Text

Proposed Tech Specs Re Reactivity Control Sys,Providing Consistency Between Units & Correcting Errors
	ML20246C713
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	06/29/1989
From:	; DUQUESNE LIGHT CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20246C698	List: ML20246C696; ML20246C700; ML20246C713;
References
	NUDOCS 8907110118
	Download: ML20246C713 (25)
	v • d • e

. _ - _ _ - .

M

9

- .. ATTACHMENT A-1 Revise the Beaver Valley Unit No. 1 Technical Specifications as follows:

Remove Pace Insert Pace 3/4 1-11 3/4 1-11 3/4 3-46 3/4 3-46 3/4 3-52 3/4 3-52 3/4 3-64 3/4 3-64 3/4 5-2 3/4 5-2 B 3/4 5-1 B 3/4 5-1 3/4-6-11 3/4 6-11 3/4 7-10 3/4 7-10 3/4 9-8 3/4 9-8 1

8907110118 890629 PDR ADOCK 03000334 P PDC

w

. REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CHARGING PUMP - SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.3 One charging pump in the boron injection flow path required by Specification (3.1.2.1) or Low Head Safety Injection Pump (with an open reactor coolant system vent of greater than or equal to 3.14 square inches) shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE bus.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With none of the charging pumps OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until one charging pump or Low Head Safety Injection pump is restored to OPERABLE status.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.3.1 The above required charging pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying, on recirculation flow, that the pump develops a discharge pressure greater than or equal to 2402 psig when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

4.1.2.3.2 All charging pumps, except the above required charging pump, shall be demonstrated inoperable

at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months by l verifying that the control switches are placed in the PULL-TO-LOCK position and tagged.

4.1.2.3.3 When the Low Head Safety Injection pump is used in lieu of a charging pump, the Low Head Safety Injection pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

a. Verification of an operable RWST pursuant to 4.1.2.7,

b. Verification of an operable Low Head Safety Injection Pump pursuant to Specification 4.5.2.b.2,

c. Verification of an operable Low Head Safety Injection flow path from the RWST to the Reactor Coolant System once per shift, and

d. Verification that the vent is open at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .**

An inoperable pump may be energized for testing provided the discharge of the pump has been isolated from the RCS by a closed isolation valve with power removed from the valve operator, or by a manual isolation valve locked in the closed position.

- Except when the vent path is provided with a valve which is locked or provided with remote position indication, or sealed, or otherwise secured in the open position, then verify these valves open at least once per 7 days.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 1-11 PROPOSED WORDINC

)

i w

N o O l I l x T f o

LA ER . . . .

NB A. A. c.

NI A. A.

AL N N N N R R R R R R R R 2

. I A

_ OC 1

~

7 4

t n

e L ) )

) m E 4 4

)

5 (

2 e NK ( ( (

r i

N NI AI i I M M M M M M M M M M M U

/

u q

O QO S e

. I R T

e R

I c

-_. N .na E 1.ll 3

_ DS

1. i 1 Er Mw 3 e v

4 3 r 3

, Mm I u n

{3-G n nS o o ih i 3 Nw I tt t a

4 RM ai cw c

_. T I i i E Pm f n f

_... R NN io i I

A ci c T 0u 7

N et pc e p

Sn S Wm i hj uh Ow

] g t n t g

Mo i o r i

_ RS I I r I wc w S t d

l en ci e

c E o o n n I x e H C ) ad a 7 u t 3 de dr M l a ) ) - - ( e rm

- F R 1 1 t or o

_ M r p

( ( e e t a c o cc a u x r r e R cf e

e u u l ar.a t u t t t e t w ee l

c r l a a a r u o npgn a F R r r u O l i ai u t p

e e s l F et N S r p p e s e X dbul e e a

e t u n e

m e

r u e r

v e

H r e e ro oa r g g l r T T s l P l - t i tti T

n a

cu a s e a u nu t t t e v r r e w q aq N R R N S n n r n o o r d ekl e E a a P I t t u e rcpr M e e e e g

l l a a t e e U t t g o o r r r r u F yh d y R a a n n o o e e e e u tcet T a a C C n n S

N i

d e

i d

e R R r r i

z r

i z

r e

G e

G vray i l

ileiPl di6c nl I

t m

r e

t m

r e

u e

cr mt c r

u o

a o

t c

a u

s s

e u

s s

e m

a e

m a

e hix R

l i n o

betb anxawn rneron ea e n n o o e e r r t t I u i pl npe1 I I S S R R P P S S M A t a

OOaOB

. . . . . . . . . . t )) ))

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 o 12 34 1 1 1 N (( ((

s

% ix <$eMd i eD e w

- s s:m' c e w*

ud w w2 Yneyc:

t g O *g to@ oxe

i w

o G

I l

l

, ' T o LA f E

- NN NI c.

