ML20206N954

Proposed Tech Specs,Modifying Applicable Sections by Removing Rod Position Deviation Monitor,Rod Insertion Limit Monitor,Afd Monitor & QPTR Monitor

ML20206N954
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	12/24/1998
From:	DUQUESNE LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20206N952	List: L-98-238, LARs 262 & 135 to Licenses DPR-66 & DPR-73,modifying Applicable TS & Bases by Removing Rod Position Deviation Monitor,Rod Insertion Limit Monitor,Afd Monitor & QPTR Monitor ML20206N954
References
NUDOCS 9812280271
Download: ML20206N954 (42)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:.... -.. -. _.. -.. -.... -. ... -. _ _ - _ ~ l ATTACHMENT A-1 v Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 License Amendment Request No. 262 The following is a list of the affected pages: j Affected Pages: 3/4 1-19 i 3/4 1-20 { 3/4 1-20b 4 3/4 1-20c 3/4 1-23 3/4 1-23a j 3/4 2-2 1 3/4 2-11 i J B 3/4 1-4 i l B 3/4 2-2 B 3/4 2-7 B 3/4 2-10 i 9812280271 981224 I~ PDR ADOCK 05000334, P PDR i L_

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l LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued) b) The SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is determined at least once per 12 hours. c) A power distribution map i isobtafnedfromthemovable incore detectors and FQ(Z) and Fa H are verified to be within their limits within 72 hours. d) A reevaluation of each accident analysis of Table 3.1-1 is performed within 5 days; this reevaluation shall confirm that the-previously analyzed results of these accidents remain valid for the duration of operation under these conditions. d With more than one rod tripable but inoperable due to causes other than addressed by Action a above, POWER OPERATION may continue provided that:

1. Within one

hour, the remainder of the rods in the bank (s) with the inoperable rods are aligned to within 12 steps of the inoperable rods while maintaining the rod sequence and insertion limits provided in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT.

The THERMAL POWER level shall be restricted pursuant to specification 3.1.3.6 during subsequent operation, and 2. The inoperable rods are restored to OPERABLE #4ctus within 72 hours. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.3.1.1 Each shutdown and control rod not fully inserted in the core shall be determined to be OPERABLE by movement of at least 10 steps in any one direction at least once per 31 days. 4.1.3.1.2 The position of each full length rod shall be determined to be within i 12 steps of the associated group demand counter by verifying the individual rod position at least once per 12 hours. ex::pt during inte:vti: "'. n the ned P::iti:n 0:victi:n : niter is inepareble, then verify the gscup yesiticu et 1.est cuem per 4 heuro. s

• See Special Test Exception 3.10.2 and 3.10.4 I

1 BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/' 1-19 J fcen ment No.9M, #12, 1M (ltefdC LOHdt l

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS l POSITION INDICATION SYSTEMS-OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR' OPERATION 3.1.3.2 The shutdown and control rod position indication system' shall be OPERABLE as follows: i Group Demand Counter (1), 1 per group Individual analog rod position instrument channel, 1 per rod +12 steps (1) accuracy (3) 'ut;=: tic ned i::ition Ocviction M:nitor '2, 2), ::tpcint: 112 l tep:, Or, retpcint verificatier by re:Ording an le;/ digital : d

ition

t 1

:t n:: ;;r t h:ur:.

l (1) During the first hour fol. lowing rod motion, the group demand counter is the primary indicator of precise rod position information, with the analog channels displaying general rod l movement information. For power levels below 50%, a 1-hour thermal soak time is allowed before the analog channels are required to perform within the specified accuracy. (2) For power leve's below 50,% a one hour thermal soak time is i allowed. Ther:fsrc, if

ned rc

ition 0;viction Monitor clarr m._.

. ~ ...m m. Of (3) Malfunctions of the group demand counter, ' analog RPI-:: Erd-De"iation

Meniter, providing, no actual rod isalignment existed during the malfunction, shall be reported in the monthly operating report.

3/4'.-2p Amendment No. St 122 BEAVER' VALLEY - UNIT 1 WM)0th 449M

i' . LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Con't) l e. If the position of a maximum of one rod cannot be i determined by either the direct reading of the rod j position indicators or by reading primary detector j voltage measurements, i 1. Determine the position of the non-indicating rod indirectly by the movable incore detectors immediately and at least once per 8 hours and i immediately after any motion of the non-indicating rod which exceeds 24 steps in i ons direction since the last' determination of j the rod's position. i l f. If the position of more than one rod cannot be determined by either the direct reading of the rod position indicators or by reading primary detector voltage measurements, then Specification 3.0.3 is j applicable. 2. Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 50% of RATED THERMAL j power within 8 hours.. 2 l d. Wit the Autom tic De latio Moni r in erab i OP TION may conti e p vide that he d iatio betw en th ind cated posi ens che ed by the rato at 1 ast,) y l o ce pe 4 ho s. 5 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS i k i 4.1.3.2.1 Each of the group demand counters shall be determined to be OPERABLE by: a. Performing a CHANNEL CHECK by the group demand counters i within a

bank, and observing proper overlap

• of the indicated positions, and b.

Performing a CHANNEL CHECK by an intercomparison between the control ~ bank benchboard indicators and the logic solid state indicators in the logic

cabinet, and determining their agreement within i 2 steps, at least once per 92 days.

During startup and shutdown, overlap must be checked for all control banks at the respective bank overlap height transition points. / BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 1-20 b {fMfesek tddds

SCPNsL*2:CE FRUIPDE;TS (Centinued) 4.1.3.2.2 Each cf the analog red pcsition indicators shall be de-terr.ined to be CPEPP" by:

a. Perfecting a CFJENE.L CHECK by interecenparison** between each analog red positien indicator and its ccrresponding group demand ccunter at least once per -E+ hours.

/A

b. Performing a CHANNEL EVNCTIONAL TEST and CHANNEL CALIBPA-gg TION at least cnce per 18 nonths.

be CPERAELE by perforning a functicnal test at least cnce per 7 days,] 4.1.3.2.3 The Aut:2natic Red Deviation Monitor shall be determined to ard the deviation between the position indicated by the individual analog red pcsiticn instru: rent channel and the pcsition irdicated by the ccrresponding grcup demard counter shall be checked ** nanually for ach red at least cnce per 24 hcurs. Ecr Core PHYSICS TESTING in Mcde 2, priarary detector witage neasure-rents may be used to determine the pcsitien of rods in shutdown banks A and B and cent _ml banks A and 3 for the purpcse of, satisfying Specifica-tien 3.1.3.2. During Mcde 2 cperatien, rod pcsitien indicaters for shut-o dcwn banks A ard B ard centrol banks A and B may deviace frem the group demand indicators by greater than + 12 steps during reacter startup and shutdcwn cperations, while reds are being withdrawn er inserted. If the red Ecsitien indicaters for shutdcwn banks A and 3 and centrol banks A and a deviate by greater than + 12 steps from the group derrand irdicator, red withdrawal or insertien nay continue until the desired group height is achieved. When the driM. grcup height is achieved, a ene hour scak tine is allowed below 50% reactor gewer to per: nit stabilization of the red position analog indicators. Tb attada therral equilibrium during the cne hcur scak tine, the absciute value of red action shall not exceed 6 stecs. .. ~.,

• • For power levels telcw 50% one hour tha=nal "scak tine" is permitted.

During this scak tire, the absclute value of red notion is limited to six steps. 1 BEAVER VALLEY '- UNIT 1 3/4 1-20c Amendment No.-68 0 % p,r d M.j,) l. i.

REACTIVITY' CONTROL SYSTEM SHUTDOWN ROD INSERTION LIMIT LIMITING OONDITION FOR OPERATION' 3.1.3.5 All shutdown rods shall be within the insertion limits specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1* and 2*# ACTION: With a naximum of one shutdown rod inserted beyond the insertion l limit,. except for surveillance testing pursuant to Specification 4.1.3.1.1, within one hour either:

a. Restore the rod to within the limit, or b.

Declare the rod to be inoperable and apply Specification 3.1.3.1. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Each[;by2:: 4.1.3.5 hutdown rod shall be determined to be within the l insertion limit cf the gr:up d:::nd ccunters, and cerificd by th encleg red p :iti:n indi::ter:^^

a. Within 15 minutes prior to withdrawal of any rods in control banks A,

B, C or D during an approach to reactor criticality, and

b. At least once per ++-hours thereafter.

13. See Special Test Exception 3.10.2 and 3.10.4.

• • For power levels below 50% one hour thermal " soak time" is permitted.

