ML22059B045
| ML22059B045 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 01/21/2022 |
| From: | Forrestt W Dominion Energy Nuclear Connecticut |
| To: | Brian Fuller Operations Branch I |
| Shared Package | |
| ML21321A323 | List: |
| References | |
| EPID L-2022-OLL-0039 | |
| Download: ML22059B045 (34) | |
Text
Simulator Guide SEG#_2K21 NRC-05_ Rev ; __0__
Page 5 of 34 Facility: Millstone 3. Scenario No.: 2K21 NRC-05 (Rev 0). Op-Test No.: 2K21.
Examiners:
Operators:.
Initial Conditions: IC-99, 100% Power, Beginning of life, Equilibrium Xe Turnover: B RHR Pump is tagged out of service.
Critical Tasks: 1. Manually close the B PORV Block Valve by the completion of E-0 Step 12.(CT-10).
- 1.
Event No.
Malf.
No Event Type*
Event Description 1
MB8B-B08 US TS Breaker trips for 3DAS-P10, containment drain unidentified sump pump 2
RX09C US I,TS RO I Controlling channel of pressurizer pressure fails high causing the pressurizer spray valves to open.
3 FW01 US C RO R BOP C Loss of condenser vacuum requiring use of AOP 3559 and subsequent rapid downpower.
4 TC01 RP10A RP10B RP09A US C BOP C Main Turbine trips on rising condenser vacuum with an automatic reactor trip failure. MB7 Reactor trip is successful.
5 MS07A MS07B MS07C MS07D ALL M Loss of secondary heat removal transient causes both PORVs and S/G Safeties to open. The low set safeties on all four S/Gs fail to reseat. Four Faulted SGs (E-0, E-2, ECA-2.1).
6 RC18B US C RO C B PORV fails to re-close and requires manual action to close the associated block valve.
7 SG02A US C BOP C A SG Blowdown Isolation Valve sticks open requiring dispatch and manual closure of alternate valve.
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Simulator Guide SEG#_2K21 NRC-05_ Rev ; __0__
Page 6 of 34 Transient and Event Checklist (used to complete NRC Form ES-301-5)
US (target)
RX 0 (0)
NOR 0 (1*)
I/C 5 (2)
MAJ 1 (1)
TS 2 (2)
- of CTs 2
- For an Exam Set, the ROs and Instant SROs are required one Normal evolution. However, reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced w/ additional I/C manlfunctions on a one-for-one basis.
Simulator Scenario Quality Checklist (used to complete NRC Form ES-301-4)
Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See NUREG 1021 Appendix D)
Actual
- 1. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2
- 2. Abnormal events (2-4) (typically before major event) 3
- 3. Major transients (1-2) 1
- 4. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) (exclude E-0) 1
- 5. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions ( 1 per scenario set) 1
- 6. Pre-identified critical tasks ( 2) 2
Simulator Guide SEG#_2K21 NRC-05_ Rev ; __0__
Page 7 of 34 Critical Tasks TASK DESCRIPTION TASK #
K/A BASIS OF SELECTION Manually close the B PORV Block Valve by the completion of E-0 Step 12.
CT-10 EPE 009-EA1.15 (3.9 / 4.1)
Source: Westinghouse PWROG-14043-NP ERG Rev. 3 Based Critical Tasks Reduce AFW flow to 100 gpm per SG by completion of step 2 of ECA-2.1.
AFW 061 A3.02 (4.0 / 4.0)
Failure to control AFW flow rate to the SGs leads to an unnecessary and avoidable challenge to RCS integrity.
Simulator Guide Page 1 of 34 SEG#_2K21 NRC-05_ Rev ; __0 SITE:
Millstone Power Station PROGRAM:
Unit 3 ILT COURSE:
N/A EXAM TITLE:
NRC SIM EXAM 5 EXAM #: 2K21 NRC-05 Total Time 90 Minutes Prepared by:
W.M. Forrestt Signature on file 12/8/2021 Printed Name Developer Signature Date J. Go Signature on file 12/9/2021 Reviewed by:
Printed Name Operations Supervisor Signature Date Approved by:
A. Leone Signature on file 12/13/2021 Printed Name Facility Review Signature Date
Simulator Guide SEG#_2K21 NRC-05_ Rev ; __0__
Page 2 of 34
SUMMARY
OF CHANGES DATE DESCRIPTION REV/CHANGE 12/2/21 Original issue for re-examination.
0 / 0
Simulator Guide SEG#_2K21 NRC-05_ Rev ; __0__
Page 3 of 34 TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTIONS LISTED IN ORDER
- 1.
Cover Page
- 2.
Table of Contents
- 3.
Exam Overview and Forms
- 4.
Exam Guide
Attachment:
Shift Turnover Report
Simulator Guide SEG#_2K21 NRC-05_ Rev ; __0__
Page 4 of 34 SECTION 3 EXAM OVERVIEW
Title:
Four Faulted SGs
- 1. The crew takes the shift with the plant at 100% power and at beginning of core life. The B Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump is tagged out service for an emergent motor oil leak.
Event 1: Breaker trips for 3DAS-P10, containment drain unidentified sump pump.
A Main Board annunciator for loss of control power to 480 Motor Control Centers alarms. The US implements the ARP actions and determines that 3DAS-P10 breaker has tripped. This pump is credited in TS for RCS leakage detection. The US enters the appropriate TS.
Event 2: Controlling channel of pressurizer pressure fails high causing the pressurizer spray valves to open.
RCS*P457 fails high. The RO performs immediate actions per AOP 3581, Immediate Operator Actions. The US transitions to AOP 3571, Instrument Failure Response, to remove the failed channel, place an alternate channel in service, and address Tech Specs.