AL R R R 2 GAC R R R R R R R R R R 1

7 4

d

'IT L 2

t I

) n e

F 1 t L ( m 1 E e r

1 NK U i U NC / A u U

e AE M S M M M M M M M M / M N

M q l GEC R e

e

- c M

I n

a l

l i

e vr 7-N r r

o S

u 3 N o t h

- t a t i

4 r a c w c

E o i ) )

t a

i d 5 s n L

B c d

n n

I 4

4 l e o A r i I p i t

N T o d n ,

u c n

t n n o 4 o n i

a c I o i 4 co u i t 4 l j g i n t i e m m n r d o i s C- v r e o

- a n r i so o R- e e t c M I o t P L h s t i P P 1 y n g n a so r P r S i n o c r o ( e t N t e

a i

l c

o o

i i

t s

o i

d I

n P

h c

t o

c e

t t

c e

e l

s e

t W

a r u

s e i E

x i

t g

n d

e m

r M R P n t t e n e s e a o

- b u o i D n g e r c f w r w D a n r o i r .

S i S e h a P C d ee l o o t l r C ( n pg e

N v e

l F

t m

e t

c e

i b

s t

i m i a

c t u

a e

r d R-e e

g n

s e

I l

et a

r s u bu L t P i t r i a a o M r t e

S y

D e

h L s n

e p

s s W R Mu v n

o tt e a c e t n e p e o I n t

a w t n

l t v c e r n d c a d a i l A T P u i o l kl W e e

a c w a S W m e cp l

o i S V e e l r s e r

e F

o t

su v v o t t e s hd z y C t k l l r n n h e ced i c a a t e e I V i r a

o m o V V n m m n r

u r c i l o n n 'e r l e i o A L B y y C i i r o et s l t t t a a o t nx s

e i

x ca N N N e e N t t C c ne r u e I I I f f I n n - a a P V O O a a O o o n e hn A R I P P S S P C C I R C a

. . . . . . . . . . . . . )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 (

,M ey <> pm* i c :

H - UV u "

3Ong

~ r. o

m

.se n

~'

TABLE 3.3-13' (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 31'-' With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE' requirement, operation of this -system may continue provided grab-samples are taken and analyzed at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . With both channels inoperable, operation'may.

continue provided grab samples are taken and analyzed at least once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months during degassing. operations and at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months during other operations.

ACTION 32 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels. OPERABLE requirement, effluent releases via this pathway may continue provided samples are continuously collected with auxiliary sampling equipment as required in Table 4.11-2 or sampled and analyzed once every 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

l l

l BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-64 PROPOSED WORDING l

- ___ _-_ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ = _ - _ _ - _ _ _ - _

.4

?i p ., EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 7

I SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) i

b. At least once per 31 days. and within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months after each solution volume increase of greater than or equal.to 1% of-tank volume by verifying the boron' concentration of the

. accumulator solution.

c. .

At least once per 31 days when the RCS pressure is above l 2000 psig be . verifying that power to the isolation valve.

l operator control circuit is disconnected by removal of the plug.in the lock out jack from the circuit.

d. Verifying at least once per 19 renths that each accumulator isolation valve opens automatically under each of the following conditions:

1. When the RCS pressure exceeds 2000 psig.

2. Upon receipt of a Safety Injection test signal.

4.5.1.2 Each accumulator water level and pressure alarm channel shall be-demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by the performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

b. .At least once per 18 months by the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

4.5.1.3 During normal plant cooldown and- depressurization, each accumulator discharge isolation valve [MOV-1SI-865A, B and C) shall be verified to be closed

and de-energized when RCS pressure is I reduced to 1,000 i 100 psig.

With the- accumulator pressure less than the low temperature overpressure protection setpoint the accumulator discharge isolation valves may be opened to perform accumulator discharge check valve testing.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 5-2 PROPOSED WORDING

-. s 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

BASES 3/4o5.1 ACCUMULATORS The OPERABILITY of each of the RCS accumulators ensures that a sufficient volume of borated water will be immediately forced into the reactor core through each of the cold legs in the event the RCS pressure falls below the pressure of the accumulators. This initial surge of water into the core provides the initial cooling mechanism during large RCS pipe ruptures.

