ND-21-1024, ITAAC Closure Notification on Completion of ITAAC 2.5.02.02.i (Index Number 522)
| ML22103A234 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 04/13/2022 |
| From: | Coleman J Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| ND-21-1024 | |
| Download: ML22103A234 (14) | |
Text
.~ Southern Nuclear Docket No. :
52-025 APR 1 3 2022 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Jamie M Coleman Regulatory Affairs Director Vogtle 3 & 4 Southern Nuclear Operating Company Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 3 7825 River Road Waynesboro, GA 30830 706-848-6926 tel ND-21-1024 10 CFR 52.99(c)(1)
ITAAC Closure Notification on Completion of ITAAC 2.5.02.02.i (Index Number 5221 Ladies and Gentlemen:
In accordance with 10 CFR 52.99(c)(1 ), the purpose of this letter is to notify the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) of the completion of Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP)
Unit 3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) Item 2.5.02.02.i (Index Number 5221 to demonstrate that the Protection and Safety Monitoring System (PMS) equipment identified as seismic Category I or Class 1 E in the Combined License (COL)
Appendix C, Table 2.5.2-1 is designed and constructed in accordance with applicable requirements.
The closure process for this ITAAC is based on the guidance described in NEI 08-01, "Industry Guideline for the IT AAC Closure Process Under 10 CFR Part 52," which was endorsed by the NRC in Regulatory Guide 1.215.
This letter contains no new NRC regulatory commitments. Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) requests NRC staff confirmation of this determination and publication of the required notice in the Federal Register per 10 CFR 52.99.
If there are any questions, please contact Kelli Roberts at 706-848-6991.
Respectfully submitted,
( ~
Ja
- M Coleman Regulatory Affairs Director Vogtle 3 & 4
Enclosure:
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Unit 3 Completion of ITAAC 2.5.02.02.i (Index Number 5221 JMC/BSZ/sfr
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-21-1024 Page 2 of 3 To:
Southern Nuclear Operating Company/ Georgia Power Company Mr. Peter P. Sena Ill Mr. D. L. McKinney Mr. H. Nieh Mr. G. Chick Mr. S. Stimac Mr. P. Martino Mr. J.B. Williams Mr. M. J. Yox Mr. A. S. Parton Ms. K. A. Roberts Ms. J.M. Coleman Mr. C. T. Defnall Mr. C. E. Morrow Mr. K. J. Drudy Mr. J. M. Fisher Mr. R. L. Beilke Mr. S. Leighty Ms. A. C. Chamberlain Mr. J. C. Haswell Document Services RTYPE: VND.LI.L06 File AR.01.02.06 Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ms. M. Bailey Mr. M. King Mr. G. Bowman Ms. A. Veil Mr. C. P. Patel Mr. G. J. Khouri Mr. C. J. Even Mr. B. J. Kemker Ms. N. C. Coovert Mr. C. Welch Mr. J. Gaslevic Mr. 0. Lopez-Santiago Mr. G. Armstrong Mr. M. Webb Mr. T. Fredette Mr. C. Santos Mr. B. Davis Mr. J. Vasquez Mr. J. Eargle Mr. T. Fanelli Ms. K. Mccurry Mr. J. Parent Mr. B. Griman Mr. V. Hall
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-21-1024 Page 3 of 3 Oglethorpe Power Corporation Mr. R. B. Brinkman Mr. E. Rasmussen Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia Mr. J. E. Fuller Mr. S. M. Jackson Dalton Utilities Mr. T. Bundros Westinghouse Electric Company, LLC Dr. L. Oriani Mr. D. C. Durham Mr. M. M. Corletti Mr. Z. S. Harper Ms. S. L. Zwack Other Mr. S. W. Kline, Bechtel Power Corporation Ms. L. Matis, Tetra Tech NUS, Inc.
Dr. W. R. Jacobs, Jr., Ph.D., GOS Associates, Inc.
