ML20154D638
| ML20154D638 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 09/30/1998 |
| From: | Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20154D635 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9810070282 | |
| Download: ML20154D638 (1) | |
Text
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DPR-66 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASE'S 3/4.4.6.2 OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE (Continued)
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (Continued) affect the probability of such an event.
The safety analysis for an event resulting in steam discharge to the atmosphere conservatively assumes a 10 gpm primary-to-secondary LEAKAGE.
With the exception described below for the main steamline break (MSLB) analyzed in support of voltage-based steam generator tube repair criteria.
Primary-to-secondary LEAKAGE is a
factor in the dose releases outside containment resulting from a steamline break (SLB) accident.
To a lesser extent, other accidents or transients involve secondary steam release to the atmosphere, such as a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR).
The leakage contaminates the secondary fluid.
The MSLB is more limiting for site radiation releaces.
The primary-to-secondary LEAKAGE assumed in the safety analysis for the MSLB accident is described in UFSAR Section 14.2.5.
The radiological consequences of a MSLB outside of containment was reanalyzed in support of the tube support plate voltage-based repair criteria stated in SR 4.4.5.4.a.10.
For this analysis, the thyroid dose was maximized at 10% of the 10 CFR Part 100 guideline of 300 rem for the c'o-incident iodine spike case.
RCS leakage was based on projection rather than on technical specification leakage limits.
The analysis indicated that offsite doses would remain within regulatory criteria with the assumed primary-to-secondary leakage (described in UFSAR Section 14.2.5) should steam generator tubes fail due to the depressurization associated with a MSLB.
A similar analysis was performed using a control room thyroid dose of 30 rem as the criterion.
The control room was assumed to be manually isolated and pressurized at T=30 minutes for a period of one
- hour, at which time filtered emergency intake would be automatically started.
The control room would be purged with fresh air at T=8 hours following release cessation.
The analysis indicated that control room doses would remain within regulatory criteria with the assumed primary-to-secondary leakage (described in UFSAR Section 14.2.5) should steam generator tubes fail due to the depressurization associated with a MSLB.
ISQ RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:
a.
Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE No pressure boundary LEAKAGE is allowed, being indicative of material deterioration.
LEAKAGE of this type is BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-3f Amendment No.
9810070282 980930 PDR ADOCK 05000334 p
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