The limits on accumulator volume, boron concentration and pressure ensure that the assumptions used for accumulator injection in the accident analysis are met. The limit of one hour for operation with an inoperable accumulator minimizes the time exposure of the plant to a LOCA event occurring concurrent with failure of an additional accumulator which may result in unacceptable peak cladding tcspcr5turcs.

The RCS accumulators are isolated when RCS pressure is reduced to 1000 i 100 psig to prevent borated water from being injected into the RCS during normal plant cooldown and depressurization conditions and also to prevent inadvertent overpressurization of the RCS at reduced RCS temperature. With the accumulator

, pressure reduced to less than the reactor vessel low temperature overpressure protection setpoint, the accumulator pressure cannot challenge the cold overpressure protection system or exceed the 10 CFR 50 Appendix G limits.

Therefore, the accumulator discharge isolation valves may be opened to perform the accumulator discharge check valve testing specified in the IST program.

3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of two separate and independent ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of i a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure i consideration. Either subsystem operating in conjunction with the accumulators l is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding

' temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward. In l addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.

The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensure that at a minimum, the assumptions used in the accident analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained.

The limitation for a maximum of one charging pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify all charging pumps except the required OPERABIE pump to be inoperable below 275'F provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV.

l 3/4.5.4 BORON INJECTION SYSTEM i

The OPERABILITY of the boron injection system as part of the ECCS ensures that sufficient negative reactivity is injected into the core to limit any positive i

increase in reactivity caused by RCS system cooldown. RCS cooldown can be caused by inadvertent depressurization, a loss-of-coolant accident or a steam line rupture.

The boron injection tank is required to be isolated when RCS temperature is less than 275'F to prevent a potential overpressurization due to an inadverti safety injection signal.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-1 PROPOSED WORDING -

l _ _ -

.-.t-

.. CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.2- DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS

.CQlG11. HIE 2iI QVfd!.CILE.EEAX_EJE.IEli LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION L

-3.6.2.1 Two separate and independent containment quench spray subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With one containment quench spray subsystem inoperable, restore the {

inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in.at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.2.1 Each containment quench spray subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE;

a. At least once per 31 days by:

1. Verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position; and

2. Verifying the temperature of the borated water in the refueling water storage tank is within the limits shown on Figure 3.6-1.

b. By verifying, that on a recirculation flow, each pump I develops a discharge pressure of greater than or equal to 153 psig at a flow of 2 1550 gpm when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-11 PROPOSED WORDING

+,

N~- . PLkNT SYSTEMS MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7'.1.5 Each main steam line isolation valve shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: -MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

MODES.1 - With one main steam line isolation valve inoperable but open, POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable valve is restored to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ; Otherwise, be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

MODES 2 - With one main steam line isolation valve inoperable, and 3 subsequent operation in MODES 2 or 3 may proceed after: l

a. The inoperable isolation valve is restored- to OPERABLE status, or

b. The isolation valve is maintained closed; Otherwise, be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.1.5 Each main steam line isolation valve that is open shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by;

a. Part-stroke exercising the valve at least once per 92 days, and

b. Verifying full closure within 5 seconds on any closure actuation signal while in HOT STANDDY with T 2 515'F during each reactor shutdown except that verik1$ation of full closure within 5 seconds need not be determined more often than once per 92 days.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 7-10 PROPOSED WORDING

--- ____ _ _--_____---_ . 1

- ~

. REFUELING OPERATION 3/4 9.8 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND COOIANT CIRCULATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION j l

3.9.8.1 At least one residual heat removal (RHR) loop shall be in operation. j APPLICABILITY: MODE 6 ACTION:

a. With less than one residual heat removal loop in operation, except as provided below, suspend all operations involving l an increase in the reactor decay heat load or a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System. Close all containment penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

b. The residual heat removal loop may be removed from operation for up to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months per 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months period during the performance of CORE ALTERATIONS in the vicinity of the reactor pressure vessel (hot) legs.

c. The residual heat removal loop may be removed from operation for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months per 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months period during the performance of Ultrasonic In-service Inspection inside the reactor vessel nozzles provided there is at least 23 feet of water above the top of the reactor vessel flange.

d. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.9.8.1 Verify at least one residual heat removal loop is in operation and circulating reactor coolant at:

a. A flow rate 2 1000 gpm twice per shift when the Reactor Coolant System is in a reduced inventory condition *.

b. A flow rate 2 3000 gpm prior to the start of and once per hour during a reduction in the Reactor Coolant System boron concentration.

