90195 DIN: 960229-04 DPN: DRN: )
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 72823 259 72823 260 RIDS: DFX2D l i
9603140138 Forwards LER 96-501-00 per 10CFR73.71. Enc 1 withheld.
FROM: HICKLE,B.J. Florida Power Corp.
TO: Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)
ISSUED: 960310 AVAIL: CF 1p. DOCUMENT TYPE: CLINC FPAC: 9603140138 TASK: ODID: 3F0396-07 DIN: 960310 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 72834 197 72834 197 RIDS: IX21D
- . _ _ . --. . . _ ~ . ~ - . - - - . -.- .. -- .- -- ..-. - --
, 5/ 2/97 PAGE 4' U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i ,
, DCS PARTIAL RECORD FORMAT REPORT l l
9603190225 "Significant' Event Evaluation & Info Network (SEE-IN)
)
Program Products Being Developed.-" Enc 1 withheld. j i
FROM:
- NRC - No Detailed Affiliation Given j
, TO:
4 ISSUED: 960311 AVAIL: CF 2pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: TZINDX FPAC: 9603190201A 4 TASK: ODID: DIN: INDX-960311 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: ' 05000302 05000414 05000443 FICHE: 99309 336 99309 338 RIDS:
9603190225 Ol' "Significant Event Evaluation & Info Network (SEE-IN)
Program Products Being Developed." Enc 1 withheld.
l I- ,
1 IFROM:
- NRC - No Detailed Affiliation Given
, TO:
- ' ISSUED: 960311-AVAIL: CF 2pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: TZINDX FPAC: 9603190201A
] TASK: ODID: DIN: INDX-960311 DPN: DRN:
- DOCKET NO
- 05000302 05000444 05000482 FICHE: 99309 336 99309 338 RIDS:
j 9603150143 Forwards SE approving request for relief for plant IST y program.
1 FROM: SCARBROUGH,T.G.
TO: BERKOW,H.N.
ISSUED: 960313 AVAIL: CF 7pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMO FPAC: 9603150143
- TASK
- ODID: TAC M93337 DIN: 960313 DPN: DRN:
5- . DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 72832 354 72832 360 RIDS: DFX2D l 9603270187 Forwards notice of consideration of issuance of amend to 4 license DPR-72 &~ proposed NSHC determination & opportunity for hearing on 960329 request.
1
- FROM
- IMBRD,E.V.
~
TO: CLAYPOOLE,R.
ISSUED: 960325 AVAIL: CF 1p. DOCUMENT TYPE: CLOUT FPAC: 9603270187*
TASK: ODID: DIN: 960325 DPN: DRN:
l DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 72839 187 72839 199 RIDS: DFX2D i 9603270209 Notice of consideration of issuance of amend to license DPR-72 & proposed NSHC determination & opportunity for hearing. Amend revises TS which would be applicable for one 1 cycle duration.& only to IGA degradation mechanism.
i FROM: BUCKLEY,B.C.
TO:
ISSUED: 960325 AVAIL: CF 12pp. . DOCUMENT TYPE: TFFRN FPAC: 9603270187A TASK: ODID: DIN: FRN-960325 DPN: DRN:
J DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 72839 188 72839 199 RIDS:
d
5/ 2/97 PAGE 5 U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DCS PARTIAL RECORD FORMAT REPORT 9604120300 Submits petition on behalf of LB Bennett te suspension or revoking of nuclear operating license for Florida Power Corp Crystal River NPP.
FROM: PUTNEY,L.D. Putney, L. D.
TO: Ofc of the Executive Director for Operations ISSUED: 960328 AVAIL: CF 7pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: CLINC FPAC: 9604120287A TASK: ODID: DIN: 960328 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 72853 341 72853 347 RIDS:
9604100151 Requests FR publication of notice of consideration of issuance of amend to license DPR-72 & proposed NSHC dotermination & opportunity for hearing on 960321 request re changes to TS for CR3 re OTSG tube insp.
FROM: RAGHAVAN,L.
TO: NRC - No Detailed Affiliation Oiven ISSUED: 960408 AVAIL: CF 1p. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMD FPAC: 9604100151 TASK: ODID: TAC M92548 DIN: 960408-02 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 72952 086 72852 086 RIDS: DFX2D 9604120287 Forwards petition dtd 960228, filed on behalf of BL Bennett to security deficiencies at Florida Power Corp Crystal River NPP.
FROM: GOLDBERG,J.R. Deputy As si s tarit Gens ral Counsel for Enforcement TO: RUSSELL,W.T.
ISSUED: 960409 AVAIL: CF 3pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMO FPAC: 960412O287*
TASK: ODID: 2.206 DIN: 960409 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 72853 338 72853 347 RIDS: DFOiD 9604160059 Forwards technical ltr rept on second 10-yr interval ISI program plan requests for relief 95-020,95-030 & 95-040 for fccility. Request for relief 95-010 mill be evaluated in scparate rept.
FROM: ANDERSON,M.T. Idaho National Engineering Laboratory TO: MCLELLAN,T.K.
ISSUED: 960410 AVAIL: CF 14pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: CLINC FPAC: 9604160059 TASK: ODID: MTA-20-96 DIN: 960410 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 72862 001 72862 014 RIDS: XOO6D 9604160059 01 Forwards technical ltr rept on second 10 yr interval ISI program plan requests for relief 95-020,95-030 & 95-040 for facility. Request for relief 95-010 mill be evaluated in ooparate rept.
FROM: ANDERSON,M.T. Idaho National Engineering Laboratory TO: MCLELLAN,T.K.
ISSUED: 960410 AVAIL: CF 14pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: CLINC FPAC: 9604160059 TASK: ODID: TAC M93755 DIN: 960410 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 72862 001 72862 014 RIDS: XOO6D
S/ 2/97 PAOE 6 U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DCS PARTIAL RECORD FORMAT REPORT 9604170411 Discusses SASG review in response to TIA 95-009, " Technical Assistance Request."
FROM: CARUSO,R.
TO: JONES,R.C.
ISSUED: 960415 AVAIL: CF 13pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMO FPAC: 9604170411 TASK: ODID: TAC M93236 DIN: 960415-01 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000702 FICHE: 72860 192 72860 204 RIDS: DFX2D 9604220011 Responds to 950818 FPC request for review of five setpoint celculations for plant. Concludes that some inconsistencies identified,but licensee methodology appears appropriate &
no further staff review necessary.Results of review enc 1.
FROM: IMBRD,E.V.
TO: MERSCHOFF,E.W.
ISSUED: 960416 AVAIL: CF 5p p. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMD FPAC: 9604220011 TASK: ODID: TAC M93339 DIN: 960416-07 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 72863 314 72863 318 RIDS: DFX2D 9604240055 Informs that staff completed review & finds makeup tank pressure vs level curve acceptable & will adequately protect high head safety injection pumps following LOCA.Results of SRXB review provided as Attachment 1.
FROM: WEISS E.W.
TO: RAGHAVAN,L.
ISSUED: 960416 AVAIL: CF 14pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMO FPAC: 9604240055 TASK: ODID: TAC M93236 DIN: 960416-10 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 03000302 FICHE: 72868 062 72068 075 RIDS'. DFX2D <
9604240112 Responds to 950807 request for NRR re"iew of MUT pressure vorsus level curve to determine adequacy & to evaluate ecceptability of operating w/MUV-64 blocked open.
FROM: IMBRO,E.V.
TO: MERSCHOFF,E.W.
ISSUED: 960417 AVAIL: CF 14pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMO FPAC: 9604240112 TASK: ODID: TAC M93236 DIN: 960417-02 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 72868 045 72869 058 RIDS: DFX2D 9605090205 02 Forwards Probabilistic. Safety Assessment Branch submittal for Jun 1996 SMM.
l l
l FROM: FLACK,J.H.
TO: DORCHARDT,R.W.
ISSUED: 960425 AVAIL: CF 46pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMD FPAC: 9605090205 TASK: ODID: DIN: 960425-07 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000213 05000302 05000237 FICHE: 72881 228 72881 273 RIDS: DFX2D i
1
5/ 2/97 PAGE 7 U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DCS PARTIAL RECORD FORMAT REPORT 9605090032 Forwards investigation & conclusions te Allegation RII-96-A-OO21,dtd 960307.
FROM: BEARD,P.M. Florida Power Corp.
TO: Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)
ISSUED: 960426 AVAIL: CF 5p p. DOCUMENT TYPE: CLINC FPAC: 9605090032 TASK: ODID: 3F0496-21 DIN: 960426-01 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 729*2 352 72912 356 RIDS: IX54D 9605020191 Requests FR publication of notice of issuance of amend 154 to license DPR-72. Amend provides for interim repair criteria for volumetric IGA indications in OTSG.
FROM: RAGHAVAN,L.
TO: NRC - No Detailed Affiliation Given ISSUED: 960430 AVAIL: CF 2pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: ChMEMO FPAC: 9605020191 TASK: ODID: TAC M92548 DIN: 960430-01 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 72875 257 72875 258 RIDS: DFX2D 9607010209 Proprietary "Ampacity Test Investigation of Raceway Fire Barriers for Conduit & Cable Tray Sys." Withheld. 5 FROM:
- Underwriters Laboratory. Inc.
TO: l ISSUED: 960D07 AVAIL: CF 425pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: TSTEST FPAC: 9607010203A l TASK: ODID: DIN: 95NK17030 NC197 DPN: 3 DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 99393 007 99394 171 RIDS:
9605200471 Forwards input for use in responding to TIA 95-014.W/o enc 1.
FROM: BERLINGER,C.H.
TO: JONES,R.C.
ISSUED: 060516 AVAIL: CF 1p. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMO FPAC: 9605200471 TASK: ODID: TAC M93604 DIN: 960516-01 DPN: DRN:
DOCKTiT NO: 05060302 FICHE: 72899 322 72899 322 RIDS: DFX2D 960917C545 Responds to numerous 1tts te concern related to quality assurance, emergency preparedness, discrimination & maint practices at Crystal River Nuclear Plant. Review completed &
portially substantiated concerns.
FROM: URYC,B. Region 2 (Post 820201)
TO: WOLLESEN,E.S. Affiliation Not Assigned ISSUED: 960517 AVAIL: CF 3pp. DOCUMENT YYPE: CLOUT FPAC: 9609170524D TASK: CDID: DIN: 960517 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 73016 020 73016 022 RIDS:
)
1
-_ . . - - . - . - ~ . - . - - .-. -._-. - ~ - - ~ - . - , - . . .
- 5/ 2/97 PAOE- 8-U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l DCS PARTIAL RECORD FORMAT REPORT i
I 9605290114 Forwards draft Technical Evaluation Rept, " Engineering Analysis & Risk Significance Estimate for Concurrent -
- Inadequate Vacuum Breaker Capacity for BWST &
Non-Conservative MUT Pressure Vs Level Curve."
FROM: CHAFFEE,A.E.
4 TO: JONES,R.C.
ISSUED: 960522 AVAIL: CF 45pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMD FPAC: 9605280114 ,
l ' TASK: ODID: TAC M94540 DIN: 960522-07 DPN: DRN:
- DOCKET NO
- 05000302 FICHE: 72992 191 72902 235 RIDS: DFX2D 9606110430 Forwards results of investigation of. allegations contained in 10CFR2.206 petition filed on behalf of BL Bennett, contract worker at facility.
j FROM: BEARD,P.M. Florida Power Corp.
7 TO: Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)
! ISSUED: 960531 AVAIL: CF 6pp DOCUMENT TYPE: CLINC FPAC: 9606110430 TASK: ODID:, 3F0596-30 DIN: 960531-01 DPN; DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 72917'352 72917 357 - RIDS: IX54D l 9606110430 et Forwards results of. investigation of allegations contained in 10CFR2.206 petition filed on behalf of BL Bennett, .
contract worker at facility. )
FROM: BEARD,P.M. Florida Power Corp.
TO: Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)
ISSUED: 960531 AVAIL: CF 6pp. DOCUMENT TYPE. CLINC FPAC: 9606110430 TASK: ODID: 2.206 DIN: 960531-01 'DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 72917 352 72917 357 RIDS: IX54D 9606240026 Forwards revised attachments te close out of OL-92-01,Rev 1, Supplement 1, " Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity."
FROM: STROSNIDER,J.R.
TO: MCDONALD,D.G.
ISSUED: 960614 AVAIL: CF 25pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMD FPAC: 9606240026 TASK: ODID: GL-92-01 DIN: 960614-11 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000244 05000302 05000313 FICHE: 72933 218 72933 242 RIDS: DFX2D 9606200342 Responds to 960522 memo re request for review of draft rept -
for task order 5 under JCN J-2162 re plant.
FROM: COLLINS,T.E.
TO: CHAFFEE.A.E.
ISSUED: 9606f8 AVAIL: CF 3pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMD FPAC: 9606200342 TASK: ODID: 1AC M94540 DIN: 960618-06 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 72931 020 72931 022 RIDS: DFX2D
9/ 2/97 PAOE 9 U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DCS PARTIAL RECORD FORMAT REPORT 9606200342 01 Responds to 960622 memo re request for review of draft rept for task order 5 under JCN J-2162 re plant.
FROM: COLLINS,T.E.
TO: CHAFFEE,A.E.
ISSUED: 960618 AVAIL: CF 3pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMO FPAC: 9606200342 TASK: ODID: J-2162 DIN: 960618-06 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 72931 020 72931 022 RIDS: DFX2D
~
9606260149 Provides Commission w/ planned resolution of violations caused by licensed operators.
FROM: TAYLOR,J.M. Ofc of the Executive Director for Operations TO:
ISSUED: 960620 AVAIL: CF 54pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: TRSECY FPAC: 9606260149 TASK: ODID: EA-95-126 DIN: SECY-96-132 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 72935 302 72935 355 RIDS: DFX2D
\
9607010269 Requests access to radiological, vital & protected areas for plant integrated performance assessment process insp team m2mbers durino period 960708-26.
FROM: GALLO,R.M.
TO: SHAW,P.R. '
Region 2 (Post O20201)
ISSUED: 960628 AVAIL: CF 1p. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMD FPAC: 9607010269 TASK: ODID: DIN: 960628 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 72939 259 72939 260 RIDS: DFX2D 9607030413 Requests that SPSB provide risk insights re potential overpressurization of plant nuclear svc closed cycle cooling sys as result of postulated RCP thermal barrier heat oxchanger tube failure. l FROM: COLLINS,T.
TO: BUTCHER,E.
ISSUED: 960701 AVAIL: CF 1p. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMO FPAC: 9607030413 TASK: ODID: TAC M93604 DIN: 960701-07 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 72942 228 72942 230 RIDS: DFX2D 9607260215 Forwards trip rept which documents const & fire endurance tosting activities witnessed by Fire Protection Section.
FROM: CONNELL,E.
TO: WEST,K.S.
ISSUED: 960716 AVAIL: CF 14pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMD FPAC: 9607260215 TASK: ODID: TAC M91772 DIN: 960716-10 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 72968 122 72968 135 RIDS: DFX2D l
l 1
___ a
. l 5/ 2/97 PAOE 10 U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DCS PARTIAL RECORD FORMAT REPORT 9608050070 Forwards second draft TER, " Engineering Analysis & Rick Significance Estimate for Concurrent Inadequate Vacuum Breaker Capacity for BWST & Non Conservative Make-up Tank Pressure Vs Level Curve," for review & comment.
FROM: CHAFFEE,A.E.
TO: JONES,R.C.
ISSUED: 960801 AVAIL: CF 67pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMD FPAC: 9608050070 TASK: ODID: TAC M94540 DIN: 960801-02 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 72974 106 72974 172 RIDS: DFX2D 9609170551 Forwards inquiry from ES Wo11esen re o u t'-o f-d a t e d o c ume r.t violation cover up by NRC. Requests careful consideration of remarks & thoughts on remedies for situation.
FROM: MOYNIHAN,D.P. Senate TO: NRC - No Detailed Affiliation Given ISSUED: 960805 AVAIL: CF 4pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: CLINC FPAC: 9609170524E TASR: ODID: DIN: 960805 DPN: DRN DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 73016 023 73016 026 RIDS:
9608130293 Requests assistance in resolving issue at plant re cepability of decay heat removal sys to assure long term core cooling following certain design basis loss of coolant accidents.
FROM: GALLO,R.M.
TO: HEBDON,F.J.
ISSUED: 960809 AVAIL: CF 4pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMD FPAC: 9608130293 TASK: ODID: DIN: 960809-02 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 72984 236 72984 239 RIDS: DFX2D 9608190248 Forwards technical Itr rept on second ten yr interval ISI program plan request for Relief 95-010 for Crystal River Nuclear Plant, Unit 3.
FROM: ANDERSON,M.T. Idaho National Engineering Laboratory TO: MCLELLAN T.K.
ISSUED: 960813 AVAIL: CF 5pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: CLINC FPAC: 9608190248 TASK: ODID: TAC M93755 DIN: 960813-02 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 72992 335 72992 339 RIDS: XOO6D 9608190248 01 Forwards technical ltr rept on second ten-gr interval ISI program plan request for Relief 95-010 for Crystal River Nuclear Plant, Unit 3.
FROM: ANDERSON,M.T. Idaho National Engineerir.g Laboratory TO: MCLELLAN,T.K.
ISSUED: 960813 AVAIL: CF 5p p. DOCUMENT TYPE: CLINC FPAC: 9608190248 TASK: ODID: MTA-52-96 DIN: 960813-02 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 72992 335 72992 339 RIDS: XOO6D l
l
5/ 2/97 PAGE 11 U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DCS PARTIAL RECORD FORMAT REPORT 960822020G Forwards request for addl info re licensee request for exemption from technical requirements in Sections III.O.2.c
& III.J of App R to 10CFR50.
FROM: WEST,K.S.
TO: HEBDON,F.J.
ISSUED: 960819 AVAIL: CF 5p p. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMD FPAC: 9608220200 TASK: ODID: TAC M95817 DIN: 960819-03 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 72995 031 72995 035 RIDS: DFX2D 9611010304 "Rept on Raceway Fire Barriers for Aluminum Cable Tray &
' Aluminum Wireway Sys." Withheld.
FROM:
- Underwriters Laboratorg. Inc.
TO:
ISSUED: 960819 AVAIL: CF 194pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: TSTEST FFAC: 9611010292A TASK: ODID: DIN: TEST-960819 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 99491 210 99492 061 RIDS:
9609170024 Responds to 960805 Itr concerning Itr from ES Wo11esen re out-of 1ste document violation covered up by NRC.NRC thoroughly reviewed issue & advised Wo).lesen of results.
FROM: TAYLOR,J.M. Ofc of the Executive Director for Operations TO: MOYNIHAN,D.P. Senete ISSUED: 960828 AVAIL: CF 2pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: CLOUT FPAC: 9609170524*
TASK: ODID: DIN: 960828-01 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 73016 001 73016 026 RIDS: HXO5D 9609090144 Forwards response to request from Reactor Sys Branch to ,
provide risk insights, based on available data re potential overpressurization at nuclear svc closed cycle cooling sys.
FROM: O'NEAL,D.
TO: DIEC,D.
ISSUED: 960830 AVAIL: CF iSpp. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMD FPAC: 9609090144
-TASK: ODID: TAC M93604 DIN: 960830-05 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 73009 215 73009 229 RIDS: DFX2D 9609060029 Informs that addl info needed to complete review of TIA 95-014 re nuclear svcs closed cycle cooling sys,per request.
FROM: HEBDON,F.J.
TO: JOHNSON,J.R. Region 2 (Post 820201)
ISSUED: 960904 AVAIL: CF 1p. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMO FPAC: 9609060029 TASK: ODID: TAC M93604 DIN: 960904 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 73009 066 73009 072 RIDS: DFX2D A
5/ 2/97 PAGE 12 U. S.
NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION l
DCS PARTIAL RECORD FORMAT REPORT 9609060029 01 Informs that addl info needed to complete review of TIA 95-014 re nuclear svts closed cycle cooling sys,per request.
FRG9 HEBDON, F. J.
.]HNSON,J.R. Region 2 (Post 820201)
ISSUEL. 960904 AVAIL: CF 1p.
TASK: ODID: TAC M96398 DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMO FPAC: 9609060029 DOCKET NO.- 05000302 DIN: 960904 DPN: DRN:
FICHE: 73009 066 73009 072 RIDS: DFX2D 9609250102 Dibcutses insp at Crystal River facility & concerns re licensing basis & design basis associated w/ pipe rupture as result of HELB. Portions of insp rept 50-302/95-21 enc 1.
FROM: JOHNSON,J.R. Region 2 (Post 820201)
TO: HEDDON,F.
ISSUED: 960920 AVAIL: CF Spp.
TASK: ODID: DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMD FPAC: 9609250102 DOCKET NO: 05000302 DIN: 960920 DPN: DRN:
FICHE: 73024 003 73024 007 RIDS: HXO5D 9609250114 Discusses insp at Crystal River facility & concerns that there were no installed relief protection devices on decay heat removal heat exchangers. Portions of insp rept 50-302/95-21 enc 1.
FROM: JOHNSON,J.R. Region 2 (Post 820201)
TO: HEDDON,F.
ISSUED: 960920 AVAIL: CF 5pp.
TASK: ODID: DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMO FPAC: 9609250114 DOCKET NO: 05000302 DIN: 960920-01 DPN: DRN:
FICHE: 73030 028 73030 C32 RIDS: HXO5D 9610030148 Forwards draft NOV re insp conducted on June & Jul 1996 f insp rept 50-302/96-201. Recommended enforcement classificatior, per 10CFR2, App C, included in draft NOV.
Listing FROM: GALLO,R.M. of resolved & inspector follow-up items also enc 1.
TO: MERSCHOFF,E.W. Region 2 (Post 820201)
I aSUED: 960926 AVAIL: CF 5pp.
TASK: ODID: DOCUMENT T(PE: CMMEMO FPAC: 9610030148 DOCKET NO: 05000302 DIN: 960926 DPN: DRN:
FICHE: 73098 001 73098 005 RIDS: DFX2D 9610240088 Requests Vendor Branch assistance in evaluating Williams Power Co access authorization program.
FROM: JOHNSON,J.R. Region 2 (Post 820201)
TO: GILLESPIE,F.P.
ISSUED: 961008 AVAIL: CF 1p.
TASK: ODID: DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMO FPAC: 9610240081A DOCKET NO: DIN: 961008 DPN: DRN:
05000302 05000324 05000325 FICHE: 73059 073 73059 073 RIDS:
5/ 2/97 PAGE 13 U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DCS PARTIAL RECORD FORMAT REPORT 9610150171 Requests FR publication of notice of consideration of issuance of amend to license DPR-72 & proposed NSHC determination & opportunity for hearing on. 960927. Request te rev to plant, unit 3 PAM instrumentation TS.
FROM: RAGHAVAN,L.
TO: NRC - No Detailed Affiliation Given ISSUED: 961010 AVAIL: CF 4pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMO FPAC: 9610150171 TASK: ODID: TAC M96696 DIN: 961010-01 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 73045 180 73045 183 RIDS: DFX2D 9610150200 Requests FR publication of notice of consideration of issuance of amend to license DPR-72 & proposed NSHC determination & opportunity for hearing on 960923 request te plant Unit 3 TSs revision.
FROM: RAGHAVAN,L.
TO: NRC - No Detailed Affiliation Given ISSUED: 961010 AVAIL: CF 4pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMD FPAC: 9610150200 TASK: ODID: TAC M96695 DIN: 961010-02 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 73045 192 73045 195 RIDS: DFX2D 9610250152 Forwards results of assessment of regulatory programs conducted by Special Insp Branch during June & Jul 1996.
FROM: GILLESPIE F.P.
TO: MIRAGLIA,F.J.
ISSUED: 961021 AVAIL: CF Op p. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMD FPAC: 9610250152 TASK: ODID: DIN: 961021-07 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 73060 338 73060 345 RIDS: DFX2D 9610250155 Informs that plant, unit 2 exam 100% of SG tube sleeve 3 dosigned by CE using plus point probe in Feb 1995 refueling outage.
FROM: SULLIVAN,E.J.
TO: SHIRAKI,C.Y.
ISSUED: 961023 AVAIL: CF 3pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMO FPAC: 9610250150 TASK: ODID: DIN: 961023-02 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 73062 134 73062 136 RIDS: DFX2D 9611080211 Forwards RAI re plant Unit 3 960102 summary rept for seismic adequacy of mechanical & electrical equipment.
FROM: BAGCHI,G.
TO: WESSMAN,R.H.
ISSUED: 961106 AVAIL: CF 4pp. DOCUMENT. TYPE: CMMEMO FPAC: 9611080211 TASK: ODID: TAC M69440 DIN: 961106-02 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 73076 018 73076 021 RIDS: DFX2D i
5/ 2/97 PAGE 14 U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DCS PARTIAL RECORD FORMAT REPORT 9611130153 Forwards. documents required for util to respond to request for proposal on upcoming task order under JCN to be designated & to perform work te ampacity derating tests &
Thermo-Lag protected cable sys for plant.W/o enc 1.
FROM: JENKINS,R.
TO: NOWLEN,S.P. Sandia National Laboratories ISSUED: 961106 AVAIL: CF 2pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: CLOUT FPAC: 9611130153 TASK: ODID: DIN: 961106 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 73078 205 73078 206 RIDS: DFX2D 9612110068 Forwards LER 96-502-00 re security breach in protected area via CWS,per 10CFR73.71. Withheld.
FROM: BEARD,P.M. Florida Power Corp.
TO: Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)
-ISSUED: -961202 AVAIL: CF 1p. DOCUMENT TYPE: CLINC FPAC: 9612110068 TASK: ODID: 3F1296-04 DIN: 961202 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 73104 092 73104 092 RIDS: IX21D 9612110068 01 Forwards LER 96-S02-00 re security breach in protected area via CWS,per 10CFR73.71. Withheld.
FROM: BEARD.P.M. Florida Power Corp.
TO: Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)
ISSUED: 961202 AVAIL: CF 1p. DOCUMENT TYPE: CLINC FPAC: 9612110068 TASK: ODID: 96-S02-00 DIN: 961202 DPN: DRN:
i DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 73104 092 73104 092 RIDS: IX21D 9612100247 Forwards SE accepting changes to plant TS to delete note for surveillance requirements for ESAS logic.
FROM: WERMIEL,J.
TO: HEBDON,F.J.
ISSUED: 961206 AVAIL: CF 6pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMO FPAC: 9612100247 TASK: ODID: TAC M96695 DIN: 961206-01 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 73104 120 73104 125 RIDS: DFX2D 9612230228 Responds to RAI re A-46 program w/ seismic portion of IPEEE program being evaluated by Ofc of NRR for Crystal River Unit 3 & requests that EMEB be given opportunity to review soismic IPEEE portion of RAI before responding.
FROM: WESSMAN,R.H.
TO: BERKOW,H.N.
ISSUED: 961218 AVAIL: CF 10pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMD FPAC: 9612230228 TASK: OR A-46 ODID; TAC M69440 DIN: 961218-09 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 73130 015 73130 025 RIDS: DFX2D l
l
5/ 2/97 PAGE 15 U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION )
i DCS PARTIAL RECORD FORMAT REPORT j 1
1 9612230404 Forwards LER 96-S03-00 re degraded alarm sys capability resulting in vulnerability of security sys,per 10CFR73.71.
LER withheld.
FROM: BEARD,P.M. Florida Power Corp.
TO: Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)
ISSUED: 961218 AVAIL: CF 1p. DOCUMENT TYPE: CLINC FPAC: 9612230404 TASK: ODID: 3F1296-18 DIN: 961218 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 73131 001 73131 001 RIDS: IX21D 9612230404 01 Forwards LER 96-S03-00 re degraded alarm sys capability rosulting in vulnerability of security sys,per 10CFR73.71.
LER withheld.
FROM: BEARD,P.M. Florida Power Corp.
TO: Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)
ISSUED: 961218 AVAIL: CF 1p. DOCUMENT TYPE: CLINC FPAC: 9612230404 TASK: ODID: 96-503-00 DIN: 961218 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 73131 001 73131 001 RIDS: IX21D 9612310116 Forwards safety evaluation of util request,dtd 961125,for ,
cpproval for implementation of alternative rules of ASME j Sect XI Code Case N-524 dtd 930809, titled " Alternative Exam J
Roquirements for Longitudinal Welds in Class 1 & 2 Piping."
FROM: BAGCHI,G.
TO: HEDDON,F.J.
ISSUED: 961224 AVAIL: CF 7pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMD FPAC: 9612310116 TASK: ODID: DIN: 961224-02 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 73134 208 73134 214 RIDS: DFX2D 9701060013 Discusses plant exemption request re access control requirements.
FROM: MARTIN,T.T.
TO: REYES,L. Region 2 (Post 820201)
ISSUED: 961231 AVAIL: CF 1 p. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMD FPAC: 9701060013 TASK: ODID: DIN: 961231 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 73138 336 73138 336 RIDS: DFX2D 9701100281 Discusses assessment trip to review performance of Region 2 Site Team at exercise at Crystal River plant.Rept documenting FY96 assessment enc 1.
FROM: JORDAN,E.L. Office for Analysis & Evaluation of Operational Data, D TO: EDNETER,S.D. Region 2 (Post 820201)
ISSUED: 970103 AVAIL: CF 15pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMO FPAC: 9701100281 TASK: OD7D: DIN: 970103 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 73142 195 73142 209 RIDS: DFX2D
5/ 2/97 PAGE 16 U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DCS PARTIAL RECORD FORMAT REPORT 9701100192 Requests FR publication of notice of issuance of amend 155 to license DPR-72. Amend changes TS to delete note for surveillance requirement 3.3.' 1 for engineered safeguard cctuation sys logic.
