ND-21-1031, ITAAC Closure Notification on Completion of ITAAC Item 2.1.03.06.i (Index Number 75)

ITAAC Closure Notification on Completion of ITAAC Item 2.1.03.06.i (Index Number 75)

ML22077A779
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	03/18/2022
From:	Yox M Southern Nuclear Operating Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
ND-21-1031
Download: ML22077A779 (13)

Text

Michael J. Yox 7825 River Road

.>-,, Southern Nuclear Regu latory Affairs Director Vogtle 3 & 4 Waynesboro. GA 30830 706-848-6459 tel MAR 1 8 2022 Docket Nos.: 52-025 ND-21-1031 10 CFR 52.99(c)(1)

U.S . Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington , DC 20555-0001 Southern Nuclear Operating Company Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 3 ITAAC Closure Notification on Completion of ITAAC Item 2 .1.03.06.i (Index Number 75)

Ladies and Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10 CFR 52.99(c)(1 ), the purpose of this letter is to notify the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) of the completion of Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Unit 3 Inspections, Tests , Analyses , and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) Item 2.1.03 .06.i (Index Number 75) to demonstrate that the Reactor System (RXS) equipment identified as seismic Category I or Class 1 E in the Combined License (COL) Appendix C , Table 2.1.3-1 is designed and constructed in accordance with applicable requirements. The closure process for this ITAAC is based on the guidance described in NEI 08-01 , "Industry Guideline for the ITAAC Closure Process under 10 CFR Part 52 ," which was endorsed by the NRC in Regulatory Guide 1.215.

This letter contains no new NRC regulatory commitments . Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) requests NRC staff confirmation of this determination and publication of the required notice in the Federal Register per 10 CFR 52 .99.

If there are any questions, please contact Kelli Roberts at 706-848-6991.

R*;::~b; A/)

Michael J. YoJP_ ~

Regulatory Affairs Director Vogtle 3 & 4

Enclosure:

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Unit 3 Completion of ITAAC 2.1.03 .06 .i (Index Number 75)

MJY/BSZ/sfr

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-21-1031 Page 2 of 3 To:

Southern Nuclear Operating Company/ Georgia Power Company Mr. Peter P. Sena Ill Mr. D. L. McKinney Mr. H. Nieh Mr. G . Ch ick Mr. S. Stimac Mr. P. Martino Mr. J.B. Williams Mr. M. J. Yax Mr. A. S. Parton Ms . K. A. Roberts Ms . J.M. Coleman Mr. C. T. Defnall Mr. C. E. Morrow Mr. K. J. Drudy Mr. J. M. Fisher Mr. R. L. Beilke Mr. S. Leighty Ms. A. C. Chamberlain Mr. J. C. Haswell Document Services RTYPE : VND.LI .L06 File AR.01 .02 .06 Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ms . M. Bailey Mr. M. King Mr. G. Bowman Ms. A. Veil Mr. C. P. Patel Mr. G . J. Khouri Mr. C. J. Even Mr. B. J. Kemker Ms . N. C. Coovert Mr. C. Welch Mr. J. Gaslevic Mr. 0 . Lopez-Santiago Mr. G. Armstrong Mr. M. Webb Mr. T. Fredette Mr. C. Santos Mr. B. Davis Mr. J. Vasquez Mr. J. Eargle Mr. T. Fanell i Ms. K. Mccurry Mr. J. Parent Mr. B. Griman Mr. V. Hall

U.S . Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-21-1031 Page 3 of 3 Oglethorpe Power Corporation Mr. R. B. Brinkman Mr. E. Rasmussen Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia Mr. J. E. Fuller Mr. S. M . Jackson Dalton Utilities Mr. T. Bundros Westinghouse Electric Company, LLC Dr. L. Oriani Mr. D. C . Durham Mr. M . M. Corletti Mr. Z. S. Harper Ms . S. L. Zwack Other Mr. S. W. Kline , Bechtel Power Corporation Ms . L. Matis, Tetra Tech NUS, Inc.

Dr. W . R. Jacobs, Jr., Ph.D ., GOS Associates, Inc.