The Reactor Coolant System water level is lower than three feet below the reactor vessel flange.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 9-8 PROPOSED WORDING

s jk* ,

! - ATTACHMENT A-2' ;

Revise.:-the' Beaver ~ Valley UnitLNo. 2 Technical Specifications as

-follows:

Remove Paoes Insert Pages 3/4 1 3/4 1-10 3/4 3-57 3/4.3-57 3/4 3 3/4 3-69 3/4 5-2 3/4 5-2 B 3/4 5-1 B 3/4'5-1 3/4 9-8 3/4 9-8

~

l l

q REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CHARGING PUMP-SHUTDOWN i LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION )

l 4

'3.1.2.3 One charging pump in the boron injection flow path required by ,

Specification 3.1.2.1 or Low Head Safety Injection Pump (with an open Reactor Coolant System vent of greater than or equal to 3.14. square inches) shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency bus.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 4, 5 and 6

' ACTION:

With none of the above pumps OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until one charging pump or Low Head Safety Injection pump is restored to OPERABLE status.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.3.1 The above required charging pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying, that on recirculation flow, the pump develops a differential pres-sure of > 2437 psid when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

4.1.2.3.2 All charging pumps, except the above required charging pump, shall be demonstrated inoperable

by verifying that the control switches are placed in the PULL-TO-LOCK position and tagged within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months after entering MODE 4 from MODE 3 or prior to the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs decreasing below 325 F, whichever comes first, and at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months thereafter.

4.1.2.3.3 When the Low Head Safety Injection pump is used in _ lieu of a charg-ing pump, the Low Head Safety Injection pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

a. Verification of an OPERABLE RWST pursuant to 4.1.2.7 and 4.1.2.8

b. Verification of.an OPERABLE Low Head Safety Injection Pump pursuant l to Specification 4.5.2.b.2, l

c. Verification of an OPERABLE Low Head Safety Injection flow path from the RWST to the Reactor Coolant System once per shift, and

d. Verification that the vent is open at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .**

l l *An inoperable pump may be energized for testing provided the discharge of the I

pump has been isolated from the RCS by a closed isolation valve with power removed from the valve operator, or by a manual isolation valve ccurc' in l the closed cosition. IOc Ke2

- Except when the vent path is provided with a valve which is locked or provided with remote position indication, or sealed, or otherwise secured in the open position, then verify these valves cpen at least once per 7 days.

l l

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 1-10 fR0f0SEb

^ .

(=* J.- INSTRUMENTAL 10N'

p .-

ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.3.8 The accident monitoring instrumentation chanhels shown in Table 3.3.11 i shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION i

a. With.the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring instrumentation channels less than the Total Number of Channels shown in Table 3.3.11, either ,

restore the inoperable chann'el(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be l

-in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months except for the PORV(s)

, which may be isolated in accordance with Specification 3.4.11.Q.gegfg l !

b. Wi h the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring instrumentation channels less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements of Table 3.3.11, I either restore the inoperable channel (s) to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months !

or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . ,

j

c. With the number of OPERABLE Reactor Vessel Level Indication System channels <

1ess than the required number of channels or'the Minimum Channels OPERABLE l requirement, restore the inoperable channel (s) to OPERABLE status as per !

ACTION a or b above as applicable if repair is not feasible, prepare and l submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 ;

within 14 days that provides action taken, cause of the inoperability, and l the plans and schedule for restoring the channels to OPERABLE status. !

This ACTION statement applies to the first fuel cycle only.

d. With the number of OPERABLE Reactor Coolant System Subcooling Margin Monitor instrumentation channels less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE '

requirements of Table 3.3.11, either restore the inoperable channel (s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in a least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next '

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

e. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable. t SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.3.8 Each accident monitoring instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the CHANNEL CHECK and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-7. i BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 3-57

$0f0.SD

TABLE 3.3-13 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS

'~

ACTION 27 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, the contents of the tank may be released to the environment provided that prior to initiating the release:

1. At least two independent samples of the tank's content are analyzed, and at least two technically qualified members of the Facility Staff independently verify the release rate calculations and discharge valve lineup, or

2. Initiate continuous monitoring with a comparable alternate monitoring channel. Surveillance requirements applicable

, to the inoperable channel shall apply to the comparable alternate monitoring channel when used to satisfy this technical specification requirement.

Otherwise, suspend releases of radioactive effluents via this pathway.

ACTION 28 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, effluent releases via this pathway may continue provided the flow rate is estimated at least once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

ACTION 29 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, effluent releases via I this pathway may continue provided:

1. Grab samples are taken at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months and these samples are analyzed for gross activity within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , or

2. Initiate continuous monitoring with a corigartble alternate

,. monitoring channel. Surveillance requirements applicable to the inoperable channel shall apply to the comparable alternate monitoring channel when used to satisfy this technical specification requirement.

