Text

NRC-2016-000721 - Resp 3 - Interim, Agency Records Subject to the Request Are Enclosed
	ML20294A070
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	10/20/2020
From:	Stephanie Blaney; Information Services Branch
To:	Lochbaum D; Union of Concerned Scientists
Shared Package
ML20294A067	List: ML20294A068; ML20294A069; ML20294A070; ML20294A071; ML20294A072;
References
	FOIA, NRC-2016-000721
	Download: ML20294A070 (113)
	v • d • e

NRC FORM 464 Part I U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FOIA RESPONSE NUMBER I

(03-2017)

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i RESPONSE TO FREEDOM OF 2016-0721 11 3

..,..,...... INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) REQUEST

RESPONSE

TYPE [ZJ INTERIM FINAL REQUESTER: DATE:

IDavid Lochbaum DESCRIPTION OF REQUESTED RECORDS:

11 l Request for 35 documents by ADAMS accession number PART I. ** INFORMATION RELEASED You have the right to seek assistance from the NRC's FOIA Public Liaison. Contact information for the NRC's FOIA Public Liaison is available at htt!'.Ls://www. nrc.,gov/reading-rm/foia/contact-foia. html Agency records subject to the request are already available on the Public NRC Website, in Public ADAMS or on microfiche in the

[ZJ NRC Public Document Room.

[ZJ Agency records subject to the request are enclosed.

Records subject to the request that contain information originated by or of interest to another Federal agency have been referred to that agency (see comments section) for a disclosure determination and direct response to you.

[ZJ We are continuing to process your request

[ZJ See Comments.

PART I.A -- FEES NO FEES AMOUNT*

You will be billed by NRG for the amount listed.

Due to our delayed response, you will Minimum fee threshold not met.

II II You will receive a refund for the amount listed.

See Comments for details Fees waived. not be charged fees.

PART I.B ** INFORMATION NOT LOCATED OR WITHHELD FROM DISCLOSURE We did not locate any agency records responsive to your request. Note: Agencies may treat three discrete categories of law enforcement and national security records as not subject to the FOIA ("exclusions"). 5 U.S.C. 552(c). This is a standard notification given to all requesters: it should not be taken to mean that any excluded records do, or do not, exist.

[ZJ We have withheld certain information pursuant to the FOIA exemptions described, and for the reasons stated, in Part II.

Because this is an interim response to your request, you may not appeal at this time. We will notify you of your right to

[ZJ appeal any of the responses we have issued in response to your request when we issue our final determination.

You may appeal this final determination within 90 calendar days of the date of this response by sending a letter or e-mail to the FOIA Officer, at U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001, or FOIA.Resource@nrc.g_ov. Please be D sure to include on your letter or email that it is a "FOIA Appeal." You have the right to seek dispute resolution services from the NRC's Public Liaison, or the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS). Contact information for OGIS is available at h~tgs://ogis.archives.gov/about-ogis/con1a-ct:informa1ion.ntm PART I.C COMMENTS ( Use attached Comments continuation oaae if required)

This interim response addresses 10 more of the records listed in your request. Since the date of your request, these records have been removed from ADAMS. However, because the NRC was able to locate them by the accession numbers when your request was received, we have processed the records, except as noted below.

[ continued on next page]

Sianatura---F;reedom of lnfonnatlon .Act'Qffic.er or Desianee l ¥-1 fJJ.n.LA. ( j )JJ -/~ !

NRC Form 464 Part I (03-2017)

() Page 2 of4

NRC FORM 464 Part II U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FOIA I

(03*2017)

I

.f,;,,..J."-'-lif<lu,,_,,,.o 2016-0721#3

//'

~

i RESPONSE TO FREEDOM OF

.l INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) REQUEST DATE:

I I PART II.A -APPLICABLE EXEMPTIONS Records subject to the request are being withheld in their entirety or in part under the FOIA exemption(s) as indicated below (5 U.S.C. 552(b)).

Exemption 1: The withheld information is properly dassified pursuant to an Executive Order protecting national security information.

Exemption 2: The withheld information relates solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of NRC.

Exemption 3: The withheld information is specifically exempted from public disclosure by the statute indicated.

Sections 141-145 of the Atomic Energy Act, which prohibits the disclosure of Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data (42 U.S.C. 2161-2165).

Section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act. which prohibits the disclosure of Undassified Safeguards Information (42 U.S.C. 2167).

41 U.S.C. 4702(b), which prohibits the disclosure of contractor proposals, except when incorporated into the contract between the agency and the submitter of the proposal.

Exemption 4: The withheld information is a trade secret or confidential commercial or financial information that is being withheld for the reason(s) indicated.

The information is considered to be proprietary because it concerns a licensee's or applicant's physical protection or material control and accounting program for special nuclear material pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390(d)(1).

The information is considered to be another type or confidential business (proprietary) information.

The information was submitted by a foreign source and received in confidence pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390(d)(2).

0 Exemption 5: The withheld information consists of interagency or intraagency records that are normally privileged in civil litigation.

0 Deliberative process privilege.

Attorney work product privilege.

Attorney-client privilege.

Exemption 6: The withheld information from a personnel, medical, or similar file, is exempted from public disclosure because its disclosure would result 0 in a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

0 Exemption 7: The withheld information consists of records compiled for law enforcement purposes and is being withheld for the reason(s) indicated.

(A) Disclosure could reasonably be expected to interfere With an open enforcement proceeding.

(C) Disclosure could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

(DJ The information consists of names and other information the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to reveal identities of confidential sources.

(E) Disclosure would reveal techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or guidelines that could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.

0 (F) Disclosure could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of an individual.

0 Other I One of the requested records is a personal, rather than agency, record PART 11.B -- DENYING OFFICIALS In accordance with 10 CFR 9.25(g) and 9.25(h) of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations, the official(s) listed below have made the determination to withhold certain information responsive to your request APPELi.ATE OFFICIAL DENYING OFFICIAL TITLE/OFFICE RECORDS DENIED EDO SECY I Stephanie A. Blaney II FOIA Officer II 3rd party PIT, deliberative & security-related I 0 I lI I information I

I I I

11 I Appeals must be made in writing within 90 calendar days of the date of this response by sending a letter or email to the FOIA Officer, at U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001, or FOIA.Resource@nrc.gov. Please be sure to include on your letter or email that it is a "FOIA Appeal."

NRC Form 464 Part II (03-2017) Page 1 of 1

NRC FORM 464 Part I U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FOIA RESPONSE NUMBER I I (03-2017)

RESPONSE TO FREEDOM OF INFORMATION 2016-0721 lI 3 ACT (FOIA) REQUEST Continued 0

RESPONSE

INTERIM FINAL TYPE REQUESTER: DATE:

joavid Lochbaum PART 1.C COMMENTS (Continued) 11 l The record designated as ML l 6236A0 18 is an email exchange between staff members in the Offices of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) and New Reactors (NRO), to which a red-lined draft of a "Style Sheet", including personal advice and recommendations about writing style by its author, was attached. This draft was not finalized, although it is similar to NUREG-1379 NRC Editorial Style Guide. It is also noted that the focus of the email exchange was a particular template NRO used to write reviews of post-Fukushima Recommendation 2.1 Flood Hazard Reevaluation Reports, which is different altogether from the red-lined draft the originating RES staff member had attached to his email. A copy of the email exchange is enclosed.

ML16236A230 is an early draft document, "Generic Issue Program Proposal - Random Failure of an Upstream Dam."

The NRC is exercising its discretion to release this record in its entirety; it is enclosed Since all but one of the email exchanges included in the record corresponding to ML16237A004 are already publicly available as a result of our processing ofFOIA-2013-0264, please refer to ML13226A261-ML13226A264, ML13 l23A204, and ML13226A259. We note that the redactions of personally identifiable information (PU) on the basis of exemption 6 were already applied in the emails included within MLI 6237A004. We have enclosed the one additional email exchange that had not been the subject of any prior requests; the personally identifiable information (PII) appearing in this record has been redacted under exemption 6. We continue to assert exemption 7F for the cross-section diagram of the Jocassee Dam, which is slide I 8 in the attachment to the email that is ML13226A264.

The record that corresponds to ML16236A005 is also already publicly available as a result of our processing of FOIA-2013-0264; please refer to MLl3226A259.

ML16237A006 is a letter from a third party individual (who has provided a privacy waiver) to then-EDO Bill Borchardt and then-ChiefFOIA Officer Darren Ash, following up on a pending FOIA appeal, FOIA-2013-009A, including seven enclosures. The enclosures consist of: (1) an acknowledgment letter; (2) a Form 464 response package to 2013-0126 (which is already publicly available as ML13106A167), including an appendix listing the already publicly available redacted records responsive to the request; (3) ML13099A247 (as redacted); (4) ML13039A084 (as redacted); (5)

MLI3039A0086 (as redacted); (5) a copy of the U.S. Anny Corps of Engineers (ACE)'s Engineer Manual, "General Design and Construction Considerations for Earth and Rock-Fill Dams," (which is publicly available at ACE's website) and a Continuing Education & Development, Inc. cover sheet for a program on this subject (which is also publicly available at its website); and (7) an unredacted copy of the cross-section diagram of the Jocassee Dam. With the exception of enclosure 7, the pages of this record are enclosed. As for enclosure 7, this diagram continues to be withheld on the basis of exemption 7F as noted above.

MLI 623 7A007 was determined to be a personal, rather than agency, record. The email was a personal email received by an NRC staff member at a personal email address. Since NRC has not located another copy of the email received in the course of any NRC staff member's assigned duties in any of its records systems, we have determined that the email is a personal record. (The slides attached to this email are identical to MLI6237A004 and included in ML16237A007, which we have addressed above.) As such, it is not subject to the FOIA and has not been processed.

MLI 6238A0 13 is a NRC Form 183, Report of Security Incident/Infraction/Violation that was completed as a result of actions taken by an NRC staff member, who has furnished a privacy waiver. Accordingly, we have enclosed a copy for you.

[continued on next page]

NRG Form 464 Part I (03-2017) Page 3 of4

NRC FORM 464 Part I U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FOIA RESPONSE NUMBER (03-2017)

RESPONSE TO FREEDOM OF INFORMATION I 2016-0721 11 3

I ACT (FOIA) REQUEST Continued RESPONSE TYPE 0 INTERIM FINAL REQUESTER: DATE:

loavid Lochbaum PART 1.C COMMENTS (Continued) 11 l ML16238A014 is a copy ofan undated memorandum from Mary Jane Ross-Lee to Richard Correia concerning the subject "REPORT OF SECURITY INCIDENT (INFORMATION SPILL)" related to the event that is the subject of ML16238A013. Because the subject of this event has furnished a privacy waiver, a copy of this memorandum is enclosed.

ML16239A085 consists of(l) an email exchange among the General Counsel to the Inspector General, the NRC Solicitor, and a lawyer representing an NRC staff member (who has furnished the above-referenced privacy waiver) with respect to the resolution of a prior FOIA lawsuit he had filed; (2) a letter from the General Counsel to the Inspector General to this individual; and (3) a copy of the stipulation of dismissal of that lawsuit, which is publicly available. They are enclosed.

ML I 6244A008 consists of an email from this same NRC staff member (who, as noted above, has provided a privacy waiver) to Commissioner Ostendorff, in which he forwarded an email exchange he had had with another NRC staff member and attached several other records. This email and the attached records were previously released in part as ML 15 l 28A61 O; we have revisited the material that had been redacted pursuant to exemption 5 as it incorporates the deliberative process privilege. We continue to assert exemption 6 for a cell # of another NRC staff member. The record, with content restored, is enclosed. The November 14, 2012 letter to Senator Boxer is also enclosed with the author's PII restored, in light of the privacy waiver he furnished.

NRG Form 464 Part I (03-2017) Page4 of4

Criscione, Lawrence From: Cook, Christopher Sent: Monday, August 22, 2016 7:35 AM To: Criscione, Lawrence; Salley, MarkHenry; Peters, Sean Cc: Rivera-Varona, Aida; Harvey, Brad; Correia, Richard

Subject:

RE: response: Style Sheet for JLD Flooding Review Documents Attachments: ,-------------------,

R2.l_SA_Template_FINAL_ML13218A150.pdf The 66-page red lined draft is withheld in full under exS.

Larry, The file you attached is a draft job aid that Mark McBride created (he called it a Style Sheet), but he did not finish it before he retired. No one has worked on the job aid since he retired.

Our staff assessment template is ML13218A150 (attached) and was completed in September 2013. Please note that the template is a non-public document in ADAMS.

Since 2014, we have issued approximately 22 staff assessments. Over the years, our staff assessments have evolved as a result of Commission direction and as we have tried to improve our products. For example, all staff assessments issued in 2016 were written after issuance of an Interim Staff Letter (ISR) to the licensee (for example, here's Salem Generating Station's ISR Letter: ML15244B266). In 2013 and when the template was finished, the concept of an ISR did not exist. Therefore, if you compare our most recent staff assessment to the template, you will see that our staff assessments generally follow the 2013 template. However, we also evolved as the process changed in response to Commission direction plus we're always trying to improve.

In summary, the best guidance I can provide is a reference to our most recent staff assessments plus the attached 2013 template.

Regards, Chris From: Criscione, Lawrence Sent: Friday, August 19, 2016 12:56 PM To: Cook, Christopher <Christopher.Cook@nrc.gov>; Salley, MarkHenry <MarkHenry.Salley@nrc.gov>; Peters, Sean

<Sean.Peters@nrc.gov>

Cc: Rivera-Varona, Aida <Aida.Rivera-Varona@nrc.gov>; Harvey, Brad <Brad.Harvey@nrc.gov>; Correia, Richard

<Richard.Correia@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: response: Style Sheet for JILD Flooding Review Documents

Chris, I got the document from an NRO colleague who received it from Mark McBride in 2015.

I'm reviewing the Chairman's response to the Office of Special Counsel's referral regarding my disclosure on the NRC's handling of flooding hazards.

The flooding reviews are being conducted as "staff assessments" vice as "safety evaluations". Safety evaluations are handled under LI C-101. I'm trying to determine what the guidance is for "staff assessments".

The purpose of my questions to you are two-fold:

1. To find out if the attached document is the only guidance there is for conducting staff assessments and, if there is other guidance, to find out where it is at so I can review it.

2. To find a clean copy of the attached document so that I can reference it in my comments on the Chairman's response to the Office of Special Counsel.

So, that being said:

Do you know of any guidance your staff uses when conducting their staff assessments of the flooding reviews (other than the attached document)?

Do you know if the attached version is in ADAMS and-if not-can you tell me who the current document owner is and where I can find the latest version of the document?

Thanks, Larry 573-230-3959 From: Cook, Christopher Sent: Friday, August 19, 2016 12:32 PM To: Criscione, Lawrence <Lawrence.Criscione@nrc.gov>; Salley, MarkHenry <MarkHenry.Salley@nrc.gov>; Peters, Sean

<Sean.Peters@nrc.gov>

Cc: Rivera-Varona, Aida <Aida.Rivera-Varona@nrc.gov>; Harvey, Brad <Brad.Harvey@nrc.gov>

Subject:

response: Style Sheet for JLD Flooding Review Documents

Larry, Where did you find this document? I think it was produced as a job aid for my branch and it lives out on the JLD SharePt site, but I'm not sure. Can you also let me know the purpose for your question?

I'm also trying to understand the nexus between your 3 questions, our other ORA activities (primarily in DRA/FXHAB), and what you're trying to accomplish.

I've included Mark Salley and Sean Peters in case they prefer to respond instead.

Thanks, Chris Christopher B. Cook, Ph.D., P. E.

Chief, Hydrology and Meteorology Branch 1 US NRC, Office of New Reactors (301) 415-6397 Christopher.Cook@nrc.gov From: Criscione, Lawrence Sent: Friday, August 19, 201611:47 AM To: Cook, Christopher <Christopher.Cook@nrc.gov>

Cc: Rivera-Varona, Aida <Aida.Rivera-Varona@nrc.gov>; Harvey, Brad <Brad.Harvey@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: Style Sheet for JLD Flooding Review Documents

Chris, I was told Aida is out sick today and it looks like she is on vacation next week. Mark McBride has apparently retired.

I am attempting to find the guidance used by the NRC staff to conduct the "Staff Assessments" of the flooding reviews. I just spoke with Brad HaNey and he doesn't think we have any such guidance-other than the out-of-date style guide attached to this email.

Do you know of any guidance that your staff uses when conducting their staff assessments of the flooding reviews? Do you know if the attached document is in ADAMS? If not, can you tell me who the current document owner is and where I can find the latest version of the document?

Thank you, Larry Lawrence S. Criscione 573-230-3959 From: Criscione, Lawrence Se nt: Friday, August 19, 201611:18 AM To: Rivera-Varona, Aida <Aida.Rivera-Varona@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Style Sheet for JLD Flooding Review Documents

Aida, The person listed as the owner of the attached document (Mark McBride) no longer works for the NRC but he was in your branch. Do you know where the attached document is located? Is it in ADAMS? Is it possible for me to get the most current revision (i.e. one without unaccepted changes)?

I am trying to find guidance on conducting Staff Assessments. Other than this document, where is the guidance for conducting a Staff Assessment?

Thanks, Larry Lawrence S. Criscione Reliability & Risk Engineer RES/ DRA/HFRB Tl0-844 (573) 230-3959

Generic Issue Program Proposal - Random Failure of an Upstream Dam While reviewing a recent external flooding issue associated with a nuclear power plant (NPP), it was identified that, if a random failure of an adjacent upstream dam was not adequately evaluated, during the external flooding analysis of the NPP, it could have a potential impact on the public health and safety. The impact would be due to the amount of water that the reservoir would release and the associated effects on the environment, as well as on the common defense and security at the site. The overall result of this event at a nuclear site may contribute to an unacceptable level of probability of core damage frequency (CDF).

The Duke Energy Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS) did not originally evaluate the random failure of the Jocassee Dam in the plant design flooding analysis. The random failure of the Jocassee Dam will result in a flooding scenario, where approximately 18.5 feet of water could result at the site . Presently, the plant is only protected for a flood level of approximately 7 feet. Once the dam failure scenario starts, the plant has three hours until the water reaches the site. This amount of water will result in the loss of the switchyard, loss of the emergency power supply (hydro units), loss of the safe shutdown facility, and the loss of other mitigation equipment. With the loss of the above equipment, there will be core damage in 8 to 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months , followed by containment failure in 59 to 68 hours7.87037e-4 days 0.0189 hours 1.124339e-4 weeks 2.5874e-5 months . The public would receive a significant radiation dose as a result of the combined fuel and contai11ment failure.

The risk and safety significance of this issue has been adequately determined by the NRR staff (i.e., it does not involve phenomena or other uncertainties that would require long-term studies and/or experimental research to establish the risk or safety significance). After reviewing all of the available data, the present calculations show that a dam failure has an initiating event frequency (IEF) of 2.0 x 10-4. This calculated initiating frequency is consistent to the dam failure frequency studies performed by others as listed below in Table 1.

Table 1. Frequency of Occurrence of Dam Failures Reported in the Literature*

Total Dam No. of Failure Area Reference Years Failures Rate o*

(x1 3)

USA Gruner (1963, 1967) 33 71 .0 5 X 10*4 Babb & Mermel (1968) 12 43.0 3 X 10*4 USCOLD (1975) 74 113.0 7 X 10-4 Mark & Stuart-Alexander (1977) 1 4.5 2 X 10*4 World Mark & Stuart-Alexander (1977) 125 300.0 4 X 10*4 Middle brooks { 1953) and Mark &

9 47.0 2 X 10*4 Stuart-Alexander (1977)

Japan T akase ( 1967) 1046 30 000 4 X 10*5 Spain Gruner (1967) 150 235 6 X 10*4 Overall Averaqe Dam Failure Rate 4 X 10*4

ACRES International Newsletter, August 2004, "Issues in Dam Safety" (ACRES International, Niagara Falls, Ontario, Canada)

The CDF will be based on the plant configuration. At Oconee, the conditional core damage probability (CCDP) can be has high as 1, due to the loss of the mitigating equipment listed above. With the CCDP of 1, the result will give an overall CDF of 2.0 x 10-4 per year. Based on this outcome, the issue has to be properly evaluated.

The key point here is that a tremendous amount of water, from a random failure of an upstream dam, could reach a downstream nuclear site with the results being catastrophic. The potential catastrophic results would be due to the loses of the plant's mitigating equipment, due to the site flooding , which would lead to fuel failure and containment failure. This issue becomes even more relevant if the site did not adequately evaluate and mitigate a random dam failure scenario for the upstream dam.

Therefore, the NRR staff has determined that this issue is a good candidate for inclusion in the generic issue program (GIP). The issue cannot be readily addressed through other regulatory programs and processes; existing regulations, policies, or guidance; or voluntary industry initiatives. However, this issue can be resolved by a new or revised regulation , policy, or guidance.

Finally, we believe that the issue is well-defined, discrete, and technical, and the resolution of this issue may potentially involve review, analysis, or action by the affected licensees operating the nuclear power plants (NPPs) located downstream of dams.

Based on the potential outcome of this issue, the NRR staff conducted a brief investigation to determine if similar flooding situations existed at other nuclear plant sites, and found that there are, indeed, several sites with the potential of external flooding issues as a result of upstream dam failures.

Attached is Table 2 with a preliminary list of dams located upstream of several INPPs, entitled, "Review of Dam and/or Levee Failures for Nuclear Plants," which was prepared by the Division of Reactor Licensing (DORL)/NRR. This list contains comments (shown as "FSAR Discussion," in the last column of the table) regarding whether an analysis was completed regarding the potential failure of the dams.

Table 2 Prelimina List of Nuclear Sites w/o Dam Failure Evaluations Random Sunny Max. Yard Day Body of Design Grade Site Name State Area Upstream Water Basis (ft.

Dam (ft. msl) msl)

Failure Evaluated Arkansas Arkansas Nuclear AR Stream 361 353 NO River Missouri Cooper NE Stream 906 903 NO River Missouri Fort Calhoun NE Stream River 1014 1000 NO Indian Point NY Stream Hudson River 15 ? NO Mississippi Prairie Island MN Stream River 684.5 695 NO Lake Robinson SC Lake NA 225 NO Robinson Salem DE Stream Delaware NOT 9 NO River AVAILABLE Sur VA Stream James River 28.6 26.5 NO Susquehanna Three Mile Island PA Stream 310 304 NO River In view of the information discussed above, concerning the potential hazards caused by dam breaks at more than a couple of NPPs, we request that you initiate expeditious action to enter the external flooding issue into the GIP. If you have any questions, your staff may contact George Wilson (301-415-171 1) or Meena Khanna (301-415-2150).

Original Message-----

From: Boska, John <John.Boska@nrc.gov>

To: Colleen Payne !(b ,__)(_6)_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __,! Pascarelli, Robert <Robert.Pascarelli@nrc.gov>

Sent: Mon, Mar 25, 2013 8:04 am

Subject:

RE: Duke Energy meeting Colleen, we receive such a high volume of requests that we do not have the time to communicate with individuals on these items. We have established an email listserver for each of the power reactors, and if you sign up for the listserver, you will be emailed a copy of all the public documents we issue for Oconee Nuclear Station. The listserver is automated, I cannot add people or remove them or even see who is on the list. If you want to sign up, please go to http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/listserver/plants-by-reqion.html and sign up for Oconee. The meeting notice for 3/25/13 was issued on the listserver on 3/18/13 and was placed on the NRC web site on 3/19/13.

I will add your name to the security list for today's meeting (although it is not a requirement, any member of the public can attend, they just have to register with security when they get here). Attached are the slides for today's meeting. Copies will be available at the meeting. Please call my cell phone!(b)(6) !after you pass through security and I will ensure an escort brings you to the meeting room.

John Beska Oconee Project Manager, NRR/DORL U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 301-415-2901 email: john.boska@nrc.gov From: Colleen Payne [m '-'-='"a=' il~to'1-l(_bl_(6_l _ _ __ _ _ __J Sent: Saturday, March 23, 2013 10:05 AM To: Pascarelli, Robert; Boska, John

Subject:

Re: Duke Energy meeting John and Robert, Could you please keep me informed, I thought from last meetings, correspondence and my request that I was clear on receiving all current, future meetings re: Lake Jocasse/Oconee/Duke Energy & NRC. I receive daily updates and continually monitor NRC site, however, somehow I missed the upcoming 3/25 meeting re flooding issues/Duke/NRG.

Thank you, Colleen Payne

Original Message--..,.-...., --,,......- - - - - - - - - .

From: Colleen Payne ~...(b_)(_ 6l_ _ _ _ _ _ __,

To: robert.pascarelli <robert.pascarelli@nrc.gov>; john .boska <john.boska@nrc.gov>

Sent: Sat, Mar 23, 2013 9 :56 am

Subject:

Re: Duke Energy meeting Good morning John and Robert, Is Monday's, 3/25 meeting re: "to discuss the licensee's flooding hazard reevaluation report for the three Oconee units... " a rescheduled or new meeting? I was not made aware nor was this posted until just recently - within past few days.

I will be attending this meeting, please add my name to security list.

Thank you, Colleen Payne l(b)(6) I

Original Message-.., --....,

From: Colleen Payne !(b ........l(_

6l_________,,_ ___,

To: Robert.Pascarelli <Robert.Pascarelli@nrc.gov>

Sent: Mon, Mar 11, 2013 2:36 pm

Subject:

Re: Duke Energy meeting Bob,

Yes, that is correct. Thank you.

