Text

Proposed Tech Specs Revising TS 3.7.1.1, Svs, Incorporating Improved STS Guidance of NUREG-1431 & Recommendations of W Nuclear Safety Advisory 94-01,dtd 940120
	ML20236P805
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	07/09/1998
From:	; DUQUESNE LIGHT CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20236P803	List: L-98-146, Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-66 & NPF-73,modifying TS 3.7.1.1, SVs & Associated Bases to Incorporate Improved STS Guidance of NUREG-1431 & Recommendations of W Nuclear Safety Advisory Ltr 94-01,dtd 940120; ML20236P805;
References
	RTR-NUREG-1431 NUDOCS 9807170152
	Download: ML20236P805 (62)
	v • d • e

,

ATTACHMENT A-1 Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 214 1

The following is a list of the affected pages:

! Affected Pages: VII l XII XVII 3/4 7-1 3/4 7-2 3/4 7-3 deleted 3/4 7-4 B 3/4 7-1 B 3/4 7-2 ,

9 I

l l

9807170152 980709 PDR ADOCK 05000334 P pg

..*' DPR-66 IUDEX y

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE I' L 3 / 4 .' 7 PLANT SYSTEMS

)

3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE (Luk s%

ASafety Valves A.(Mss Vd

.3/4.7.1.1 ............. 3/4 7-1 l 3/4.7.1.2' Auxiliary Feedwater System. . . . . . . . 3/4 7-5 3/4.7.1.3 -Primary Plant Demineralized Water (PPDW). 3/4 7-7 l 3/4.7.1.4 Activity. . . .............. 3/4 7-8 )

l-3/4*.7.1.5 Main Steam Line Isolation Valves. . . . . 3/4 7-10 3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATION. . .............. 3/4 7-11 l- . . .

.3/4.'7.3- . COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM. . . . . . 3/4 7-12

!' 3/4.7.4 REACTOR' PLANT RIVER WATER SYSTEM. . . . . 3/4 7-13 l

ULTIMATE HEAT SINK - OHIO RIVER 3/4 7-14

~

l' 3/_4.7.5 .. . . .

3/4.7.6 FLOOD PROTECTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-15 3/4.7.7 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY HABITABILITY

SYSTEMS .. . ............... 3/4 7-16 3/4.'7.8 . SUPPLEMENTAL LEAK COLLECTION AND

' RELEASE SYSTEM. ............. 3/4 7-19 "3/4.7.9- SEALED-SOURCE CONTAMINATION . . . . . .. 3/4 7-22 3/4.7.12 SNUBBERS. . . ..............

3/4 7-26 l 3/4.7.13' ' AUXILIARY RIVER WATER SYSTEM. . . . . . . 3/4 7-34 1

.3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.1 A.C. SOURCES ,

3/4 8-1 L3/4.8.1.1' . Operating-. .. ............. -)

3/4.8.1.2 Shutdown. . .. ......-.......

3/4 8-5

' BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT'l VII Amendment ' No. -M8-

$hf0 Sed U]db

__ . - - - - a

i DPR-66 INDEX BASES SECTION PAGE 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS l

3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE MdA Shed (MSS 6,)

3/4.7.1.1 4 Safety Valves 4........................... B 3/4 7-1 3/4.7".1.2 Auxiliary Feedwater System..............

, B 3/4 7-2 l 3/4.7.1.3 Primary Plant Demineralized- Water . ......... . . B 3/4 7-2j l 3/4.7.1.4 Activity................................ B 3/4 7-3.

3/4.7.1.5 Main Steam Line Isolation. Valves........ B-3/4 7 3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE:

LI M ITATI ON . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 7 3/4.7.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM.......... B 3/4 7-4.

3/4.7.4 RIVER WATER SYSTEM...................... B 3/4 7-4 3/4.7.5 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK...................... .B 'l/4 7 3/4.7.6. FLOOD PROTECTION........................ B 3/4 7-4 3/4.7.7- CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY HABITABILITY SYSTEM.................................. B 3/4 7-5 3/4.7.8 SUPPLEMENTAL LEAK COLLECTION AND -

RELEASE SYSTEM.......................... B 3/4 7-5 3/4.7.9 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION............. B 3/4 7-5 3/4.7.12 SNUBBERS................................ B 3/4 7-6 3/4.7.13 AUXILIARY RIVER WATER SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 7-7 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.1 AND 3/4.S.2 A.C. SOURCES, D.C. SOURCES AND ~

ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS....... B 3/4 8-1 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION..................... B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION......................... B 3/4 9 O i

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 XII Amendment No. -206-Wrofc6e YOYYin}b

l .

l l DPR-66 l Table Index (cont.)

TABLE TITLE

! PAGE 3.3-11 Accident Monitoring Instrumentation 3/4 3-51 4.3-7 Accident Monitoring Instrumentation 3/4 3-52 Surveillance Requirements !

3.3-13 Explosive Gas Monitoring Instrumentation 3/4 3-55 l

l 4.3-13 Explosive Gas Monitoring Instrumentation 3/4 3-57 Surveillance Requirements ,

4.4-1 Minimum Number of Steam Generators to be Inspected During Inservice Inspection 3/4 4 ' toe l

I 4.4-2 Steam Generator Tube Inspection !