ACTION 3'O - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by Mini-mum Channels OPERABLE requirement, immediately suspend PURGING of Reactor Containment via this pathway.

ACTION 31 -

VitAtbg_MUR'Channe4 the MINI number of channels ABLE requiremen OPERABLE peratTon of this one less than yre pgg 9 system 4may continue rov 1 tr-virm a1,are obtained every hours nd-analyr in the following'2Fhours dQ

-ad 1 lons to a tank.

. 1 ACTION 32 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, effluent releases via this pathway may continue provided samples are continuously collected with auxiliary sampling equipment as required in Table 4.11-2 or sampled and analyzed once every 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

t ACTION 35 - (This ACTION is not used) ,

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 3-69 f/20fGSEb l

37 '

4

\

' EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE RE001REMENTS (Continuedl

c. At least once per 31 days when the RCS pressure is above 1000 psig by ver'.fying that power to the isolation valve operator control circuit is disconnected by removal of the plug in the lockoutjackfromthecircuit.

d. At least once per 18 months by verifying that each accumulator isolation valve opens automatically under each of the following conditions:

1) When an actual or a simulated RCS pressure signal-exceeds the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure Block of Safety Injection)

Setpoint, and

2) Upori receipt of a Safety Injection test signal. ._

4. 5.1. 2 Each accumulator water level and pressure alarm channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by the performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

b. At least once per 18 months by the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

4.5.1.3 During normal plant.cocidown and depressurization, each accumulator dischajreisolationvalve2 closed and de-energized when RCS pressure is reduced to 1,000 1 100 psig.

SIS-MOV865A,BandCshallbeverifiedtobe

.l' UtY /be OCC umulabW jitSSvte. /ess jkan Wle fou) }emfe/*abart 0(1ed fv'eCSu et jry/ec /r On seffol d YNe sc c um u lobe &s'c da e

/Selo be b., ValVe5 ntay be ofene hwj b/m a c c um u /a.bic N' sC kaq t C]tec Y Va /t/e lEsbn ,

i i

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 5-2 _ _- !

fk0f85EY)

~

j l

6 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

BASES

~

1 3/4.5.1 ACCUMULAT0i1 The OPERABILITY of each of the RCS accumulators ensures that a suffi-cient volume of borated water will be immediately forced into the reactor

r. ore through each of the cold legs in the event the RCS pressure falls below the pressure of the accumulators. This initial surge of water into the core provides the initial cooling mechanism during large RCS pipe ruptures.

The limits on accumulator volume, boron concentration and pressure ensure that the assumptions used for accumulator injection in the accident analysis are met.

1 The limit of one hour for oparation with an inoperable accumulator minimizes the time exposure of the plant to a LOCA event occurring concurrent with failure of an additional accumulator which may result in unacceptable peak cladcing temperatures.

The RCS accumulators are isolated when RCS pressure is reduced to 1000 +

100 psig to prevent borated water from being injected into the RCS during no? mal plant cooldown and depressurization conditions and also to prevent inadvertent overpressurization of the RCS at reduced RCS temperature. 7 /JS B f f R l 3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of two separate and independent ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one su'osystem through any single failure consider-ation. Either subsystem operating in conjunction with the accumulators is cap-able of sbpplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward. In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.

The surveillance rec,uirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensure that at a minimum, the assumptions used in the accident analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained.

The limitation for a maximum of one charging pump to be OPERABLE and the surveillance requirement to verify all charging pumps except the required OPER-ABLE pump to be inoperable below 350 F provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 B 3/4 5-1 _.

$0f05Eh ~

l

___ _ - - _ - - - - - - - )

i KEFUELING OPERATIONS I 3/4 9.8 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION

_ LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.8.1 At least one residual heat removal (RHR) loop shall be OPERABLE and in operation.*

APPLICABILITY: MODE 6.

ACTION:

a. With less than one residual heat removal loop in operation, except as provided M below, suspend all operations involving an increase in l the reactor decay heat load or a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System. Close all containment penetrations pro-viding direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

b. The residual heat removal loop may be removed from operation for up to I hour per 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months period during the performance of CORE ALTERATIONS in the vicinity of the reactor pressure vessel hot legs,

c. The residual heat removal loop may be removed from operation for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months per 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months period during the performance of Ultrasonic In-service Inspection inside the reactor vessel nozzles provided there is at least 23 feet of water above the top of the reactor vessel flange.

d. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

_ SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.9. 1/[ east pife r/sidual' heat r/movai loop sh'all be ver'ified to'be .i'n /

op at'#n phd circulating reactor coolant'at a flow rate cf /> 3000 gpm at' least nce erj4 hourg wheri making bo'ron dilution changes and > 10D0 gpm for decay j hej removalphen,the geactor' Coolant System isvin the d7ained down condition !