I just received notice from John Boska, 3/19 meeting has been rescheduled to 4/9.

Colleen

Original Message-----

From: Pascarelli, ,obe~<Robert PascareUj@nrclgov>

To: Colleen Payne[(b)(6)_ _

Sent: Mon, Mar 11... , -2u

- ;..,...1....:....4.,..0_p_m_ _ _ _ ___.

Subject:

RE: Duke Energy meeting

Colleen, I believe that you are referring to the April 16- 18 industry meeting in Columbia, SC. It is an industry-sponsored meeting that the Office of New Reactors (NRO) has been invited to speak at for the last few years. Due to budget restrictions, NRO is not planning to attend this year.

Bob Pascarelli From: Colleen Payne [.'-'- m=a= d_(b_)(5_l _ _ _ _ _ _ ___,,

i lt,.,,

Sent: Thursday, March 07, 2013 4:43 PM To: Pascarelli, Robert

Subject:

Re: Duke Energy meeting

Bob, Do you know who will be speaking at the SMR Conference April 16-17? I was registered for that event, but will not be able to attend.

Thank you, Colleen

Original Message-----

From : Pascarelli, Robert <Robert.Pascarelli To: Colleen Payne (b)(6)

Sent: Thu, Mar 7, ?1-1-~.,...,"7"'1"""_ _ _ _ ___.

Subject:

RE: Duke Energy meeting

Colleen, It's possible that the meeting could occur as late as May. We coordinate resources with our Region II office to ensure that we can conduct all of the site meetings within a few months following the issuance of the annual assessment letters. I'll let you know as soon as we have a tentative date. Have a nice day.

Bob From: Colleen Payne fffifiltlcl(bX6)

Sent: Thursday, Marc~ ~1'"'3'"'2"'"':"'"

14 P'""

...... M_ _ _ _ _....,

To: Pascarelli, Robert

Subject:

Re: Duke Energy meeting Bob Thank you for this information. Any chance of scheduling assessment meeting in May? I would like to attend and mid-May would work for me. (smile, I am joking - but doesn't hurt to ask)

Colleen

Original Message-----

To: Colleen Payne ...._ _________

From: Pascarelli, Robert <Robert.Pascarelli (b)(6) _.

Sent: Thu, Mar 7, 2013 10:35 am

Subject:

RE: Duke Energy meeting Ms. Payne, It was a pleasure to speak with you on Tuesday afternoon and I look forward to seeing you on March 19th . Another meeting that you may be interested in is the annual end-of-cycle assessment meeting that is held in the Oconee visitor's center. Although we have not finalized a date, our annual meeting will most likely occur in the early April timeframe. I encourage you to consider attending if you are in the area. Additionally, please feel free to contact myself or John Beska if you have any questions or concerns. Have a great day!

Bob Pascarelli, Chief Plant Licensing Branch 11-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation From: Colleen Payne [mailto! (b)(5)

Sent: Thursday, March 07, 2 13 9:52 AM To: Pascarelli, Robert

Subject:

Duke Energy meeting

Bob, Just a quick note to thank your for your time on Tuesday, March 5 during and after Duke meeting.

I appreciate you taking the time to discuss some of the concerns regarding NRC's position regarding Oconee site.

I look forward to seeing you on the 19th - or rescheduled date.

Have a good rest of week, Colleen

April 11, 2013 1412 Dial Court Springfield, IL 62704 Bill Borchardt, Executive Director for Operations (EDO)

Darren Ash, Chief Freedom of Information Act Officer United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001

SUBJECT:

Update to FOIA Appeal 2013-009A

Dear Mr. Borchardt and Mr. Ash:

This letter is an update to a FOIA appeal the NRC acknowledged on March 29, 2013 concerning FOIA/PA 2013-0126. The NRC's acknowledgment letter to that appeal is included as Enclosure 1. Today (2013-04-11), I received a response to FOIA 2013-0126, which I have included as Enclosure 2. Note that this response has come 40 working days after my initial request and 9 working days after I submitted an appeal in accordance with 10 CFR §9.25.

On Tuesday, February 12, 2013 I requested five records from t ile NRC:

1. ML103490330, Oconee Nuclear Site, Units 1, 2, and 3. Oconee Response to Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) 2-10-003, dated Nov. 29, 2010

2. ML111460063, Oconee Nuclear Site, Units 1, 2, and 3. Response to Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) 2-10-003, dated April 29, 2011

3. ML100780084, Generic Failure Rate Evaluation for Jocassee Dam Risk Analysis

4. ML101610083, Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, - External Flood Commitments

5. ML101900305, Identification of a Generic External Flooding Issue Due to Potential Dam Failures My incoming FOIA request can be found in ADAMS as ML13044A487.

Today, I was provided the following documents in your response to FOIA 2013-0126:

1. ML103490330 (released w ithout redactions so not part of FOIA Appeal 2013-009A)

2. ML13099A247 instead of M L111460063 (included with this appeal as Enclosure 3)

3. ML13039A084 instead of ML100780084 (included with this appeal as Enclosure 4)

4. ML101610083 (released without redactions so can be removed from FOIA Appeal 2013-009A)

5. ML13039A086 instead of ML101900305 (included with this appeal as Enclosure 5)

For the records denied, Exemption 7F of the Freedom of Information Act is claimed. I disagree with this decision and in this letter am providing you the reasons for that disagreement so that, if you chose, you can take this information into account when evaluating FOIA Appeal 2013-009A.

I see nothing in the records requested which indicate they were compiled for law enforcement purposes nor do I see anything which would indicate to me that disclosure could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of an individual. It appears to me that the NRC is using Exemption 7F as a means to withhold information which it believes may be beneficial to terrorists or saboteurs yet none of the information withheld pertains to security processes or hardware. The information withheld

merely pertains to the nuclear safety hazards which deficiencies in the Oconee Station's flooding defenses pose to the American public. These safety risks are present due to the risks of natural disasters and latent engineering/construction flaws and have nothing specifically pertaining to terrorist activities.

As a specific example, consider ML100780084, the Generic Failure Rate Evaluation of Jocassee Dam Risk Analysis, submitted by James Vail, Fernando Ferrante, and Jeff Mitman on March 15, 2010. This document was a formal write up of analyses done by NRR in 2007 /2008 to support Region !l's efforts to get Duke Energy to address safety concerns regarding flooding protection at Oconee. In th is document, the Reliability & Risk Analysts at NRR estimated the failure frequency of the Lake Jocassee Dam to be 2.8E-4/yr which equates to a 1 in 3600 chance of failing in any given year. Given that the catastrophic failure of the Lake Jocassee Dam would likely lead to a meltdown of the three reactors at the Oconee Nuclear Station, the dam failure rate calculated by Vail, Ferrante & Mitman suggests that the probability of a nuclear accident at Oconee Nuclear Station is ten times what it is at a typical US reactor plant. This is the type of important information which President Obama expects us to share with the American public (see the President's 2009-01-19 memo on Open Government). Yet the NRC did not share this information with the public. In stead, we stamped the Vail et. al. analysis as "Official Use Only- Security-Related Information" and for years never publicly mentioned its existence. Then, in response to a FOIA request by Dave Lochbaum, we released a redacted version of this supposed "Security-Related" report as ML13039A084. The only redaction in this 15 page report was a figure on page 1 showing the generic construction of Jocassee Dam - a figure very similar to what one can find in any Civil Engineeri ng text book. I have included similar publicly available figures as Enclosure 6. Despite the fact that this figure did not provide any insight to terrorists, it apparently kept this important report from the public for nearly three years. On March 25, 2013 I attended a public meeting with Duke Energy in which this very same figure was presented by [)uke Energy as a slide (see Enclosure 7). The slide show from this meeting was forwarded to me by Jim Riccio of Greenpeace and was posted by the NRC on their public website (M L13084A022). So this supposedly "Security-Related" figure, which caused NRR to keep the Vail et. al. analysis from the public for nearly three years and which NRR had redact from Dave Lochbaum's FOIA response in February 2013, was by March 2013 being emailed by NRR to Greenpeace and being posted by NRR on the world-wide web.

The world-wide web gets that name for a reason: it is truly world-wide. Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the host of other countries which sponsor terrorist activity against the United States have access to this world-wide web. So why can NRR email this generic drawing to Greenpeace and post it on the web for our enemies to see yet must redact it from the version of the Vail et. al. analysis that it sent to David Lochbaum, Tom Zeller and Paul Blanch in response to their separate FOIA requests? Is this figure "Security-Related" or not? If it is, why are we sharing it on the world-wide web? If it is not, why did we keep the Vail et. al. report from the public for nearly three years and why do we still refuse to release it in its entirety? These are rhetorical questions. Please do not delay answering FOIA Appeal 2013-009A due to these questions. I merely wish to point out to you some inconsistencies in your control of information in the event you would like to consider those inconsistencies while addressing FOIA Appeal 2013-009A.

Additionally, information redacted from the documents supplied to me today has already been publicly release to Greenpeace in our 2013-02-06 partial response (M L130520858) to FOIA 2012-0325 (ML12263A087).

Under FOIA Appeal 2013-009A, please release the following three records to me with no redactions.

ML111460063, Oconee Nuclear Site, Units 1, 2, and 3. Response to Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) 2-10-003, dated April 29, 2011

ML100780084, Generic Failure Rate Evaluation for Jocassee Dam Risk Analysis

ML101900305, Identification of a Generic External Flooding Issue Due to Potential Dam Failures Again, this letter is an update to FOIA Appeal 2013-009A in response to documents I received today from the NRC. The information I received came in response to FOIA Request 2013-0126 and not FOIA Appeal 20013-009A. I expect FOIA Appeal 2013-009A to be answered within 30 working days from March 29, 2013 (i.e. by May 10, 2013). I am providing the information in this letter for you to consider if you so choose.

Although I live in Springfield, IL, I work in Rockville, MD. Please do not send documents to my home in Springfield, IL as I will not get them in a timely manner. Please send all written correspondence to me via email at LSCriscione@hotmail.com . If your processes will not allow you to do this, then please contact me via phone or email and I will come by the FOIA desk to pick up the correspondence.

Very respectfully, d ,. ,., ,_ s Ct.*:-_,,

Lawrence S. Criscione, PE (573) 230-3959 Enclosures (7)

Cc: Billie Garde, Esq., Clifford & Garde Louis Clark, The Government Accountability Project Fernando Ferrante, NRC/NRR/DRA Jeff Mitman, NRC/NRR/DRA Dave Lochbaum, Union of Concerned Scientists Jim Riccio, Greenpeace Tom Zeller, Huffington Post Paul Blanch, consultant

Enclosure 1 of Update to FOIA 2013f09A UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555- 0001 March 29, 2013 FOIA/PA-2013-00009A FOIA/PA-2013-00126 FOIA/PA-2013-0001 0A FOIA/PA-2013-00127 FOIA/PA-2013-00011 A FOIA/PA-2013-00128 Lawrence Criscione 1412 Dial Court Springfield, IL 62704

Dear Requester:

We have logged your March 29, 2013 correspondences as appeals for Lack of Response to you under FOIA/PA-2013-00126, FOIA/PA-2013-00127 and FOIA/PA-2013-00128.

Your appeals have been assigned the following reference numbers that you should use in any future communications with u s about your appeals: FOIA/PA-2013-00009A, FOIA/PA-2013-0001 0A, and FOIA/PA-2013-00011 A.

The following person is the FOIA/PA Specialist who has been assigned responsibility for your appeals: Linda Kilgore at 301-415-5775.

If you have questions on any matters concerning your FOIA/PA appeals, please feel free to contact the FOIA/PA Specialist assigned to your appeals or me. I can be reached at 301 -415-7169.

Sincerely, ISi Donna L. Sealing FOIA/Privacy Act Officer Office of Information Services

Enclosure:

Incoming Request

Enclosure 2 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FOIA/PA RESPONSE NUMBER RESPONSE TO FREEDOM OF 2013-0126 INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) / PRIVACY ACT(PA)REQUEST

RESPONSE

TYPE

[Zj FINAL PARTIAL REQUESTER OATE Lawrence Criscione APft 11 2013 PART I. - INFORMATION RELEASED D No additional agency records subject to the request have been located.

D Requested records are available through another public distribution program. See Comments section Agency records subject to the request that are Identified in the listed appendices are already available for I pubhc inspection and copying at the NRC Public Document Room.

I.

APPENO!ccs I

====,

Agency records subject to the request that are Identified in the listed appendices are being made available for

. public inspection and copying at the NRC Public Document Room.

Document Room, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MO 20852-2738.

Enclosed is Information on how you may obtain access to and the charges for copying records located at the NRC Public

_ _ __ ......,I Agency records subject to the request are enclosed.

I APPENOICES referred to that agency (see comments section) for a disclosure determination and direct response to you.

Records subject to the request that contain information originated by or of interest to another Federal agency have been See Comments.

We are continuing to process your request.

PART I.A -- FEES I D AMOUNT*

You will be billed by NRC for the amount listed. [Z] None. Minimum fee threshold not met sI

See ccmments for details D You will receive a refund for the amount listed. D Fees waived.

PART I.B - INFORMATION NOT LOCATED OR WITHHELD FROM DISCLOSURE No agency records subject to the request have been located. For your information, Congress excluded three discrete categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIA. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(c)

(2006 & Supp. IV (2010). This response Is limited to those records that are subject to the requirements of the FOIA. This Is a standard notification that is given to all our requesters and should not be taken as an indication that excruded records do, or do no~ exist.

0 Certain Information in the requested records is being withheld from disclosure pursuant to the exemptions described In and for the reasons stated in Part 11.

0 This determination may be appealed within 30 days by writing to the FOIA/PA Officer, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. Clear1y state on the envelope and In the letter that It is a "FOIA/PA Appeal."

PART I.C COMMENTS ( Use attached Comments continuation page If required)

The incoming FOIA request will be available in ADAMS at MLI 3044A487.

SIGN U ~ ~ AN~lp~A!=T OFFICER D nrn I.;. Sealing - ~-j NRC FORM 464 Part 1 (10-2012)

Enclosure 2 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A NRC FORM 464 Part II U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FOIA/PA DATE (4-2011)

RESPONSE TO FREEDOM OF INFORMATION 2013-0126 APft 1 1 2013 ACT (FOIA) / PRIVACY ACT (PA) REQUEST PART II.A** APPLICABLE EXEMPTIONS l~PPENOICES Records subject to the request tha1 are described In the enclosed Appendices are being wl1hheld in their entirely or In part under the I

. Exemption No.(s) ol 1he PA and/or the FOIA as Indicated below (5 U.S.C. 552a and/or 5 U.S.C. 552(b)).

Exemption 1: The withheld informaUon Is properly classified pursuan1 to Executive Order 12958.

Exemption 2: The withheld lnlorma1lon relates solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of NRC.

Exemption 3: The withheld information is specifically exempted from public disclosure by statute indicated.

Sections 141-145 of the Atomic Energy Act, which prohibits the disclosure of Restricted Data or Former1y Restricted Data (42 U.S.C.

2161-2165).

Section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act. which prohibits the disclosure of Unclassified Safeguards Information (42 U.S.C. 2167).

41 U.S.C.* Section 253b, subsection (m)(1 ), prohibits the disclosure of contractor proposals In the possession and control of an executive agency to any person under section 552 ol TIiie 5, U.S.C. (the FOIA). except when incorporated into the contract between the agency and the submitter of the proposal D Exemption 4 : The wlthheld information Is a trade secret or commercial or financial Information that Is being withheld for the reason(s) Indicated.

D The information is considered to be confidential business (proprietary) information.

The Information Is considered to be proprietary because It concerns a licensee's or applicanrs physical protection or material control and accounting program for special nuclear material pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390(d)(1).

D The Information was submitted by a foreign source and received In confidence pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390(d)(2).

D Disclosure will harm an identifiable private or governmental interest.

Exemption 5: The withheld Information consists of interagency or intraagency records that are not available through discovery during lltlgatlon.

Applicable privileges:

Deliberative process: Disclosure of predecisional Information would tend to inhibit the open and frank exchange of ideas essential lo the deliberative process. 1/vhere records are withheld in their entirety, the facts are inextricably intertwined with the predecisional Information.

There also are no reasonably segregable faeluaf portions because the release of the facts would permit an indirect inquiry into the predecisional process of the agency.

D Attorney work-product privilege. (Documents prepared by an attorney in contemplation of litigation)

D Attorney-client privilege. (Confidential communications between an attorney and his/her client)

Exemption 6: The withheld information Is exempted from public dlselosure because Its disclosure would result in a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, f7l Exemption 7: The withheld Information consists of records compiled for law enforcement purposes and is being wtthheld for the reason(s) l.!..J indicated.

(A) Disclosure could reasonably be expected to Interfere with an enforcement proceeding (e.g .* It would reveal the scope, direction. and focus of enforcement efforts, and thus could possibly allow recipients to take action to shield potential wrong doing or a violation of NRC requirements from investigators).

(C) Disclosure could constitute an unwarranted Invasion of personal privacy.

(D) The information consists of names of Individuals and other Information the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to reveal ldentaies of oonfidenlial sources.

D (E) Disclosure would reveal techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions. or guidelines that could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.

[Z] (F) Disclosure could reasonably be expected lo endanger the life or physical safety of an individual.

OTHER (Specify)

I PART 11,B ** DENYING OFFICIALS Pursuant to 10 CFR 9.25(g), 9.25(h), and/or 9.65(b) of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations, It has been determined that the information withheld is exempt from production or disclosure, and !Fiat its production or disclosure is contrary to the public interest. The person responsible for the denial are those officials identified below as denying officials and the FOIA/PA Officer for any denials that may be appealed to the Executive Director for Operations (EDO).

DENYING OFFICIAL TITLE/OFFICE RECORDS DENIED APPELLATE OFFICIAL 1-- - - - - - - - - - , - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + - - - - - - - - - - - - +~E_DO -'-il SECY .L!2..._

Victor McCrcc )Regional Administrator, Region II Sec Appendices A2 IZ] IO 0 Eric J Leeds !office Director, NRR Sec Appendix A3, AS 0 D D I DI Appeal must be made in writing within 30 days of receipt of this response. Appeals should be mailed to the FOIA/Privacy Act Officer, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Wa*shington, DC 20555-0001 , for action by the appropriate appellate officlal(s). You should clearfy state on the envelope and letter that it is a "FOIAIPA Appeal."

NRC FORM 464 Part II (4-2011)

Enclosure 2 of Update t o FOIA 2013-009A Re: FOIA-2013-0126 APPENDIX A RECORDS ALREADY AVAILABLE IN THE PDR NO. ACCESSION NO. DATE DESCRIPTION/CPAGE COUNT)

1. ML103490330 11/29/10 Oconee Nuclear Site, Units 1, 2 and 3, Oconee Response to Confirmatory Action Letter 2-10-003 (7 Pages) 2 ML13099A247 04/29/ 11 Oconee Nuclear Site, Units 1, 2, 3, Response to Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) 2-10-003 (16 pages) Exemption 7F

3. ML13039A084 03/15/10 Generic Failure Rate Evaluation for Jocassee Dam (15 pages) Exemption 7F

4. ML101610083 06/03/10 Oconee Nuclear Station - External Flood Commitments (5 pages)

5. ML13039A086 07 /19/10 Memorandum to Benjamin Beasley, RES from Lois James, NRR,

Subject:

Identification of a Generic External Flooding Issue Due to Potential Dam Failures (9 pages) Exemption 7F

Enclosure 3 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A

' ~Duke T. PRESTON GILLESPIE, JR.

Vice President

,&Energy,. . Oconee Nuclear Station Duke Energy ONO JVP I 7800 Rochester Hwy.

Seneca, SC 29672 April 29, 2011 864-873-4478 864-873-4208 fa~

T.Glllesp/e@duke-energy.com Mr. Victor McCrea, Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region II Marquis One Tower 245 Peachtree Center Ave., NE, Suite 1200 Atlanta, Georgia 30303-1257

Subject:

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Oconee Nuclear Site, Units 1, 2, and 3 Renewed Facility Operating License, DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55 Docket Numbers 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287 Oconee Response to Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) 2-10-003

References:

1. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) letter from Luis A. Reyes to Dave Baxter (Duke Energy), "Confirmatory Action Letter - Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Commitments to Address External Flooding Concerns (TAC Nos. ME3065, ME3066, and ME3067)" dated June 22, 2010

2. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) letter from Eric Leeds to Preston Gillespie (Duke Energy), "Staff Assessment of Duke's Response to Confirmatory Action Letter Regarding Duke's Commitments to Address E~ernal Flooding Concerns at the Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 (ONS) (TAC Nos. ME3065, ME3066, and ME3067)"

dated January 28, 2011

3. Duke Energy letter from T. Preston Gillespie to Luis Reyes (Nuclear Regulatory Commission), "Oconee Response to Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) 2-10-003" dated November 29, 201 O

4. Duke Energy letter from Dave Baxter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Oconee External Flood Interim Actions" dated January 15, 201 o The purpose of this letter is to respond to the NRC's request, as noted in the Confirmatory Action Letter dated June 22, 201 O(Reference 1), for a list of all modifications necessary to adequately protect the Oconee site from the impact of a postulated failure of the Jocassee Dam.

www. duke-ener8f. com

Enclosure 3 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A Victor Mccree Nuclear Regulatory Commission April 29, 2011 Page 2 Duke Energy agreed to provide this list and the associated implementation dates by April 30, 2011 (Reference 3).

In Reference 2, the NRC found that the documentation previously supplied by Duke Energy provided sufficient justification that the parameters and analysis used to evaluate the inundation of the Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS) site, resulting from the postulated failure of the Jocassee Dam, were bounded. The Information provided by Duke Energy was in response to one of the NRC's requests in Reference 1.

Attachment 1 is a proposed strategy for mitigating the external flood impacts from a postulated failure of the Jocassee Dam. Calculations supporting this strategy are in progress and have not been finalized. Attachment 2 is a description of proposed site modifications necessary to implement the mitigation strategy. During design and implementation of these modifications, the actions required by Reference 1 will remain in place. Also, periodic independent assessments and emergency response organization drills of the interim actions will be conducted to verify continued viability.

Design of the modifications is in progress and details may change as the process continues.

The capability to provide adequate protection of the Oconee units and the spent fuel from a postulated failure of the Jocassee dam will be documented within the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).

Duke Energy will submit the design of the Intake Dike Diversion Wall and the Intake Dike Tie Section modification (discussed in Attachment 2) to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Duke Energy will also submit any License Amendment Requests (LARs) to the NRC that are necessitated by the power block flood wall modification. The modifications identified in will be completed within a time frame of thirty (30) months plus FERC and NRC LAR review and approval time.

Duke Energy is committed to an orderly and thorough approach to resolution of the external flood mitigation issues at ONS so that the dates provided above and completion of the related modifications can be achieved. Duke Energy is proceeding, consistent with Its corporate governance requirements, to obtain necessary internal approvals to fund the Implementation of these commitments. Additionally, Duke Energy must undergo additional land acquisitions for relocation of the 100 kV (Fant) line towers.

Since this letter contains security sensitive information, Duke Energy hereby requests the NRC withhold the letter and its attachments from public disclosure pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390(d)(1),

"Public Inspections, exemptions, requests for withholding.*

If you have questions concerning this matter, please contact Bob Meixell, Oconee Regulatory Compliance, at 864-873-3279.

Enclosure 3 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A Victor Mccree Nuclear Regulatory Commission Aprll 29, 2011 Page3 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on April 29, 2011 .

Sincerely, rr~,,c.ca 4plC T. Preston Gillesple, Jr.

Vice President Oconee Nuclear Station Attachments: - Jocassee Dam Failure Flood Mitigation Strategy - Description of Modifications

Enclosure 3 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A d)(1)

Victor Mccree Nuclear Regulatory Commission April 29, 2011 Page4 cc:

Mr. Joseph G. Giitter, Director Division of Operating Reactor Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 0-8 E1A Washington, D. C. 20555 Mr. John Stang, Project Manager Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 0-8 G9A Washington, D. C. 20555 Mr. Andy Sabisch Senior Resident Inspector Oconee Nuclear Site Susan E. Jenkins, Manager Radioactive & Infectious Waste Management Division of Waste Management SC Dept. of Health and Environmental Control 2600 Bull Street Columbia, SC 29201

Enclosure 3 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A ATTACHMENT 1 JOCASSEE DAM FAILURE FLOOD MITIGATION STRATEGY

Enclosure 3 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A Withhold from Publlc Olsclosu Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment 1 - Jocassee Dam Failure Flood Mitigation Strategy Page 2 Jocassee Dam Failure Flood Mitigation Strategy The strategy proposed within this attachment will continue to ensure adequate protection of the Oconee units and spent fuel in the unlikely occurrence of a Jocassee Dam failure. This strategy is provided based on the following Initial Oconee site conditions:

All three units are at power operation

Unit 1&2 and Unit 3 Spent Fuel Pools (SFP) heat rates are consistent with that associated with all three units at power operation (no full core offload)

Condenser Circulating Water (CCW) is not dewatered

The Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) is available

I(b)(7)(F)

Credited Systems, Structures, and Components are in normal alignments When the Oconee site is not within these initial conditions or associated mitigation systems are unavailable, appropriate compensatory measures will be taken based on the insight provided through the 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) program, as applicable.

Furthermore, the mitigation strategy assumes the following:

The Jocassee Dam failure does not occur concunrent with design basis accidents, design events, or transients.

The Jocassee Dam failure does not occur concurrent with an earthquake.