Mr. S. Roetger, Georgia Public Service Commission Mr. R. L. Trokey , Georgia Public Service Commission Mr. K. C. Greene, Troutman Sanders Mr. S. Blanton , Balch Bingham

U.S . Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-21-1031 Enclosure Page 1 of 10 Southern Nuclear Operating Company ND-21-1031 Enclosure Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Unit 3 Completion of ITAAC 2.1.03.06.i [Index Number 75]

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-21-1031 Enclosure Page 2 of 10 ITAAC Statement Design Commitment:

6. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1 .3-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function .

9.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during , and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function .

Inspections, Tests , Analyses:

i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1 .3-1 (except fuel assemblies, rod cluster control assemblies, gray rod cluster assemblies, and incore instrument Quickloc assemblies) is located on the Nuclear Island .

ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.

iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions . This inspection must be performed on the as-built equipment except for the fuel assemblies, rod cluster control assemblies, gray rod cluster assemblies, and incore instrument Quickloc assemblies.

i) Type tests , analysis , or a combination of type tests and analysis will be performed on Class 1E equipment located in a harsh environment.

ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring ,

cables , and terminations located in a harsh environment.

Acceptance Criteria:

i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.3-1 (except fuel assemblies , rod cluster control assemblies , gray rod cluster assemblies , and incore instrument Quickloc assemblies) is located on the Nuclear Island.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function .

iii) A report exists and concludes that the equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

i) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during , and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function .

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-21-1031 Enclosure Page 3 of 1O ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring ,

cables , and terminations identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests , analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.

ITAAC Determination Basis This ITAAC requires that inspections , tests , and analyses be performed and documented to ensure the Reactor System (RXS) components identified as seismic Category I or Class 1E in the Combined License (COL) Appendix C, Table 2.1.3-1 (the Table) are designed and constructed in accordance with applicable requirements .

i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.3-1 (except fuel assemblies, rod cluster control assemblies, gray rod cluster assemblies, and incore instrument QuickLoc assemblies) is located on the Nuclear Island.

To assure that seismic Category I components can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function , all the components in the Table are designed to be located on the seismic Category I Nuclear Island. In accordance with Equipment Qualification (EQ)

Walkdown ITAAC Guideline and EQ ITAAC As-built Installation Documentation Guideline (References 1 & 2) , an inspection was conducted of the RXS to confirm the satisfactory installation of the seismically qualified components . The inspection includes verification of equipment make/model/serial number and verification of equipment location (Building ,

Elevation , Room) . Fuel assemblies , rod cluster control assemblies, gray rod cluster assemblies, and incore instrument QuickLoc assemblies are not installed in their final location until after the 10 CFR 52.103(g) finding has been made as part of initial fuel load . Per item ii below, the assemblies are seismically qualified when located on the nuclear island . Inspections of these assemblies are performed but not in the final installed location , since that is not allowed by 52.103(g) . The EQ As-Built Reconciliation Reports (EQRR) (Reference 5) identified in Attachment A document the results of the inspection and conclude that the seismic Category I components are located on the Nuclear Island except for the fuel assemblies , rod cluster control assemblies , gray rod cluster assemblies, and incore instrument QuickLoc assemblies .

ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function .

Seismic Category I components in the Table require type tests and/or analyses to demonstrate structural integrity and operability. Structural integrity of the passive seismic Category I mechanical equipment is demonstrated by analysis in accordance with American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Section Ill (Reference 6).

Safety-related (Class 1E) electrical equipment in the Table is seismically qualified by type testing combined with analysis in accordance with Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standard 344-1987 (Reference 7) . The specific qualification method (i.e .,

type testing , analysis, or combination) used for each component in the Table is identified in Attachment A Additional information about the methods used to qualify AP1000 safety-related equipment is provided in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Appendix 3D (Reference 8) . The EQ Reports (Reference 9) identified in Attachment A contain applicable test reports and associated documentation and conclude that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function .

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-21-1031 Enclosure Page 4 of 10 iii) A report exists and concludes that the equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions .

To the extent that the installation prior to fuel load is possible , an inspection (References 1 & 2) was conducted to confirm the satisfactory installation of the seismically qualified components in the Table. The inspection verifies the equipment make/model/serial number, as-designed equipment mounting orientation , anchorage and clearances , and electrical and other interfaces.