1thjn' thef loopsI i

-usur i

/ ! 1

I !

Py#ior t up to# 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months o per initiai 2-hourcriticality

/ peri'od during/th'e thfperformance RHR loo'p may of CORC be /emov$d ALTERATIONS tin frbm op

/the . vicinity,of the reactor vessel bot legs. j BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 9-8 PR opcs ED

~

a

-4 ,

INSERT _1 4.9.8.1 Verify at least one residual heat removal loop is in operation and circulating reactor coolant at:

a. A flow rate 2 1000 gpm twice per shift when the Reactor Coolant System is in a reduced inventory condition *. !

l

b. A flow rate 2 3000 gpm prior to the start of and once per I hour during a reduction in the Reactor Coolant System boron concentration.

The Reactor Coolant system water level is lower than three feet below the reactor vessel flange.

INSERT 2 With the accumulator pressure reduced to less than the reactor vessel low temperature overpressure protection setpoint, the accumulator pressure cannot challenge the cold overpressure protection system or exceed the 10 CFR 50 Appendix G limits. Therefore, the accumulator discharge isolation valves may be opened to perform the accumulator discharge check valve testing specified in the IST program.

INSERT 3 With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, operation of this system may continue provided grab samples are taken and analyzed at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . With both channels inoperable, operation may continue provided grab samples are taken and analyzed at least once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months during degassing operations and at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months during other operations.

i

ATTACHMENT H Safety Analysis Beaver Valley Power Station Proposed Technical Specification Change BV-1 Change No. 165 BV-2 Chance No. 24 Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would revise applicable BV-1 and BV-2 specifications to correct errors and provide consistency between the units. Tnese changes are described as follows:

1) BV-1 surveillance requirement 4.1.2.3.2, 4.1.2.3.3.c and note

have been revised to reflect the BV-2 requirements which include a change to BV-2 4.1.2.3.3.c to provide for a Low Head Safety Injection (LHSI) flow path from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) once per shift. This is consistent with the guidance provided in Generic Letter 88-17.

The

note applicable to BV-1 is no longer required and has been deleted. The

note applicable to BV-2 specification 4.1.2.3.2 has been added to the BV-1 specification to allow testing following maintenance. These changes will allow operational flexibility when maintenance is to be performed on equipment while satisfying the required flow path requirements and does not affect the FSAR or any regulatory basis.

2) BV-1 Table 4.3-6 notation (2) and Table 4.3-7 notation (1) have been revised to reference surveillance requirement 4.7.1.2.c.

These are editorial changes to reflect the revised surveillance requirement numbering incorporated in the auxiliary feedwater specifications and will not affect the FSAR or any regulatory basis.

3) BV-2 specification 3.3.3.8 Action a has been corrected by changing the action statement referenced from 3.4.11.a to 3.4.11. Specification 3.4.11 Action statements b and c also apply to inoperable PORV's not just Action a. This is an editorial change and does not affect the FSAR or any regulatory basis.

4) Table 3.3-13 Action 31 for both BV-1 and BV-2 has been revised to reflect Action 50 stated in Draft Revision 5 of the Standard Technical Specifications (STS). Our current action statement requires grab sampling when one channel of the Waste Gas Decay Tank Oxygen Monitor is inoperable and does not provide any I guidance when two channels are inoperable. The STS Action statement provides separate requirements when one channel is j inoperable and also when both channels are inoperable.

Incorporating tne STS Action statement will reduce the sampling required by our current action statement when only one channel is inoperable and does not affect the FSAR or any regulatory basis.

1

e.

S

. 'AhTACHMENTB (CONTINUED)

5) An

note has been added to surveillance requirement 4.5.1.3 to allow opening the accumulator discharge isolation valves when RCS )

pressure is less than 1000 i 100 psig. Bases 3/4.5.1 '

Accumulators has also been revised to provide the reason for opening the valves. The accumulator discharge isolation valves must be opened to perform accumulator discharge check valve testing in accordance with the IST program. This testing will be performed when the accumulator pressure is less than the reactor vessel low temperature overpressure protection setpoint to ensure ,

the accumulator pressure will not challenge the cold overpressure protection system or exceed the 10 CFR 50 Appendix G limits.

Therefore, this change vill not affect the FSAR or any regulatory basis.