Mr. S. Roetger, Georgia Public Service Commission Mr. R. L. Trokey, Georgia Public Service Commission Mr. K. C. Greene, Troutman Sanders Mr. S. Blanton, Balch Bingham
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-21-1024 Enclosure Page 1 of 11 Southern Nuclear Operating Company ND-21-1024 Enclosure Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Unit 3 Completion of ITAAC 2.5.02.02.i [Index Number 522]
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-21-1024 Enclosure Page 2 of 11 IT AAC Statement Design Commitment
- 2. The seismic Category I equipment, identified in Table 2.5.2-1, can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.
- 3. The Class 1 E equipment, identified in Table 2.5.2-1, has electrical surge withstand capability (SWC), and can withstand the electromagnetic interference (EMI), radio frequency interference (RFI), and electrostatic discharge (ESD) conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.
- 4. The Class 1 E equipment, identified in Table 2.5.2-1, can withstand the room ambient temperature, humidity, pressure, and mechanical vibration conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.
Inspections, Tests, Analyses i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.5.2-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.
ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.
iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.
Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the equipment.
Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the Class 1 E equipment identified in Table 2.5.2-1.
Acceptance Criteria i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.5.2-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.
ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.
iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.
A report exists and concludes that the Class 1 E equipment identified in Table 2.5.2-1 can withstand the SWC, EMI, RFI, and ESD conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-21-1024 Enclosure Page 3 of 11 A report exists and concludes that the Class 1 E equipment identified in Table 2.5.2-1 can withstand the room ambient temperature, humidity, pressure, and mechanical vibration conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.
ITAAC Determination Basis This ITAAC requires that inspections, tests, and analyses be performed and documented to ensure the Protection and Safety Monitoring System (PMS) equipment identified as seismic Category I or Class 1 E in the Combined License (COL) Appendix C, Table 2.5.2-1 (the Table) is designed and constructed in accordance with applicable requirements.
i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.5.2-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.
To assure that seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function, all the equipment in the Table is designed to be located on the seismic Category I Nuclear Island. In accordance with Equipment Qualification (EQ) Walkdown ITAAC Guideline and the EQ ITAAC As-Built Installation Documentation Guideline (References 1 and 2), an inspection was conducted of the PMS to confirm the satisfactory installation of the seismically qualified equipment. The inspection includes verification of equipment make/model/serial number and verification of equipment location (Building, Elevation, Room).
The EQ As-Built Reconciliation Reports (EQRR) (Reference 3) identified in Attachment A document the results of the inspection and conclude that the seismic Category I equipment is located on the Nuclear Island.
ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.
Seismic Category I equipment in the Table requires type tests and/or analyses to demonstrate structural integrity and operability. Safety-related (Class 1 E) electrical equipment in the Table was seismically qualified by type testing combined with analysis in accordance with Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standard 344-1987 (Reference 4). The specific qualification method (i.e., type testing, analysis, or combination) used for each piece of equipment in the Table is identified in Attachment A. Additional information about the methods used to qualify AP1000 safety-related equipment is provided in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Appendix 30 (Reference 5). The EQ Reports (Reference 6) identified in Attachment A contain applicable test reports and associated documentation and conclude that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.
iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.
An inspection (References 1 & 2) was conducted to confirm the satisfactory installation of the seismically qualified equipment in the Table. The inspection verified the equipment make/model/serial number, as-designed equipment mounting orientation, anchorage and clearances, and electrical and other interfaces. The documentation of installed configuration of seismically qualified equipment includes photographs and/or sketches/drawings of equipment/mounting/interfaces.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-21-1024 Enclosure Page 4 of 11 As part of the seismic qualification program, consideration is given to the definition of the clearances needed around the equipment mounted in the plant to permit the equipment to move during a postulated seismic event without causing impact between adjacent pieces of safety-related equipment. When required, seismic testing by measuring the maximum dynamic relative displacement of the top and bottom of the equipment was performed. EQ Reports (Reference 6) identify the equipment mounting employed for qualification and establish interface requirements for assuring that subsequent in-plant installation does not degrade the established qualification. Interface requirements are defined based on the test configuration and other design requirements.