During this soak time, the absolute value of rod motion is limited to six steps. With Keff 21.0. L i BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 1-2'5 Amendment No.95!, 104 Y t*Jees k (Ald t

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS ~ , CONTROL ROD INSERTION LIMITS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.3.6 The control banks shall be specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT.within the insertion limits l APPLICABILITY: Modes 1* and 2*# ACTION: With the control banks inserted beyond the insertion limits, except l for surveillance testing pursuant to Specification 4.1.3.1.1, either: a. Restore the control banks to within the limits within 2 hours, or

b. Reduce THERMAL POWER within 2 hours to less than or. equal to that fraction or RATED THERMAL POWER which is allowed by the bank position insertion limits specified in the CORE OPERATING l

LIMITS REPORT, or Be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours. c. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS F 4.1.3.6_,/ W en t Rod Inse ion imit d is ERAB the j onitotheidividalang[ogro fdevi ion etwee the p sitio indi ted b pos ion instr ent hanne and the ositio ind cated by te i co espon ing roup emand coun r sh 11 be heck

• • ma ally or e ch ro at least once er 24 ours.

When he R Inse tion mit onito is noper le, he d viati bet een dicat d pos' ions shall e ch ked** anua y at east ce pe 4 ho s. See Special Test Exception 3.10.2 and 3.10.4 I l with Keff 2 1.0

• • For power levels below 50%, one hour thermal " soak time" is permitted.

During this soak time, the absolute value of rod motion is limited to six steps., i Thpdfoo:, e+ eeek edu/ kk shall An Alv~,4 k k Af \\ ith A svM I,atis*t-J tud nee & a Mu. y l BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 1-23a Ament.1ent No. 9, -M4-i (next page is 3/4 2-1) {

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

b. THERMAL POWER shall not be increased above 90%

of RATED THERMAL POWER unless the indicated AFD is within the target I band and ACTION a.2.a) 1), above has been satisfied.

c. THERMAL POWER shall not be increased above 50%

of RATED THERMAL POWER unless the indicated AFD has not been outside of the target band for more than 1 hour penalty deviation l cumulative during the previous 24 hours. i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.2.1.1 The indicated AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE shall be determined to be within its limits during POWER OPERATION above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER ef+- I M:nitori-ng the indicated ?FO-for each OPERABLE excore channeh$f 2. -be,[ least once per 7 days.-uher th: ?.FD !!: nit:r '.1:rr in - -.--uuu, una 2. le t o e p. hor r fo the firs 24 hours after w estor ng t AFD onit Ala to ERAB sta us, b. nitor ng a d log ing e in cate AXIA FLUX IFFE NCE or ach PERAB E ex ore hann at east nce r ho for he first 24 ours and t lea t onc per 0 mi tes ' erea er, when. the AXIAL FLUX DIFF RENCE Monit r Al m is noper ble. The logg.d val es of the i dicat d AXI L FLU DIFF RENCE shal ) be ass ed ex'st d ring the 'nterv 1 pr cedin ea j 1 ging 4.2.1.2 The indicated AFD shall be considered outside of its target l band when at least 2 of 4 or 2 of 3 OPERABLE excore channels are indicating the AFD to be outside the target band. POWER OPERATION outside of the target band shall be accumulated on a time basis of: l

a. One minute penalty deviation for each one minute of POWER

~ OPERATION outside of the target band at THERMAL POWER levels equal to or above 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER, and

b. One-half minute penalty deviation for each one minute of POWER OPERATION outside of the' target band at THERMAL POWER levels between 15% and 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 2-2 Amendment No. N,9 12,7 25, iC; YM)MStel idado. l

DPR-66 l POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.2.4 Verify the QPTR is within the limit: Bycalculationatleas[ a. 1) gnce per 7 days. tith the OPTn cicr= OPI:PJ.0LI:, c nd-2) Once within 12 heurc--cnd every 12 heurc thercafter with-the OPT!; cicrr. inoporchic. b. Using the movable incore detectors once within 12 hours and every 12 hours thereafter. (2) With one power range high neutron flux channel input to QPTR inoperable and THERMAL POWER less than 75 percent RTP, the remaining three power range high neutron flux channels can be used for calculating the QPTR. (3) only required to be performed with less than four power range high neutron flux channels input to QPTR operable with THERMAL POWER greater than or equal to 75 percent RTP. BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 2-11 Amendment No. l: YtefotU IOctdo

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES position indicators (after thermal soak after rod motion) is sufficient verificacion that the control rods are above the insertion limits below 50 percent power. Above 50 percent power, reliance is placed on the analog rod position indicator channels to assure that control rods are c.bove the insertion limits. The ACTION statements which permit limited variations from the basic rsquirements are accompanied by additional restrictions which ensure that the original design criteria are met. Misalignment of a rod requires msasurement of peaking factors and a restriction in THERMAL POWER. These restrictions provide assurance of fuel rod integrity during continued operation. In addition,'those safety analyses affected by a misaligned rod are reevaluated to confirm that the results remain valid during future operation. Continuous monitoring of rod position with respect to insertion limits and rod deviation is provided by the rod insertion limit monitor and rod deviation

monitor, respectively.

OPERABILITY of the rod deviation monitor is verified by a functional test at least once per 7 days and by comparison of the indicated analog positions versus the respective group demand counters at least once per 24 hours. If the rod deviation monitor or the rod insertion limit monitor is INOPERABLE, the 'requency of manual comparison of indicated rod position is increased to (.nintervalofatleastonceper4 hours. I For Specification 3.1.3.1 ACTION c. and d., it is incumbent upon the plant to verify the trippability of the inoperable control rod (s). l l Trippability is defined in Attachment C to a letter dated December l 21, 1984, from E. P. Rahe (Westinghouse) to C. O. Thomas (NRC). This may be by verification of a control system failure, usually electrical in l

nature, or that the failure is associated with the control rod stepping machanism.

In the event the plant is unable to verify the rod (s) trippability, it must be assumed to be untrippable and thus falls under the requirements of ACTION a. l i d BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 1-4 Amendment No' N' (h/bfOSY$0NIh. ~ ' ' '

. - _ ~ POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS BASES obtained by multiplying the RATED THERMAL POWER value by the appropriate fractional THERMAL POWER level. The periodic updating of l the target flux difference value is necessary to reflect core burnup considerations. Although it is intended that the plant will be operated with the AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE within the target band about the target flux l difference, during rapid plant THERMAL POWER reductions, control rod motion will cause the AFD to deviate outside of the target band at l reduced THERMAL POWER Levels. This deviation will not affect the xenon redistribution sufficiently to change the envelope of peaking factors which may be reached on a subsequent return to RATED THERMAL POWER (with the AFD within the target band) provided the ti'me duration of the deviation is limited. Accordingly, a 1 hour penalty deviation limit cumulative during the previous 24 hours is provided l for operation outside of the target band but within the limits i specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT for THERMAL POWER l levels between 50% and 90% of RATED THERMAL POWER. For THERMAL POWER levels between 15% and 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER, deviations of the AFD outside of the target band are less significant. The penalty of 2 hours actual time reflects this reduced significance. halofe Provisions for monitoring the AFD on an automatic basis are derived from the plant process computer through the AFD Monitor Alarm. The computer determines the one minute average of each of the OPERABLE excore detector outputs and provides an alarm message immediately if the AFD for at least 2 of 4 or 2 of 3 OPERABLE excore channels are l outside the target band and the THERMAL POWER is greater than 90% of RATED THERMAL POWER. During operation at THERMAL POWER levels between 50% and 90% and between 15% and 50% RATED THERMAL POWER, the computer outputs an alarm message when the penalty deviation j (accumulatesbeyondthelimitsof1hourand2 hours, respectively. Figure B 3/4 1-1 shows a typical monthly target band near the beginning of core life. i l J BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 2-2 YO 880No, /Wendment tio,9, 'il,15? N

i DPR-66 l ~ POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS l BASES 3/4.2.4 OUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO (OPTR) (Continued) LQQ The QPTR limit of 1.02, at which corrective action is required, provides a margin of protection for both the DNB ratio and linear heat generation rate contributing to excessive power peaks resulting from X-Y plane power tilts. A limiting QPTR of 1.02 can be tolerated before the margin for uncertainty in F (Z) and (fa) is possibly o challenged. APPLICABILITY The QPTR limit must be maintained in MODE 1 with THERMAL POWER greater than 50 percent RATED THERMAL POWER (RTP) to prevent core power distributions from exceeding the design limits. Applicability in MODE 1 less than or equal to 50 percent RTP and in other MODES is not required because there is either insufficient stored energy in the fuel or insufficient energy being transferred to the reactor coolant to require the implementation of a QPTR limit on the distribution of core power. The QPTR limit in these conditions is, therefore, not important. Note that the fu and Fa(Z) LCOs still apply, but allow progressively higher peaking factors at 50 percent RTP or lower. ACTION a. With the QPTR exceeding its limit, a power level reduction of 3 percent RTP for each 1 percent by which the QPTR exceeds 1.00 is a conservative tradeoff of total core power with peak linear power. The completion time of 2 hours allows sufficient time to identify the cause and correct the tilt. Note that the power reduction itself may cause a change in the tilted condition. h. Af ter completion of ACTION a, -th.......... ... ~-... l -it: clar=cd state.-..: cuch, any additional changes in the QPTR are detected by requiring a check of the QPTR once per 12 hours thereafter. If the QPTR continues to increase, l THERMAL POWER has to be reduced accordingly. A 12 hour l completion time is sufficient because any additional change j in QPTR would be relatively slow. l l BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/ 27 Amendment No. -140-t ' h, % 2, 9,, M, a: U^Yd

=ce

DPR-66 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS + BASES 3/4.2.4 OUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO (OPTR) (Continued) SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS (SR) / b # M #'# M #

1. N

{ a.d elam. avo]Inhk A da op m rW SR 4.2.4.a (g' & g 4 / App g, _' SR 4.2.4.a is modified by a Note that lows QPTR to be calculated with three power range high neutron flu channels that input to QPTR if THERMAL POWER is less than 75 percen RTP and one power range high neutron flux channel is inoperable. This surveillance verifies that the PTR, as indicated by the Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS) chann s, excore channels, is within its limits. The frequency of 7 days Men the C =P. 21: n i OP S LE 1:-

ptable 5 ::u:: ef the leu prebability th t thi: :le n een ::::in in:p:::ble Uith: t d:t cti:n.