For components not installed prior to fuel load , the inspection is accomplished by verifying a quality assurance data package (Reference 12 (i.e. fuel assemblies , rod cluster control assemblies , gray rod cluster assemblies , and incore instrument Quickloc assemblies)) exists that concludes that the equipment was constructed as per design .

The inspection conducted for each component in the table will cons ider the critical seismic attributes identified in the associated EQ Report for that component. The inspection will confirm that the equipment, including anchorage , is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions .

Attachment A identifies the EQRR (Reference 5) completed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment listed in the Table , including anchorage , are seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions , IEEE Standard 344-1987 (Reference 7) and NRC Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.100 (Reference 10).

i) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before , during , and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function .

The harsh environment Class 1E components in the Table are qualified by type testing and/or analyses . Class 1E electrical component type testing is performed in accordance with IEEE Standard 323-197 4 (Reference 7) and RG 1.89 (Reference 3) to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49. Type testing of safety-related equipment meets the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A , General Design Criterion 4. Attachment A identifies the EQ program and specific qualification method for each safety-related mechanical or Class 1E electrical component located in a harsh environment. Additional information about the methods used to qualify AP1000 safety-related equipment is provided in the UFSAR Appendix 3D (Reference 8) .

EQ Reports (Reference 9) identified in Attachment A contain applicable test reports and associated documentation and conclude that the equipment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before , during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring ,

cables , and terminations identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests , analyses , or a combination of type tests and analyses.

An inspection is conducted to confirm the satisfactory installation of the harsh qualified as-built components in the Table. The inspection verifies the equipment location, make/model/serial number, as-designed equipment mounting , wiring , cables , and terminations and confirms that the environmental conditions for the zone in which the component is mounted are bounded by the tested and/or analyzed conditions.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-21-1031 Enclosure Page 5 of 10 The EQRR (Reference 5) identified in Attachment A document this inspection and conclude that the harsh environment Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables , and terminations are bounded by the qualified configuration and IEEE Standard 323-1974 (Reference 11 ).

Together, these reports (References 5, 9, and 12) provide evidence that the ITAAC Acceptance Criteria requirements are met:

• The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.3-1 (except fuel assemblies, rod cluster control assemblies, gray rod cluster assemblies , and incore instrument Quickloc assemblies) is located on the Nuclear Island;

• A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function ;

• A report exists and concludes that the equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions;

• A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during , and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function ; and

• A report exists and concludes that the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring , cables , and terminations identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests , analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses .

References 5, 9, and 12 are available for NRC inspection as part of the Unit 3 ITAAC 2.1.03.06.i Completion Package (Reference 4) .

ITAAC Finding Review In accordance with plant procedures for ITAAC completion , Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) performed a review of all lTAAC findings pertaining to the subject ITAAC and associated corrective actions. This finding review, which included now-consolidated ITAAC Indexes 76, 77 , 81 , and 82 , found no relevant ITAAC findings associated with this ITAAC .

ITAAC Completion Statement Based on the above information , SNC hereby notifies the NRC that ITAAC 2.1.03.06.i was performed for VEGP Unit 3 and that the prescribed acceptance criteria are met.

Systems , structures, and components verified as part of this ITAAC are being maintained in their as-designed , ITAAC compliant condition in accordance with the approved plant programs and procedures.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-21-1031 Enclosure Page 6 of 10 References (available for NRC inspection)

1. ND-RA-001-014, "EQ ITAAC As-built Walkdown Guideline", Version 3.1

2. ND-RA-001-016, "EQ ITAAC As-built Installation Documentation Guideline", Version 1.0

3. Regulatory Guide 1.89, Rev 1, "Environmental Qualification of Certain Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants"

4. 2.1 .03.06 .i-U3-CP-Rev0 , ITAAC Completion Package

5. EQ Reconciliation Reports as identified in Attachment A for Units 3

6. American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B&PV)

Code , Section Ill , "Rules for Construction of Nuclear Power Plant Components," 1998 Edition with 2000 Addenda

7. IEEE Standard 344-1987, "IEEE Recommended Practices for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations"

8. Vogtle 3&4 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Appendix 3D, "Methodology for Qualifying AP1000 Safety-Related Electrical and Mechanical Equipment"