Attachment A identifies the EORR (Reference 3) completed to verify that the as-built seismic Category I equipment listed in the Table, including anchorage, are seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions, IEEE Standard 344-1987 (Reference 4) and NRC Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.100 (Reference 7).
A report exists and concludes that the Class 1 E equipment identified in Table 2.5.2-1 can withstand the SWC, EMI, RFI, and ESD conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.
The Class 1 E equipment in the Table was qualified by a combination of type testing and analysis in accordance with RG 1.180 (Reference 8) and industry standards. The specific qualification method (i.e., type testing, analysis, or combination) used for each piece of equipment in the Table is identified in Attachment A. The baseline Military Standard ("MIL-STD") program is used in its entirety for emissions testing as described in Attachment B, and shows the Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) type test and category (SWC, EMI, RFI or ESD), the test standard, and the application. The alternate International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) program is used in its entirety for susceptibility testing as described in similar fashion in Attachment C. The testing described in the attachments is a complete set for this ITAAC in accordance with RG 1.180 and the ESD test requirement, and compliant results of these tests combined with the location analysis indicate that the ITAAC acceptance criteria was met.
The results of the tests and analysis are documented in the EQ Reports (Reference 6) identified in Attachment A and conclude that the Class 1 E equipment identified in the Table has SWC and can withstand the EMI, RFI, and ESD conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.
A report exists and concludes that the Class 1 E equipment identified in Table 2.5.2-1 can withstand the room ambient temperature, humidity, pressure, and mechanical vibration conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.
The Class IE equipment identified in the Table was qualified by a combination of type testing and analysis in accordance with IEEE Standard 323-1974 (Reference 9) and RG 1.89 (Reference 10) to meet the requirements of 1 O CFR 50.49. This demonstrates that the equipment can withstand the room ambient temperature, humidity, pressure, and mechanical vibration conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function. Additional
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-21-1024 Enclosure Page 5 of 11 information about the methods used to qualify AP1000 safety-related equipment is provided in UFSAR Appendix 3D (Reference 5).
EO Reports (Reference 6) identified in Attachment A contain applicable test reports and associated documentation and conclude the equipment identified in the Table can withstand the room ambient temperature, humidity, pressure, and mechanical vibration conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.
Together, these reports (References 3 and 6) provide evidence that the ITAAC Acceptance Criteria requirements are met:
The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.5.2-1 is located on the Nuclear Island; A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function; A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions; A report exists and concludes that the Class 1 E equipment identified in Table 2.5.2-1 can withstand the SWC, EMI, RFI, and ESD conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function; and A report exists and concludes that the Class 1 E equipment identified in Table 2.5.2-1 can withstand the room ambient temperature, humidity, pressure, and mechanical vibration conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.
References 3 and 6 are available for NRC inspection as part of the Unit 3 ITAAC 2.5.02.02.i Completion Package (Reference 11 ).
ITAAC Finding Review In accordance with plant procedures for ITAAC completion, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) performed a review of all lTAAC findings pertaining to the subject ITAAC and associated corrective actions. This finding review, which included now-consolidated ITAAC Indexes 523, 524, 525, and 526, found the following Notices of Nonconformance (NON) associated with this ITAAC:
- 1) 99900404/2015-204-02 (closed - ML181528785)
- 2) 99900404/2015-204-03 (closed - ML181528785)
The corrective actions for these findings have been completed and the findings are closed. The ITAAC completion review is documented in the IT AAC Completion Package for ITAAC 2.5.02.02.i (Reference 11) and is available for NRC review.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-21-1024 Enclosure Page 6 of 11 ITAAC Completion Statement Based on the above information, SNC hereby notifies the NRC that ITAAC 2.5.02.02.i was performed for VEGP Unit 3 and that the prescribed acceptance criteria were met.
Systems, structures, and components verified as part of this ITAAC are being maintained in their as-designed, ITAAC compliant condition in accordance with approved plant programs and procedures.