"h:n the OPTP 21:n le ineperable, the freq"ency le increated te 12- -h ur. Thi fr qu ncy i Od:qu t te d tect :ny ::1:ti :1y :1:e ch:ng; in 0"T",, i ::::: [or those causes of QPT that occur quickly (e.g., a dropped rod), there typically are other indications of abnormality that prompt a verification of core power tilt. SR 4.2.4.b This surveillance is modified by a Note, which states that it is required only when less than four power range high neutron flux channels input to QPTR are operable and the THERMAL POWER is greater than or equal to 75 percent RTP. With an excore detector inoperable, tilt monitoring for a portion of the reactor core becomes degraded. Large tilts are likely detected with the remaining channels, but the capability for detection of small power tilts in some quadrants is decreased. Performing SR 4.2.4.b at a frequency of 12 hours provides an accurate alternative means for ensuring that any tilt remains within its limits. For purposes. of monitoring the QPTR when one excore detector is inoperable, the moveable incore detectors are used to confirm that the normalized symmetric power distribution is consistent with the indicated QPTR and any previous data indicating a tilt. The incore detector monitoring is performed with a full incore flux map or a partial core flux map with quarter core symmetry detailed in accordance with controlled procedures. BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 2-10 Amendment No. +M-{- (hhfate.of i4l0ko

I ATTACHMENT A-2 Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 License Amendment Request No. 135 The following is a list of the affected pages: Affected Pages: 3/4 1-19 3/4 1-21 3/4 1-24 3/4 1-25 3/4 2-2 3/4 2-10 B 3/4 1-5 B 3/4 2-2 B 3/4 2-7 B 3/4 2-9 B 3/4 2-10 i l b

. _..~ i NPF ~13 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued) b) The SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is determined at least once per 12 hours, c) A power distribution map is obtained from the movable incoredetectorsandF(Z)andFhareverifiedtobe q within their limits within 72 hours. d) A reevaluation of each accident analysis of Table 3.1-1 is performed within 5 days; this reevaluation shall confirm i ~ that the previously analyzed results of these accidents remain valid for the duration of operation under these conditions. d. With more than one-rod trippable but inoperable due to causes other than addressed by Action a above, POWER OPERATION may continue provided that: 1. Within one hour, the remainder of the rods in the bank (s) with the inoperable rods are aligned to within 112 steps of the inoperable rods whila maintaining the rod sequence and insertion limits provided in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT. l The THERMAL POWER level shall be restricted pursuant to Specifi-cation 3.1.3.6 during subsequent operation, and 2. The inoperable rods are restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours. SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 1 4.1.3.1.1 Each shutdown and control rod not fully inserted in the core shall be determined to be OPERABLE by movement of at least 10 steps in any one direction at least once per 31 days. 4.1.3.1.2 The position of each full length rod shall be determined to be within i 12 steps of the associated group demand counter by verifying the individual rod position at least once per 12 hours,::::pt during int:rv:1 =h:r th: 9:d -P :iti:n 0:vi:ti:n :: nit:r i: in:p:r:ble, then ver Mj th: gr:up p :iti r :t 1:::t On:: per ' h:;r. BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 o m.3/4 1 19 9, Amendment No. 7, 31 s

NPF-73 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS POSITION INDICATION SYSTEMS - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.3.2 The Digital Rod Position Indication System and the Demand Position Indication System shall be OPERABLE and capable of determining the control rod positions within i 12 steps. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2. ACTION: With a maximum of one digital rod position indicator per bank a. i inoperable either: 1. Determine the position of the nonindicating rod (s) indirectly by the movable incore detectors at least once per 8 hours and immediately after any motion of the nonindicating rod which exceeds 24 steps in one direction since the last determination of the rod's position, or 2.' Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 8 hours. b. With a maximum of one demand position indicator per bank inoperable either: 1. Verify that all digital rod position indicators for the affected bank are OPERABLE and that the most withdrawn rod and the least withdrawn rod of the bank are within a maximum 12 steps of each other at least once per 8 hours, or 2. Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 8 hours. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.3.2 Each digital rod position indicator shall be determined to be OPERABLE by verifying that the Oemand Position Indication System and the Digital Rod Position Indication System agree within 12 steps at least once per 12 hours. cxcept during tim interval: when th; r:d p :iti:n deviatien : nitor i 4-- operable, then compere the 0 : nd Pesition Indication System and th: Oigital Red P :ition Indicati:n Sy:te at lasst One per ', hour:. BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 1-21 UMperd ideka&

l NPF-73 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM I l SHUTOOWN R00 INSERTION LIMIT LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION l 3.1. 3. 5 All shutdown rods shall be within the insertion limits specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT. t APPLICABILITY: MODES la and 2*# i l ACTION: With a maximum of one shutdown rod inserted beyond the insertion limit, except for surveillance testing pursuant to Specification 4.1.3.1.1, within one hour either: a. Restore the rod to within the limit, or I l b. Declare the rod to be inoperable and apply Specification 3.1.3.1. l l l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS I l 4.1.3.5 Each shutdown rod shall be determined to be within the insertion l limit: l a. Within 15 minutes prior to withdrawal of any rods in control banks A, B, C, or D during an approach to reactor criticality, and t b. At least once per 94 hours thereafter. /;L l l

• See Special Test Exception 3.10.2 and 3.10.3 l

1. With Keff > 1.0 l

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 1-24 Amendment No. -M-(ftdysed LOuYan

~ _ lj: l L 'NPF-73 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS l CONTROL R00 INSERTION LIMITS i, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION i 3.1. 3. 6 The control banks shall be within the limits specified in the CORE l OPERATING LIMITS REPORT. I APPLICABILITY: MODES 1* and 2*# ACTION: With the control banks inserted beyond the insertion limits, except for o I surveillance testing pursuant to Specification 4.1.3.1.1, either: Restore the control banks to within the limits within 2 hours, or a. b. Reduce THERMAL POWER within 2 hours to less than or equal to th'at fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER which is allowed by the bank posi-tion insertion limits specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT l or c. Be in at least HOT STANDBY witihin 6 hours. l-SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.3.6 The position of each control bank shall be determined to be within the ' insertion limits at least once per 12 hours.::::pt durin;; tit: St:r=h wher, the red in;;rti;n limit ;;r, iter i; in;per;bi;, then ser' fy th; indi'.id;;i red p;;ition; :t i:::t ;nc; p;r i h:;r;. L 1 l l-

• See Special Test Exception 3.10.2 and 3.10.3

'#with.Keff > 1.0 BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 1-25 Amendment No. 41-- ($toposedLOWd},)

-= - NPF-73 ~ POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS ' LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued 1 ACTION: (Continued) b. THERMAL POWER shall not be increased above 90 percent of RATED THERMAL POWER unless the indicated AFD is within the target band l and ACTION a.2.a) 1), above has been satisfied. THERMAL POWER shall not be increa.ced above 50 percent of RATED c. THERMAL POWER unless the indicated AFD has not been outside of the target band for more than 1 hour penalty deviation cumulative I during the previous 24 hours. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.2.1.1 The indicated AXIAL FLUX OIFFERENCE shall be determined to be within its limits during POWER OPERATION above 15 percent of RATED THERMAL POWER byt-- Meriteri g the i dic:ted ^FD for each OPERABLE excore channel n n [t least once per 7 days.when th: ^FD M niter Alar-1: -1. m mm_, ~ 2 At 1 st onc per ho for th first 4 hours after r =torin the F0 Mon' or Ala to OP ABLE s tus. b. Monit ing a loggin the in cated IAL FL DIFFE NCE fo eac OPERAB excor channel at lea once p r hour r the irst 24 ours d at le t once er 30 nutes ereaft , when he l IAL FL DIFFE NCE Mo tor Al m is i perable The 1 gged va es of the ndicate AXIAL UX DIF RENCE all be ssumed o exis duringj the i erval ecedin each 1 ging. / 4.2.1.2 The indicated AFD shall be considered outside of its target band when I at least 2 of 4 or 2 of 3 OPERABLE excore channels are indicating the AFD to be outside the target band. POWER OPERATION outside of the target band shall ] be accumulated on a time basis of: a. One-minute penalty deviation for each 1 minute of POWER OPERATION outside of the target band at THERMAL POWER levels equal to or above 50 percent of RATED THERMAL POWER, and b. One-half-minute penalty deviation for each 1 minute of POWER OPERATION outside of the target band at THERMAL POWER levels between 15% and 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER. BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 2-2 Amendment No. 't, 31 - OMysted 100$Ih