FROM: RAOHAVAN,L.
TO: NRC - No Detailed Affiliation Given ISSUED: 970106 AVAIL: CF 1p. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMO F7AC: 9701100192 TASK: ODID: TAC M96695 DIN: 970106-02 DPN: DRN:
d DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 73141 317 73141 317 RIDS: DFX2D 9701240245 Forwards safety evaluation accepting FPC evaluation re bent rod hangers in main steam sys at facility. !
FROM: WESSMAN,R.H.
TO: HEBDON,F.J. l ISSUED: 970116 AVAIL: CF 3pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMO FPAC: 9701240245 l TASK: ODID: TAC M95788 DIN: 970116-10 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 73162 125 73162 127 RIDS: DFX2D 9701210411 Forwards SE accepting mecatiss fire barrier sys relied upon .
by licensee to meet NRC fire protection requirements for {
listed raceway types & sizes. l FROM: WEST,K.S.
TO: REINHART,F.M.
ISSUED: 970117 AVAIL: CF 10pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMD FPAC: 9701210411 TASK: ODID: TAC M71772 DIN: 970117 DPN: DRN:
DOCKP NO: 05000302 FICHE: 73157 235 73157 244 RIDS: DFX2D 9701210411 01 Forwards SE accepting mecatiss fire barrier sys relied upon by licensee to meet NRC fire protection requirements for listed raceway types & sizes. )
FROM: WEST,K.S.
TO: REINHART,F.M.
ISSUED: 970117 AVAIL: CF 10pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMD FPAC: 9701210411 TASK: ODID: GL-86-10 DIN: 970117 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 73157 235 73157 244 RIDS: DFX2D 9701210411 02 Forwards SE accepting mecatiss fire barrier sys relied upon by licensee to meet NRC fire protection requirements for listed raceway types & sizes.
FROM: WEST,K.S.
TO: REINHART,F.M.
ISSUhD: 970117 AVAIL: CF 10pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMO FPAC: 9701210411 TASK: ODID: GL-92-08 DIN: 970117 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 73157 235 73157 244 RIDS: DFX2D
5/ 2/97 PACE 17 U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DCS PARTIAL RECORD FORMAT REPORT 9701230419 02 Informs of GL 96-05, "Addl Project Manager Guidance for MPA L-605: Periodic Verification of Design-Dasis Capability of Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves," issued on 960918 to cil holders of OLs or const permits for NP reactors.
FROM: HANSEN.A.G.
TO:
ISSUED: 970121 AVAIL: CF 4pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMO FPAC: 9701230419 TASK: ODID: GL-96-05 DIN: 970121-07 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000155 05000298 05000302 FICHE: 73157 296 73157 299 RIDS: DFX2D 9702030176 Forwards listed Incident Reporting Sys repts.
4 FROM: ROSSI,C.E. Division of Safety Programs (Post 870413)
TO: CLAUSNER,J.P. Organization for Economic Cooperation,& Development ISSUED: 970129 AVAIL: CF 7pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: CLOUT FPAC: 9702030176 TASK: ODID: DIN: 970129-02 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000278 05000302 05000413 FICHF: 73171 291 73171 297 RIDS: DFX2D 9702270443 Provides early results of analyses te estimated risk l significance of avents in IN 96-55.
l FROM: BARANOWSKY,P.W. Office for Analysis & Evaluation of Operational Data, D i TO: CHAFFEE.A.E. i ISSUED: 970224 AVAIL: CF Sp p. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMO FPAC: 9702270443 !
TASK: ODID: IEIN-96-055 DIN: 970224 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000213 05000309 05000302 FICHE: 73195 139 73195 143 RIDS: DFX2D l 9702280181 Forwards notice of consideration of issueance of amend to license DPR-72. Proposed amend would change plant TS to 4
implement 10CFR50, app J, option B.
FROM: RAGHAVAN,L.
TO: BEARD,P.M. Florida Power Corp.
ISSUED: 970224 AVAIL: CF 2pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: CLOUT FPAC: 97022801'81* l TASK: ODID: TAC M97987 DIN: 970224 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 73196 034 73196 043 RIDS: DFX2D
~
9702280184 Notice of consideration of issuance of amend to license DPR-72 & proposed NSHC determination & opportunity for hoaring. Amend implements 10CFR50, App J," Primary Reactor Centainment Leakage Testing Fo* Water-Cooled Reactors."
FROM: RAGHAVAN,L.
TO:
ISSUED: 970224 AVAIL: CF Opp. DOCUMENT TYPE: TFFRN FPAC: 9702280181A TASK: ODID: DIN: FRN-970224 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 73196 036 73196 043 RIDS:
D/ 2/97 PAGE 18 U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DCS PARTIAL RECORD FORMAT REPORT
- l 9703050322 Requests FR publication of notice of consideration of issuance of amend to license DPR-72 & proposed NSHC determination & opportunity for hearing on 970217 request te changes to TS to implement 10CFR50 app J option B.
FROM: RAGHAVAN,L.
TO:- NRC - No Detailed Affiliation Given ISSUED: 970304 AVAIL: CF 1p. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMO FPAC: 9703050322 TASK: ODID: TAC M97987 DIN: 970304 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 73202 177 73202 177 RIDS: DFX2D 9704010233 Discusses TIA 96-013 for plant licensing basis for dynamic LOCA effects.
FROM: WESSMAN,R.H.
TO: BERKOW,H.N.
ISSUED: 970327 AVAIL: CF 2pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMD FPAC: 9704010233 TASK: ODID: DIN: 970327-11 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 73240 069 73240 070 RIDS: DFX2D 9704030127 Informs of completed review re reactor coolant sys attachment piping, Class 1. Fatigue Analysis at plant, Unit 3, per request.
FROM: WESSMAN,R.H.
TO: HEDDON,F.J.
ISSUED: 970401 AVAIL: CF 3pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMO FPAC: 9704030127 TASK: ODID: TAC M95347 DIN: 970401-01 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 73241 242 73241 244 RIDS: DFX2D 9704070239 Forwards SE granting licensee request for relief 95-050, Rev 1 re second ten-yr interval ISI program plan for plant, Unit 3.
FROM: BAGCHI,G.
TO: HEBDON,F.J.
ISSUED: 970402 AVAIL: CF lipp. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMD FPAC: 9704070239 TASK: ODID: TAC M94772 DIN: 970402-08 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 73244 205 73244 215 RIDS: DFX2D 9704090187 Discusses results of review of issues involving installation of pressure relief devices on various SW & DHR exchangers at plant, unit 3.
FROM: WESSMAN,R.H.
TO: HEBDON,F.J.
ISSUED: 970407 AVAIL: CF Spp. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMD FPAC: 9704090187 TASK: ODID: TAC M96605 DIN: 970407-03 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 0$000302 FICHE: 73249 342 73249 346 RIDS: DFX2D
5/ 2/97 PAGE 19 U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DCS PARTIAL RECORD FORMAT REPORT 9704090187 01 Discusses results of review of issues involving installation of pressure relief devices on various SW & DHR exchangers at plant unit 3.
FROM: WESSMAN,R.H.
TO: HEDDON,F.J.
l ISSUED: 970407 AVAIL: CF 5p p. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMO FPAC: 9704090187 i TASK: ODID: TIA 96-14 DIN: 970407-03 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 73249 342 73249 346 RIDS: DFX2D i 9704160069 Transmits Technical Ltr Rept on second ten-gr interval inservice insp program plan request for relief 95-050,rev 1.
FROM: ANDERSON,M.T. Idaho National Engineering Laboratory TO: MCLELLAN,T.K.
ISSUED: 970408 AVAIL: CF 6pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: CLINC FPAC: 9704160069 I TASK: ODID: TAC M94772 DIN: 970408-01 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 73256 197 73256 202 RIDS: XOO6D 970416006V 01 Transmits Technical Ltr Rept on second ten-gr interval l inservice : nsp program plan request for relief 95-050,rev 1. ;
i i
FROM: ANDERSON,M.T. Idaho National Engineering Laboratory TO: MCLELLAN,T.K.
ISSUED: 970408 AVAIL: CF 6pp. DOCUMENT TYPE: CLINC FPAC: 9704160069 TASK: ODID: MTA-12-97 DIN: 970408-01 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 73256 197 73256 202 RIDS: XOO6D 9704210226 Responds to TIA 96-014 code requirements for relief valves on decay heat removal & svc water heat exchanges at plant, unit 3.
j l
FROM: HEDDON F.J.
TO: JOHNSON,J.R. Region 2 (Post 820201)
ISSUED: 970417 AVAIL: CF 1p. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMD FPAC: 9704210226 TASK: ODID: TAC M96605 DIN: 970417 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 73257 339 73257 342 RIDS: DFX2D 9704210226 01 Responds to TIA 96-014 code requirements for relief valves on decay heat removal & svc water heat exchanges at plant, unit 3.
FROM: HEBDON,F.J.
TO: JOHNSON,J.R. Region 2 (Post 820201)
ISSUED: 970417 AVAIL: CF 1p. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMO FPAC: 9704210226 TASK: ODID: TIA 96-014 DIN: 970417 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 73257 339 73257 342 RIDS: DFX2D
O 5/ 2/97 PAGE 20 U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORV COMMISSION DCS PARTIAL RECORD FORMAT REPORT l
l 9704230210 Informs that TIA 96-013 & TAC M96604 re licensing basis for dynamic LOCA effects complete & subj TAC closed. l l
FROM: HEBDON,F.J.
TO: JOHNSON,J. Regien 2 (Post 820201)
ISSUED: 970421 AVAIL: CF 1p. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMD FPAC: 9704230210
< TASK: ODID: TAC Mo6604 DIN: 970421 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 73268 030 73268 032 RIDS: DFX2D 9704230210 01 Informs that TIA 96-013 & TAC M96604 re licensing basis for dynamic LOCA effects complete & subj TAC closed.
FROM: HEBDON,F.J.
TO: JOHNSON.J. Region 2 (Post 820201)
ISSUED: 970421 AVAIL: CP 1p. DOCUMENT TYPE: CMMEMD FPAC: 9704230210 TASK: ODID: TIA 96-013 DIN: 970421 DPN: DRN:
DOCKET NO: 05000302 FICHE: 73268 030 73268 032 RIDS: DFX2D 4
001110 RECORDS SCANNED 97 RECORDS PRINTED ( 79 RECORDS, 18 SUPP.)
ENDING CODE- 3596 LAST KEY- 9704239704290103 l
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Pcgs No. 1 4
05/22/97 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF !NVESTIGATIONS CASE DATA AS OF 04/30/97 ALL REGIONS CRYSTAL RIVER CASES OPENED / CLOSED SINCE 01/01/%
CASE No. FACILITY OPENED CLOSED ISSUED REFERRED ACT ALLEGATION 10N l
l 2-94 036S CRYSTAL R]VER 3 08/04/95 02/13/96 $ 02/13/% 01/22/% DEC ALLEGED VIOLATION OF PLANT DESIGN SASIS j i
2 95 016 CRYSTAL RIVER 3 08/04/95 02/23/96 U 02/29/96 / / ALLEGED FAILURE TO FOLLOW PROCEDURES BY CONTROL ROOM OPERATORS 1
l 2-95 016S CRYSTAL RIVER 3 05/09/96 05/28/96 U 05/28/% / / FAILURE TO FOLLOW PROCEDURES BY CONTROL ROOM OPERATORS WITH PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OR SANCTION OF LICENSEE MANAGEMENT 2-95 020 CRYSTAL RIVER 3 09/20/95 02/26/97 U 02/26/97 / / ALLEGED DISCRIMINATION AGAINST OPERATIONS SHIFI.
SUPERVISOR FOR RAISING SAFETY CONCERNS ABOUT AN OPERATING CURVE 2-95 021 CRYSTAL RIVER 3 09/20/95 02/28/97 U 02/28/97 / / ALLEGED DISCRIMINATION AGAINST OPERATIONS AS$1STANT SHIFT SUPERVISOR FOR RAISING SAFETY CONCERNS RE OPERATING CURVE 2 95 027 CRYSTAL RIVER 3 10/26/95 09/24/96 S 09/24/96 09/19/96 DEC ALLEGED DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ROOFING CONTRACTOR ESCORT BY ROOFING CONTRACTOR FOR RAISING SAFETY CONCERNS RE VISITORS 2- % -005 CRTSTAL RIVER 3 03/06/96 12/13/96 S 12/13/96 12/05/96 DEC ALLEGED V!OLATION OF SITE SECURITY PLAN BY CONTRACT SECURITY PERSONNEL REf1ARDING BADGE CONTROL 2-96-011 CRYSTAL RIVER 3 03/22/% 02/28/97 U 02/28/97 / / ALLEGED DISCRIMINATION AGAINST CONTROL OPERATOR FOR RAISING SAFETY CONCERNS REGARDING MAKEUP TANK OVERPRESSURE 2-96 012 CRYSTAL RIVER 3 03/22/96 03/11/97 U 03/11/97 / / ALLEGED DISCRIMINATION AGAINST CONTROL OPERATOR FOR RAISING SAFETY CONCERNS REGARDING MAKEUP TANK OVERPRESSURE 2- @ 018 CRYSTAL RIVER 3 05/22/96 12/12/96 U 12/12/96 / / FAILURE TO FOLLOW COOLDOWN RATE PROCEDURES 2 W 022 CRYSTAL RIVER 3 07/02/96 04/30/97 U 04/30/97 / / DISCRIMINATION AGAINST CONTRACT SECURITY GUARD FOR RAISING CONCERNS REGARDING SECURITY PROCEDURES
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, 05/22/97 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS$10N OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS CASE DATA AS OF 04/30/97 - ALL REGIONS CRYSTAL RIVER CASES OPENED / CLOSED $1NCE 01/01/%
CASE NO. FACILITY OPENED CLOSED ISSUED REFERRED ACT ALLEGATION ION
% b 2 96 026 CRYSTAL RIVER 3 07/09/96 04/30/97 U 04/30/97 / / DISCRIMINATION AGAINST CONTRACT SECURITY GUARD FOR RAISING CONCERNS REGARDING FITNESS FOR JUTY 2-96 033 CRYSTAL RIVER 3 08/27/% 01/27/97 U 01/27/97 / / ALLEGED COVERUP 0F FUEL HANDLING IWCIDENT 2-96-034 CRYSTAL RIVER 3 08/27/% 02/14/97 P 02/14/97 / / FALS!FICATION OF SECURITY BACKGROUND QUESTIONNAIRE kY CONTRACTOR CMPLOYEE b
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CRYSTAL RIVER 3 ch .f crs.m er Allegation No Deuristion Ril-1996-A-0003 1 SECURITY PERSONNEL FOUND INATTENTIVE ON DUTY ARE NOT FIRED BY LICENSEE MANAGEMENT AS REQUIRED THUS CREATING A LACK- ADAISICAL ATMOSPHERE WHICH COULD LEAD TO A SAFETY PROBLEM.
Ril-1996-A-0021 1 INDUSTRIAL SAFETY PRACTICES-LICENSEE HAS NOT TAKEN ACTION ON A PROBLEM REPORT IDENTIFYING PERSONNEL SAFETY CONCENS.
Ril-1996-A-0041 1 CONCERNED WITH SAFETY WHEN OPERATING VEHICLE BARRIER AND OPERABILITY STATUS OF VEHICLE BARRIER IN ITS PRESENT STATE FROM SAFEGUARDS STANDPOINT.
Ril-1996-A-0042 1 THE ALGF< SAID THAT HE HAD ANOTHER EKAMPLE OF A CONCERN INVOLVING THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE 1994, SP630 PUMP CAVITATION WHICH INVOLVED THE MAKE-UP TANK IN WHICH MANAGEMENT WAS NOT SUPPORTIVE. INFORMATION OBTAINED DURING INTERVIEWS OF OPERATORS INDICATED THAT THE ALLEGER WAS DISCRIMINATED AGAINST. THE ALLEGER DID NOT MAKE THIS ALLEGATION HOWEVER,01 OPENED A CASE.
2 FLORIDA POWER CORPORATIONS' EMPLOYEE CONCERN PROGRAM FAILED TO RESOLVE OR EVALUATE SAFETY CONCERNS.
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3 CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 SUPERVISORY AND MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL FAILED TO RESOLVE SAFETY CONCERNS ABOUT THE MAKE-UP TANK OVERPRESSURE LIMIT CURVE PROACTIVELY IN ORDER TO COMPLY WITH FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION SENIOR MANAGEMENTS
- GOALS CONCERNING DISSOLVED HYDROGEN CONCENTRATION.
4 CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 ENGINEERING STAFF FAILED TO CONDUCT AN ADEQUATE REVIEW TO DETERMINE IF THE MAKE-UP TANK OVERPRESSURE LIMIT CURVE WAS CORRECT AND CONSERVATIVE.
5 FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION INAPPROPRIATELY REQUIRED A DISSOLVED HYDROGEN CONCENTRATION BASED ON INDUSTRY INFORMATION THAT WAS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE DESIGN OF CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3. FURTHER, MANAGEMENT REQUIRED THE PLANT TO BE OPERATED AT THE SPECIFIED DISSOLVED HYDROGEN CONCENTRATION ALTHOUGH THIS REQUIREMENT HAD NOT BEEN PROPERLY ANALYZED AND INCORPORATED INTO PLANT PROCEDURES.
Ril-1996-A-0059 1 ANONYMOUS CALLER STATED THAT FPC ENGINEERS GET DRUNK AFTER WORK AND THEN REPORT TO WORK THE NEXT MORNING.
CONCERNED ABOUT THEIR PERFORMANCE AT WORK.
Ril-1996-A-0078 1 NRC INITIATED CONCERN - ON 1/11/96 DURING UNIT COOLDOWN, THE REACTOR COOLANT RATE WAS NOT MAINTAINED WITHIN THE APPLICABLE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.
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CRYSTAL RIVER 3 <A4r d@.m e Allegation No Dessripti_on Ril-1996-A-0079 1 FPC WITHHELD INFO ON MGT FAILURE TO RESPOND TO MUT SAFETY CCNCERN; PERMITTED OTHER " TESTS";ECP FAILED TO RESOLVE CONCERNS ON 2 OCC.;OfTR GOALS OVERRODE SAFETY CONCERNS; ENGR REVIEWOF CURVE 8 INADEQ:MGT REQUIRED 25CC/KG H2 ALTHOUGH INAPPRC-PRIATE FOR CR3; FAILED TO REPORT LAW 50.72;DISCRIM EMPLOYMENT PRAC;tNCOMPLETE INFO TO NRC; CURVES NOT UPDATED C:NCE 1931; CONTROL RM INSTR INADEQUATE; COUNSELING DID NOT OCCUR, FPC AWARE OF MUT ISSUE EARLIER THAN JULY 7.1995 LFR; RESPONSE TO OP CONCERN 29036 DOES NOT PROVIDE ADEO SAFETY ASSURANCE;lNDEPENDENT REV PROCESS NOT EFFECTIVE IN FINDING ENGR ERRORS;MGT PRACTICE UNDERMINE SAFETY CULTURE; DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS AGAINST OPERATORS IN MUT CASE HAS CHILLING EFFECT ON OTHERS; ENGR DEPT DOES NOT FUNCTION AS INDEPENDENT ORG TO DETERMINE TRUE ENGR FACTS OF ISSUES;ADEO ASSURANCE DOES NOT EXIST THAT CR3 '
OPERATING WITHIN DESIGN BASIS.
R!l-1996-A-0094 1 MANAGEMENT ASSIGNING EMPLOYEES TO WORK IN THE OUTAGE SUPPORT BUILDING TOOL ROOM WITHOUT RECEIPT OF CONTAMINATION CONTROL TRAINING.
RIl-1996-A-0155 1 State ' ! made by Florida Power Corporation (FPC) manager to the NRC that "other" evolutions were necessitated by " operational reasons" is false. .ne ALLEGER stated that the Hydrogen regulator MUV-491 opened, by the old Curve 8. at approximately 70 inches. There was no
" operational reason" to drain the make-up tank (MUT) to 55 inches. This was merely a MUT manipulation not required by plant condition s 2 FPC management demonstrated their inability to react to situations where procedures and equipment are not in place. An example of this had to do with January 9,1996, main condenser tube rupture. The ALLEGER stated that rather than initiate a reactor trip and initiate Emergency Feedwater to supply clean, chloride free feedwater, the plant was shutdown and cooled down over the next 55 hours6.365741e-4 days <br />0.0153 hours <br />9.093915e-5 weeks <br />2.09275e-5 months <br />. During that time, salt water leakage was as high as 50 gallons per minute. The concern was salt water intrusion and potential steam generator tube degradation. The ALLEGER contends that FPC management made the decision to feed salt water when other altematives were available. Furthemvare, there are no valid procedures in place to manage the large amount of radioactive water leaking into the secondary system for a postulated primary tube feak or rupture.
3 Non-conservative decision made by operators in allowing the plant to operate rather than trip the reactor. This occurred during the week of May 20, 1996, when the plant experienced transient conditions after the newly installed govemor valves rotated and damaged feedback circuitry to the integrated control system. The ALLEGER stated that in responding to this event, the operators placed the control system in manual and attempted to chase the symptoms, rather than making a conservative decision to trip the reactor. The ALLEGER went on state that FPC management is not capable of transmitting a clear expectation to plant personnel and, strongly believes that employees are afraid that management will punish employee decisicr. making in an arbitrary manner.
CRYSTAL RIVER 3 2
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Allegation No Descdotion Ril-1996-A-0155 4 Aftec discovering that the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) will exceed their design rating when called upon to block load during an ES (Emergency Safeguards) signal, FPC management and Engineering have made the decision to allow the design basis to be exceeded. ALLEGER contends that this acceptance places the EDGs at risk of failure. The margin cf safety is reduced and according to the ALLEGER, the EDG vendor wrote a one sentence reply to the plant which said the diesel would survive a one-time, five second event. The ALLEGER questioned whether it is acceptable to expect diesel failure on its second block loading start.
The alleger stated he had concems related to EDG overloading. The licensee had implemented a modification to the Emergency Feedwater system during the April-May 1996 refueling outage. The modification introduced changes to the EDG block loading process. The alleger contended that the modification: (1) was not properly analyzed per 10 CFR 50.59, (2) a one time, 5 second excursion above 3500 Kw is not reasonable, (3) a manual restart of the HPI pump following a postulated failure of the auto start of loads during an ES actuation could cause the EDG to stall, and (4) a recent change to AP-770 contained an inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation since the evaluation did not address the potential overload that could occur.
Ril-1996-A-0177 1 POSSIBLE COVER-UP OF MARCH 26,1996 FUEL HANDLING EVENT BY LICENSED OPERATORS. (Self-initiated following enfore review. EA 96-316; Of 2-96-033)
Ril-1996-A-0178 1 FALSIFICATION OF ACCESS AUTHORIZATION FORMS. LICENSEE IDENTIED AN INDIVIDUAL WHO FALSIFIED HIS ACCESS AUTHORIZATION. (Self-initiated following enforcement review. EA 96-317.) FALSIFICATION OF SECURITY BACKGROUND QUESTIONNAIRE BY CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL. ON 8/23/96, A REGION ll ENFORCEMENT PANEL REVIEWED INSPECTOR FINDINGS REGARD!NG FOUR INSTANCES OF FALSIFICAT!ON OF SECURITY QUESTIONNAIRES REGARDING CRIMINAL HISTORY BY EMPLOYEES OF WlLLIAMS POWER COMPANY.
RIl-1996-A-0183 1 THE LICENSEE REPORTED THAT ON 2/9/96 AN FPC EMPLOYEE LEFT THE SIT"'MTHOUT TURNING IN HIS SECURITY BADGE. TWO CONTRACT GUARDS ATTEMPTED TO COVER UP THE LOSS OF THE CONTP . OF THE BADGE BY RETURNING IT UNNOTICED TOTHE SECURITY BADGE RACK.
Ril-1996-A-0196 1 AN INDIVIDUAL EXPRESSED A CONCERN RELATED TO THE POSSIBLE EXISTENCE OF ADDITIONAL EXAMPLES OF EQUIPMENT TAMPERING AT THE CRYSTAL RIVER NUCLEAR PLANT.
The individual stated that he thought there must be additional examples of tampering that had not been recognized as such. He said he could think of one recent event that had been attributed to failure to follow procedure that had the potential to have been tampering. This event involved a Control Rod Drive Power Breaker that had been tagged open, independently verified as open, and had subsequently been found closed, when a high temperature alarm had been received. He said he knew that one of the two operators had a reputation for making mistakes, but that he had a lot of confidence in the other operator and had discussed the event with the c' ators, who swore to him tht.t they had left the breaker open.
The individual further stated that he thought that recent events, such as mis-positionings, needed to be looked at closely, that some might be the result of tampering. He had no evidence to support this statement, but said he felt that these things needed to be looked into and that the licensee's review of these events needed to be scrutinized.
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CRYSTAL RIVER 3 d r. 4 c r .ra e Allegation No Desription Ril-1996-A-0198 1 REQUIRED TO WORK OVERTIME ON VERY SHORT NOTICE TWO DAYS AFTER RAISING CONCERN.
Ril-1996-A-0253 1 PROCEDURES DO NOT EXIST FOR CAS/SAS OPERATIONS AS THEY ARE CONDUCTING IT TODAY, THOUGH LACK OF PROCEDURE WAS AN ELEMENT LEADING TO PROBLEMS WITH THE LOSS OF DETECTION EVENT.
2 DISCIPLINARY ACTION TAKEN AGAINST SECURITY ANALYSTS BECAUSE OF THE LOSS OF INTRUSION DETECTION WAS SEVERE CONSIDERING THAT THE ANALYSTS HAD NO PROCEDURES OR GUIDANCE.
l 3 FRIDAY, DECEMBER 13,1996, WORK ON MUX-4 RENDERED ZONE 16 INOPERABLE IN THAT THEY DID NOT RECEIVE ALARMS IN THE CAS/SAS. NO ONE WAS AWARE.
4 THEY DO NOT LOCK NEW MUX PANELS. THEY CANNOT LOCK THE MUX PANEL IN THE CONTROL COMPLEX.
Ril-1996-A-0254 1 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES TO RESPOND TO GIVEN ALARMS ARE UNKNOWN, AND HAVE NOT BEEN COMMUNICATED TO THE OFFICERS. CAS/SAS OPERATORS DON'T KNOW WHAT ALARMS MEAN OR HAVE NO TRAINING OR IDEA OF WHAT THEY SEE.
2 VITAL AREA DOOR CHECKS (VADCS) ARE BEING PERFORMED ACCORDING TO PROCEDURE, BUT THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT THE ALARMS ARE NOT OCCURRING IN THE CAS/SAS TO VERIFY ALARM CAPABILITY.
3 TIME DISPLAYED ON THE JC6000 IS INCORRECT BY 4 MINUTES, THEREFORE INACCURATE TIME IS DOCUMENTED FOR COMPENSATORY MEASURES, POST CHECKS, ETC.
4 THE OFFICERS ARE BEING GIVEN TOO MUCH OVERTIME AND ARE VERY TIRED. MORALE IS LOW AND A COMMITMENT TO DUTY IS LAX AND NON-EXISTENT.
5 NO KEYS TO THE RBA201 AND THE HEALTH PHYSICS DOOR TO ACCESS EQUIPMENT WHEN A CONTINGENCY RESPONSE IS REQUIRED.
6 POST NUMBERS DIFFER ON EACH TEAM, THEREFORE, WHEN A TEAM MEMBER IS CALLED IN OR SCHEDULED TO WORK ON A DIFFERENT TEAM, THE POST NUMBERS ARE DIFFERENT AND THEY ARE GOING TO THE WRONG POSTS.
7 FLACK VESTS DO NOT FIT SMALLER OFFICERS IN THAT THEY CANNOT GET TO THEIR GUN OR RADIO WHEN REQUIRED TO WEAR THEM.
CRYSTAL RIVER 3 d
CRYSTAL RIVER 3 cu fcw fa er Allegation No Deictistion Ril-1996-A-0256 1 THE ALLEGER STATED HE HAD A CONCERN RELATED TO THE ARMORY AT THE CRYSTAL RIVER NUCLEAR PLANT. THE ALLEGER STATED THE WALLS OF THE WEAPONS ARMORY ONLY EXTEND TO THE DROP CEILING AND THERE ARE NO BARRIERS ABOVE THE WALL TO PREVENT ACCESS TO THE ARMORY FROM THE HALLWAY. THE ALLEGER ALSO STATED THAT THIS ISSUE WAS IDENTIFIED TO LICENSEE SECURITY MANAGEMENT WHEN THE ARMORY WAS INSTALLED.
R11-1997-A-0002 1 FOLLOWING REGION 11 REVIEW OF NRC 01 INVESTIGATION REPORT 2-96-005, THE STAFF DEVELOPED A PLANT SECURITY ALLEGATION THAT CAME FROM TWO DIFFERENT SOURCES. REFERENCE ALLEGATION Ril-1997-A-0003 FOR THE SECOND SOURCE.
THE ALLEGATION IS THAT A SECURITY BADGE WENT OFF SITE ON FEBRUARY 16,1996, AND WAS NOT RETURNED UNTIL.
FEBRUARY 19,1996. MANAGEMENT WAS UNAWARE OF THE SITUATION.