Event 3: Loss of Condenser Vacuum / Rapid Downpower A loss of condenser vacuum occurs (consistent with a condenser vacuum boot issue). The US implements AOP 3559, Loss of Condenser Vacuum. The leak worsens and the crew is forced to perform an emergency load reduction per AOP 3575, Rapid Downpower.
Event 4: Main Turbine trips with an automatic reactor trip failure.
Automatic Reactor trip is defeated and there is a failure of the MB4 Rx Trip Switch. The BOP Operators will trip the Reactor using the MB7 Rx Trip Switch.
Event 5: Loss of secondary heat removal transient causes both PORVs and S/G Safeties to open. Four Faulted SGs.
The turbine trip (without automatic Rx trip) causes both the PORVs & S/G Safeties to lift. The low set safeties on all four SGs will not re-close (100% failure is inserted on the RX Trip). This ultimately requires the crew to implement ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization Of All Steam Generators.
While in ECA-2.1, the crew reduces auxiliary feed flow to 100 gpm per SG (Critical Task).
Event 6: The B PORV fails to re-close.
The US directs closure of the B PORV block valve using the guidance of E-0 (Critical Task).
Event 7: A SG Blowdown Isolation Valve sticks open.
US utilizes ECA-2.1 Attachment B guidance to close an alternate Blowdown isolation valve.
Simulator Guide SEG#_2K21 NRC-05_ Rev ; __0__
Page 8 of 34 SECTION 4 EXAM GUIDE All Control Room Conduct, Operations and Communications shall be in accordance with OP-AA-100, Conduct of Operations.
"Review the Simulator Operating Limits (design limits of plant) and the Simulator Modeling Limitations and Anomalous Response List prior to performing this exam scenario on the simulator. The evaluators should be aware if any of these limitations may be exceeded." (NSEM 6.06)
Simulator Guide Page 9 of 34 SEG#_2K21 NRC-05_ Rev : __0_
INPUT
SUMMARY
RESET SIMULATOR TO IC-99 Ensure the following is loaded into IC-99 ID Description Event Trigger Delay Time Ramp Time Delete Time Severity Or Value MALFUNCTIONS MB8B-B08 MCC LOSS OF CNTRL POWER 1
ON RX09C PZR PT457 FAIL 2
30 sec. 2500 psia FW01 LOWERING CONDENSER VACUUM 3
20 sec. 1000 cfm TC01 TURBINE TRIP 4
30 sec.
TU02F TURBINE HIGH VIB BRG #6 4
8 mils TU02G TURBINE HIGH VIB BRG #7 4
7 mils TU02H TURBINE HIGH VIB BRG #8 4
6 mils RP10A AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP TRAIN A FAIL RP10B AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP TRAIN B FAIL MS07A MS SAFETY VALVE RV22A FAIL 30 100%
MS07B MS SAFETY VALVE RV22B FAIL 30 100%
MS07C MS SAFETY VALVE RV22C FAIL 30 100%
MS07D MS SAFETY VALVE RV22D FAIL 30 100%
RC18B PORV PCV455B FAILS IN OPEN
Simulator Guide Page 10 of 34 SEG#_2K21 NRC-05_ Rev : __0_
INPUT
SUMMARY
RESET SIMULATOR TO IC-99 Ensure the following is loaded into IC-99 ID Description Event Trigger Delay Time Ramp Time Delete Time Severity Or Value RP09A REACTOR MANUAL TRIP SWITCH MB4 FAIL SG02A SG BLOWDOWN ISOL (3BDG*CTV22A) FAILS IN POSITION MB5D-C07 32-2M ROD CNTL AREA EL 45-6 1
ON REMOTE FUNCTIONS WDR04 3DAS P10 CONTROL SWITCH OFF OVERRIDES
Simulator Guide Page 11 of 34 SEG#_2K21 NRC-05_ Rev : __0_
SCENARIO TIME LINE BOOTH INSTRUCTOR EXPECTED RESPONSE PROCEDURE INSTRUCTION COMPLETE Simulator Setup and Readiness Checklist.
SELECT appropriate IC: IC-99 (Password: hickory), 100% power, BOL.
LOAD and RUN applicable Schedule, N/A (part of IC-99)
LOAD event file N/A As necessary, VERIFY the following Initial Malfunctions / I/Os / Remote Functions, as specified on previous Input Summary page.
When the simulator is ready, PLACE to Run and VERIFY the simulator reflects the Initial Conditions for the scenario and is stable.
As necessary, REMOVE the following Equipment from service and tag accordingly:
3RHS*P1B B RHR Pp 1. Ensure in PTL 2. Place a YCT on Control Switch N/A CONDUCT briefing with evaluators.
PRE-SCENARIO:
BRIEF the crew initial plant conditions and provide a shift turnover.
(All) Walk down control boards and conduct shift briefing.
EVENT 1: Breaker trips for 3DAS-P10, containment drain unidentified sump pump US (TS)
General Note(s):
1.) MB8B 2-8 MCC LOSS OF CNTL PWR alarms. The US implements the ARP and determines that 3DAS-P10 breaker has tripped.
This pump is credited in TS for RCS leakage detection. The US enters the appropriate TS.
2.) If the PEO is requested to reset and close the breaker for DAS-P10, the breaker will immediately trip again.
T= Directed by the Lead Examiner:
Trigger 1 (MB8B-B08)
BOP acknowledges MB8B 2-8, MCC Loss of CNTL Pwr.
US enters ARP.