NPF-73 j l i POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 1 4.2.4 Verify the QPTR is within the limit: a. By calculation"3 at least -it-gfnce per 7 days with the QPTn clar; OrrrJ.0LC, and I -2 ) One: vithin 12 heurc and / cry 12 hour thereafter uith th: QPTR clar; inoperable. b. Using the movable incore detectors once within 12 hours and every 12 hours thereafter."3 (2) With.one power range high neutron flux channel input to QPTR inoperable and THERMAL POWER less than 75 percent RTP, the remaining three power range high neutron flux channels can be used for calculating the QPTR. (3) Only required to be performed with less than four power range high neutron flux channels input to QPTR operable with THERMAL POWER greater than or equal to 75 percent RTP. l l l i BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 2-10 Ame'ndment No. Wa-- YN)004 Woko l

NPF-73 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES ~ 3/4.1.2 *BORATION SYSTEMS (Continued) satisfied before the verification is completed to ensure that no unacceptable reduction of SHUTDOWN MARGIN occurred when the LCO requirements were not satisfied. The primary function of the surveillance is to ensure that the valve (s) used to isolate the Primary Grade Water System are locked, sealed or otherwise secured. The frequency of 31 days to ensure that the Primary Grade Water System is properly isolated is based on engineering judgment,'and has proven to be acceptable. Operating experience has shown that the failure rate is so low that the 31 day frequency is justified. A time frame of 15 minutes provides a minimum reasonable time for an operator to isolate the Primary Grade Water System following a planned activity requiring its use. 3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES The specifications of this section ensure that 1) acceptable power distribution limits are maintained, 2) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained, and 3) the potential effects of rod misalignment on associated accident analyses are limited. OPERABILITY of the movable control assemblies is established by observing rod motion and determining that rods are positioned within i 12 steps (indicated position), of the respective group demand counter position. The OPERABILITY of the control rod position indication system is required to determine control rod positions and thereby ensure compliance with the control rod alignment and insertion limits. The ACTION statements which permit limited variations from the basic requirements are accompanied by additional restrictions which ensure that the original design criteria are met. Misalignment of a rod requires measurement of peaking factors and a restriction in THERMAL POWER. These restrictions provide assurance of fuel rod integrity during continued operation. In addition, those safety analyses affected by a misaligned rod are reevaluated to confirm that the results remain valid during future operation. Continuou

nitoring of red pecition with respect t: incertien limite and red deviation in provided by the red insertion limit m: nit r and red deviation

monitor, rc pectively.

If the rod deviation monitor or the rod insertion limit acnitor is inoperobic, the frequency of m:nual =parizon of indicated rod p;sition is inerenced t an interval of at 100 t once per 4 hours. The maximum rod drop time restriction is consistent with the assumed rod drop time used in the safety analyses. Measurement with T greater than or equal to 541*F and with all reactor coolant avg 4 B 3/4 1-Amendment No.

• l BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 unpsedn]4)

i NPF-73 i l POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS BASES l l AXIAL FLUX OIFFERENCE (AFO) (Continued) duration limit of the deviation is limited. Accordingly, a 1 hour penalty de- ,viation limit cumulative during the previous 24 hours is provided for operation outside of the target band but within the limits specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT for THERMAL POWER levels between 50% and 90% of. RATED i THERMAL POWER. For THERMAL POWER levels between 15% and 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER, deviations of the AFD outside of the target band are less significant. The penalty of 2 hours actual time reflects this reduced significance Provisions for monitoring the AFD on an automatic basis are deri r he plant process computer through the AFD Monitor Alarm. The computer deter-mines the one minute average of each of the OPERABLE excore detector outputs and provides an alarm message immediately if the AFD for at least 2 of 4 or 2 of 3 OPERABLE excore channels are outside the target band and the THERMAL. POWER is greater than 90% of RATED THERMAL POWER. During operation at THERMAL POWER levels between 50% and 90% and between 15% and 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER, the computer outputs an alarm message when the penalty deviation accumulates beyond Q limits of 1 hour and 2 hours, respectivelv. i Figure B 3/4 2-1 shows a typical monthly target band near the beginning r,f l core life. 3/4.2.2 and 3/4.2.3 HEAT FLUX AND NUCLEAR ENTHALPY HOT CHANNEL FACTORS F (Z)and F"H 9 a l The limits on heat flux and nuclear enthalpy hot channel factors ensure that 1) the design limits on peak local power density and minimum DNBR are not exceeded and 2) in the event of a LOCA the peak fuel clad temperature will not exceed the ECCS acceptance criteria limit of 2200 F. Each of these hot channel factors are measurable but will normally only be determined periodically as specified in Specifications 4.2.2 and 4.2.3. This periodic surveillance is sufficient to insure that the hot channel factor limits are maintained provided: a. Control rods in a single group move together,with no individual rod insertion differing by more than i 12 steps from the group demand

position, b.

Control rod groups are sequenced with overlapping groups as described in Specification 3.1.3.6. 1 ~ BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 B 3/4 2-2 Amendment No. 41-Ytofne) OOO

a ._m.-..__-._- _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _. _ _ ~. _ _ _ _. _ NPF-73 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS BASES 3/4.2.4 OUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO (OPTR) (Continued) APPLICABILITY (Continued) the. reactor. coolant to require the implementation of a QPTR limit on the distribution of core power. The QPTR limit in these conditions l .is, therefore, not important. Note that the fa and Fa(Z) LCOs still l . apply,_but allow progressively higher peaking factors at 50 percent i RTP or lower. ACTION A. With the QPTR exceeding its limit, a power level reduction of 3 percent RTP for each 1 percent by which the QPTR i l exceeds 1.00 is a conservative tradeoff of total core power with peak linear power. The completion time of 2 hours l allows sufficient time to identify the cause and correct the tilt. Note that the power reduction itself may cause a change in the tilted condition. I h. After completion of. ACTION a, _ _ _ _ _._ _ i :- it: 21::::d etzt. ?.: cuch, any additional changes in the QPTR are detected by requiring a check of the QPTR once per .12 hours.thereafter. If the QPTR continues to increase, THERMAL POWER has to be reduced accordingly. A 12 hour j completion time is sufficient because any additional change in QPTR would be relatively slow. ,c. The peaking factors fa and Fo(Z) are of primary importance in ensuring that the power distribution remains consistent with the initial conditions used in the safety analyses. Performing surveillances on fa and Fo(Z) within the l completion time of 24 hours ensures that these primary 1 l indicators of power distribution are within their respective l limits. A completion time of 24 hours takes into consideration the rate at which peaking factors are likely to change, and the time required to stabilize the plant and perform a flux map. If these peaking factors are not within their limits, the actions provide an appropriate' response l for the abnormal condition. If the QPTR' remains above its l specified. limit, the peaking factor surveillances are required each 7 days thereafter to evaluate fa and Fe(Z) with changes in power distribution. Relatively small changes.are expected due to either burnup and xenon i redistribution or correction of the cause for exceeding the QPTR limit. t. l l 4 s i BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 2-7 Amendment No. -M-l Ob a% O )1 00ric;t0d by Letter'dat0d v Octob;r 10,10% I l

.m-m. .u

_u_,

m-a.m 4m m._, m..m ,m NPF-73 POWER DISTRIBUTIOM LIMITS BASES 3/4.2.4 OUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO (OPTR) (Continued)_ ACTION (Continued) power does not reach RTP within 24 hours, but is increased

slowly, then the peaking factor surveillances must be 1

performed within 48 hours of the time when the ascent to power was begun. These completion times are intended to allow adequate time to increase THERMAL POWER to above the limit of ACTION a or b, while not permitting the core to remain with unconfirmed power distributions for extended periods of time. This action assures that the peaking factor surveillances may only be done after the excore detectors have been normalized to show a tilt less than or equal to 1.02 (i.e., ACTION e). The intent of this is to have the peaking factor surveillances performed at operating power levels, which can only be accomplished after the excore detectors are normalized to show a tilt less than or equal to 1.02 and the core returned to power. i g. If ACTIONS a through f are not completed within ' their associated completion times, the unit must be brought to a MODE or condition in which the requirements do not apply. To' achieve this status, THERMAL POWER must be reduced to less than 50 percent RTP within 4 hours. The allowed completion time of 4 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience regarding the amount of time required to reach the reduced power level _ without challenging plant systems. %kes a A16 accouedobto" on % dHn a aW dMM M Y SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS (SR) 14 /dt cNra/ fouPM. SR 4.2.4.a SR 4.2.4.a is modified by a Note that allows QPTR to be calculated with three power range high neutron fl x, channels that input to QPTR if THERMAL POWER is less than 75 perc t RTP and one power range high l neutron flux channel is inoperable. This surveillance verifies that th QPTR, as indicated by the Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS) chan 1s, excore channels, is within its limits. The frequency of 7 days wher. th; OPTn clarm 1 OPERACLE i; omceptoLle Loceuse of the law prebebility thet thio elei m voii z umeiii i;;;;;~;b2: ;,'i h;st i:::::1;;. i ( BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 B 3/4 2-9 Amendment No..-W l +5YYn ,b o n-, ~, ~- r,

1 l' i i NPF-73 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITG l BASES 3/4.2.4 OUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO-(OPTR) (Continued) SURVEILT ANCE REOUIREMENTS (SR) (Concinued) .m_._ u_ m m,.m m 4_ 4,.. .u,-

4. u., _,....