Ril-1997-A-0003 1 FOLLOWING REGION ll REVIEW OF NRC 01 INVESTIGATION REPORT 2-96-005. THE STAFF DEVELOPED A PLANT SECURITY ALLEGATION. REFERENCE ALLEGATION Ril-1997-A-0002.
THE ALLEGATION IS THAT SECURITY BADGES WENT OFF SITE IN THE PAST AND OFFICERS HAVE PUT THEM BACK ON THE RACK SO IT WOULD NOT BE KNOWN. ALLEGER HEARD THAT SOMEONE HAD TAKEN THEIR BADGE HOME FOR THE WHOLE WEEKEND AND BROUGHT IT BACK.
Ril-1997-A-0011 1 THE ALLEGER STATED THAT CONTRARY TO THE FSAR, THE LICENSEE HAD KNOWN FOR THE LAST 10 YEARS THAT THERE WAS A REQUIREMENT TO MAINTAIN A MINIMUM OF 40 DEGREE TEMPERATURE INSIDE THE AUXILIARY BUILDING. LICENSEE COULD HAVE NOT MET THIS REQUIREMENT DURING COLD SPELLS, BECAUSE THE HEATER ELEMENTS ARE AND HAVE BEEN INOPERABLE (BROKEN). DURING FURTHER DISCUSSIONS ON MARCH 5,1997. THE ALLEGER STATED THAT THE MINIMUM TEMPERATURE REQUIREMENT IN THE AUXlLIARY BUILDING WAS 600 F AND NOT 400 F AS HE HAD PREVIOUSLY STATED, BUT THE TEMPERATURE HAD BEEN RECORDED BELOW 400 F.
2 DBA ANALYSIS CONTAINS A NON-CONSERVATIVE ASSUMPTION WITH REGARD EDG START TIME. ALLEGER BELIEVES THAT THE ANALYSIS SHOULD HAVE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT AN ADDITIONAL 5-SECOND TIME DELAY FOR EDG START FOLLOWING A LOCA COMBINED WITH LOSS-OF-OFFSITE POWER EVENT. THIS EDG START DELAY WOULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO POSTULATED PLANT TRANSIENT CONDITIONS.
Ril-1997-A-0024 i FPC ENGINEERING REQUIRED TO WORK EXCESSIVE OVERTIME HOURS. DETRIMENTAL FOR MAKING RATIONAL DECISIONS ON CRITICAL MODIFICATION PROJECTS AND CALCULATION WORK.
CRYSTAL RIVER 3 5
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CRYSTAL RIVER 3 % c7S f.m er Allegation No Deicdntion RIl-1997-A-0055 1 ALLEGER STATED THAT HIS CONCERN IS RELATIVE TO THE LOW TEMPERATURE RELATED TO REMOVAL OF THE HEAT TRACING ON THE BORIC ACID PIPING. TEMPERATURE IN THE AUXILIARY BUILDING MUST BE CONTROLLED FOR MA!NTAINING THE BORIC ACID IN SOLUTION. NRC HAD BETTER TAKE A GOOD LOOK AT THE 50.59 EVALUATION IN PROCESS FOR REMOVAL OF HEAT TRACE PlPING FROM THE BORIC ACID PIPING.
REFERENPE ALLEGATION Ril-1997-A-0011. ALLEGER PREVIOUSLY TOLD NRC THAT THE AUXILIARY BUILDING WAS REQUIRED TO BE MAINTAINLO AT 40 F MINIMUM AND HAD NOT BEEN MAINTAINED AT THAT TEMPERATURE. HE STATED TODAY THAT HE MADE A MISTAKE, THAT IT WAS 60 F MINIMUM. HE FURTHER STATED THAT THERE WAS DOCUMENTATION THAT THE BUILDING WAS FOUND TO BE LESS THAN 40 F. HE SAID THAT WALTER JOHNSON HAS A STRIP CHART RECORDING THE TEMPERATURE AT LESS THAN 400 F.
Ril-1997-A-0076 1 REFERENCE ALLEGATION Rl!-1997-A-0024, RECEIVED FROM AN ANONYMOUS SOURCE ON JANUARY 29,1997. THE ISSUE INVOL'ES EXCESSIVE OVERTIME BY THE ENGINEERING STAFF. RECENT INFORMATION RECEIVED BY NRC RESIDENT INSPECTORS
- OFFICE ON MARCH 26,1997. COVERS SAME SUBJECT. THE DOCUMENT IS A COPY OF THE LICENSEE'S COMPLETED " EMPLOYEE CONCERNS FORM" MARKED CONFIDENTIAL WITH NO NAME PROVIDED.
IN SUM, THE DESCRIPTION OF CONCERN IS THAT"THE AMOUNT OVERTIME REQUIRED OF ENGINEERING HAS REACHED EXTREMELY HIGH LEVELS. ALL ENGINEERS ARE REQUIRED TO WORK 60 HOURS A WEEK. THE CUMULATIVE STRESS HAS REACHED A BREAKING POINT." THE CONCERN DESCRIPTION GOES ON TO STATE, " THIS LEVEL OF STRESS ALSO PUTS THE PLANT AND THEREFORE, PUBLIC SAFETY AS WELL AS SAFETY OF OTHER EMPLOYEES IN JEOPARDY."
CRYSTAL RIVER 3 6
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PRE-DECISIONAL CRYSTAL RIVER L SALP Period: October 6. 1996 through October 11. 1997 i
Previous SALP Ratings: Operations 3 Maintenance 2 Engineering 3 Plant Support 2 I. PERFORMANCE OVERVIEW l Overall performance at the facility has been at a low point. The )lant has i been shut down for this assessment period, and continued evidence las been '
found of widespread design and performance problems. A Confirmatory Action Letter was issued on March 4, 1997, requiring NRC concurrence for the restart of Crystal River 3 prior to entering Mode 2 (Keff 2 0.99, reactor thermal l power s 5% rated thermal power. average coolant temperature N/A for Mode 2 but !
! 2 280 F to be in Mode 3). Two escalated enforcement actions have been issued i during this evaluation period: one for numerous programmatic engineering problems and one for security problems associated with a security facilities ;
upgrade project. A third escalated enforcement action is pending on 10 CFR 50.72 and 73 reportability problems. A fourth escalated enforcement action is
- . pending for having seven required operator actions for the high pressure injection system in E0Ps when only one was allowed by the licensing basis. A fifth escalated enforcement action is pending for inadequate corrective action for the protection of safeguards material. Self-assessments
- and quality assurance functions have been only minimally effective across the functional areas although recent improvement has been seen in the depth and scope of quality assurance activities. Insufficient management oversight has contributed to problems, and organizational interface controls did not assure l teamwork and organizational cooperation.
l Crystal River management has initiated extensive corrective actions, including replacement of a number of upper and middle managers: Senior VP. Site VP.
Engineering Director. Licensing Director, Outage Manager, Nuclear Safety Assessment Team Manaaer and Plant Review Committee Chairman. The licensee's l
decision to keep the unit shut down to perform engineering evaluations of questionable safety systems' margins was prudent, however the corrective actions remain to be demonstrated as effective. The licensee is still in the discovery phase of determining the extent of condition for operations, engineering, and security problems. Improvements were noted in problem identification with a continued high rate of identification using the precursor system (the licensee's corrective action system for conditions adverse to quality). This was offset by relatively poor performance in root cause analysis and corrective actions. With vendor assistance and staff training, a few of the recent root cause evaluations have shown marked improvement with more rigor, detailed documentation, independent verification, and conservative decisions.
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- underlined sections cover the SMM Plant Performance Evaluation Template areas
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CRYSTAL RIVER PRE DECISIONAL The common attributes that contributed to the decline in performance are
- insufficient management oversight (poor commitment to implement fundamental l~ performance changes) ineffective self-assessment insufficient quality assurance involvement and a lack of understanding and compliance with
_4 regulatory requirements. The licensee's management corrective action plan (MCAP) conceptually will address the weaknesses, but proof of performance
- improvement will be in the implementation of the proposed actions, which requires the immediate and full attention of both management and staff.
F The NRC has developed Five Major Areas of Concern over the last eighteen months: 1 e Insufficient management oversight and involvement. This area includes j corrective action program and quality assuranca program ineffectiveness.
1 i e Marainally effective enaineerina oraanization. This area includes desian control errors. desian outouts missina or imorocer. and failure i to follow orocedures e I lack of an adeauate understandino and knowledae of the Crystal River 3 '
- desian basis. j
). e Lack of understanding and compliance with NRC regulations. )
e' Poor ooerator oerformance. This area includes a poor safety focus on i refueling activities, and po r communication within operations and with j
- other site groups.
)
j _Recent Operating History:
Ooerational transients have not been observed since the plant shut down on l September 2, 1996 due to low turbine lube oil pressure. The unit outage was extended in order to resolve potential Unreviewed Safety Questions concerning emergency diesel generator loading concerns and emergency feedwater system single failure vulnerabilities. On October 4.1996, the licensee notified the ,
NRC that they planned to remain shut down for an extended period to implement I modifications to several safety systems in order to obtain additional safety margin for accident conditions. The licensee has developed a detailed restart readiness plan and is expected to remain shut down until the last quarter of 1997.
II. FUNCTIONAL' AR'iA ASSESSMENTS Doerations A. Assessment Overall plant ooerational oerformance has been inconsistent but adequate with some areas of noted improvement. Identified strona coints include coerator
_ identification of Droblems and operator auestionina attitudes. Challences 2
CRYSTAL RIVER PRE DECISIONAL include orocedure adecuacy. operator adherence to orocedures. adeauacy and timeliness of reoortability evaluations. and coordination with other arouos.
esoecially work olannina and schedulina. Some actions the licensee has taken to address these problems include hiring five previously licensed STAS from
'other utilities, temporarily reducing the shift crews from six to five to support rotations to other groups and limit overtime, and initiating an effort to improve Operation's ownership of the work control process. A recent requalification inspection indicated that the requalification program was in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55 for the areas inspected. The development and administration of the simulator portion of the operating test was considered a strength of the program.
B. Basis e Examples of operator identification of problems and operator questioning attitude include:
Problem rendering fire pumps inoperable during freeze protection recirculation was found by subs'e questioning attitude. (1/17/97, quent shift supervisor exhibiting a NCV 97-01-03)
Inappropriate valve work scheduled that would impact required Mode 5 equipment caught by operators. (2/27/97)
Drain valve work only 2 check valves away from RCS loop questioned l and stopped by operators since normal makeup path not in service.
(2/27/97)
Implementation of a thorough Manaaement Assessment of the Plant Operations program emphasizing crew ownership by each Shift l Supervisor. (2/27/97) '
e Examples of procedural inadequacy and failure to follow procedure:
All 3 fire pumps inadvertently rendered inoperable during freeze protection recirculation evolution by changing recirculation flow on verbal authorization of fire protection engineer. Calculation limit was exceeded, but limit was not in the fire plan and not in 3rocedure. (1/17/97. NCV 97-01-03)
Tour mispositioned valve events in three days. (1/26-28/97, VIO 02-01) .
Air-operated valve opened on active clearance during maintenance.
Procedure did not require local tagging of valve. (2/6/97, VIO 01-01) e Examples of coordination problems include:
Pressure transmitter isolation valve work scheduled without recognizing the impact to reactor protection system - lack of Operations involvement in planning / scheduling. (2/27/97)
EDG run for Post Maintenance Test (PMT) by Operations, discoveied later several PMTs missed so EDG run again - poor coordination between Operations and Maintenance / Scheduling groups. (2/1/97) 3
4 CRYSTAL RIVER PRE DECISIONAL C. Plans In addition to the core resident inspection program, the regional initiative i effort will -focus on control of equipment configuration and status control:
s work controls: corrective actions (problem identification, adequate root cause determination, extent of condition verified, and appropriate corrective actions implemented): meeting reportability requirements: assessment of management oversight: procedural compliance: operability determinations; and interface between management, engineering and licensing. An initial operator licensing examination is currently scheduled for June 16. 1997. This examination should evaluate the facility training staff's ability to ensure thatthecandidatesarebeingadequatelytrainedintheareasof administrative and procedurai compliance. In December 1997 an E0P team inspection is planned a , .
Maintenance 1 1
A. Assessment The Licensee's maintenance program remained good. Eight violations were identified during the period. The violations were for various reasons with no
- distinct trends identifiable. A number of surveillance problems (failure to
. perform surveillances) were identified, but these did not appear to be maintenance problems since maintenance does not issue the procedures. Areas where some problems have been identified are: preventive maintenance (PM) i backlog, procedure compliance, measurement and test equipment (M&TE). and instrument calibration.
- B. Basis e During the last six months the plant issues matrix (PIM) indicated eight violations and three weaknesses relative to maintenance. The problems were varied and no distinct trends were noted. Examples of. maintenance personnel errors were:
A review of operating history revealed several unplanned power reductions due to poor material condition (reliability) of BOP equipment and poor maintenance practices. (11/27/96)
Failure to perform a required TS test for the Remote Shutdown System. (11/27/96)
Inadequate surveillance procedures failed to implement TS requirements for numerous containment penetrations. (01/07/97)
Inadequate corrective actions for deficient containment penetration surveillances. (01/07/97)
C. Plans Three man-weeks of inspection are recommended for inspection of PM ba'cklog (see high number of overdue tags), procedure compliance. M&TE. instrument
- calibration, and reactor building coatings.
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O CRYSTAL RIVER PRE DECISIONAL Enaineerina (and Desian)
A. Assessment Engineering performance has declined from superior to good to adequate over the last two years. Tne licensee is continuing to discover the extent of conditions relative to the areas for which escalated enforcement was issued on March 12. 1997: 50.59 evaluations, design control, and corrective actions. A '
major system readiness review is underway during the current long term shut
- down.
- B. Basis e Evaluation of the 50 54(f) Response on Facility Design Basis Information revealed the following: FPC did not conclude that their processes were effective in the past - the plant has been shut down since September 1996 because certain safety systems are not within their design bases.
The NRC has issued a Confirmatory Action Letter confirming that certain licensee actions will be completed ' prior to plant restart and confirming that the licensee will obtain NRC concurrence prior to restart. FPC stated that many changes were being made in their processes and that their current processes and programs and corrective action initiatives <
would result in reasonable assurance that the configuration of CR-3 will '
be maintained consistent with the design basis. Prior to plant restart, the licensee plans to complete a System Readiness Review Plan to confirm that the systems, structures, and components conform with their design basis.
e A lack of effective communications between operations and engineering and poor support of the plant became evident as a result of NRC inspections. This led to more detailed inspections of the engineering area and the licensee's design process at Crystal River. The results of
, this revealed significant problems, such as:
failure to control the load on the emergency diesel. generators such that they would become overloaded under design basis conditions. (11/04/96) performing a modification to eliminate the automatic start of the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump under some conditions. (11/04/96
& Inspection Report 96-19) failure to resolve concerns about the head available to the emergency feedwater pumps. (11/04/96 & Inspection Report 96-19) several failures to recognize unreviewed safety questions associated with the three items above. (11/04/96 & Inspection Report 96-19) l failure to identify, and therefore include in surveillance procedures multiple containment penetrations. (1/7/97 & Inspection Report 96-19) l C. Plans The core engineering and regional initiative inspections will be performed to
- support the assessment of the licensee's readiness to restart and the ongoing 5
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l CRYSTAL RIVER PRE DECISIONAL i Management Corrective Action Program (MCAP). Inspection areas of focus will include: problem identification; extent of condition: root cause evaluations:
10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluations: design control: corrective actions:
engineering support to operations and maintenance: management oversight, and self assessment: and review of outage modifications to restore design margia j and resolve unreviewed safety questions.
- Plant Sucoort
'A. Assessment l l The licensee continued to maintain a satisfactory level of performance in the Plant Support area. The 1996 collective dose was approximately 353 person rem with 244 outage days in 1996. The licensee continued to maintain effective programs for monitoring plant chemistry and radiological effluents. The ,
i 1.icensee's emergency response capability was being maintained at a fully i
proficient level of operational readiness. Overall, site security has been less than adequate. However, management oversight appears to be moving in the l right direction. The licensee-is still slowly progressing with the security I upgrade. Implementation of the fire protection program continued to be satisfactory; however. Appendix.R related discrepancies were identified.
- j. B. Basis i e Radiation Protection L -
Licensee efforts to reduce the quantity of radioactive solid waste j being generated were aroactive. (10/30/96)
Implementation of a C1emistry Quality Control Manual was a good
]rogram improvement. (10/30/96) 4CV Failure to conduct an adequate radiation survey. (10/30/96)
NCV. Failure to follow sampling requirements of Offsite Dose Calculation Manual. No formal 50.59 review performed. (10/30/96)
Staff understanding of corrective action concepts in " Chemistry.
Radiation Protection, and Environmental Monitoring Programs was a :
weakness. (10/30/96) i Falsification of radiation worker practical factor walkdown records.
Licensee identification of problem and corrective action response I were conservative. (02/05/97) e Emeraency Preparedness (EP)
Overall performance during the graded EP exercise was adequate.
Technical Support Center (TSC) Dose Assessment Staff performance was very good. (12/02/96)
Accident assessment and the development of sound mitigation strategies outside the control room was not strongly demonstrated by accident assessment team in the TSC or Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). (12/02/96) ,
6
CRYSTAL RIVER PRE DECISIONAL e Security A $50.000 CP was issued for six violations, mostly pertaining to the licensee's current upgrade of their security system which should be completed by June 1997. A lack of management oversight-and poor understanding of the regulations were cited as causes. (1/31/97'&
2/28/97. Inspection Report 96-18'& EA 97-012)
A 50.54(p) plan change submitted did not meet the criteria and would ,
be considered 50.90 changes / exemptions. This is currently pending NRR's policy decision. (1/31/97. URI 96-18-06)
A previously unidentified pathway resulted in a breach of the -
protected area via the Condenser Circulating Water System. Found by an alert licensee security guard. (1/30/97)
Audits previously conducted did not identify numerous problems.
(1/31/97. IFI 96-18-09)-
e- Fire ProtectiQn A number of Appendix R discrepancies were identified. (12/23/96. IFI 96-17-04)
Thermo-Lag fire barrier replacement material installations were of high quality with good Quality Control (0C) oversight. (11/27/96 &
Inspection Report 96-15)
C. Plans One man-week inspection effort in Health Physics. Effluent / Radioactive Waste and TI 133 Rad Waste. Core inspection to review security audits. corrective actions. management support and effectiveness. and the newly submitted revision to the Physical Security Plan (PSP). An initial core security inspection was conducted the week of March 17. A Regional Initiative inspection with NRR regional assistance is scheduled to inspect performance testing conducted on the new security equipment. Fire Protection core and Appendix R regional initiative inspections are planned.
III. FUTURE ACTIVITIES A. Inspections:
- a. The licensee's corrective actions and resolution of restart issues will be evaluated through a combination of enhanced irspections and the guidelines established in Manual Chapter 0350 " Staff Guidelines for Restart Approval." Additionally, we will continue to inspect and assess their ongoing efforts to use MCAP II to facilitate improvement in each. functional-area.
- b. Escalated Enforcement for an Engineering Programmatic Breakdown was issued on March 12. 1997. Inspection of the corrective actions will be managed through the system readiness for restart plan.
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{ CRYSTAL RIVER PRE-DECISIONAL
- c. An inspection in late 1997 of the E0P revisions is required due to safety system modifications.
- d. An SSFI will be conducted on two safety systems prior to restart.
4
[ e. An Appendix R inspection will be conducted in August 1997.
i
- i. f. Escalated Enforcement for significant regulatory concerns.in the i i safeguards area. Inspection of the corrective actions will be j conducted during 1997.
B. Other Activities:
i a. MC 0350 Restart Panel meetings and inspections will be conducted to support MC 0350 Restart Panel as' described on the Specific Issues i Matrix and the Task Checklist.
- b. NRC Restart Panel Meetings each, month i c. Restart Panel Meetings with FPC each month ,
- d. The staff is providing greater focus on CR3 restart ' readiness
- this
- f. includes the approval of N+2 which arrived at CR on April 7. 1997.
- and approval of separate Branch for CR3 oversight,
- e. Future Management Corrective Action Plan (MCtP) meetings are planned '
- every other month, with meetings held alternately between the Region II office and at the site.
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- l POWER REACTOR EVENT NUMBER: 32339 j 1
FACILITY: CRYSTAL RIVER REGION: 2 NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/16/97 UNIT: [3] [ ] [ ] STATE: FL NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:08 {ET] !
RE TYPE: [3] B&W-L-LP EVENT DATE: 05/15/97 '
EVENT TIME: 13:53[EDT]
NRC NOTIFIED BY: G SUTTER LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/16/97 HQ GPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON NOTIFICATIONS l EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE 10 CFR SECTION: TOM PEEBLES RDO NLTR LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT )
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l UNIT SCRAM CODE RX CRIT INIT PWR INIT RX MODE CURR PWR CURR RX MODE j 3 N N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN 0 COLD SHUTCOWN 1
EVENT TEXT 2
ALL THREE FIRE PUMPS INOPERABLE SIMULTANEOUSLY TIME DURING SURVEILLANCE ;
TESTING.
IN THE LAST 30 DAYS THE LICENSEE'S FIRE PROTECTION PLAN HAS BEEN REVISED. l THE NEW REVISION REQUIRES THAT THE NRC OPERATION CENTER BE NOTIFIED ANY TIME THEY HAVE TWO OR MORE (THERE ARE THREE TOTAL) HIGH PRESSURE FIRE PUMPS i INOPERABLE. THEIR FIRE PROTECTION PLAN REQUIREMENT STATES THAT "AT ALL l TIMES, AT LEAST TWO HIGH PRESSURE FIRE PUMPS, EACH WITH A CAPACITY OF 2000 GPM AND WITH THEIR DISCHARGE ALIGNED TO THE FIRE MAIN HEADER, MUST BE ;
OPERABLE".
DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF A SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURE, IN ORDER TO RETURN A FIRE PUMP TO SERVICE, ALL PUMPS (THREE) ARE RENDERED INOPERABLE. THIS CONDITION EXISTED FOR 97 MINUTES. WHEN THE CONDITION WAS RECOGNIZED, THE SURVEILLANCE WAS STOPPED AND TWO OF THE FIRE PUMPS RETURNED TO OPERABLE ,
STATUS. DURING THE SURVEILLANCE TWO OPERATORS REMAINED IN THE AREA AND WERE AVAILABLE TO RESTORE THE SYSTEM IF REQUIRED TO PERFORM FIRE FIGHTING SERVICES. THE SYSTEM IS NOW IN STANDBY WITH TWO FIRE PUMPS OPERABLE. THE SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURE WHICH RESULTED IN THIS INCIDENT HAS BEEN PLACED ON ADMINISTRATIVE HOLD TO PREVENT A REOCCURRENCE UNTIL CORRECTIONS CAN BE MADE I TO TFE PROCEDURE. THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED OF THIS EVENT BY THE LICENSEE.
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'D % '.3 POWER REACTOR EVENT NUMBER: 31914 l
FACILITY: CRYSTAL RIVER REGION: 2 NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/07/97 UNIT: [3] [] [] STATE: FL NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:48 [ET]
RX TYPE: [3] B&W-L-LP EVENT DATE: 03/07/97 EVENT TIME: 15:30[EST)
NRC NOTIFIED BY: BANDHAUER LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/07/97 HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD
NOTIFICATIONS EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE 10 CFR SECTION: THOMAS PEEBLES RDO ADAS 50.72 (b)-(2) (i) DEG/UNANALYZED COND UNIT SCRAM CODE RX CRIT INIT PWR INIT RX MODE CURR PWR CURR RX MODE 3 M N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN 0 COLD SHUTDOWN EVENT TEXT THE LICENSEE DISCOVERED A CONDITION WHERE THE HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION (HPI)
PUMP MAY FAIL.
THE LICENSEE DISCOVERED THAT FOR CERTAIN SMALL BREAK LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENTS, THE HPI PUMP FLOW RATES MAY BE SUFFICIENTLY LOW THAT RECIRCULATION IS REQUIRED. IF THE LOW PRESSURE INJECTION PUMP IS IN SERVICE TO PROVIDE NET POSITIVE SUCTION HEAD (NPSH) TO THE HPI PUMP, THEN A FLOW PATH COULD BE ESTABLISHED FROM THE REACTOR BUILDING SUMP TO OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT VIA A RELIEF VALVE IN THE HPI RECIRCULATION FLOW PATH. THIS FLOW PATH WOULD BE CREATED IF A MAKEUP TANK RELIEF VALVE LIFTED AND THUS CONTAINMENT SUMP INVENTORY WOULD ENTER THE AUXILIARY BUILDING SUMP VIA THE MAKEUP TANK RELIEF VALVE.
AN ADDITIONAL CONCERN IS IF ONE OF THE TWO RECIRCULATION ISOLATION VALVES IN THE RECIRCULATION LINE FAILS TO OPEN, AND THE HPI PUMP FLOW RATE IS SUFFICIENTLY LOWER THAN THE HPI PUMP MAY NOT HAVE ENOUGH FLOW FOR CONTINUED OPERATION.
THEY HAVE A NUMBER OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS WHICH COULD BE IMPLEMENTED, BUT ONE UNDER' CONSIDERATION IS'A MODIFICATION THAT WOULD CONNECT THEIR HPI PUMP DZSCHARGE LINE TO THE REACTOR BUILDING SPRAY LINE. THIS WOULD PROVIDE A
-FLOW PATH THAT WOULD RETURN THE RECIRCULATION FLOW BACK INTO THE REACTOR BUILDING.
THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE NOTIFIED.
- t -j EVENT NUMBER: 31903 POWER REACTOR REGION: 2 NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/06/97 FACILITY: CRYSTAL RIVER STATE: FL NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:41 [ET)
UNIT: [3] [] [] EVENT DATE: 03/06/97 RX TYPE: [3] B&W-L-LP -
EVENT TIME: 10 : 35 [EST)
LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/06/97 NRC NOTIFIED BY: LARRY MOFFATT HQ OPS OFFICER: RUDY KARSCH NOTIFICATIONS EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE RDO THOMAS PEEBLES 10 CFR SECTION:
ADAS 50.72 (b) (2) (i) DEG/UNANALYZED COND INIT RX MODE CURR PWR CURR RX MODE UNIT SCRAM CODE RX CRIT INIT PWR N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN 0 COLD SHUTDOWN 3 N EVENT TEXT THE LICENSEE HAS DISCOVERED THAT TEMPERATURES INSIDE THE REACTOR BUILDING AND THE AUXILIARY BUILDING CAN FALL BELOW THE RANGE OF TEMPERATURES USED IN THE INSTRUMENTATION UNCERTAINTY CALCULATIONS. UNTIL THE IMPACT ON J
E14GINEERED SAFEGUARDS SYSTEMS IS ANALYZED, THE LICENSEE CONSIDERS ALL INSTRUMENTATION LOCATED IN THESE BUILDINGS DEGRADED.
THE INSTRUMENTATION LOCATED IN THE REACTOR BUILDING AND AUX BUILDING ARE CALIBRATED TO BE ACCURATE OVER AN ENVIRONMENTAL TEMPERATURE RANGE OF 70*F TO 119 F. THE LICENSEE OBSERVED AN AMBIENT TEMPERATURE INSIDE THE REACTOR i BUILDING OF 41'F. THIS COULD RESULT IN INSTRUMENT UNCERTAINTIES THAT WOULD l BE NONCONSERVATIVE FOR ACTUAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS. THIS CONCERN l INCLUDES THE ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM. THE LICENSEE IF EVALUATING THE EFFECTS OF ACTUAL TEMPERATURE VARIATIONS ON INSTRUMENT UN: +P.TAINTY CALCULATIONS. THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.
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r.. f POWER REACTOR EVENT NUMBER: 31784
' FACILITY: CRYSTAL RIVER REGION: 2 NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/14/97 UNIT: [3] [] [] STATE: FL NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:46 [ET)
RX TYPE: [3] B&W-L-LP EVENT DATE: 02/14/97 EVENT TIME: 12:00[EST)
ERC NOTIFIED BY: SWEENEY LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/14/97 HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY NOTIFICATIONS EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE 10 CFR SECTION: POTTER RDO ADAS 50.72 (b) (2) (i) DEG/UNANALYZED COND UNIT SCRAM CODE RX CRIT INIT PWR INIT RX MODE CURR PWR CURR RX MODE 3 N N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN 0 COLD SHUTDOWN EVENT TEXT LICENSEE HAS DISCOVERED AN ACCIDENT SCENARIO NOT PREVIOUSLY ANALYZED THE LICENSEE HAS DISCOVERED A NEW POSTULATED ACCIDENT SCENARIO, NOT PREVIOUSLY ANALYZED, AND NOT ADDRESSED BY CURRENT EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES. SPECIFICALLY, THE POSTULATED SCENARIO IS A LOSS OF FEEDWATER, COINCIDENT WITH: A SMALL BREAK LOCA, LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER, SINGLE FAILURE OF EMERGENCY FEEDWATER PUMP #2, AND THE LOSS OF EMERGENCY FEEDWATER PUMP #1 DUE TO A TRIP LOCK FUNCTION. THE LICENSEE STATED THAT THIS EVENT IS NOT OF CONCERN DURING THE PRESENT PLANT CONDITION DUE TO A VERY LOW DECAY HEAT LOAD. THIS SCENARIO WILL BE ADDRESSED PRIOR TO PLANT STARTUP. THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE INFORMED BY THE LICENSEE.