References (available for NRC inspection)
- 3. EQ As-Built Reconciliation Reports (EQRR) as identified in Attachment A for Unit 3
- 4. IEEE Standard 344-1987, "IEEE Recommended Practices for Seismic Qualification of Class 1 E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations"
- 5. Vogtle 3&4 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Appendix 30, "Methodology for Qualifying AP1000 Safety-Related Electrical and Mechanical Equipment"
- 6. Equipment Qualification (EQ) Reports as identified in Attachment A
- 7. Regulatory Guide 1.100, Rev. 2, "Seismic Qualification of Electric and Mechanical Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants"
- 8. Regulatory Guide 1.180, Rev. 1, "Guidelines for Evaluating Electromagnetic and Radio-Frequency Interference in Safety-Related Instrumentation and Control Systems"
- 9. IEEE Standard 323-1974, "IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class 1 E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations"
- 10. Regulatory Guide 1.89, Rev. 1, "Environmental Qualification of Certain Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants"
- 11. 2.5.02.02.i-U3-CP-Rev 0, Completion Package for Unit 3 ITAAC 2.5.02.02.i [Index Number 522]
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-21 -1024 Enclosure Page 7 of 11 Attachment A System: Protection and Safety Monitoring System (PMS)
Seismic Class 1E/
Type of Equipment Name+
Qual. For EQ Reports Cat. 1+
Harsh Envir.+
Qual.
PMS Cabinets, Type Test & SV3-PMS-VBR-002 Yes Yes/No Division A Analysis SV3-PMS-VBR-003 PMS Cabinets, Type Test & SV3-PMS-VBR-002 Yes Yes/No Division B Analysis SV3-PMS-VBR-003 PMS Cabinets, Type Test & SV3-PMS-VBR-002 Yes Yes/No Division C Analysis SV3-PMS-VBR-003 PMS Cabinets, Type Test & SV3-PMS-VBR-002 Yes Yes/No Division D Analysis SV3-PMS-VBR-003 Reactor Trip Type Test & SV3-JY50-VBR-002 Yes Yes/No Switchgear, Division A Analysis SV3-JY50-VBR-003 Reactor Trip Type Test & SV3-JY50-VBR-002 Yes Yes/No Switchgear, Division B Analysis SV3-JY50-VBR-003 Reactor Trip Type Test & SV3-JY50-VBR-002 Yes Yes/No Switchgear, Division C Analysis SV3-JY50-VBR-003 Reactor Trip Type Test & SV3-JY50-VBR-002 Yes Yes/No Switchgear, Division D Analysis SV3-JY50-VBR-003 MCR/RSW Transfer Type Test & SV3-JW03-VBR-00 1 Yes Yes/No Panels Analysis SV3-JW03-VBR-002 MCA Safety-related Type Test & SV3-OCS-VBR-006 Yes Yes/No Display, Division A Analysis SV3-OCS-VBR-008 MCA Safety-related Type Test & SV3-OCS-VBR-006 Yes Yes/No Display, Division B Analysis SV3-OCS-VBR-008 MCA Safety-related Type Test & SV3-OCS-VBR-006 Yes Yes/No Display, Division C Analysis SV3-OCS-VBR-008 MCA Safety-related Type Test & SV3-OCS-VBR-006 Yes Yes/No Display, Division D Analysis SV3-OCS-VBR-008 MCA Safety-related Type Test & SV3-OCS-VBR-006 Yes Yes/No Controls Analysis SV3-OCS-VBR-008 Notes:
+ Excerpt from COL Appendix C Table 2.5.2-1 As-Built EQRR 2.5.02.02.i-U3-EQRR-PCD001 Rev. 1 2.5.02.02.i-U3-EQRR-PCD001 Rev. 1 2.5.02.02.i-U3-EQRR-PCD001 Rev. 1 2.5.02.02.i-U3-EQRR-PCD001 Rev. 1 2.5.02.02.i-U3-EQRR-PCD001 Rev. 1 2.5.02.02.i-U3-EQRR-PCD001 Rev. 1 2.5.02.02.i-U3-EQRR-PCD001 Rev. 1 2.5.02.02.i-U3-EQRR-PCD001 Rev. 1 2.5.02.02.i-U3-EQRR-PCD001 Rev. 1 2.5.02.02.i-U3-EQRR-PCD001 Rev. 1 2.5.02.02.i-U3-EQRR-PCD001 Rev. 1 2.5.02.02.i-U3-EQRR-PCD001 Rev. 1 2.5.02.02.i-U3-EQRR-PCD001 Rev. 1 2.5.02.02.i-U3-EQRR-PCD001 Rev. 1
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-21-1024 Enclosure Page 8 of 11 Attachment B PMS Applicable SWC Test Standards, Baseline (MIL-STD) Emissions Testing Program EMC Type Test Test Standard Application MIL-STD-461E(CE101) "Requirements Conducted for the Control of Electromagnetic Reactor Trip Switchgear Emissions, Interference Characteristics of Power Leads (Note 1)
Low Frequency Subsystems and Equipment," U.S.
