Text

Proposed Tech Specs Re Typed Paged for Change Request 213 & 80
	ML20141K537
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Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	05/23/1997
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l ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.

l FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-66 DOCKET NO. 50-334 Replace the following pages of Appendix A, Technical Specifications, with the enclosed pages as indicated.

The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

l Remove Insert Index Page XII Index Page XII 3/4 3-19a 3/4 3-19a 3/4 3-27a 3/4 3-27a I

3/4 3-46 3/4 3-46 3/4 3-52 3/4 3-52 3/4 7-5 3/4 7-5 3/4 7-6 3/4 7-6 3/4 7-6a B 3/4 7-2 B 3/4 7-2 l

B 3/4 7-2a B 3/4 7-2b B 3/4 7-2c l

B 3/4 7-2d j

B 3/4 7-2e B 3/4 7-2f B 3/4 7-2g l

B 3/4 7-2h B 3/4 7-21 l

l i

l

.i 9705290203 970523 PDR ADOCK 05000334 p

PDR l

~ _.

~.

DPR-66 I

INDEX

~

BASES SECTION PAGE 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE 3/4.7.1.1 Safety Va1ves...........................

B 3/4 7-1 3/4.7.1.2 Auxiliary Feedwater System..............

B 3/4 7-2 l

3/4.7.1.3 Primary Plant Demineralized Water.......

B 3/4 7-21 l

3/4.7.1.4 Activity................................

B 3/4 7-3 3/4.7.1.5 Main Steam Line Isolation Valves........

B 3/4 7-3 3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE i

LIMITATION..............................

B 3/4 7-4 3/4.7.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM..........

B 3/4 7-4 j

3/4.7.4 RIVER WATER SYSTEM......................

B 3/4 7-4 3/4.7.5 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK......................

B 3/4 7-4 3/4.7.6 FLOOD PROTECTION........................

B 3/4 7-4 3/4.7.7 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY HABITABILITY SYSTEM..................................

B 3/4 7-5 3/4.7.8 SUPPLEMENTAL LEAK COLLECTION AND RELEASE SYSTEM..........................

B 3/4 7-5 3/4.7.9 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION.............

B 3/4 7-5 3/4.7.12 SNUBBERS................................

B 3/4 7-6 3/4.7.13 AUXILIARY RIVER WATER SYSTEM............

B 3/4 7-7 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.1 AND 3/4.8.2 A.C.

SOURCES, D.C.

SOURCES-AND ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS.......

B 3/4 8-1 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION.....................

B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION.........................

B 3/4 9-1 BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 XII Amendment No.

k TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

DPR-66

i ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM TOTAL NO.

CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNET,dii TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION 7.

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER i

a.

Steam Gen. Water Level-Low-Low (Loop Stop valves open)

{

1.

Start Turbine Driven 3/sta. gen.

2/sta.

2/sta. gen.

1, 2,

3 14 Pump gen. any stm. gen.

ii. Start Motor 3/sta. gen.

2/sta.

2/sta. gen.

1, 2,

4 14 Driven Pumps

-any 2 sta.

gen. any 2 gen.

stm. gen.

i b.

Undervoltage-KCP (Start (3)-1/ bus 2

2 1-14 Turbine Driven Pump) c.

S.I.

(Start All Auxiliary See 1 above (all S.I.

initiating functions and requirements)

Feedwater Pumps) d.

Emergency Bus Undervoltage 1/ bus 1

1 1,

2, 3

18 (Start Motor Driven Pumps) t

e. Trip of Main Feedwater 1/ pump 1

1 1,

2, 3

18 Pumps (Start Motor Driven Pumps) i i

i i

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-19a Amendment No.

i

DPR-66 TABLE 3.3-5 (Continued)_

i ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIMES 1

INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS

11. Steam Generator Water Level-Low-Low a.

Motor-driven Auxiliary 60.0 Feedwater Pumps **

l b.

Turbine-driven Auxiliary 60.0 Feedwater Pumps ***

12. Undervoltaae RCP l

a.

Turbine-driven Auxiliary 60.0 Feedwater Pumps

13. Emercency Bus Undervoltaae a.

Motor-driven Auxiliary 60.0 Feedwater Pumps

14. Trio of Main Feedwater Pumos a.

Motor-driven Auxiliary 60.0 Feedwater Pumps NOTE:

Response time for Auxiliary Feedwater 60.0 l

Pumps on all S.I.

signal starts on 2/3 any Steam Generator on 2/3 in 2/3 Steam Generators l

I i

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-27a Amendment No.

i

~

TABLE 4.3-6 DPR-66 I

REMOTE SHUTDOWE PANEL MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS CHANNEL CHANNEL INSTRUMENT CHECK CALIBRATION I

1.

Intermediate Range Nuclear Flux M

N.A.

2.

Intermediate Range Startup Rate M

N.A.

l 3.

Source Range Nuclear Flux (1)

M (4)

N.A.

4.

Source Range Startup Rate (1)

M (4)

N.A.

5.

Reactor Coolant Temperature - Hot Leg M

R

[

6.

Reactor Coolant Temperature - Cold Leg M

R 7.

Pressurizer Pressure M

R 8.

Pressurizer Level M

R 9.

Steam Generator Pressure M

R

)

10.

Steam Generator Level M

R 11.

RHR Temperature - HX Outlet (3)

M (5)

R 12.

Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Rate S/U (2)

R Notation i

(1) Operability required in accordance with Specification 3.3.1.1.

(2) Channel check to be performed in conjunction with Surveillance Requirement 4.7.1.2.7 l

following an extended plant outage.

(3) Operability required in accordance with Specification 3.4.1.3.

(4) Below P-6.

(5) Channel check to be performed in conjunction with Surveillance Requirement 4.4.1.3.1.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-46 Amendment No.

(next page is 3/4 3-49) i

TABLE 4.3-7 DPR-66 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS CHANNEL CHANNEL CHECK CALIBRATION 1.

Pressurizer Water Level M

R N

2.

Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Rate S/U R

3.

Reactor Coolant System Subcooling Margin M

R 4.

Deleted 5.

PORV Limit Switch Position Indicator M

R 6.

PORV Block Valve Liv.it Switch Position' Indicator M

R 7.

Safety Valve Acoustical Detector Position Indicator M

R

{

8.

Deleted 9.

Deleted

[

10.

Containment Sump Wide-Range Water Level M

R

(

11.

Containment Wide-Rant;c Pressure N/A R

12.

In-Core Thermocouples (Core-Exit Thermocouples)

M R

1 13.

Reactor Vessel Level Indicating System M

R 1

i t

(1)

Channel check to be performed in conjunction with Surveillance Requirement 4.7.1.2.7 following l f

~

an extended plant outage.

A BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-52 Amendment No.

I DPR-66 PLANT SYSTEMS AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM l

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.2 Three Auxiliary trains shall be OPERABLE and consistofthefollowing:gedwater(AFW) a.

One motor driven AFW pump with a flow path from WT-TK-10 to l

each feedwater injection header via the train "A"

supply header.

I b.

One motor driven AFW pump with a flow path from WT-TK-10 to each feedwater injection header via the train "B"

supply header.

c.