Simulator Guide Page 12 of 34 SEG#_2K21 NRC-05_ Rev : __0_
SCENARIO TIME LINE BOOTH INSTRUCTOR EXPECTED RESPONSE PROCEDURE INSTRUCTION OP 3353.MB8B, MCC LOSS OF CNTL PWR (Rev. 13)
As PEO, acknowledge dispatch to MCC 32-2M.
Two minutes later, REPORT The breaker for 3DAS-P10, Containment Drain Unidentified Sump Pump, is in the tripped position. There is no bypass switch for the alarm.
BOP goes to MB5 Rear and determines effected MCC is 32-2M.
PEO is dispatched to AB - 45 ft.
- 1. DETERMINE motor control center supplying component with loss of control power by checking the following indications:
Annunciator panel MB 5D Plant computer
- 2. Refer To the following and DETERMINE loads causing loss of control power alarm:
There is no alarm bypass switch for the load.
- 3. IF component causing alarm is known and, IF desired, PLACE affected relay switch to BYPASS to reset loss of control power relay alarm.
If dispatched to the LWS panel, report there are no lights for DAS-P10.
- 4. IF no components have lost indicating lights AND no other means of determining the faulty component exists, SEND Operator to perform the following in coordination with Control Room:
There is no alarm bypass switch for the load.
- 5. WHEN cause of loss of control power alarm is fixed, RESTORE affected relay switch to appropriate position:
US determines these Tech Specs are not applicable. However, the US should recall that the RCS leakage detection TS is effected (see following)
- 6. Refer To the following Technical Specifications and DETERMINE Limiting Condition for Operation:
T/S 3.8.1.1, A.C. Sources --- Operating T/S 3.8.1.2, A.C. Sources --- Shutdown T/S 3.8.3.1, Onsite Power Distribution ---
Operating T/S 3.8.3.2, Onsite Power Distribution ---
Shutdown
Simulator Guide Page 13 of 34 SEG#_2K21 NRC-05_ Rev : __0_
SCENARIO TIME LINE BOOTH INSTRUCTOR EXPECTED RESPONSE PROCEDURE INSTRUCTION This condition should prompt the US to enter the Tech Spec for RCS leakage detection.
Give the US 5 minutes to enter the following TS.
T/S 3.4.6.1b Action b After 5 minutes (or completion of TS entry), move onto Event 2.
EVENT 2: Controlling channel of pressurizer pressure fails high causing the pressurizer spray valves to open.
US (TS, I) / RO (I)
General Note(s):
- 1. Controlling channel of pressurizer pressure fails high causing the pressurizer spray valves to open. RCS*P457 fails high. The RO performs immediate actions per AOP 3581. The US transitions to AOP 3571, Instrument Failure Response, to remove the failed channel, place an alternate channel in service, and address Tech Specs.
T= Directed by the Lead Examiner:
Trigger 2 (RX09C)
RO begins immediate operator actions while US maintains oversight RO Performs Immediate Operator Actions:
- 1. Announces Taking my IA for PZR Spray Valve(s) Open
- 2. Announces actions taken as he / she is manually adjusting the Master Pressure Controller.
Simulator Guide Page 14 of 34 SEG#_2K21 NRC-05_ Rev : __0_
SCENARIO TIME LINE BOOTH INSTRUCTOR EXPECTED RESPONSE PROCEDURE INSTRUCTION AOP 3581, Immediate Actions (Rev 7)
- 1. Using Appropriate Attachment, PERFORM Immediate Actions - Attachment E Pressurizer Spray Valve Open RO adjusts Master Pressure Controller to
~58% to close the spray valves and energize the PZR heaters.
E. 1. Terminate Pressurizer Spray
- a. CHECK pressurizer spray valves -BOTH CLOSED (3RCS*PCV455B & 455C)
RNO: IF Pressurizer Pressure is less than 2270 psia, THEN PLACE Master Pressure Controller in MAN AND ADJUST to GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 50% output to maintain Pressurizer Pressure between 2225 psia and 2280 psia.
RCS pressure will be rising under the ROs control.
E.2 Check Pressurizer Spray TERMINATED
- a. CHECK Pressurizer Pressure STABLE OR INCREASING E.3 CHECK Initiating Event INSTRUMENT FAILURE US briefs transition to AOP 3571.
E.4 GO TO AOP 3571, Instrument Failure
Response
AOP 3571, Instrument Failure Response (Rev. 17)
US proceeds to Attachment B.
- 1. PROCEED TO the Appropriate Attachment, AND PERFORM Corrective Actions The Master Pressure Controller has already been placed in manual.
B.1 CHECK PZR PRES (3RCS-PK455A) -
IN MAN US directs selecting Channel 1 for PZR Press Control and recording.
B.2 DEFEAT Failed Channel Input (RCS-PS455F, 455G, & TS411E)
B.3 CHECK PZR Pressure - 2250 psia B.4 PLACE PZR PRES (3RCS-PK455A)
Controller In - AUTOMATIC
Simulator Guide Page 15 of 34 SEG#_2K21 NRC-05_ Rev : __0_
SCENARIO TIME LINE BOOTH INSTRUCTOR EXPECTED RESPONSE PROCEDURE INSTRUCTION If WW Coordinator is contacted for I&C support, acknowledge request. However, bistables will not be tripped as part of this scenario.
US marks Channel 3 for bistables.
B.5 Trip Associated Reactor Protection System Bistable(s)
- a. Using Table B.1, PLACE a check mark in the box above the channel required to be tripped Allow Examinee ~5 minutes to evaluate Tech Specs BEFORE proceeding with the scenario.
US enters Tech Specs:
- 1. TS 3.3.1 (Rx Trip INSTRU) FU7, FU9, FU10. All are Action 6A.