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POWER REACTOR EVENT NUMBER: 31699 FACILITY: CRYSTAL RIVER REGION: 2 NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/31/97 UNIT: [3] [ ] [] STATE: FL NOTIFICATION TIME: 01:18 [ET)
RX TYPE: [3] B&W-L-LP EVENT DATE: 01/31/97 EVENT TIME: 01 : 00 [EST)
NRC NOTIFIED BY: W STEPHENSON LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/31/97 HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN NacKINNON NOTIFICATIONS EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE 10 CFR SECTION: CHARLES HOSEY RDO DDDD 73.71 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH UNIT SCRAM CODE RX CRIT INIT PWR INIT RX MODE CURR PWR CURR RX MODE 3 N N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN 0 COLD SHUTDOWN EVENT TEXT SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM DEGRADATION. IMMEDIATE COMPENSATORY MEASURES WERE TAKEN UPON DISCOVERY.
THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED OF THIS EVENT BY THE LICENSEE.
(SEE THE HOO LOG BOOK FOR DETAILS.)
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POWER REACTOR EVENT NUMBER: 31691 FACILITY: CRYSTAL RIVER REGION: 2 NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/30/97 UNIT: [3] [] [] STATE: FL NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:55 [ET]
RX TYPE: [3] B&W-L-LP EVENT DATE: 01/30/97 EVENT TIME: 13 : 00 [EST)
NRC NOTIFIED BY: G.L. SUTTER 01/30/97
~
LAST UPDATE DATE:
HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN ,
NOTIFICATIONS ]
d EMERGENCY CLASS: UNUSUAL EVENT '
10 CFR SECTION: CHARLES HOSEY RDO AAEC 50.72 (a) (1) (i) EMERGENCY DECLARED BUTCH BURDEN EO RICHARD BARRETT IRD SULLIVAN FEMA
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UNIT SCRAM CODE RX CRIT INIT PWR INIT RX MODE CURR PWR CURR RX MODE 2
3 N N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN 0 COLD SHUTDOWN EVENT TEXT AN UNUSUAL EVENT WAS DECLARED AND TERMINATED FOLLOWING A FIRE AND POSSIBLE EXPLOSION OF THE CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 4 MAIN TRANSFORMER.
" REPORTS MADE FROM THE SITE OF AN EARLY MORNING FIRE INVOLVING A NEARBY l FOSSIL FUELED (COAL) ELECTRIC POWER GENERATION UNIT TRANSFORMER INDICATE i THAT A POSSIBLE EXPLOSION MAY HAVE OCCURRED. THE FIRE HAS BEEN fEXTINGUISHED. NO DAMAGE OCCURRED TO THE NUCLEAR UNIT." ,
THE LICENSEE'S EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL REQUIRES CLASSIFICATION OF ANY CONDITION INVOLVING A SEVERE EXPLOSION NEAR OR WITHIN 0,83 MILES OF THE SITE BOUNDARY. THE AFFECTED UNIT 4 MAIN TRANSFORMER IS WITHIN 0.7 MILES OF THE SITE BOUNDARY...
THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE STATE OF FLORIDA., CITRUS AND LEVY COUNTIES, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN REHABILITATIVE SERVICES (DHRS), AND THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. THE LICENSEE PLANS ON ISSUING A PRESS RELEASE.
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POWER REACTOR EVENT NUMBER: 31363 FACILITY: CRYSTAL RIVER REGION: 2 NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/20/96 UNIT: [3] [] [] STATE: FL NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:41 [ET)
RX TYPE: [3] B&W-L-LP EVENT DATE: 11/20/96 i EVENT TIME: 18 : 30 [EST)
NRC NOTIFIED BY: WALTER NEUMAN LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/20/96 HQ OPS OFFICER: RUDY KARSCH NOTIFICATIONS EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE 10 CFR SECTION: MARK LESSER RDO DDDD 73.71 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH UNIT SCRAM CODE RX CRIT INIT PWR INIT RX MODE CURR PWR CURR RX MODE 3 N N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN 0 COLD SHUTDOWN EVENT TEXT ,
1 SECURITY EVENT INVOLVING A SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM DEGRADATION RELATED TO AN l ALARM. COMPENSATORY MEASURES WERE fAKEN. (REFER TO THE HOO LOG FOR DETAILS.)
THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.
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POWER REACTOR EVENT NUMBER: 31267 FACILITY: CRYSTAL RIVER REGION: 2 NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/01/96 UNIT: [3] [] [] STATE: FL NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:13 [ET)
RX TYPE: [3] B&W-L-LP EVENT DATE: 11/01/96 EVENT TIME: 22:20[EST)
NRC NOTIFIED BY: W. K. BANDRAUER LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/01/96 HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE NOTIFICATIONS EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE 10 CFR SECTION: MARK LESSER RDO DSAF 73.71(b) (1) SECURITY DEGRADATION UNIT SCRAM CODE RX CRIT INIT PWR INIT RX MODE CURR PWR CURR RX MODE 3 N N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN 0 COLD SHUTDOWN EVENT TEXT BREACH OF A PROTECTED AREA BARRIER A SECURITY OFFICER DISCOVERED A BREACH IN A PROTECTED AREA BARRIER AT 2220 TODAY. THIS BREACH OF THE PROTECTED AREA BARRIER HAD EXISTED FOR SEVERAL ;
DAYS PRIOR TO DISCOVERY. IMMEDIATE COMPENSATORY ACTIONS WERE TAKEN UPON j DISCOVERY, AND THE BREACH WAS PHYSICALLY CLOSED AT THE TIME OF THIS !
NOTIFICATI1. THERE WAS NO INDICATION OF AN UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS ATTEMPT OR l TAMPERING nS A RESULT OF THIS EVENT.
(REFER TO THE HOO LOG FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.)
THE LICENSEE PLANS TO NOTIFY THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.
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j POWER REACTOR EVENT NUMBER: 31141 l FACILITY: CRYSTAL RIVER REGION: 2 NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/11/96 UNIT: [3] [ ] [] STATE: FL NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:12 [ET]
i RX TYPE: [3] B&W-L-LP EVENT DATE: 10/11/96
- EVENT TIME
- 17:50[EDT]
- NRC NOTIFIED BY
- RICH SWEENEY LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/11/96 l HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE
, NOTIFICATIONS EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE i 10 CFR SECTION: JOHN POTTER RDO l AIND 50.72 (b) (2) (iii) (D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION l
i UNIT SCRAM CODE RX CRIT INIT PWR INIT RX MODE CURR PWR CURR RX MODE l 3 N N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN 0 COLD SHUTDOWN
, EVENT TEXT l
- REMOVAL OF PUMP AUTO START SIGNAL DURING PLANT MOD OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS -
DURING A REVIEW OF A DIESEL LOADING CALCULATION, THE LICENSEE DETERMINED THAT THE CALCULATION ASSUMED THAT THE STEAM DRIVEN EMERGENCY FEEDWATER PUMP i (SDEFP) WAS RUNNING WHEN THE MOTOR DRIVEN EMERGENCY FEEDWATER PUMP RECEIVED 2 AN AUTOMATIC TRIP SIGNAL AT REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE OF 500 PSIG.
THIS INFORMATION IS NOT INCLUDED IN PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.
A PLANT MODIFICATION HAD REMOVED ONE OF THE AUTO START SIGNALS FROM THE SDEFP TO PREVENT PUMP RUNOUT DURING CERTAIN SCENARIO CONDITIONS WHEN ITS
- FLOW CONTROL VALVE FAILED WIDE OPEN.
- THUS, A CONDITION OUTSIDE OF THE PLANT DESIGN BASIS COULD HAVE OCCURRED
- WHILE THE PLANT WAS OPERATING AT POWER.
1 i THIS CONDITION IS NOT IN EFFECT WHILE THE PLANT IS IN ITS PRESENT COLD l SHUTDOWN MODE.
4 -THE LICENSEE IS DETERMINING CORRECTIVE ACTION (S) AND WILL RESOLVE THIS ISSUE PRIOR TO PLANT RESTART.
THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. l, i
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t POWER REACTOR EVENT NUMBER: 31105 FACILITY: CRYSTAL RIVER REGION: 2 NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/07/96 UNIT: [3] [] [] STATE: FL NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:10 [ET]
RX TYPE: [3] B&W-L-LP EVENT DATE: 10/07/96 EVENT TIME: 08:49[EDT]
NRC NOTIFIED BY: JEFF BECK LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/08/96 HQ OPS OFFICER: RUDY KARSCH '
NOTIFICATIONS EMERGENCY CLASS: UNUSUAL EVENT 10 CFR SECTION: PAUL FREDRICKSON RDO AAEC 50.72 (a) (1) (i) EMERGENCY DECLARED AL CHAFFEE EO ANHU 50. 72 (b) (1) (iii) HURRICANE STORER FEMA FRANK CONGEL AEOD UNIT SCRAM CODE RX CRIT INIT PWR INIT RX MODE CURR PWR CURR RX MODE 3 N N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN 0 COLD SHUTDOWN EVENT TEXT UNUS'UAL EVENT DECLARED AT 0849 EDT DUE TO THE IMPENDING ARRIVAL OF HURRICANE JOSEPHINE.
WEST CENTRAL FLORIDA AND THE CRYSTAL RIVER SITE HAVE BEEN PLACED INTO A HURRICANE WARNING DUE TO HURRICANE JOSEPHINE. LAND FALL IS EXPECTED EARLY TUESDAY MORNING NORTH OF THE SITE. STORM SURGES OF SIX TO SEVEN FEET ARE EXPECTED FOR CITRUS COUNTY. PRESENT WIND SPEED AT THE SITE IS 12 MPH. THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR, STATE AND COUNTY GOVERNMENTS AND A PRESS RELEASE WILL BE ISSUED.
o*
- UPDATE 1207EDT 10/7/96 FROM TYRIE TO S.SANDIN * *
- THE LICENSEE IS CORRECTING THE PREVIOUS NOTIFICATION TO SHOW THAT TROPICAL STORM JOSEPHINE HAS SUSTAINED WINDS OF 70 MPH AND IS EXPECTED TO STRENGTHEN TO HURRICANE FORCE WITHIN THE NEXT 12 HOURS. ALL OTHER INFORMATION IS CORRECT.
Oo* UPDATE ON 10/08/96 @ 00:04 BY MARSHALL TO GOULD*** THE HURRICANE WARNING WAS DISCONTINUED AT 23:00 AND THE NOUE WAS TERMINATED AT 23:26. THE RI WAS INFORMED ALONG WITH STATE AND LOCAL AGENCIES. THERE WILL BE A PRESS RELEASE. RDO POTTER, EO BATEMAN, FEMA RISHE WERE NOTIFIED.
o *
- UPDATE 1140 10/8/96 FROM TYRIE TAKEN BY STRANSKY * *
- THE LICENSEE HAS MADE A PRESS RELEASE REGARDING THE UNUSUAL EVENT. NOTIFIED R2DO (POTTER).
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t POWER REACTOR EVENT NUMBER: 31027 l
FACILITY: CRYSTAL RIVER REGION: 2 NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/19/96 UNIT: [3] [] [] STATE: FL NOTIFICATION TIME: 05:47 [ET]
RX TYPE: [3] B&W-L-LP EVENT DATE: 09/19/96 EVENT TIME: 05:10{EDT]
NRC NOTIFIED BY: GREGORY SUTTER LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/19/96 HQ OPS OFFICER: RUDY KARSCH NOTIFICATIONS EMERGENCY CLASS: UNUSUB.L EVENT 10 CFR SECTION: THOMAS DECKER RDO
, AREC 50.72 (a) (1) (i) EMERGENCY DECLARED JACK ROE EO WRIGHT FEMA FRANK CONGEL AEOD EUGENE MCPEEK (NRR) IAT JOHN DAVIDSON (NMSS) IAT UNIT SCRAM CODE RX CRIT INIT PWR INIT RX MODE CURR PWR CURR RX MODS 3 N N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN 0 COLD SHUTDOWN
, EVENT TEXT THE LICENSEE DECLARED AN UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO AN APPARENT ACT OF SABOTAGE.
THE LICENSEE DISCOVERED A FOREIGN OBJECT LODGED IN THE LUBE OIL STRAINER OF THEIR "A" EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR. THE OBJECT APPEARED TO BE PLACED IN A WAY THAT INDICATED DELIBERATE ACTION. THE LICENSEE WILL STAY IN THE UNUSUAL EVENT UNTIL THEY ARE CERTAIN THAT THIS REPRESENTS A SINGULAR EVENT AND THAT THE "B" EDG IS NOT SIMILARL'Y JEOPARDIZED. THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR, THE STATE OF FLORIDA AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES.
SEE HOO LOG FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.
4
POWER REACTOR EVENT NUMBER: 30814 FACILITY: CRYSTAL RIVER REGION: 2 NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/31/96 UNIT: [3] [ ] [] STATE: FL NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:10 [ET]
RX TYPE: [3] B&W-L-LP EVENT DATE: 07/31/96 EVENT TIME: 10 : 30 [EDT]
NRC NOTIFIED BY: AL KORALEWSKI LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/31/96 HQ OPS OFFICER: RUDY KARSCH NOTIFICATIONS EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE 10 CFR SECTION: DAVE VERRELLI RDO HFIT 26.73 FITNESS FOR DUTY UNIT SCRAM CODE RX CRIT INIT PWR INIT RX MODE CURR PWR CURR RX MODE 3 N Y 100 POWER OPERATION 100 POWER OPERATION EVENT TEXT CONFIRMED POSITIVE DRUG TEST FOR A CONTRACT EMPLOYEE THE EMPLOYEE NEVER HAD SITE ACCESS AND RESIGNED. (REFER TO THE HOO LOG FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.)
THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.
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t POWER REACTOR EVENT NUMBER: 30631 FACILITY: CRYSTAL RIVER REGION: 2 NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/14/96 UNIT: -[3] [] [ ] STATE: FL NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:05 [ET)
RX TYPE: [3] B&W-L-LP EVENT DATE: 06/14/96 EVENT TIME: 19 : 3 8 [EDT]
NRC NOTIFIED BY: WALTER NEUMAN LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/14/96 HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE NOTIFICATIONS EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE 10 CFR SECTION: CAUDLE JULIAN RDO AOUT 50.72 (b) (1) (ii) (B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS UNIT SCRAM CODE RX CRIT INIT PWR INIT RX MODE CURR PWR CURR RX MODE 3 N Y 100 POWER OPERATION 100 POWER OPERATION EVENT TEXT
- ES INDICATING LIGHT MATRIX SYSTEM TRANSFER SWITCH PROCURED AS NON-Q -
DURING A REVIEW OF THE PLANT FUSE CONTROL PROGRAM, THE LICENSEE DISCOVERED THAT THE MANUAL TRANSFER SWITCH IN THE POWER LINE TO THE ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS (ES) INDICATING LIGHT MATRIX SYSTEM WAS PROCURED AS NON-SAFETY RELATED (NON-Q) BUT SHOULD HAVE BEEN PROCURED AS SAFETY RELATED (Q).
THE TRANSFER SWITCH PROVIDES POWER TO THE ES INDICATING LIGHT MATRIX FROM TWO DIFFERENT VITAL BUSES. THE SWITCH ENCLOSURE, SUPPORTS, AND BREAKERS HAVE BEEN EVALUATED TO MEET SEISMIC REQUIREMENTS.
THE LICENSEE CONSIDERS THE SWITCH TO BE DEGRADED, BUT OPERABLE, PENDING FULL UPGRADE TO SAFETY RELATED STATUS.
THE LICENSEE IS DETERMINING CORRECTIVE ACTION AND WILL PROBABLY REPLACE THE SWITCH WITH ONE PROCURED AS SAFETY RELATED.
THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.
I
POWER REACTOR EVENT NUMBER: 30571 FACILITY: CRYSTAL RIVER' REGION: 2 NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/31/96 UNIT: [3] [ ] [] STATE: FL NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:02 [ET]
RX TYPE: [3] B&W-L-LP EVENT DATE: 05/31/96 EVENT TIME: 21 : 25 [EDT)
NRC NOTIFIED BY: IVAN WILSON LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/31/96 HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON NOTIFICATIONS EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE 10 CFR SECTION: TOM DECKER RDO ARPS 50.72 (b) (2) (ii) RPS ACTUATION AESF 50. 72 (b) (2) (ii) ESF ACTUATION UNIT SCRAM CODE RX CRIT INIT PWR INIT RX MODE CURR PWR CURR RX MODE 3 A/R Y 100 POWER OPERATION 0 HOT STANDBY EVENT TEXT REACTOR TRIP OCCURRED DURING TURBINE EHC TRIP SOLENOID TESTS.
REACTOR TRIP OCCURRED DURING TURBINE EHC SOLENOID VALVE TESTS. IT APPEARS THAT THE TURBINE CONTROL VALVES CLOSED DURING EHC VALVE TESTING. THE REACTOR TRIPPED DUE TO HIGH REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE. NORMAL REACTOR COOLANT PRESSURE IS 2155 psig. THE HIGHEST REACTOR COOLANT PRESSURE DURING THE TRANSIENT WAS 2350 psig. ALL RODS FULLY INSERTED INTO THE CORE. BOTH EMERGENCY FEEDWATER PUMPS STARTED ON LOW ONCE THROUGH STEAM GENERATOR (OTSG) WATER LEVEL. OTSG ATMOSPHERIC VALVES OPENED AND CLOSED DURING THIS TRANSIENT. ONE TURBINE BYPASS VALVE (MSV-11) ON THE "B" OTSG MAY NOT HAVE OPERATED PROPERLY DURING THE TRANSIENT (LICENSEE WAS NOT SURE IF THE VALVE HAD OPENED). ALSO, OTSG "B" ATMOSPHERIC VALVE (MSV-33) RESET l AT A LOWER THAN NORMAL SETPOINT. THE VALVE SHOULD RESET AT APPROXIMATELY l 1000 psig BUT IT RESET BETWEEN 950 psig AND 990 psig. THEREFORE, THE LICENSEE IS MAINTAINING REACTOR COOLANT TEMPERATURE AT 498 F INSTEAD OF AT 555*F. LICENSEE IS INVESTIGATING THE ABOVE NOTED PROBLEMS. ALL EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS AND THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS ARE OPERABLE.
THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS INFORMED BY THE LICENSEE.
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POWER REACTOR EVENT NUMBER: 30513 1
1 FACILITY: CRYSTAL RIVER REGION: 2 NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/21/96 UNIT: [3] [] [ ] STATE: FL NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:20 [ET] ,
RX TYPE: [3] B&W-L-LP EVENT DATE: 05/20/96 {
EVENT TIME: 12:00[EDT] l NRC NOTIFIED BY: BILL BANDHAUER LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/30/96 l HQ OPS OF?ICER: RUDY KARSCH l NOTIFICATIONS l EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE 10 CFR SECTION: CHRIS CHRISTENSEN RDO NINF INFORMATION ONLY l
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UNIT SCRAM CODE RX CRIT INIT PWR INIT RX MODE CURR PWR CURR RX MODE 3 N Y 70 POWER OPERATION 70 POWER OPERATION EVENT TEXT LARGE BREAK LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT (LOCA) ANALYSIS ASSUMPTION ERROR A RECENT REVIEW OF AN EXISTING EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM CALCULATION REVEALED AN ASSUMPTION ERROR IN THE LARGE BREAK LOCA ANALYSIS. THE ASSUMPTION ERROR INVOLVED THE EXTENT OF FUEL GRID PLASTIC DEFORMATION DURING A LARGE BREAK LOCA. CORRECTION OF THE ASSUMPTION ERROR WOULD RESULT IN EXCEEDING THE CLAD TEMPERATURE LIMIT OF 2,200oF USING THE CONVENTIONAL GUILLOTINE-BREAK MODEL. USING LEAK-BEFORE-BREAK MODELING FOR LOCA ANALYSIS (WITH CORRECT ASSUMPTIONS ON GRID DEFORMATION) WILL PROVIDE MARGIN TO AVOID EXCEEDING THE 2,200*F CLAD LIMIT. THE UPDATED ANALYSIS IS BEING PERFORMED BY THE BABCOCK AND WILCOX OWNERS GROUP.
THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. (REFER TO RELATED EVENT NUMBERS 30500, 30504, AND 30521.)
NOTE: THIS EVENT WAS RE-RELEASED DUE TO EXTENSIVE REVISIONS TO THE EVENT TEXT.
- UPDATE @ 1140 EDT 05/30/96 BY NEUMAN TAKEN BY MACKINNON***
LICENSEE CHANGED THE WORD "WOULD" IN THE THIRD SENTENCE TO "COULD". THE THIRD SENTENCE NOW READS, " CORRECTION OF THE ASSUMPTION ERROR COULD RESULT IN EXCEEDING THE CLAD TEMPERATURE LIMIT OF 2,200 F USING CONVENTIONAL GUILLOTINE-BREAK NODEL". R2DO (TOM DECKER) NOTIFIED.
THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE INFORMED BY THE LICENSEE.
POWER REACTOR EVENT NUMBER: 30323 FACILITY: CRYSTAL RIVER REGION: 2 NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/19/96 UNIT: [3] [] [] STATE: FL NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:37 [ET] l RX TYPE: [3] B&W-L-LP EVENT DATE: 04/19/96 EVENT TIME: 11 : 4 5 [EDT] l NRC NOTIFIED BY: NEUMAN LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/19/96 HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY NOTIFICATIONS EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE 10 CFR SECTION: CASTO RDO ADAS 50.72 (b) (2) (i) DEG/UNANALYZED COND 1 UNIT SCRAM CODE RX CRIT INIT PWR INIT RX MODE CURR PWR CURR RX MODE I
3 N N O COLD SHUTDOWN O COLD SHUTDOWN l
EVENT TEXT l
INSUFFICIENT ELECTRICAL SEPARATION OF TOXIC GAS MONITOR CHANNELS ,
1 1
THE LICENSEE HAS DETERMINED THAT THE CABLE AND CIRCUIT SEPARATION CRITERIA i FOR CABLES TO THE TOXIC GAS ANALYZERS WAS NOT MET. THE CABLES FROM THE AC POWER DISTRIBUTION PANELS ARE ROUTED THROUGH A COMMON CABLE TRAY. IN RDDITION, THERE IS NO ELECTRICAL ISOLATION BETWEEN THE SAFETY-RELATED AND NON-SAFETY RELATED PORTIONS OF THE ELECTRICAL POWER AND CONTROL CABLES TO THE TOXIC GAS ANALYZERS.
THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR HAS BEEN INFORMED BY THE LICENSEE.
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POWER REACTOR EVENT NUMBER: 30303 FACILITY: CRYSTAL RIVER REGION: 2 NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/17/96 UNIT: [3] [] [] STATE: FL NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:30 [ET]
RX TYPE: [3] B&W-L-LP EVENT DATE: 04/17/96 EVENT TIME: 16:00[EDT]
NRC NOTIFIED BY: BILL BANDHAUER LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/17/96 HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER NOTIFICATIONS EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE 10 CFR SECTION: CHARLES CASTO RDO AMED 50.72 (b) (2) (v) OFFSITE MEDICAL UNIT SCRAM CODE RX CRIT INIT PWR INIT RX MODE CURR PWR CURR RX MODE 3 N N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN 0 COLD SHUTDOWN EVENT TEXT POTENTIALLY CONTAMINATED INJURED WORKER TRANSPORTED OFFSITE ON 4/12/96 AT 1600 A WORKER INJURED IN A FALL WAS TRANSPORTED TO A LOCAL HOSPITAL FOR TREATMENT. THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED IN THE REACTOR BUILDING.
THIS REPORT IS BEING MADE AVTER THE LICENSEE REVIEWED NUREG-1022 AND DECIDED THAT THE EVENT SHOULD HnVE BEEN REPORTED ON 4/12.
THE WORKER WAS NOT CONTAMINATED, HOWEVER HER COVERALLS CONTAINED FIXED CONTAMINATION AT A LEVEL OF 1000 DPM/100 cm2 THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.
POWER REACTOR EVENT NUMBER: 30286 FACILITY: CRYSTAL RIVER REGION: 2 NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/14/96 UNIT: [3] [] [] STATE: FL NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:31 [ET)
RX TYPE: [3] B&W-L-LP EVENT DATE: 04/14/96 EVENT TIME: 14:30(EDT]
NRC NOTIFIED BY: BANDHAUER LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/14/96 HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY NOTIFICATIONS EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE '
10 CFR SECTION: VERRELLI RDO AESF 50.72 (b) (2) (ii) ESF ACTUATION DNIT SCRAM CODE RX CRIT INIT PWR INIT RX MODE CURR PWR CURR RX MODE 3 N N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN 0 COLD SHUTDOWN EVENT TEXT CLOSED CYCLE COOLING WATER PUMP INADVERTENTLY STARTED DURING A TEST. l DURING PERFORMANCE OF A SURVEILLANCE TEST, AN OPERATOR MISSED A STEP IN THE 1 PROCEDURE FAILING TO BLOCK THE ACTUATION OF THE '1A' CLOSED CYCLE COOLING WATER PUMP. WHEN THE OPERATOR PROCEEDED WITH THE TEST, THE PUMP STARTED AND OPERATED PROPERLY. NO COMPONENTS WERE DAMAGED AS A RESULT OF THIS EVENT.
THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE INFORMED BY THE LICENSEE.
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POWER REACTOR EVENT NUMBER: 30284 FACILITY: CRYSTAL RIVER REGION: 2 NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/13/96 UNIT: [3] [ ] [] STATE: FL NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:25 [ET)
RX TYPE: [3] B&W-L-LP EVENT DATE: 04/13/96 EVENT TIME: 17:00[EDT]
WRC NOTIFIED BY: BAUDHAUER LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/13/96 HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY NOTIFICATIONS EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE 10 CFR SECTION: VERRELLI RDO AOUT 50.72 (b) (1) (ii) (B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS UNIT SCRAM CODE RX CRIT INIT PWR INIT RX MODE CURR PWR CURR RX MODE 3 N N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN 0 COLD SHUTDOWN EVENT TEXT SAFETY-RELATED BATTERY CHARGERS MAY NOT BE QUALIFIED FOR ALL INPUT VOLTAGES THE FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A FACSIMILE SUBMITTED BY THE LICENSEE:
"THIS REPORT IS FOR SUSPECTED OPERATION OUTSIDE OF THE DESIGN BASIS.
SAFETY-RELATED BATTERY CHARGERS USED AT CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 ARE REQUIRED TO OPERATE WITHIN A SPECIFIED RANGE OF AC INPUT VOLTAGE. THE VENDOR PREVIOUSLY CERTIFIED THE BATTERY CHARGERS AS QUALIFIED TO OPERATE WITHIN THE REQUIRED VALUES. ON 04/11/96, THE VENDOR STATED IN WRITING THAT THE BATTERY CHARGERS WERE NOT ACTUALLY TESTED TO THE CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 REQUIRED VALUES AND, THEREFORE, REQUIRE ADDITIONAL TESTING TO ASSURE THE BATTERY CHARGERS WILL MEET DESIGN REQUIREMENTS."
THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE INFORMED BY THE LICENSEE.
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' - l POWER REACTOR EVENT NUMBER: 30189 FACILITY: CRYSTAL RIVER REGION: 2 NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/28/96 UNIT: [3] [ ] [] STATE: FL NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:04 [ET]
RX TYPE: [3] B&W-L-LP EVENT DATE: 03/28/96 EVENT TIME: 11: 55 [EST)
NRC NOTIFIED BY: WALT NEUMAN LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/28/96 HQ OPS OFFICER: RUDY KARSCH NOTIFICATIONS EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE 10 CFR SECTION: GEORGE AL BELISLE RDO AOUT 50.72 (b) (1) (ii) (B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS 4
UNIT SCRAM CODE RX CRIT INIT PWR INIT RX MODE CURR PWR CURR RX MODE 3 N N 0 REFUELING 0 REFUELING 4
EVENT TEXT THE UNIT WAS OPERATED FOR ONE FUEL CYCLE WITH THE EMERGENCY FEED INITIATION AND CONTROL (EFIC) SYSTEM SEISMICALLY VULNERABLE.
INSTRUMENT TUBING FOR THE EFIC HIGH RANGE LEVEL CHANNELS "C" AND "D" WAS DISCOVERED TO BE REMOVED FROM ITS SEISMIC SUPPORTS. THIS TUBING IS THE HIGH SIDE OF THE LEVEL TAP AND PROVIDES THIS FUNCTION FOR THE OPERATING l RANGE AND STARTUP RANGE FOR THE "B" ONCE THROUGH STEAM GENERATOR (OTSG).
THE TUBING WAS REMOVED FROM THE SUPPORTS TO ALLOW INSTALLATION OF THE OTSG WORK PLATFORMS. THE WORK PLATFORM DESIGN DID NOT ALLOW THE TUBING SEISMIC SUPPORTS TO BE RE-ATTACHED. THE SUPPORTS ARE BEING REDESIGNED AT PRESENT AND WILL BE RE-ATTACHED BEFORE PLANT RESTART. THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.