6) BV-1 surveillance requirement 4.6.2.1.b has been revised to conform with the BV-2 wording for quench spray pump testing. The Inservice Test (IST) program has been updated to the 1983 ASME Section XI code which requires pump testing quarterly. The monthly quench spray pump tests described in UFSAR Section 6.4.2 were based on the old ASME code edition. The proposed changes will not affect the FSAR accident analysis or any regulatory basis, however, UFSAR Section 6.4.2 will be revised to specify testing the quench spray pumps in accordance with ASME Section XI.

7) BV-1 specification 3.7.1.5 Action statements have been revised to conform with the BV-2 Action statements. The Mode 1 Action statement has been revised to address an inoperable but open Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) and requires restoration of the valve to operable status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months or be in Hot Shutdown within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . The Mode 2 and 3 Action statement has been revised to remove applicability to Mode 1 since the above action statement applies to Mode 1. These changes will reduce the confusion when determining the required action to take. This is consistent with the BV-2 Technical Specifications and the STS and will not affect the FSAR or any regulatory basis.

8) Surveillance requirement 4.9.B.1 for both units has been separated into items a and b to clarify the required surveillance frequencies. For item a the RHR flow rate will be verified 2 1000 gpm twice per shift when the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) is drained to a level lower than three feet below the reactor vessel flange. For item b the RHR flow rate will be verified 2 3000 gpm before the start of and once per hour during a reduction in RCS boration concentration. The surveillance frequency for item a is consistent with our commitment provided in our response to Generic Letter 88-17. The surveillance frequency for item b was corrected to conform with the frequency provided in specification 3.1.1.3. The BV-2

note has been deleted since this note allowed removal of the operating RHR loop from service during core alterations prior to initial criticality and no longer applies. These changes provide clarification and correct errors and will not affect the FSAR accident analysis or any regulatory basis.

.o. , '

., ,. o sf ATTACHMENT B i (CONTINUED)

The proposed specifications have been. updated ..to clarify and

-improve the. understanding- of- the requirements. _ These changes are.

consistent with .the'. regulations and the UFSAR accident' analysis and will not reduce the safety of the plant.

~l a__-_--_____-----_-_-------___-_---

e.

O' , ' ATTACHMENT C No Significant Hazard Evaluation Beaver Valley Power Station Proposed Technical Specification Change BV-1 Change No. 165 BV-2 Chance No. 24 Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists in accordance with 10 CFR 50.92(c). A preposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed changes do not involve a significant hazard consideration because:

1) Surveillance requirement 4.1.2.3.3.c for BV-1 has been changed to reflect the BV-2 requirements. The proposed change will require a flow path from the RWST to the RCS and is consistent with the guidance provided in Generic Letter 88-17. The

note applicable to BV-1 is no longer required and has been deleted. The

note applicable to BV-2 specification 4.1.2.3.2 has been added to the BV-1 specification to allow testing following maintenance. These changes provide consistency between the two units and with specification 4.1.2.1 and with the intent of the technical specification requirements for the low temperature overpressure protection system.

BV-1 Table 4.3-6 otation (2) and Table 4.3-7 notation (1) have been revised to reference surveillance requirement 4.7.1.2.c.

These are editorial changes to reflect the revised surveillance requirement numbering incorporated in the auxiliary feedwater specifications.

BV-2 specification 3.3.3.8 Action a has been corrected by changing the action statement referenced from 3.4.11.a to 3.4.11. Specification 3.4.11 Action statements b and c also apply to inoperable PORV's not just Action a. This is an editorial change.

Table 3.3-13 Action 31 has been revised for both units to reflect i Action 50 in the Draft Revision 5 version of the STS. Our I current action statement applies to the Waste Gas Decay Tank Oxygen Monitor and requires grab sampling when one channel is inoperable and does not address two inoperable channels. The STS Action statement provides guidance for one channel inoperable and also for two channels inoperable. The STS Action statement will reduce unnecessarily restrictive sampling requirements imposed by the current action statement.

l

Y . ' ATTACHMENT C (CONTINUED)

'An

note added to surveillance requirement 4.5.1.3 will allow opening the accumulator discharge isolation valves to' perform accumulator discharge check valve testing in accordance with the IST program. -This testing will be performed when the accumulator pressure is less than the reactor vessel low . temperature overpressure protection setpoint. This ensures the accumulator pressure will not challenge- the cold overpressure protection system or exceed the limits of 10 CFR 50 Appendix G.