The occurrence of a single failure, as well as the failure of a control rod to fully insert, is not assumed.

Systems, Structures, and Components (SSCs) to mitigate a Jocassee Dam failure are not required to be QA~1.

UFSAR Section 2.4.2.2 documents the Flood Design Considerations for both the Keowee and Jocassee Reservoirs. The dams and other hydraulic structures were designed with adequate freeboard and structural safety factors to safely accommodate the effects of Probable Maximum Precipitation (PMP). UFSAR Section 2.4.4 documents that Jocassee has been designed to the same seismic input conditions as Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS). Flooding due to the potential failure of the Jocassee Dam or Keowee Dam was not addressed and was considered to be beyond design basis. Thus, the current ONS licensing basis defines protection from external flooding caused by a Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) applicable to ONS which was analyzed based on the PMP. This basis satisfied General Design Criterion 2 of the UFSAR (Section 3.1.2).

Criterion 2 of the UFSAR Imposes design criteria on select (designated as Essential) SSCs associated with the forces and conditions associated with natural phenomena. As such, natural phenomena events are not design basis events at Oconee, instead they impose design criteria

Enclosure 3 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A Wrthho,"""1.\1!!lJ"'VII Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment 1 - Jocassee Dam Failure Flood Mitigation Strategy Page 3 on SSCs identified for mitigation of accidents. As was the original site design for flooding conditions, these design criteria are to remain within the constraints of the PMF applicable to ONS which was analyzed based on the PMP. Therefore, the original PMF analysis will remain as the flood design criteria for the Essential SSCs.

A Jocassee Dam failure can subject the Oconee Nuclear Site to adverse conditions beyond the plant design basis. Specifically, the postulated failure of the Jocassee Dam could result In a loss of off-site and emergency power, loss of external water sources and Inundation of a majority of the station's SSCs. As described and accepted within Reference 1, compensatory measures are in place to mitigate these potential adverse consequences. Modifications are planned and discussed In Attachment 2 to improve the capability to maintain the three Oconee units as well as both SFPs in a condition that adequately protects the fuel. Upon completion of these modifications and implementation of the mitigation strategy within station procedures and processes, the compensatory measures described within Reference 1 will no longer be required.

Flood barriers will be designed to protect the credited SS'),l,lil.-l!, . ~'"-"-"w....>LLI,\ Turbine Building, Auxiliary Building and the SSF, and the surrounding ard (b)(7)(F) followin the power source for p ant sys1ems. protected power source would also allow the SSF to be owered without startin the SSF diesel enerator thus * *

(b)(7)(F)

'---- -----:=----:--::------:-:-:-----.,.,..----:--:------------=-----__,..-.11 Thus, mitigation of the Jocassee Dam failure would be limited by the loss of external water sources to ONS. The water inventory trapped in the CCW system piping system would be the credited source of water for core decay heat removal and SFP makeup.

The planned modifications have been assumed to be implemented in the mitigation strategy for establishing and maintaining the three Oconee units as well as both SFPs in a condition that adequately protects the fuel. The mitigation strategy for this scenario has been subdlvid'ed into the following phases:

- Phase 1: Reactor shutdown and establishment of Mode 3

Phase 2: Initiation of Natural Circulation Cooldown of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) to 250°F

Phase 3: Maintain RCS at S250°F

Enclosure 3 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A n.

Withhold from Pu-....._,--""-- vn.....w_..-......,w.1* (d){1)

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment 1 - Jocassee Dam Failure Flood Mitigation Strategy Page4 Phase 1: Reactor shutdown and establishment of Mode 3 (b)(7)(F)

.____________________,!Actions are taken to establish the flood protective features, such as Isolating Turbine Building and yard drain flowpaths and closing flood barrier access openings.

Following notification, the ONS Switchyards are assumed to remain L-------~-

avaiiabIe to each unit's startup transformer which provides power to normal and emergency systems.

The operators will take actions to shutdown the reactor(s) and establish Mode 3 with T_ and RCS pressure at approximately 525°F and 2155 psig respectively, using normal plant systems.

Operator actions will be undertaken to begin boration of the RCS for cold shutdown conditions.

Normal secondary plant systems will remain in operation during this phase.

The operators will take actions to disable the Essential Siphon Vacuum System and vent it to prevent reverse siphon flow from the CCW inlet piping back to the Intake Canal when it is lost.

The emergency CCW discharge flow path will be disabled by operators to prevent any loss of CCW. Actions will be taken to isolate the High Pressure Service Water {HPSW) outside of the flood protected area to ensure its capability to provide cooling water to the High Pressure Injection (HPI) pump motors.

Phase 2: Initiation of Natural Circulation Cooldown of the Reactor Coolant System to 250°F (b)(7)(F) results In a momentary loss of power to ea are lost due to the loss of ower to the sta

.__ _______________________ (b)(7)(F)

,... The SSF is normally powered from Unit 2's MFB, but it is load shed. Operator action wlll be taken to restore power to the SSF from Unit 2's MFB. Following reset of the load shed, power for the SSF would be provided from Unit 2's MFB to minimize any usage of the CCW inventory for SSF diesel operation.

The rising flood water in the ONS Intake Canal is postulated to result in failure of the Lake Keowee impoundment including the Intake canal. This requires the shutdown of the Low Pressure Servie:e Water (LPSW) pumps to conserve water inventory in the CCW piping.

Enclosure 3 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A etter Wlthhold from Public Dlsdosure Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment 1 -Jocassee Dam Failure Flood Mitigation Strategy Page 5 Heat removal from the Spent Fuel Cooling system is normally provided by the Recirculated Cooling Water (RCW) system. Following the overtopplng of the Keowee Dam, the loss of CCW flow results in a loss of RCW cooling. This leaves the Units 1 & 2 shared SFP and the Unit 3 SFP without cooling. The SFP will eventually heat up to the point of boiling. When boiling occurs, the SFP level will decrease. Makeup to the SFP would be initiated from available sources including the water contained within the CCW buried piping to maintaln a sufficient water level above the spent fuel stored in the pools.

The shutdown of the LPSW pumps results in a loss of cooling to such items as the Reactor Building, HPI pumps, the Component Cooling System, the motor-driven EFW pumps, and the Low Pressure Injection coo'lers.

With the shutdown of the CCW and LPSW systems, environmental conditions within the plant would be established as needed by the use of temporary equipment and operation of necessary existing and temporary ventilation systems. The temporary equipment will be powered from a 4160VAC electrical bus tha1 receives power from CT5.

The HP1 pumps can continue to operate because backup cooling is provided from the HPSW system via the Elevated Water Storage Tank (EWST}. Power to an HPSW pump would be restored and the pump would be operated to replenish the EWST to maintain cooling water to the HPI pump motor coolers. The HPI system operates to maintain pressurizer level at the desired setpoint.

A loss of normal secondary systems is experienced due to the temporary loss of power to the main feeder buses. Decay heat removal would initially be maintained by the EFW System. The motor-driven EFW pumps must be secured due to the loss of LPSW cooling. The turbine-driven EFW pump does not require LPSW for cooling and is therefore allowed to continue to operate to feed the SGs. The loss of condenser cooling will result in the SGs being steamed to atmosphere using the Atmospheric Dump Valves which results in depletion of the condensate Inventory.

Upon a loss of normal RCS letdown capability a cooldown is initiated. Since RCPs cannot be operated based on a loss of cooling and power to the pumps, a natural circulation cooldown must be performed. Oepressurization of the RCS would be accomplished by means of the Power Operated Relief Valve and/or auxiliary spray.

Core decay heat removal would eventually be transferred to the SSF Auxiliary Service Water (ASW) system to utilize the trapped water inventory in the CCW piping. With the use of tlhe SSF ASW system, valve alignments would be made to maximize the available trapped water inventory in the CCW piping to the SSF ASW pump suction. This would be accomplished by cross-connecting the CCW inlet and discharge piping between all three units.

Enclosure 3 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A This letter conntlll:Ml&Curily nsll In nnation Withhold from Public Disclosure un 10CFR .3 d)(1)

Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Jocassee Dam Failure Flood Mitigation Strategy Page6 When the cooldown has been completed, the operating HPI pump would be stopped. The SSF ASW system would continue to supply the steam generators (SGs) to maintain decay heat removal.

Phase 3: Maintain RCS at S250°F Core decay heat removal will be maintained by natural circulation of the RCS with the SSF ASW system providing decay heat removal by means of SG feeding and steaming through the ADVs.

The HPI system will be operated as needed to maintain RCS water level within an acceptable band. Pressurizer heaters will be operated as necessary to maintain RCS pressure. Water level In the SFP will be maintained at a sufficient level above the spent fuel stored in the pools.

The suction source for the SSF ASW system and the SFP makeup system is the water inventory trapped In the CCW piping.

Enclosure 3 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A ATTACHMENT 2.

DESCRIPTION OF MODIFICATIONS

Enclosure 3 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A Wi old """"'..,,.,.,

Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Description of Modifications Page 2 Based on the mitigation strategy discussed within Attachment 1, the following table Identifies proposed modifications to mitigate site flooding following the postulated failure of the Jocassee Dam.

Specifically, modifications will be required to protect the required SSCs to meet the mitigation strategy and provide a dedicated flood protected power supply following a postulated Jocassee Dam failure. Protection of the credited SSCs including the Turbine Building, Auxiliary Building, SSF, and the surrounding yard (including CT5 Substation) will be accomplished with flood barriers and associated infr st (b)(7)(F)

No Category Description 1 (b)(7)(F) (b)(7)(F) ~

(b)(7)(F) ,--

1A

~

1B CT5 Substation Modify CTS Substation to supply the standby bus and a new recovery eauipment bus.

2 Protect Required Protect required SSCa and the surrounding yard due SSCs and the to Keowee lmpoundment failures and rising waters In Surrounding Yard the tallrace area 2A Power Block Flood Wall Install a new flood wall located on the east side of the Oconee site.

28 Intake Dike Diversion Install a new diversion wall along the northern side of the Wall ON$ intake dike 2C Turbine Building Drain Install barriers to minimize flood waters from entering Into Isolation the Turbine Building from rising waters in the tailrace area 2D Yard Drain Isolation Install barriers to minimize flood waters from entering the site 3 SFP Makeup Utilizes stored water Inventory for makeup to the SFP 3A SSF Service Water SSF ASW minimum flow line diverted to outside SSF for Discharge Flow Path transfer to SFP 3B SFP Level Install new SFP level Instrumentation rated for post-flood Instrumentation conditions

Enclosure 3 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A tter co

s security se

In Withhold from Public o_,.,,ouu...,,,,iler 10CF Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment 2 - Description of Modifications Page3 Description of Modifications:

1-Dedlcated, Flood Protected Power In order to ensure an adequate dedicated power path to the Oconee site after a Jocassee Dam failure, the following modifications are required:

(b)(7)(F) 1B - CT5 Substation L------------------------'

(b)(7)(F) r-,::~~~~l I The Jocassee Dam failure requires modification of the CT5 Substation to add multiple power paths for mitigation. The Initial function of the CT5 Substation will be to provide emergency power to loads required to mitigate the Jocassee Dam failure from the Oconee Standby Buses.

Isolation for CT5 to the Standby Bus power path will be provided by a new breaker in the CT5 Substation. A secondary function of the CT5 Substation will be to provide an additional power path to temporary loads used for mitigation. These loads will be powered by a new recovery equipment bus designed for the CTS Substation. This bus wlll provide power to portable distribution tra1ilers at voltage levels of 4160V, 600V, 480V, 208V, and 120V for these temporary loads. Isolation/protection of this bus will be provided by a new breaker.

Individual loads wlll be isolated/protected by load-specific fusible gang switches on the load side of this bus.

General Design Parameters:

Loading of CT5 transformer does not exceed the 12/16/20MVA rating consistent with UFSAR Section 8.2.1.4.

2-Protect Required SSCa and the Surrounding Yard In order to prevent flood waters from flowing Into the site from the Keowee impoundment failure and from rising waters In the tallrace area, the following modifications are required:

Enclosure 3 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A (1)

Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Description of Modifications Page4 2A - Power Block Flood Wall The new Power Block flood Wall will envelope the eastern side and the southern end of the ONS protected area. The wall is comprised of 3 sections: The Discharge Diversion Section, The East Wall, and the Intake Dike Tie Section. The wall will have at least one vehicular access and one personnel access located at the north road crossing, each of which will have flood protection capability.

General Design Parameters:

Classification: Class 3, consistent with UFSAR Section 3.2.1 .1.3 Design Loadings:

Dead + Wind (UFSAR Section 3.3.2.4) or Dead + Hydrodynamic (Flood) (Reference 2)

Additional Design Considerations: General erosion; flood scour; debris; leakage from access gates, expansion joints, and unidentified locations (details to be determined); site drainage; and soil exploration and characterization. Interactions of non-seismic SSCs with seismic SSCs will be addressed.

Discharge Diversion Section (approximately 300 ft long) 7 Wall Height: Top Elev.1.-l(b_l(__l(F_)_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ .

Protection Height Margin: Approximately 2 ft.

Wall Thickness: Material dependent Design Codes: Similar to UFSAR Section 3.8.5.4.3 Design Methodology: UFSAR Section 3.8.5.4.3 East wall Section (approximately 2000 ft. long) 7 Wall Height: Top Etev. lL-(b_l(_)_(F_)- - - - - - -- - -~

Protection Height Margin: Approximately 2 ft.

Wall Thickness: Material dependent Design Codes: Similar to UFSAR Section 3.8.5.4.3 Design Methodology: UFSAR Section 3.8.5.4.3 Access Barriers: Vehicular access closure is planned to be a gate (sliding or hinged, possibly designed with some mechanical sealing devices), or stop logs (concrete or steel),

similar to standard flood gates or other similar barriers.

Enclosure 3 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A Withho*.....,_.,,=......,61 Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Description of Modifications Pages Intake Dike Tie Section (approximately 160 ft. long) 1 7 Wall Height: Top Elev. l(b)( l(F) ~apering to zero height Protection Height Margin: Approximately 2 ft.

Wall Thickness: Material dependent. Wall ls planned to be a combination of Power Block.

Wall transitioning to an embankment (compacted fill) wall tied to the existing Intake Canal Dike embankment.

Design Codes: Similar to UFSAR Section 3.8.5.4.3 Design Methodology: UFSAR Section 3.8.5.4.3 28 - Intake Dike Diversion Wall This wall will prevent the rising waters on Lake Keowee, more specifically the Oconee Intake Canal, from flowing over the northern crest of the dike and directly into the yard. The wall will be located on the northern side of the dike crest, going from the northeast comer of the dike to the northwest comer of the dike where it will tie to higher ground. One access gate is planned for the exist~ng roadway connecting the western portion of the nuclear site to the crest of the dike. Design parameters for the Intake Dike Diversion Wall are described below:

General Design Parameters Classification: Class 3, consistent with UFSAR Section 3.2.1.1.3 Design Loadings:

Dead + Wind (UFSAR Section 3.3.2.4) or Dead + Hydrodynamic (Flood) (Reference 2)

Additional Design Considerations: General erosion; flood scour, debris; leakage from access gates, expansion joints, and unidentified locations (details to be detennined); and soil exploration and characterization. Interactions of non-seismic SSCs with seismic SSCs will be addressed.

7 Wall Height: Top Elev.l{bl( l(F)

Protection Height MargL.i-n:_,A...p-p-ro_x..,.

im _a....,.te

_,l,y"""2..,.ft Wall Thickness: Material dependent Design Codes: Similar to UFSAR Section 3.8.5.4.3 Design Methodology: UFSAR Section 3.8.5.4.3 Access Barriers: Vehicular access closure Is planned to be a gate or stop logs similar to standard flood gates or other similar barriers.

Enclosure 3 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A This tette11,1:9~1S-S411Catify'le*

W h Id 1)

Nuclear Regulatory Comm sion - Description of Modifications Page6 2C - Turbine Building Drain Isolation The free-flowing capability of the Turbine Building drain will be restricted during the site external flood by a flood gate or other similar barrier to minimize water flowing into the Turbine Building from the flooded tallrace area. Design parameters are described below:

Classification: Class 3, consistent with UFSAR Section 3.2.1.1.3 Design Loadings: Dead + Hydrodynamic (Flood) (Reference 2)

Design Code: Sluice gate or valve, standard to be determined 2D - Yard Drain Isolation This modification adds. a flood gate or other similar barrier to minimize the amount of water entering the flood protected area via the yard drains. Design parameters are described below:

Classification: Class 3, consistent with UFSAR Section 3.2.1.1.3 Design Loadings: Dead + Hydrodynamic (Flood) (Reference 2)

Design Code: Sluice gate or valve, standard to be determined 3-SFP Makeup In order to provide makeup to the Spent Fuel Pools after a Jocassee Dam failure, the following modifications are required:

3A - SSF Service Water Discharge Flow Path The capability to remove water from the CCW pipe by means of the SSF ASW Minimum Flow Line will be added for collection and transfer to the Units 1 & 2 shared SFP and the Unit 3 SFP.

38 - SFP Level !nstrumentatlon SFP level instrumentation will be designed to monitor the SFP level to ensure proper level ls maintained during SFP boiling conditions.

Enclosure 4 of FOIA Appeal 2013-009A Update Letter

~U.S.NRCUNITED STATES NUCLEAR. I\EGm.ATORY COMMISSION Protecting People and the Environment Generic Failure Rate Evaluation for Jocassee Dam March 15, 2010 Probabilistic Risk Assessment {PRA) Analyst: James Vail, Reliability and Risk Analyst, NRR/DRA/APOB Probabilistic Risk As~essment (PRA) Analyst: Fernando Ferranle, Reliability and Risk Analyst, NRR/ORA/APOB Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Analyst: Jeff Mitman, Senior Reliability and Risk Analyst, NRR/DRAIAPOB Peer Reviewer: Steven A. Laur, Senior Technical Advisor NRR/DRA

Enclosure 4 of FOIA Appeal 2013-009A Update Letter GENERIC FAILURE RATE EVALUATION FOR JOCASSEE DAM BY DIVISION OF RISK ASSESSMENT'S PRA OPERATIONAL SUPPORT BRANCH The following documents a generic dam failure rate analysis applicable to the Jocassee Dam performed by the PRA Operational Support Branch (APOB) of the Division of Risk Assessment (DRA) in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation {NRR). The analysis, technical justifications, and databases used in support of the calculations for the derived value are briefly discussed.

Portions of this evaluation were initially performed in 2007 but not formally documented at that time.

Approach The approach used in deriving a generic failure rate value applicable to the Jocassee Dam included: (I) an evaluation of the physical characteristics and description o1 the dam, (ii) an assessment of the overall U.S. dam population for those with similar features to the Jocassee Dam, (iii) a study of U.S. dam perfonnance information for failure events that may be applicable to this subset of the overall population, and (iv) a calculation of a point estimate, as well as consideration of the uncertainty involved, for the failure rate given the observed failure events and the observed time period (in dam-years),

Jocassee Dam Description The Jocassee Dam is located In northwest South Carolina, forming a reservoir (Lake Jocassee) with a 7565-acre surface area, a water volume of 1,160,298 acre-feet, and a total drainage area of 147 sq-miles at full pond (1,110 feet elevation above mean sea level). The reservoir was created in 1973 with the construction of the dam. The Jocassee Dam is an embankment dam with an earthen core and rockfilled and random rockfilled zones (see Figure 1).

(b)(7)(F)

...§fNSITl1/Efl'qPORMATION- OFFICIAL O ~ Y 1

Enclosure 4 of FOIA Appeal 2013-009A Update Letter The dam is 385 feet in height (1,125 crest elevation above mean sea level) and 1,825 feet in length and, along with two homogeneous earthfill dikes and a reinforced concrete spillway, is part of a hydroelectric station and pumped storage project. The underground powerhouse generating units receive water from two cylindrical intake towers through eight openings. The water is channeled from the intake towers to four hydro turbines by two bifurcated power tunnels which are constructed through the bedrock of the east abutment. Two gates 33 feet in height and 38 feet in width control the outflow of the spillway.

Databases The staff used two databases to obtain information about the population of dams in the US: the National Inventory of Dams (NID}, maintained by the US Army Corps of Engineers, and the National Performance of Dams Program (NPDP), developed by the Department of CMI and Environmental Engineering at Stanford University. The NIO database-contains data describing multiple attributes such as dimensions, type, impoundment characteristics, etc. The NPDP database contains a collection of dam incident reports searchable by various parameters including dam type, incident type, and consequences.

Failure Events Table 1 lists the applicable dam failures initially derived from the NPOP database. To choose these 13 failures, the analysts used criteria based on the previously discussed dam characteristics (i.e., dam type and height). However, due to the ambiguity in the classificatfon of.

the dam type (i.e., based on material composition) between and within the NIO and NPDP databases, as well as the lack of information to establish an exact link with the Jocassee Dam characteristics for every data point, the staff considered both rockfill dams and mixed-rockfill dams (i.e., those classified exclusively as rockfill dams as well as mixed dam types that include rockfill in their categorization). It should be noted that the NPDP database does not list any failures post-2006 and at least two well-known large dam failures in the U.S. are not included:

the Big Bay Dam in Mississippi (March 2004) and the Taum Sauk Rese,voir (December 2005) in Missouri. While the Big Bay Dam was an earthen dam (i.e., excluded based on dam type).

the Taum Sauk Reservoir consisted of a concrete-faced rockfill dam approximately 100 feet in height and was, therefore, included in the current analysis.

Additionally, the list was screened to take into consideration (i) failure events observed between 1900 and 2005, and (ii) failure events observed between 1940 and 2005; under the assumption that events prior to these construction periods could produce different results representative of distinct design practices. In part, this choice was due to the lack of information on the exact construction date of several dams in the database. The staff expended an extensive effort to determine th~ construction completion date for several dams for which the information was missing in the NPOP database (this information is included in Table 1).

Several failures listed in Table 1 have (or are assumed to have) occurred within a few years of either the start or completion of construction (e.g., the Lower Hell Hole Dam and the Frenchman Dam failures). Based op the information available and the estimated completion dates, the staff screened out such failures since the occurrence of the events was assumed to be related to the construction phase and, therefore, not applicable to a mature dam such as Jocassee.

Finally, the analysts chose to include the Dresser No. 4 Dam failure, because they deemed this dam to be similar to the Jocassee Dam in composition (i.e., a large mixed earthJill-rockfill dam),

SFI\IS!JIUE 11413'0~MPiTION OFFICIAL USE ot*LY..

. 2

Enclosure 4 of FOIA Appeal 2013-009A Update Letter despite the fact that it is listed as a tailings dam (i.e., a dam theoretically built under lower standards of quality and maintenanc~)-

Therefore, the final list of failures of dams similar to, and therefore applicable to, the Jocassee Dam includes 6 failures occurring between 1900 and 2005. These six failures are highlighted in Table 1. The staff included these failures based on the following criteria: (i) rockfill or mixed-rockfill dam type, (ii) dam height above 50 feet. (iii) failure occurring after 1900, and (iv} no failures during or within a few years of completion of construction. Note that if failures occurring prior to-1940 are screened, then only 4 events remain: (1) Taum Sauk, (2) Dresser No.4 Dam, (3) Skagway, *and (4) Kem Brothers Reservoir. It should be noted that there are 1 to 3 failures of dams bullt between 1940 and 2005 depending on whether the entries with unknown construction dates are excluded or not, respectively (in similar fashion, there are 3 to 5 failures for dams constructed between 1900*2005 excluding or not entries with unknown construction dates, respectively).

Total Dam-years Calculation

. To calculate the dam failure rate, the staff needed to obtain the total number of dam.years of both failed and non-failed dams. The analysts extracted a subset of dams from the NID database based on a set of parameters to narrow the US population of dams to those reflecting the characteristics of the Jocassee Dam discussed above, i.e., large rockfill dams. They assumed that dams above 50 feet in height appropriately reflect design practices and structural characteristics of larger dams such as Jocassee. This height criterion was consistent with the large dam definition (WCD, 2000) established by the International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD) which ~defines a large dam as a dam with a height of 15m or more from the foundation." If dams are between 5*15 meters high and have a reservoir volume of more than 3 million cubic meters, ICOLD also classified such dams as large. Hence, the staff used this definition as a screening criterion. The dams considered for calculation of the total dam-years were those in the NID database that were categorized exclusively as 'Rocl<fill' dams (i.e., those listed under the 'ER' abbreviation, intended to correspond to rockfill dams for NID cataloguing purposes).

The staff included the dam-year contributions from SkagwaY- and the replacement for the failed Frenchman Dam, while those from Kern Brothers Reservoir, Dresser No. 4 Dam, Penn Forest, and the failed Frenchman Dam were not included. This was because the staff judges that including the dam-year contribution from these specific dams would not significantly impacl the resulting dam-year total. The staff calculated the final result using the difference between the last year in the available data (2005) and either 1900 or 1940. For the 1900-2005 period, the staff" obtained a total of 21,490 dam-years; while for 1940-.2005 the result was 13,889.dam~

years. See Appendix A for a tabulation of the dams and the associated dam-years.

3

Enclosure 4 of FOIA Appeal 2013-009A Update Letter.

SENSlllVE INFORM;t(fl61* OFFIGIAt-USE.QNl.¥ a e ..: m1a IS 0 am f'I Tbl11'fll'tfd a1 ure events appl'bltthJ 1 1ca e o e ocassee Dam Incident Completion Heignl Dam Name Year Year(Esl) i~rtType j-

Dam Type .(ft} .. OesCllptlon From NPDP Dl!tabase (Except Taum Sau~);;'

Taum Sauk Dvertopped due to over-pumping of niservoir. !ndependent ana~is 2005 1963 Overtopping Rockfill 94 indicated sewral root causes (e.g., lad of mon~oring, spillway).