One turbine driven AFW pump capable of being powered from two steam supplies with a flow path from WT-TK-10 to each i

l-feedwater injection header via the designated train supply l

header.

d.

One feedwater injection header to each steam generator.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2,

and 3, MODE 4 when steam generator (s) is relied upon for heat removal.

ACTION:

a.

With one of the two steam supplies to the turbine driven AFW pump inoperable, restore two steam supplies to OPERABLE l

status within 7 days and within 10 days from discovery of l

failure to meet the LCO or be in HOT STANDBY within the next l

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

b.

With one feedwater injection header inoperable in MODE 1, 2,

or 3, be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

I (1) Only one AFW train (capable of providing flow to the steam generator (s) relied upon for heat removal),

which includes a motor driven pump, is required to be OPERABLE in MODE 4.

l l

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 7-5 Amendment No.

DPR-66 PLANT SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION ACTION (Continued) c.

With one AFW train inoperable in MODE 1, 2,

or 3 for reasons other than one of the two steam supplies or one feedwater injection header inoperable, realign the two AFW pumps to l

separate train supply headers within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months if both train l

supply headers are operable, and restore the AFW train to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months and within 10 days from l

discovery of failure to meet the LCO or be in HOT STANDBY within the 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the l

following6gext hours.

l d.

With two AFW trains inoperable in MODE 1,

2, or 3 for reasons other than one of the two steam supplies inoperable, be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

l l

e.

With three AFW trains inoperable in MODE 1,

2, or 3 for reasons other than one of the two steam supplies inoperable, immediately init action to restore one AFW train to OPERABLE status.gte f.

With the required AFW train inoperable in MODE 4,

immediately initiate action to restore one AFW train to OPERABLE status.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - GENERAL NOTE - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

i l

Establish and maintain constant communications between the control room and the auxiliary feed pump room while any normal AFW pump discharge valve is closed during surveillance testing.

i 1

(2) This time period may be extended for up to 90 hours0.00104 days 0.025 hours 1.488095e-4 weeks 3.4245e-5 months for the l

turbine driven AFW pump provided that the plant has not entered l

MODE 2 following a refueling outage.

(3) LCO 3.0.3 and all other LCO ACTION statements. requiring MODE changes are suspended until one AFW train is restored to OPERABLE status.

4 e

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 7-5 Amendment No.

l

DPR-66 PLANT SYSTEMS

. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 4.7.1.2.1 Verify. each AFW manual, power operated, and automatic valve in each water flow path, and in both steam supply

-flow paths to the steam turbine driven AFW pump, that is i

not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in positi in the correct position at least once per 31 days.g, is 4.7.1.2.2 Verify operability of each River Water Auxiliary Supply valve by cycling each manual River Water to Auxiliary Feedwater System valve through one complete cycle at least once per 31 days.

4.7.1.2.3

Verify, at the frequency specified in the Inservice Testing Program, on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS that the developed head of each AFW pump at the flow test point is greater than or equal to the required developed head as specified in the Inservice Testing Program.

The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry i 3 for the steam turbine driven pump testing. g MODE 4.7.1.2.4 Verify each AFW automatic valve that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, actuates to the correct position on an actual og simulated actuation signal at least once per 18 months 4.7.1.2.5 Verify each AFW pump starts automatically on an actual or sin actuation signal at' least once per 18 months.gtgd 4. 7.1. 2. 6 Cycle each power operated (excluding automatic) valve in the flow path that is r.ot testable during plant operation, through at least one complete cycle at least once per 18 months during shutdown.

4.7.1.2.7 Verify AFW flow from W2-TK-10 to the Steam Generators with the AFW valves in their normal alignment. W (4)

Reverify these requirements by a

second and independent operator.

(5)

Not required to be performed for the turbine driven AFW pump until 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after establishing the minimum required secondary side steam pressure of greater than 600 psig.

(6)

Not applicable in MODE 4.

(7)

This surveillance is required to be performed prior to entry into MODE 2 whenever the plant has been in MODES 5 or 6 for greater than 30 continuous days.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 7-6a Amendment No.

]*

DPR-66 j

' PLANT SYSTEMS BASES l

l SAFETY VALVES (Continued) q

)

U=

maximum number of inoperable safety valves per l

operating steam line i

I (109)

Power Range Neutron Flux-High Trip setpoint for (N)

=

loop operation

!l (W) 71 percent of RATED THERMAL POWER permissible by P-8

=

Satpoint for 2 loop operation with stop valves open (W) 66 percent of RATED THERMAL POWER permissible by P-8

=

Setpoint for 2

loop operation with stop valves closed Total relieving capacity of all safety valves per X

=

steam line in lbs/ hour (4,261,66C)

Maximum relieving capacity of one safety valve in Y

=

lbs/ hour (873,600) 3/4.7.1.2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM (AFW)

BACKGROUND s

The AFW System automatically supplies feedwater to the steam generators to remove decay heat from the Reactor ' Coolant System upon the loss of normal feedwater supply.

The AFW system consists of two motor driven pumps and one steam turbine. driven pump.

The pumps are equ.ipped with independent recirculation lines, to prevent pump operation against a closed system.

Each motor driven AFW pump is powered from an independent Class 1E power supply and each pump feeds' all. three steam generators.

The steam turbina driven AFW pump receives steam from two of the three main steam lines upstream of the main steam isolation valves.

Each of the steam feed lines will' supply 100 percent of the steam requiroments for the turbine l

driven AFW pump.

The steam feed lines from each of the main steam 1

lines combine to form one main header.

The main header then splits into twc.. parallel paths with one Train "A"

operated and one Train "B"

operated isolation valve on each pathway.

These two parallel paths then i combine into one header which supplies the turbine driven AFW pump.

j 1

The flow path from the domineralized water storage tank (WT-TK-10) to the steam generators consists of individual supply lines to each of the three AFW' pumps.

Each motor driven AFW pump has an individual line that connects to its train related supply header.

In addition, each motor driven AFW pump has the ability to be aligned to the opposite train header.

The turbine driven pump has BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-2 Amendment No.

-. ~ -. _ -

. - _ ~ _ _..-.--

DPR-66 P1 ANT SYSTEMS k

BASES 1

j 3/4.7.1.2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM (AFW) i BACKGROUND (Continued) i j

an individual line that can be aligned to either the Train "A" or "B"

j supply header as necessary.

Both the Train "A"

and "B"

supply headers each contain three normally open remotely operated valves arranged in parallel.

Each of these valves then provides a flow path to ona of the three common feedwater injection headers.

Each of the

]

feedwater injection headers then supplies its designated steam i

genera. tor via the normal feedwater header downstream of the feedwater

}

isolai.lon valves.

The steam generators function as a heat sink for core decay Seat.

The heat load is dissipated by releasing steam to j

the atmosphere from the steam generators via the main steam safety valves (MSSVs) or atmospheric dump valves (ADVs).

If the main j

condenser is available, steam may be released via the steam dump j

valves.