(EMIi RFI)
Department of Defense, August 1999.
PMS Cabinet Power Leads Conducted MIL-STD-461E(CE102), "Requirements Reactor Trip Switchgear for the Control of Electromagnetic Power Leads Emissions, High Interference Characteristics of Frequency Subsystems and Equipment," U.S.
Main Control Room (MCR)
(EMIi RFI)
Department of Defense, August 1999.
Safety-related (SR) Display &
Control Power Leads MIL-STD-461E(RE101 ), "Requirements PMS Cabinet Radiated for the Control of Electromagnetic Reactor Trip Switchgear Emissions, Interference Characteristics of Magnetic Field Subsystems and Equipment," U.S.
MCR SR Display & Control (EMIi RFI)
Department of Defense, August 1999.
MIL-STD-461E(RE102), "Requirements PMS Cabinet Radiated for the Control of Electromagnetic Reactor Trip Switchgear Emissions, Interference Characteristics of Electric Field Subsystems and Equipment," U.S.
MCR SR Display & Control (EMIi RFI)
Department of Defense, August 1999.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-21-1024 Enclosure Page 9 of 11 Attachment C PMS Applicable SWC Test Standards, Alternate (IEC) Susceptibility Testing Program EMC Type Test Test Standard Application PMS Cabinet Power & Signal Leads I EC 61000-4-16, "Electromagnetic Reactor Trip Switchgear Power &
Conducted Compatibility (EMC), Part 4: Testing and Signal Leads Susceptibility, Measurement Techniques, Section 16: Test Main Control Room/Remote Low Frequency, for Immunity to Conducted, Common Mode Shutdown Workstation (MCR/RSW)
(EMIi RFI)
Disturbances in the Frequency Range of O Transfer Panel Signal Leads Hz to 150 kHz," 1998.
MCR SR Display & Control Power &
Signal Leads I EC 61000-4-13, "Electromagnetic Conducted Compatibility (EMC), Part 4: Testing and PMS Cabinet Power Leads Susceptibility, Measurement Techniques, Section 13:
Low Frequency, Harmonics and lnterharmonics Including MCR SR Display & Control Power (EMIi RFI)
Mains Signaling at AC Power Port, Low Leads Frequency Immunity Tests," 2002.
PMS Cabinet Power & Signal Leads IEC 61000-4-6, "Electromagnetic Reactor Trip Switchgear Power &
Conducted Compatibility (EMC), Part 4: Testing and Signal Leads Susceptibility, Measurement Techniques, Section 6:
High Frequency Immunity to Conducted Disturbances, MCR/RSW Transfer Panel Signal (EMI/ RFI)
Induced by Radio-Frequency Fields," 1996.