Dresser No.4 EarthRockfill ,. '

1975 Unknown Piping 105 Catastrophic failure thai created abreach 300 feet 'Mde in the lellee.

Dam /Tailings Inflow Food

Skagway 1965 1925 Rockfill 79 The dam lai~d curing aftood in 1965.

Hyijrologic Event Dam failed du'ing construction. Overtopped by 100 leet -washing Hell Hole 1964 1964 Nol Known Rockfill 410 out most or tlie fill.

Concrete Earth Penn Forest 1960 1gsc Piping 151 Partial failJre. Sin'<hole occurred in ups1ream slope of dam.

Rockf*II Frenchman *

Inflow Flood

Runoff from r,etti'lg snow, Adike section was overtoppad early 1952 1951 Hydrologic Event Rocknll 63 morning April 15, 1952. Later lhat day, dam breached.

Da:11 Ker.: Brothers 1949 Unknown Selllement Earth Roddill 54 Failure due to excessive settlement of fill.

Reservoir Blowou1 fa:.ure under concrete spillway weir struclure during period lake Francis 1899

1sgg Piping Earth -~0Ckfill 79 of heavy spil~ay How. Spillway failure thought lo be due to piping in soft saturated fcundation.

Foundat~n slide during oonstruction (at 120 feet). Height raised to Lafayette !928 1928 Emoankment Slide Earth Rockfill 132 170 feet in 1932. Not sure if this is ronsidered afailure.

Manitou 1924 1917 Seepage Earth Rodmll . 123 Partial fa~ure Wc!S disintegrating and c:onve~ed into gra~el fill.

Failure by µiiing through abutment;* undermined by passage of water Lyman 1915 1912 Piping Earth Rockfill 76.4 under cap of lava rock which Hanked dam and exlended beneath spillway. Man pM of dam uninjured.

Foundation $;ide during rons1ruclion {al 120 feet). Height raised to Lower Olay 1916 1897 Spillway Earth Rod(fill 154 170 fool in 1932. Not sure if !his is oonsldered afailure.

Failure by piping through abutment; undermined by passage ol waler under cap of ,aw ~ck which Hanked dam and exlended beneath Blad\ Rock 1909 1908 Piping Earth Rockfill 70 spillway. PortKl" of spillway dropped 7feel; some fill at soulh end washed ou:. Mair, part of dam uninjured.

SQl!Sl+II" IHF9RMMION -OfFlel:~L USE Ol'ftV 4

Enclosure 4 of FOIA Appeal 2013-009A Update Letter SENSITIVE INmRMATl~Fr lCIAL U5E ONLY Generic Point Estimate of the Dam Failure Rate The staff calculated the point estimate by dividing the number of applicable dam failures (see Table 1 above) by the total applicable dam-years (derived as described previously). Assuming a 1900-2005 range for the year of occurrence of the failure events and the dam-year estimation (based on completion year) , the analysts obtained a failure rate of 2.BE-4 per dam-year. When considering a 1940-2005 rainge, the staff obtained a result of 2.9E-4 per dam-year.

Because the.NID database does not give Information regarding the quality of design, construction and/or maintenance, and the NPDP database does not consistently supply information on the dam health (i.e., is It well maintained?) at time of failure, the staff could not derive failure rates for above or below average built and maintained dams. This lack of information precluded the staff from making any judgment as to whether Jocassee is or is not an above average designed, constructed and maintained dam deserving of a failure frequency different than an average failure frequency.

Additionally, the staff recognizes that ambiguity and lack of complete information with respect to dam type, construction completion data, and darn incident reporting, may result In variations in the failure rate estimation. Therefore, the staff performed a simple sensitivity study in order to evaluate the changes due to screening failure events and cut-off year criteria. The results are shown in Table 2 for an assumed number of failures and clearly indicated that the results exhibit small variations for the period cut-off selected (1900-2005 and 1940-2005) and the number of failures considered (6 and 4, respectively). Additionally, the extent of the variation in the point estimate is shown for other number of failures and cut-off years based on the subset of darns selected. The table illustrates that the order-of-magnitude failure frequency estimate does not change significantly if the number of failures is increased or decreased slightly.

Table 2: Failure Rate Sensitivity Analysis ASSUMED NUMBER OF FAILURES CUT- DAM-OFF YEARS # DAMS 2 3 4 5 6 7 ALL 25137 484 4.0E-05 8.0E-05 1.2E-04 1.6E*04 2.0E-04 2.4E-04 2.8E-04 1900 21490 466 4.7E-05 9.3E-05 1.4E-04 1.9E-04 2.3E-04 2.8E-04 3.3E-04 1910 19778 449 5.1E-05 1.0E-04 1.SE-04 2.0E-04 2.SE-04 3.0E-04 3.SE-04 1920 18389 434 5.4E-05 1.1 E-04 1.6E-04 2.2E-04 2.7E-04 3.3E-04 3.8E-04 1930 16475 410 6.1 E-05 1.2E-04 1.8E-04 2.4E-04 3.0E-04 4.2E-04 1940 13889 373 7.2E-05 1.4E-04 2.2E-04 2.9E-04 5.0E-04 1950 12269 346 8.2E-0S 1.6E-04 2.4E-04 3.3E-04 5.7E-04 1960 8453 270 1.2E-04 2.4E-04 3.SE-04 4.7E-04 8.3E-04 1970 3242 143 1980 1339 82 1990 381 36 FAILURE RATE GIVEN# NUMBER OF FAILURES AND CUTOFF YEAR 5

Enclosure 4 of FOIA Appeal 2013-009A Update Letter Bayesian Estimate of the Dam Failure Rate To evaluate the dam failure rate uncertainty, the staff conducted a Bayesian analysis of the failure rate for the 1900-2005 period via a Bayesian analysis approach (Atwood et al, 2003). 1n this approach, a prior distribution was assumed from the number of failures and dam-years for all large dams {according to the !COLD definition) identified in the NID and NPOP databases, Failures identified as 'infantile failures' in NPDP were excluded and only dams built since 1900 according to NID were used for total dam-year calculation. Under these assumptions, the total number of failures for all large dams for 1900-2005 was 84 with a total of 260,960 dam-years.

This corresponds to a point estimate of the failure rate equivalent to 3.2E-4/dam-year. A distribution was fitted around this mean. The number of dam failure events was modeled as a Poisson distribution for which its conjugate prior was assumed to follow a Gamma distribution (i.e .. the conjugate prior in a Gamma-Poisson model). The staff, based on judgment, chose a Gamma distribution with the point estimate obtained from the large dam failure rate above and a 51h percentile corresponding to 1E-5/dam-year. With these assumptions, the staff obtained a prior Gamma distribution with parameters a= 0.8333 and~= 2589, which has a 5th percentile equivalent to 1E-5/dam-year and a 95th percentile corresponding to 1E-3/dam-year. The staff updated this prior distribution with the data used to obtain the large rockfill dam point estimate (e.g., 6 failures in 21,490 dam~years) to calculate the posterior distribution. The resulting posterior has a mean of 2.BE-4/dam-year, a 51~ percentile of 1.3E-4/dam-years, and a 9511' percentile of 4.8E-4/dam-years (with parameters a = 6.8333 and 13 .= 24,079). Figure 2 shows both the generic large dam prior and the posterior specific to rockfill dams, Conclusions The staff estimated generic dam failure rates for large rockfill dams, which it considers applicable to the Jocassee Dam, as 2.BE-4/dam-year. Given the nature of the qata and the assumptions involved in narrowing the applicable failure events and subset of the U.S. dam population comparable to this specific dam, the staff performed a Bayesian analysis. Using available data on the domestic inventory of dams and dam failures, the range obtained varies between 1.3E-4/dam-year and 4.SE-4/dam-year (51h - 95th percentile) around a mean of 2.SE-4/dam-year. .

A literature review performed by the authors for statistical studies of dam failures appears to corroborate this conclusion. Such studies were found in Baecher et al [ 1980}, Martz and Bryson (1982), Donnelly (1994), ICOLD (1995}, Foster (2000a}, and Foster et al {2000b}.

Enclosure 4 of FOIA Appeal 2013-009A Update Letter SENSII1V~ INFGRMATIQ~,j -OFFICIAL U ~

Figure 2: Failure Rate Probability Distributions Used in Bayesian Updating 0000,.------,-----.------,-----.---~

4500~

---* Prior 4000 1- Posterior I

I

];, 3500 I

-UJ

~ 3000 \

\

-:.c

.~2500 \

\

112000 \

e a.. 1500 1000 ~,.

sool I

o~----'------'-----'-==----...J 2 *s a 10 Failure Rate (per dam-years)* x 1o""

References Baecher, G. B., M. E. Pate, and R. De Neufville (1980), "Risk of Dam Failure in Benefit-Cost Analysis," Water Resource Research, 16(3), 449-456.

Martz, H.F., and M.C. Bryson (1982), "Predicting Low-Probability/High-Consequence Events,"

Proceedings of the Workshop on Low-Probability/High-Consequence Risk Analysis, June 15-17, 1982, Arlington, Virginia.

Donnely, R. (1994), Nlssues in Dam Safety, ACRES International Innovations Autumn Edition":

http://www. hatch. com_ cn/H atchenergy/ In naval ions/ autumn 2004/featu re. ht mI ICOLD (1995), "Dam Failures Statistical Analysis," Bulletin 99, International Commission on Large Dams.

WCD (2000), ~oams and Development: A New Framework for Decision-Making - overview," The Report of the World Commission on Dams.

Foster M, Fell R, Spannagle M (2000a), "The statistics of embankment dam failures and accidents," Canadian Geotechnical Journal, 37, 1000-1024.

Foster M, Fell R, Spannagle M (2000b) "A method for assessing the relative likelihood of failure of embankment dams by piping." Canadian Geotechnica/ Journal, 37, 1025-1061

-sENSI flve-tNf:OS:MAT10N Or"EIG+At USE ONl.¥ 7

Enclosure 4 of FOIA Appeal 2013-009A Update Letter C.L. Atwood, J.L. LaChance, H.F. Martz, O.J. Anderson, M. Englehardt, D. Whitehead, and T.

Wheeler (2003), *Handbook of Parameter Estimation for Probabilistic Risk Assessment."

NUREG/CR-6823, US NRC.

SENSIMVE IN~MATION

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14

Enclosure 5 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A July 19, 2010 MEMORANDUM TO: Benjamin Beasley, Chief Operating Experience and Generic Issues Branch Division of Risk Analysis Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research FROM: Lois James, Chief /RA/

Probabilistic Risk Assessment Operational Support Branch Division of Risk Assessment Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT:

IDENTIFICATION OF A GENERIC EXTERNAL FLOODING ISSUE DUE TO POTENTIAL DAM FAILURES INTRODUCTION The NRC's primary function is to license and regulate the safe use of radioactive materials for civilian purposes to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety and the environment.

In performing this function, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) identified during a recent review of a regulatory action associated with an operating nuclear power plant (NPP) a higher than expected potential for both the external flooding hazard due to a potential dam failure and its associated consequences to the public health and safety and the environment.

Based on these findings, the Division of Risk Assessment (DRA) and the Division of Engineering (DE) at the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) began evaluating the potential implications of these findings to other operating NPP sites by:

(i) evaluating the extent to which this hazard has been considered in the past via US NRC's regulatory framework (e.g., 10 CFR 50, Regulatory Guides, Standard Review Plan),

(ii) examining current design flood bases regarding dam-related external flooding issues, (iii) interacting with other federal agencies involved in oversight and risk assessment of dams, and (iv) considering whether this additional knowledge may translate into an increase in risk when compared to the previous understanding of this issue.

TECHNICAL ISSUE External flooding considerations involve a series of hydrological and non-hydrological factors that may impact a NPP site. Hydrological factors include site-specific extreme phenomena characteristics (e.g., high tides, severe storms, wave action) potentially causing flooding, while non-hydrological events include seismic activity and other causes. In both cases, there is a potential hazard due to the effect of hydrological and non-hydrological phenomena on man-made structures such as dams, levees, and dikes as contributors to flooding. Available guidance on dams from entities such as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERG),

Enclosure 5 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A US Bureau of Reclamation (USBR), and the US Army Corps of Engineers (USAGE) indicate mechanisms that may trigger the uncontrolled release of the reservoir impounded by a dam.

These generally include (i) overtopping of a dam due to severe precipitation-induced flooding, (ii) seismically-induced failures, (iii) breaches caused by internal erosion/piping phenomena, (iv) operational errors or mechanical failures, and (iv) combinations of these various mechanisms.

Failures other than severe storm and seismic events can be grouped into a subset often referred to as "sunny-day" failures, which can occur during normal operations (e.g., internal erosion and operational failures). Guidance from USBR clearly indicates that these "sunny day" failures may be higher contributors to risk when compared to low-frequency extreme events such as severe storms and earthquakes (USBR, 2010). Additionally, when compared to severe weather events, "sunny day" failures may provide less warning time for mitigating actions to take place. From discussions with these multiple agencies involved in dam risk assessment, it was concluded that the current state-of-art has evolved sufficiently to provide better risk estimates of such contributors.

REGULATORY FRAMEWORK The regulatory requirements for issues related to external flooding are found in Appendix A to 10 CFR 50 (CFR. 1971), where the General Design Criteria (GDC) is described. The GDC was developed to establish minimum requirements for the principal design criteria (i.e., set of necessary requirements to ensure public health and safety) for NPP sites similar to those already licensed. The General Design Criteria 2 (GDC 2) explicitly discusses considerations on the appropriate design bases for structures, systems, and components (SSCs) important to safety expected to withstand the effects of natural phenomena such as flooding. In some cases where the license for a specific reactor site was issued prior to the development of GDC 2, licensees have used criteria similar to GDC 2 to cover natural phenomena considerations in their original license submittals. GDC 2 states that:

"The design bases far these SSCs shall reflect: (1) Appropriate consideration of the most severe of the natural phenomena that have been historically reported far the site and the surrounding area, with sufficient margin for the limited accuracy, quantity and period of time in which the historical data have been accumulated, (2) appropriate combinations of the effects of normal and accident conditions with the effects of the natural phenomena, and (3) the importance of the safety functions to be performed."

In terms of regulatory guidance, four Standard Review Plans (SRPs) in NUREG-0800 (ML0D3740388, ML062260222, ML070730405) and Regulatory Guide 1.59, "Design Basis Floods for Nuclear Power Plants," (ML003740388) include specific guidance on external flooding at NPPs due to potential dam failures. The guidance provided in Regulatory Guide 1.59 explicitly covers hydrologic and seismic-induced dam failures, as well as considerations for combinations of lesser events.

Upon review by NRR staff of the above references, it has been concluded that existing NRC requirements and guidance is ambiguous on whether certain failure mechanisms such as internal erosion or operational errors should be explicitly considered, which have commonly not been the focus of safety analyses performed for operating sites. In part, an assessment of the risk contribution due to Msunny day" failures may have not been consistently performed due to a lack of understanding of its impact on the safety margins of existing NPP sites. Further guidance can be developed with additional understanding of the actual contribution to NPP risk due to "sunny day" failures individually and in combination with other mechanisms.

2

Enclosure 5 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A CURRENT DESIGN FLOOD BASES A detailed analysis of dam-related flooding potential and its consequences in the licensing of operating NPPs is limited in the available documentation, which consists primarily of the Final Safety Analysis Reports (FSARs) and the Individual Plant Examinations for External Events

. (IPEEEs) for individual sites. lt is clear however, that emphasis has been placed on the use of conservative screening assumptions to eliminate this flooding hazard from further consideration based on either bounding characteristics of other flooding phenomena, low initiating event frequency and/or sufficient advance warning in case a dam failure does occur.

In multiple FSARs and IPEEEs, dam failures are described as "not credible" (Fort Calhoun Station, Cooper Nuclear Station), "highly unlikely" (McGuire Nuclear Station), or "extremely unlikely" (Arkansas Nuclear One, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant) by taking into account individual or combinations of severe events hydrologic and seismic events. From a preliminary review, at least four sites have considered quantitative dam failure rate: Oconee Nuclear Station (South Carolina), Cooper Nuclear Station (Nebraska), Fort Calhoun Station (Nebraska), and H.B. Robinson (South Carolina). All four sites considered failure rates in the range between 5 x 1o*5/year and 1 x 1o-5/year. Flooding requirements are considered for a number of sites, including the use of sandbagging and other mitigative actions which assume ample lead time for implementation. However, a preliminary review of the IPEEEs indicates that, since dam failures were excluded from consideration in most FSARs, its risk contribution has not been addressed to date.

RISK SIGNIFICANCE Due to the limited risk considerations available, NRR further evaluated the dam failure rates considered in the subset of IPEEEs mentioned above. As there were few reliable dam failure data sources when most estimates where derived, it was found that these analyses relied mainly on an estimate published in NUREG/CR-5042, "Evaluation of External Hazards to Nuclear Power Plants in the United States" (ML062260222). In turn, the data source for the dam failure estimate in NUREG/CR-5042 is "NSAC-60 Oconee PRA: A Probabilistic Risk Assessment of Oconee Unit 3" (NSAC/EPRI, 1984). Upon detailed review by NRR staff, it was concluded that the failure frequency value used for large dams in this publication was incorrectly underestimated by an order of magnitude which propagated to the other analyses (e.g.,

IPEEEs). This large difference was in part due to a commingling of different types of large dam population data and a restricted choice of failure data.

From this observation and the fact that most external flooding screening analysis were based on combinations of severe phenomena to screen out this initiating event without significant consideration of the ~sunny day" dam failure mechanisms, NRR staff performed two additional actions: (i) examined current NPP vulnerabilities to dam failure hazards and performed a qualitative assessment of sites more or less Hkely to be impacted based on available information (mostly FSAR and IPEEE information), and (ii) estimated a generic dam failure rate calculation based on the most up-to-date historical data for the specific subset of embankment dams which the NSAC-60 study was intended for (i.e., large rockfill dams).

In the first effort, a study was produced that resulted in a coarse screening and ranking of sites more vulnerable to this hazard (due to both upstream and downstream dam failures). U.S.

commercial nuclear reactors are located in 65 sites adjacent to streams, lakes/reservoirs, or coastal areas. A number of information sources were used to ascertain the location of dams and the corresponding impact to NPPs based on distance to the site and reservoir volume 3

Enclosure 5 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A impounded. Due to the lack of more up-to-date independent information, this study had to primarily consider design bases flooding elevation, historical flooding records, and flood routing results available from FSARs and IPEEEs submitted by licensees. From the 65 sites available, 45 sites were considered to be less vulnerable to potential dam fa/lures while 20 sites were considered to have a higher vulnerability. Of the remaining 20 sites, a qualitative assessment was applied to evaluate sites which could have high, medium, or low Impact due to a dam failure (see Table 1). Particular challenges observed are: (i) lack of independent up-to-date assessments of dam breach analysis and subsequent flood elevations at a site, (Ii) the extensive use of theoretical upper bounds used to approximate the frequency of extreme events such as severe storms and earthquakes (e.g., events with frequencies of 1 in 10,000 years or less), (iii) the complexity Involved in evaluating flood routing at specific watersheds, including estimating dam breach size and time for the corresponding flood wave to impact a site, and (iv) the effectiveness of the flooding protection barriers and site response due to uncertainties in the information above. The scope of this study was preliminary in nature and could greatly benefit from additional short term analysis to evaluate the overall risk at individual sites, since it is recognized that not all dam failures may be sufficiently large to impact a NPP and that significant distances between a site and the impounding structure(s) may attenuate the flood wave and increase the response time available. However it also provided an overview of the generic nature of this issue with a defined subset for further focused analyses.

In the second effort, a generic dam failure rate analysis applicable to a large rockfill dam of modern construction was performed to assess a point estimate and a range that can be supported by available historical data, along the lines of those performed in a subset of IPEEE submittals (ML100780084). Input information included (I) an assessment of the overall US dam population for those with features corresponding to a large rockfill dam, and (ii) a study of U.S.

dam performance information for failure events that may be applicable to this subset of the overall population. The best available databases were used to obtain the total number of dam-years for large dams and documented failures, which also provided insights into limitations and challenges involved In deriving failure rates using this approach. A point estimate calculation produced a value of 2.8 x 104 /dam-year, providing a further check on the estimate previously used in the industry. Simple sensitivity analysis Indicates that significantly lower estimates cannot be reasonably supported by the use of historical data alone. Hence, while limitations in historical data represent a challenge to ascertain a more precise estimate, it is clear that screening this hazard exclusively via this methodology is not justified. Additionally, a Bayesian updatin9 analysis with the subset of dam-years and failures corresponding to rockfill dams was performed using an assumed prior distribution for large dams. This resulted in a posterior distribution with a mean of 2.8 x 104 /dam-year, a 5th percentile of 1.3 x 10"4/dam-year, and a 95lh percentile of 4.8 x 104 /dam-year (i.e., a narrow distribution around the mean value).

Additionally, a literature review of similar published statistical studies of dam failures corroborated the conclusion that a generic dam failure rate for large dams is in the order of magnitude of 1 in 10,000 dam-years.

From these two efforts, NRR staff has concluded that (i) there is an increase in the estimated frequency of a potential dam failure of an order of magnitude from the additional preliminary analysis performed, (ii) prior estimates used in the industry underestimated dam failure rates, (iii) multiple sites can be affected by the impact of dam failures, and (iv) the overall risk to NPP sites may not have been fully addressed due to inconsistencies in identifying and appropriately addressing significant failure modes for dams.

4

Enclosure 5 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A RECENT EXPERIENCE On April 28, 2006, NRC staff identified a performance deficiency involving the Oconee Nuclear Station (CNS) maintenance activities associated with the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) to facilitate installation of tern ora electrical ower cables. The im ortance of this find in is that (b)(7)(F)

ONS was issued operating licenses in 1973 (Units 1 and 2) and 1974 (Unit 3), prior to the publication of significant regulation (e.g., GOC 2) and guidance on external flooding hazards applicable to most of the industry. The licensing basis of ONS did not originally evaluate the consequences of a failure of the Jocassee Dam in the plant design flooding analysis. Flooding protection for the SSF was later added as a risk assessment enhancement obtained via insights the IPEEE submittal for ONS. However, after interactions with licensee, it was established that the original elevation (5 feet) to which the SSF flood protection was designed for would be exceeded based on more recent studies. These studies indicate that approximately 18.5 feet of waler could occur at the sitel(b){7)(F} !after a breach of Jocassee Dam. In this case, the licensee has indicated that a loss of the switchyard, loss of the emergency power supply (hydro units), los ** *

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(b)(7}(F)

(b)(?)(F) ence, based on the varying plant configurations and the loss of the mitigating equipment listed above, the conditional core damage probability (CCDP) given a dam failure for ONS could be as high as 1. Given that ONS had originally used the NSAC*60 study which incorrectly derived a dam failure rate an order of magnitude tower than the NRR analysis indicates, additional reviews, analysis, and actions are expected to affect the licensee on this issue.

Additionally, an NRC inspection on March 2010 at the Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) identified an apparent violation for failure to maintain adequate procedures for flood protection at the site, as stated in its licensing basis (ML101670034 ). Since FCS is located in close proximity to the Missouri River, and its base plant elevation (1004 feet mean seal level (MSL)) is not far above the normal river levels, NRR is currently evaluating the flooding licensing basis with respect to severe precipitation events. Current NRC assessments of external flooding vulnerabilities indicates that all normal plant equipment fails when floods reach 1010 MSL, and that essential safety*related components fail between 1010 MSL and 1014 MSL. Review of flooding extrapolation updates performed by USAGE for the FCS region indicate an increase in potential elevation for floods with a return period of up to 500 years, not previously considered by the licensee (ML101670034). FCS is also located downstream from several large dams, and its IPEEE su mitt t tates that failure of the lar r m wo I use a floo wave that would reach the site (bl(7)(F) Based on the increase in estimated flood levels, the use of NSAC*60 dam failure rates, and the recent experience with flood routing analysis in the ONS dam failure studies; a potential for an increase in risk due to this hazard is also expected at the FCS site (attenuated only by the distance to the set of dams located upstream). Furthermore, the original FSAR and IPEEE submittals for Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS) formed the basis for the external flooding analysis performed at FCS. As indicated above, CNS {which is further downstream from FCS) has also used NSAC-60 as a basis and screened this hazard as "not credible."

5

Enclosure 5 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A Since additional information is limited for other sites, there is a potential that additional regional flooding studies and improvement in the state-of-art assessments of the impact of dam failures at NPP sites may also Indicate an overall change in risk not previously considered in other original studies, applying to more than the facilities identified above.

RECOMENDATION NRC's primary function Is to license and regulate the safe use of radioactive materials for civilian purposes to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety and the environment.

Considering the existing regulatory framework, the safety significance of the issue, the risk increase considerations, and the generic implications provided; the recent information and experience with dam-related external flooding vulnerabilities indicates an issue that needs to be properly addressed to support NRC's mission.

Under these considerations, we recommend that you initiate expeditious action to examine the dam-related external flooding issue under your Generic Issue Program. NRR/DE and NRR/DRA will maintain interaction with your staff. as needed, during the resolution process, and initiate appropriate action in accordance with the findings from the final resolution of this generic issue.