- 2. TS 3.3.2.b (ESFAS INSTRU) FU1d.
Action 20A.
- 3. TS 3.3.2.b (ESFAS INSTRU) FU11.
Action 20.
- 5. TS 3.2.5.b (DNB - most limiting TS the 2 hr Action Statement) (CONDITIONAL:
Applicable IF RCS pressure lowered below 2204 psia)
- b. REFER TO the following Tech Specs for required actions
- TS 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation
- TS 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation
- TS 3.3.3.5, Remote Shutdown Instrumentation
- c. REFER TO the following Technical Requirement for required actions
- TRM 3.3.2.1, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation Yes a Rx trip will not occur when bistables are tripped.
- d. CHECK existing bistable status to ensure a Reactor trip will NOT occur when the failed channel is tripped Yes RCS*PI457 is not normal.
- e. CHECK affected channel indication - NOT NORMAL If WW Coordinator is contacted for I&C support, acknowledge request. However, bistables will not be tripped as part of this scenario.
At the direction of the Lead Examiner, proceed to the next event.
- f. REQUEST I&C use Table B.1 and ATTACHMENT S to perform the following:
- 1. PLACE selected Master Test switch in TEST
- 2. PLACE selected Bistable Switches in TEST
Simulator Guide Page 16 of 34 SEG#_2K21 NRC-05_ Rev : __0_
SCENARIO TIME LINE BOOTH INSTRUCTOR EXPECTED RESPONSE PROCEDURE INSTRUCTION EVENT 3: Loss of Condenser Vacuum / Rapid Downpower US (C) / RO (R) / BOP (C)
General Note(s):
- 1. This event will cause loss of condenser vacuum of varying amounts (cause will not be disclosed to the crew.. but postulated as condenser vacuum boot issue). At first, the booth operator will hold vacuum under 5 in HgA to allow performing actions in AOP 3559.
After the Lead Examiner is satisfied, vacuum will degrade to force the crew to downpower the unit.
T = Lead Examiner Cue Trigger 3 (FW01 @ 1000 cfm)
After condenser backpressure reaches
~4.4 in Hga, Reduce FW01 (740 TO 720 cfm) to maintain condenser backpressure below 5 in HgA.
BOP notes rising condenser back pressure.
US enters AOP 3559.
AOP 3559, Loss of Condenser Vacuum (Rev. 13)
If PEOs are dispatched to the Turbine Building, a cause for the degraded vacuum will NOT be given to the crew.
Condenser backpressure is expected to still be below 5 in. HgA. US proceeds to step 3.
- 1. Check if the Reactor Should Be Tripped
- a. CHECK Reactor Power GREATER THAN 3%
- b. CHECK Condenser backpressure LESS THAN 7.5 inches Hg Absolute
- c. CHECK Condenser backpressure LESS THAN 5 inches Hg Absolute
- d. PROCEED TO step 3
Simulator Guide Page 17 of 34 SEG#_2K21 NRC-05_ Rev : __0_
SCENARIO TIME LINE BOOTH INSTRUCTOR EXPECTED RESPONSE PROCEDURE INSTRUCTION US will have to balance efforts to identify
/ resolve cause of backpressure issue with requirements to downpower the unit.
NOTE: When directed, AOP 3559 is implemented in parallel with AOP 3575, Rapid Downpower. The actions of AOP 3559 are NOT to distract from plant control during AOP 3575.
If called as OMOC (for direction on a downpower), state Absent a turbine vibration issue, dont downpower until condenser back pressure reaches 5 in HgA.
Maintain condenser backpressure below 5 in. HgA until directed by the Lead Examiner. When directed, increase FW01 to 750 cfm (or more) and maintain condenser backpressure between 5 and 6.5 in.HgA.
Step 3 is a Continuous Action Step that either drives a unit downpower if either.condenser backpressure exceeds 5 in. HgA or Management discretion.
Backpressure will be held below 5 in.
HgA to allow the crew to implement AOP 3559. Once the Lead Examiner is satisfied, condenser back pressure will be increased greater than 5 in HgA. to have the crew exercise AOP 3575, Rapid Downpower.
- 3. Check If Turbine Load Should Be Reduced
- a. CHECK Condenser backpressure GREATER THAN 5 inches Hg Absolute AND CHECK Main Generator output GREATER THAN 389 Mwe RNO: PROCEED TO Note prior to step 4 AND IF US/SM DETERMINE a turbine load reduction is needed to stabilize vacuum, THEN RETURN TO step 3.b.
- b. PERFORM both of the following:
GO TO AOP 3575, Rapid Downpower, and LOWER Turbine load AND PROCEED TO the Note prior to Step 4 AND WHEN one of the following occurs:
- Main Generator output LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 389 Mwe THEN PERFORM Step 3.c NOTE: Steps 4 through 11 may be performed in any order.
Simulator Guide Page 18 of 34 SEG#_2K21 NRC-05_ Rev : __0_
SCENARIO TIME LINE BOOTH INSTRUCTOR EXPECTED RESPONSE PROCEDURE INSTRUCTION Cause of loss of vacuum will not be found.
Circ Water alignment / conditions are found to be normal.
- 4. Check Circulating Water System Operation
- a. CHECK Circulating Water Pumps AT LEAST ONE PER CONDENSER RUNNING
- b. CHECK Water Box Outlet Isolation valves for In-Service Water Boxes OPEN
- c. CHECK all Circulating Water pumps -
RUNNING
- d. CHECK the Traveling Screen differential pressure - LESS THAN 12 inches H2O 3ASS-AOV22 is Open.