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!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
POWER REACTOR EVENT NUMBER: 30152 FACILITY: CRYSTAL RIVER REGION: 2 NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/22/96 UNIT: [3] [] [ ] STATE: FL NOTIFICATION TIME: 04:22 [ET)
RX TYPE: [3] B&W-L-LP EVENT DATE: 03/22/96 EVENT TIME: 04 : 00 (EST)
NRC NOTIFIED BY: BILL BANDHAUER LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/19/96 HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE NOTIFICATIONS EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE 10 CFR SECTION: MILTON SHYMLOCK RDO AOUT 50.72 (b) (1) (ii) (B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS UNIT SCRAM CODE RX CRIT INIT PWR INIT RX MODE CURR PWR CURR RX MODE 3 N N O REFUELING 0 REFUELING EVENT TEXT
- CREV SYSTEM DESIGN FLOW RATE CALCULATIONS MAY BE NONCONSERVATIVE -
THE LICENSEE DETERMINED THAT THE CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION (CREV)
SYSTEM DESIGN CALCULATIONS ASSUMED NOMINAL AIR FLOW VALUES. THE CREV FANS HAVE AN ALLOWABLE ADJUSTMENT TOLERANCE OF t10% OF THE NOMINAL FLOW RATE.
THE CURRENTLY MEASURED ACTUAL FLOW RATES ARE WITHIN THE ALLOWABLE DESIGN FLOW RATE TOLERANCE. THE DESIGN CALCULATIONS DO NOT PROVIDE ASSURANCE THAT ADJUSTMENT WITHIN THIS TOLERANCE WILL PROVIDE ADEQUATE CHARCOAL FILTRATION l EFFICIENCY AT THE HIGHER TOLERANCE OR ADEQUATE DILUTION OF AIR IN LEAKAGE l POSE) AT THE LOWER TOLERANCE. THE CALCULATION IS CURRENTLY BEING REPERFORMED USING THE TOLERANCE VALUES. THE LICENSEE WILL RESOLVE THIS ;
ISSUE PRIOR TO THE PLANT ENTERING MODE 4 WHEN THE CREV SYSTEM WILL BE REQUIRED. THE CASE FOR FUEL MOVEMENT (FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT) HAS ALREADY BEEN ANALYZED AND IS WELL WITHIN THE DESIGN LIMITS.
THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.
0 *
- UPDATE AT 0906 ON 04/19/96, FROM NEUMAN TAKEN BY STRANSKY * *
- THE LICENSEE IS RETRACTING THIS NOTIFICATION. THE REVISED CALCULATION HAS BEEN COMPLETED, AND SHOWED THAT THE UNIT WAS NOT OPERATING OUTSIDE OF ITS DESIGN BASIS. ,
1 THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR HAS BEEN INFORMED. THE NRC OPERATIONS CENTER NOTIFIED THE R2DO (CASTO).
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I!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
POWER REACTOR EVENT NUMBER: 29998 i
FACILITY: CRYSTAL RIVER REGION: 2 NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/19/96 UNIT: [3] [] [] STATE: FL NOTIFICATION TIME: 21:45 [ET]
RK TYPE: [3] B&W-L-LP EVENT DATE: 02/19/96 EVENT TIME: 21:00(EST)
NRC NOTIFIED BY: H LILES LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/29/96 HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON NOTIFICATIONS EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE 10 CFR SECTION: JOHN POTTER RDO AUNA 50.72 (b) (1) (ii) (A) UNANALYZED COND OP UNIT SCRAM CODE RX CRIT INIT PWR INIT RX MODE CURR PWR CURR RX MODE 3 N N 0 HOT SHUTDOWN O HOT SHUTDOWN EVENT TEXT REACTOR BUILDING PURGE INLET CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES FAILED THEIR LOCAL LEAK RATE TEST (LLRT).
WHILE ENTERING A REFUELING OUTAGE, A LLRT OF REACTOR BUILDING PURGE INLET ISOLATION VALVES (AHV-1C rtND AHV-1D) WAS PERFORMED, AND THE LEAKAGE RATE FOR THE VALVES WAS >0.6 La. (THE LIMIT IS 206.4 liters / min.) THE LEAKAGE RATE FOR THE REACTOR BUILDING PURGE INLET IFOLATION VALVES WAS >500 liters / min. (MAXIMUM READING ON LEAKAGE FLOW METER.) PER TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.6.1.b (OVERALL CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE TESTING) AND TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.6.3.d (CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE LEAKAGE LIMITS), THE LICENSEE HAS 36 HOURS TO BE IN A COLD SHUTDOWN CONDITION SINCE THERE ARE NO ISOLATION VALVES TO ISOLATE AHV-1C AND AHV-1D. AFTER REACHING COLD SHUTDOWN CONDITION, THE LICENSEE WILL OPEN THE VALVES AND ESTABLISH A CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE PURGE TO CLEAN THE CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE. THE VALVES WILL BE REPAIRED BEFORE EXITING THE REFUELING OUTAGE. THE REACTOR '
BUILDING INLET PURGE ISOLATION VALVES ARE PRESSURIZED TO BETWEEN 54.2 psig AND 54.7 psig (AIR IS INTRODUCED BETWEEN THE TWO INLET PURGE ISOLATION VALVES.), AND THEN THE LEAKAGE RATE IS MEASURED. THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS WILL BE INFORMED OF THIS EVENT BY THE LICENSEE.
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- 1256 FEBRUARY 29, 1996, UPDATE FROM PORTER TAKEN BY TROCINE * *
- THE LICENSEE IS RETRACTING THIS EVENT. THE LICENSEE DETERMINED THAT THE VALVE INSIDE CONTAINMENT WAS NOT LEAKING AND CONCLUDED THAT THERE WAS NO l LOSS OF CONTAINMENT BECAUSE ONE BARRIER EXISTED. THE LICENSEE WILL NOTIFY '
THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. THE HOO NOTIFIED THE R2DO (MCALPINE).
7 POWER REACTOR EVENT NUMBER: 29966 FACILITY: CRYSTAL RIVER REGION: 2 NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/09/96 UNIT: [3] [ ] [ ] STATE: FL NOTIFICATION TIME; 18:23 [ET]
RX TYPE: [3] B&W-L-LP EVENT DATE: 02/09/96 EVENT TIME: 17 : 45 [EST)
NRC NOTIFIED BY: L. MOFFATT LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/09/96 HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON NOTIFICATIONS EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE 10 CFR SECTION: CAUDLE JULIAN RDO DSAF 73.71(b) (1) SECURITY DEGRADATION UNIT SCRAM CODE RX CRIT INIT PWR INIT RX MODE CURR PWR CURR RX MODE 3 N Y 100 POWER OPERATION 100 POWER OPERATION l
l EVENT TEXT COMPENSATORY MEASURES NOT TAKEN WITHIN SPECIFIED TIME REQUIREMENT.
PLANT EMPLOYEE INADVERTENTLY TOOK HIS SECURITY BADGE HOME. WHEN SECURITY WAS INFORMED OF THIS, SECURITY DID NOT TAKE COMPENSATORY ACTIONS WITHIN THE SPECIFIED TIME LIMIT.
SECURITY WAS NOT COMPROMISED DURING THIS EVENT. l l
RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS INFORMED BY THE LICENSEE OF THIS EVENT.
l SEE HOO LOG BOOK FOR FURTHER DETAILS l
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POWER REACTOR EVENT NUMBER: 29909 FACILITY: CRYSTAL RIVER REGION: 2 NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/30/96 UNIT: [3] [] [] STATE: FL NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:30 [ET]
RX TYPE: [3] B&W-L-LP EVENT DATE: 01/30/96 EVENT TIME: 18:00[EST)
NRC NOTIFIED BY: RICHARD SWEENEY LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/30/96 HQ OPS OFFICER: RUDY KARSCH NOTIFICATIONS EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE 10 CFR SECTION: CHARLES HOSEY RDO AOUT 50.72 (b) (1) (ii) (B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS UNIT SCRAM CODE RX CRIT INIT PWR INIT RX MODE CURR PWR CURR RX MODE 3 N Y 100 POWER OPERATION 100 POWER OPERATION 4 EVENT TEXT THE LICENSEE DETERMINED THAT A LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT (LOCA) CONCURRENT WITH A LOSS OF OFF-SITE POWER (LOOP) , AND A FAILURE OF THE "B" TRAIN OF DC POWER WILL RESULT IN EXCESSIVE SERVICE WATER (SW) FLOW. THE SW SYSTEM IS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE FLOW TO TWO REACTOR BUILDING FAN COOLERS. IN THIS SCENARIO ALL THREE FAN COOLERS WOULD BE PROVIDED FLOW. THE LICENSEE'S INTERIM CORRECTIVE ACTION IS TO ISOLATE ONE FAN COOLER IF THESE EVENTS OCCUR. THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.
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POWER REACTOR EVENT NUMBER: 29843 l FACILITY: CRYSTAL RIVER REGION: 2 NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/16/96 l UNIT: [3] [ ] [] STATE: FL NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:12 [ET] 1 RX TYPE: [3] B&W-L-LP EVENT DATE: 01/16/96 l EVENT TIME: 16 :16 (EST)
NRC NOTIFIED BY: WALT NEUMAN LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/16/96 ,
HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE l NOTIFICATIONS EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE 10 CFR SECTION: THOMAS DECKER RDO ADAS 50.72 (b) (2) (i) DEG/UNANALYZED COND UNIT SCRAM CODE RX CRIT INIT PWR INIT RX MODE CURR PWR CURR RX MODE 3 N N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN O COLD SHUTDOWN EVENT TEXT
- CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENT SYSTEM INOP DUE TO PARTIALLY OPEN DAMPER -
WITH UNIT 3 IN MODE 5 (COLD SHUTDOWN) IN A MAINTENANCE OUTAGE, LICENSEE DISCOVERED THAT AIR DAMPER #AHD-2 IN THE CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION (CREV) SYSTEM WOULD NOT FULLY CLOSE. LICENSEE CALCULATED THAT THE OPENING OF THE PARTIALLY OPEN DAMPER IS GREATER THAN ALLOWED BY TECH SPECS WHILE THE PLANT IS IN MODES 1 THROUGH 4. THIS CONDITION RENDERS THE SYSTEM INOPERABLE.
LICENSEE WILL REPAIR THE DAMPER PRIOR TO ENTERING MODE 4.
LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.
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- UPDATE AT 2149 ON 01/16/96 BY NEUMAN ENTERED BY HOO JOLLIFFE * *
- LICENSEE INSPECTED THE OTHER AIR DAMPERS IN THE CREV SYSTEM AND DISCOVERED THAT DAMPER #AHD-12 HAD A MISSING VENT BLADE. THE MISSING VENT BLADE ON DAMPER #AHD-12 ALONE DOES NOT RENDER THE CREV SYSTEM INOPERABLE.
LICENSEE PLANS TO START UNIT 3 UP ON 01/18/96.
l l LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.
l HOO NOTIFIEC R2DO TOM DECKER.
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- *, 7 o POWER REACTOR EVENT NUMBER
- 29832
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FACILITY: CRYSTAL RIVER REGION: 2 NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/13/96 UNIT: [3] [] [] STATE: FL NOTIFICATION TIME: 02:24 [ET) i RX TYPE: [3] B&W-L-LP EVENT DATE: 01/13/06 EVENT TIME: 01:33[EST)
NRC NOTIFIED BY: MOFFATT LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/13/96 HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD NOTIFICATIONS l EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE 10 CFR SECTION: JACK CRLENJAK RDO AOUT 50.72 (b) (1) (ii) (B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS i
i
(
UNIT SCRAM CODE RX CRIT INIT PWR INIT RX MODE CURR PWR CURR RX MODE f 3 N N 0 COLD SHUTDOWN 0 COLD SHUTDOWN i.
)
i EVENT TEXT THE LICENSEE DETERMINED THAT SAFETY-RELATED CONTAINMENT' MINI-PURGE VALVES
- CLOSING CIRCUITRY IS ROUTED THROUGH A NON SAFETY-RELATED SYSTEM.
l DURING AN INVESTIGATION OF A 1995 PROBLEM REPORT CONCERNING THE CONTAINMENT PURGE VALVES, A DISCREPANCY WAS NOTED WITH THE CONTAINMENT MINI-PURGE 1 VALVES (LRV-70, 71, 72, AND 73). THESE VALVES ARE SAFETY-RELATED AND RECEIVE A SIGNAI TO CLOSE ON CERTAIN ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES (ESP)
- ACTUATIONS. IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE CIRCUITRY TO CLOSE THESE VALVES IS j ROUTED THROUGH THE CONTAINMENT PURGE DUCT RADIATION 140NITOR (RM-A1) CABINET WHICH IS NON SAFETY-RELATED.
L
- AN OPEN CIRCUIT IN THE RM-Al PORTION OF THE CIRCUITRY WOULD NORMALLY CAUSE
, THE VALVES TO CLOSE (i.e. MOVE TO THEIR ESF REQUIRED POSITION). A SHORT CIRCUIT IN THE RM-Al PORTION OF THE CIRCUITRY COULD CAUSE THE VALVES TO REMAIN IN THEIR PRIOR POSITION AND WOULD LEAVE THE CAPABILITY OF THE VALVES TO CLOSE ON AN ESF ACTUATION INTACT. A " HOT" SHORT IN THE'RM-Al PORTION OF THE CIRCUITRY, HOWEVER, COULD CAUSE THE VALVES TO REMAIN OPEN DESPITE AN
.ESF ACTUATION TO CLOSE THE VALVES. BASED ON CIRCUIT DESIGN, THIS
. POSTULATED FAILURE WOULD NOT CAUSE THE VALVES TO OPEN SPURIOUSLY, AND THE CONTROL BOARD SWITCH FOR THESE VALVES WOULD NOT BE DISABLED BY THE POSTULATED FAILURE.
THE PLANT IS PRESENTLY IN COLD SHUTDOWN, AND THERE ARE NO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS FCE THE CONTAINMENT MINI-PURGE VALVES IN THIS MODE. THESE VALVES HAVE BEEN OPENED SEVERAL TIMES WITH THE PLANT IN MODE 1 DURING THE LAST FEW YEARS. IF THE POSTULATED FAILURE HAD OCCURRED (i.e.
THE PLANT IN MODE 1 AND THE CONTAINMENT MINI-PURGE VALVES OPEN WITH A COINCIDENT ESF ACTUATION), EXITING THE EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE WOULD (Continued on next page)
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FACILITY: CRYSTAL RIVER PAGE # 2 OF EVENT NUMBER: 29832 HAVE LED THE CONTROL BOARD OPERATOR TO NOTE THE FAILURE AND TO USE THE CONTROL SWITCH TO CLOSE THE VALVES. THE LICENSEE IS STILL INVESTIGATING A '
METHOD TO CORRECT TETS CONDITION.
THE NRC RESIDENT Ii!SPECTOR WILL BE NOTIFIED.
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- .7' POWER REACTOR EVENT NUMBER: 29826 FACILITY: CRYSTAL RIVER REGION: 2 NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/11/96 UNIT: [3] [] [ ] STATE: FL NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:28 [ET)
RX TYPE: (3) B&W-L-LP EVENT DATE: 01/11/96 EVENT TIME: 16:37(EST]
NRC NOTIFIED BY: NEUMAN LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/11/96 HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE NOTIFICATIONS EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE 10 CFR SECTION: JACK CRLENJAK RDO ADAS 50.72 (b) (2) (i) DEG/UNANALYZED COND UNIT SCRAM CODE RX CRIT INIT PWR INIT RX MODE CURR PWR CURR RX MODE 3 N N 0 HOT SHUTDOWN 0 HOT SHUTDOWN l
l EVENT TEXT l DISCOVERY THAT CIRCUITS FOR CONTROLLING EMERGENCY FEEDWATER FLOW TO BOTH l STEAM GENERATOPS PASS THROUGH A COKMON FIRE AREA AND ARE NOT PROTECTED WITH I ANY FIRE BARRIER PROTECTION IN THAT COMMON AREA '
l DURING ONGOING APPENDIX-R TSI-MATERIAL RELATED WORK, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT CONDUITS EFS56 AND EFS57 (WHICH CONTAIN CIRCUITS FOR CONTROLLING EMERGENCY FEEDWATER FLOW TO BOTH STEAM GENERATORS) PASS THROUGH A COMMON FIRE AREA AND ARE NOT PROTECTED WITH ANY FIRE BARRIER PROTECTION IN THAT COMMON AREA.
THE FIRE BARPIER PROTECTION MATERIAL OUTSIDE THE REACTOR BUILDING (TSI MATERIAL) IS CURRENTLY CONSIDERED INOPERABLE, AND THE LICENSEE PLANS TO CONTINUE EMERGENCY COMPENSATORY ACTIONS (ROVING FIRE WATCH) UNTIL THE TSI-MATERIAL ISSUE IS RESOLVED. THE EMERGENCY FEEDWATER ISSUE WILL BECOME PART OF THE OVERALL FIRE SAFETY ISSUE. A SPECIFIC EVALUATION OF THE IMPACT OF THIS EMERGENCY FEEDWATER ISSUE ON EMERGENCY FEEDWATER OPERABILITY WILL DE COMPLETED PRIOR TO ASCENSION INTO A MODE THAT REQUIRES EMERGENCY FEEDWATER OPERABILITY. THE UNIT IS NOT IN ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERABILITY AT THIS TIME.
THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE NOTIFIED.
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PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION II APRIL 3, 1997 Licensee / Facility: Notification:
Florida Power Corporation MR Number: 2-97-0022 Crystal River 3 Date: 04/03/97 Crystal' River, Florida Dockets: 50-302 PWR/B&W-L-LP Sub-l ec t : ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES Discussion:
Effective April 3, 1997, Florida Power Corporation has announced the following management changes at their Crystal River Unit 3 (CR3) Nuclear Plant: Mr. Charles Pardee has been hired to be the Director of Nuclear Plant Operations (Plant Manager). Mr. Pardee is currently the Operations Manager at Carolina Power & Light's (CP&L) Brunswick Plant and was previously the Manager of Technical Support. He holds an active Senior Reactor Operator license at Brunswick. He was formerly employed by INPO as an on-shift Startup Director and Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory as a Shift Supervisor, Maintenance Manger, and Operations Manager. The current Director of Nuclear Plant Operations, Bruce Hickle, will assume the duties of Restart Director and will be responsible for all aspects of the licensee's activities associated with restart efforts. He will continue to be a direct report to the Vice President, Nuclear Production.
Mr. Robert Grazio has been hired to be the Director Regulatory Affairs to oversee all licensing and regulatory interface functions. This position replaces the current position of Director Site Support. Mr. Grazio is currently the Brunswick Engineering Manager but is on loan to Northeast Utilities' Millstone site where he is overseeing Licensing and Engineering interfaces. He has previously worked for Florida Power and Light (FP&L) on Turkey Point nuclear licensing issues and at Pilgrim as Engineering and Licensing Manager.
Mr. Mark Marano has been hired to be the Director of Site Services to oversee Nuclear Security, Information Resources, Document Control, Contract Services, Financial Planning, and Corporate Relations. These functions are currently overseen by the Director Nuclear Operations
- Materials and Controls held by Mr. William Conklin. Mr. Conklin will retain this title and oversite of Nuclear Purchasing and Material Control. Mr. Marano is currently the Corrective Action Program Manager at PSE&G's Salem plant. He was previously employed by CP&L as the l ' Brunswick Site Support Director and FP&L in the Information Technology l area.
l Recional Action:
Information Only
Contact:
L. MELLEN (404)331-5561 b
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PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION II JANUARY 7, 1997 Licensee / Facility: Notification:
Florida Power Corporation MR Number: 2-97-0002 Crystal River 3 Date: 01/07/97 Crystal River, Florida Dockets: 50-302 PWR/B&W-L-LP Subiect: ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES Discussion:
On January 6, 1997, Florida Power Corporation (FPC) announced organizational changes at Crystal River. Mr. Roy A. Anderson, currently Senior Vice President of Customer Services at Carolina Power and Light (CP&L), will be the new Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer at FPC effective March 3, 1997. He is expected to be onsite during February for turn over with Mr. Percy (Pat) Beard who previously announced his retirement effective April 1, 1997. Vice President Mr. John Paul Cowan will also be leaving CP&L to assume the Site Vice President position at FPC. These announcements were also made by CP&L.
Additionally, the Director, Nuclear Operations Site Support, Mr. Larry Kelley, announced that he will retire effective January 31,
. 1997. His replacement will be Mr. Dave Kunsemiller. FPC also announced that Mr. Jerry Campbell, Assistant Plant Director, Maintenance and Radiation Protection, will be transferring to the Polk County Construction Project. The date for this transfer will be determined when a replacement for Mr. Campbell is identified.
Recional Action: l Information only.
Contact:
L. MELLEN (404)331-5561 l
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. PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED ' MORNING REPORT - REGION II DEC. 11, 1996 Licensee / Facility:
Notification:
Florida Power Corporation MR Number: 2-96-0120 Crystal-River 3..
-Crystal River, Florida-Date: 12/11/96
-Dockets: 50-302 PWR/B&W-L-LP-Subiect: ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES Discussion:
On December 10, 1996, Florida Power Corporation announced an organizational change at Crystal River. Vice President of Nuclear Production and acting Director of Nuclear Engineering, Mr. Gary L. Boldt, ;
announced that he will resign effective January 31, 1997. A replacement i
for Mr. Boldt has'not been announced. ,
Reaional Action:
For information only.
Contact:
L. MELLEN (404)331-5561 i
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PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION II DEC. 06, 1996
- Licensee / Facility: Notification:
Florida Power Corporation MR Number: 2-96-0119 Crystal River 3 Date: 12/06/96 Crystal River, Florida Dockets:'50-302 PWR/B&W-L-LP Subiect: ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES p_iscussion:-
On December 4, 1996, Florida Power Corporation announced an organizational: change at Crystal River. Senior Vice President of Nuclear.
Operations, Mr. Percy " Pat" M. Beard, Jr., announced that he~will retira, effective April 1,'1997. A replacement for Mr. Beard has not been
- announced.
Realonal Action:
For information only.
Contact:
L. MELLEN (404)331-5561 t-i
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-PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION II JUNE 12, 1996 Licensee / Facility: Notification:
Florida. Power Corporation MR Number: 2-96-0053 Crystal River 3 Date: 06/12/96 :
Crystal River,s_orida ;
Dockets: 50-302 PWR/B&W-L-LP Sub-l ec t : ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES Discussion:
1 On June 11, 1996, Florida Power Corporation announced an organizational I change at Crystal River. G. L. Boldt, site Vice President - Nuclear Production, assumed. direct oversight of the Nuclear Engineering '
Department. Mr. Boldt will remain acting director until this position is filled. -This change became effective on June 10, 1996.
l Additional changes in the engineering department are planned. l Recional Action:
i For information only.
Contact:
L. MELLEN (404)331-5561 i
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PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION II JUNE 4, 1996 Licensee / Facility: Notification: 4 Florida Power Corporation MR Number: 2-96-0049 Crystal River 3 Date: 06/04/96 Crystal River, Florida Dockets: 50-302 PWR/B&W-L-LP Subiect: FOLLOWUP TO PLANT TRIP - TURBINE VALVE TESTING Reportable Event Number: 30571 Discussion:
On May 31, 1996 Crystal River 3 tripped from 100% power during the performance of the turbine EHC trip solenoid valves testing. The reactor tripped on high RCS pressure when the turbine valvec started to drift closed, reducing the secondary side cooling of'the RCS.
Investigation by the licensee concluded that the most probable cause of the trip was debris in the EHC system preventing the block valve from seating. properly. This would allow EHC pressure to slowly bleed off. !
During the trip, several equipment problems were noted. Turbine bypass I valve TBV 11 did not operate properly. Following the trip the licensee found that the controller for this valve was not calibrated properly and )
readjusted it. Two main steam safety valves opened at pressures below the design setpoints. These were found out of calibration and were recalibrated.
The licensee began the unit start-up on June 2, 1996 and rolled the turbine on June 3, 1996. During the turbine start-up throttle and governor' valve trip test, it was noted that throttle valve #1 hesitated approximately 10 seconds before closing. Additional testing has been performed with erratic results, ranging from no hesitation to l approximately 17 seconds hesitation. The plant is currently in Mode 1, j approximately 10 percent thermal power with the turbine tripped. H Troubleshooting and corrective action planning for throttle valve #1 l continues.
Recional Action:
The resident inspectors independently received post trip plant response and will continue to followup.
Contact:
L. MELLEN (404)331-5561 a
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}- BRIEFING FOR CHAIRMAN JACKSON ON THE FINDINGS.OF THE INTEGRATED --
- PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT PROCESS
- (IPAP) OF CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 i
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! SEPTEMBER 4,1996 I
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l JEFFREY JACOBSON, NRR l IPAP TEAM LEADER
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Crystal River IPAP - Team Conclusions l
i During the public exit meeting conducted on August 6,1996 l j the team discussed specific findings in the areas of safety I assessment / corrective action, operations, engineering,
- maintenance, and plant support (radiological controls). Based on these findings, the team has identified concerns in six
- general areas. The six general areas of concern are as follows
1
- Weaknesses in the original plant design i
- Weaknesses in recent engineering work j
- A lack of sensitivity / understanding of the plant's
! design basis and NRC regulations
- An ineffective quality organization
- Failure to implement the corrective action program for emergent issues
- Failure to establish and enforce proper performance standards The following is a compilation of the team's more significant findings grouped by the general area of concern. Note that some of the findings are indicative of a concern in mare than one area. Several findings that do not fall in to the e.bove areas are listed at the end as " Miscellaneous findings". In addition, a tabulation of licensee strengths is provided.
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1 i Weaknesses in the original olant design i
l e Lack of thermal relief valves on industrial cooling water l piping to the reactor cavity cooling fans (non-safety related). I 4 This system will isolate following a safety system actuation.
i Should the containment isolation valves not fully close, the isolated piping will heat up due to the containment l l atmosphere and could burst. A release path might then exist l to outside of containment. The licensee made an immediate I
- modification to install relief valves to resolve this issue. l A recent information notice was issued that informe~d I i licensee's of similar concerns at other plants.
l l e Failure to ensure the availability of a passive and an
} active means of preventing boron precipitation following l j design basis loss of coolant accidents. Original plant design j provided three methods of preventing boron precipitation, one
- passive and two active. A 1991 B&W analysis raised l questions regarding the functionality of the passive method l and one of the active methods. Recent information identified
! by the licensee regarding the inability of the reactor building l sump screens to handle everse differential pressure, raised a question regarding the remaining active method.
i
- Currently an open generic issue, reactor systems branch j following. 50.54f letter issued to Crystal River. Preliminary i review of licensee's response has identified no immediate
! safety concern. The team also identified an internal (i.e. NRC)
{ program issue concerning the issuance of a letter in 1993 to j the B&W owners group which was taken by the licensee as l authorization to deviate from its licensing basis.
! e inability to cool down following a small break loss of l' j coolant accident and assuming a single failure in the decay i heat drop line due to minimum flow limitations on low j pressure injection pumps. Issue has been assigned to the -
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- . reactor systems branch. The licensee is looking into a facility c that can do additional testing on the low pressure pump to l justify continued operation. The licensee has completed an operability review which in their opinion provides justification j for short term operability until the issue can be resolved. The i team also identified an internal program issue concerning our
! acceptance of the licensee's response to Bulletin 88-04 where t
a simulator scenario set up to address the possible pump i
mission times assumed no single failures. This issue could be j generic to B&W plants.
j e Potentially unacceptable minimum net positive suction
- head for the 1B building spray pump. Calculation assumptions
] questionable, no margin available in calculations. Short term l operability O.K., although the ability to meet the licensing 1 basis is questionable.
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- i Weaknesses in recent engineering wegk_
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e Licensee curve established for evaluating operability of j service water heat exchangers did not use conservative
] fouling factors for reactor building fan coolers. Temporary
! compensatory measures instituted, i
[
- Calculations to establish loading on emergency diesel l generators did not evaluate the full spectrum of break sizes
- and their effect on flow / power requirements. Assuming worst l case until calculations are completed.
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- Curves used by operators in OP-103B to monitor i operation of the decay heat pump flow rates for reduced i
inventory operations and for monitoring reactor coolant
. system pressure versus decay heat inlet temperature were not l referenced or validated. (Note this is the same procedure that
! contained the make-up tank curve for which the licensee l received a 500k civil penalty.) Preliminary review by the P
licensee did not identify any technical concerns although the curves need to be validated. Open item.
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A lack of sensitivitv/understandina of the olant's desian basis i and NRC reaulations/oositions -
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- Failure to ensure the availability of a passive and an l active means of preventing boron precipitation following i design basis loss of coolant accidents. Poor safety evaluation
- j. conducted in 1994 and licensing review conducted in 1996 j which concluded the decay heat drop line was unnecessary.
Failure to ensure the plant is in accordance with the approved licensing basis.
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- The licensee has used the 500 kv backfeed as an offsite
! source during outages without calculations to support the i acceptability of its use. Recent calculations have shown this is not an acceptable source, however tech spec bases state this is a qualified source of off-site power. Licensee has suspended the use of the backfeed until issue is resolved. ,
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- Decay cooling air operated valves have non-safety related ;
j positioners.- Licensee identified this issue and took a position ;
! that non-safety related failures of a likelihood less than 10E-6 I need not be considered.
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- The licensee had initially taken a position that they do not j consider single failures, such as the failure of the drop line to I open, when evaluating long term cooldown following certain i loss of coolant accidents. There is nothing on the docket that would exempt them from general design criteria. The licensee is now considering several options to mitigate the concern with the ability to cool down following a loss of coolant accident, including modifications of the decay heat drop line and additional testing of the decay heat pumps. ,,
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- e The licensee has apparently mis-interpreted a branch l technical position and the subsequent safety evaluation i regarding the required capacity of the fire water storage l tanks. !
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- Numerous discrepancies noted in FSAR one line !
j diagrams. !