If you have any questions, your staff may contact George Wilson (301-415-1711), Lois James (301-415-3306) or Meena Khanna (301415-2150).

REFERENCES Baxter, Dave, Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, letter to Joseph G. Giiter, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, September 26, 2008, ADAMS Accession No. ML082750106.

Nuclear Safety Analysis Center/Electric Power Research Institute, "NSAC-60 Oconee PRA: A Probabilistic Risk Assessment of Oconee Unit 3," Palo Alto, CA, 1984.

US Bureau of Reclamation, "Dam Safety Risk Analysis Best Practices Training Manual,"

Version 2.0, U.S. Department of the Interior, Technical Service Center, Denver, CO, 2010.

U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, "Criterion 2--Design bases for protection against natural phenomena,~ Part 50, Appendix A, Chapter I, Title 10, "Energy."

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Design Basis Floods For Nuclear Power Plants,"

Regulatory Guide 1.59, Rev. 2, 1977, Agencywide Document Access and Management System

{ADAMS) Accession No. ML003740388.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Evaluation of External Hazards to Nuclear Power Plants in the United States," NUREG/CR-5042, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, December 1987, ADAMS Accession No. Ml062260222.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) on Streams and Riverst NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan, Chapter 2, Section 2.4.3, Rev. 4, 2007, ADAMS Accession No. ML070730405.

6

Enclosure 5 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Floods,R NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan, Chapter 2, Section 2.4.2, Rev. 4, 2007, ADAMS Accession No. ML070100647.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Potential Dam Failures.ft NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan, Chapter 2, Section 2.4.4, Rev. 3, 2007, ADAMS Accession No. ML070730417.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Generic Failure Rate Evaluation for Jocassee Dam,"

March 15, 2010, ADAMS Accession No. ML100780084.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "EA-10-084, Fort Calhoun Station, Failure to Maintain External Flooding Procedures: May 27 2010, ADAMS Accession No. ML101670034.

7

Enclosure 5 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A OFF -RELATED INf=

Table 1. Qualitative preliminary assessment of dam hazard vulnerabilities for operating NPPs Site Name State Area Body of Water s:creening Arkansas Nuclear AR Stream Arkansas River HIGH Fort Calhoun NE Stream Missouri River HIGH Catawba River/ Lake McGuire NC Stream/ Lake HIGH Nonnan Oconee SC Stream/ Lake Keowee River/ Keowee Lake HIGH South Texas TX Lake Cooling Pond HIGH Watts Bar TN Stream Tennessee River HIGH Beaver Valley PA Stream Ohio River MEDIUM Browns Ferry AL Stream Tennessee River MEDIUM Columbia WA Stream Columbia River MEDIUM Cooper NE Stream Missouri River MEDIUM Peach Bottom PA Stream Susquehanna River MEDIUM H.B. Robinson SC Lake Lake Robinson MEDIUM Tennessee River/

Sequoyah TN Stream/ Lake MEDIUM Chickamauga Lake Three Mile Island PA Stream Susquehanna River MEDIUM Vermont Yankee VT Stream Connecticut River MEDIUM Hope Creek/Salem DE Stream Delaware River LOW Indian Point NY Stream Hudson River LOW Prairie Island MN Stream Mississippi River LOW Surry VA Stream James River LOW Waterford LA Stream Mississippi River LOW 8

Enclosure 5 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A Table 1. Qualitative preliminary assessment of dam hazard vulnerabilities for operating NPPs I

Site Name State Area Body of Water ~creening Arkansas Nuclear AR Stream Arkansas River HIGH Fort Calhoun NE Stream Missouri River HIGH Catawba River! Lake McGuire NC Stream/ Lake HIGH Norman Oconee SC Stream! Lake Keowee River! Keowee Lake HIGH South Texas TX Lake Cooling Pond HIGH Watts Bar TN Stream Tennessee River HIGH Beaver Valley PA Stream Ohio River MEDIUM Browns Ferry AL Stream Tennessee River MEDIUM Columbia WA Stream Columbia River MEDIUM Cooper NE Stream Missouri River MEDIUM Peach Bottom PA Stream Susquehanna River MEDIUM H.B. Robinson SC Lake Lake Robinson MEDIUM Tennessee River/

Sequoyah TN Stream/ Lake MEDIUM Chickamauga Lake Three Mile Island PA Stream Susquehanna River MEDIUM Vermont Yankee VT Stream Connecticut River MEDIUM Hope Creek/Salem DE Stream Delaware River LOW Indian Point NY Stream Hudson River LOW Prairie Island MN Stream Mississippi River LOW Surry VA Stream James River LOW Waterford LA Stream Mississippi River LOW Accession Number* ML101900305 OFFICE NRR/DRAIAPOS NRR/DEIEMCB NRR/DE/EEEB NRR/DRNAPOB NAME FFerrante MKhanna GWilson Wames DATE 7/912010 711512010 7112/2010 7/1912010 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY 9

Enclosure 6 of FOIA Appeal 2013-009A Update Letter Design and Construction of Earth and Rock-Fill Dams Course No: G07-001 Credit: 7 PDH Gilbert Gedeon, P .E .

gJacom Continuing Education and Development, Inc.

9 Greyridge Farm Court Stony Point, NY 10980 P: (877) 322-5800 F: (877) 322-4774 info@cedengineering .com

Enclosure 6 of FOIA Appeal 2013-009A Updat e Letter m

EM 111 0-2-2300 30 July 2004 US Army Corps of Engineers ENGINEERING AND DESIGN General Design and Construction Considerations for Earth and Rock-Fill Dams ENGINEER MANUAL

Enclosure 6 of FOIA Appeal 2013-009A Update Letter EM 1110-2-2300 30 Jul 04 IHCLIHEO 011: VERTICAL OIIAIH IF!

LAYER (f')

SOIL

a. Homogeneous dam with internal drainage on impervious founcla tion

4'151 IIOC,,r

b. Central core dam on impervious foundation

- ,_if ftQel(

c. Inclined core dam on impervious foundation LEGENO M

IMPl!AVIOUS P

Pu,v,ous ft, IIANOOM F " Sl:LIECT PIEftVtOUS

.. A ... 1:9111*-.i..

US a UPST!ltl:AM LZZZ7 SOIL

d. Homogeneous dam with internal drainage on pervious foundation IIOCO:

e. central core dam on pervious foundation uJ' ,...r~111v,ou::

IILAN<<ET-,

.... RELIEF *ELLS LZllJ SOIL f, Dam with upstream impervious zone on pervirus foundation Figure 2-1. Types of earth dam sections 2-4. Basic Requirements

a. Criteria. The following criteria must be met to ensure satisfactory earth and rock-till stmctures:

(I) The embankment, foundation, and abutments must be stable under all conditions of constmction and reservoir operation including seismic.

2-5

Enclosure 6 of FOIA Appeal 2013-009A Update Letter EM 1110-2-2300 30 Jul 04 FILTER ZONES AS NEEDED BETWEEN CORE AND ROCK FILL ~ND BETWEEN EARTH FOUNDATION AND ROCK FILL TOP OF SOUHO ROCK

a. DAM WITH INCLINED IMPERVIOUS ZONE M - IMPERVIOUS RKF : ROCK FILL FILTER ZONES AS NEEDED BETWEEN CORE AND ROCK Fill. AND BETWEEN EARm FOUNDATION ANO ROCK Fill.

Rl<F

b. DAM WITH CENTRAL CORE Figure 2-2. Two types of rock-fill dams (2) Seepage through the embankment, foundation, and abutments must be collected and controlled to prevent excessive uplift pressures. piping. sloughing, removal of material by solution. or erosion of material by loss into cracks, joints, and cavities. In addition, the purpose of the project may impose a limitation on the allowable quantity of seepage. The design should consider seepage control measures such as foundation cutoffs, adequate and nonbrittle impervious zones, transition zones, drainage blankets, upstream impervious blankets, and relief wells.

(3) Frccboard must be sufficient to prevent ovcrtopping by waves and include an allowance for the normal settlement of the fi:mndation and embankment as \veil as f<.1r seismic etlects where applicable.

(4) Spillway and outlet capacity must be sufficient to prevent overtopping of the embankment.

h. Special attention. Special attention should be given to pQssible development of pore pressures in foundations, particularly in stratified compressible materials, including varved clays. I ligh pore pressures may be induced in the frmndation, beyond the toes of the embankment where the weight of the dam produces little or no vertical loading. Thus, the strengths of foundation soils outside of the embankment may drop below their original in situ shear strengths. When this type of foundation condition exists, instrumentation should be installed during construction (sec Chapter I0).

2-6

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3. Upper slopes typically steepened using high strength outer shell material such as rockfill. O'l

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UJ 18 For Information Only

NRC NRC FORM FORM 183 183 s~n REQREG 11( U.S. NUCLEAR U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY REGULATORY COMMISSION COMMISSION (09-2012)

(09-2012) ..)(i of

~

0 NRCMD12.1 NRCMD 12.1 :7 .~

. ~/ ~

C) ** .....

~- ~"-C' *

~

REPORT REPORT OF SECURITY SECURITY INCIDENT/INFRACTIONNIOLATION INCIDENTIINFRACTIONNIOLATION

.,,.')

........ +O~

TO TO:: FROM: (DIVISION/OFFICE IN WHICH FROM: (DIVISION/OFFICE WHICH INFRACTION INFRACTION OCCURRED)

OCCURRED)

Division Division of Facilities Facilities and Security Security DRA/RES DRA IRES NAME(S)

NAME(S) OF PERSON PERSON ACKNOWLEDGING ACKNOWLEDGING RESPONSIBILITY RESPONSIBILITY TITLE TITLE Risk and Risk and Reliability Reliability Engineer Engineer Lawrence Criscione Lawrence Criscione 0

TYPE OF SECURITY SECURITY REPORT:

REPORT: INCIDENT INCIDENT INFRACTION INFRACTION VIOLATION VIOLATION D

DATE OF OCCURRANCE:

OCCURRANCE: 9/ 18/2012 9/18/2012 DATE REPORTED:

DATE REPORTED: 9/20/20 9/20/201212 HIGHEST CLASSIFICATION OF MATERIAL HIGHEST CLASSIFICATION MATERIAL INVOLVED:

INVOLVED: [Z] SUNSI SUNSI SGI I CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL I SECRET SECRET

\ TOP SECRET TOP SECRET WAS RESTRICTED WAS RESTRICTED DATA DATA INVOLVED?

INVOLVED?

DYES YES 0[{] NO NO D N/A NIA REASON OR CAUSE REASON CAUSE FOR INFRACTION INFRACTION A RES/DRA RESIDRA staff staff sent sent an email email to Chairman Macfarlane and Chairman Macfarlane and others within the others within the agency agency and outside the and outside the agency.

agency. Those Those on distribution distribution outside outside the the agency include the agency include the U.S. Office of U.S. Office of Specia Special l Counsel Counsel and and House House and and Senate Senate oversight committee members oversight committee members andand staff. The staff. The email email and both attachments and both attachments contain contain sensitive in formation (SUNSI) sensitive information (SUNS !) but but were were not not properly properly marked.

marked. The The reason reason for for not not properly properly marking the marking information is unknown the information unknown. .

DESCRIPTION DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENTINCIDENT ANO ASSOCIATED MANAGEMENT AND ASSOCIATED MANAGEMENT DIRECTIVES DIRECTIVES SECTION SECTION INVOLVED INVOLVED: :

ensiti ve information Sensitive information (SUN (SUNSI) SI) waswas not not appropriately appropriately labeled labeled or marked and or marked was transmitted and was transmitted outside the agency outside the agency to other other federal federal government government entities.entities. The The email message does email message do snot appear to have not appear have beenbeen sent sent to to anyone anyone outside outside thethe federal federal governme government.nt. Neither either the the email email nor the attached nor the attached letter letter was was marked marked as containing containing sensitive information. Management sensitive information. Management Directive Directi e sections sections involved involved are MD 12.1 are MD section section V Infractions and V, "Infractions Violations' and and Violations" and Part Part 11 of MD 12.6 11ofMD 12.6, "Protection "Protection and and Control of Sensitive Control of Sensitive Unclassified Unclassified Information."

Information."

IMMEDIATE IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE CORRECTIVE ACTION ACTION TAKEN Page 2 for TAKEN: : (See Page suggested disciplinary for suggested disciplinary ac~on.)

action.)

The transmittal outside The transmittal outside the the agency agency of of sensitive sensitive information information (SUNS!) witho ut proper (SUNS I) without proper markings markings was was reported reported to the the Division Division ofof Facilities and Facilities and Security Security on 9/20/20 9/20/2012. l 2. Additional Additional correcti correctiveve actio actions ns are are under consideration.

under consideration.

CORRECTION CORRECTION MEASURESMEASURES TAKEN TAKEN PENDING PENDING LONG TERM RESOLUTION:

LONG TERM RESOLUTION:

one yet None yet identified.

identified.

NRC FORM NRC FORM 183 (09-2012)

(09-2012)

SUBMIT SUBMIT

o.~f='.ICl,&,I,. Uii ONLY iiNSITIVa INTERNAL INFORMATION UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 MEMORANDUM TO: Richard P. Correia, Director Division of Risk Analysis Office of Nuclea: R~ylatory Research

,2, -~

FROM: "~

Mary JaJ:11': ~ / / ~*/ . ~

Division of R,a ies and Security Office of Ac:frflinistration

SUBJECT:

REPORT OF SECURITY INCIDENT (INFORMATION SPILL)

On September 20, 2012, the Division of Facilities and Security (DFS) notified the Computer Security Office, Policy Standards and Training of the subject infraction (see attached NRC Form 183 "Report of Security lncidentllnfractionMolation,*trom Benjamin Beasley and emails detailing this incident) which occurred September 18, 2012. DFS staff concluded that since this incident does not involve protection of classified information, a security infraction did not occur. Instead, this report will be identified as a security incident for failure to follow applicable Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information (SUNS!) guidelines.

To prevent recurrence of additional incidents involving the inadvertent release of SUNSI documents, the person or individuals responsible for the security incident must review the SUNS! guidance located on the NRC internal web at ::JJ.;, /1www ,:-:t,'., :3 r-~;__;;;::.::.'r£~~-- Once the SUNSI training has been completed, send a confirmation email to the Facilities Security Branch indicating that the person(s) responsible for the incident has completed thelr review and understands the information.

Please be advised that no infraction will be issued for the subject incident. DFS has noted corrective measures are implemented to prevent recurrence. This memorandum closes this incident.

Enclosures:

1. NRC Form 183 "Report of Security lncident/lnfractionNiolation," (September 27, 2012)

2. Email detailing this incident CONTACT: Daniel Cardenas, ADM/DFS (301) 415-6184 OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION EXHIBIT 3

NRC FORM 464 Part I U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FOIA/PA RESPONSE NUMBER (08-2013)

RESPONSE TO FREEDOM OF 2014-0236 INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) / PRIVACY ACT (PA) REQUEST

RESPONSE

TYPE

[ZJ FINAL PARTIAL REQUESTER DATE Larry Criscione JUN O 2 2014 PART I. -- INFORMATION RELEASED D No additional agency records subject to the request have been located.

D Requested records are available through another public distribution program. See Comments section.

[GROUP Agency records subject to the request that are identified in the specified group are already available for I_ public inspection and copying at the NRC Public Document Room.

[GROUP Agency records subject to the request that are contained in the specified group are being made available for I public inspection and copying at the NRC Public Document Room.

0 1~ROUP Agency records subject to the request are enclosed.

I Records subject to the request that contain information originated by or of interest to another Federal agency have been referred to that agency (see comments section) for a disclosure determination and direct response to you.

We are continuing to process your request.

See Comments.

PART I.A -- FEES I D AMOUNT"

[ZJ sI You will be billed by NRC for the amount listed. None. Minimum fee threshold not met.

See comments for details D You will receive a refund for the amount listed. D Fees waived.

PART I.B -- INFORMATION NOT LOCATED OR WITHHELD FROM DISCLOSURE No agency records subject to the request have been located. For your information, Congress excluded three discrete categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIA. See 5 U.S.C. § 552{c)

(2006 & Supp. IV (2010). This response is limited to those records that are subject to the requirements of the FOIA. This is a standard notification that is given to all our requesters and should not be taken as an indication that excluded records do, or do not, exist.

Certain information in the requested records is being withheld from disclosure pursuant to the exemptions described in and for the reasons stated in Part II.

This determination may be appealed within 30 days by writing to the FOIA/PA Officer, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. Clearly state on the envelope and in the letter that it is a "FOIA/PA Appeal."

PART I.C COMMENTS ( Use attached Comments continuation page if required)

NRC FORM 464 Part 1 (08-2013) / l)

rb)il)(C) ,

Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research US Nuclear Regulatory Commission September 14, 2012 Hubert T. Bell Office of the Inspector General U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, MS OS*Ell 1155S Rockville Pike Rockvilfe MD 20852 Dear Mr. Bell.

Subject:

Concealment of Significant Nuclear Safety Information by the US Nuclear Regulatory Comm,ssion I allege that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has intentionally m1scharacteri1ed relevant and noteworthy safety information as sensitwe, security information in an effort to conceal the information from the pubftc. This action occurred in anticipation of, in preparation for, and as part of the NRC's response to a Freedom of Information Act request for information concerning the peneric issue investigation on Flooding of U.S. Nuclear Powe-r Pfonrs Following Upstream Dam failure Specifically requested was the completed screening analysis report for this issue,!MUilC) j Portions of the publitally released version of this report are redacted citing security sensitivities, however, the redacted information is of a general descriptive nature or is strictly relevant to the safety of u.s_ nuclear power plants, plant personnel, and members of the public. The flluclear Regulatory Commission staff has engaged in an effort to mischaracteri1e the informat10n as security sensitive in order to jtistify withholding it from public release using certain exemptions specified in the Freedom of lnfo,mation Act. Evidence supporting this allegation fncludes the redacted teKt from the analysis report, e-mails and written correspondence within the NRC, and e*mail correspondence with other Government agencies. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff may be motivated to prevent the disclosure of this safety information to the public because it will embanass the agency. The redacted information includes discussion of, and excerpts from, NRC official agency records that show the NRC has been in possession of relevant, notable, and derogatory safety tnformation for an extended penod but failed to properly act on it. Concurrently, the NRC concealed the information from the public.

Because this concern involves a violation of law and i~ not related to a technical opinion or distinction, / am not submitting this concern to (or though) the NRCs Differing Professional Opinion Program. It is my intention to cooperate fully wi1h NRC Office of the Inspector General. It is also my intention to mate a copy of tflis letter available to the publtc ~hortly after I have submitted it to your office; therefore. please consider this allegation to be public informatt0n.

Enclosure:

Response to Freedom of Information Act/ Privacy Act Request, 2012 *0106, Final cc: Rep. Donna Edwards, 8730 Georgia Avenue, Suite 610 Silver Spring, Maryland 20910

Forwarded Message -----

From: "Averbach, Andrew" <Andrew.Averbach@nrc.gov>

To: "infoprivacylaw@yahoo.com" <infoprivacylaw@yahoo.com>

Cc: "Grodin, Maryann" <Maryann.Grodin@nrc.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, March 12, 2014 11:45 AM

Subject:

RE: notification in Criscione v. NRC,12-042 (D.D.C)

My apologies; case number is13-942 (D.D.C.)

From: Averbach, Andrew Sent: Wednesday, March 12, 2014 11:44 AM To: infoprivacylaw@yahoo.com Cc: Grodin, Maryann

Subject:

notification in Criscione v. NRC,12-042 (D.D.C)

Mr. Hodes:

This email confirms our conversation this morning, during which I informed you that we will be sending out a notice of closure of investigation pursuant to paragraph 2 of the settlement agreement dated October 28, 2013. We will send this notification today by certified mail through the USPS (to the address designated in the settlement agreement) and will also send you a copy of the notice by e-mail to this address (infoprivacylaw@yahoo.com).

Please let me know if you have any questions.

Andrew P. Averbach Solicitor U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (301) 415-1956 andrew.averbach@nrc.gov

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL March 12, 2014 Mr. Lawrence Criscione 1412 Dial Court Springfield, IL 62704 RE: Civil Action No: 13-0942 (RMC)

Dear Mr. Criscione:

Pursuant to paragraph two of the settlement agreement in the above captioned matter, this constitutes notice that both OIG lnvestigations13-001 and 13-005 are now closed cases.

Please contact Joseph McMillan, the Assistant Inspector General for Investigations, Office of the Inspector General, at 301 M415-5929 to arrange for your receipt of the digital recording referenced in the settlement agreement.

Sincerely, Maryann L. Grodin General Counsel to the Inspector General cc: Joseph McMillan Andrew Averbach

Case 1:13-cv-00942-RMC Document 11 Filed 11/01/13 Page 1 of 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

)

LAWRENCE CRISCIONE, )

)

. Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No.: 13-0942 (RMC)

)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY )

COMMISSION, )

)

Defendant. )

STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT AND DISMISSAL Plaintiff Lawrence Criscione ("Plaintiff') and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

("NRC") (uDefendant") hereby settle and compromise the above-entitled lawsuit brought under the Freedom of lnfo1*mation Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended, on the following terms:

I. Plaintiff agrees to dismiss this suit with prejudice with each side bearing its own fees and costs, based on the terms set forth below.

2. Within five working days of the closure ofNRC's Office of Inspector General's

("OIG") Investigation 13-001 and 13-005 or within 12 months of the date of this agreement, whichever is sooner, the Defendant shall release to Plaintiff an un-redacted digital copy of the recording of the requested January 17, 2013 interview regarding OIG Investigations13-001 and 13-005 (the "recording>'). Defendant will notify Plaintiff once both 010 Investigations I3-001 and 13-005 are closed. Notification to the Plaintiff will entail the NRC sending a letter by certified mail to the Plaintiff at 1412 Dial Court, Springfield, IL 62704 ("Plaintiffs mailing address") and including in the letter instructions for whom to contact to arrange timely receipt of tllS' digital reco1:ding. This notification letter will be postmarked within five working days of the

Case 1:13-cv-00942-RMC Document 11 Filed 11/01/13 Page 2 of 4 closure ofOIG Investigations13-001 and 13-005. If Plaintiffs mailing address changes after the signing of this agreement but before receipt of the recording, Plaintiff will notify the NRC's Office of Inspector General of any change in address. For purposes of this paragraph, "closure" means notice from the agency to 010 of management's decision concerning agency action. If on the one year anniversary of the date of this agreement the Plaintiff has not yet received an un-redacted digital copy of the recording, then by the end of the next working day the Defendant will send the un-redacted recording to the Plaintiff via ce1tified mail to the Plaintiffs mailing address. For the purposes of this agreement, "certified mail" includes any government or private postal or parcel service which entails signing for the receipt of the document or package. Email transmission or personal pick-up at the NRC's F'OIA desk in Rockville, MD (i.e. the methods traditionally used by the Plaintiff to receive docwnents from the NRC under the Freedom of Information Act) may, and should, be used in lieu of certified mail if the parties can agree to less formal arrangements for receipt of the Un-redacted digital 1*ecording at the time it is available for release.

3. At the time Plaintiff receives an un-redacted copy of the digital recording, any and all obligations as set forth under paragraph 2 will be satisfied.

4. This Stipulation of Settlement constitutes the full and complete satisfaction of any and all claims arising from (a) the allegations set forth in the complaint filed in this lawsuit and (b) any litigation or administrative proceeding that Plaintiff has brought, could bring, or could have brought regarding Plaintiffs FOi A/Privacy Act request in this case with the exception of enforcing tbe settlement agreement.

5. This Stipulation of Settlement does not constitute an admission of liability or fault on the part of Defendant, the United States, its agents, servants, or employees, and is entered into Case 1:13-cv-00942-RMC Document 11 Filed 11/01/13 Page 3 of 4 by all parties for the sole purpose of compromising disputed claims and avoiding the expenses and risks of further litigation.

6. This Stipulation of Settlement is binding upon and inures to the benefit of the parties hereto and their respective successors and assigns.

7. The Court retains jurisdiction over enforcement of any other provisions of this Stipulation of Settlement.

.(remainder~( this page left intentionally blank)

3-

Case 1:13-cv-00942-RMC Document 11 Filed 11/01/13 Page 4 of 4

8. The execution and filing of this Stipulation of Settlement by counsel for Plaintiff and by counsel for Defendant constitutes a dismissal o.fthis lawsuit, with prejudice, pursuant to Rule 41 (a)(l )(A)(ii).

Dated: October 28, 2013 Respectfully submitted, RONALD C. MACHEN JR., D.C. Bar #4478/o\ ,.._/

United States Attorney ~~

SCOTT A. HODES D.C. Bar# 430375 DANrEL F. VAN HOJ>>,1,4.c. Bar #924092 P.O. Box 42002 Chief, Civil Divisio~

Washington, D.C. 20015 (301) 404-0502 infoprivacylaw@yahoo.com By: ~ 9 ./2-==

Special Assistant United States Attorney Attorney.for Plaint/ff 555 4th Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20530 (202} 252-2633 michel le.seo@usdoj.gov Attorneys for Defendant ft is SO ORDER Don this _12 day of { } ; ~ ~ , 2013.