The AFW System is capable of supplying feedwater to

Joe steam i

generators -during normal unit startup,

shutdown, and wt standby j

conditions.

l l

During a normal plant cooldown, one pump at full flow is sufficient i

to remove decay heat and cool the unit to residual heat removal (RHR) entry conditions.

Thus, the requirement for diversity in motive i

power sources for the AFW System is met.

4 l

The AFW System is designed to supply sufficient water to the. steam generator (s) to remove decay heat with steam generator pressure at i

the setpoint. of the MSSVs.

Subsequently, the AFW System supplies j

sufficient water to cool the unit to RHR entry conditions, with steam j

released through the ADVs.

The AFW System actuates automatically on steam generator water 1

level-low-low by the Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS).

The system also actuates on loss of offsite powcr, safety d

j injection, and trip of all operating main feedwater (MFW) pumps.

4 i

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

?

j The AFW System mitigt.2es the consequences of any event with loss of normal feedwater.

l The. design basis of the AFW System is to supply water to the steam j

generator to remove decay heat and other residual heat by delivering at least the minimum required flow rate to the stcam generators at l

pressures corresponding to the lowest steam generator safety valve set pressure plus 1%.

t I

1 BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-2u Amendment No.

1 k

i

DPR-66 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.1.2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SY2fJ4 (AFW) i APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (Continued) j In addition, the AFW System must supply enough makeup water to replace steam generator secondary inventory lost as the unit coolr to MODE 4 conditions.

Sufficient AFW flow must also be available to 4

account for flow losses such as pump recirculation and line breaks.

The limiting Design Basis Accident (DBA) for the AFW System is the small break loss of coolant accident (SBLOCA).

For a SBLOCA, the, analyses are performed assuming loss of offsite power coincident with reactor trip with a limiting single active failure of the loss of one train of Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) on a failure to start of a diesel generatur.

The diesel failure is presumed to render one motor driven AFW pump inoperable, which results in one motor driven and one turbine driven AFW pump being operable.

The AFW System design is such that it can perform its function following a feedwater line break (FWLB) between the MFW isolation valves and containment, combined with a

loss of offsite power following turbine trip, and a single active failure of the steam turbine driven AFW pump.

Sufficient flow would be delivered to the two intact steam generators following isolation of the break.

The analysis assumes a ten minute delay on AFW flow to the steam generator to allow for isolation of the break.

With one feedwater injection header inoperable, an insufficient number of steam generators are aval~ table to meet the feedline break analysis.

This anal.ysis assumes AN flow will be provided to the two remaining intact feedwater linea.

Should a feedline break occur en one of the operable feedwater headers with one feedwater injection header already inoperable, the plant could no longer meet its safety analysis.

The ESFAS automatically actuates the AFW turbine driven pump and associated power operated valves and controls when ' required to ensure an adequate feedwater supply to the steam generators der - g loss of power.

Power operated valves are provided for each AFW

_.ne to control the AFW flow to each steam generator.

LC_Q This LCO provides assurance that the AFW System will perform its design safety function to mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in overpressurization of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.

Three AFW pumps in three diverse trains are required to be OPERABLE to ensure the availability of RHR capability BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-2b Amendment No.

_~

l DPR-66 ELANT SYSTEMS l

l BASES 3/4.7.1.2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM (AFW)

LCO (Continued) l l

for.all events accompanied by a loss of offsite power and a single l

failure.

This is accomplished by powering two of the pumps from independent emergency buses.

The third AFW pump is powered by a different means, a steam driven turbine supplied with steam from a source that is not isolated by closure of the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs).

The AFW System is configured into three trains.

The AFW System is considered OPERABLE when the components and flow paths required to provide redundant AFW flow to the steam generators are OPERABLE.

This requires that the two motor driven AFW pumps be OPERABLE in two l

diverse paths, each supplying AFW to each steam generator.

The turbine driven AFW pump is required to be OPERA 3LE with redundant steam supplies from two of the three main steam lines upstream of the i

MSIVs, and shall be capable of supplying AFW to the steam generator's i

via the designated train supply header.

The

piping, valves, instrumentation, and controls in the required flow paths also are required to be OPERABLE.

The LCO is modified by a note.

Note (1) indicates that one AFW train l

(capable of providing flow to the steam generator (s) relied upon for l

heat removal), which includes a motor driven pump, is required to be l

OPEFABLE in MODE 4.

This is because of the reduced heat removal requirements and short period of time in MODE 4 during which the AFW l

may be required and the insufficien. steam available in MODE 4 to l

power the turbine driven AFW pump.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1,

2, and 3, the AFW System is required to be OPERABLE in the event that it is called upon to function when the MFW is lost.

In addition, the AFW System is required to supply enough makeup water to replace the steam generator secondary inventory lost as the unit cools to MODE 4 conditions.

In MODE 4, the AFW System may be used for heat removal via the steam generators.

In MODE 5 or 6, the steam generators are not normally used for heat removal, and the AFW System is not required.

l i

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-2c Amendment No.

l l

DPR-66 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.1.2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM (AFW) (Continued)

ACTIONS a.

If one of the two steam supplies to the turbine driven AFW train is inoperable, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE sta';us within 7 days.

The 7 day completion time is reasonable, cased on the following reasons:

1.

The redundant OPERABLE steam supply to the turbine i

driven AFW pucp; j

'2.

The availability of redundant OPERABLE motor driven AFW pumps; and 3.

The low probability of an event occurring that requires the inoperable steam supply to the turbine driven AFW Pump.

j The second completion time for ACTION statement a

establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of conditions to be inoperable during any continuous failure to meet this LCO.

The 10 day completion time provides a

limitation time allowed in this specified condition after discovery of failure to meet the LCO.

This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which ACTION statements a and c are entered concurrently.

The MQ connector between 7 days and 10 days dictates that both completion times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive must be met.

b.

With one feedwater injection header inoperable in MODES 1,

2, or 3, the unit must be placed in ? MODE.in which the LCO does not apply.

To achieve this status, tae unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and in MODE 4 within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

The allowed completion times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

In MODE 4 with one feedwater injection header inoperable, operation is allowed to continue because only two steam generators are required to remove decay heat per LCO 3.4.1.3, "RCS-SHUTDOWN."

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-2d Amendment No.

1 j

DPR-66 PLANT SYSTEMS l

1 j

BASES i-3/4.7.1.2 AUhILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM (AFW)

,1 j

ACTIONS (Continuedl i

c.

With one of the required AFW trains (pump or flow path) i j

inoperable in MODE 1, 2,

or 3 for reasons other than ACTION statements a or b, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

This condition includes the loss of l

two steam supply lines to the turbine driven AFW pump.

The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months completion time is reasonable, based on redundant capabilities afforded by the AFW System, time needed for

{j repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period, i

The second completion time for ACTION statement c

3 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any l

combination of conditions to be inoperable during any continuous failure to meet this LCO.

5 The 10 day completion time provides a

limitation time allowed in this specified condition after discovery of i

failure to meet the LCo.

This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which ACTION statements a and c j

are entered concurrently.

The AtD2 connector between 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months and 10 days dictates that both completion times apply j

simultaneously, and the more restrictive must be met.

i j-ACTION statement c is modified by a note.