- 5. Check Condenser Air Removal Alignment
- a. CHECK STEAM JET AIR EJECTOR AUXILIARY STEAM SUPPLY valve (3ASS-AOV22) - OPEN When requested as PEO, wait 4 minutes and REPORT
- 1) Both ejectors in service
- 2) Two first stage jets in service on each ejector
- 3) Ejectors not backfiring 5b. Using OP 3329, Condenser Air Removal, locally PERFORMthe following:
- 1. CHECK BOTH sets of Steam Jet Air Ejectors -
IN SERVICE
- 2. CHECK TWO First Stage Jets IN SERVICE ON EACH AIR EJECTOR
- 3. CHECK Air Ejectors NOT BACKFIRING
- 4. MAINTAIN Condenser backpressure in the prescribed band determined by the procedure in effect
Simulator Guide Page 19 of 34 SEG#_2K21 NRC-05_ Rev : __0_
SCENARIO TIME LINE BOOTH INSTRUCTOR EXPECTED RESPONSE PROCEDURE INSTRUCTION 5c. CHECK Gaseous Waste to Millstone Stack Isolation Dampers (3GWS*AOD78A and 3GWS*AOD78B) - OPEN When requested as PEO, wait 4 minutes and REPORT:
3GWS-FN1A is running.
5d. At Gas Waste Panel (3GWS-PNL01), CHECK Process Vent fans -
ONE RUNNING 3GWS-FN1A OR 3GWS-FN1B When requested as PEO, wait 3 minutes and REPORT:
Both 3ARC-AOV36A/B are open.
5e. Locally, at Turbine Bldg 38 southwest, CHECK Steam Jet Air Ejector Exhaust valves - OPEN 3ARC-AOV36A AND 3ARC-AOV36B
- 6. CHECK Gland Seal Pressure BETWEEN 3 AND 5 PSIG
- 7. Check Auxiliary Steam Pressure In Required Band
- a. CHECK Auxiliary Steam Header Pressure (3ASS-PIC20)(MB6) 140 TO 155 PSIG
- 8. CHECK Condensate Surge Tank Level GREATER THAN 21,000 gal NOT DECREASING IN AN UNEXPECTED MANNER
- 9. CHECK Exhaust Hood Temperature (175°F)
Annunciators - NOT LIT
Simulator Guide Page 20 of 34 SEG#_2K21 NRC-05_ Rev : __0_
SCENARIO TIME LINE BOOTH INSTRUCTOR EXPECTED RESPONSE PROCEDURE INSTRUCTION When requested as PEO, wait 4 minutes and REPORT:
Water is visible in each Vacuum Breaker.
- 10. Check For Condenser In-Leakage
- a. CHECK Condenser Vacuum Breakers (MB7)
(VAC BKRS 3ARC-MOV20A-B-C) -CLOSED
- b. At Turbine Bldg 60 west, locally CHECK Vacuum Breaker Loop Seals - FILLED
- c. Locally CHECK for NO unusual noises indicative of air in-leakage
- d. CHECK Seal Water Supply Pressure Annunciator EXT STM NRV SEAL PRES LO (30 psig) (MB6A 3-6B) - NOT LIT
- e. CONTACT Engineering to assist in locally checking condenser penetrations for air in-leakage If requested as OMOC, REPORT:
Downpower the unit to 75% power at 3%
/ min.
Crew recognizes Condenser backpressure exceeds 5 inHgA.
US implements Step 3 to initiate a downpower.
AOP 3575, Rapid Downpower (Rev. 28)
US works with crew (& OMOC) to determine downpower to 75% at 3% /
min. using a canned Rx plan (RE-H-07).
Attachment H yields a final desired MWE of 933 MW with a Load Set indicated Mwe setting of 1070 MWe.
- 1. Determine The Following:
REFER to ATTACHMENT H to determine the following:
Final desired MWE: ___________
Load Set Indicated MWe Setting:
Final desired Rx Pwr: __________
- 2. CHECK Rod Control - IN AUTO Continue to Modify FW01 to maintain backpressure between 5-6.5 in HgA.
BOP aligns for Load Set.
- 3. Align EHC Panel
- a. CHECK Load reduction using Load Set -
DESIRED
- b. Using ATTACHMENT E, ALIGN EHC Panel for Load Set operation
Simulator Guide Page 21 of 34 SEG#_2K21 NRC-05_ Rev : __0_
SCENARIO TIME LINE BOOTH INSTRUCTOR EXPECTED RESPONSE PROCEDURE INSTRUCTION OMOC recommended 3% per min.
- 4. Determine Power Reduction Rate (% / min)
- a. CHECK power reduction rate - 3%/min or 5%/min RO initiates rapid boration.
- 5. Initiate Rapid Boration
- g. CHECK RCS Makeup System in - AUTO
- h. START ONE Boric Acid Transfer Pump
- BA PP A
- BA PP B
- i. OPEN Emergency Boration Valve, (3CHS*MV8104)
- j. CHECK direct Boric Acid flow (3CHS-FI183A) - INDICATED 5k. RECORD time boration started 5l. ADJUST Charging Line Flow Control Valve, as necessary, to establish net charging flow matched or exceeding Boric Acid flow 5m. RNO: PROCEED TO step 7 AND WHEN boration has been performed for the calculated time, THEN using ATTACHMENT G, STOP boration
Simulator Guide Page 22 of 34 SEG#_2K21 NRC-05_ Rev : __0_
SCENARIO TIME LINE BOOTH INSTRUCTOR EXPECTED RESPONSE PROCEDURE INSTRUCTION Rapid boration is in progress. BOP selects 3% minute and adjusts load set to 1070 MWe.