-.J-l;tt:lc:~~46¢-..LJ,~-l--_~~:..!L!.~-----

NITED S GE

Criscione, Lawrence From: Criscione, Lawrence Sent: Monday, December 10, 2012 6:53 PM To: Ostendorff, William; Magwood, William Cc: Boska, John; Hiland, Patrick; Evans, Michele; Pascarelli, Robert; Wilson, George; Bartley, Jo nathan; Cook, Christ opher; M iller, Ed; Cheok, Michael; Chen, Yen-Ju; Beasley, Benjamin; Merzke, Daniel; Coffin, Stephanie; Skeen, David; See, Kenneth; Monninger, John; Perkins, Richard; Bensi, M ichelle; Philip, Jacob; Sancalctar, Selim; Galloway, Melanie; Mitman, Jeffrey; Ferrante, Fernando; Bubar, Patrice; Tappert, John

Subject:

Your Meeting Today Concerning Flooding at Oconee from Jocassee Dam Attachments: 2012-12-lO_Briefing_on_Oconee_Flood ing.pdf.pdf; Lack of Transparency Impeding Resolution of Flooding Concerns at Oconee.pdf.pdf; 2009-04-06.pdf Commissioner Ostendorff, It came to my attention today that you and Commissioner Magwood were being briefed by NRR on the flooding vulnerabilities posed to the reactors at Oconee from a catastrophic failure of Jocassee Dam . Attached to this email are the "Commissioner Briefing Notes" prepared by NRR. Also attached are a 2012-11-14 letter from me to the Senate Committee on the Environment & Public Works (E&PW) and an April 6, 2009 Non-Concurrence Form w hich a Deputy Division Director at NRR/DRA (Melanie Galloway) submitted against NRR's pusillanimous treatment of the Oconee/Jocassee concerns.

I do not know exactly what you were told during your briefing today, but if it was limited to the "Commissioner Briefing Notes" then you did not receive all the pertinent fact s.

A major concern of mine, which I addressed in my attached letter to the E&PW, is that, in all the internal documents I have uncovered regarding NRR briefings of the Commissioners on the Jocassee/Oconee flooding issue, the actual risk numbers ca lculated by NR R/DRA are never mentioned and neither is the 2008-09-26 Duke Energy timeline concerning the predicted failure sequence which would occur at Oconee following a catastrophic failure of the Lake Jocassee Dam (for the context of t he quot e below, see p. 10 of Attachment 2 of ML082750106):

The following flood time line is based on the results of the 1992 Inundation Study. In this scenario the dam is assumed to fail at time zero. Notification from Jocassee would occur be/ore o total failure of the dam; however, for purposes of this timeline, notification is assumed to be at the same time the dam fails. Following notification from Jocossee, the reactor(s) are shutdown within approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . The predicted flood would reach ONS in approximately 5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months , at which time the SSF walls are overtopped. The SSF is assumed to fail, with no time delay, following the flood level exceeding the height of the SSF wall. The failure scenario results are predicted such that core damage occurs in about 8 to 9 hours1.041667e-4 days 0.0025 hours 1.488095e-5 weeks 3.4245e-6 months following the dam break and containment failure in about 59 to 68 hours7.87037e-4 days 0.0189 hours 1.124339e-4 weeks 2.5874e-5 months . When containment failure occurs, significant dose to the public would result.

Hopefully you recognize that the above scenario is very similar t o what occurred at Fukushima when a tsunami overtopped their inadequately sized flood wall and disabled their st andby shutdown equipment. Why the above scenario does not ever appear in Commissioner briefing packages, I do not understand. This seems to me like something you would want to know.

Another thing you should know is the annual probability of failure calculated by NRR/DRA for Jocassee Dam . That number is 2.8E*4/year, which is of the same order of magnitude of a 49 foot tsunami striking the Japanese coast at Fukushima . Given this calculated probability of dam failure and the Duke Energy timeline quoted above, it appears that the inadequately sized flood wall at Oconee presents a very similar hazard to the American public as the inadequat ely

sized flood wall at Fukushima presented to the Japanese public. Is this not something of which NRR should be informing the Commissioners?

As noted by Dr. Ferrante in the ema il t rail below, NRR is not a monolithic institution. Specifically, NRR/DRA has a very different position on the Jocassee/Oconee issue as NRR/DORL. See the attached Non-Concurrence from Melanie Galloway as an example.

I do not know who was at your briefing today, but from the invitation attached to this letter it appears that neither were the key personnel from NRR/DRA !Galloway, Mitman, Ferrante) nor were the authors of the Gl-204 Screening Report (Perkins, Bensi, Philip, Sancaktar) invited to attend. It might be helpful to your understanding of the Jocassee/Oconee issue if you were to speak to Ms. Galloway regarding her 2009-04-06 Non-Concurrence, Dr. Ferrante and Mr. Mitman regarding their 2010-03-15 Generic Failure Rate Evaluation for Jocassee Dam, and Richard Perkins regarding his ordeal in routing and releasing the screening analysis for Gl-204 on flooding due to upstream dam failures.

After over 60 years of military service, Admiral Rickover noted:

A major flaw in our system of government, and even in industry, is the latitude to do less than is necessary. Too often officials are willing to accept and adopt to situations they know to be wrong. The tendency is to downplay problems instead of actively trying to correct them.

The NRC first identified the undersized flood wall at Oconee Nuclear Station in March 1994. !tis my concern that the reason this issue is taking more than two decades to address is that Division Directors at NRR have been willing to accept and adapt to situations they know to be wrong. As noticed by Ms. Galloway in April 2009, the tendency in NRR was to downplay the Jocassee/Oconee problem instead of actively trying to correct it. The public looks to the NRC Commissioners to curtail this latitude to do less than is necessary" and to ensure the NRC staff transparently addresses concerns in a timely manner.

I appreciate you taking an interest in this issue and requesting a briefing by NRR. I am concerned, however, that your briefing might not have adequately detailed the vulnerabilities faced at Oconee.

V/r, Larry Lawrence S. Criscione Reliability & Risk Analyst RES/DRA/OEGI B 573-230-3959 If a subordinate always agrees with his superior, he is a useless part of the organization, From: Ferrante, Fernando Sent: Thursday, November 15, 2012 1:58 PM To: Criscione, Lawrence Cc: Mitman, Jeffrey Subject.: RE: Lack of Transparency Impeding Resolution of Flooding Concerns at Oconee In understand, and I think the folks who were involved in it understand as well. l just worry that other folks will look at our affiliations and assume "NRR" means the specific folks listed in the letter.

From: Criscione, Lawrence Sent: Thursday, November 15, 2012 11:42 AM To: Ferrante, Fernando Cc: Mitman, Jeffrey

Subject:

RE: Lack of Transparency Impeding Resolution of Flooding Concerns at Oconee

Thanks Fernando. Jeff sent me the PSA and PSAM papers last month.

When I use "NRR" I mean the dominant position that won out. Hopefully most people understand that in an agency of 4000 people there is no one true NRC position or one true NRR position. Over the past five years it has bothered me to no end that a legitimate FOIA exemption is "pre-decisional information" and that the NRC is able to use it to conceal the internal debate process. I think the public should be able to FOIA the varying NRC positions on issues and to understand how things are internally debated and decisions arrived at.

From: Ferrante, Fernando Sent: Thursday, November 15, 2012 8:04 AM To: Criscione, Lawrence Cc: Mitman, Jeffrey

Subject:

RE: Lack of Transparency Impeding Resolution of Flooding Concerns at Oconee Larry, Thanks for the opportunity to review this letter. For the most part, the facts related to activities I am directly aware of are correct. Regarding the Information Notice (IN) that NRR authored on dam failure probabilities, I will give you some more background information that will hopefully help further clarify the discussion.

The IN came as a direct result of the Oconee/Jocassee issue. Jim Vail. a retired NRR/DRA/APOB staff, was in charge of developing it (with support from the NRR staff in charge of releasing generic communications in NRR/DPR/PGCB) under guidance from Melanie Galloway, then NRR/DRA Deputy Director. Sometime in 2009, I took over the responsibility of re-writing and issuing the IN (in the same manner l was tasked with rewriting NRR's original submittal to RES regarding the creation of what would eventually become Gl-204 ). Since the beginning, there was a lot of resistance and internal struggle regarding this IN. In order to have the IN released I made sure to build consensus between NRR/DRA, NRR/DE, RES/ORA (which had produced an internal dam failure report which supported the information that eventually went into the IN). and others. As more NRC Offices lined up to be included in the IN, the concurrence process started to take longer and this ended up indeed being an exceedingly long turnover for a generic communication. The Gl-204 process continued in parallel until it became bogged down with some of the issues you described in the letter. At some point a presentation was made in an NRR LTIET meeting, and the directive for the IN became to coordinate its release with the release of the Gl-204 report. Because of the delays in the Gl-204 report, this added another 6 months to a year of the release of the IN itself. At some point, when it became clear both releases were imminent, I was asked if the IN should be reclassified as . NON-PUBLIC/SECURITY RELATED," which I rejected on the basis that no information was contained in the IN which was covered in both NRR and NRC guidance regarding the withholding of information. Hence, the IN was eventually released publicly.

I should add that. as part of an effort to publicly release and discuss information that was created during the development of the dam failure report by RES/DRA, two papers were submitted. accepted , and presented at PRA conferences (the most recent in Helsinki. 2012} with concurrence from both NRR/DRA and RES/DRA staff (I can send these papers to you if you are interested). Both papers were reviewed internaffy and, similar to the IN. contained no information that went against guidance regarding withholding of information. Both papers relied in part on data developed by the US Army Corps of Engineers {USACE) which does restrict public release of certain portions of their dam databases, but we followed their guidelines and contacted USACE to make sure no inadvertent release was made. This papers follow the same methodology discussed in the internal NRR/DRA document you referred to in the letter (M L 100780084) which, to my knowledge, is the closest we have come to a more official position on the dam failure rate issue (which was, at least in part, the intent I had when the document was created).

I'm sharing the above information to make sure that readers who are totally unfamiliar with the issue (inside or outside of NRC ), get a clear picture of how NRR/DRA dealt with some of the issues we were faced during the Oconee/Jocassee issue. In several parts of the letter, certain positions regarding the release of information or level of importance the issue deserved are attributed to "NRR" as a whole (e.g .. " ... there was a strong push by NRR to force RES to remove all OUO-SRI material from the screening report for Gl-204.") which I don't think were shared by all staff or Divisions within NRR I am concerned this may be misconstrued by readers who are

completely unaware of the challenges the Oconee/Jocassee issue presented to the technical staff to mean all staff within NRR shared these positions.

Thank you.

Fernando Ferrante, Ph.D.

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)

Division of Risk Assessment (ORA)

PRA Operational Support Branch (APOB}

Mail Stop: 0-10C15 Phone: 301-415-8385 Fax: 301-415-3577 From: Criscione, Lawrence Sent~ Wednesday, November 14, 2012 10:23 AM To: Zimmerman, Jacob; Vrahoretis, Susan Cc: Beasley, Benjamin; Coe, Doug; COrreia, Richard; Galloway, Melanie; Mitman, Jeffrey; Ferrante, Fernando; Wilson, George; Leeds, Eric

Subject:

FW: Lack of Transparency Impeding Resolution of Flooding Concerns at Oconee Jacob/Susan: Please forward the attached letter to the Commission staff whom you believe should be aware of it.

I have copied on this email some of the NRR staff men1ioned in the letter. Please let me know if I am mis-portraying any of your positions. Please feel free to forward this letter to whomever you believe needs to see it.

Vlr.

Larry Criscione 573-230-3959 From: Criscione, Lawrence Sent: Wednesday, November 14, 2012 9: 15 AM To: 'valerie_manak@epw.senate.gov'; 'nathan_mccray@epw.senate.gov'

Subject:

Lack of Transparency Impeding Resolution of Flooding Concerns at Oconee Please see the attached letter to the Senate Committee on the Environment & Public Works.

November 14, 2012 1412 Dial Court Springfield, IL 62704 Barbara Boxer, Chairman us Senate Committee on the Environment & Public Works 410 Dirksen Senate Office Bldg.

Washington, DC 20510-6175

Dear Senator Boxer:

There are three reactors in Oconee County, South Carolina which face a risk of meltdown and containment failure that is highly similar to the accident which occurred in Japan in March 2011. The staff of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission has known about these risks since 2007 but has yet to adequately address the issue. I am writing to you because the Commissioners of the NRC failed to bring up the three Oconee Nuclear Station reactors during their March 15, 2012 testimony at the US Senate Committee on the Environment & Public Works hearing and because it is unclear to me whether or not the Commissioners are fully aware of the vulnerabilities at Oconee.

The vulnerability posed to the reactors concerns a catastrophic failure of Jocassee Dam, which is upstream of the Oconee Nuclear Station. The NRC has known since 20061 that the flood wall at Oconee Nuclear Station is 7 to 12 feet too low to protect against the predicted flood height that would occur were Jocassee Dam to catastrophically fail. like the reactors at Fukushima Dai-ichi, the reactors themselves at Oconee and their containment buildings are designed to survive earthquakes and flooding. However, their support systems - that is, the emergency standby equipment needed to safety shut them down and remove decay heat from their cores

- are vulnerable to failure due to flooding which overtops their flood walls. The difference between Oconee and Fukushima is the source of the flood: a dam break instead of a tsunami.

Aside from that difference, the predicted accidents are eerily similar in both their timing sequence and their probability of an unmitigated release of radioactivity to the surrounding countryside.

On September 18, 2012 I wrote a letter to NRC Chairman Macfarlane detailing my concerns regarding the vulnerability posed by Jocassee Dam to the Oconee reactors. Three days after sending my letter, I was informed by my branch chief that he was directed to fill out a NRC Form 183 on me for not adequately designating my letter as "Official Use Only - Security-Related Information". Four weeks after sending my letter I was informed by the Chairman's 1

See pp. 5-9 of the "Oconee Nuclear Station Integrated Inspection Report 05000269/2006002, 05000270/200602.

05000287/2006002". This report is in the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) under "Accession Number" ML061180451. Most of the documents I refer to in this letter are non-public and the most efficient way to request them from the NRC is to refer to the ADAMS Accession Number.

legal counsel that my letter had been referred to the NRC's Office of the Inspector General.

Other than these two instances, I have not had any other discussions regarding my letter and am unsure if the Chairman or any of the other Commissioners have read my letter or are aware of the details of my concerns.

I have been directed by the NRC not to further distribute my 2012-09-18 letter because it is not properly designated. I have also been directed to no longer send NRC documents to Congressional staffers without going through my chain of command and the NRC's Office of Congressional Affairs. However, I did copy you on that 2012-09-18 letter, and Valerie Manak and Nathan McCray of the E&PW staff should have electronic copies of it.

Since becoming involved in the Jocassee/Oconee issue in 2007, the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) has designated all internal and external correspondence regarding this issue as "Official Use Only - Security-Related Information". This designation not only prohibits the American public from knowing about the grave risks which Jocassee Dam poses to the reactors at Oconee, but, as I will explain below, this designation has also inhibited internal discussion of these concerns within the NRC.

In a September 26, 2008 letter to the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (ML082750106), Duke Energy provided a harrowing timeline of what would occur at the Oconee Nuclear Station (ONSI were Jocassee Dam to catastrophically fail. Despite the fact that this time line appears in a Wikipedia article on Oconee Nuclear Station, since the NRC considers the Duke Energy letter to be "Official Use Only - Security-Related Information" I cannot quote the letter here. But the scenario provided in the 2008-09-26 Duke Energy letter is essentially the scenario that occurred at Fukushima Oai-ichi except, instead of a tsunami being the source of water overtopping the known inadequately sized flood wall, the source of water at ONS is a flood resulting from the failure of Jocassee Dam.

Prior to the 2011-03-11 tsunami, it was believed that the annual probability of a 45 foot tall tsunami reaching Fukushima Dai-ichi was on the order of once in every 100,000 years. It is now widely held that the annual probability is more likely around once in every 1,000 years.

In the 1980's it was believed the annual probability of Jocassee Dam failing was on the order of one chance in 100,000. 2 However, by 2007 the US NRC believed the actual number was more on the order of one chance in 10,000. 3 When the five Commissioners testified before your committee on March 15, 2012, members of the staff at the US NRC believed that the three reactors at the Oconee Nuclear Station faced a risk eerily similar to what occurred at Fukushima Dai-ichi. Vet none of the Commissioners mentioned that fact when Senator Barrasso brought up the Union of Concerned Scientists' 1 1.3E-5/year was the failure frequency Duke Energy used in some of its risk assessments.

3 2.9E-4/year is the failure rate the NRC has calculated for large rock-filled dams similar to Jocassee.

1

report on the vulnerability of US plants to Fukushima type disasters. Were the Commissioners withholding information from your committee? I don't believe so. I think what actually has happened is that crucial information has been withheld from them. They cannot testify before Congress about vulnerabilities of which they themselves have not been made fully aware.

To me, the most important tool the public has for ensuring good regulation and safety is accurate information. 1n a democratic republic such as ours, openness and transparency are essential in providing our citizens and t heir elected officials with the accurate information they need to make informed decisions.

To my knowledge, concerns that the flood wall at the Oconee Nuclear Station was too small first surfaced internally at Duke Energy in late 1993 and first made it to the NRC's attention in February 1994. The NRC dismissed the concerns in September 1994 as "not credible" because of an inappropriately low assumption regarding the failure rate of Jocassee Dam.

The issue regarding the inadequately sized flood wall resurfaced in March 2006. While attempting to defend a violation he had written against Duke Energy for inadequately controlling a two year breach in the flood wall (Ml061180451), one of the NRC Resident Inspectors at Oconee Nuclear Station began researching the regulatory requirements for the flood wall.

In 2007 NRR's Division of Risk Assessment (NRR/DRA) determined that the annual failure probability of dams similar in construction to Jocassee is around 2.SE-4/year, which equates to 4

a chance of once in every 4000 years (ML100780084). These might seem like good odds, but, given that a catastrophic failure of Jocassee Dam will lead to a Fukushima scenario in South Carolina, these odds make the risk of a significant accident and radiat ion release at Oconee Station about 100 times greater t han the risks associated with a typical US commercial nuclear reactor.

In 2008 the NRC sent Duke Energy a 10CFRS0.54(f} request (M L081640244) to obtain the necessary information to adequately determine if the risks posed to Oconee Nuclear Station by Jocassee Dam were acceptable. A l 0CfRS0.54(() request is a rare occurrence and it undoubtedly got the attention of the Commissioners. However, because by this time the NRC was stamping all documents concerning Jocassee Dam as "Official Use Only - Security-Related Information" (OUO-SRI), it did not get the attention of the public.

My primary reason for bringing t he Jocassee/Oconee issue to your attention is because, to me, it is an example of how lack of discipline regarding transparency has allowed a significant issue to go uncorrected for over six years and counting, with the current deadline for resolution still four years away. I believe that NRR's stamping of all documents concerning Jocassee Dam as 4

Mll00780084 is dated 2010-03-15. This is the formalized version of research and calculations performed in 2007 by Ferrante and Mitman of NRR/DRA.

3

"OUO-SRI" has not only prevented the public scrutiny necessary for our democratic and republican institutions to properly function, but has also inhibited the internal flow of information within the NRC and thereby has been detrimental to both public safety and security.

Duke Energy's response to the NRC's 10CFRS0.54(f) request was, like the original request, withheld from the public under the guise of security. This response is the document which contains the Fukushima-style timeline regarding what would occur to the three reactors at Oconee were Jocassee Dam to catastrophically fail. 5 It is unclear to me whether or not any of the Commissioners reviewed this document. It is ludicrous to expect the Commissioners to review every piece of correspondence received by the NRC - they have a staff of over 4,000 federal employees to assist with that. But I would assume that all important issues make it to their attention during their periodic briefings. However, based on the documents I have reviewed, I question the exact level of detail which they have received regarding the Jocassee/Oconee issue during their briefings from NRR.

On February 3, 2009 Commissioner Peter Lyons traveled to South Carolina to tour Jocassee Dam and Oconee Nuclear Station. In the briefing book prepared from him by NRR (ML090280474) there is a 25-line summary detailing the flooding issues. The 2008-08-15 10CFRS0.54{f) request is mentioned in this summary. However, what did not make it into this summary is NRR/DRA's estimate that the failure rate of Jocassee Dam is about 2.SE-4/year and that in their 2008-09-26 response to the 20CFR50.54(f) request Duke Energy admitted that a catastrophic failure of Jocassee Dam would li'kely lead to the meltdown of all three reactor cores at the Oconee Nuclear Station and possibly the failure of the containment structures.

On February 20, 2009 two engineers from NRR's Division of Risk Assessment, Fernando Ferrante and Jeffrey Mitman, began routing an Information Notice (IN 2012-02) concerning the risks posed to some nuclear reactor sites due to dam failures. The purpose of this information notice (ML090510269} was:

... to alert addressees of a potentially nonconservative screening value for dam failure frequency that originated in 198D's reference documents which may hove been referenced by licensees in their probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) for external events.

Using a nonconservative screening value for dam failure frequency to evaluate the need for on additional detailed analysis may result in underestimating the risks to the plant associated with external flooding or loss of heat sink from the failure of upstream and 5 t cannot quote from Duke Energy's 2008-09-26 letter without the NRC daiming that this letter to you is now "Official Use Only - Security*Related Information" which must only be provided through their Office of Congressional Affairs (NRC/DCA). I respectfully suggest that your staff request ML082750106 and ML112430114 from NRC/OCA. The Fukushima-style timeline appears on p. 10 of attachment 2 of MLOB2750106 and on pp. 8*9 of ML112430114. It is also quoted on the fourth page of my 2012-09*18 letter to NRC Chairman Macfarlane.

4

downstream dams or levees. The NRC expects that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.

Please note that this Information Notice was being routed more than two years prior to Fukushima occurring. That is, two years prior to the 2011-03-11 flooding-induced triple reactor accident at Fukushima, the NRC was aware that certain US plants might face a similar scenario were dams upstream of them to fail. However, this information notice was not released until more than three years later (March 5, 2012 which was nearly a year after Fukushima). The reason this information notice took more than three years to route was because of the controversial nature of NRR's indecisiveness regarding how to address the flooding vulnerabilities at Oconee and also because of the debate over whether dam break effects on nuclear reactors is a security concern which needs to be w ithheld from the American public.

In the past year, I have encountered many people, both within the NRC and external, who are adamant that the vulnerability which a failure of Jocassee Dam poses to the reactors at Oconee is a security liability which must be kept from the public. Although I am sympathetic to the desire not to broadcast our security liabilities, I have no tolerance for using concerns over security as a pretext for withholding important safety vulnerabilities from the public. When the Jocassee/Oconee issue first came to light in an April 28, 2006 publicly available inspection report, the issue was not being withheld. At some point in 2007 the NRC, either at the request of Duke Energy or on their own accord, decided to begin withholding from the public all correspondence regarding the safety liability posed by a failure of Jocassee Dam.

Is Jocassee Dam a credible target for terrorists and/or saboteurs? I don't know. But it does make sense to me that, in 2007, the NRC might reasonably want to withhold information regarding Jocassee/Oconee while they determined whether or not a security vulnerability existed and whether or not security measures were required to be put into place to protect it.

What does not make sense to me, however, is that in 2012 we are still withholding from the public information on a vital safety concern under the guise of "Security-Related Information".

After five years, have we not addressed the security concerns?

It is unreasonable to me that a government agency is allowed to withhold a significant public safety concern from the public under the guise of security, yet then not, after 5 years, do any meaningful study of the issue to determine if, in fact, a security vulnerability does exist and what must be done to remove it. Is there a security concern or isn't there? If there is, why, after five years, has it not been addressed? If there is not, then why, after five years, are we still withholding vital information from the public under the guise of security?

In April 2009, NRR was in the process of responding to Duke Energy regarding resolution of the Jocassee/Oconee issue. As part of the routing of that response, NRR's Division of Risk Assessment was asked for their concurrence. The Deputy Director of NRR/DRA, Melanie Galloway, refused to initial her concurrence block and instead submitted a Non-Concurrence 5

form {ML09117010) on April 6, 2009. Like all documents regarding Jocassee/Oconee, Ms.

Galloway's Non Concurrence form is stamped "QUO-SRI" and I cannot quote from it. But a deputy division director submitting a Non-Concurrence is rare; this is a process that is mainly used by lower level staff, and even for them it is rare. Had Ms. Galloway's Non-Concurrence form -which in no way concerns security vulnerabilities - been publicly available, it would have likely gained the attention necessary to get the Jocassee/Oconee issue resolved in a timely manner.

Had intervener groups such as the Union of Concerned Scientists been given access to Melanie Galloway's Non-Concurrence form via publicly available ADAMS, then they would have likely been able to counter the pressure which Duke Energy was placing on NRR. With dozens of their own engineers, lawyers and hired contractors, Duke Energy was able to convince NRR that, in order for improvements to Oconee's flooding defenses to be required, the NRC needed to probabilistically show that Jocassee Dam placed an inordinate risk upon the three reactors at Oconee. Pressure from the Union of Concerned Scientists and other intervener groups, however, would have likely convinced NRR that, per Duke Energy's operating license for the Oconee reactors, in order for Duke Energy to be allowed to continue to operate the three reactors at Oconee they needed to deterministically show that these reactors were adequately protected from a catastrophic failure of Jocassee Dam.

On April 9, 2009 Chairman Jaczko was briefed by NRR on the Jocassee/Oconee issue. I don't exactly know what was said at this briefing. The briefing slides {ML091030172) mentioned that new calculations concerning the failure frequency of Jocassee Dam suggested that core damage frequency (i.e. the annual probability that a meltdown will occur) for the reactors at Oconee might be non-conservative by an order of magnitude. What is not mentioned in the slides is Duke Energy's Fukushima-style scenario jcontained in their 2008-09-26 letter) of what would occur at Oconee Nuclear Station were Jocassee Dam to catastrophically fail.