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) Ineffective cuality organization I
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- The licensee is not integrating the information obtained l . from the various performance assessment processes and as l such, has not focused on specific areas where performance improvements are still warranted. A newly instituted quarterly
- management assessment program has not provided meaningful results. The recently formed nuclear safety j assessment team has not yet demonstrated its effectiveness 4
at integrating assessment data or at improving the quality of
- licensee assessments. !
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- Quality audits have identified few substantive issues, j When issues are identified they are not effectively I
- communicated, and are not followed up sufficiently.
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- Root cause evaluations, when performed, are weak, and j fail to address many of the contributing causes to .significant plant events.
.
- The licensee is not effectively trending the data from l precursor cards which form the bulk of the data inputed into l the corrective action system. I
- Line organizational self assessments have not been i
! sufficiently critical and have not identified significant issues.
l A site-wide self assessment program has not been i established.
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I Failure to imolement the correcti've action orogram for emergent issues 4
j e Problem report not initially written for issue identified by j the. team with questionable net positive suction head for 1B j building spray pump.
- Problem report not written / operability evaluation not
- performed for issue identified by the licensee concerning
! potential common mode failure due to cooling water piping routed through switchgear and relay rooms.
l i e Problem report not written / operability evaluation not
- performed when spurious equipment actuations raised a i concern regarding the acceptability of the 500 kv backfeed as
! a source of power during refueling outages.
l e Problem report not written when team observed I&C ,
! work out of sequence during conduct of surveillance l procedure.
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- Problem report not written after refueling incident where a fuel bundle was lowered on to top of another bundle.
e Problem reports not written by operations for instances when reactor coolant system level decreased lower than expected, when the refueling cavity level increased unexpectedly, and when the reactor coolant system level increased while re-circulating to the reactor coolant boron tank.
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i Failure to establish and enforce oroner oerformance standards l
- e The team identified that licensee management had not l established or enforced proper performance standards in the
- following areas:
l 1. The role of the quality organization
- 2. Procedural adherence l 3. The thoroughness of event investigations
- j. 4. The adherence and understanding of the design basis
! 5. The threshold for when operability evaluations are
! required l 6. The thoroughness of root cause evaluations l e The team identified that operations management has not
- documented their assessments of crew performance and has l not re-enforced their standards in the following areas
j 1. In one instance control room operators were uncertain i as to where out of service equipment is logged.
j 2. Control room operators failed to exhibit adequate control during performance of surveillance with I&C.
- 3. Control room operators failed to declare the service water system inoperable when the required flow could not be established during surveillance testing.
- 4. Control room operators violated a procedure by changing the official copy of log entries.
- 5. Auxiliary operators did not identify diesel oil level out of specification while conducting surveillance checks.
- 6. Operators were not checking leakage rates of main steam safety relief valves, nor where they aware that engineering was informally monitoring the leakage.
- 7. Operators are unclear as to the requirements for performing independent verifications (difference between performed-by versus verified-by).
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! Miscellaneous findings j
! e inadequate work package instructions - some mechanical j work packages do not contain sufficient instructions for j completing the work (example is tech support center diesel troubleshooting).
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- e ineffective work planning and a shortage of I&C
! personnel have contributed to reduce the number of control board deficiencies. I l
o Potential maintenance rule violation -licensee did not i establish or monitor goals after multiple repetitive failures of !
! isolation valve MU-103 which resulted in several uncontrolled l l borated water additions. In addition, recent communications i between engineering and operations regarding the status of i this valve were weak and may have contributed to a recent over-boration event.
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Licensee Strength.s l
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f Safety Assessment / Corrective Action i i e The precursor system has been used effectively to
- identify low level issues that would not warrant a problem report.
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j e The on-site and off-site review committees have identified come good issues. l I
e When QA does identify issues, responsiveness of the line organization has generally been good.
l Ooerations e The team observed several good operating practices such as board monitoring, communications between operators, self-verification, use of alarm response procedures, and shift turnovers.
o Operator knowledge of plant systems appeared to be good.
- The use of an on-line risk monitor was a strength.
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1 Maintenance 1 4
- The plant material condition is good. Equipment is generally well maintained.
- Pre-job briefings were good.
- Good maintenance history is available~ for equipment.
i e Good use of risk assessment.
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- Good procedure feedback process.
Engineering
- The temporary modification program was a strength.
- Good use of computer analysis in electrical calculations.
- Excellent laboratory facilities for component dedication and acceptance testing. ;
- Improved instrumentation calculations and setpoint methodology.
- The formulation of one document which integrates l system design and IST limits. j
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l' Radiological Controls j e Programs for minimizing dose.
i e Use of technological advancements.
j e Good self assessments.
i e Good teamwork with other organizations.
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W i
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Summary of the January 1997 NRC Senior Management Meeting l,
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- HRC Senior Managcmont M20 ting Summary January 14, 15 and 17, 1997 Region IV Following the June 1985 loss of feedwater event at Davis-Besse, one resulting NRC action was that senior NRC managers periodically meet to discuss the plants of greatest concern to the agency and to plan a coordinated course of action. The NRC senior managers held their twenty-second such meeting in Region IV on on January January 17,14-15 1997.and continued the meeting in NRC Headquarters June 1996. The last meeting was held in Region III in The meeting in Region IV was structured to review the status of the Watch List plants identified at the last meeting and to review the performance of other plants to determine if any changes close shouldbybeNRC.
monitoring made to the list of facilities which require In preparation for the meeting, NRR and HMSS, in conjunction with the four regional offices, AEOD, OE, and RES, prepared background documents on the plants and materials licensees to be discussed.
Inputs for each operating reactor plant included a summary of the most recent operating SALP and SALP history, a discussion of current experience, performance indicator data. current NRC and licensee activities, and Data pertaining to safety significant hardware issues at the plants were also provided.
This information was distributed to meeting attendees prior to the meeting. It providedand each plant's performance the1Sasis for review and dircussion of senior management identification of those plants warranting inc :ased NRC attention.
In reviewingproblems, performance the reactor plantr that have experienced significant the NRC nanagers have set the following categories of performance based upon plantiacticas to date to correct the problems and to achieve improved operations.
- 1. Plants removed from the 1.st of problem facilities.
Plants in this category have taken effective action to correct improvedidentified proble;4s and po implement programs for performance. No further NRC special attention is necessary beyond the regivial office's current level of monitoring to ensure impro<ement continues.
2.
Plants authorized to operate that the NRC will monitor closely.
Plants in this category have been identified as having weaknesses that headquarters warrant and increased the regional NRC attention from both office. A plant will remain in this category improved performance.until the licensee demonstrates a period of I
- e. o .
i,' '
3.
Shutdown plants requiring NRC authorization to operate and which the NRC will monitor closely.
Plants in this category have been identified as having significant weaknesses that warrant maintaining the plant in a shutdown condition until the licensee can demonstrate to the NRC that adequate programs have been established and implemented to ensure substantial improvement.
The following charts list conclusions reached by the senior managers at this meeting and from the previous meeting for nuclear power plants and for materials licensees:
Meeting Dates Cateoory 3 JAN 14-15, 1996 Catecory 2 Cateaory 1 Millstone Crystal River 3 1,2&3 Dresden 2&3 Indian Point 3 Lasalle 1&2 Maine Yankee Salem 1&2 Zion 1&2 JUN 4-5, 1996 (1) Dresden 2&3 Browns Ferry 3 Indian Point 3 Millstone 1,2&3 Meeting Dates Facilitles for Priority Attention JAN 14-15, 1997 None JUN 4-5, 1996 None NRC senior management will continue to hold meetings to review the status ofsix-month approximate all reactor and materials licensees on an frequency. Recommendations will be made during those meetings to add or delete licensees from the list of facilities requiring increased NRC attention based on demonstrated performance. This program represents a concerted effort by the NRC senior management to focus NRC resources on those plants and issues that need to be addressed to assure adequate protection of public health and safety.
(1)
Unit iBecause a decision regarding the restart of Browns Ferry has been indefinitely deferred, the senior managers concluded, in June 1996, that it should no longer be identified as a Category 3 plant. However, if TVA were to decide to resume operation and restart activities at Browns Ferry Unit 1, this plant will be reinstated as a Category 3 plant requiring Commisuion authorization prior to resumption of operation.
s
, , , ,. i Snecific Discursfon of Droblem Facilities Cateaory 1r Plants That Have Been Removed from the List of Problem Facilities None.
Catecory 2; Plants Authorirgd to Operate that the NRC Will Monitor closely CRYSTAL RIVER 3 Declining performance at Crystal River 3 was first discussed during the June 1996 Senior Management Meeting. Performance concerns at Crystal River 3 involved Florida Power Corporation's (FPC) mishandling of several design issues, their interpretation of certain NRC regulations, and weaknesses in operator performance, corrective actions, and management oversight.
Overall perfornance at the facility continued to decline from the previous assessment period as evidenced by reduced performance in operatiens, engineering and plant support. Self-assessments and quality assurance functions have been only minimelly effective acrocs the functional areas.
NRC 1995: has developed the following five areas of concern since June Insufficient management oversight and involvement. This area includes corrective action pro assurance program ineffectiveness. gram and quality Marginally offs :tive engineering organization. This crea includes design control errors, design outputs missing or improper, and failure to follow procedures Lack of an adequate understanding and knowledge of the '
Crystal River 3 design basis. This area includes a lack of
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understanding of the plant's design basis, weaknesses in the l original plant design, and an inadequate understanding of design margins.
Lack of sensitivity for the need to cosply with regulations.
This area includes a lack of sensitivity / understanding of HRC regulations and regulatory requirements.
operator performance.
This area . includes a poor safety focus on refueling activities, and poor communication within op6 rations and with other site groups.
FPC has initiated demonstrated extensive corrective actions which remain to be as effective.
keep the plant shut down to The licenhee's effect en recent decision to questionable safety systems' margins,gineering evaluationsDiesel including Emergency et j Generator loading and Emergency Feedwater System vulnerabilities, was prudent. Some improvement was noted in problem I identification, but this was offset by relatively poor i performance in root cause analysis and corr.utive actions. self- i assesssents appeared ineffective and quality assurance 1
. I
, e 2
involvement was insufficient. The effectiveness of the newly-revised corrective action plan will be measured by FPC's implementation of the proposed actions and actual future performance.
The initiatives new site management team, which in this plan will be led by FPC's has yet to be formed.
The senior managers' review of the safety performance indicators for Crystal River 3 did not reveal any noteworthy performance insights.
However, the senior managers observed that, although the prior operating history of the plant was good and plant maintenance was effective, recent balance of plant problems resulting in plant transients warrant additional licensee management attention.
The senior managers considered the merits for increasing agency attention at Crystal River. The senior managers reviewel the licensee's operational safety performance sin'ce the Juns 1996 SKM, the recent engineering problems', the attributes of declining performance discussed above as well as that evidenced in the recent Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance, and the number and the severity of recent NRC enforcement actions.
The senior managers acknowledged the licensee's recent mana changes, process and personnel improvement initiatives,gement and the recent conservative decision to remain shutdown to address engineering issues. However, the recent decline in the overall safety performance at Crystal River, including the weaknesses in the licensee's design change processes which manifest significant contemporary design flaws, led the senior managers to conclude '
that additional agency attention was warranted. Crystal River 3 was placed on the Watch List as Ca:egory 2 plant.
i COMMONWEALTH EDISON 4
Since the June 1996 Senior Management Meeting (SMM), Commonwealth Edison (Comed, the licensee) has reacted to significant performance problems at almost all of its six nuclear sitos.
4 During this same period, comed has significantly increased its allocation of resources its system-wide (on problems.
performance the order of $200 Million) to address In addition, significant changes were made at the senior management level to provide i
better and more focused oversight and guidance ta the nuclear sites.
In response to the findir.gs of the NRC's Independent Safety Inspection at the Dresden Nuclear Station, and other recent NRC l
Inspections and self-assessments at Lasalle, Zion and Dresden, Comed directed that each sit 6 initiate actions to improve the quality, maintenance and accessibility of design information.
Actions in progress o,r planned include the followings validate the UFSAR information for selected systems against operating and surveillance procedures; establish engineering oversight teams to review operability and to CPR S0.59 safety evaluational review Technical Specification interpretations against corresponding requirements; perform Safety system runctional Inspections on selected safety-related systems; review the in-service testing program against design basis critorial establish an Engineering Assurance Group to provide oversight of key engineering
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CRYSTAL RIVER ARGUMENTS FOR INCREASED AGENCY ATTENTION Decreased Performance Since Last SMM Shutdown Due to Serious Engineering Problems Overall Decrease in Last Two SALPs Seven Severity Level 111 Violations Six ltems under Review for Escalated Enforcement Increased Number of Allegations ARGUMENTS FOR MAINTAINING CURRENT LEVEL OF ATTENTION Extensivo Management Changes Improvements in Engineering Processes Improvements in Technical Competency Licensee Established Startup Review Process NRC Established 0350 Restart Panel Bimonthly Meetings to Monitor Progress Added Third Resident inspector i.
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I I I I I PLANT MANACER O!B[CTOR, NUCL[AR PLANT DIKCTOR NUCL[AR DIKCTOR. taELLas , DIR[CTOR OF OINCTOR, NUCLEAR OIRCTOR IN TRAINING OPERA!!ONS OPCRATIONS TRA]NING R[Cas.ATORT Aff AtR5 . 58t[ 5[Rv!CES (NCIN(( RING AND PROXCTS QUALl!V PROCRAM5 Chip Pardee 4/97 Gruce J. Nickle 10/92 John Lind (Acting) 4/97 Bob Cremie 5/97 Mart Morane 4/97 John Holden 2/97 Jim BaumstarN 6/96 (352) 563-4591 (352) 563-4529 (352) 563-4754 (352) 563-4401 (352) 563 4477 (352) 563-4755 ASSISTARY PLANT OtKCTOR seANAC[R 84ANAC[A l MANAGER MANACER. MUELEAR NuCL[AR SAFETY NUCLEAR LICENSING SECURITY f T[CINf! CAL SUPPORT SAf[fY ASSISMBf ffAM Greg Halmen 3/97 Dave Kuneemitter 5/97 Fred Mercussen 6/97 Jim terry 6/96 Dave Dansets 1/97 (352) 563-4649 (352) 563-4566 (352) 563-4670 (352) 563-4321 (352) 563-4554 A55151 ANT PLANY DlKCTOR MANACTR MANACER, NUCLEAR MANAc[R, NUCLEAR OPERATIONS KCALATORT AS5URANCC [NCIN(( RING 0[11CN QUAllty AS5[5MNT Ron W. Davis 1/96 Monter Pike 5/97 Fran Sutilvan 6/96 Ray vest 10M6 (352) 543-4354 (352) 563-43F4 (352) 563-4789 (352) 563-4750 A5515fANT PLANT DIKCTOR teMeACER 64ANACER, NUCLEAR 4tANACE R MAINTENANCE EERCENCY PKPAKON[55 [NCIN[tRING PROGRAMS QUALliv SYSTEMS Jerry Caechell 1/96 John 5t , 5/92
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%s PLANT ISSUES MATRIX BY DATE CRYSTAL RIVER SFA DATE 'WPE SOURCE ID PRIM SEC l TEM APPARENT CAUSE / COMMENTS 5/22/97 VIO IR 97-07 N M O Inadequate preps for EFW Cav Venturi Hydro - OPS awr;ership/ involvement poor, 494 (DRAFT) venting / monitoring adjacent systems not planned, didnt demand to be involved; test run taggout inadequate; brief for OPS not req. & by MAINT contractor - no FPC Mods inadequate; stopped after NRC questions engineer coordinating; hydro engineer did not coordinate taggout w/ OPS 5/22/97 WEAK IR 97-07 N O O Clearance taggout problem - boundary MOVs for OPS mgmt expectation is hands off red 507 (DRAFT) EFW test leaked, tightened 1/2 turn by operators with tagged valves but not required in red tags still on valves; operators didn't see as a current CP-115 procedure; new rev will problem fix 5/22/97 POS IR 97-07 N E M Motv-driven EFW Pump Cav Venturi Test - 2 briefings held - good preps, r.iplex 506 (DRAFT) com;ieted SAT, some vibration questions remain at test, minor deficiency full flow with 0 backpressure w/ communications planning & valve restoration immediately following test 5/19/97 WEAK IR 97-05 N E SA Proposed corrective actions for PC 97-2360 were 504 (DRAFT) weak in that the corrective actions did not adequately address the apparent cause identified for the PC.
5/19/97 POS IR 97-05 N O SA Licensee self-assessment activities continue to be Self-Assessments uses site CA system 501 (DRAFT) effective. Deficiencies were observed w/ commitment to track finding.
tracking which are being addressed. Licensing org was undergoing several personnel changes intended to result in improved Licensing performance.
5/16/97 LER LER 95-025-02 L E E Personnel errors by architect engineer resu!t in Supplement issued to document new 493 operation outside design basis due to inadequate corrective actions.
safety /non-safety related circuit isolation. Orig. LER event date 11/2/95.
FROM: 1/1/96 TO: 5/29/97 Page 1 of 39 29-May-97 O
e SFA DATE TYPE SOURCE ID PRIM SEc ITEM APPARENT CAUSE / COMMENTS 5/12/97 VIO 1R 97-07 L O O Clearance taggout error - wrong breaker tagged as 1 Inadequate procedure - didn't require 496 (DRAFT) item addenda to existing clearance; transcription error any IV of operator's work /taggout by operator; caught by electrician checking circuit adequacy - allowed to be optional.
dead before working Hanging of tag checked /IV'd by 5 -
people (part of short term CAs for hanging probs) 5/10/97 POS IR 97-07 N O SA Drop in total number of open corrective action system Licensee attempting to deal w/ backlog 495 (DRAFT) items (PCs). First downward trend so far in 1997. and improve closure rate to be above opening rate.
5/4/97 NEG IR 97-05 N O SA Corrective Action program problems continue - Management addressing process 499 (DRAFT) pending rev to CP-111 program proc fixes most. Root problems iteratively and adeqmtely.
cause/CA development timeliness remains a New rev adds EOC reg, mgmt approval challenge. Need an event review process for of extensions, more grading guidance.
immediate problem investigations.
5/4/97 WEAK IR 97-05 N O O Operations ownership and cognizance of plant Examples of poor questioning attitudes 498 (DRAFT) spaces, equipment and processes was poor. and conservative decision making were Numerous examples so considered a weakness. observed by inspectors.
5/4/97 VIO 97-05-03 N E O Violation identified for annunciator response Vitai Battery Inverter annunciators -
500 (DRAFT) procedures that contained incorrect information. setpoint changed by modifcation but not noted in change package so not changed by OPS; criginal setpoint in proc wrong; annunciator meaning not ;
described.
5/1/97 WEAK IR 97-05 N O O Equipment labelling a weakness - significant potential Some equipment unlabelled (bkrs),
497 (DRAFT) for tagging or manipulation of the wrong component. labels often don't match clearance ;
indelible markers used which could potentially bypass tags - no effort to fix ECO database, labelling controls. overreliance on operator experience of components.
5/1/97 POS 1R 97-05 N PS O EP Drills - off-hours emetgency staffing drill of Proactive effort, good coms and 509 (DRAFT) TSC/ EOF done; first of new quarterly drills command / control by OPS on simulator; w/ simulator observed - EP activities performed well, no big-picture plant status board in TSC only minor deficiencies FROM: 1/1/96 TO: 5/29/97 Page 2 of 39 29-May-97
,_ o SFA '.
DATE TYPE SOURCE ID PRIM SEC ITEM l APPARENT CAUSE / COMMENT 4/29/97 VIO EA 97-008 L PS PS Continued failure to protect safeguards information. Actions to consolidate and declassify 476 EA 97-161 Corrective action in response to previous similar taken but slow.
IR 97-03 violations has been inadequate to prevent reoccurrence.
4/25/97 POS 1R 97-05 N O SA Operations issued comprehensive action plan .'o Notable change for licensee to develop 488 (DRAFT) address config/ equip status control problems. Plan - written action plans integrated into CA thorough and valid but not result of root cause system - being driven by new determination which is still being developed (see 3/31 mgmt/NRC.
entry).
4/22/97 LER URI 97-05-02 L E O Licensee determined 50.73 required for MS ADVs inadequate design change. Impacts 484 (DRAFT) LER being inaccessible for manual operation due to high ability to achieve 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> cold 97-010 Int. Bldg. temperature during a LOOP. shutdown for App. R fire also.
4/21/97 NEG IR 97-02 N O SA Self-assessment activities restructured in an attempt Adequate oversight of process but 463 to improve programs. Problems continued to be plant staff doesn't yet fully view CA observed, but were being recognized & addressed by system as a tool to use.
mgmt. CA problems indicate underuse of PC sys &
lack of visibility of signif problems for mgmt review.
4/21/97 STREN IR 97-02 N O O The licensee's restraints and required PRC reviews 462 for normal Mode 5 conditions constituted a good means of oversight for shutdown safety & defense in depth and was considered a licensee strength. 3 4/21/97 NEG IR 97-02 N O SA OPS department was not using the corrective action Reluctance to use formal process and 461 system appropriately as a tool to facilitate their document plans. New Sr. Mgmt. team problem investigations. Thus, senior mgmt. addressing.
involvement / awareness of CAPS was limite.1, &
timeliness of root cause eval. & subsequent dev. of CAs was poor i
FROM: 1/1/96 TO: 5/29/97 Page 3 of 39 29-May-97
SFA DATE TYPE SOURCE ID PRIM SEc ITEM APPARENT CAUSE / COMMENTS 4/21/97 POS IR 97-02 N O SA PRC was providing appropriate oversight and safety Very good management oversight.
464 perspective. Changes to restrict membership, assign a full time chairman & refine expectations were beneficialinitiatives & were indicative of an emphasis on improving nuclear safety performance.
4/21/97 OTHER IFl 97-02-05 L E E OutstarMing issues associated with EDG power Questions on limiting components to 472 uprate modification. take advantage of 150kw upgrade.
4/21/97 POS IR 97-02 N PS PS Security Program Peer Assessment was balanced & Good initiative to call in outside utihty 473 beneficial for licensee security staff in their efforts to help.
igrove performance & regulatory compliance.
4/21/97 . VIO IR 97-02 N E E Add"i examples of VIO 97-31-07 were id'd. Temp See 1/31/97 entry.
470 VIO 97-01-07 ranges assumed in ESCPM used for instrument loop uncertainty setpoint cales weren't maintained in RB &
IB, temp assumptions not translated into instr calib procedures & proceduralized controls lacking.
4/21/97 POS IR 97-02 N E E Progress continued in resolving ITS setpoint program 469 deficiencies. Calculations reviewed were well documented w/well-founded assumptions, & followed ISA methodology.
4/21/97 WEAK IR 97-02 N E SA PR 96-0423 was not revised to address discrepancies Problem in previous CA system.
465 identified with missed identification in MAR packages of needed procedure revisions.
4/21/97 VIO 97-02-03 N E E Inadequate procedures for taking the plant from hot 468 standby to cold shutdown within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> fo!!owing main control room evacuation due to a fire.
FROM: 1/1/96 TO: 5/29/97 Page 4 of 39 29-May-97
i SFA DATE TYPE SOURCE ID PRIM SEc ITEM APPARENT CAUSE I COMMENTS 4/21/97 VIO 97-02-04 L E E Fai!ure to conduct TS-required testing on Engineered GL 96-01 finding by licensee.
471 Safeguards Actuation System instrumentation.
4/21/97 VIO 97-05-01 L O O Several examples of failure to follow CP-115 Tagging Personnel errors & requirements not 489 (DRAFT) procedure: tags IV*d on wrong bkr; tags hung on clearly understood and not reinforced wrong bkr; wiong tags pulled when clearing; maint by mgmt in field - more mgmt field personnel manipulating red tagged equip. observations required by licensee. CP-115 being rewritten.
4/21/9/ WEAK IR 97-02 N E SA Extent of condition was not adequately addressed in Not explicity required in current CA 467 the corrective actions for a CREVS survei!!ance test process - adding in pending revision.
Iailure.
4/21/97 OTHER URI 97-02-02 L E PS Primary and secondary plant water quahty 466 requirements were deleted from FSAR.
4/18/97 POS IR 97-03 N PS PS Continued progression of secdrity upgrade.
475 Completion to be late June 1997. Appropriate compensatory measures were in place.
4/18/97 VIO 1R 97-03, EA L PS PS Loss of control of a security badge & subsequent Licensee's actions upon discovery of 474 97-008, EA 97- failure to immediately report the loss & remove badge the event were timely & appropriate.
161 from the security computer.
4/17/97 VIO eel 97 N E E 3 examples of inadequate safety evaluations for Changes invo!ved USQ and were 478 01 EA 97-162 added operator actions for design basis SBLOCA implemented w/o required prior NRC mitigation. Safety eval for FSAR inadequate. review and approval.
FROM: 1/1/96 TO: 5/29/97 Page 5 of 39 29-May-97
SFA DATE TYPE SOURCE ID PRIM SEc ITEM APPARENT CAUSE / COMMENTS 4/17/97 NCV IR 97-05 S PS E Security CAS lost power repeatedly due to xfer to a Security mgmt didnt prioritize the issue 508 (DRAFT) UPS - security staff not familiar with operation or and obtain adequate resolution from function of the UPS. engineering. so resolution still pending; mgmt unaware of problem scope until questioned by NRC.
4/13/97 WEAK IR 97-05 N O SA Short term investigation for tagging problem inadequate guidance for immediate ,
490 (DRAFT) inadequate - no plan, personnel statements not fully response to events - not integrated in obtained, notes not taken on interviews, timeline not CA system. Need event review considered. procedure - under development by licensee.
4/11/97 VIO eel 97 N O O Failure to hand carry a suspected reportable issue to Weak link in process - relies on 481 02 EA 97-094 the Shift Manager for a reportability review as individual to recognize suspected required by licensee's procedures. reportable problem.
4/11/97 VIO eel 97-04-01 N O O Failure to make an emergency phone report within Report delayed to assemble 480 EA 97-094 time requirements (one hour) of 10 CFR 73.71, for paperwork - requirement to start clock waterbox breach (see 1/30/97 entry). at time of recognition not understood.
4/11/97 WEAK IR 97-04 N O O Emergency Action Level classification was not made Shift Supervisor did not pursue 479 in timely manner following a transformer explosion at information to conclusively determine an adjacent fossil power plant (12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> later). EAL 4/8/97 NEG IR 97-05 N O SA Corrective action program timeliness poor- some Large volume in CA system; extensions 487 (DRAFT) level B precursor reports getting CARB mgmt review allowed by ind. doing investigation, not over 2 months after problems identified. mgmt; lack of visibility. + Note: CARB reviews are improved; detailed scrutiny.
- 4/7/97 LER LER 97-008-00 L E E Discovery of original design configuration resulting in Recirc to MUT with outlet va!ves closed 458 unanalyzed condition regarding HPl pump causes relief to lift.
recirculation leading to possible pump failure and dose consequences.
FROM: 1/1/96 TO: 5/29/97 Page 6 of 39 29-May-97
?
SFA DATE TYPE SOURCE ID PRIM SEc ITEM APPARENT CAUSE / COMMENTS 4/4/97 NEG IR 97-05 N O SA FPC " NOTES" tracking system for commitments is Observation from several inspections.
486 (DRAFT) poor. Numerous missing items from circa 1995 when One possible reason for previous data not entered; format and sorting is poor for licensee problems with commitment managing required actions. mgmt.
3/31/97 POS IR 97-05 N E SA New 50.59 process implemented. Comprehensive Noted problems minor- mostly in areas 452 (DRAFT) program review done using NRC IP 37001 by outside of info avaitability (SERs) for reviewers auditor for licensee QA. Generally + comments, and flow of analyses to Licensing to some weaknesses and enhancements noted. ensure accurate NRC submittal.
3/31/97 VIO 97-02-01 L O M Equip Status Control- numerous and ongoing Cause evals/ corrective actions slow to 451 examples (see 2/27 entry) indicating pervasive develop. Poor issue visibility - being problems. Root causes such as inadequate treated as singie CONFIG MGMT procedures causing FTFP, tax control by minor mnt CONTROL problem but no crew & clearance tag process being identified. comprehensive CAP. GOOD obs. re 01-12 investigations done immediately 3/26/97 LER LER 94-06-06 L E O Rev 6 to LER, FPC found new setpoint control Instrument error not accounted for MCB 455 (EA 95-16/ eel example w5ile implementing corrective action. ind. of RCS flow - was used for TS SR 95-02-04) Setpoint Action Plan analyses done, proc changes 3.4.1.3 shiftly verification. Now using stillin process. plant computer.
3/24/97 NCV 97-01-10 L E E Inadequate design control, non-safety related The licensee has taken the necessary '
453 components in safety related applications - two immediate corrective actions and has examples: thyrite surge protection device, operator added final resolution of these issues to and controller for MUV-103. the restart restraint list.
3/24/97 POS IR 97-01 N E E GL 96-0S Cnmt. Penetration MAR, inci 50.59 eva!.. New licensee processes more thorough 450 design and installation of the expansion chambers and rigorous.
was detailed and well documented, demonstrating good Engineering performance.
3/19/97 LER LER 97-009-00 L E E Inadequate design resulted in reactor coolant pump New leakage sites found on all 4 460 lubricating oil collection system being outside rqmts of pumps plus sites on B,C and D pumps 10 CFR 50 App R. Supplement expected by 6/27/97. coverd in exemption given to A RCP only.