4 4.,.. i i """ _ '" " ~ T, T.~ ' .. 3.. !.!.,. ~ U. '.J..Z..,__..._.'J.,"Z.._ ".,..2.:~!".'3_.J.,.' Z.",'.Z.U...!J,.. Z.,.Z 2.T_ ch ng : in ^"T",, in 't:: d r those causes of QPT that occur quickly l (e.g., a dropped rod), there typically are other indications of abnormality that prompt a verification of core power tilt. SR 4. 2. 4. b l This surveillance is modified by a Note, which states that it is required only when less than four power range high neutron flux i channels input to QPTR are operable and the THERMAL POWER is greater than or equal to 75 percent RTP. i l l With an excore detector inoperable, tilt monitoring for a portion of the reactor core becomes degraded. Large tilts.are likely detected with the remaining channels, but the capability for detection of l small power tilts in some quadrants is decreased. Performing SR 4.2.4.b at a frequency of 12 hours provides an accurate alternative j i means for ensuring that any tilt remains within it" limits. For purposes of monitoring the QPTR when one excore ' detector is inoperable, the moveable incere detectors are used to confirm that the normalized symmetric power distribution is consistent with the indicated QPTR and any previous data indicating a tilt. The incore detector monitoring is performed with a full incore flux map or a partial' core flux map with qt.rter core symmetry detailed in accordance with controlled procedures. The symmetric thimble flux map can be used to generate symmetric thimble " tilt." This can be compared to a reference symmetric l- _ thimble tilt, from the most recent full core flux map, to generate an incore QPTR. Therefore, the symmetric thimble flux-map can be used to-confirm that QPTR is within limits. With one-excore detector inoperable, the indicated tilt may be changed from the value indicated with all four channels OPERABLE. To confirm that no change in tilt has actually occurred, which might cause the QPTR limit to be exceeded, the incore results may be compared against previous flux maps either using the symmetric thimbles as described above or a complete flux map. Nominally, l quadrant tilt from the surveillance should be within 2 percent of the tilt shown by the most recent flux map data. BEAVER. VALLEY - UNIT 2 B /4 2-10 Amendment No.-75 l [ %pne I che;p)

ATTACHMENT B Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 License Amendment Request Nos. 262 and 135 DELETE INOPERABLE MONITOR REQUIREMENTS A. DESCRIPTION OF AMENDMENT REQUEST The proposed amendment revises the Technical Specification (TS) requirements for the rod position deviation

monitor, rod insertion limit (RIL)

monitor, axial flux difference (AFD]

monitor and quadrant power tilt ratio (QPTR] monitor. Nuclear Electric Institute (NEI) Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) 110 Revision 2 provides the basis for these changes and recommends relocating the requirements for these monitors to " plant administrative practices." The AFD monitor and the QPTR monitor requirements will be relocated to the Licensing Requirements Manual (LRM) and changes to these requirements will be controlled in accordance with the 10 CFR 50.59 process which will require NRC approval if the change constitutes an unreviewed safety question.

However, based on the smaller change in surveillance intervals, deletion and not relocation of the rod position deviation monitor and the RIL monitor requirements can be justified and is proposed.

In addition, Unit 1 surveillance requirements (SR) 4.1.3.5 and 4.1.3.6 have been further modified by incorporating the Unit 2 wording to provide surveillances more consistent with the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO). All except one of the monitors are included in the TS as part of an SR and are not specifically required operable by the associated LCO. The TSs require a reduced surveillance interval in the event the monitors referenced in the following surveillance requirements are inoperable: Unit 1: 4.1.3.1.2, 4.1.3.6, 4.2.1.1, 4.2.4; Unit 2: 4.1.3.1.2, 4.1.3.2, 4.1.3.6, 4.2.1.1, M 2.4. Unit 1 TS 3.1.3.2 differs from the above list specifications in that it includes the rod position deviation monitor in the LCO operability requirements and Action (d.) that requires a reduced surveillance interval when this monitor is inoperable. In addition, Unit 1 SR 4.1.3.2.3 includes a requirement to perform a functional test on the rod position deviation monitor every 7 days. The inclusion of this monitor in the LCO, Action and SR of TS 3.1.3.2 was an option implemented by Unit 1 when placing this monitor in the TS via Amendment 51. The placement of this monitor in the TS LCO and Actions was inconsistent with the corresponding standard TS at that time. The corresponding Standard TS included this monitor in the associated rod position indication system TS SRs (with a reduced surveillance interval when it was inoperable). However, the Unit 1 implementation of this monitor in the TS was acceptable since it effectively achieved the same result as the corresponding standard

- _ - ~ ATTACHMENT B, continu d Licenso Am:ndnant Raqunst Nos. 262 and 135 Page 2 requirements at the time (i.e., a reduced surveillance interval when the monitor was inoperable). The proposed amendment would modify the applicable TS requirements by deleting reference to the rod position deviation monitor and RIL monitor and relocating the requirements associated with the AFD monitor and QPTR monitor from the above specifications and Bases to the LRM. Eliminating these monitors from the TS results in a less frequent surveillance being required when the monitors are inoperable. Removal of these monitors from the TS is based on the NRC approved NEI TSTF Change 110 Rev. 2 which relocated these monitors from the Westinghouse Improved Standard Technical Specifications (ISTS) in NUREG-1431. In

addition, the normal frequencies of the retained SRs associated with these monitors are revised to be consistent with the frequencies used in the ISTS and the TSTF 110 revisions to the ISTS.

Therefore, the 24 hour surveillance frequency in Unit 1 SR 4.1.3.2.2, 4.1.3.5 and 4.1.3.6 as well as in Unit 2 SR 4.1.3.5 is revised to a more restrictive 12 hour frequency in order to assure adequate monitoring of the affected parameters is performed. When the rod deviation monitor requirements are removed from Unit 1 SR 4.1.3.2.3, the remaining portion of SR 4.1.3.2.3 is addressed by SR 4.1.3.2.2.a; therefore, SR 4.1.3.2.3 is completely eliminated. The details of each change affecting the RIL, AFD, QPTR and rod deviation monitors are discussed separately in Section D " Safety Analysis." B. DESIGN BASES The monitors identified above only serve to provide alarms and do not perform any required automatic protective function assumed by a safety analysis to mitigate a design basis accident. The affected monitors are currently utilized to assist the operators by providing alarm indication when a parameter limit required ty the associated LCO is approached. The demand and rod position signals are displayed on the control room control board and are also monitored by the unit computer which provides a visual printout and audible alarm via the rod deviation monitor when a rod is misaligned from the other rods in that bank by more than a preset amount. The RIL monitor alerts the control room operator of excessive rod insertion. The insertion limits are provided to maintain sufficient shutdown margin following a reactor trip, provide a limit on the maximum inserted rod worth in a rod ejection event and limit rod insertion to maintain acceptable peaking factors. Monitoring the AFD on an automatic basis is derived from the plant process computer which initiates an AFD alarm when the axial flux is outside the target band. The TS requirements for AFD limit axial power distribution to maintain core peaking factors consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analysis. The QPTR is determined using the power range detector input independently of the power range channel B-2

..~ -.~.--.-.. ~ ~ - ATTACHMENT B, continutd ' Licsnso Amindmitnt Raqusst Nos. 262 and 135 ) Page 3 indication 'in monitoring radial power distribution. The QPTR limit ensures that the gross radial power distribution remains consistent with the design values used in the safety analysis. The rod insertion limits, AFD and QPTR provide limits on process variables that characterize and control the three-dimensional power distribution of the reactor core. The.LCOs (except Unit 1 3.1.3.2) do not require that these alarms be operable. The LCOs specify the required parameter limits and provide the appropriate actions if a parameter exceeds the limit. In addition, other indications (rod position and power) are available and monitored regularly which provide adequate indication of plant status. C. JUSTIFICATION The NRC issued a final policy statement to provide the scope and purpose of technical specifications for nuclear power plants as required by 10 CFR 50.36. It establishes a specific set of objective criteria as guidance for determining which regulatory requiretcnts and operating restrictions should be included in technical specifications. It encourages licensees to implement a voluntary program to update their technical specifications to be consistent with improved vendor-specific Standard Technical Specifications (STS) issued by the NRC in September 1992. The improved STS for Westinghouse plants was published as NUREG 1431. Experience in the development of the improved STS and in the review of license amendment requests has led the Commission to conclude that safety benefits can be realized from adopting portions of the improved STS without fully implementing all STS improvements. The four NSSS supplier Owner's Groups have been working with the NRC to propose revisions to the generic ISTS. One example of an improvement is TSTF 110, Revision 2 which is incorporated in this request. The specific revision of the surveillance requirements identified in TSTF 110 Revision 2 does not require the incorporation of the complete ISTS specification requirements. The relaxation identified in TSTF 110 Revision 2 is not tied to the LCO but only impacts a reduced surveillance interval when an alarm is inoperable. With this change, the monitors will continue to be controlled as required by other means. Removing these monitors from the TS is consistent with the NRC approved changes to the ISTS identified in TSTF 110, Revision 2. This change generically removes these monitors from the ISTS based on the fact that the LCO limits are still required to be maintained and that the monitors being removed from the TS requirements do not adversely affect any safety functions or perform any protective functions assumed in a safety analysis to mitigate a design basis accident. In addition, verification that plant conditions are within specified limits at the frequency specified in the normal surveillance provides sufficient information to allow the operator to detect a parameter that is B-3