On January 6, 2010 the leadership of NRR met to discuss the Jocassee/Oconee issue (Ml100280954). The purpose of the meeting was whether NRR should issue an order to Oconee requiring them to, in a timely manner, mitigate the risks posed by a failure of Jocassee Dam, or whether NRR should merely issue another 10CFRS0.54{f) request for information and potentially follow up with an order later. The "Cons" listed for the "10CFR50.54(f) option" were that it was not as enforceable as an order and that it had a slower response time for resolution of the external flooding issue. The "Cons" listed for the "order option" were that there was the potential for a public hearing and that an order required signature authority. In other words, to go the route of an order, the Commission and the public would need to be made aware of the risks which Jocassee Dam posed to Oconee. Despite the slower response time, NRR opted to go the route of the 10CFRS0.54(f) letter and avoid the Commission and public scrutiny an order would entail.

In February 2010 - using information provided by Ferrante and Mitman of NRR/DRA- George Wilson submitted an informal memorandum to the NRC's Office of Nuclear Regulatory 6

Research (RES) requesting that a Generic Issue be assigned to investigate whether external flooding concerns, similar to those posed by Jocassee Dam to the three reactors at Oconee, existed elsewhere in our nation's fleet of 104 commercial reactor plants. George Wilson was the Dam Safety Officer in NRR's Division of Engineering (NRR/DE). At the time, we (i.e.

RES/DRA/OEGIB) deemed Mr. Wilson's February 2010 memo to be too speculative and inflammatory to make it an official agency record; however, I have a copy of it if your committee staff requires it. This memo is an example of just how serious mid-level staffers in the various divisions of NRR viewed the Jocassee/ Oconee issue. Keep in mind, this is over a year prior to the Fukushima accidents, yet the staff within NRR were presciently predicting the nuclear catastrophe that could occur were an inadequately sized flood wall to be overtopped allowing the flooding of the standby shutdown equipment necessary to remove decay heat from the reactor cores and containment buildings. Unfortunately it does not appear the managers at NRR were providing the Commissioners all the details of the NRR staff's concerns.

On June 22, 2010 NRR issued a Confirmatory Action Letter to Duke Energy (MLl0l 730329) requiring them to (1) by August 2, 2010 provide an estimate of the volume of water impounded by the Lake Jocassee Dam to be used for flood height analyses at Oconee Nuclear Station, (2) by November 30, 2010 provide a list of modifications to be made at Oconee to adequately protect the plant from flooding due to a fa ilure of the Lake Jocassee Dam, and 13) by November 30, 2011 have the provided modifications in place.

On July 19, 2010, NRR sent a formal memo to RES requesting a Generic Issue on flooding of nuclear power plant sites following upstream dam failures (Mll01900305). In August 2010, the Operating Experience and Generic Branch (RES/DRA/OEGIB) of the Division of Risk Assessment in the NRC's Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research began working on a screening analysis report for what would become Gl-204 (Generic Issue 204). In my opinion, the 2010-07-19 memo and the attendant screening report are evidence of the NRC staff identifying a significant vulnerability and striving to get it addressed. Please note that this issue was being forwarded without the hindsight of the Fukushima accident and entirely due to the analysis of the NRR staff and their determination to pro-actively address an issue significant to the safety of about a fifth of our nation's nuclear reactor plants.

On August 2, 2010, Duke Energy provided the NRC with an estimated volume of water to be assumed impounded by the Lake Jocassee Dam. Their estimate was a "sunny day" estimate.

For reasons not understood by myself and other staff engineers at the NRC, Duke Energy believes that a failure of Jocassee Dam during an inordinately heavy rainfall (such as the one experienced in Senator Sanders' state in 2011 as the remnants of Hurricane Irene blew over parts of Vermont and New York) is not a credible scenario. In January 2011, Jeff Mitman of NRR/DRA challenged this assumption through the Non-concurrence process (ML110260443).

On November 29, 2010, Duke Energy informed the NRC that it was giving itself an additional 6 months to provide the list of modifications needed to protect the three reactors at Oconee from a failure of the Lake Jocassee Dam (ML103490330). Despite this issue being over four 7

years old in its current incarnation (and over 161/2 years old from its 1994 incarnation), NRR did not object to Duke's 6 month extension.

By March 10, 2011 (the eve of the earthquake and tsunami in Japan), RES/DRA/OEGIB had drafted its screening analysis report for Gl-204 and submitted it for routing. As you are well aware, on March 11, 2011 flooding induced from a tsunami disabled the emergency equipment at the Fukushima Oai-ichi reactors leading to the meltdowns of three reactor cores and the destruction of the buildings housing their containments. In the NRC's Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, we assume that the accident in Japan would add a sense of urgency to the approval of Gl-204 and the addressing of the flooding concerns at Oconee. Instead, it inordinately delayed both. I am in no position to completely understand what occurred, but from my second-hand vantage point it appears that the management at NRR viewed the true vulnerability exposed by Fukushima not to be the flooding issue at Oconee but rather their multi-year mismanagement of getting it addressed.

On April 29, 2011 Duke Energy provided the NRC the list of modifications it intended to do at Oconee to protect against a failure of Jocassee Dam (ML111460063). In this letter, Duke Energy extended the NRC's due date for implementation of the modifications from Nov. 30, 2011 to a nebulous commitment of 30 months after the approval of the modification plans by the NRC and FERC (the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission).

So, as of April 29, 2011 - seven weeks after the Fukushima accidents - the NRC's deadline for adequately protecting the Oconee reactors from a failure of Jocassee Dam had slid from November 30, 2011 to some indefinite time in roughly mid-2014.

As noted many times to your committee, the NRC has issued orders to all 104 reactor plants to make modifications based on the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident. What has likely not been noted to your committee is that the NRC has allowed Duke Energy to slide their mid-2014 due date for protecting Oconee from a Jocassee Dam failure to 2016 in order to conform with the Fukushima deadlines given to the other US reactor plants. But the three reactors at Oconee are different from the rest of the US fleet. Unlike the other 101 reactors, the three reactors at Oconee had a known external flooding concern that, over nine months prior to the Fukushima accident event occurring, had a November 30, 2011 deadline set (i.e. the 2011-11-30 deadline was established in a 2010-06-22 letter which was delivered to Duke Energy nearly 9 months prior to the 2011-03-11 tsunami occurring). The 2016 deadline is reasonable for the other 101 reactors because this was a new issue for them. But for the three reactors at Oconee, by the time the post-Fukushima orders came out they were already 5 years into the external flooding issue and had a deadline for modifications already set. Does it make sense that their already generous deadline be extended to match everyone else's?

The history I have provided you is little known within the NRC. Because of supposed security concerns, the Jocassee/Oconee issues are not discussed at All Hands Meetings. The issues are not discussed in sessions at the NRC's annual Regulatory Information Conference (RIC). The 8

issues do not appear in articles of Platts, or at American Nuclear Society conferences, or in online nuclear discussion groups, or in Union of Concerned Scientists biogs. Because of the QUO-SRI designation of all correspondence regarding this issue, there is virtually no internal oversight within the NRC to make sure NRR is properly handling this issue. And because of the QUO-SRI designations there was a strong push by NRR to force RES to remove all OUO-SRI material from the screening report for Gl-204.

like briefing packages for the Commissioners, Generic Issue screening reports are typically released to the public as part of the NRC's commitment to transparency. But it must be remembered that these reports are not written for public consumption - they are written for internal use. Briefing packages to the Commissioners are written to concisely inform the Commissioners of important points on key issues. Generic Issue screening reports are written to inform the screening panel members of the issues. Being that the Commissioners and the NRC staff are all authorized to view QUO-SRI documents, why would we water down our internal reports by removing all QUO-SRI material and thereby share less information with ourselves? I do not know the answer to that, but I have a suspicion.

When NRR knows a document - such as a Generic Issue screening report or a Commissioner briefing package - is going to eventually be released to the public, they prefer it be released without redactions. Redactions are a "red flag" for intervener groups like Greenpeace and the Union of Concerned Scientists. If the Fukushima-style timeline from Duke Energy's 2008-09-26 letter were to appear in a briefing book for Commissioner Apostolakis' trip to Oconee, then NRR knows that, when that briefing book is eventually released with a paragraph from the "External Flooding" section redacted, David Lochbaum will be asking his connections on Capitol Hill to request the redacted section. To avoid this, NRR essentially "pre-redacts" it by not even including it in the first place. Unfortunately, in doing this they keep the Commissioners from obtaining vital information that the Commission needs to know to make important decisions.

And likewise for the screening panel for Generic Issue 204. Richard Perkins, the lead author of the "Screening Analysis Report for the Proposed Generic Issue on Flooding of Nuclear Power Plant Sites Following Upstream Dam Failures" (ML112430114), was under constant pressure from NRR to remove the 2008-09-26 Duke Energy timeline from his report (he has a foot tall stack of internal NRC email correspondence to document it). Richard Perkins came to the NRC from the Department of Energy where he worked on the annual certification process for assuring the safety and reliability of America's nuclear weapons. He is a graduate of the National War College and was used to working with Top Secret and Special Compartmentalized Information (TS-SCI) on a daily basis. To him, the notion that the screening panel for Gl-204 did not have a "need to know" the accident timeline from Duke Energy's 2008-09-26 letter was absolutely ludicrous. He has rhetorically asked me on many occasions, "Why would we want to redact this information from our internal report?"

On September 14, 2012 Richard Perkins submitted a letter to the NRC's Inspector General alleging that the NRC had "intentionally mischaracterized relevant and noteworthy safety 9

information as sensitive, security information in an effort to conceal the information from the public." I assume the NRC's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) is investigating his complaint but am unaware of their findings. Given the NRC OIG's proclivity for narrowly focusing on procedural processes and not questioning the broader intent of those processes, I am doubtful that the OIG investigation will be conducted with a broad enough questioning attitude to adequately investigate Mr. Perkins' claims.

On September 12 & 13, 2011, Commissioner Apostolakis visited Jocassee Dam. In the NRR prepared briefing book for that visit (ML11244A024), the 25 line description of the External Flood section provided to Commissioner Lyons had shrunk to 9 lines. Although Commissioner Apostolakis' visit was a mere six months after Fukushima, no mention of Duke Energy's Fukushima-style timeline from their 2008-09-26 letter was made in the briefing book. Nor was there any mention of the failure probability of Jocassee Dam being in the same range as the probability of a 45 foot tsunami hitting the Fukushima DaHchi site.

On February 1, 2012 Commissioner Svinicki visited Jocassee Dam. NRR's briefing book for that visit (ML12026A549) contains a whole page on the External Flooding issue, yet does not mention the facts that (1) the issue has gone on for six years, (2) the Duke Energy accident timeline is very similar to Fukushima, (3) the flooding probability is similar to Fukushima, (4)

NRR had assigned Duke Energy a 2011-11-30 deadline nine months prior to Fukushima, (5) seven weeks after Fukushima that 2011*11-30 deadline was extended by Duke Energy to mid-2014, and (6) the deadline for Duke Energy's propose modifications to their flooding defenses was later moved to 2016 to match the Fukushima action plan for all the plants without known flooding hazards. These are things that, were I Commissioner Svinicki, I would like to know before visiting Oconee - and, for that matter, before testifying before your committee on March 15, 2012.

On February 16, 2012 Duke Energy came to NRC headquarters for a "Drop-in Visit" with Bill Borchardt, the NRC's Executive Director for Operations (EDO). NRR's briefing book for that visit (ML12039A217) contains a page on the External Flooding issue which is similar to the one provided to Commissioner Svinicki. I do not know if Mr. Borchardt is aware of the true risk that Jocassee Dam poses to the three reactors at Oconee, but if all he knows is the summary in his briefing book, then there is much which he is unaware of yet needs to know.

On March 15 all five Commissioner testified before your committee at the Hearing on Post-Fukushima U.S. Reactor Safety. None of the Commissioners mentioned the fact that three reactors in Oconee County, South Carolina face a similar risk as was faced by the reactors at Fukushima Dai-ichi on March 11, 2011. I believe they did not mention it to your committee because it has been kept from them themselves.

On July 11, 2012 Duke Energy again visited Mr. Borchardt for a "Drop-in Visit" and on August 7, 2012 they dropped in on the Commissioners. As before, the briefing books supplied for these 10

visits (ML12188A071 & ML12206A325) did not mention the true risks posed by Jocassee Dam or the delays in resolving these risks.

If you believe the issues I have brought forward in this letter are of interest to your committee, then I respectfully suggest your staff seek answers to the following:

1. What is the official NRC determination as to the best estimate of the annual failure frequency of Jocassee Dam? How does this failure frequency compare to the annual frequency of a tsunami similar to the one in Japan on 2011-03-11 which caused the flooding induced nuclear accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi?

2. What is the official NRC position regarding whether or not a catastrophic failure of Jocassee Dam is a credible risk for which Duke Energy must deterministically show that the three reactors at Oconee Nuclear Station are adequately protected?

3. What is the official NRC position regarding whether or not the current flooding defenses at Oconee are adequate and what, if any, improvements need to be made?

4. What is the official NRC position regarding the most likely accident sequence at Oconee Nuclear Station were Jocassee Dam to catastrophically fail? How does this accident sequence compare to the March 2011 accident at Fukushima?

5. Assuming the catastrophic failure of Jocassee Dam, what is the NRC's best estimate of the likelihood that the operators at Oconee Nuclear Station would be able to restore cooling to the reactors prior to the containment buildings failing? What are the differences between the Oconee reactors and the Fukushima reactors that leads the NRC to believe the Oconee operators will be able to successfully restore cooling prior to containment failures? Has the NRC conducted any formal studies to estimate the success rate of Duke Energy's mitigation strategies to prevent containment failures in the event of a catastrophic failure of Jocassee Dam? If so, when were these studies conducted and what were the results?

6. Has the US NRC or any federal agency conducted an assessment to determine if Jocassee Dam is adequately protected from terrorist threats? If so, what were the results of the assessments? Is access to Jocassee Dam adequately guarded from terrorist attack? Are the employees at the Jocassee Hydro-Electric Facility screened for inside saboteurs to the same level at which nuclear workers at the Oconee reactors are screened? Is it necessary to continue to withhold from the public vital safety information concerning the risks which a failure of Jocassee Dam poses to the three reactors at the Oconee Nuclear Station?

7. Do the Commissioners believe that, prior to their March 15, 2012 testimony before the US Senate Committee on the Environment & Public Works, they were adequately informed of the vulnerability which Jocassee Dam poses to the reactors at the Oconee Nuclear Station?

8. When does the US NRC intend to release to the public their correspondence concerning Jocassee Dam and Oconee Nuclear Station? What is the justification for continuing to withhold this information from the American public and from public intervener groups 11

such as the Union of Concerned Scientists? Does the NRC believe it would benefit from a review of its handling of the Jocassee/Oconee issue conducted by intervener groups?

Enclosed with this letter is a list of NRC correspondence, memos and studies regarding the Jocassee/Oconee issue. As can be seen from the enclosed list, this issue has festered in its current incarnation since 2006 and was originally brought forward to the NRC in 1994. Please note that most of the documents on the enclosed list are being withheld from the American public.

Although I am convinced the risks of a nuclear accident at Oconee are at least an order of magnitude greater than at a typical US reactor plant, I am not yet convinced that these risks are unacceptable. And although I do not know enough about nuclear security to judge whether or not all the security issues have been adequately addressed, at this time I do not believe a credible security threat to Jocassee Dam e)(ists. I am not appealing to your committee with safety or security concerns. My concern is transparency, and how the lack of it has not only impeded this issue from getting the public scrutiny which it requires but may also be impeding this issue from getting the appropriate scrutiny from the Commissioners of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Very respectfully,

'\ .1.-(.... ...... . * . * * . ,*

Lawrence S. Criscione, PE Reliability & Risk Engineer Operating E,cperience & Generic Issues Branch Division of Risk Assessment Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 5 73-230-3959 Enclosure Cc: Senator James lnhofe, Ranking Member, Committee on Environment & Public Works Senator Thomas Carper, Chairman, E&PW Subcommittee on Clean Air & Nuclear Safety Senator John Barrasso, Ranking Member, E&PW Subcom. on Clean Air & Nuclear Safety Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, Chairman, E&PW Subcommittee on Oversight Senator Mike Johanns, Ranking Member, E&PW Subcommittee on Oversight Chairman Allison Macfarlane, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 12

List ofNRC Correspondence, Memos and Studies Regarding Failure of ]ocassee Dam Date ADAMS Title 1994-FEB-11 letter from Albert F. Gibson, NRC, to J. W. Hampton, Duke, "Notice of Violation and Notice of Deviation (NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-269/93-25, 50-270/93-25, and 50-287/93-25)," dated February 11, 1994 1994-MAR-14 Letter from J. W. Hampton, Duke, dated March 14, 1994 1994-0CT-6 Internal NRC memo documenting a meeting between Region II and NRR concerning a hypothetical Jocassee Dam failure.

1994-DEC-19 letter from Albert F. Gibson, NRC, to J. W. Hampton, Duke, "Notice of Violation and Notice of Deviation (NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-269/94-31. 50-270/94-31, and 50-287/94-31)," dated December 19, 1994 2000-MAR-15 Letter from David E. LaBarge, NRC, to W.R. Mccollum, Jr., "Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Re: Review of Individual Plant Examination of External Events (TAC Nos. M83649, M83650, and M83651)," dated March 15, 2000 2006-APR-28 ;'1,'. L06: 180,F, I OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000269/2006002,05000270/200602,05000287/2006002 2006-AUG-31 I._i.080780: .. 3 IR 05000269-06-016, IR 05000270-06-016, IR 05000287*06-016, on 03/31/2006, Oconee Nuclear Station - Preliminary White Finding 2006-0CT-5 Ml062890206 Oconee, Units 1, 2 & 3

Response to Preliminary White Finding 2006-NOV-22 ~~[06326028) IR 05000269-06-017, IR 05000270-06-017, IR 050002.87-06-017, Final Significance Determination for a White Finding and Notice of Violation, Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC 2006DEC-20 Ml063620092 Oconee, Units 1, 2, & 3, Appeal of Final Significance Determination for White Finding and Reply to Notice of Violation; EA-06-199 2007-JAN-19 Ml070440345 Summary of Revised Fragility Evaluation Results for Jocassee Dam 2007-FEB-5 Letter from Bruce H. Hamilton, Duke, to NRC, "Seismic Fragility Study" 2007*FEB-22 ML070590329 Manual Chapter 0609.02 Appeal Panel Recommendations {Oconee Reply to a Notice of Violation and White finding !EA-06-1991) 2007-MAR*l ML070610460 Oconee Appeal Panel Review of Manual Chapter 0609.02 Appeal Panel Review of Oconee Standby Shutdown facility White finding (EA-06-199) 2007-MAY*:I Ml072970510 Oconee, Units 1, 2 and 3 - Request for NRC to Review Appeal of Final Significance Determination for SSF Flood Barrier White Finding 2007 JUN-22 Ml071580259 Consideration of New lnformation Associated with a Final Significance Determination for a White finding - Oconee NS 2007-JUN-28 Phone call between the NRC and Duke Energy 2007-0CT*l ML072770765 10/01/2007, Slides with Notes for Final Regulatory Assessment of Oconee Flood Barrier Issue 2007-0Ci-1 ML072770775 Dam Failure Information 2007-0CT-1 Ml072770777 Questions and Answers Related to Oconee Flood Barrier 2007-NOV-20 ML073241045 Reconsideration of Final Significance Determination Associated with Standby Shutdown Oconee Facility Flood Barrier White Finding 2008-MAY-19 ML081350689 Briefing Package For Drop-In Visit By Duke Energy Chief Nuclear Officer With Chairman Klein And Commissioner Jaczko On May 21, 2008 2008-JUN-23 ML082390669 Proposal for a Risk Analysis of the Failure of the Jocassee and Keowce Dams to Assess the Potential Effects on the Safe Shut Down Facility of the Oconee Nuclear Station, South Carolina 2008-JUL-28 ML082120390 Oconee Nuclear Station - Revisions to the Selected Licensee Commitments Manual (SLC)

Enclosure, page 1

List of NRC Correspondence, Memos and Studies Regarding Failure uf Jocassee Dam Date ADAMS Title 2008-AUG-15 ML081640244 Information Request Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(F) Related to External Flooding, Including Failure of the Jocassee Dam at Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 (TAC Nos. MD8224, MD8225, and MD8226) 2008-AUG-26 ML082390690 Kick Off for Risk Analysis of the Failure of the Jocassee and Keowee Dams to Assess the Potential Effects on the Safe Shutdown Facilrty at the Oconee Nuclear Station 2008-AUG-28 ML083300427 08/28/2008 - Summary of Closed Meeting to with Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC to Discuss the August 15, 2008, 50.S4(f) Letter on External Flooding (TAC Nos.

MD8224, MD8225, and M08226) 2008-AUG-28 ML082550290 Meeting with Duke Energy Carollnas, Oconee Flood Protection and the Jocassee Dam Hazard 2008-SEP-6 ML082250166 Oconee Nuclear Station - Communication Plan for Information Request Related to Failure Frequencies for the Jocassee Pumped Storage Dam (Jocassee Dam) at the Oconee Nuclear Station and Potential Generic Implications 2008-SEP-26 ML082750106 Oconee, Units 1, 2 and 3 - Response to 10 CFR 50.S4(f) Request 2008-NOV-5 ML091060761 11/05/08 Summary of Closed Meeting with Duke on External Flooding Issues, including failure of the Jocassee Dam, at Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 2008-NOV-5 ML083390650 11/05/2008 Meeting Slides, "Oconee Site Flood Protection," NRC Meeting with Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC 2008-DEC-4 ML091420319 12/04/2008 Meeting Summary, Meeting to Discuss External Flooding at Oconee Nuclear Station (Reissuance, with Error on Page 3 Corrected) 2008-DEC-4 ML090480044 Oconee Nuclear Station, External F!ood NRR Meeting, Rockville, MD, December 4, 2008 2009-FEB-3 ML090280474 Briefing Package for Commissioner Lyons Visit to Oconee on February 4, 2009 2009-APR-6 ML091170104 Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 And 3 - Non-concurrence on Evaluation of Duke Energy Carolinas, LlC September 26, 2008, Response to Nuclear Regulatory Commission Letter Dated August 15, 2008 Related to External Flooding 2009-APR-9 ML091030172 Oconee External Flooding Briefing for Commissioner Jaczko 2009-APR-30 ML090570779 Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3, Evaluation of Duke Energy Carolinas September 26, 2008, Response to External Flooding, Including Failure of the Jocassee Dam 2009-MAY-11 ML092940769 05/11/2009 Summary of Closed Meeting with Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, to Discuss Preliminary Results of the Recent Inundation and Sensitivity Studies Concerning Failure of the Jocassee Dam and Resultant Flooding at Oconee Nuclear Station, l, 2, and 3 2009-MAY-1 l ML090820470 5/11/2009 Notice of Forthcoming Closed Meeting with Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, to Discuss Sensitivity Studies Concerning Failure of the Jocassee Dam & Resultant Flooding at the Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 1, 2, & 3 2009-MAY-ll ML091380424 Oconee Nuclear Station, Slides for Closing Meeting May 11, 2009 with Duke on the Oconee Flooding Issue 2009-MAY-20 ML091470265 Oconee, Units 1, 2 & 3, Request for Extension of Duke Response Time to Referenced Letter 2009-MAY-26 ML091480116 E-mail re Briefing Package for Visit to Jocassee Dam on June 23, 2009 2009-JUN-l ML091590046 Oconee, Units 1, 2, and 3, Request to Withhold Sensitive Information in Presentation Materials Left with Staff 2009-JUN-10 ML091680195 Oconee, Units 1, 2, and 3 - Interim 30-Dav Response to Reference 2.