Note (2) states that the completion time of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months to reach HOT SHUTDOWN j

may be extended for an additional 90 hours0.00104 days 0.025 hours 1.488095e-4 weeks 3.4245e-5 months for the turbine

}

driven AFW pump provided that the plant has not entered j

MODE 2 following a refueling outage.

This extension of the required completion time to reach MODE 4 from MODE 3 to 96

hours, allows additional time to complete any necessary repairs and/or testing of the turbine driven AFW pump prior to initiating a plant cooldown to MODE 4.

d.

When two AFW trains are inoperable in MODE 1, 2,

or 3 for reasons which may include the feedwater injection headers, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply.

To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and in MODE 4 within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

The allowed completion times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-2e Amendment No.

DPR-66 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.1.2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM (AFW) i ACTIONS (Continued)

In MODE 4 with two AFW trains inoperable, operation is allowed to continue because only one motor driven pump AFW train is required in accordance with the Note (1) that modifies the LCO.

Although not required, the unit may continue to cool down and initiate RHR.

i e.

If all three AFW trains are inoperable in MODE 1,

2, or 3 for reasons which may include the feedwater injection headers, the unit is in a seriously degraded condition with no safety related means for conducting a cooldown, and only limited means for conducting a cooldown with nonsafety related equipment.

In such a condition, the unit should not 4

be perturbed by any. action, including a power change, that might result in a trip.

The seriousness of this condition requires that action be started immediately to restore one AFW train to OPERABLE status.

ACTION statement e is modified by a Note (3) indicating that all required MODE changes or power. reductions are suspended until one AFW train is restored to OPERABLE status.

In this case, LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable because it could force the unit into a less safe condition.

f.

With one required AFW train inoperable, action must be taken to immediately restore the inoperable train to OPERABLE status.

The immediate completion time is appropriate due to the need to ensure that a safety related means of providing flow to the steam generator (s),

for the purpose of core decay heat removal, is available.

S_URVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (SR)

The Surveillance Requirements are modified by a General Note which requires that constant communications be established and maintained when any.

normal AFW pump discharge valve is closed during surveillance testing.

SR 4.7.1.2.1

-Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power-operated,- and automatic valves in the AFW System water and steam supply flow paths provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for AFW BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-2f Amendment No.

DPR-66 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.1.2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM (AFW)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (SR) (Continued) operation.

This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since they are verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing.

This SR also does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.

This SR does not require any l

testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position.

l l

The 31 day frequency is based on engineering judgment, is consistent with the procedural controls governing valve operation, and ensures l

correct valve positions.

Note (4) ensures valve position verification is reverified by a second and independent operator.

SR 4.7.1.2.2 Verifying the operability of each river water auxiliary supply valve by operating the valves through one complete cycle at least once per 31 days, ensures that an alternate water source will be available if the water volume in the demineralized water storage tank is depleted during system operation as a result of a DBA.

SR 4.7.1.2.3 Verifying that each AFW pump's developed head at the flow test point is greater than or equal to the r.equired developed head ensures that AFW pump performance has not degraded during the cycle.

The term

" required developed head" refers to the value that is assumed in the AFW safety analysis for developed head at a flow point.

This value for required developed head at a flow point is defined as the Minimum Operating Point (MOP) in the Inservice Testing Program.

Flow and differential head are normal test parameters of centrifugal pump performance required by Section XI of the ASME Code.

Because it is undesirable to introduce cold AFW into the steam generators while they are operating, this testing is normally performed on recirculation flow.

The recirculation flow rate is assumed to be a fixed value since the recirculation line flow resistance remains constant.

This test confirms one point on the pump design curve and is indicative of overall performance.

Such inservice tests confirm component OPERABILITY, trend performance, and detect incipient failures by indicating abnormal performance.

Performance of inservice testing as required in the ASME Code,Section XI, satisfies this requirement.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-2g Amendment No.

I DPR-66 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.1.2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM (AFW)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (SR) (Continued) l This SR is modified by a Note (5) indicating that the SR should be deferred until suitable test conditions are established for testing the turbine driven AFW pump.

This deferral is required because there is insufficient steam pressure to perform the test.

l i

SR 4.7.1.2.4 This SR verifies that AFW can be delivered to the appropriate steam generator in the event of any accident or transient that generates an ESFAS, by demonstrating that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on the actual or simulated actuation signal.

The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this surveillance under the conditions that apply during a unit outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the surveillance were i

performed with the reactor at power.

The 18 month Frequency is acceptable based on operating experience and the design reliability j

of the equipment.

l l

This SR is modified by a Note (6) that states the SR is not required 1

in MODE 4.

In MODE 4, the heat removal requirements would be less providing more time for operator action to manually align the flow path.

SR 4.7.1.2.5 l

This SR verifies that the AFW ptmps will start in the event of any accident or transient that generates an ESFAS by demonstrating that each AFW pump starts automatically on an actual or simulated

. actuation signal.

The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this surveillance under the conditions ' that apply during a unit outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the surveillance were performed with the reactor at power.

This SR is modified by two notes.

Note (5) indicates that the SR be deferred until suitable test conditions are established for testing the turbine driven AFW pump.

This deferral is required because there

-is insufficient steam pressure to perform the test.

Note (6) states 1-that the SR is not required in MODE 4.

In MODE 4, the heat removal requirements would be less providing more time for operator action to l

manually start the required AFW pump.

4 i

l BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-2h Amendment No.

DPR-66 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.1.2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM (AFW)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (SR) (Continued)

SR 4.7.1.2.6 Cycling each power operated valve (excluding automatic) in the flow l

path that is not testable during plant operation, ensures that the l

valves will function when required.

The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this surveillance under the conditions that apply during a unit outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the surveillance were performed with the reactor at power.

SR 4.7.1.2.7 This SR verifies that the AFW is properly aligned by verifying the flow from WT-TK-10 to the steam generators prior to entering MODE 2 l

after more than 30 continuous days in MODE 5 or 6 per Note (7).

OPERABILITY of AFW flow paths must be verified before sufficient core heat is generated that would require the operation of the AFW System during a subsequent shutdown.

The Frequency is reasonable, based on l

engineering judgment and other administrative controls that ensure I

that flow paths remain OPERABLE.

To further ensure AFW System l

alignment, flow path OPERABILITY is verified following extended outages to determine no misalignment of valves has occurred.

This SR l

ensures that the flow path from the WT-TK-10 to the steam generators is properly aligned.

3/4.7.1.3 PRIMARY PLANT DEMINERALIZED WATER l

The OPERABILITY of the PPDW storage tank with the minimum water volume ensures that sufficient water is available for cooldown of the Reactor Coolant System to less than 350 F in the event of a total loss of off-site power.

The minimum water volume is sufficient to maintain the RCS at HOT STANDBY conditions for 9 hours1.041667e-4 days 0.0025 hours 1.488095e-5 weeks 3.4245e-6 months with steam discharge to atmosphere.

I i

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-21 Amendment No.

l l

l

i l

l ATTACHMENT B-2 Unit No. 2 Technical Specification Pages i

[

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-73 DOCKET NO. 50-412 Replace the following pages of Appandix A, Technical Specifications, with the enclosed pages as ind.4.cated.