9. Equipment Qualification Reports as identified in Attachment A

10. Regulatory Guide 1.100, Rev . 2, "Seismic Qualification of Electric and Mechanical Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants" 11 . IEEE Standard 323-197 4, "IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations"

12. SV3-RXS-ITR-800075, "Unit 3 Reactor System (RXS) Seismic Category I Equipment Qualification - As-Built Summary for Fuel Assemblies , Control Rods , and Gray Rods"

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-21-1031 Enclosure Page 7 of 10 Attachment A System : Reactor System (RXS)

Class 1 E/ Envir Equipment Seismic Qua l. For Envi r. Qual Type of Tag No.+ EQ Reports EQRR Name+ Cat. I+ Harsh Zone 1 Prog ram Qual.

Envir.+ 3 2 SV3-RV (Reactor 2.1.03.06.i-U3-RXS-MV-01 Yes - N/A N/A Analysis MV01-Vessel) EQRR-PCD001 Z0R-101 Reactor Upper SV3-MI01 - 2.1.03.06.i-U3-RXS-Ml-01 Yes - N/A N/A Analysis Internals S3R-002 EQRR-PCD001 Assembly Reactor Lower SV3-MI01- 2.1.03.06.i-U3-RXS-Ml-02 Yes - N/A N/A Analysis Internals S3R-002 EQRR-PCD001 Assembly

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-21-1031 Enclosure Page 8 of 10 Class 1 E/ Envir Equipment Seismic Qual. For Envir. Qual Type of Tag No.+ EQ Reports EQRR Name+ Cat. I+ Harsh Zone 1 Program Qual.

Envir.+ 3 2 RXS-F A-AO?/ A08/ A09/ B05/ B06/ B07 / B08/

B09/ B 10/ B 11 / C04/ C05/ C06/ CO?/ C08/ C09/

C 10/ C 11 / C 12/ D03/ D04/ D05/ D06/ D07 / D08/

D09/ D10/ D11 / D12/ D13/ E02/ E03/ E04/ E05/

E06/E07/E08/E09/E10/E11/E12/E13/E14/

F02/ F03/ F04/ F05/ F06/ F07/ FOB/ F09/ F10/

F11/ F12/ F13/ F14/ G01/ G02/ G03/ G04/ G05/

CN-NRFE-Fuel G06/ GO?/ GOBI G09/ G10/ G11/ G12/ G13/

10-21 Assemblies G14/ G15/ H01/ H02/ H03/ H04/ H05/ H06/ HO?/ 2.1.03.06.i-U3-Yes - N/A N/A Analysis (157 HOB/ H09/ H10/ H11/ H12/ H13/ H14/ H15/ J01/ EQRR-PCD002 CN-NRFE-locations) J02/J03/J04/J05/J06/J07/JOB/J09/J10/J11/

13-1 J 12/ J 13/ J 14/ J 15/ K02/ K03/ K04/ K05/ K06/

KO?/ KOB/ K09/ K10/ K11/ K12/ K13/ K14/ L02/

L03/ L04/ L05/ L06/ LO?/ L08/ L09/ L 10/ L 11 /

L 12/ L 13/ L 14/ M03/ M04/ M05/ M06/ MO?/ MOB/

M09/ M10/ M11/ M 12/ M13/ N04/ N05/ N06/

NO?/ NOB/ N09/ N10/ N11/ N12/ P05/ P06/ PO?/

P08/ P09/ P10/ P11/ RO?/ ROB/ R09 RXS-FR-B06/ B10/ C05/ CO?/ C09/ C11/ D06/

Rod Cluster D08/D10/E03/E05/E07/E09/E11/E13/F02/

Control F04/ F12/ F14/ G03/ G05/ GO?/ G09/ G11/ G13/

Assemblies 2.1.03.06.i-U3-H04/ HOB/ H 12/ J03/ J05/ JO?I J09/ J 11 / J 13/ Yes - N/A N/A Analysis NRFE-14-1 (RCCAs) EQRR-PCD002 K02/ K04/ K 12/ K 14/ L03/ L05/ LO?/ L09/ L 11 /