Leads MCR SR Display & Control Power &
SiQnal Leads Radiated IEC 61000-4-8, "Electromagnetic PMS Cabinet Susceptibility, Compatibility (EMC), Part 4: Testing and Measurement Techniques, Section 8:
Reactor Trip Switchgear Magnetic Field, Power Frequency Magnetic Field Immunity (EMI/ RFI)
Test," 1993. (Note 2)
MCR SR Display & Control Radiated IEC 61000-4-9, "Electromagnetic PMS Cabinet Susceptibility, Compatibility (EMC), Part 4: Testing and Measurement Techniques, Section 9:
Reactor Trip Switchgear Magnetic Field, Power Frequency Magnetic Field Immunity (EMI/ RFI)
Test," 1993.
MCR SR Display & Control Radiated IEC 61000-4-10, "Electromagnetic PMS Cabinet Susceptibility, Compatibility (EMC), Part 4: Testing and Measurement Techniques, Section 1 O:
Reactor Trip Switchgear Magnetic Field, Damped Oscillatory Magnetic Field (EMI/ RFI)
Immunity Test," 1993.
MCR SR Display & Control
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-21-1024 Enclosure Page 10 of 11 EMC Type Test Test Standard IEC 61000-4-3, "Electromagnetic Radiated Compatibility (EMC), Part 4: Testing and Susceptibility, Measurement Techniques, Section 3:
Electrical Field, Radiated, Radio-Frequency, (EMI/ RFI)
Electromagnetic Field Immunity Test,"
1995.
Radiated MIL-STD-461E(RS103), "Requirements for Susceptibility, the Control of Electromagnetic Interference Electrical Field, Characteristics of Subsystems and (EMI/ RFI)
Equipment," U.S. Department of Defense, (Note 2)
August 1999.
I EC 61000-4-4, "Electromagnetic Electrical Fast Compatibility (EMC), Part 4: Testing and Transient Measurement Techniques, Section 4:
(SWC)
Electrical Fast Transient/Burst Immunity Test," 1995.
- Surge, IEC 61000-4-5, "Electromagnetic Combination Compatibility (EMC), Part 4: Testing and Wave Measurement Techniques, Section 5:
(SWC)
Surge Immunity Test," 1995 & 2005.
I EC 61000-4-12, "Electromagnetic Surge, Ring Compatibility (EMC), Part 4: Testing and Wave Measurement Techniques, Section 12:
(EMI/ RFI)
Oscillatory Waves Immunity Test," 1995 &
2006.
Application PMS Cabinet Reactor Trip Switchgear MCR/RSW Transfer Panel MCR SR Display & Control PMS Cabinet Reactor Trip Switchgear MCR/RSW Transfer Panel MCR SR Display & Control PMS Cabinet Power & Signal Leads Reactor Trip Switchgear Power &
Signal Leads MCR/RSW Transfer Panel Signal Leads MCR SR Display & Control Power &
Siqnal Leads PMS Cabinet Power & Signal Leads Reactor Trip Switchgear Power &
Signal Leads MCR/RSW Transfer Panel Signal Leads MCR SR Display & Control Power &
Signal Leads PMS Cabinet Power & Signal Leads Reactor Trip Switchgear Power &
Signal Leads MCR/RSW Transfer Panel Signal Leads MCR SR Display & Control Power &
Signal Leads
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-21 -1024 Enclosure Page 11 of 11 EMC Tvpe Test Test Standard Electrostatic I EC 61000-4-2, "Electromagnetic Discharge Compatibility (EMC), Part 4: Testing and Immunity (ESD)
Measurement Techniques, Section 2:
(Note 3)
Electrostatic Discharge Immunity Test,"
2008.
Notes:
Application PMS Cabinet Reactor Trip Switchgear MCR/RSW Transfer Panel MCR SR Disolav & Control
- 1. Voltage Total Harmonic Distortion (VTHD) tests were performed to support exemption of the following equipment from CE101 tests under Regulatory Guide 1.180 Position 3.1.
- 2. MIL-STD-461 E RS103 (Radiated susceptibility, electric field) test is used to extend the alternative susceptibility test range of the radiated electrical fields susceptibility above 1 GHz, as indicated in RG 1.180 Position 6.