ND-22-0001, ITAAC Closure Notification on Completion of ITAAC 2.2.03.11a.i (Index Number 207)

ITAAC Closure Notification on Completion of ITAAC 2.2.03.11a.i (Index Number 207)

ML22147A180
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	05/27/2022
From:	Coleman J Southern Nuclear Operating Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
ITAAC 2.2.03.11a, ND-22-0001
Download: ML22147A180 (7)

Text

Jamie M. Coleman 7825 Rive r Road A Southern Nuclear Regulatory Affairs Director Way nesboro , GA 30830 Vogtl e 3 & 4 706-848-6926 te l May 27 , 2022 Docket No.: 52-025 ND-22-0001 10 CFR 52 .99(c)(1)

U.S . Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington , DC 20555-0001 Southern Nuclear Operating Company Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 3 ITAAC Closure Notification on Completion of ITAAC 2.2.03.11 a.i (Index Number 2071 Ladies and Gentlemen :

In accordance with 10 CFR 52 .99(c)(1 ), the purpose of this letter is to notify the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) of the completion of Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Unit 3 Inspections, Tests , Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) Item 2.2.03 .11 a.i (Index Number 2071 . This ITAAC confirms that controls in the Main Control Room operate to cause a signal at the squib valve electrical leads that is capable of actuating the squib valves identified in Combined License (COL) Appendix C Table 2.2 .3-1 . The closure process for this ITAAC is based on the guidance described in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 08-01, "Industry Guideline for the ITAAC Closure Process Under 10 CFR Part 52 ," which was endorsed by the NRC in Regulatory Guide 1.215 .

This letter contains no new NRC regulatory commitments . Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) requests NRC staff confirmation of this determination and publication of the requi red notice in the Federal Register per 10 CFR 52 .99.

If there are any questions , please contact Kelli Roberts at 706-848-6991 .

Respectfully submitted,

-~

JJl:an Regulatory Affairs Director Vogtle 3 & 4

Enclosure:

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Unit 3 Completion of ITAAC 2.2.03 .11 a.i (Index Number 2071 JMC/RLB/sfr

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-22-0001 Page 2 of 3 To:

Southern Nuclear Operating Company/ Georgia Power Company Mr. Peter P. Sena Ill Mr. D. L. McKinney Mr. H. Nieh Mr. G. Chick Mr. S. Stimac Mr. P. Martino Mr. D. Pitts Mr. J. B. Williams Mr. A. S. Parton Ms . K. A. Roberts Ms. J.M. Coleman Mr. C. T. Defnall Mr. C. E. Morrow Mr. K. J. Drudy Mr. J. M. Fisher Mr. R. L. Beilke Mr. S. Leighty Ms. A. C. Chamberlain Mr. J. C. Haswell Document Services RTYPE : VND.LI.L06 File AR.01 .02.06 cc:

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ms . M. Bailey Mr. M. King Mr. G. Bowman Ms. A. Veil Mr. C. P. Patel Mr. G. J. Khouri Mr. C. J. Even Mr. B. J. Kemker Ms . N. C. Coovert Mr. C. Welch Mr. J. Gaslevic Mr. 0 . Lopez-Santiago Mr. G. Armstrong Mr. M. Webb Mr. T. Fredette Mr. C. Santos Mr. B. Davis Mr. J. Vasquez Mr. J. Eargle Ms. K. Mccurry Mr. J. Parent Mr. B. Griman Mr. V. Hall

U.S . Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-22-0001 Page 3 of 3 Oglethorpe Power Corporation Mr. R. B. Brinkman Mr. E. Rasmussen Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia Mr. J. E. Fuller Mr. S. M. Jackson Dalton Utilities Mr. T. Bundros Westinghouse Electric Company, LLC Dr. L. Oriani Mr. D. C. Durham Mr. M. M. Corletti Mr. Z . S. Harper Ms . S. L. Zwack Other Mr. S. W . Kline , Bechtel Power Corporation Ms. L. Matis, Tetra Tech NUS, Inc.

Dr. W . R. Jacobs, Jr., Ph .D., GOS Associates, Inc.

Mr. S. Roetger, Georgia Public Service Commission Mr. R. L. Trokey , Georgia Public Service Commission Mr. K. C. Greene, Troutman Sanders Mr. S. Blanton , Balch Bingham

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-22-0001 Enclosure Page 1 of 4 Southern Nuclear Operating Company ND-22-0001 Enclosure Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Unit 3 Completion of ITAAC 2.2.03.11 a.i [Index Number 207]

U.S . Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-22-0001 Enclosure Page 2 of 4 ITAAC Statement Design Commitment 11.a) Controls exist in the MCR to cause the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.3-1 to perform their active function(s) .

Inspections/Tests/Analyses i) Testing will be performed on the squib valves identified in Table 2.2 .3-1 using controls in the MCR, without stroking the valve .

Acceptance Criteria i) Controls in the MCR operate to cause a signal at the squib valve electrical leads that is capable of actuating the squib valve .