ATTACHMENT B, continusd Lic3nse Amand22nt Raquest Nos. 262 and 135 i Page 4 beginning to deviate from its expected limits (where required, the normal surveillance intervals have been conservatively reduced to provide further assurance that the affected parameters i are adequately monitored). The specified interval in the normal l surveillance takes into account other information (rod position indication and power level indication) that is continuously available to the operator in the control room, so that during changes in plant conditions, deviation from the specified limits j l can be readily detected. The TSs continue to require operability of the rod position indication system and power range instrument l channels. l The normal surveillance interval has been shown to be adequate ) l through industry operating experience and NRC approval of the ISTS to monitor the affected parameters. This change does not adversely affect the information used by 1.ne operators since the normal surveillance interval used to obtain the information is i adequate to monitor plant conditions without the reduced surveillance interval required when the monitors are inoperable. l l Although these monitors are being removed from the TSs, they will continue to be described in the UFSAR (subject to UFSAR changes via the 10 CFR 50.59 process). Therefore, the TS requirements for these monitors including the LCO, Action and SRs of Unit 1 TS 3.1.3.2 as well as the other requirements which simply l increase the frequency of surveillances when these monitors are inoperable are overly conservative and do not need to be included in the TS. Removing the rod deviation monitor requirements from Unit 1 SR 4.1. 3. 2. 3 makes the rersining portion of SR 4.1.3.2.3 redundant to SR 4.1.3.2.2.a; therefore, SR 4.1.3.2.3 has been deleted. The revised surveillance frequencies provide reasonable assurance that plant conditions are adequately monitored, with or without i the monitor alarms, and provide consistency between the units as well as consistency with the corresponding surveillance frequencies in the revision to the ISTS. Further modification to Unit 1 SR 4.1.3.5 and 4.1.3.6 involves incorporating the Unit 2 wording to provide surveillances more consistent with the LCO. SR 4.1.3.5 currently specifies how to verify the shutdown rod insertion limits by inclusion of "by use of the group demand counters, and verified by the analog rod position indicators." This phrase has been deleted since the TSs normally do not specify how an SR is to be performed. This change modifies the SR to be more consistent with the current LCO l requirements and is consistent with the Unit 2 and ISTS wording. SR 4.1.3.6 currently specifies how to verify the control rod insertion limits by inclusion of "the deviation between the position indicated by the individual analog rod position i instrument channel and the position indicated by the i corresponding group demand counter shall be checked manually for each rod." This phrase has been deleted since the TSs normally B-4

ATTACHMENT B, continutd i 4, Licanas Amnndnant Rrquest Nos. 292 and 135 Page 5 do not specify how an SR is to be performed and this phrase is not consistent with the LCO requirements. This change modifies the SR to be more consistent with the LCO requirements and is consistent with the Unit 2 and ISTS wording. i D. SAFETY ANALYSIS l Rod Position Deviation Monitor / Alarm SR 4.1.3.1.2 has been modified for both units along with Unit 2 SR 4.1.3.2 by deleting reference to the rod position deviation monitor. In addition, SR 4.1.3.2.3 has been deleted since, when the rod deviation monitor requirements are removed from this SR, the remaining portion is redundant to the requirements of l SR 4.1.3.2.2.a. Unit 1 SR 4.1.3.2.2 has also been modified by 4 changing the 24 hour surveillance frequency to 12 hours to be consistent with SR 4.1.3.1.2, Unit 2 SR 4.1.3.2 and the ISTS. Unit 1 Specification 3.1.3.2 is revised to delete reference to the rod position deviation monitor in the current LCo, including associated Notes (2) and (3), and to delete Action statement (d). } As described previously, the inclusion of this monitor in the LCO requirement, Actions and SRs of TS 3.1.3.2 was an option implemented by Unit 1 when placing this monitor in the TS via j, Amendment 51. The placement of this monitor in the LCO and Actions of the TS was inconsistent with the corresponding standard TS at that time which only included this monitor in the { associated rod position indication system TS (with a reduced surveillance interval when inoperable).

However, the i

implevntation of this monitor in the Unit 1 TS was acceptable since it effectively achieved the same result as the corresponding standard requirements at the time (i.e., a reduced ( surveillance interval when the monitor was inoperable). The difference in the way Unit 1 implemented this requirement was not j due to any technical differences in the plant design but a j preference in how the requirement was presented in the TS. 3 i The requirements, applicable when a monitor is inoperable, l specify that the operator verify rod position (to confirm the alignment limits are met) on a 4 hour frequency in lieu of the normal frequency. The normal frequency (which is retained within l-the TS) requires verification that individual rod positions are within the alignment limits on a 12 hour frequency. The previous i Unit 1 surveillance (4.1.3.2.2) frequency is revised from 24 hours to 12 hours to provide additional assurance that the alignment limits specified in the TS continue to be met. The normal verification frequency is adequate to ensure the LCO requirements for alignnent limits are met. The normal frequency takes into account other information (i.e., rod position indication system, rod bottom alarm and excore neutron detectors) that is normally continuously available to the operator in the control room, so that during actual rod motion, deviations can be readily detected. The normal 12 hour surveillance frequency has been shown to be adequate to monitor the alignment limits through B-5 i

1 ATTACHMENT B, continutd Licsnso Amandannt Raquant Nos. 262 and 135 Page 6 industry operating experience and as approved by the NRC and documented in the corresponding ISTS requirements. The rod position deviation alarm is provided as an administrative aid to alert the operator of a deviation of one rod from its bank position. The rod position deviation alarm does not perform any protective functions assumed in a safety analysis to mitigate a design basis accident. The rod position indication system provides direct visual indication of each rod position and continues to be required operable by the TS. A rod bottom alarm i provides indication of a dropped rod. The excore detectors e detect asymmetrical flux distribution which would be indicative of rod misalignment. The deletion of the TS requirements associated with the rod deviation alarm (including the Unit 1 i LCO, Action and functional test SR) does not affect the operation of the rod position indication system or the assumptions of any accident analyses described in the UFSAR. The deletion of this alarm requirement from the TS is also consistent with the NRC approved revision to the ISTS. Although the deletion of this a j alarm requirement from the TS results in elimination of the reduced surveillance interval when the alarm is inoperable, the effect is not significant considering the other indications i available to the operator and the relatively infrequent rod j movement that occurs during steady state operation. Therefore, based on the above, the elimination of the requirement to perform i increased verifications of the rod alignment limits with an 1 inor cable rod deviation alarm and the elimination of the LCO req,trement that this monitor be operable are acceptable and will l not adversely affect the safety of the plant. RIL Monitor / Alarm SR 4.1.3.6 has been modified for both units by deleting reference to the RIL monitor in the current surveillance, which requires verification of individual rod positions on a 4 hour frequency in j lieu of the normal frequency, when this monitor is inoperable. The Unit 1 24 hour frequency in SRs 4.1.3.5 and 4.1.3.6 and the Unit 2 24 hour frequency in SR 4.1.3.5 have also been changed to 12 hours to ensure the rod insertion limits are adeouately ~ monitored and to be consistent with the corresponding i surveillance intervals used in the ISTS. This change also provides consistency with the corresponding surveillance ] frequency between the units. This change does not affect the operation of the system and is consistent with the revision to j the ISTS. j Unit 1 SRs 4.1.3.5 and 4.1.3.6 have been additionally modified by 1 incorporating the Unit 2 wording which more closely provides a i surveillance appropriate for the LCO. The LCO requires the shutdown rods / control banks to be within the insertion limits and the revised SR requires a determination that each shutdown rod / control bank is within the insertion limits on a 12 hour l frequency. Therefore, the revised SRs are consistent with the i B-6