The Inservice Test (IST) program has been updated to the 1983 ASME Section XI code which requires pump testing quarterly. The monthly quench spray pump tests described in UFSAR'Section 6.4.2 were based on the old ASME code edition. The proposed change will bring the BV-1 quench spray pump testing specified in surveillance requirement 4.6.2.1.b into conformance with the BV-2 i requirements. The proposed changes will not affect the FSAR {

accident analysis or any regulatory basis, however, UFSAR Section l 6.4.2 will be revised to specify testing the quench spray pumps in accordance with ASME Section XI.

- The BV-1 Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Action statements of specification 3.7.1.5 have been revised to reflect the BV-2 requirements and are consistent with the STS.

Surveillance requirement 4.9.8.1 for both units has been separated into items a and b to clarify the required surveillance frequencies. For item a the RHR flow rate will be verified twice per shift when the RCS is drained'to a level lower than three feet below the reactor vessel flange. This is consistent with our commitment. provided in our response to Generic Letter 88-17.

For item b the ' surveillance frequency has been corrected to conform with specification 3.1.1.3. The BV-2

note has been deleted since this note allowed removal of the operating RHR loop from- service during core alterations prior to initial criticality and no longer applies.

These changes are consistent with the accident analysis assumptions and will not increase the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated.

2) The proposed changes provide clarification and consistency between the two units for surveillance test requirements and frequency. These changes will not reduce the safety of the plant since they are consistent with the FSAR accident analysis and will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from those described in the FSAR.

3) These changes are consistent with the accepted criteria for operating, testing and verification of system operability. The proposed changes will not affect any of the plant setpoints or margins to the accident analysis limits or the technical specification limits and will not reduce the margin of safety as a result of these changes.

Therefore, based on the above considerations, implementation of )

the proposed changes will not involve a significant hazard. j i

Y i

M. -

ATTACIIMENT D UFSAR Change Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 Proposed Technical Specification Chancie No. 165

lt i , _n l .

i f . BVPS-1-UPDATED FSAR Rev. 0 (1/82) decrease the capacity of the quench spray during operation. A

[ . stainless steel strainer is ~ provided in the suction and each quench pump. .

/

W a tt.0 GAC The quench . spray pumps shall be flow tested)atidtb ASdf SecT ica:;t sncc

..thly. A deviation from flow rates and discharge pressures, as previously determined during preoperational tests, will indicate either. particulate buildup in ' the strainers or clogging of the test- spray nozzles (smallest size nozzles orifice) in the refueling water storage tank. Strainers and test nozzles . are easily removable if cleaning is required. The strainers located on the discharge of the quench spray pumps have a 4 mesh per inch (0.063 ' inch. diameter wire) outer basket and.a 20 mesh per inch (0.014 inch diameter wire) inner basket.

Recirculation Spray Subsystem Each of the four recirculation spray subsystems, shown in Figure 6.4-1,. consists of a recirculation pump and a recirculation spray cooler and feeds a 180' degree spray ring header located approximately 80 ft above the operating floor.

, Component design data for the recirculation spray subsystems is

! given in Table 6.4-2 The recirculation spray pumps become effective automatically 5 minutes. after receipt of a containment isolation phase B signal (Section 7.5). The total delay of 300 seconds. in the recirculation spray effective time was selected

( to provide maximum containment pressures during core reflooding

.after a cold leg DER. For the recirculation spray subsystem, from approximately 65 to 83 seconds. is required to fill the f system piping and deliver rated flow. Timers installed in the recirculation spray pump start circuit are set at approximately 210 seconds. Analysis has shown that 60 seconds, changes in the times at which the quench spray system and/or recirculation spray system are taken to be effective have little or no effect on the containment depressurization time or the ability to. remain depressurized.

Two of the recirculation spray ring headers have a radius of 49 ft-3 inches. The other two have a radius of 50 ft-3 inches.

Each of the headers has 195 fittings for spray nozzles, with each fitting having two spray nozzles. Ninety-eight of these fittings have two Spraying Systems Co. type 1/2-B60 nozzles. These nozzles are similar to the quench spray 1/2-B40 nozzles in having a relatively fine spray, but have a larger orifice. One nozzle per fitting is positioned to spray vertically downward while the other is positioned to spray horizontally toward the center of the containment.

The remaining 97 fittings are equipped with one Spraying Systems Co. type 1/2-B60 nozzle and one Spraying Systems Co. type 1713A nozzle. The 1/2B-60 nozzle is positioned to spray horizontally toward the center of the containment while the 1713A nozzles are positioned to spray upward at an angle of 4b degrees to the 1

l l

6.4-7

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ - -_--_ - - _ - _ __ _ _

ML20246C713

Text

Navigation menu

Search