The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Insert l

l 3/4 3-20 3/4 3-20 3/4 3-27 3/4 3-27 3/4 3-36 3/4 3-36 3/4 3-37 3/4 3-37 3/4 3-54 3/4 3-54 l

3/4 3-59 3/4 3-59 3/4 7-4 3/4 7-4 l

3/4 7-5 3/4 7-5 3/4 7-Sa B 3/4 7-2 B 3/4 7-2 l

B 3/4 7-2a B 3/4 7-2b l

B 3/4 7-2c B 3/4 7-2d B 3/4 7-2e B 3/4 7-2f B 3/4 7-2g B 3/4 7-2h B 3/4 7-21 l

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

NPF-73

~

d ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM l

TOTAL NO.

CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION 7.

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (Continued) b.

Steam Gen. Water Level--

i Low-Low i

1 1

1.

Start Turbine 3/sta. gen.

2/sta.

1, 2,

3 14 i

Driven Pump gen. any gen.

(

sta. gen.

i 2.

Start Motor 3/sta. gen.

2/sta.

1, 2,

3 14 Driven Pumps gen. any gen.

2 sta. gen.

r c.

Undervoltage-RCP (Start (3 ) -1/ bus 2

2 1,

2 14 Turbine Driven Pump) f d.

Safety Injection (Start All See 1 above (all SI initiating functions and requirements)

{

Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps) e.

Trip of Main Feedwater 1/ pump 2

2 1,

2, 3

18

[

Pumps (Start Motor Driven Pumps)

[

8.

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE INTERLOCKS I

a.

Reactor Trip, 2

1 2

1, 2,

3 45 i

i P-4 b.

Pressurizer Pressure, 3

2 2

1, 2,

3 38 l

P-11 r

Low-Low Tavg, 3

2 2

1, 2,

3 38 c.

P-12

,i f

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 3-20 Amendment No.

L

TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued)

NPF-73

~

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS i

TOTAL SENSOR TRIP j

FUNCTIONAL UNIT ALLOWANCE (TA)

Z DRIFT (S)

SETPOINT ALLOWABLE VALUE i

7.

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (Continued) b.

Steam Generator Water

[

Level--Low-Low 1.

Start Turbine 11.5 10.18 1.67 1 11.5% of 1 10.7% of

(

Driven Pump narrow range narrow range instrument instrument i

span span 2.

Sthrt Motor 11.5 10.18 1.67

> 11.5% of 1 10.7% of Driven Pumps narrow range narrow range instrument instrument span span c.

Undervoltage - RCP 27.7 1.39 0.0

> 75% of

> 73% of I

(Start Turbine Driven nominal bus nominal bus Pump) voltage voltage d.

Safety Injection See Item 1.

above for all Safety Injection Trip Setpoints (Start All Auxiliary and Allowable Values.

Feedwater Pumps) e.

Trip of Main Feedwater N.A.

N.A.

4 Pumps (Start Motor-i Driven Pumps) i i

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 3-27 Amandme c No.

TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued)

NPF-73 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS CHANNEL MODES IN WHICH CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST REOUIRED 6.

LOSS OF POWER a.

4.16kV Emergency Bus 1.

Undervoltage (Trip Feed)

N.A.

R M

1, 2,

3, 4

2.

Undervoltage (Start Diesel)

N.A.

R M

1, 2,

3, 4

l t

b.

4.16kv Emergency N.A.

R M

1, 2,

3, 4

Bus (Degraded Voltage) c.

480v Emergency Bus N.A.

R M

1, 2,

3,.4 (Degraded Voltage)

(

I#I 7.

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER i

a.

Automatic Actuation Logic N.A.

N.A.

M(2) 1, 2,

3 and Actuation Relays b.

Steam-Generator Water Level-Low-Low f

1.

Start Turbine Driven S

R Q

1, 2,

3 Pump l

2.

Start Motor Driven S

R Q

1, 2,

3

(

Pumps i

(4)

Manual initiation is included in Specification 3.7.1.2.

l BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 3-36 Amendment No.

N TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued)

NPF-73 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS CHANNEL MODES IN WHICH CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST REOUIRED 7.

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (continued) c.

Undervoltage - RCP (Start S

R M

1, 2

Turbine-Driven Pump) d.

Safety Injection (Start See 1 above (all SI surveillance requirements)

All Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps) l e.

Trip of Main N.A.

N.A.

R 1,

2, 3

Feedwater Pumps (Start Motor-Driven Pumps) 8.

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE INTERLOCKS I3) a.

Reactor Trip, P-4 N.A.

N.A.

R 1,

2, 3

b.

Pressurizer Pressure, P-11 N.A.

R Q

1, 2,

3 c.

Low-Low Tavg, P-12 N.A.

R Q

1, 2,

3 4

?

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 3-37 Amendment No.

... - ~.

NPF-73 TABLE 4.3-6 REMOTE SHUTDOWN MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS CHANNEL CHANNEL INSTRUMENTS

CHECK CALIBRATION 1.

Intermediate Range Nuclear Plux M

N.A.

l 2.

Intermediate Range Startup Rate M

N.A.

3.

Source Range Nuclear Flux (2)

M(4)

N.A.

4.

Source Range Startup Rate (2)

M(4)

N.A.

5.

Reactor Coolant Temperature - Hot Leg M

R 6.

Reactor Coolant Temperature - Cold Leg M

R 7.

Pressurizer Pressure M

R 8.

Pressurizer level M

R l

l 9.

Steam Generator Pressure M

R l

10. Steam Generacor Level M

R l

11. RHR Temperature - HX Outlet (3)

M R

NI

12. Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Rate S/U R

l l

l

Emergency Shutdown Panel (1) Channel check to be performed in conjunction with surveillance l-Requirement 4.7.1.2.7 following an extended plant outage.

l (2) Operability required in accordance with Specification 3.3.1.1.

l (3) Operability required in accordance with Specification 3.4.1.3.

l l

(4) Below P-6.

I e

EEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 3-54 Amendment No.

l l

NPF-73 TABLE 4.3-7 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS CHANNEL CHANNEL INSTRUMENT CHECK CALIBRATION 1.

Pressurizer Water Level M

R 2.

Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Rate S/U*

R 3.

Reactor Coolant System Subcooling M

R Margin Monitor 4.

PORV Limit Switch Position M

R Indicator 5.

PORV Block Valve Limit Switch M

R Position Indicator 6.

Safety Valve Position Indicator M

R 7.

Deleted 8.

Containment Sump Wide-Range Water M

R Level 9.

Containment Wide-Range Pressure N/A R

10.

Reactor Vessel Level Indication M

R System 31.

cors Exit Thermocouples M

R Channel check to be performed in conjunction with Surveillance Requirement 4.7.1.2.7 following an extended plant outage.

l l

i BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 3-59 Amendment No.

l NPF-73 PLANT SYSTEMS AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.2 Three Auxiliary F trains shall be OPERABLE and consist of the following: ydwater (AFW) a.