- 7. Initiate Load Reduction
- a. CHECK Turbine OPERATING MODE - MANUAL
- b. CHECK load reduction-USING LOAD SET
- c. SELECT LOAD RATE LIMIT %/MIN (1%/MIN, 3%/MIN, or 5%/MIN)
- d. CHECK Lowering Turbine Load -
IMMEDIATELY REQUIRED
- e. REFER to ATTACHMENT H AND Using the LOAD SELECTOR pushbuttons, ADJUST LOAD SET to Load Set Indicated MWe setting recorded in step 1 Examiner Note: When Lead Examiner is satisfied with downpower, cue Booth to move onto Event 4.
7f. ENERGIZE ALL PZR Heaters 7g. ADJUST PZR Spray Valves to 50%
setpoint 3RCS-PK 455B 3RCS-PK 455C 7h. MAINTAIN plant parameters values as listed in ATTACHMENT C OR as directed by Operations Management Acknowledge ISO-NE communication and request MP3 maintain 100 MVARs out (+/- 20 MVARs)
Yes.
7i. CHECK power reduction - ISO-NE REQUESTED RNO: NOTIFY ISO-NE of load reduction rate (MWe/min) and final MWe level.
Simulator Guide Page 23 of 34 SEG#_2K21 NRC-05_ Rev : __0_
SCENARIO TIME LINE BOOTH INSTRUCTOR EXPECTED RESPONSE PROCEDURE INSTRUCTION 7 j. CHECK using either of the following to reduce turbine load:
Load Limit Standby Load Set US determines rods are above RIL
- 8. Check Rod Position Above RIL Examiner Note: When Lead Examiner is satisfied with downpower, cue Booth to move onto Event 4.
(US)
- 9. Monitor Downpower
- a. CHECK the following-REMAINS UNCHANGED
- Final desired MWe load
- Final desired target power level
- Boron injection path
- b. PROCEED TO step 9 EVENT 4: Main Turbine trips with an automatic reactor trip failure. US (C) / BOP (C)
EVENT 5: Loss of secondary heat removal transient causes both PORVs and S/G Safeties to open. Four Faulted SGs. ALL (M)
EVENT 6: B PORV Fails to Re-Close US (C) / RO (C)
General Note(s):
1.) Trigger 4 will cause high turbine vibrations followed by a Main Turbine trip (30 seconds later). Automatic Rx trip is defeated and there is a failure of the MB4 Rx Trip Switch. The MB7 Rx Trip Switch will work. (Event 4) 2.) The turbine trip (without an automatic Rx trip) causes both the PORVs & S/G Safeties to lift. The low set safeties on all four SGs will not re-close (100% failure will be inputted on the RX Trip). (Event 5) 3.) The B PORV will fail to re-close. This will require manual closure of the B PORV Block Valve. (Critical Task) (Event 6).
T = Lead Examiner Cue Trigger 4 (TC01,TU02F, TU02G, TU02H)
Event 4.
Crew recognizes the Main Turbine has tripped without an automatic Rx Trip.
BOP successfully trips the Rx from MB7.
US enters E-0.
Simulator Guide Page 24 of 34 SEG#_2K21 NRC-05_ Rev : __0_
SCENARIO TIME LINE BOOTH INSTRUCTOR EXPECTED RESPONSE PROCEDURE INSTRUCTION E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION (Rev. 35)
BOP has tripped the RX from MB7.
1
- Check Reactor Trip CHECK Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers - OPEN CHECK Rod Bottom lights - LIT CHECK Neutron Flux - DECREASING 2
- Check Turbine Trip
- a. CHECK all Turbine Stop Valves - CLOSED Power source is normal - offsite.
3
- Check Power To AC Emergency Busses 3a. CHECK AC Emergency Busses 34C and 34D - BOTH ENERGIZED 3b. Open Phase Condition (OPC) NONE Exists 3c. PROCEED TO step 4.
BOOTH NOTE: Monitor for B PORV opening. Provided there is a slight delay (5 sec.) with tripping the Rx (from when the turbine tripped), the B PORV will automatically open (& fail to close -
RC18B).
In the unlikely case that the B PORV doesnt open, manually INSERT:
1.) Remote: RCLO0063 to ON 2.) Malfn RC07B to 80.0
- When B PORV Block Valve is closed later, remove RC07B.
SI has auto actuated on low Pressurizer Pressure (B PORV fails to re-close once opened automatically - RC18B).
At step 4 pause, RO identifies RCP Trip Criteria is met and US directs stopping RCPs.
4
- Check If SI Is Actuated 4a. CHECK SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION annunciators, (MB4D 1-6 or MB2B 5-9) - LIT 4b. By observation of ESF Group 2 Status Panel lights, CHECK both trains of SI -
ACTUATED
Simulator Guide Page 25 of 34 SEG#_2K21 NRC-05_ Rev : __0_
SCENARIO TIME LINE BOOTH INSTRUCTOR EXPECTED RESPONSE PROCEDURE INSTRUCTION CTMT is NOT adverse.
- 5. DETERMINE IF ADVERSE CTMT CONDITIONS EXIST
- Ctmt temperature - GREATER THAN 180°F OR
- Ctmt radiation - GREATER THAN 10^5 R/ hr RNO: DO NOT USE ADVERSE CTMT parameters RO performs Attachment B.
- 6. Using ATTACHMENT B, Actuation Signal Verification, CHECK Equipment Alignment All three AFW pumps are running normally.