ATTACHMENT B, continusd Lic2nsa Amandnsnt Rsqusst Nos. 262 and 135 Page 7 LCO requirements and provide verification that the LCO is met. This change does not affect the operation of the rod position indication system or any other system and is consistent with the Unit 2 and ISTS wording. This change will not affect the ability of any system to perform its design function; therefore, this j change is acceptable and will not adversely affect the safety of i the plant. The normal surveillance interval retained in the TS requires verification that individual rod positions are within the TS required insertion limits on a 12 hour frequency. This i surveillance frequency provides sufficient information and is adequate to ensure the TS requirements for rod insertion are met. l The normal 12 hour frequency takes into account other information (i.e., rod position indication system, rod bottom alarm and excore neutron detectors) that is continuously available to the operator in the control room, so that during actual rod motion, deviations can be readily detected. The normal 12 hour surveillance frequency has been shown to be adequate to monitor the insertion limits through industry operating experience as approved and documented in the corresponding ISTS requirements. The RIL alarm is provided as an administrative aid to alert the operator to excessive rod insertion.- The RIL alarm does not perform any protective functions assumed in a safety analysis to mitigate a design basis accident. The rod position indication system provides direct visual indication of each rod position and continues to be required operable by the TS. A rod bottom alarm provides indication of a dropped rod. The deletion of the TS requirements associated with the RIL alarm'does not affect the operation of the rod position indication system or the assumptions of any accident analyses. The deletion of the TS requirements associated with this alarm is also consistent with the NRC approved content of the revision to the ISTS. Although the deletion of this alarm requirement from the TS results in elimination of the reduced surveillance interval when the alarm is inoperable, the effect is not significant considering the indications available to the operator and the relatively infrequent rod movement that occurs during steady state power operation. Therefore, based on the above, the elimination of the requirement to perform increased verifications of the insertion limits with an inoperable RIL alarm is acceptable and will not adversely affect the safety of the plant. AFD Monitor / Alarm SR 4.2.1.1 has been modified for both units by removing requirements which are based on the operability of the AFD monitor alarm. The affected requirements removed from the TS are l as follows: i l B-7

ATTACHMENT B, continusd License Amendment Request Nos. 262 and 135 Page 8 a.1 Monitoring the indicated AFD at least once per hour for the first 24 hours after restoring the AFD monitor to operable status. I b. Monitoring and logging the indicated AFD for each operable excore channel at least once per hour for the first 24 hours and at least once per 30 minutes thereafter, when the AFD monitor alarm is inoperable, in lieu of the normal once per 7 day frequency. The normal surveillance, which is retained within the TS, verifies that the AFD as indicated by the Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS) excore channels is within the target band. The normal surveillance frequency of 7 days is adequate because the AFD is effectively controlled by the operator via power and rod l manipulations and continuously monitored by the process computer. Furthermore, any deviations of the AFD from the target band that are not alarmed should be readily noticed through changes in rod positions or changes in power. Verification that the indicated AFD is within its limits once per 7 days provides sufficient history to allow the operator to detect a deviation from its l expected target. This frequency takes into account other information (i.e., rod position indication system, rod bottom alarm and excore neutron detectors) that is normally continuously available to the operator in the control room, so that during power operation, deviations from the target band can be readily detected. l The AFD monitor alarm is provided as an administrative aid to l alert the operator to AFD deviations outside the target band. The AFD monitor alarm does not perform any protective functions assumed in a safety analysis. The TSs continue to require AFD to be within the specified limits and the associated Actions provide adequate remedial measures when the AFD is outside those limits. Removal of the requirements associated with the AFD monitor alarm from the TS does not affect the operation of the excore neutron detector channels, rod position indication system or any other plant system. In addition, the removal of this information from the TS does not affect the assumptions of any accident analyses and is consistent with the NRC approved revision to the ISTS. The LRM will be revised as necessary to incorporate the I surveillance requirements associated with the AFD monitor and changes to those requirements will be controlled via the 10 CFR 50.59 process. Therefore, based on the above, relocating the requirement to perform increased AFD verifications with an l inoperable AFD alarm to the LRM is acceptable and will not l adversely affect the safety of the plant. QPTR Monitor / Alarm SR 4.2.4 has been modified for both units by removing the requirements associated with the QPTR monitor alarm to the LRM. i The affected requirements specify that QPTR must be calculated B-8 i l

-. - ~... - _ _. ATTACHMENT B, continund License Amendment Request Nos. 262 and 135 Page 9 within 12 hours and every 12 hours thereafter, when the QPTR alarm is inoperable, in lieu of the normal once per 7 day frequency. This SR verifies that the QPTR, as indicated by the NIS excore channels, is within its limits. The normal 7 day frequency for performing this surveillance is retained within the i TS and is adequate to detect the normally slow changes in QPTR. Changes in QPTR that occur quickly (e.g., a dropped rod), are typically detected by other indications of abnormality that prompt a verification of core power tilt. The normal 7 day frequency takes into account other information (i.e., rod position indication system, rod bottom ala: m and excore neutron detectors) that is continuously available to the operator in the control room, so that during power operation, deviations can be readily detected. The QPTR monitor alarm is provided as an administrative aid to alert the operator to changes in QPTR outside the TS limit. The QPTR monitor alarm does not perform any protective functions assumed in a safety analysis. The TS continue to require QPTR to be within the limit and provide appropriate remedial measures if that limit is exceeded. In

addition, the excore neutron detectors continue to be required operable by the TS and provide continuous indication of the neutron flux distribution in the core.

The movable incore detectors may also be used to determine QPTR. Removal of TS requirements associated with an inoperable QPTR monitor alarm does not affect the operation of the excore neutron detector system or the assumptions of any accident analysis. The removal of the TS requirements related to the QPTR alarm is also consistent with the NRC approved revision to the ISTS. The LRM will be revised as necessary to incorporate the surveillance requirements associated with the QPTR monitor and changes to those requirements will be controlled via the 10 CFR 50.59 process. Therefore, based on the above, relocating the requirement to perform increased QPTR verifications with an inoperable QPTR alarm to the LRM is acceptable and will not adversely affect the safety of the plant. E. NO :sIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATION The no significant hazard considerations involved with the proposed amendment have been evaluated. The three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) are as quoted below: The Commission may make a final determination, pursuant to the procedures in paragraph 50.91, that a proposed amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not: 1 (1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or i consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or 1 B-9

_-m._ ATTACHMENT B, continusd { Licence Amand:22nt Rcquoct Non. 262 and 135 Page 10 l I (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or 1 (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The following evaluation is provided for the no significant l hazards consideration standards. i 1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the j probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated? The proposed amendment would modify applicable Technical Specifications (TS) by deleting requirements associated with the rod position deviation monitor and rod insertion limit (RIL) monitor and relocating the requirements associated with the axial flux difference (AFD) monitor and quadrant j power tilt ratio (QPTR) monitor from the following specifications and Bases: Unit 1: 4.1.3.1.2, 3.1.3.2, 4.1.3.2.2, 4.1.3.2.3, 4.1.3.6, 4.2.1.1, 4.2.4; Unit 2: 4.1.3.1.2, 4.1.3.2, 4.1.3.6, 4.2.1.1, 4.2.4. The TS contain requirements where a reduced surveillance interval is required in the event the monitors referenced in 4 the above specifications, surveillance requirements (SR) and associated Bases are inoperable. Removing the requirements associated with these monitors from the TS will not affect the ability of any system to perform its design function. i-Nuclear Electric Institute (NEI) Technical Specification j Task Force (TSTF) 110 Revision 2 provides the basis for these changes and recommends relocating the requirements for these monitors to " plant administrative practices." The AFD monitor and the QPTR monitor requirements will be relocated to -the LRM and changes to these requirements will be i controlled in accordance with the 10 CFR 50.59 process which will require NRC approval if the change constitutes an unreviewed safety question. However, based on the smaller 4 change in surveillance intervals, deletion and not j relocation of the rod position deviation monitor and the RIL l monitor requirements can be justified and is proposed. 1 Although these monitors are being removed from the TSs, they will continue to be maintained as described in the UFSAR (subject to revisions via the 10 CFR 50.59 process). J Removing the rod. deviation monitor requirements from Unit 1 SR 4.1.3.2.3 makes the remaining portion of SR 4.1.3.2.3 j redundant to SR 4.1.3.2.2.a; therefore, SR 4 1.3.2.3 has i been deleted. In