FROM: 1/1/96 TO: 5/29/97 Page 7 of 39 29-May-97
?
SFA DATE TYPE SOURCE ID PRIM SEc ITEM APPARENT CAUSE / COMMENTS 3/18/97 VIO 96-09-05 N E O FPC accepted VIO after their denial denied on MUV- MUV-64 determined not needed in any 454 64 valve control Valve changed from failed open DB scenario after MAR issued - didnt AOV to locked open chain-op. manual valve w/o update design inputs to MAR or EDBD.
procedure changes.
3/17/97 POS IR 97-05 S O SA As part of an internal Licensing and Regulatory Numerous potentialimprovements 485 (DRAFT) Performance Self-Assessment, FPC did identified but plan to implement benchmarking trips to 2 other plants. The report was changes not developed - Licensing reviewed by an inspector. undergoing many personnel changes so in flux, Irttle continuity.
3/12/97 VIO EA 96-365 N E E NOVs issued for 96-19 Eels: A) Six 50.59 examples Enforcement discretion exercised due 456 96-465 96- aggregated as SL ll B) 5 examples of inadequate to CAL and forced outage, so no CP 527 design control- SL 111. C) 3 examples of poor assessed. Cited poor FPC Corrective Actions - SL 111. performance as evidence of systemic engineering breakdown.
3/6/97 LER LER 97-007-00 L E E Building temperature variations larger than assumed 459 resulting in unknown instrument uncertainties.
3/4/97 OTHER Conf. Action N E O CAL issued by Ril citing Enf. Conference for IR 96-19 1) Resolve 8 deficiencies in 10/28/96 440 Letter Engineering issues, and 2/12/97 Restart Panel FPC letter. 2) Conduct EOC system meeting. Five actions required prior to restart. readiness reviews. 3) Resolve issues from #2. 4) Meet with NRC to assess MCAP 11 progress. 5) Get approval from Ril RA.
2/28/97 LER LER 96-005-02 L E E Inadequate failure modes review creates possibility of 457 cooling water flow outside design limits. LER 96-005-00 issued 02/28/96; 96-005-01 issued 05/01/96.
2/28/97 VIO 1R 96-18 N PS PS $50,000 civil penalty issued for multiple security Numerous SL IVs aggregated to SL 111 441 EA 97-012 violations in IR 96-18. Letter cited lack of due to collective weakening of abildy to management attention and lack of regulatory respond to a security threat.
understanding. (see entry 390 -1/31/97)
FROM: 1/1/96 TO: 5/29/97 Page 8 of 39 29-May-97
_ . _ _ _ _ . _ . - _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ .--m _m _..___ m
SFA DATE TYPE SOURCE ID PRIM SEc ITEM APPARENT CAUSE / COMMENTS 2/27/97 WEAK 1R 97-01 N M O !nappropriate Mode 5 work scheduled and sent to Lack of OPS knowledge in 432 control room. Unexpected testing alarm received in planning / scheduling. Work package control room. didn't flag alarm would occur - relying on technician and OPS Work Control Supervisor review each time - no effort to fix these problems back into WPs.
2/27/97 VIO 97-01-04 N M E SFP level transmitters not calibrated since '87 & '92, Cats deferred due to open REA on 430 LER 97-002 required on 2 year cycle; VIO against failure to meet d:fficulty to cal w/in tolerances. EOC TS SR for level verification. Licensee did not investigation revealed large recognize TS SR implications until NRC questioned. unprioritized PM/ instrument cal program backlog.
2/27/97 NEG IR 97-01 L O SA Corrective Action Program-still has numerous Problems: initial event CA not covered 429 deficiencies and poorly defined expectations. under PC scope; no EOC However, new NSAT manager recognizes the requirements; role of CARB not problems and is proactively working on defined; no standard formats; granting fixes, of extensions and MANAGEMENT VISIBILITY of timeliness 2/27/97 VIO 97-01-02 s O O Inadvertent EDG start - operator failure to follow Operator removed from shift duties -
426 procedure caused start. Time pressure - 20 min to Operations management had identified complete, operator distracted tJntil min 19 and rushing previous performance concerns with him.
2/27/97 NEG 1R 97-01 L E O EDG potentially exceeded load limits during testing - Inop since last test in RF10. 50 kw 434 LER 97-006 Dranetz test inst accuracy not considered on max accuracy band used in RF10 pre test load test so EDGs potentially did not meet min SR briefs BUT not inc. in proc. FPC found, load regs and exceeded 30 minute CA timely & thorough. Considering ex rating. of problem found as CA for prev eel.
2/27/97 NCV 97-01-05 L M E Chlorine Monitor Problems -inadequate test Good proactive effort by licensee to 433 procedure would not identify response time troubleshoot detectors and find deficiencies. problem. Procuring new detector design.
2/27/97 POS IR 97-01 L O E Venting problems due to unventable portion of DH Effort to resolve procedurally via new 427 PIiP ng. P Jrsued by operators remembering previous vent paths unsuccessful, resuit will be pressurizei level perturbations on DH system new DH high point vent added, made a restoration. restart item.
FROM: 1/1/96 TO: 5/29/97 Page. 9 of 39 29-May-97
/
SFA DATE TYPE SOURCE ID PRIM SEc ITEM APPARENT CAUSE / COMMENTS 2/27/97 OTHER URI 97-01-06 N E E URl: Regarding concerns with the design inspector noted that the licensee's 438 assumptions, licensing basis and Tech Specs for the recently completed extent of condition HPl system. 7 operator actions added since 1996, review (time line) for the makeup /HPI licensing basis has only 1. system design did not identify any of
+
these concerns. Needs further review 2/27/97 OTHER URI 97-01-08 N E E URI: Regarding the adequacy of procedures to take Need further staff review of NRR past 439 the plant from hot standby to cold shutdown from acceptance of hot standby or co'd outside the control room in the event of a fire. shutdown endpoint.
2/27/97 POS 1R 97-01 N O O A thorough Management Assessment Program of Example of new licensee initiatives to 482 Operations was implemented. Emphasized crew improve management oversight and ownership by each Shift Supervisor and routine line OPS performance.
mgmt observations of OPS crews.
2/27/97 OTHER 1R 97-01 N O O Several examples of good question attitudes seen - Poor exampies also continue so 493 drain valve work from RCS loop questioned by OPS aggregate is not a positive comment; since normal M/U path not in service; fuse fire pump flow changed w/o procedure, replacement stopped to resolve concerns, etc. late 50.72 reports, etc.
2/21/97 VIO IR 96-10 S O SA 01 findings on fuel moved on t'op of other assy. found 1) Inadequate supervision. 2) Old 423 Ol 2-96-033 no wrongdoing. Two VIOs: 1) Failure to follow corrective action system ineffective -
procedure w/4 examples 2) Inadequata corrective new program implemented 11/96. 3) action - PC in spring of '95 not upgraded to PR, and Procedure clarity - should used vs.
closed wie fully addressing root causes. shall for management expectations.
2/14/97 LER LER 97-005 L E E Unanalyzed condition regarding small break LOCA Certain SBLOCAs require EFW even if 443 mitigation. EFW system required but potentia!!y 2 HPI pumps available - EFW unavailable in some scenarios due to EDG loading. availability not ensured.
2/10/97 POS 1R 97-01 N E E System Readiness Review Process underway. Plan presented to NRC 2/12/97. FPC 421 Support engineers from MPR and Framatome onsite aggressively pursuing getting process training on process with FPC engineers. Reviews to started to progress towards restart.
commence later in week as part of Restart EOC verification.
FROM: 1/1/96 TO: 5/29/97 Page 10 of 39 29-May-97
1 SFA DATE TYPE SOURCE ID PRIM SEc ITEM APPARENT CAUSE / COMMENTS 2/7/97 VIO eel 97-04-03 N O E EFW/NPSH outside design basis issue not reported Deficiencies in internal process for 417 EA 97-094 to NRC and 4 additional examples of late NRC reportability evaluations & unfamiliarity classifications & reports indicate inadequate with requirements by plant populace corrective action for previous VIOs. result in late evaluations. Process not always followed. 3 of 4 examples NRC identified.
2/7/97 NEG IR 97-01 N O O Operations log rqmts (01-5) ur clear, expectations not No guidance on expectations of SSOD 415 emphasized by mgmt. SSOD Log content varies with vs. SM logs. Several examples of individual, several practices used not delineated in OI- significant items not logged. Procedure 5 such as time of event vs log entry, shift reliefs not not reflective of actual practices. Some logged. good innovations noted but not proceduralized.
2/7/97 LER LER 97-004 L E E Thermal relief valves inside the containment do not GL 96-06 finding.
444 meet the requirements for design basis accidents.
2!6/97 VIO 97-01-01 L O M Clearance hold order integrity violated - l&C tech Proc (CP-115) doesn't req local tagging 419 aHowed to work on solenoid in air to AOV that was red of valves-l&C tech unaware he was tagged, resulting in valve opening. Procedure vio'd in working on red tagged valve. Got OPS that valve which fails open on loss of air used as permission based on that assumption.
boundary w/o gagging shut. FPC held OPS /MAINT standown &
verified all clearances for adequacy.
2/5/97 VIO 96-20-01 L O O Cooldown rate not adjusted at 150 degree transition Operators used DH cooler inlet vs. ,
401 UR 95-21-04 point so limit on rate exceeded below 150 degrees for outlet temperature as intended by the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. TS 3.4.3 VIO occurred 1/11/96. procedure to determine transition point. Procedures were unclear -inlet temp. used for many other functions.
2/5/97 VIO VIO 96-20-02, N M SA Maintenance procedure did not receive complete Unclear requirements for technical 402 IR 96-20 interdiscipline review-I&C not included. Work reviews. PC written on deficiencies not stopped by SSOD due to poor procedure (no sign-offs resolved before procedure or place keeping aids; insufficient instruction). implementation attempted 2/1/97 WEAK IR 97-01 N M O Scheduling weakness for missed post maint tests on Lack of coordination was identified as a 431 EDG-1A/ train outage. No mechanism to ensure that key contributor.
PMTs not completed were rescheduled for the subsequent week.
FROM: 1/1/96 TO: 5/29/97 Page 11 of 39 29-May-97
SFA DATE TYPE SOURCE ID PRIM SEc ITEM APPARENT CAUSE / COMMENTS 1/31/97 OTHER URI 96-18-06 N PS PS Security plan change per 50.54(p) decreased the Pending further NRC review of the 414 effectiveness of the plan without requesting a license regulatory process. No formallicensee amendement per 50.90. process to ensure plan changes do not reduce effectiveness.
1/31/97 OTHER IR 96-18 N PS PS Security Team assessment report issued w/6 Failure to effectively manage security 390 EA 97-012 apparent eel Vios: lack of procedures, failure to organization and security upgrade respond to alarms, inadequate equipment, inadequate project; lack of sensitivity and PA barriers, unsecured weapons repository, failure to understanding of regulations. Almost all control plan changes. Enf Conf held 2/14/97. NRC ID'd indicating programmatic deficiencies.
1/31/97 LER LER 97-003 L E E Personnel error causes testing deficiencies resulting Supplement to report related logic 449 in condition prohibited by TS - GL 96-01 review system testing deficiencies expected by finding on EDG SLUR /FLUR relay visual check. 6/30/97.
1/31/97 VIO 97-01-07 N E E Inadequate design control- assumptions for Aux Bldg No procedures for ensuring the Aux 436 temps used in instrument setpoint cales were not Bldg temps would be maintained within translated into cal procedures, EDBD, or FSAR. the ranges assumed by instrument setpoint cales, no records / logs of daily temps.
1/31/97 VIO 97-01-09 N E SA inadequate corrective action in that corrective actions Nonconservative assumptions used; 437 for cable ampacity concerns identified in 1992 and corrective actions never implemented.
1993 were not accomplished.
1/31/97 OTHER IFl 96-18-08 N PS SA IFl opened to assess licensee's corrective actions for Further examples of inadequate self-483 secunty internal audit findings. Numerous problems assessment ability, lack of knowledge with 50.54p changes not caught in previous audits. of regulatory requirements.
1/30/97 NEG 97-01 L PS M Security protected area breach found on condenser Found by alert secunty guard - breach i 435 LER 97-S01 waterbox work. pathway not in recognized list.
FROM: 1/1/96 TO: 5/29/97 Page 12 of 39 29-May-97
t SFA DATE TYPE SOURCE ID PRIM SEC ITEM APPARENT CAUSE / COMMENTS 1/29/97 OTHER January '97 N E O CR placed on NRC Watch List-Category 2: Plants Also noted that MCAP contained 422 SMM authorized to operate that will be closely monitored by thorough corrective actions but the NRC. Letter cited overall performance decline as successful implementation will require seen in SALP, particularly in Engineering as extensive attention.
evidenced by unrecognized USQs.
1/28/97 NEG 1R 97-01 S O M Mispositioned valves - 4 examples in 1 week. Root cause being finalized at end of IR 428 Equipment afteration control forms not retained - no period. Problems indicative of potential record of vane manipulation. (See 4/21/97 VIO 97 deficiencies in overall process for
- 01) configuration and status control of plant equipment.
1/28/97 LER LER 97-001 L E E Ineffective change management results in 492 unrecognized NPSH issue affecting Emergency Feedwater availability.
1/17/97 NCV 97-01-03 L O E All fire pumps rendered inoperable during freeze prot. Combination of compensating for poor 425 recirc of tanks - recirc flow changed > limit, not design and requirements not translated recognized since limit not in FP plan or procedure into procedures. Found by shift l supervisc' exhibiting a questioning '
attitude. t 1/8/97 OTHER IR 96-19, EA N E E Eight apparent violations. Combining with three Enforcement conference held 1/24/97.
405 96-365,465 apparent violations in IR 96-12 indicates broad See March 12,1997 fetter entry - 3 i and 527 spectrum of Engineering problems: 50.59 evals, VIO's cited: (1) Severity 11 and (2) design control, corrective action implementation. Severity ill.
procedures.
1/7/97 VIO eel 96-19-02 N M E Inadequate corrective actions for Deficient Cnmt Pen. Inadequate extent of condition '
394 Surveillances. 3 previous LERs and 1 VIO on similar assessment -licensee focused on enmt. pen problems. Licensee corrective action did problem at hand.
not include review of procedures to determine problem scope.
FROM: 1/1/96 TO: 5/29/97 Page 13 of 39 29-May-97
A SFA DATE TYPE SOURCE ID PRIM SEC ITEM APPARENT CAUSE / COMMENTS 1/7/97 VIO eel 96-19-03 L E E Inadeq 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Eval for a mod involving inadequate 50.69 reviews - narrow 395 URI 96-12-01 potential USQ affecting EFW NPSH. Prev mods in scope. Cavitating venturis will be 1987 & 92 to resolve NPSH concerns did not consider installed to fix.
hydraulic effects of moving ASV-204 actuation logic to A train.1996 mod to fix raised EDG toad prob 1/7/97 VIO eel 96-19-01 L M E Three inadequate surveillance procedures failed to 31-day verifications not done.
393 LER 96-18 implement TS requirements on numerous identified by new system engineer.
penetrations. Problems in both outside enmt procedure (SP-341) and inside procedure (SP-324)- 18 and 9 pens.
out of 99. Also SP-346 for core alts.
1/7/97 VIO EE! 96-19-08 N E O Error in design calculations for SW system heat Poor control and review of design 400 URI 96-201-05 loads. Total heat load used assumed max fouling of calculations. IPAP issue.
HXs - conservative for RB analysis but not SW load analysis. Resulted in OP curve error.
1/7/97 VIO eel 96-19-07 N E E Inadequate 50.59 eval for post-LOCA boron Failed to identify USQ - reluctance to 399 URI 96-04-01 precipitation control. 50.59 eval to change FSAR and have 50.59s result in USQs.
EDBD to use the gap method as the first and inadequate 50.59 evals. Generic boron preferred method of LOCA boron precipitation control precipitation issue being resolved b/w did not identify USO. B&W owners group and NRR.
1/7/97 VIO eel 96-19-06 N E E Inadequate 50.59 safety eval for a mod involving a Failed to identify USQ - reluctance to 398 Potential USQ due to disabling EFP-2 under certain have 50.59's result in USQs.
credible accident scenarios. Did not consider that 96 Inadequate depth of review for complex mod removing ASV-204 auto-open increased mod.
probability of failure of EFP-2.
1/7/97 VIO eel 96-19-05 L E E Fai!ure to include applicable design info in the design inadequate review for complex 397 input regs for a mod. Design info (EFP-2 continuing modifications, poor control of design to operate after EFP-1 automatically tnpped; hydraulic basis.
rqmts; SBO & GL89-10 analysis) for MAR 96-04 01 (ASV-204 auto disable) not considered.
f FROM.1/ i/96 TO: 5/29/97 Page 14 of 39 29-May-97
SFA DATE TYPE SOURCE ID PRIM SEc ITEM APPARENT CAUSE / COMMENTS 1/7/97 VIO EE! 96-19-04 L E E Failure to update applicable design does to Poor control of design basis documents.
396 incorporate design info. Assumption that EFP-2 operating not incorporated in FSAR, TS or EDBD for mod which tripped EFP-1 @ 500 psig in RCS. EDBD not updated at all for mod.
12/23/96 POS IR 96-17 N E E 8 Design issues - Prelim. Review - No modifications Prelim design approaches appear 380 r test activities completed - all in various stages of adequate. DRB pkgs detailed & good design or testing. mix of personnel on DRBs. Prelim 50.59 safety eval more complete &
stand alone than most previous ones.
12/23/96 POS IR 96-17 N M O Communications between maintenance technicians Licensee has ongoing effort to improve 388 and operations personnel were good, berng concise this area.
and conveying accurate information.
12/23/96 POS 1R 96-17 N E E Licensee planned to perform several extent of Timelines for: EFW, EDG, RB Spray, 382 condition reviews for engineering design issues. DH, MU. FMEA on Loss DC Power.
None of the reviews have been completed, and all Review 20 modification 50.59s.
were in a conceptual, planning or partially completed cond! tion. I 12/23/96 POS IR 96-17 N E E Draft of the new Conduct of Engineering admin. Most oversight org. were working to 333 procedure documented expectations / goals for dept.; expectation documents issued by almost issue ready. Oversight groups were allin interoffice corres. Implementing some state of change to improve mgmt oversight. procedures not yet issued.
12/23/96 OTHER URI 96-17-03, L E E Failure to conduct required Technical Specification URI opened untillicensee's GL 96-01 384 LER 96-25, surveillance testing on safety related circuitry (GL 96- review complete.
LER 96-11 01). Load sequence /shed relays and 12 ESAS RCS Low and Low-Low P contacts.
12/23/96 WEAK IR 96-17 N E SA Lack of procedural controls for Design Review Board Lack of strkt adherence to interim DRB 385 pr cess and lack of adherence to DRB Expectations expectations because not a procedure.
interoffice correspondence. Final procedure in development.
FROM: 1/1/96 TO: 5/29/97 Page 15 of 39 29-May-97
4.
SFA DATE TYPE SOURCE ID PRIM SEc ITEM APPARENT CAUSE / COMMENTS 12/23/96 OTHER IFl 96-17-04 L PS PS Opened pending the completion of an independent Expected completion of review - early review f the adequacy of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Fire February '97. Several problems found 386 Study and Documentation. so far.
12/23/96 OTHER IFl 96-17-02 L E O Potential overflow of the make-up tank to the auxiliary HPI pump recirc directed to MUT.
3gg building while the High Pressure injection / Low Pressure injection piggyback lineup is in the recirculation mode.
12/23/96 NCV 96-17-01 L o O Inadvertent / unrecognized entry into TS 3.3.1 Insufficient information in equipment 378 Condition A RPS Instrumentation; CROs energized in OOS log to identify the impact of M5 w/o all RPS instruments 1/S. changing conditions on TS LCOs. No requirement to maintain the log below Mode 4.
12/23/96 WEAK IR 96-17 N O O Weaknesses identified in shift briefing and pre-job Poor OPS internal communications.
387 briefing practices and communication of overtime scheduling.
12/2196 POS IR 96-14 N PS PS Overall, the licensee's performance during the 373 exercise was adequate and successfully demonstrated the ability to respond effectively to the simulated accident conditions.
12/2/96 POS IR 96-14 N PS PS The Emergency Operations Facility Director was 376 effective in coordinating licensee activities related to the emergency and providing information to Federal, State and local authorities responding to the radiological emergency and to the public.
12/2396 POS 1R 96-14 N PS PS Offsite notifications of emergency conditions were 375 prompt and accurate.
FROM: 1/1/96 TO: 5/29/97 Page 16 of 39 29-May-97
SFA DATE TYPE SOURCE ID PRIM SEC ITEM APPARENT CAUSE / COMMENTS 12/2/96 WEAK IR 96-14. N PS PS Accident assessment and the development of sound 377 mitigation strategies outside the control room was not strong!y demonstrated by the accident assessment teams in the Technical Support Center or Emergency Operations Facility.
12/2/96 STREN IR 96-14 N PS PS The dose assessment staffs performance in the 374 Technical Support Center was very good.
11/27/96 VIO 96-15-02 N PS PS Failure of the reactor coolant pump motor oil Inadequately tightened gasket seal.
369 collection system to retain oilleaking from reactor Ongoing problem (see NCV 96-04-05).
coolant pump motor D.
11/27/96 VIO 96-15-01 N M M Failure to perform a required TS surveillance test for Pump run changed from monthly to 362 the Remote Shutdown System. Monthly channel quarterly w/o recognizing was being check of EFP-1 discharge pressure gage req. by SR used to meet SR 3.3.18.1.
3.3.18.1 not in survei!!ance.
11/27/96 POS IR 96-16 N PS PS The vehic!e barrier system was an acceptable barrier 370 capable of stopping a vehicle prior to the vehicle penetrating the protected area perimeter and causing damage to vital equipment.
11/27/96 STREN IR 96-15 N O O The development and administration of the simulator 361 Portion of the operating test was considered a strength of the Operator's Requalification Program.
11/27/96 POS 1R 96-15 N PS PS Positive action was demonstrated in resolution of 368 Thermo-Lag issue. Install of Mecatiss fire barriers was of high quality. Continuous FPC oversight ensured the installation met design requirements.
FROM: 1/1/96 TO: 5/29/97 Page 17 of 39 29-May-97
SFA DATE TYPE SOURCE ID PRIM SEc ITEM APPARENT CAUSE / COMMENTS 11/27/96 OTHER IFl 96-15-03 L E E Opened to track the plant specific corrective actions B&W OG Prelim. Safety Concern 1-95.
367 for post-accident recnticality concerns due to FPC working with them to resolve with localized boron dilution. NRR.
11/27/96 WEAK IR 96-15 N M E The work planning and scheduling department's System engineer unaware that switch 366 decision to delay repairs to an EDG jacket coolant not worked since last test - had temperature switch, DJ-8-TS, is identified as a prioritized. Repair deferred to EDG weakness. No problems were identified during the outage but didn't require EDG OOS.
performance of the surveillance test.
11/27/96 POS 1R 96-16 N PS PG Based on the inspector's review of the VBS 372 procedures and in discussion with the licensee, the inspector concluded that ti,e plans and procedures were acceptable for implementing the Vehicle Barrier System.
11/27/96 NCV 96-15-04 L O E EFIC compensator modules hang up at 130 in Due to variation in demand vottage on 360 switchover point from low to high range instrument change. Thorough and instrumentation. Potential for level control valves to prompt licensee response. Another close in auto, operators must control manually. example of failure to translate design requirements to the field.
11/27/96 NEG IR 96-15 S M M Licensee has experienced several unplanned power A review of monthly operating data and 363 reductions due to poor reliability of BOP equipment. weekly thermal performance data Some problems result of equipment design, others revealed poor BOP reliability and poor associated with circulating water debris filters caused maintenance practices.
by previous maintenance practices.
11/4/96 WEAK IR 96-12 N E E An engineering self assessment dated 4/9/96 was sufficiently highlighted, clear, or 359 ineffectue. No corrective actions or improvements as conclusive to support prompt of 10/11/96. Managers had not responded to self responsive actions. Licensee had assessment report. Report failed to reach appropriate provided no guidance or training in conclusions, and findings of report were not conducting self assessments.
11/4/96 VIO EEi 96-12-04 N E E An engineering procedure improperly allowed the 358 general use of unverified electrical system calculations, hydraulic system calculations, and station blackout calculations to support the design, instaflation and use of plant modifications.
FROM: 1/1/96 TO: 5/29/97 Page 18 of 39 29-May-97
SFA DATE TYPE SOURCE ID PRIM SEc ITEM APPARENT CAUSE / COMMENTS 11/4/96 VIO eel 96-12-03 N E E Two examples where corrective actions were 357 inadequate both prior to, and enar, the plant modification in April 1996 that inappropriately introduced Unreviewed Safety Questions related to EDG loading.
11/4/96 OTHER URI 96-12-01 N E E A postulated event concurreat with a single 355 equipment failure could result in a low net positive suction head (NPSH) for both EFW pumps.
11/4/96 VIO eel 96-12-02 N E E Three examples were identified where 10 CFR 50.59 356 safety evaluations for one plant modification and two operating procedure changes failed to identify the intro of Unreviewed Safety Questions related to increased EDG loading.
10/30/96 POS IR 96-11 N DS PS Licensee efforts to reduce the quantity of radioactive 347 solid waste being generated were proactive.
10/30/96 VIO 96-11-01 L C, O Inadequate work instructions to prevent the Did not require fuel racks be racked out 341 inadvertent start of the A emergency diesel prior to returning to service, resulting in generator. The work instructions prevented the an inadvertent EDG start.
racking out of the EDG fuel racks due to work being performed.
10/30/96 NCV 96-11-06 L PS PS Failure to follow sampling requirements of the Offsite 351 Dose Calculation Manual.
10/30/96 WEAK IR 96-11 N PS PS t;nderstanding of corrective action concepts from 350 ' Chemistry, Radiation Protection , Environmental Monitoring & Waste Audits" was a staff weakness.
FROM: 1/1/96 TO: 5/29/97 Page 19 of 39 29-May-97
SFA DATE TYPE SOURCE ID PRIM Si"C ITEM APPARENT CAUSE / COMMENTS 10/30/96 POS IR 96-11 N PS PS Implementation of the new Chemistry Quality Contini 348 Manual was a good program improvement.
10/30/96 NCV 96-11-05 L PS PS Failure to conduct an adequate radiation survey.
346 10/30/96 WEAK IR 96-11 N M M Lack of coordination of the inspection effort forit'e 345 reactor building sump screens.
10/30/96 VIO 96-11-04 L M M Reactor building sump not being constructed in Welds were missing from sump screen 344 accordance with approved construction drawings. supports.
10/30/96 VIO 96-11-03 N M M Personnel performed work on the reactor building 343 sump without logging onto a clearance, as required by the approved Work Request.
10/30/96 NOV 96-11-02 L O O Failure to meet TS 5.2.2.e requirements for 342 scheduling of work in excess of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> in a seven day period. Operator worked greater than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> ir' a seven day period without DNPO approva'.
10/30/96 WEAK 1R 96-11 N PS PS Documentation of corrective actions for controls 349 outside limits appeared to be a weakness in the laboratory Quahty Control Program.
10/28/96 WEAK 1R 96-13 N M M The practice of transporting small nafety-related 352 components, without any identification or protection, as was done with the strainer screea, is considered a poor work practice.
FFOM: 1/1/96 TO: 5/29/97 Page 20 of 39 29-May-97
2 SFA DATE TYPE SOURCE ID PRIM SEc ITEM APPARENT CAUSE / COMMENTS 10/28/96 POS IR 96-13 N O O The inspectors concluded that site management 353 appropriateiy pursued identification of the cause for the penny in thc. ube oil strainer.
10/28/96 POS IR 96-13 N PS PS The licensee appropriately identified actions to be 354 taken to enhance detection of additional tampering.
10/11/96 LER LER 96-024 L E E Plant modification creates unanalyzed condition 445 LER 96-024-01 regarding EFW availability.
10!4/96 VIO 96-09-02 N PS PS Unescorted visitor personnel within the protected Failure to follow security procedure.
321 area. RI found visitor in the TSC separated frora his escort.
10/4/96 VIO 96-09-07 N E E Untimely corrective actions for the EFIC (Emergency See URI 96-04-06. Also, operators had 335 Feedwater Initiation and Control) system concerns rec'd simulator training on Rule 3 of and problems. Modifications deferred because of EOP-13, which provided guidance for time & engineering manpower restraints due to other taking manual control of the EFW flow overriding priorities per FPC controlvalves. No deficiencies related to operator performance were identified.
10/4/96 VIO 96-09-06 N E E Three examples of design control errors. The errors See URI 96-03-07 334 included incorrect design inputs for battery charger and 4160/480 volt transformer modifications, & failure to update drawing & ISI program following a modification 12 years ago.
10/4/96 VIO 96-09-05 N E E Failure to incorporate design info into operations See URI 96-04-09.
330 procederes. MUV-64 valve was changed from air operated to manual gear driven, chain operated, w/o procedure change to reflect intended use and operation of valve.
FROM: 1/1/96 TO: 5/29/97 Page 21 of 39 29-May-97
.a SFA DATE TYPE SOURCE ID PR!M SEC ITEM APPARENT CAUSE / COMMENTS 10/4/96 VIO 96-09-04 N E E Failure to update operating curves to reflect 1981 See URI 96-03-09.
329 power uprate. In 1981, reactor power was increased from 2472 to 2544 MWth. OP-103A, startup curves, was not updated to reflect power increase until July 21,1995.