One motor driven AFW pump with a flow path from TK-210 to each feedwater injection header via the train "A"

supply header.

b.

One motor driven AFW pump with a flow path from TK-210 to each feedwater injection header via the train "i3" supply header.

c.

One turbine driven AFW pump capable of being powered from two steam supplies with a flow path from TK-210 to each feedwater injection header via the designated train supply header.

d.

One feedwater injection header to each steam generator.

i APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2,

and 3, l

MODE 4 when steam generator (s) is relied upon for I

heat removal.

I ACTION:

a.-

With one of the two steam supplies to the turbine driven AFW pump inoperable, restore two steam supplies to OPERABLE status within 7 days and within 10 days fron discovery of failure to meet the LCO or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

b.

With one feedwater injection header inoperable in MODE 1, 2,

or 3, be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

(1) Only one AFW train (capable of providing flow to the steam generator (s) relied upon for heat removal),

which includes a motor driven pump, is required to be OPERABLE in MODE 4.

l i

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 7-4 Amendment No.

,m.,

=

- - - ~ <

NPF-73 PLANT. SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION ACTION (Continued) c.

With one AFW train inoperable in MODE 1, 2,

or 3 for reasons other than one of the two steam supplies or one feedwater injection header. inoperable, realign the two AFW pumps to separate train supply headers within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months if both train supply headers are operable, and restore the AFW train to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months and within 10 days from discovery of failure to meet the LCO or be in HOT STANDBY within the gext 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

d.

With two AFW trains inoperable in MODE 1,

2, or 3 for reasons other than one of the two steam supplies inoperable, be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

e.

With three AFW trains inoperable in MODE 1,

2, or 3 for reasons other than one of the two steam supplies inoperable, immediately ini action to restore one AFW train to OPERABLE status.gte f.

With the required AFW train inoperable in MODE 4,

immediately initiate action to restore one AFW train to OPERABLE status.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - GENERAL NOTE - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Establish and maintain constant communications between the control room and the auxiliary feed pump room while any normal AFW pump dischargs valve is closed during surveillance testing.

(2) This - time period may be extended for up to 90 hours0.00104 days 0.025 hours 1.488095e-4 weeks 3.4245e-5 months for the turbine driven AFW pump provided that the plant has not entered MODE 2 following a refueling outage.

(3) LCO 3.0.3 and all other LCO ACTION statements requiring MODE changes are suspended until one AFW train is restored to OPERABLE status.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 7-5 Amendment No.

i

\\

NPF-73 PLANT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 4.7.1.2.1 Verify each AFW manual, power operated, and automatic j

valve in each water flow path, and in both steam supply flow paths to the steam turbine driven AFW pump, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in posit inthecorrectpositionatleastonceper31 days.gp,is 4.7.1.2.2 Verify operability of each Service Water Auxiliary Supply valve by cycling each manual Service Water to Auxiliary l

Feedwater System valve through one complete cycle at l

least once per 31 days.

4.7.1.2.3

Verify, at the frequency specified in the Inservice Testing. Program, on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS that the developed head of each AFW pump at the flow test point is greater than or equal to the required developed head as specified in the Inservice Testing Program.

The l

provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry i 3 for the steam turbine driven pump testing. g MODE 4.7.1.2.4 Verify ~ each AFW automatic valve that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, actuates to the correct position on an actual or achadon signal at least once per 18 months. {,)sindated 4.7.1.2.5 Verify each AFW pump starts automatically on an actual or months. g g etuation signal at least once per 18 simulat i

4.7.1.2.6 Cycle each power operated (excluding automatic) valve in i

the flow path that is not testable during plant l

operation, through at least one complete cycle at least j-once per 18 months during shutdown.

r l

4.7.1.2.7-Verify AFW flow from TK-210 to the Steam Generators with l

the AFW valves in their normal alignment.(7)

(4)

Reverify these requirements by a

second and independent operator.

(5)

Not required to be performed for the turbine driven AFW pump l

until 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after establishing the minimum required secondary side steam pressure of greater than 600 psig.

(6)

Not applicable in. MODE 4.

i (7)

This surveillance is required to be performed prior to entry j

into MODE 2 whenever the plant has been in MODES 5 or 6 for j

greater than 30 continuous days.

I 1

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2-3/4 7-Sa Amendment No.

l' -

I NPF-73 PLANT SYSTEMS l

l A

BASES 3/4.7.1.1 SAFETY VALVES (Continued)

Total relieving capacity of all safety valves per steam X

=

line in lbs/ hour (4,242,375) j Maximum relieving capacity of one safety valve in Y

=

l lbs/ hour (848,475) 1 l

3/4.7.1.2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM (AFW)

BACKGROUND i

The AFW System automatically supplies feedwater to the steam generators to remove decay heat from the Reactor Coolant System upon the loss of normal feedwater supply.

The AFW system consists of two motor driven pumps and one steam turbine driven pump.

The pumps are 4

i equipped with independent recirculation lines to prevent pump operation against a closed system.

Each motor driven AFW pump is powered from an independent Class 1E power supply and each pump feeds all three steam generators.

The steam turbine driven AFW pump receives steam from at least two main steam lines upstream of the i

main steam isolation valves.

Each of the steam feed lines will i

supply 100 percent of the steam requirements for the turbine driven j

AFW pump.

The steam feed lines from each of the main steam lines contain two in-line series solenoid operated isolation valves.

j Downstream of the series isolation valves, the three lines combine to form one main header.

The main header then supplies the turbine driven AFW pump.

i The flow path from the domineralized water storage tank (TK-210) to the steam generators consists of individual supply lines to each of i

the three AFW pumps.

Each motor driven AFW pump has an individual j

line that connects to its train related supply header.

The turbine 1

driven pump has an individual line that can be aligned to either the Train "A"

or "B" supply header as necessary.

Both the Train "A"'and "B" supply headers each contain three normally open remotely operated valves arranged in parallel.

Each of these valves then provides a

=

flow path to one of the three common feedwater injection headers.

I Each of the feedwater injection headers then supplies its designated i

steam generator via the normal feedwater header downstream of the feedwater isolation valves.

The steam generators function as a heat j

sink for core decay heat.

The heat load is dissipated by releasing steam to the atmosphere from the steam generators via the main steam i

safety valves (MSSVs) or atmospheric dump valves (ADVs).

If the main condenser is available, steam may be released via the steam dump valves.

4 f

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-2 Amendment No.

n - -..

NPF-73 PLANT SYSTEMS i

BASES l

j-3/4.7.1.2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM (AFW) i j

BACKGROUND (Continued)

The AFW System is capable of supplying feedwater to the steam j

generc. tors during normal unit startup,

shutdown, and hot standby J

conditions.

During a normal plant cooldown, one pump at full flow is sufficient to remove decay heat and cool the unit to residual heat removal (RHR) entry conditions.

Thus, the requirement for diversity in motive j

power sources for the AFW System is met.

i The AFW System is designed to supply sufficient water to the steam generator (s) to remove decay heat with steam generator pressure at

.j the setpoint of the MSSVs.

Subsequently, the AFW System supplies i

sufficient water to cool the unit to RHR entry conditions, with steam 3

released through the ADVs.