addition, the 24 hour surveillance I

frequency in Unit 1 SR 4.1.3.2.2, 4.1.3.5 and 4.1.3.6 as B-10

ATTACHMENT B, continu2d Lic0nso A02ndrrnt R3 quest Non. 262 End 135 Page 11 well as in Unit 2 SR 4.1.3.5 is being changed to 12 hours to assure the required parameters are adequately monitored and to provide consistency between the units and related requirements as well as the Improved Standard Technical Specifications (ISTS). Removing these monitors from the TS is consistent with the NRC approved changes to the ISTS identified in TSTF-110, Revision 2. Verification that plant conditions are within specified limits at the frequency specified in the normal SR provides sufficient information that allows the operator to detect a parameter that is beginning to deviate from its expected limits. The specified frequency takes into account other information (i.e., rod position indication system, rod bottom alarm and excore neutron detectors) that is continuously available to the operator in the control room, so that during changes in plant conditions, deviation from the limits can.be readily detected. The. proposed changes do not affect the operation of the system or the accident analyses and are consistent with the NRC approved changes to the surveillances identified for the ISTS of NUREG-1431 identified in TSTF-110, Revision 2. These changes do not involve a change to plant equipment and do not affect the performance of plant equipment used to mitigate an accident. Although the deletion of these monitor requirements from the TS results in elimination of the reduced surveillance interval when the alarm is inoperable (for those requirements not being relocated to the LRM) the change in frequency is not significant considering the indications available to the operator and the relatively slow changes in the parameters being monitored during steady state operation. Therefore, based on the above, these changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequerces of an accident previously evaluated. Unit 1 SRs 4.1.3.5 and 4.1.3.6 have been additionally modified by incorporating the Unit 2 wording which more closely provides a surveillance appropriate for the LCo. The LCO requires the shutdown rods / control banks to be within the insertion limits and the revised SR requires a determination that each shutdown rod / control bank is within the insertion limits on a 12 hour frequency. Therefore, the revised SRs are consistent with the LCO requirements and more clearly provide verification that the LCO is met. This change does not affect the operation of the rod position indication system or any other system and is consistent with the Unit 2 and ISTS wording. This change will not affect the ability of any system to perform its design function; therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. B-11

i ATTACHMENT B, continued Licanse A2Cndmsnt Raquest Nos. 262 and 135 Page 12 2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated? Changing the surveillance frequency from 24 to 12 hours is more conservative and assures the affected parameters are adequately monitored. In

addition, the change removes monitors from the TSs and provides consistency between the j

SRs, the units and the ISTS.

Changing the surveillance i frequency, correcting the Unit 1 SRs and removing reference l to the identified monitors from the TS will not cause a t significant reduction in system reliability nor affect the ability of any system to perform its design function. There are no hardware changes associated with thie license amendment nor are there any changes in the method by which any safety-related plant system performs its safety function. No new accident scenarios, transient precursors, failure I mechanisms or limiting single failures are introduced as a result of these changes. These changes do not introduce any l l adverse effects or challenges to any safety-related systems, i No change is required to any system configurations, plant equipment or analyses. Therefore, these changes will not create the possibility of any new or different kind of l accident from any accident previously evaluated. l 3. Does the change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety? The proposed changes do not affect the acceptance criteria for any analyzed event nor impact any plant safety analyses since the assumptions used will remain unchanged. The safety limits assumed in the accident analyses and the design function of the equipment required to mitigate the consequences of any postulated accidents will not be changed since the proposed changes do not affect the accident l analyses assumptions or equipment required to mitigate design basis accidents described in the UFSAR. Although the deletion of these monitor requirements from the TSs results .in elimination of the reduced surveillance interval when the alarm is inoperable (for those requirements not being relocated to the LRM) the effect is not significant l considering the indications available to the operator and the relatively slow changes in the parameters being monitored during steady state operation. The TSs continue to assure the applicable operating parameters are maintained within the required limits. Based on engineering judgement, incorporating these changes will not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety. l The margin of safety depends upon maintenance of specific operating parameters within design limits. The TSs continue to require that these limits be maintained and provide appropriate remedial actions if a limit is exceeded. The B-12

ATTACHMENT B, continued Lic3nso AmEndE2nt Raquact Nos. 262 and 135 l Page 13 l maintenance of these limits continues to be assured through l performance of the normal surveillance at the proposed i frequency and the requirements for increased monitoring that are relocated to the LRM. Additional assurance that the required parameters are adequately monitored is provided through other information readily available (i.e., rod position indication system, rod bottom alarm and excore neutron detectors) that allows the operator to detect a parameter that is beginning to deviate from its expected limits and through the proposed changes which reduce the normal surveillance interval from 24 hours to 12 hours to assure the affected parameters are adequately monitored. Although these monitors are being removed from the TSs, they l will continue to be maintained as described in the UFSAR (subject to revisions via the 10 CFR 50.59 process). Therefore, the plant will be maintained within the analyzed limits and the proposed changes will not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. F. NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION Based on the considerations expressed above, it is concluded that the activities associated with this license amendment request satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 50.92(c) and, accordingly, a no significant hazards consideration finding is justified. G. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION This license amendment request changes a requirement with respect to a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. It has been determined that this license amendment request involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. This license amendment request changes a surveillance requirement with respect to a facility component located within the restricted area;

however, the category of this licensing action does not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment.

Accordingly, this license amendment request meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51. 2 2 (c) (9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this license amendment request. H. UFSAR CHANGES 1 j No changes to the UFSAR are required to address this License Amendment Request. t l B-13

~. - l 1 ATTACHMENT C-1 1 i Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 i .l License Amendment Request No. 262 ] DELETE INOPERABLE MONITOR REQUIREMENTS i I Applicable LRM changes i i i l I i l I t 1 i 4 i k a f 4 u 4 1 4 .i '1 l l; i 4 l i 4 Y i

BVPS-1 LICENSING REQUIREMENTS MANUAL I Axial Flux Difference (AFD) Monitnr Aurveillance Note: This surveillance is only required to be performed when the AFD monitor is inoperable and power is above 15% rated thermal power. Logged values of the AFD are assumed to exist during the preceding time interval. surveillance: Monitor and log the indicated AFD for each operable channel at least once per hour for the first 24 hours and at least once per 30 minutes thereafter. Monitor the indicated AFD for each operable excore channel at least once per hour for the first 24 hours after restoring the AFD monitor alarm to operable status. Ranen: Surveillance of the AFD verifies that the AFD, as indicated by the Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS) excore channels, is within its limits. When the AFD alarm is operable a 7 day surveillance interval is acceptable because of the low probability that this alarm can remain inoperable without detection. During operation above 15% RTP, when the AFD alarm is inoperable, the surveillance interval is reduced to detect operation outside of the target band and to compute the penalty deviation time before corrective action is required. The logged values of the AFD are assumed to exist for the preceding 24 hour interval in order for the operator to compute the cumulative penalty deviation time. Quadrant pnwer Tilt patin (opTR) Monient surveillance Note: This surveillance is only required to be performed when the QPTR monitor is inoperable. Surveillance: Verify the QPTR is within the limits every 12 hours. Banen: Surveillance of the QPTR verifies that the QPTR, as indicated by the Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS) excore channels, is within its limits. When the QPTR monitc is operable, surveillance is performed on a 7 day interval because of the low probability that this alarm can remain inoperable without detection. When the QPTR alarm is inoperable, the surveillance interval is reduced to 12 hours. This frequency is adequate to detect any relatively slow changes in QPTR, because for those causes of core power tilt that occur quickly (e.g., a dropped rod), there typically are other indications of abnormality that prompt a verification of core power tilt.

_... _ _ _ _ _. ~ _ _ # BVPS-2 LICE'NSING REQUIREMENTS MANUAL Axial Fluy Difference (AFD) Monitor surveillance j Note: This surveillance is only required to be performed when the AFD monitor is inoperable:and power is above 15% rated thermal power. Logged values of the AFD are assumed to exist during the preceding time interval. i surveillance: Monitor and log the indicated AFD for each operable channel at least once per hour for the first 24 hours and at least once per 30 minutes thereafter. Monitor the indicated AFD for each operable excore channel at least once per hour for the first 24 hours after restoring the AFD monitor alarm to operable status. Rasen: Surveillance of the AFD verifies that the AFD, as indicated by the Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS) excore channels, is within its limits. When the AFD alarm is operable a 7 day surveillance interval is acceptable because of the low probability that this alarm can remain inoperable without detection. During operation above 15% RTP, when the AFD alarm is inoperable, the surveillance interval is reduced to detect operation outside of the target band and to' compute the penalty deviation time before corrective action is required. The logged values of the AFD are assumed to exist for the preceding 24 hour interval in order for the operator to compute the cumulative penalty deviation time, cuadrant power vilt natin (opTni Mnnitor surveillance Note: This surveillance is only required to be performed when the QPTR monitor is inoperable, surveillance: Verify the QPTR is within the limits every 12 hours. nanen: Surveillance of the QPTR verifies that the QPTR, as indicated by the Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS) excore channels, is within i its limits. When the QPTR monitor is

operable, surveillance is performed on a 7 day interval because of the low probability that this alarm ~can remain inoperable without detection.

When the QPTR alarm is - inoperable, the surveillance interval is reduced to 12 hours. This j l. frequency is adequate to detect any relatively slow changes in QPTR, l because for those causes of core power tilt that occur quickly (e.g., a dropped rod), there typically are other indications of abnormality that prompt a verification of core power tilt. f s I

,. - - _ -. - - -.. - _. _.. _..... ~. 4 1 ATTACHMENT C-2 Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Fo. 2 License Amendment Request No. 135 { DELETE INOPERABLE MONITOR REQUIREMENTS i 4, i j Applicable LRM changes J i: i i i 1 i i a i b i e i a ( 1 i 4 5 E. I i 4 i 4 i, 4 i i i j 1 d -,}}