7b. CHECK Turbine-Driven Pump - RUNNING IF NECESSARY
- 8. CHECK AFW Valve Alignment - PROPER EMERGENCY ALIGNMENT
- 9. Check Adequate Heat Sink 9a. CHECK NR level in at least one SG -
GREATER THAN 8% (42% ADVERSE CTMT)
RNO: PROCEED TO step 9.d 9d. CHECK Total AFW Flow - GREATER THAN 530 gpm
Simulator Guide Page 26 of 34 SEG#_2K21 NRC-05_ Rev : __0_
SCENARIO TIME LINE BOOTH INSTRUCTOR EXPECTED RESPONSE PROCEDURE INSTRUCTION BOP throttles AFW to between 530 - 600 gpm.
- 10. Check RCS Temperature
- a. Using GA-26, DUMP steam to control No-Load RCS Temperature - AT 557°F
- b. CHECK RCS Temperature - AT NO-LOAD VALUE:
- d. MAINTAIN total feed flow BETWEEN 530 to 600 gpm until NR Level is GREATER THAN 8% (42% ADVERSE CTMT) in at least one SG
- 11. Check Power To SBO Diesel Auxiliaries
- a. CHECK any SBO Bus Tie Breaker -
CLOSED TO AN ENERGIZED BUS Bus 34A: 34A1-2 Bus 34B: 34B1-2 Bus 24E: A505 (Unit 2)
Event 6: B PORV is failed open. US directs closure of B PORV Block Valve.
(Critical Task)
- 12. Check PZR Valves 12a. CHECK PORVs - CLOSED RNO: IF PZR Pressure LESS THAN 2350 psia, THEN CLOSE PORVs.
IF any PORV CANNOT be closed, THEN CLOSE its Block Valve.
Simulator Guide Page 27 of 34 SEG#_2K21 NRC-05_ Rev : __0_
SCENARIO TIME LINE BOOTH INSTRUCTOR EXPECTED RESPONSE PROCEDURE INSTRUCTION 12b. CHECK normal PZR Spray Valves -
CLOSED 12c. CHECK PORV Block Valves - AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED VALVE OPEN RNO: IF NOT closed to isolate an open PORV(s) in step 12.a RNO, THEN OPEN one Block Valve.
12d. CHECK PORV Block Valves - ALL ENERGIZED VALVES OPEN 12e. CHECK PZR Safety Valves - CLOSED If RCPs werent tripped previously (Foldout Page criteria), RCPs will be likely stopped here (based on expectant RCS pressure).
- 13. Check If RCPs Should Be Stopped
- a. CHECK RCPs - ANY RUNNING
- d. STOP all RCPs All four S/G safeties failed to re-close.
US transitions to E-2 based on 4 faulted S/Gs.
NO SG PRESSURE LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER NO SG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED RNO: INITIATE monitoring of CSF Status Trees AND GO TO E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.
Simulator Guide Page 28 of 34 SEG#_2K21 NRC-05_ Rev : __0_
SCENARIO TIME LINE BOOTH INSTRUCTOR EXPECTED RESPONSE PROCEDURE INSTRUCTION E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation (Rev. 15)
MSIV and Bypass valves are closed.
- 1. CHECK Main Steam Isolation And Bypass Valves - CLOSED 4 faulted SGs. US transitions to ECA-2.1.
- 2. Check At Least One SG Secondary Boundary Intact
- a. CHECK pressures in all SGs AT LEAST ONE STABLE OR RISING AND NOT COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED RNO: IF all SG pressures lowering in an uncontrolled manner, THEN GO TO ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators.
ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization Of All Steam Generators (Rev. 21)
CAUTION: If the capability (e.g, open throttled valves or start TD AFW pump stopped in step 1.b) to feed SGs at GREATER THAN 530 gpm is NOT available and Heat Sink status is RED, then the Heat Sink Status color of RED is valid.
CAUTION: If the TD AFW pump is the only available source of feed flow to ANY SG, a steam supply to the TD AFW pump must be maintained from at least one SG.
- 1. Check Secondary Pressure Boundary
CLOSED
Simulator Guide Page 29 of 34 SEG#_2K21 NRC-05_ Rev : __0_
SCENARIO TIME LINE BOOTH INSTRUCTOR EXPECTED RESPONSE PROCEDURE INSTRUCTION Event 7: A SG Blowdown Isolation Valve failed to isolate (embedded failure
- SGO2A). US utilizes RNO (&
Attachment B) dispatching a PEO to manually close 3BDG-V939.
1b. CHECK SG isolation:
SG Feed Regulating Valves -CLOSED SG Feed Regulating BypassValves -
CLOSED FW Isolation Trip Valves -CLOSED SG Atmospheric Relief and Bypass Valves - CLOSED SG Blowdown Isolation Valves -CLOSED SG Blowdown Sample Isolation Valves -
CLOSED SG Chemical Feed Isolation Valves -
CLOSED Using table, CHECK main steam line drains upstream of MSIVs and TD AFW pump - CLOSED RNO: CLOSE Valves or Isolation Valves.
IF a flow path CANNOT be isolated, THEN using ATTACHMENT B, locally CLOSE valves, one SG at a time.
1c. CHECK MDAFW Pumps:
A MDAFW - SUPPLYING AFW TO A AND D SGs B MDAFW - SUPPLYING AFW TO B AND C SGs 1d. CLOSE Steam Supply Valves to TDAFW pump:
3MSS*MOV17A 3MSS*MOV17B 3MSS*MOV17D CAUTION: A minimum feed flow of 100 gpm must be maintained to each SG with a NR level LESS THAN 8% (42% ADVERSE CTMT).
Simulator Guide Page 30 of 34 SEG#_2K21 NRC-05_ Rev : __0_
SCENARIO TIME LINE BOOTH INSTRUCTOR EXPECTED RESPONSE PROCEDURE INSTRUCTION Critical Task Crew reduces feed flow to 100 gpm to each SG.