ITAAC Determination Basis Multiple ITAAC are performed to verify that controls exist in the Main Control Room (MCR) to cause the remotely operated valves identified in Combined License (COL) Appendix C Table 2.2.3-1 to perform their active functions . The subject ITAAC performed testing on the Table 2.2 .3-1 squib valves listed in Attachment A Testing was performed in accordance with the preoperational tests and component test work orders listed in Reference 1 to verify that controls exist in the MCR to cause the valves identified in Attachment A to perform their active functions . Testing was performed on the squib valves using controls in the MCR without stroking the valve and ensured the controls in the MCR operate to cause a signal at the squib valve electrical leads which was capable of actuating the squib valve .

Squib valve actuation signals generated in the Protection and Safety Monitoring System (PMS) were sent to the Component Interface Modules (CIM) , resulting in an actuation of the CIM for the respective squib valve. The CIM is a safety-related component located inside the respective PMS cabinets which provides the capability for on/off control of individual safety-related plant components . Squib valve actuation signal output from the actuated CIM is sent to the respective squib valve through the squib valve controller. To provide overlap , the Reference 1 component test work orders verified that when PMS controls were operated in the MCR, the CIM was actuated and a signal was received at the squib valve controller. From the squib valve controller, the Reference 1 preoperational tests used a test tool connected to the squib valve controller to initiate a test signal and verify the signal was received at the squib valve electrical leads .

The Reference 1 component test work orders for each squib valve identified in Attachment A were conducted by manually initiating a PMS signal from the MCR using the PMS Safety Display Panel In-Containment Refueling Water Storage Tank soft controls. The squib valve actuation signal from the CIM was verified locally by measuring the arming and firing voltages at the Squib Valve Controller (SVC) cabinet. Each squib valve identified in Attachment A had the electrical leads disconnected to prevent stroking the valve .

The Reference 1 preoperational tests for each squib valve identified in Attachment A were conducted by connecting a PMS SVC Test Tool to the SVC. Circuit resistance was measured and inside and outside containment temperatures were measured at multiple locations and were

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-22-0001 Enclosure Page 3 of 4 used to calculate the circuit resistance expected during accident conditions. The calculated circuit resistances were verified to meet the minimum and maximum allowable resistances . The circuit resistance information was used to determine the circuit resistance input to the PMS SVC Test Tool. A multimeter along with a temporary data acquisition system was connected to the PMS SVC Test Tool to determine voltage and signal duration . The PMS SVC Test Tool was then used to initiate an arm and test fire sequence. Firing current was determined from the voltage measurements taken during the arm and test fire sequence.

The minimum signal necessary to actuate the squib valves is specified in valve design information as at least 3.7 amperes for 1O milliseconds. The information recorded during testing of signal duration and voltage was utilized to confirm that a sufficient test signal was received at each of the squib valves .

The test results identified in Reference 1 confirmed that controls in the MCR operate to cause a signal at the squib valve electrical leads that is capable of actuating the squib valves identified in Attachment A.

Reference 1 is available for NRC inspection as part of the ITAAC 2.2 .03.11a.i Completion Package (Reference 2) .

ITAAC Finding Review In accordance with plant procedures for ITAAC completion , Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) performed a review of all findings pertaining to the subject ITAAC and associated corrective actions. This review found there were no relevant ITAAC findings associated with this ITAAC . The ITAAC completion review is documented in the ITAAC Completion Package for ITAAC 2.2.03.11 a.i (Reference 2) and is available for NRC review.

ITAAC Completion Statement Based on the above information , SNC hereby notifies the NRC that ITAAC 2.2.03.11 a.i was performed for VEGP Unit 3 and that the prescribed acceptance criteria was met.

Systems , structures , and components verified as part of this ITAAC are being maintained in their as-designed , ITAAC compliant condition in accordance with approved plant programs and procedures.

References (available for NRC inspection)

1. SV3-PXS-ITR-800207, Unit 3 Testing Results of PXS Squib Valves : ITAAC 2.2.03.11 a.i, Rev 0

2. 2.2.03.11 a.i-U3-CP-Rev0, ITAAC Completion Package

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-22-0001 Enclosure Page 4 of 4 Attachment A

• Excerpt from COL Appendix C Table 2.2.3-1

• Equipment Name *Tag No. *C ontrol PMS/DAS Containment Recirculation A Squib Valve PXS-PL-V118A Yes/Yes Containment Recirculation B Squib Valve PXS-PL-V118B Yes/Yes Containment Recirculation A Squib Valve PXS-PL-V120A Yes/Yes Containment Recirculation B Squib Valve PXS-PL-V120B Yes/Yes IRWST Injection A Squib Valve PXS-PL-V123A Yes/Yes IRWST Injection B Squib Valve PXS-PL-V123B Yes/Yes IRWST Injection A Squib Valve PXS-PL-V125A Yes/Yes IRWST Injection B Squib Valve PXS-PL-V125B Yes/Yes