(minimum 53 L 13/ M06/ M08/ M10/ N05/ NO?/ N09/ N11/ P06/

locations)

P10 Gray Rod Cluster RXS-FG-B08/ D04/ D12/ F06/ F08/ F10/ H02/ 2.1.03.06.i-U3-Assemblies Yes - N/A N/A Analysis NRFE-14-1 H06/ H 10/ H 14/ K06/ K08/ K 10/ M04/ M 12/ POB EQRR-PCD002 (GRCAs) (16 locations)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-21-1031 Enclosure Page 9 of 10 Class 1E/ Envir Equipment Seismic Qual. For Envir. Qual Type of Tag No.+ EQ Reports EQRR Name+ Cat. I+ Harsh Zone 1 Program Qual.

2 Envir.+ 3 RXS-MV-11B06/ 11B08/ 11B10/ 11C05/ 11C07/

11C09/ 11C11/ 11D04/ 11D06/ 11D08/ 11D10/

11D12/ 11E03/ 11E05/ 11E07/ 11E09/ 11E11/

11E13/ 11F02/ 11F04/ 11F06/ 11F08/ 11F10/

Control Rod 11F12/ 11F14/ 11G03/ 11G05/ 11G07/ 11G09/

Drive SV3-11G11/ 11G13/ 11H02/ 11H04/ 11H06/ 11H08/ 2.1.03 .06 .i-U3-Mechanisms Yes No/ No N/A N/A Analysis MV11-11H10/ 11H12/ 11H14/ 11J03/ 11J05/ 11J07/ EQRR-PCD001 (CRDMs) (69 S3R-002 11 J09/ 11 J 11 / 11 J 13/ 11 K02/ 11 K04/ 11 K06/

Locations) 11 KOS/ 11 K 10/ 11 K 12/ 11 K 14/ 11 L03/ 11 L05/

11 L0?/ 11 L09/ 11 L 11/ 11 L 13/ 11 M04/ 11 M06/

11M08/ 11M10/ 11M12/ 11N05/ 11N07/ 11N09/

11N11/ 11P06/ 11P08/ 11P10 lncore Instrument SV3-2.1.03.06 .i-U3-QuickLoc RXS-MY-Y11 through Y18 Yes - N/A N/A Analysis MV01-EQRR-PCD002 Assemblies S3R-002 (8 Locations)

Type SV3 JE92-Source Testing VBR-001 / 2.1 .03 .06 .i-U3-Range RXS-JE-NE001A/ NE001 B/ NE001 C/ NE001 D Yes Yes/ Yes 1 E*

& SV3-JE92- EQRR-PCD003 Detectors (4)

Analysis VBR-002 Type SV3-JE92-Intermediate Testing VBR-001 / 2.1.03.06 .i-U3-Range RXS-JE-NE002A/ NE002B/ NE002C/ NE002D Yes Yes/ Yes 1 E*S

& SV3-JE92- EQRR-PCD003 Detectors (4)

Analysis VBR-002 Type SV3-JE92-Power Range Testing VBR-001 / 2.1.03.06 .i-U3-Detectors - RXS-JE-NE003A/ NE003B/ NE003C/ NE003D Yes Yes/ Yes 1 E*S

& SV3-JE92- EQRR-PCD003 Lower (4)

Analysis VBR-002

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-21-1031 Enclosure Page 10 of 10 Class 1 E/ Envir Equipment Seismic Qual. For Envir. Qual Type of Tag No.+ EQ Reports EQRR Name+ Cat. I+ Harsh Zone 1 Program Qual.

2 Envir.+ 3 Type SV3-JE92-Power Range Testing VBR-001 / 2.1.03.06.i-U3-Detectors - RXS-JE-NE004A/ NE0048/ NE004C/ NE004D Yes Yes/ Yes 1 E*S

& SV3-JE92- EQRR-PCD003 Upper (4)

Analysis VBR-002 Notes:

+ Excerpt from COL Appendix C Table 2.1.3-1

1. See Table 3D .5-1 of UFSAR

2. E = Electrical Equipment Program (limit switch and the motor operator, squib operator, solenoid operator)

S = Qualified for submergence or operation with spray

• = Harsh Environment

3. Dash(-) indicates not applicable