Enclosure, page 2

List of NRC Correspondence, Memos and Studies Regarding Failure of Jocassee Dam Date ADAMS Title 2009-JUN-l l ML091620669 6/11/09 Summary of Closed Meeting with Duke Carolina to Discuss External Flooding at Oconee 2009-JUN-25 ML091760072 NRC Site Visit to the Oconee Nuclear Station on June 15, 2009 2009-JUL-9 ML092020480 Oconee, Units 1, 2, & 3, Final 60-Day Response to Reference 2 2009-JUL-28 Ml092230608 Oconee, Submittal of Selected licensee Commitments Manual SLC Revision 2009-AUG* 12 M L09057011 7 Oconee Flood Protection and the Jocassee Dam Hazard Basis for NRC Allowing Continued Operation 2009-AUG-27 Ml092380305 Oconee, Slides for Closed Meeting Regarding External Flood Technical Meeting On August 27, 2009 2009-SEP-25 ML092710344 Site Visit Observation on 09/25/2009 by Joel Munday for Oconee 2009-0CT-28 ML093080034 10/28/09 Slides for Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 - Meeting Slides -

EKternal Flood NRC Technical Meeting 2009-NOV-30 Ml093380701 Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, Oconee External Flood Analyses and Associated Corrective Action Plan 2009-DEC-4 Ml090b80737 12/04/09 Summary of Closed Meeting to Discuss the Ouke Energy Carolinas, LLC.,

09/26/08 Response to NRC's August 15, 2008 50.54(f) Letter on External Flooding at Oconee 2010-JAN-6 Mll00280954 01/06/2010 Briefing to the Executive Team on the Oconee Nuclear Station EKternal Flooding Issue 2010-JAN-11 ML100150066 Request Additional Information Regarding the Oconee External rlooding Issue 201D*JAN-15 ML100210199 Oconee, Units 1, 2 and 3 - Additional Information Regarding Postulated External Flood Threat Issues 2010-JAN-29 ML100271591 Evaluation of Duke Energv Carolina, LLC (Duke), November 30, 2009, Response to Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRCJ Letter Dated April 30, 2009, Related to External Flooding At Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, And 3 (Oconee) 2010-FEB-8 ML100470053 Oconee, Units 1, 2, & 3, External Flood, Response to Request for Additional Information 2010*FEB26 Ml100610674 Oconee, Units 1. 2, & 3, fxternal Flood Revised Commitment Letter 2010-MAR-5 Ml103430047 Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, & 3, Letter From Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Regarding External rlood, Response to Request For Additional Information 2010-MAR-15 Ml 100780084 Generic failure Rate Evaluation for Jocassee Dam Risk Analysis 2010-MAR-18 Ml 100810388 Prepare Briefing Book and Material for Eric Leeds for the Duke rlect Meeting on March 18, 2010 2010-APR-14 ML100760109 Generic Failure Rate Evaluation for Jocassee Dam 2010-MAY-27 Ml101600468 Oconee, Units l, 2 & 3, Response to Requested Information on the Protection Against External rlooding Including a Postulated Failure of the Jocassee Dam 2010-JUN-1 ML101750619 OUO - Communication Plan For Issuance of Confirmatory Action Letter To Duke for Oconee - External Flooding June 2010 2010-JUN-3 ML101&10083 Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, - External Flood Commitments 2010-JUN-22 ML101730329 Oconee, Units 1, 2 & 3, Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL 2-10-003), Commitments to Address External Flooding Concerns 2010-JUN-29 ML101890803 06/29/2010 Summary of Closed Meeting With Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, to Discuss EKternal Flooding at Oconee 2010-JUL-7 ML101880768 DUO - IR 05000269-10-002, 05000270-10-006, 05000287-10-006; 01/01/2010-03/31/2010; Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2 and 3; Interim Compensatory Measures for External Flood 2010-JUL-19 ML101900305 Identification of a Generic External Flooding Issue Due to Potential Dam Failures Enclosure, page 3

List of NRC Correspondence, Memos and Studies Regarding Failure of Jocassee Dam Date ADAMS Title 2010-AUG-2 ML102170006 Oconee Units 1, 2, & 3, Response to Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) 2-10-003 2010-OCT-20 ML102910480 NRC Assessment of Oconee External Flooding Issue (October 18, 2010) 2010-OCT-26 ML102990064 NRC Staff Assessment of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, Oconee External Flooding Issue (TAC NOS. ME4441, ME4442, and ME4443}

2010-NOV-29 ML103490330 Oconee Nuclear Site, Units 1, 2, and 3, Oconee Response to Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL} 2-10-003 2011-JAN-5 ML110180609 Enclosure 1, Oconee Nuclear Station, Major Project Plans 2011-JAN-10 MLI10260443 Non-concurrence on Oconee Assessment Letter 2011-JAN-28 Mll10280153 Staff Assessment of Duke's Response to Confirmatory Action Letter Regarding Duke's Commitments To Address EMternal Flooding Concerns At The Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, And 3 {ONS) {TAC NOS. ME3065, ME3066, and ME3067) 2011-MAR-5 ML103410042 Supplement to Technical Basis for Allowing Oconee Nuclear Station to Remain in Operation Through November 2011, Associated with the External Flooding Issues 2011-MAR-15 Mlll0740482 Analysis Report for the Proposed Generic Issue on Flooding of Nuclear Power Plant Sites Following Upstream Dam Failures 2011-APR-29 Mlll 1460063 Oconee Nuclear Site, Units 1, 2, and 3, Response to Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) 2-10-003 2011-AUG-16 Ml11229A710 E-mail re Briefing Package for Visit to Oconee Nuclear Power Plant on September 12-13, 2011 2011-AUG-18 Mll 1174Al38 Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2. and 3, Assessment of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC April 29, 2011, Response to Confirmatory Action Letter Regarding Modifications to Address hternal Flooding Concerns (TAC Nos. ME6133, ME6134, and ME6135) 2011-AUG-31 Mll 12430114 Screening Analysis Report for the Proposed Generic Issue on Flooding of Nuclear Power Plant Sites Following Upstream Dam Failures 2011-SEP-1 ML11244A024 Briefing Package for Visit to Oconee Nuclear Power Plant on September 12-13, 2011 2011-OCT-3 ML11278Al 73 Oconee Nuclear Station (ONSl, Units 1, 2, and 3, Response to Requests for Additional Information Regarding Necessary Modifications to Enhance the Capability of the ONS Site to Withstand the Postulated Failure of the Jocassee Dam 2011-OCT-17 Ml11294A341 Oconee Nuclear Station (ONSl. Units 1, 2, and 3, Response to Requests for Additional Information Regarding Necessary Modifications to Enhance the Capability of the ONS Site to Withstand the Postulated Failure of the Jocassee Dam 2011-DEC-16 Mlll3500495 Screening Analysis Report for the Proposed Generic Issue on Flooding of Nuclear Power Plant Sites Following Upstream Dam Failures_redacted 2012-JAN-26 ML12026A549 Briefing Package for Commissioner Sviniclc.i Visit to Oconee on February 1. 2012 2012-JAN-31 ML12026A254 Communication Plan for Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS) Following Issuance of Gl-204 2012-FEB-3 ML12039A239 Oconee, Units 1, 2 and 3 - Request for Withholding from Public Disclosure Duke Energy letter Dated May 20, 2009 Involving Postulated Failure of the Jocassee Dam 2012 -FEB-9 Mll2039A217 Briefing Package Request for Meeting with Duke Energy on February 16, 2012 Enclosure, page 4

List of NRC Correspondence, Memos and Studies Regarding Failure of Jocassee Dam Date ADAMS Title 2012-FEB-17 ML12053A016 Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC - Recommended Revisions to the Oconee Nuclear Station Section of NRC's Screenlng Analysis Report for the Proposed Generic Issue on Flooding of Nuclear Plant Sites Following Upstream Dam Failure 2012-FEB-23 ML12058A236 02/23/12 Summary of a Teleconference between the US NRC and Duke Energy Regarding Comments made by Duke Energy Concerning the Issuance of the Screening Analysis Report for Generic Issue 204 2012-MAR-5 ML090510269 NRC Information Notice 2012-002 Potentially Nonconservative Screening Value For Dam Failure Frequency In Probabilistic Risk Assessments 2012-MAY-15 ML12129Al86 Oconee Nuclear Station. Units 1, 2, and 3

Request for Additional Information Regarding Modifications to Address the External Flooding Concerns (TAC NOS.

ME7970, ME7971, AND ME7972) 2012-JUN-14 ML12167A372 Oconee, Units 1, 2, and 3, Response to Requests for Additional Information Regarding Modifications to Address External Flooding Concerns 2012-JUL-11 Ml12215A327 07/11/2012 licensee Non-Public Meeting Slides on Oconee External Flood Mitigation 2012-JUL-11 ML12188A07l Briefing Package for Meeting with Duke Energy on July 11, 2012 2012*AUG-7 ML12206A325 Briefing Book for Meeting with Duke Energy on August 7, 2012 2012-SEP-20 ML12268A404 Communication Plan for Flooding September 2012 2012-SEP-20 ML12219Al63 Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 and 3 - Response to Questions Regarding Modifications to Address External Flooding Hazards (TAC Nos. ME7970, ME7971, AND ME7972)

Enclosure, page 5

Criscione, Lawrence From: Herr, Linda Sent: Tuesday. January 08, 2013 2:35 PM To: Criscione, Lawrence

Subject:

RE: Meeting re: Flooding at Oconee from Jocassee Dam w/Cmr. Ostendorff Perfect, thank you for your patience!

Original Message-----

From: Criscione, Lawrence Sent: Tuesday, January 08, 2013 1:14 PM To: Herr, Linda

Subject:

RE: Meeting re: Flooding at Oconee from Jocassee Dam w/Cmr. Ostendorff Thanks. The 13th is a good day. I will put it on my calendar.

Original Message-----

From: Herr, Linda Sent: Tuesday, January 08, 2013 9:01 AM To: Criscione, Lawrence

Subject:

RE : Meeting re: Flooding at Oconee from Jocassee Dam w/Cmr. Ostendorff Importance: High Hi Larry:

I have scheduled Feb 13. 2013 from 9:30-10:00am - although I was able to look at your calendar, the entire month of February is marked "tentative," so if the 13th doesn't work for you we'll try again:)

Thank you!!

Linda

Original Message-----

From: Criscione, Lawrence Sent: Friday, January 04, 2013 11 :54 AM To: Herr, Linda

Subject:

RE: Meeting re: Flooding at Oconee from Jocassee Dam w/Cmr. Ostendorff I'll be in Illinois on January 22 and 23rd. I am next back in Rockville on January 30th. I've sent you a sharing invitation for my Outlook Calendar. It is up to date through the end of February.

Thanks, Larry

Original Message---*-

F rom: Herr, Linda Sent: Thursday, January 03, 2013 1:35 PM To: Criscione, Lawrence

Subject:

RE: Meeting re: Flooding at Oconee from Jocassee Dam w/Cmr. Ostendorff Importance: High Hi Larry:

I know we've played with your meeting a couple of times already and I apologize - Cmr. Ostendorff will now be on travel the week of 1/14 thru 1/18 so may I ask your indulgence and move you one more time? Are you available on Jan 22 at 9:30am; 1:30pm or 3:00pm or on Jan 23 at 9:30am or 1:30pm? If not, please suggest days/times you are available so we can reschedule Jan 17th.

Thank you - again, I apologize.

Regards, Linda

Original Message-----

From: Criscione, Lawrence Sent Monday, December 31, 2012 9:30 AM To: Herr, Linda Subject RE: Meeting re: Flooding at Oconee from Jocassee Dam w/Cmr. Ostendorff

Linda, The later time works for me. Should I plan on meeting with the Commissioner from 1:30 to 2:00pm?

Larry

Original Message-----

From: Herr, Linda Sent: Friday, December 21, 2012 11:03 AM To: Criscione, Lawrence

Subject:

RE: Meeting re: Flooding at Oconee from Jocassee Dam w/Cmr. Ostendorff Morning Lawrence:

Could I request that we moved your meeting to 1:30-2:00pm on the 17th? If that doesn't work for you, we'll leave it at the time it currently is scheduled 1:00-1:30pm.

Thank you for your consideration.

Happy Holidays!!

Linda

Original Message-----

From: Criscione, Lawrence Sent Wednesday, December 19, 2012 1:20 PM To: Herr. Linda

Subject:

RE: Meeting re: Flooding at Oconee from Jocassee Dam w/Cmr. Ostendorff Thank you From: Herr, Linda Sent: Wednesday, December 19, 2012 1:19 PM To: Criscione, Lawrence Cc:Tappert,John

Subject:

RE: Meeting re: Flooding at Oconee from Jocassee Dam w/Cmr. Ostendorff Perfect, have scheduled you from 1:00-1:30pm on Cmr. Ostendorffs calendar in his office OWFN-18 G1.

Original Message----

From: Criscione, Lawrence

Sent: Wednesday, December 19, 2012 1:16 PM To: Herr, Linda Cc: Tappert, John

Subject:

RE: Meeting re: Flooding at Oconee from Jocassee Dam w/Cmr. Ostendorff Yes itwould.

From: Herr, Linda Sent: Wednesday, December 19, 201212:14 PM To: Criscione, Lawrence Cc: Tappert, John

Subject:

Meeting re: Flooding at Oconee from Jocassee Dam w/Cmr. Ostendorff Good Afternoon Lawrence:

Would January 17th from 1:00-1 :30pm work for you?

Thank you, Linda 301-415-1759 From: Tappert, John Sent: Wednesday, December 12, 2012 2:36 PM To: Herr. Linda

Subject:

FW: Your Meeting Today Concerning Flooding at Oconee from Jocassee Dam Linda Please arrange for a meeting in early January. Thanks John R. Tappert, P.E.

Chief of Staff Office of Commissioner William C. Ostendorff U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (301) 415-1811 (office)

!(b)(6) I (mobile)

(301) 415-1757 (fax)

From: Tappert, John Sent: Wednesday, December 12, 2012 10:17 AM To: Criscione. Lawrence Cc: Herr, Linda

Subject:

RE: Your Meeting Today Concerning Flooding at Oconee from Jocassee Dam Larry, Sounds good. I will ask Linda to look for an opportunity in the New Year and we will confirm with you. Thanks John John R. Tappert, P.E.

Chief of Staff Office of Commissioner William C. Ostendorff U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (301) 415-1811 (office)

!(6)(6) I (mobile)

(301) 415-1757 (fax)

From: Criscione, Lawrence Sent Tuesday. December 11, 2012 4:41 PM To:Tappert,John

Subject:

RE: Your Meeting Today Concerning Flooding at Oconee from Jocassee Dam John, Thank you for the invitation. Unfortunately I leave tonight for IUinois and will not be returning until January 8th.

If the Commissioner would be willing to meet with me in January, I would like to meet with him. My Outlook Calendar is up to date through Easter. If you or Linda could put me on the Commissioner's schedule in January, I would appreciate it.

Larry From: Tappert, John Sent: Tuesday, December 11, 2012 3:07 PM To: Criscione, Lawrence Cc: Herr, Linda Subject RE: Your Meeting Today Concerning Flooding at Oconee from Jocassee Dam Larry Thank you for your email. The Commissioner received a briefing yesterday that was based on the first attachment of your email. Consistent with his open door policy, he would be happy to meet with you if you would like. He has some open time on his calendar at the end of next week - Thursday afternoon or Friday -

or Linda Herr, our senior administrative assistant, can arrange for another time. Please let us know. Thanks.

John John R. Tappert, P.E.

Chief of Staff Office of Commissioner William C. Ostendorff U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (301) 415-1811 (office)

!(b; ~ (mobile)

( 1) 41 5-115(fax)

From: Criscione, Lawrence Sent: Monday, December 10, 2012 6:53 PM To: Ostendorff, William; Magwood, William Cc: Boska. John; Hiland. Patrick: Evans, Michele; Pascarelli, Robert; Wilson, George; Bartley, Jonathan; Cook, Christopher; Miller, Ed; Cheok, Michael; Chen, Yen-Ju; Beasley, Benjamin; Merzke, Daniel; Coffin, Stephanie; Skeen, David; See. Kenneth: Monninger, John; Perkins, Richard; Bensi. Michelle; Philip, Jacob; Sancaktar.

Selim; Galloway, Melanie; Mitman, Jeffrey; Ferrante. Fernando; Bubar, Patrice; Tappert, John

Subject:

Your Meeting Today Concerning Flooding at Oconee from Jocassee Dam Commissioner Ostendorff, It came to my attention today that you and Commissioner Magwood were being briefed by NRR on the flooding vulnerabilities posed to the reactors at Oconee from a catastrophic failure of Jocassee Dam. Attached to this email are the "Commissioner Briefing Notes" prepared by NRR. Also attached are a 2012-11-14 letter from me to the Senate Committee on the Environment & Public Works (E&PW) and an April 6, 2009 Non-Concurrence Form which a Deputy Division Director at NRR/DRA {Melanie Galloway) submitted against NRR's pusiUanimous treatment of the Oconee/Jocassee concerns.

I do not know exactly what you were told during your briefing today, but if it was limited to the "Commissioner Briefing Notes then you did not receive all the pertinent facts.

A major concern of mine, which I addressed in my attached letter to the E&PW, is that, in all the internal documents I have uncovered regarding NRR briefings of the Commissioners on the Jocassee/Oconee flooding issue, the actual risk numbers calculated by NRR/DRA are never mentioned and neither is the 2008-09-26 Duke Energy timeline concerning the predicted failure sequence which would occur at Oconee following a catastrophic failure of the Lake Jocassee Dam (for the context of the quote below. seep. 10 of Attachment 2 of ML082750106):

The following flood timeline is based on the results of the 1992 Inundation Study. In this scenario the dam is assumed to fail at time zero. Notification from Jocassee would occur before a total failure of the dam; however, for purposes of this timeline, notification is assumed to be at the same time the dam fails. Following notification from Jocassee. the reactor(s) are shutdown within approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . The predicted flood would reach ONS in approximately 5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months , at which time the SSF walls are overlapped. The SSF is assumed to fail, with no time delay, following the flood level exceeding the height of the SSF wall. The failure scenario results are predicted such that core damage occurs in about 8 to 9 hours1.041667e-4 days 0.0025 hours 1.488095e-5 weeks 3.4245e-6 months following the dam break and containment failure in about 59 to 68 hours7.87037e-4 days 0.0189 hours 1.124339e-4 weeks 2.5874e-5 months . When containment failure occurs, significant dose to the public would result.

Hopefully you recognize that the above scenario is very similar to what occurred at Fukushima when a tsunami overtopped their inadequately sized flood wall and disabled their standby shutdown equipment. Why the above scenario does not ever appear in Commissioner briefing packages, I do not understand. This seems to me like something you would want to know.

Another thing you should know ls the annual probability of failure calculated by NRR/DRA for Jocassee Dam.

That number is 2.BE-4/year, which is of the same order of magnitude of a 49 foot tsunami striking the Japanese coast at Fukushima. Given this calculated probability of dam failure and the Duke Energy timeline quoted above, it appears that the inadequately sized flood wall at Oconee presents a very similar hazard to the American public as the inadequately sized flood wall at Fukushima presented to the Japanese public. Is this not something of which NRR should be informing the Commissioners?

As noted by Dr. Ferrante in the email trail below, NRR is not a monolithic institution. Specifically, NRR/DRA has a very different position on the Jocassee/Oconee issue as NRR/DORL. See the attached Non-Concurrence from Melanie Galloway as an example.

I do not know who was at your briefing today, but from the invitation attached to this letter it appears that neither were the key personnel from NRR/DRA (Galloway, Mitman, Ferrante) nor were the authors of the Gl-204 Screening Report (Perkins, Bensi, Philip, Sancaktar) invited to attend. It might be helpful to your understanding of the Jocassee/Oconee issue if you were to speak to Ms. Galloway regarding her 2009-04-06 Non-Concurrence, Dr. Ferrante and Mr. Mitman regarding their 2010-03-15 Generic Failure Rate Evaluation for Jocassee Dam, and Richard Perkins regarding his ordeal in routing and releasing the screening analysis for Gl-204 on flooding due to upstream dam failures.

After over 60 years of military service, Admiral Rickover noted:

A major flaw in our system of government, and even in industry, is the latitude to do less than is necessary.

Too often officials are willing to accept and adapt to siluations they know to be wrong. The tendency is to downplay problems instead of actively trying to correct them.

The NRC first identified the undersized flood wall at Oconee Nuclear Station in March 1994. It is my concern that the reason this issue is taking more than two decades to address is that Division Directors at NRR have been willing to accept and adapt to situations they know to be wrong. As noticed by Ms. Galloway in April 2009, the tendency in NRR was to downplay the Jocassee/Oconee problem instead of actively trying to correct it. The public looks to the NRC Commissioners to curtail this "latitude to do less than is necessary" and to ensure the NRC staff transparently addresses concerns in a timely manner.

I appreciate you taking an interest in this issue and requesting a briefing by NRR. I am concerned, however, that your briefing might not have adequately detailed the vulnerabilities faced at Oconee.

Vlr, Larry Lawrence S. Criscione Reliability & Risk Analyst RES/ORA/OE GIB 573-230-3959 If a subordinate always agrees with his superior, he is a useless part of the organization.

From: Ferrante, Fernando Sent: Thursday, November 15, 20121:58 PM To: Criscione, Lawrence Cc: Mitman, Jeffrey

Subject:

RE: Lack of Transparency Impeding Resolution of Flooding Concerns at Oconee In understand, and I think the folks who were involved in it understand as well. I just worry that other folks will look at our affiliations and assume "NRR" means the specific folks listed in the letter.

From: Criscione, Lawrence Sent: Thursday, November 15, 2012 11 :42 AM To: Ferrante, Fernando Cc: Mitman, Jeffrey

Subject:

RE: Lack of Transparency Impeding Resolution of Flooding Concerns at Oconee Thanks Fernando. Jeff sent me the PSA and PSAM papers last month.

When I use "NRR" I mean the dominant position that won out. Hopefully most people understand that in an agency of 4000 people there is no one true NRG position or one true NRR position. Over the past five years it has bothered me to no end that a legitimate FOIA exemption is "pre-decisional information" and that the NRC is able to use it to conceal the internal debate process. 1think the public should be able to FOIA the varying NRG positions on issues and to understand how things are internally debated and decisions arrived at.

From: Ferrante, Fernando Sent: Thursday, November 15, 2012 8:04 AM To: Criscione, Lawrence Cc: Mitman, Jeffrey

Subject:

RE: Lack of Transparency Impeding Resolution of Flooding Concerns at Oconee

Larry, Thanks for the opportunity to review this letter. For the most part, the facts related to activities I am directly aware of are correct. Regarding the Information Notice (IN) that NRR authored on dam failure probabilities, I will give you some more background information that will hopefully help further clarify the discussion.

The IN came as a direct result of the Oconee/Jocassee issue. Jim Vail, a retired NRR/DRA/APOB staff, was in charge of developing it (with support from the NRR staff in charge of releasing generic communications in NRR/DPR/PGCB) under guidance from Melanie Galloway, then NRR/DRA Deputy Director. Sometime in 2009, I took over the responsibility of re-writing and issuing the IN (in the same manner I was tasked with rewriting NRR's original submittal to RES regarding the creation of what would eventually become Gl-204). Since the beginning, there was a lot of resistance and internal struggle regarding this IN. In order to have the IN released I made sure to build consensus between NRR/ORA, NRR/DE. RES/ORA (which had produced an internal dam failure report which supported the information that eventually went into the IN), and others. As more NRC Offices lined up to be included in the IN, the concurrence process started to take longer and this ended up

indeed being an exceedingly long turnover for a generic communication. The Gl-204 process continued in parallel until it became bogged down with some of the issues you described in the letter. At some point a presentation was made in an NRR LT/ET meeting, and the directive for the IN became to coordinate its release with the release of the Gl-204 report. Because of the delays in the Gl-204 report, this added another 6 months to a year of the release of the IN itself. At some point, when it became clear both releases were imminent, I was asked if the IN should be reclassified as "NON-PUBLIC/SECURITY RELATED," which I rejected on the basis that no information was contained in the IN which was covered in both NRR and NRC guidance regarding the withholding of information. Hence, the IN was eventually released publicly.

I should add that, as part of an effort to publicly release and discuss information that was created during the development of the dam failure report by RES/ORA, two papers were submitted, accepted, and presented at PRA conferences (the most recent in Helsinki, 2012) with concurrence from both NRR/DRA and RES/DRA staff (I can send these papers to you if you are interested). Both papers were reviewed internally and, similar to the IN, contained no information that went against guidance regarding withholding of information. Both papers relied in part on data developed by the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) which does restrict public release of certain portions of their dam databases, but we followed their guidelines and contacted USACE to make sure no inadvertent release was made. This papers follow the same methodology discussed in the internal NRRIDRA document you referred to in the letter (ML100780084) which, to my knowledge, is the closest we have come to a more official position on the dam failure rate issue (which was, at least in part, the intent I had when the document was created).

I'm sharing the above information to make sure that readers who are totally unfamiliar with the issue (inside or outside of NRG), get a clear picture of how NRR/DRA dealt with some of the issues we were faced during the Oconee/Jocassee issue. In several parts of the letter, certain positions regarding the release of information or level of importance the issue deserved are attributed to "NRRft as a whole (e.g .. ~ ... there was a strong push by NRR to force RES to remove all OUO-SRI material from the screening report for Gl-204.") which I don't think were shared by all staff or Divisions within NRR. 1am concerned this may be misconstrued by readers who are completely unaware of the challenges the Oconee/Jocassee issue presented to the technical staff to mean all staff within NRR shared these positions.

Thank you.

Fernando Ferrante, Ph.D.

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) Division of Risk Assessment (ORA) PRA Operational Support Branch (APOB) Mail Stop: 0-10C15 Phone: 301-415-8385 Fax: 301-415-3577 From: Criscione, Lawrence Sent: Wednesday, November 14, 2012 10:23 AM To: Zimmerman, Jacob; Vrahoretis, Susan Cc: Beasley, Benjamin; Coe, Doug; Correia, Richard; Galloway, Melanie; Mitman. Jeffrey; Ferrante, Fernando; Wilson, George; Leeds. Eric

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FW: Lack of Transparency Impeding Resolutton of Flooding Concerns at Oconee Jacob/Susan: Please forward the attached letter to the Commission staff whom you believe should be aware of it.

I have copied on this email some of the NRR staff mentioned in the letter. Please let me know if I am mis-portraying any of your positions. Please feel free to forward this letter to whomever you believe needs to see it.

V/r, Larry Criscione 573-230-3959

f;rom: Criscione, Lawrence Sent: Wednesday, November 14, 2012 9:15 AM To: 'valerie_manak@epw.senate.gov'; 'nathan_ mccray@epw.senate.gov'

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Lack of Transparency Impeding Resolution of Flooding Concerns at Oconee Please see the attached letter to the Senate Committee on the Environment & Public Works.

ML20294A070

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Dear Mr. Borchardt and Mr. Ash:

Dear Requester:

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Dear Mr. Criscione:

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Dear Senator Boxer:

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