The AFW System actuates automatically on steam generator water level-low-low by the Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System 1

(ESFAS)..The system also actuates on loss of offsite power, safety i

injection, and trip of all operating main feedwater (MFW) pumps.

i i

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES l

i j

The AFW System mitigates the consequences of any event with loss of normal feedwater.

The design basis of the AFW System is to supply water to the steam generator to remove decay heat and other residual heat by delivering at least the minimum required flow rate to the steam generators at pressures corresponding to the lowest steam generator safety valve set pressure plus it.

In addition, the AFW System must supply enough makeup water to replace steam generator secondary inventory lost as the unit cools to MODE 4 conditions.

Sufficient AFW flow must also be available to account for flow losses such as pump recirculation and line breaks.

The limiting Design 13 asis Accident (DBA) for the AFW System is the small break loss of coolant accident (SBLOCA).

For a SBLOCA, the analyses are performed assuming loss of offsite power coincident with reactor trip with a limiting single active failure of the loss of one train of Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) on a failure to start of a diesel generator.

The diesel failure is presumed to render one motor driven AFW pump inoperable,

-which results in one motor driven and one turbine driven AFW pump being operable.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-2a Amendment No.

NPF-73 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.1.2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM (AFW) l l

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (Continued)

The AFW System design is such that it can perform its function following a feedwater line break ( FWLE') between the MFW isolation l

valves and containment, combined whh a loss of offsite power i

following turbine trip, and a single active failure of the steam l

turbine driven AFW pump.

Sufficient flow would be delivered to the two intact steam generators by the AFW pump (s).

No pump runout occurs due to the cavitating venturis.

The design bases flow to the intact steam generators during a

feedwater line break can be delivered by either two motor driven, the turbine driven, or one motor driven and the turbine driven pump.

The flow is delivered without operator action to isolate the break.

With one feedwater injection header inoperable, an insufficient number of steam generators are available to meet the feedline break analysis.

This analysis assumes AFW flow will be provided to the two remaining intact feedwater lines.

Should a feedline break occur on one of the operable feedwater headers with one feedwater injection header already inoperable, the plant could no longer meet its safety analysis.

The ESFAS automatically actuates the AFW turbine driven pump and associated power operated valves and controls when required to ensure an adequate feedwater supply to the steam generators during loss of power.

Power operated valves are provided for each AFW line to control the AFW flow to each steam generator.

ISD This LCO provides assurance that the AFW System will perform its design safety function to mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in overpressurization of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.

Three AFW pumps in three diverse trains are required to be OPERABLE to ensure the ave.ilability of RHR capability for all events accompanied by a loss of offsite power and a single failure.

This is accomplished by powering two of the pumps from independent emergency buses.

The third AFW pump is powered by a differeat means, a steam driven turbine supplied with steam from a source that is not isolated by closure of the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs).

The AFW System is configured into three trains.

The AFW System is considered OPERABLE when the components and flow paths required to provide redundant AFW flow to the steam generators are OPERABLE. This BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-2b Amendment No.

NPF-73 PLANT SYSTEMS l

l BASES 1

3/4.7.1.2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM (AFW)

LCO (Continuedi requires that the two motor driven AFW pumps be OPERABLE in two j

diverse paths, each supplying AFW to each steam generator.

The turbine driven AFW pump is required to be OPERABLE with redundant l

steam supplies from at least two of the three main steam lines upstream of the MSIVs, and shall be capable of supplying AFW to the steam generators via the designated train supply header.

The piping, valves, instrumentation, and controls in the required flow paths also are required to be OPERABLE.

The LCO is modified by a note.

Note (1) indicates that one AFW train (capable of providing flow to the steam generator (s) relied upon for heat removal), which includes a motor driven pump, is required to be OPERABLE in MODE 4.

This is because of the reduced heat removal

{

requirements and short period of time in MODE 4 during which the AFW may be required and the insufficient steam available in MODE 4 to power the turbine driven AFW pump.

APPLICABILITY

]

In MODES 1,

2, and 3,

the AFW System is required to be OPERABLE in the event that it is called upon to function when the MFW is lost.

In addition, the AFW System is required to supply enough makeup water to replace the steam generator secondary inventory lost as the unit cools to MODE 4 conditions.

In MODE 4, the AFW System may be used for heat removal via the steam generators.

In MODE 5 or 6, the steam generators are not normally used for heat removal, and the AFW System is not required.

ACTIONS a.

If one of the two steam supplies to the turbine driven AFW train is inoperable, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 7 days.

The 7 day completion time is reasonable, based on the following reasons:

1.

The redundant OPERABLE steam supply to the turbine driven AFW pump; 2.

The availability of redundant OPERABLE motor driven AFW pumps; and r

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-2c Amendment No.

l

NPF-73 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.1.2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM (AFW)

ACTIONS (Continued) 3.

The low probability of an event occurring that requires the inoperable steam supply to the turbine driven AFW pump.

The second completion time for ACTION statement a

establishes a limit on the maximu.s time allowed for any combination of conditions to be inoperable during any continuous failure to meet this LCO.

The 10 day completion time provides a

limitation time allowed in this specified condition after discovery of failure to meet the LCO.

This liuit is considered reasonable for situations in which ACTION statements a and c are entered concurrently.

The AN_Q connector between 7 days and

.0 days dictates that both completion times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive must be met.

b.

With one feedwater injection header inoperable in MODES 1,

2, or 3, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply.

To achieve this status, the unit must be placea in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and in MODE 4 within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

The allowed completion times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

In MODE 4 with one feedwater injection header inoperable, operation is allowed to continue because only two steam generators are required to remove decay heat per LCO 3.4.1.3, "RCS-SHUTDOWN."

c.

With one of the required AFW trains (pump or flow path) inoperable in MODE 1, 2,

or 3 for reasons other than ACTION statements a or b, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

This condition includes the loss of two steam supply lines to the turbine driven AFW pump.

The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months completion time is reasonable, based on redundant capabilities afforded by the AFW System, time needed for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-2d Amendment No.

NPF-73

+

EMNT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.1.2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM (AFW)

ACTIONS (Continued)

The second completion time for ACTION statement c

establishes a limit on the maxinum time allowed for any combination of conditions to ba inoperable during any continuous failure to meet this LCO.

The 10 day completion time provides a

limitation time allowed in this specified condition after discovery of failure to meet the LCO.

This limit is considered i

reasonable for situations in which ACTION statements a and c are entered concurrently.

The MQ connector between 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months and 10 days dictates that both completion times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive must be met.

ACTION statement c is modified by a note.

Note (2) states that the completion time of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months to reach HOT SHUTDOWN may be extended for an additional 90 hours0.00104 days 0.025 hours 1.488095e-4 weeks 3.4245e-5 months for the turbine driven AFW pump provided that the plant has not entered MODE 2 following a refueling outage.

This extension of the required completion time to reach MODE 4 from MODE 3 to 96

)

l

hours, allows additional time to complete any necessary l

repairs and/or' testing of the turbine driven AVW pump prior l

to initiating a plant cooldown to MODE 4.

i l

d.