10/4/96 VIO 96-09-03 N PS PS Failure to perform 10 CFR 50 59 safety evaluation for Hydrogen concentration changed from 328 changes to procedures described in the FSAR for 15-40 cc/kg to 25-50 cc/kg without a controlling dissolved hydrogen concentration. wntten safety evaluation. See URI 96-04-07.
10/4/96 VIO 96-09-01 L M M Failure to follow a procedure resulting in the A technician turned a switch to the 320 inadvertent initiation of the control room emergency wrong position during a surveillance.
ventilation system.
9/17/96 NEG NRR N E E Inaccurate licensing submittal- On 10/7/94 the NRC was no installed forced air ventilation in 319 granted an exemption item certain Appendix R reqts that area. On 5/8/96 the licensee relating to the RCP oil collection system. This notified the NRC their previous exemption was based on licensee letter dtd 3/24/94 information was in error and there is (responding to a staff questiori) stating that there forced air ventilation.
9/17/96 NEG NRR N E E Inaccurate information- By !tr dtd 9/19/95, licensee implemented within the required date.
322 submitted four year simulator certification report. By ltr dtd 4/30/96 Iicensee stated that previous submittal was inaccurete in that 16 plant modifications were either not implemented or not 9/12/96 WEAK 96-08 L E O Incomplete corrective actions were closed out as The Make-up system audrt corrective 289 complete in Problem Report tracking system. actions were closed and noted as complete; however, the licensee identified they were not all complete.
9/12/96 VIO 96-08-01 N E O Failure to take timely corrective actions for 1) make-290 up system audit findings and 2) excessive vibration on a spent fuel pump cooling fan motor -(two examples)
FROM: 1/1/96 TO: 5/29/97 Page 22 of 39 29-May-97
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J SFA DATE TYPE SOURCE ID PRIM SEc ITEM APPARENT CAUSE / COMMENTS m -
9/12/96 NEG 96-08 N O O Operations Self Assessment appeared to be of 294 insufficent depth. No findings identified, although recent NRC inspections identified problem areas.
9/12/96 WEAK 96-08 N PS PS Management had to escalate severalidentified Corrective action procedure should be 298 weaknesses to Problem Report status from Quality clear & concise so that the proper Assurance audit assessment of fire protection and document is initiated.
emergency planning.
9/12/96 OTHER IFl 96-08-02 N M M Followup to ensure permanent fix for thermal relief 295 protection for reactor building cavity cooiing piping.
Interim thermal tr'.ef protection was found adequate.
9/12/96 VEAK 96-08 N M M A weakness was identified in maintenance personnel Maintenance technician was unclear in 291 communications with operators during the conduct of his communication.
a surveillance.
9/12/96 NEG 96-08 N O O Concern regarding an operatirig crew that did not Operators shut down per normal 293 implement valid Abnorma! Procedure after a main procedures, which took longer.
condenser tube rupture event and a plant transient, because they were not comfortable with it.
9/4/96 VIO 96-07-01 L PS PS Failure to protect Safeguards Information. (This is a 325 REPEAT violation) 9/4/96 VIO 96-07-02 N PS PS Failure to complete screening elements for Fitness 326 For Duty personnel .
9/4/96 OTHER URI 96-07-03 L PS PS Falsification of information by contractors 327 FROM: 1/1/96 TO: 5/29/97 Page 23 of 39 29-May-97
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SFA DATE TYPE SOURCE ID PRIM SEC ITEM APPARENT CAUSE1 COMMENTS 8/29/96 OTHER eel 96-10-01 N O O Four exampies for failure to follow Refueling A fuel assembly was piaced on top of 323 Procedure FP-203. . another fuel assembly during reload of the reactor vessel.
8/29/96 OTHER eel 96-10-02 N O O Failure to assure that the root cause analysis and the After refueling incident, PR was not 324 corrective actions taken to preclude repetition were submitted. No action taken u.*
adequate. anonymous precursor card arrived.
Further, the HPES Report was not reviewed in timely manner.
8/23/96 OTHER IFl 96-201-05 N E E IPAP Identifsd: Verification of motor starting data. No field test data verified against 314 computer study results.
B/23/96 OTHER URI 96-201-04 N E E IPAP identified: Fo!!owup on interim corrective actions Interim corrective actions isolated air to 296 for a deficiency regarding the use of non-safety positioners. See IR 96-08 for followup.
related positioners on safety related valves.
8/23/96 OTHER Preliminary N O O Six areas of concern: Weaknesses in original plant the corrective action program for 292 IPAP EXIT design; Weaknesses in recer.t engineering work; A emergent issues; and Failure to Meeting lack of sensitivity / understanding of the design basis establish and enforce proper and regulations; A lack of effectiveness of the quality performance standards.
organization; Failure to implement (cont) i 8/23/96 OTHER URI 96-201-01 N E E IPAP Identified: Long term plant cool down following a LPI pumps mission time far exceeds !
301 smal! break LOCA assuming a single failure in the vendor data for min. recire. flow time. j heat drop line. -
8/23/96 OTHER URI 96-201-02 N E E IPAP Identified: Net positive suction head for building Several factors in calculations were 304 spray pump has very little margin. considered non-conservative. L FROM: 1/1/96 TO: 5/29/97 Page 24 of 39 29-May-97
SFA DATE TYPE SOURCE ID PRlM SEC ITEM ,
APPARENT CAUSE / COMMENTS 8/23/96 OTHER URI 96-201-03 N O O IPAP Identified: Operating curves in OP-103B were 305 not validated. Curves 16,17 and 18 are not validated by licensee.
8/23/96 OTHER IFl 96-201-01 N E E IPAP Identified. Design Basis for Decay Heat / Core 306 Flood / Reactor Coolant Piping Temperature. Core flood check valve qualified to post accident temp (280 degrees F) vs. operating temp (650 degrees F) 8/23/96 OTHER URI 96-201-05 N E E IPAP identified: Service Water System Heat Loads 307 did not consider maximum input heat.
8/23/96 OTHER IFl 96-201-02 N E E IPAP Identified: Conduit Sizing Criteria: Conduit 308 jamm:ng ratio not considered in licensee's electrical design criteria.
8/23/96 OTHER IFl 96-201-03 N E E IPAP Identified: Cable ampacity calculations indicate 309 several cables exceed rating. Licensee had initiated aPR.
8/23/96 OTHER URI 96-201-06 N E E IPAP Identified: Preferred switchyard power source 310 for shutdown operating mode - 500 kw switchyard can be used per procedure. This source is not qualified.
8/23/96 OTHER URI 96-201-07 N E E IPAP identified: Protection of EDG against Water 313 Spray. Failure of fire protection deluge system in EDG room could cause water spray to enter generator air ventilation openings.
8/23/96 OTHER URI 96-201-08 N E E IPAP identified: EDG Ratir.g and Loading - Existing EDG Leading levels could 35 Surveillance Test Values affect tthe TS surv. test values.
FROM: 1/1/96 TO: 5/29/97 Page 25 of 39 29-May-97
SFA DATE TYPE SOURCE ID PRIM SEc ITEM APPARENT CAUSE / COMMENTS 8/23/96 OTHER IFl 96-201-06 N E E IPAP Identified: Second Level Undervoltage Relay inverters switch over from ac to dc 316 (SLUR) Setting vs. Inverter Operation operation whenever large motor was started, and voltage dip occurred.
8/23/96 OTHER IFl 96-201-07 N E E iPAP Identified: Protective Relaying and Coordination Protection of motor feeders was not 317 considered in setting of motor protective relays.
8/23/96 OTHER URI 96-201-09 N E E IPAP identified: Voltage ratings - Relays and coils:
318 Testing to qualify relays beyond mfg. ratings was inadequate.
8/23/96 OTHER IFl 96-201-04 N E E . PAP Identified. Bypassing of Protective Trips during The EDG has several protective trips 311 Emergency Mode of Operation. that are generally bypassed at other facilities during emergency operations.
7/26/96 POS IR 96-06 N E E No evidence of upper management pressure to 272 resolve problems in a manner not thorough or conservative. All perr.onnelinterviewed considered they had freedom to resolve problems in a thorough and safe manner 7/26/96 WEAK IR 96-06 N E E Appendix R design basis evaluation in error-vortexing 263 at reduced inventory in the MUT not considered 7/26/96 WEAK IR 96-06 N M M Failure to assure a calibrated torque wrench was 270 used by factory vendor rep while torquing non-safety related equipment FROM: 1/1/96 TO: 5/29/97 Page 26 of 39 29-May-97 1
SFA DATE TYPE SOURCE ID PRIM SEC ITEM l APPARENT CAUSE / C i
_T 4 m 7/26/96 OTHER URI 96-06-10 N PS PS Unresolved item Re Adequate justification for rem.:W!
277 of Thermo-Lag protection from source range instrumentation and lack of protection for intermediate range instrumentation 7/26/96 NCV 96-06-01 g, O O Failure to fo!!ow procertures, resulting in uncontrolled 258 addition of boric acid 7/26/96 V;O 96-06-02 O O Inadequate procedure for performing demineralized N
259 w ter flush following boric acid addition 7/26/96 OTHER URI 96-06-03 L E E Unresolved item Re Use of non-safety related transfer 260 LER 96-019- switch in safety related Engineered Safeguards status 00 LER 96- indicating light circuitry 019-01 7/26/96 VIO 96-06-04 N E E Failure to perform safety evaluation for cperating vital FSAR describes spare battery charger 261 battery charger using non-FSAF. configuration as C! ass 1E and can be used in lieu of regular battery charger 7/26/96 VIO 96-06-06 N E E Failure to timely notify NRC of condition outside Engineer determined on 6/15/95 t,at 262 licensing design basis for Appendix R. H2 regulator H2 regulator should be set < or = 17 set at 19.5 psig psig. On 7/7/95 notified NRC 7/26/96 NCV 96-06-05 L PS PS Failure to comply with requirements of radiation work Personnel w0rkMg in RB tool room 264 permit durir.g outage Mic not have required contam. contm!'Jaining FROM: 1/1/96 TO: 5/29/97 Page 27 of 39 29-May-97
SFA DATE TYPE SOURCE ID PRIM SEc ITEM APPARENT CAUSE / COMMENTS 7/26/96 POS 1R 96-06 N O O Actions implemented to address Management 266 Corrective Action Plan items have been effective in improving safety focus and conservative decision making. Positive indications evident in identification of severalissues by operations and engineering 7/26/96 NCV 96-06-08 L M M Failure to include the B-K-1 welds in the second 10- Per licensee, causes were personnel 271 year ISI program error, lack of knowledge, and lack of questioning attitude.
7/26/96 VIO 96-06-07 N M M Failure to initiate a problem report to resolve Control Procedures require a probfem report to 273 Room Emergency Ventilation System test failure resolve issues such as a tury test failure. See URI 96-03-10 7/26/96 OTHER IFl 96-06-09 N PS PS Concern noted due to several deficiencies in 275 procedures and documentation for Mecatiss fire barrier program 7/26/96 POS IR 96-06 N PS PS Welt integrated approach to Mecatiss fire barrier 274 installation program. Installation contractor appeared to comply with approved installation methods developed during fire test programs at UL. High quality workmanship of barriers observed 7/12/96 VIO VIO 96-05-08 N E E Fai!ure to follow purchasing procedures No procurement requisition amendment 255 and no procure. engr. services sig. on purchase order change.
7/12/96 STREN IR 96-05 N O O Two transients and a reactor trip (all due to plant 241 equipment problems) occurred. The operators response to the three events was timely, appropriate, and well supervised and is considered a strength.
FROM: 1/1/96 TO: 5/29/97 Page 28 of 33 29-May-97
SFA DATE TYPE SOURCE ID PRIM SEC ITEM APPARENT CAUSE I COMMENTS 7/12/96 VIO VIO 96-05-04 N M M Licensee approved eddy current acceptance enteria See URI 96-03-03 249 for steam generator in Service inspection being different than that required by Technica! Specs 7/12/96 OTHER URI 96-05-02 N E E Design concerns noted with degraded main stream 250 line hangers used in seismic and other dynamic load applications 7/12'96 OTHER IFl 96-05-06 L E E Concern re: large break loss of coolant accident Fuel bundle spacer grid might deform 151 analysis for B&W plants increasing fuel clad temperature 7/12/96 WEAK IR 96-05 N E E Modification Approval Record (MAR) as-building 252 process, verifying that identified Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) changes are transmitted to and received by Nuclear Licensing, was not followed for two MAR's 7/12/96 VIO VIO 96-05-05 N E E Failure to follow procedures for updating Design Basis DBD's are required to be updated every 253 D cuments two years as a minimum.
7/12/96 VIO VIO 96-05-07 N E E Inadequate receiving inspections - Battery chargers Was URI 96-03-06 254 did not meet original purchase specifications.
7/12/96 VIO VIO 96-05-01 N O O A violation was identified regarding the failure of the Bent main steam line hangers were not 242 shift supervisor to initiate a PR and an Operability properly evaluated.
Concern Resolution as required by procedures.
FROM: 1/1/96 TO: 5/29/97 Page 29 of 39 29-May-97
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SFA DATE T(PE SOURCE ID PRtM SEc ITEM APPARENT CAUSE / COMMENTS 7/12/96 WEAK 1R 96-05 N O O The precursor card program provides access and 245 identification of aay adverse condition for correction.
Licensee does not have clear understanding or control of their backlog of precursor card issues.
7/12/96 VEAK IR 96-05 N O O A weakness in the licensee's procedure program 244 controls regarding notifying Nuclear Training of new or revised procedures and clarifications regarding performance of 10 CFR 50.59 eva!uations for temporary procedure changes.
7/12/96 WEAK IR 96-05 N M M Lack of proper examination of the turbine govemor 246 valve anti-rotation rods prior to installation, which would have revealed the obvious damage 7/12/96 WEAK IR 96-05 N M M Two reactor transients and one reactor trip occurred.
247 All three events related to secondary side equipment problems, and are of concern due to the number of problems experienced and the resultant effects on plant ops.
7/12/96 NCV NCV 96-05-03 L M M Technicians involved in installing a work platform See URI 96-03-06 248 removed safety related instrument tubing supports without approved instructions or procedures.
7/12/96 WEAK IR 96-05 N O O No prompt corrective actions were taken when bent 243 rod hangers were found on the mais. stream line and only when the operability of the main stream line was questioned by the project manager did the licensee initiate action to replace the bent rod hangers.
7/10/96 VIO EA 95-126 L O O Nine instances where operators violated procedures 278 NOV 1.A for MUT pressure / level (SLill)
FROM: 1/1/96 TO: 5/29/97 Page 30 of 39 29-May-97
SFA DATE TYPE SOURCE ID PRIM SEc ITEM APPARENT CAUSE / COMMENTS 7/10/96 NEG EA 95-126 N O E The NRC is concerned about the ineffec. mgt high degree of rigor. mgt appeared 332 versight of engr.,oper, and correc. action activities insensitive to safety concems and did demonstrated by these vio. The NRC expects not aggressively pursue them, engrs licensees to promptly address safety concerns, overloo'Ked basic scientifiic princip!es especially those raised by operators, and to resolve and produced inaccurate analyses and them with a invest. failed to identify important case facts and root causes.
7/10/96 VIO EA 95-126 N E E Failure to take adequate corrective actions for oper.
282 NOV 1.C.1 concerns regarding OP-103B, Curve 8 (SLlli) 4 7/10/96 VIO EA 95-126 N E E Failure to ensure fire water storage tank contained 288 NOV ll.C adequate volume of water (SLIV) 7/10/96 VIO EA 95-126 L O O Conduct of unauthorized tests of MUT w/o written URI 96-04-08 closed per 10/18/96 EA 281 NOV1.8 eval. per 10 CFR 50.59 (SLill). Additional examples letter. Discussed in IR 96-15.
(4) identified in 10/18/96 EA 95-126 and EA 96-185 letter.
7/10/96 VIO EA 95-126 N E e Swapover of ECCS pump suction from BWST to 285 NOV 1.D.2 reactor bidg. sump at 5 feet was inadequate (SLitt) 7/10/96 VIO EA 95-126 L E E EOP's allowed single LPI pump to supply two HPI 286 NOV ll.A pumps. Exceeded NPSSH for LPI pump (SLill) 7/10/96 VIO EA 95-126 L E E Design controls failed to ensure adequate safety 284 NOV 1.D.1 margin for HPI pumps for certain LOCA scenarios (SLill)
FROM: 1/1/96 TO: 5/29/97 Page 31 of 39 29-May-97
SFA DATE TYPE SOURCE ID PR!M SEc ITEM APPARENT CAUSE / COMMENTS 7/10/96 VIO EA 95-126 L E E Corrective actions for an inadequate Curve 1(two 283 NOV 1.C.2 STI's and revised curve 8A & BB)were also ncorrect (SLlli) 7/10/96 VIO EA 95-126 N E E Failure to take adequate corrective actions for tank 287 NOV 11.8 volumes / level / suction point (SLIV) 6/17/96 VIO 96-04-02 N O O Failure to revise an operating procedure in a timely Procedure used by STA was not 235 manner revised to agree wrth revised EOPs.
6/17/96 OTHER URI 96-04-01 N E E Discrepancies in the EDBD and the FSAR regarding Licensing and engineering deleted 234 the prevention of boron precipitation post LOCA. requirement for primary method and NRC had agreed to a backup method proposed by required only the backup method be the B&WOG available.
6/17/96 WEAK IR 96-04 N E M The Modification Approval Record for the redundant 340 High Pressure injection scrrow range flow indicators was not signed off as complete, however the modification was released as complete to the operations department.
6/17/96 NCV NCV 96-04-05 L E E Failure to the Lube-Oil-Collection system to collect the 337 leaking RCP motor oil as required by 10 CFR 50 Appendix R 6/17/96 OTHER IFl 96-04-03 N E E Effect of setpoint calculations on EOP revisions. A change to the licensee setpoint 336 calculation methodology to using a graded approach has a potential to greatly impact the EOP revision program.
FROM: 1/1/96 TO: 5/29/97 Page 32 of 39 29-May-97
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SFA DATE TYPE SOURCE ID PRIM SEc ITEM APPARENT CAUSE / COMMENTS 6/17/96 NCV 96-04-04 L E E Failure to correctly implement TS required Control Procedure was not changed when new 236 Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) test TSs were implemented.
requirements.
5/24/96 NEG IR 96-03 N PS PS Strong management commitment for the ALARA 339 program was not evident with the licensee's cancellation of plans to remove certain chemical source term reduction procedures, engineering controls, from the R10 outage schedule.
5/24/96 VIO 96-03-11 N PS PS Failure to follow radiation work permits in the wearing 225 of face shields while working in the RB 5/24/96 VIO 96-03-13 N PS Failure of escort to maintain all visitors under Escort did not know what actions to 204 surveillance take when one visitor wanted to leave the area to retrieve tools. Escort followed one visitor out of area and left three other visitors without an escort.
5/24/96 VIO IR 96-03 -12 N PS Contaminated individual transported offsite to a local Person was transported in 213 hospital due to injuries from falling inside reactor contaminated protective clothing, building. No report to NRC per 10 CFR 50.72 however individual was not contaminated after removal of protective cicthing. Licensee determined not reportable.
5/24/96 NCV 96-03-02 3 O O Failure to follow procedure resulting in the inadvertent During a surveillance, the wrong switch 220 actuation of DCP-1A was tumed, which removed the bypass signal.
5/24/96 NCV 96-03-01 L O SRO in the reactor building for refueling operations SRO was relieved of alllicensed duties 205 was inattentive during fuel movement. and licensee has written NRC to make SRO's license inactive.
FROM: 1/1/96 TO: 5/29/97 Page 33 of 39 29-May-97
SFA DATE TYPE SOURCE ID PRIM SEC ITEM APPARENT CAUSE / COMMENTS 5/24/96 OTHER URI 96-03-05 N E E OTSG eddy current sample expansion based on 222 degraded tube percentages 5/24/96 OTHER IFl 96-03-14 N PS Licensee's Secunty Plan was interpreted by the Licensee interpretation of Security Plan 207 licensee to allow Health Physics procedure overrule was not agreed to by residents.
security requirements. Licensee has agreed to revise Security Plan to clarify intent during next update.
5/24/96 WEAK 1R 96-03 N E E A weakness in the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations and the 228 Process were identified.
5/24/96 WEAK IR 96-03 N E E Errors in the Enhanced Design Basis Document 1 229 regarding the battery chargers indicate a weakness in design controls.
5/24/96 STREN IR 96-03 N O O The licensee's full flow validation test of the 338 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) was considered a strength, and it demonstrated that under the most limiting accident conditions the ECCS pumps are unlikely to cavitate.
5/24/96 OTHER URI 96-03-04 N E E Measuring of OTSG percent through wallindication 221 with an unqualified procedure 5/1/96 VIO 96-02-02 N PS PS Licensee failed to maintain the main vehicle barrier 230 gate in operable condition and to provide compensatory measures.
FROM: 1/1/96 TO: 5/29/97 Page 34 of 39 29.May-97
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SFA DATE TYPE SOURCE ID PRIM SEc ITEM APPARENT CAUSE / COMMENTS 5/1/96 VIO 96-02-01 N PS SA Licensee failed to maintain at least 0.2 footcandles of i!!umination in a secunty area.
231 5/1/96 VIO 96-02-05 N PS PS Safeguards information was left unattended and 232 unlocked .
5/1/96 NCV 96-02-04 3 PS PS Licensee granted unescorted access to an individual 233 Prior to completion of background investigation.
5/1/96 VIO 96-02-03 N PS PS Licensee's SAS not functional and inadequate Licensee was given short term relief.
206 compensatory measures in place. Licensee then greatly extended out of service time without NRC concurrence.
4/16/96 NEG MGT Meetin9 N O E 5 General Areas of Concern: Design basis issues; 333 Mgt oversight & involvement have been insufficient; Lack of sensitivity to mcomply with regulations; Marginally effective engr organization; and Osperator performance.
4/8/96 URI 96-01-02 L E Discrepancies in the HP! system that do not meet the Operator identified FSAR descrip. fnr 197 design basis analysis SBLOCA failed to consider several affected pieces of equipment.
4/8/96 WEAK IR 96-01 (para N O Preplanning and control of shipping of damaged new 193 2.4) fuel was weak, with problems identifying regulatory requirements having to be met.
FROM: 1/1/96 TO: 5/29/97 Page 35 of 39 29-May-97
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SFA DATE TYPE SOURCE ID PRIM SEC ITEM APPARENT CAUSE / COMMENTS 4/8/96 STREN IR 96-01 (para N O The operators identification of the design basis issues 194 2.5) associated with the high pressure injection system is considered a strength.
4/8/96 NEG 1R 96-01 N E TS amendment 134 had inaccurate statements FPC licensing does not understand that 208 regarding spent fu21 pool temperatures. Amendment TS amendment becomes part of their stated SFP resin was good for 250 degrees F . FPC licensing basis and must be accurate.
licensing stated this was an NRC problem and not FPC problem. FPC had no record of submitting data to NRC.
4/8/96 VIO VIO 96-01-01 L E Inadequate corrective action to ensure the required Identified in 1989 time frame and 196 high pressure injection flow instrumentation as corrected. Still found to not meet required by design basis. design basis in 1996.
4/8/96 STREN IR 96-01 (para N E tmprovements noted in the PRC's thoroughness of 198 2.5) review, as evidenced by the response and management's concurrence, on the HPI design basis issue with a recommendation to shut the plant down.
4/8/96 NCV NCV 96-01-03 L E Failure to maintain 10 CFR 50, Appendix R. Contrary to the drawings, the licensee 399 separation criteria for the emergency feedwater found conduits for valves on separate system. trains running through the same distribution room, without any fire barriers, etc.
4/8/96 NCV NCV 96-01-04 L E Failure to maintain configuration control for the The licensee identified that dwgs had 200 emergency feedwater system. been updated for a change that had not been accomplished.
4/8/96 STREN IR 96-01 (para N PS The licensee's preparation and monitoring for a The licensee increased sampling of 201 5.1) possible steam generator tube leak were considered secondary water and started reviewing a strength. The offgas monitor trended up. SG tube rupture procedures, as a conservative measure.
FROM: 1/1/96 TO: 5/29/97 Page 36 of 39 29-May-97
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SFA DATE TYPE SOURCE ID PRIM SEC ITEM APPARENT CAUSE / COMMENTS 4/8/96 VIO 96-01-06 L E Potential for Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling Design would allow all three reactor 210 (SW) to operate outside design basis and for EDGs to building coolers to operate. Design exceed their kW rating. RB coolers use SW for basis only assumes two RB coolers in cooling water. operation.
4/8/96 WEAK IR 96-01 (para N O Licensee did not adequately control annunciator logs.
192 6.0) 4/8/96 VIO VIO 96-01-05 N E Failure to update the FSAR as required by 10 CFR (1) App. R changes to MU system (2) 202 50.71(e)- 2 examples license amendment 134 on SFP 4/8/96 WEAK IR 96-01 (para N M The inspectors identified maintenance equipment 195 3.1) being secured to or stored adjacent to safety related piping and equipment.
2/5/96 VEAK 1R 95-22 N O E Inadequate human factors aspects of information engr. and within departments; vague 331 pr vided to operators for control of MUT level and guidance provided to operators in pressure; lack of tracking out of calibration data; failure procedures for when procedures are ;
to place MUT level / press. alarm in cal. program; adequate for evolutions being ineffective communications between operations an performed, for alarm response times, and for determining when evolutions i 1/27/96 WEAK IR 95-21 para. N E An inadequate review of a modification was The modification was already installed 185 4.1 perf r ed. Th!s modification was to the standby when the inspector raised concerns.
feedwater pump recirculation line to allow transfer of Parallel to the inspector questions, the radioactive water in case of a SGTR. PRC rejected the proposed procedure and issued a Precursor Card stating that the whole modification had an 1/27/96 NCV 95-21-01 L O An operator failed to follow the procedure, opening The event was non-cited because of 179 the wrong valve and discharging the contents of a significance. The fiume discharged tank into the wrong raw water discharge fiume. This downstream of the circulating fiume did not have the dilution flow that was present discharge which sufficiently diluted the in the other fiume. discharged water.
FROM: 1/1/96 TO: 5/29/97 Page 37 of 39 29-May-97
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p -- o SFA DATE TYPE SCURCE ID PRIM SEc ITEM . APPARENT CAUSEI COMMENTS 1/27/96 STREN 1R 95-21 para- N O During the shutdown for the condenser tube leak, the 180 2.1 inspector noted conservative and thorough management of the operating shift by the shift supervisor.
1/27/96 STREN 1R 95-21 para. N O The questioning attitude of an operator in identifying 181 2.3 the issue of the open hnk on the SASS annunciator is considered a strength.
1/27/96 VEAK IR 95-21 para. L E The vacuun breakers on the BWST were sized where No operability concern existed when 184 3.3 d would take both functioning to relieve the expected this was found, as one of the vacuum vacuum on the design basis drawdown. breakers had been removed, leaving a large hole.
1/27/96 VIO VIO 95-21-03 L E Failure to isolate safety related and non-safety related 186 electrical circuitry for the reactor building purge and min-purge valves.
1/27/96 WEAK IR 95-21 para. N E The FSAR chapter on the reactor building purge This entry was revised to reflect a i 3g7 4.2 valves incorrectly stated that the valves closed on an modification that was never ES closure signal. implemented and has since been voided.
1/27/96 WEAK IR 95-21 p N E tr% qua; Md review of the purge valve safety /non- However, these valves will be needed 188 4.2/4.3 safet) related circuitry interface. The LER initia!!y during the upcoming refueling outage, stated that the review and development of the scheduled to begin February 29,1996.
corrective actions would be completed by December LER did not consider mini-purge valves 1996. which are similar. ,
1/27/96 WEAK IR 95-21 para. N O Procedure O!-07, Control of Equipment and System 189 2.3 Status, does not provide guidance for addressing control of an annunciator when the status of the corrective actions change.
FROM: 1/1/96 TO: 5/29/97 Page 38 of 39 29-May-97
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, s . c, SFA DATE TYPE SOURCE ID PR!M SEC ITEM APPARENT CAUSE / COMMENTS 1/27/96 WEAK 1R 95-21 para. N O Lack of sensitivity and management oversight for 190 2.3 operator identified discrepancies. PC written on annunciator concerns. Licensee management did not review problem or develop corrective actions until prompted by NRC.
1/27/96 OTHER URI 95-21-04 L o RCS cooldown rate exceeded TS. SRO SRO used decay heat cooter inlet 209 misinterpreted procedure as to when to shift to slower temp. rather than DH cooter outlet coo!down rate. temperature for transition temperature.
1/27/96 WEAK IR 95-21 para. N M The licensee failed to control maintenance activities 183 3.1.1 around the standby feedwater pump, resulting in material being piaced that could interfere with the correct operation of the pump.
1/9/96 1R 95-21 3 O On January 9,1996, a condenser tube failure caused Breaker closure is projected for 177 secondary chemistry levels to greatly exceed January 20,1996.
recommended plant operating limits. The unit was brought to COLD SHUTDOWN to allow plugging the condenser and clean up of the secondary side.
SALP Functional Areas: ID Code:
E ENGINEERING L LICENSEE M MAINTENANCE N NRC O OPERATIONS S SELF-REVEALED PS PLANT SUPPORT SA SAFETY ASSESSMENT & QV FROM: 1/1/96 TO: 5/29/97 Page 39 of 39 29-May-97
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