- 2. Control Feed Flow To Minimize RCS Cooldown
- a. CHECK cooldown rate in RCS Cold Legs -
LESS THAN 80°F/hr RNO: REDUCE feed flow to 100 gpm to each SG AND PROCEED TO step 2.c.
2c. CHECK RCS Hot Leg WR temperatures -
STABLE OR LOWERING RCPs have already been stopped.
- 4. Check PZR PORVs And BLOCK Valves When called as Chemistry, acknowledge chemistry sample request.
- 5. Check Secondary Radiation
- a. Using GA-30, ALIGN RPCCW for RCS and SG sampling 5b. CHECK trend history and alarm status of radiation monitors Main Steam Line - NORMAL Condenser Air Ejector - NORMAL SG Blowdown - NORMAL 5c. CHECK SG chemistry activity sample results - AVAILABLE RNO: PROCEED TO step 6 AND IF SG sample results indicate Abnormal Radiation, THEN GO TO E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.
Simulator Guide Page 31 of 34 SEG#_2K21 NRC-05_ Rev : __0_
SCENARIO TIME LINE BOOTH INSTRUCTOR EXPECTED RESPONSE PROCEDURE INSTRUCTION Conditions are met to stop RHR. The crew resets SI and stops A RHR Pp (B is RTO). RCS pressure is rising towards PORV setpoint.
- 6. Check Stopping RHR Pumps
- d. IF actuated, THEN RESET the following:SI /
- e. STOP RHR pumps and PLACE in AUTO
- 7. Check Stopping Containment Spray
- 8. CHECK RWST Level - GREATER THAN 520,000 gal As PEO, acknowledge request to implement GA-7. No further action needed (session will end before PEO actions are completed).
- 9. Check Isolating Accumulators
- b. Using GA-7, ISOLATE SI accumulators Conditions will be met to reduce ECCS flow.
- 10. Check If ECCS Flow Should Be Reduced Only CIA requires RESET.
- 11. Reset Actuated ESF Actuation Signals
- a. RESET SI
- b. RESET the following:
CDA LOP CIA CIB As PEO, acknowledge request to implement GA-1. No further action needed (session will end before PEO actions are completed).
- 12. Restore MCC 32-3T
- a. CHECK Emergency Bus 34C ENERGIZED
- b. Using GA-1, ENERGIZE MCC 32-3T
Simulator Guide Page 32 of 34 SEG#_2K21 NRC-05_ Rev : __0_
SCENARIO TIME LINE BOOTH INSTRUCTOR EXPECTED RESPONSE PROCEDURE INSTRUCTION
- 13. Establish Instrument Air To Ctmt
- a. CHECK Instrument Air Compressors - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING
- b. OPEN Instrument Air CTMT Isolation Valves Upon direction of Lead Examiner, PLACE Simulator in FREEZE Crew stops one Charging Pump.
- 14. STOP All But One Charging Pump AND PLACE In AUTO
Simulator Guide SEG#_2K21 NRC-05 Rev : __0__
Page 33 of 34 SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT DATE-TIME PREPARED BY SHIFT Today 0515 Unit Supervisor /NIGHT Shift 18:00 - 06:00 PLANT STATUS:
Mode:
Megawatts:
RCS Leakage:
Date/Time:
1 Thermal: 3641 MWTH Electric: 1278 MWe Identified: 0.015 gpm Unidentified: 0.036 gpm Today 0015 Rx Power:
PZR Pressure:
RCS T-AVE:
Core Burnup:
Protected Train/Facility:
Intake:
100 %
2250 psia 587 deg F 150 MWD/MTU A (Orange)
Green Active Tracking Records and Action Statements Equipment/Reason LCO Action Date Time in LCO Action Requirement Time Left B RHR is tagged out TS 3.5.2.d a
today 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Restore 71 hrs OD Compensatory Actions / Temp Logs Open Date Class Reason Reason Watch Position PLANT SYSTEMS APC System Notes RHS 3RHS*P1B, B RHR Pump, is tagged out of service for an emergent motor oil leak.
CROSS UNIT SYSTEM STATUS SURVEILLANCES / EVOLUTIONS IN PROGRESS Steady State Operation I&C has just completed RAKSET 1 Testing - SAT REACTIVITY BRIEFING (SEE REACTIVITY THUMBRULES / SPREAD SHEET FOR ADDITIONAL INFO)
Current Rod Height 216 Xenon Trend Stable Current Boron 1504 Boron Pot Setting / Blend Ratio 4.27 / 17.1 gpm Plant Risk LERF 1.06 ACT: 1 year CDF 4.15 ACT: 46.9 days
Simulator Guide SEG#_2K21 NRC-05 Rev : __0__
Page 34 of 34 REFERENCE MATERIAL Session No.: NRC-05 Reference No.
Revision
- Copies ARPs MB1C 4-3 Rev. 16 1
MB4A 3-4, 4-3, 4-4 Rev. 8 1
MB4C 6-5 Rev. 22 1
MB5A 4-4 Rev. 12 1
MB6A 4-4, 4-5, 4-6 Rev. 18 1
MB6B 4-2 Rev. 6 1
MB8B 2-8 Rev. 13 1
OTHER - RO Station E-0, ATT. B Rev. 35 N/A OTHER-BOP Station GA-1 Rev. 5 N/A GA-26 Rev. 3 N/A US Desk Procedures AOP 3559 Rev. 13 N/A AOP 3571 Rev. 17 N/A AOP 3575 Rev. 28 N/A AOP 3581 Rev. 7 N/A E-0 Rev. 35 N/A E-2 Rev. 15 N/A ECA-2.1 Rev. 21 N/A