When two AFW trains are inoperable in MODE 1,

2, or 3 for l

reasons which may include the feedwater injection headers, l

the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply.

To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and in MODE 4 within the J

l following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

l The allowed completion times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

In MODE 4 with two AFW trains inoperable, operation is allowed to continue because only one motor driven pump AFW train is required in accordance with the Note (1) that modifies the LCO.

Although not required, the unit may continue to cool down and initiate RHR.

t I

f BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-2e Amendment No.

1 o

I NPF-73 o

j PLANT SYSTEMS i

i i

j BASES 3/4.7.1.2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM (AFW) j I

ACTIONS (Continued) e.

'If all three AFW trains are inoperable in MODE 1,

2, or 3 i

for reasons which may include the feedwater injection headers,.the unit is in a seriously degraded condition with j

no-safety related means for conducting a cooldown, and only l

limited means for conducting a cooldown with nonsafety related equipment.

In such a condition, the unit should not i

be perturbed by any action, including a power change, that i

might. result in a trip.

The seriousness of this condition

{

requires _that action be started immediately to restore one i

AFW train to OPERABLE status.

j i

ACTION statement e is modified by a Note (3) indicating that i

all required MODE changes or power reductions are suspended i

until one AFW train is restored to OPERABLE status.

In this 1

j case, LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable because it could force the l

unit into a less safe condition.

l

)

i f.

With one required AFW train inoperable, action must be taken to immediately restore the inoperable train to OPERABLE l

status.

The immediate completion time is appropriate due to i

the need to ensure that a safety related means of providing i

flow to the steam generator (s),

for the purpose of core i

decay heat removal, is available.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (SR) 1 The Surveillance Requirements are modified by a General Note which j

requires that constant communications be established and maintained when any normal AFW pump discharge valve is closed during surveillance testing.

SR 4.7.1.2 1 Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the AFW System water and steam supply flow paths provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for AFW operation.

This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since they are verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing,.or-securing.

This SR also does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.

This SR does not require any

' testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the ~ correct position.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-2f Amendment No.

i e

NPF-73 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.1.2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM (AFW)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (SR) (Continued)

The 31 day frequency is based on engineering judgment, is consistent with the procedural controls governing valve operation, and ensures l

correct valve positions.

Note (4) ensures valve position verification is reverified by a second and independent operator.

SR 4.7.1.2.2 Verifying the operability of each service water auxiliary supply valve by operating the valves through one complete cycle at least l

once per 31 days, ensures that an alternate water source will be available if the water volume in the demineralized water storage tank l

is depleted during system operation as a result of a DBA.

SR 4.7.1.2.3 Verifying that each AFW pump's developed head at the flow test point is greater than or equal to the required developed head ensures that AFW pump performance has not degraded during the cycle.

The term

" required developed head" refers to the value that is assumed in the AFW safety analysis for developed head at a flow point.

This value i

for required developed head at a flow point is defined as the Minimum Operating Point (MOP) in the Inservice Testing Program.

Flow and differential head are normal test parameters of centrifugal pump performance required by Section XI of the ASME Code.

Because it is undesirable to introduce cold AFW into the steam generators while they are operating, this testing is normally performed on recirculation flow.

This test confirms one point on the pump design curve and is indicative of overall performance.

Such inservice tests confirm component OPERABILITY, trend performance, and detect incipient failures by indicating abnormal performance.

Performance of inservice testing as required in the ASME Code,Section XI, l

l satisfies this requirement.

This SR is modified by a Note (5) indicating that the SR should be i

deferred until suitable test conditions are established for testing l

the turbine driven AFW pump.

This deferral is required because there is insufficient steam pressure to perform the test.

4 BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-2g Amendment No.

l

?*

p..

1 t

NPF-73 PLANT SYSTEMS t

i BASES i

i 3/4.7.1.2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM (AFW)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (SR) (Continued)

J SR 4.7.1.2.4

]

j This SR verifies that AFW can be delivered to the appropriate eteam j

generator in the event of any accident or transient that generator, an ESFAS, by demonstrating that each autcratic valve in the flow path j

actuates to its correct position on the actual or simulated actuation j

signal.

The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this i

surveillance under the conditions that apply during a unit outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the surveillance were l

performed with tha reactor at power.

The 18 month Frequency i~s acceptable based on operating experience and the design reliability I

of the equipment.

j This SR is modified by a Note (6) that states the SR is not required l

in MODE 4.

In MODE 4, the heat removal requirements would be less providing more time for operator action to manual.ly align the flow path.

SR 4.7.1.2 5, This SR verifies that the AFW pumps will start in the event of any j

accident or transient that generates an ESFAS by demonstrating that

[

each AFW pump starts automatically on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

The IP month Frequency is based on the need to perform this surveillance under the conditions that apply during a unit outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the surveillance were performed with the reactor at power.

This SR is modified by two notes.

Note (5) indicates that the SR be deferred until suitable test conditiono are established for testing the turbine driven AFW pump.

This deferral.is required because there is insufficient stear pressure to perform the test.

Note (6) states a

that the SR is not required in MODE 4.

In MODE 4, the heat removal requirements would be less providing moice time for operator action to j

manually start the required AFW pump.

i

[

SR 4.7.1.2.6 Cycling each power operated valve (excluding automatic) in the flow path that is not testable during plant operation, ensures that the i

valves will function when required.

The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this surveillance under the conditions that apply during a unit outage and the potential for an unplanned transAent if the surveillance were performed with the reactor at power.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-2h Amendment No.

e*

6 NPF-73 PLANT SYSTEMS i

BASES 3/4.7.1.2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM (AFW)

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS (SR) (Continued)

SR 4.7.1.2.7 This SL verifies that the AFW is properly aligned by verifying the flow from TK-210 to the steam generators prior to entering MODE 2 after more than 30 continuous days in MODE 5 or 6 per Note (7).

OPERABILITY of AFW flow paths must be verified before sufficient core heat is generated that would require the operation of the AFW System during a subsequent shutdown.

The Frequency is reasonable, based on engineering judgment and other administrative controls that ensure that flow paths remain OPERABLE.

To further ensure AFW System alignment, flow path OPERABILITY is verified following extended 4

)

outages to determine no misalignment of valves has occurred.

This SR ensures that the flow path from the TK-210 to the steam generators is j

properly aligned.

3/4.7.1.3 PRIMARY PLANT DEMINERALIZED WATER (PPDW) i The OPERALILITY of the PPDW storage tank with the minimum water volume ensures that sufficient water is available to maintain the RCS l

at HOT STANDBY conditions for 9 hours1.041667e-4 days 0.0025 hours 1.488095e-5 weeks 3.4245e-6 months with steam discharge to j

atmosphere.

I 3/4.7.1.4 ACTIVITY I

The limitations on secondary system specific activity ensure that the resultant offsite radiation dose will be limited to a small fraction of 10 CFR Part 100 limits in the event of a steam line rupes3e.

This dose also includes the effects of a

coincident 0.35 gpm primary-to-secondary tube leak in the steam generator of the affected stean line.

Thesc values are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

i a

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-21 Amene.ent No.

l

ML20141K537

Text

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