3/4 4-10f l l

4.4-3 ' Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation 3/4"4-14b-Valves 3.4-1 Reactor Coolant System Chemistry Limits 3/4 4-16 4.4-10 Reactor Coolant System Chemistry Limits

Surveillance Requirements 3/4 4-17 4.4-12 Primary Coolant Specific Activity Sample and Analysis Program 3/4 4-20 l 3.7-1 /%in S% Sddy"-"-

-:; ic.c. T.11 r bl Alve LiH Se&

i I igh S:tp; int '.'ith In;;;r:bl; St;;;1ine

".:ng: !?:2 _ -. . F1- 3/4 7-2 S:fety Val? _ E m ing 3 L::p 0; ratien -

'3.7-2 M; itur ?.lle" ble P^"cr Pang ^ ??^utre- Flu 3/4 7-3 High S:tprint Uith In perable Eterr Lin:

Safety Valc;; Ouring 3 L::p Op:rstien

- 3 . -' 3 Sterm Line S f t; V21?0 P^r E P '3/4 '-t 4.7-1 Snubber' Visual Inspection Interval I

3/4 7-31 4.7-2 Secondary Coolant System Specific Activity Sample and Analysis Program 3/4 7-9 3.8 Battery Surveillance Requirements 3/4 8-9a 3.9-1 Beaver Valley Fuel Assembly Minimum Burnup~ '3/4 9-15' vs. Initial U235 Enrichment For Storage in Recion 2 Spent Fuel Racks #

oPEuew hin 51e6 9deG Wiva versus Aylkd/s Py &

\ in few-ni d RATEb THFAHAL PowEg. (R.Tf) ,

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 XVII Amendment No.-MG--

F.

DPR-66

, 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE ffAIN srMM A SAFETY VALVES N1$$/s)

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION r

3.7.1.1 All mainsteamlinecodesafetyvalvesassociatedwitheach) l steam generator of an unisolated reactor coolant loop shall be l OPERABLE with Lift Settings within +1% -3% of the value specified in Table 3.7-3.**

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

l i

ACTION:

a. With 3 reactor coolant loops and associated steam generators in operation and with one or more main steam line code safety valves inoperable, operation in MODES 1, 2 and 3 may proceed provided, that within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months , either the i

inoperable valve is restored to OPERABLE status or the l

Power Range Neutron Flux High Setpoint trip is reduced per Table 3.7-1; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following )

30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

j b. With 2 reactor coolant loops and associated steam

generators in operation and with one or more main steamline l code safety valves associated with an operating loop

! inoperable, operation in MODES 1, 2 and 3 may' proceed provided, that within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months , either the inoperable valve l

is restored to OPERABLE status or the Power Range Neutron Flux High Setpoint trip is reduced per . Table 3.7-2; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.1 No additional surveillance requirements other than those

-required by Specification 4.0.5.

Within i 1% of the value specified in Table 3.7-3 following km*a*insteamlinecodesafetyvalvetesting. _j) f l

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 7-1 Amendment No. 444-Yt&f03tY YO**kt E-___.-___--____-----.--_-----------__ - _ - - - -- - - - - J

~

INSERT 1 3.7.1.1 The MSSVs shall be OPERABLE as specified in Table 3.7-1 and Table 3.7-2.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

- - - - - - - - - - - - - GENERAL NOTE ---------------

Separate ACTION entry,is allowed for each MSSV.

a. With one or more required MSSVs inoperable, within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months reduce _ power to less than or equal to the applicable percent RATED THERMAL POWER listed in Table 3.7-1; otherwise,-be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

b.- With one or more steam generators with less than two MSSVs OPERABLE within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months be in HOT STANDBY and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

c. .The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.1.1 ~

Verify!1k each required MSSV lift setpoint per ' Table 3.7-2 in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. Following testing, lift settings shall be within f 1 percent.

1 l

(1). Required to be performed only in MODES 1 and 2.

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E R L e E B gtW A nnO R aiP E Ro P pL O rtA

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. INSERT 2 OPERABLE Main Steam Safety Valves versus Applicable Power in Percent of RATED THERMAL POWER (RTP)

MINIMUM NUMBER OF MSSVs PER STEAM GENERATOR APPLICABLE POWER REQUIRED OPERABLE (% RTP) 5 5 100 4 5 57 3 $ 39 2 5 22 e

l ,

C_______-.____________ J

T ntO a 5 4 2 S anP V Ri E oL n L rpA o .

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LR o e FU o h E D L t L N B OS n A RE o T TV UL E EA L NV B A

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-___7_____--_-__

.DPR-66 g

TABLE 3.7-X l STEAM LINE GAFETY VALVES PER LOOP LIFT ORIFICE VALVE NUMBER SETTING *** DIAMETER

a. SV-MS101A, B&C 1075 psig 4.250 in.

b. SV-MS102A, B&C 1085 psig 4.515 in.

c. SV-MS103A, B&C 1095 psig 4.515 in.

d .' SV-MS104A, B&C 1110 psig 4.515 in.

e. SV-MS105A, B&C 1125 psig 4.515 in.

8

- - The Lift Setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valve at nominal operating temperature and

, ressure. j REM.Ac& wtry sNs&R7 3 l

AND ZNCLukt eN PME 1/9 7-1.

l i

l BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 7-4 Amendment No.115 htItk Nid [Agt

l INSERT 3 Main Steam Safety Valve Lift settings t

VALVE NUMBER l- LIFT SETTING (2) l STEAM GENERATOR (Psig +1%-3%)

l #1 #2 #3 I

l SV-MS-101A SV-MS-101B SV-MS-101C 1075 SV-MS-102A SV-MS-102B SV-MS-102C 1085 SV-MS-103A SV-MS-103B SV-MS-103C 1095 SV-MS-104A SV-MS-104B SV-MS-104C 1110 SV-MS-105A SV-MS-105B SV-MS-105C 1125 l

1 +

l l

(2) The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valve at nominal operating temperature and pressure.

l I

i l

l l-

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - 1

~~

DPR-66 l

3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE I (Elit! S TBA/1 3/4.7.1.1 SAFETY VALVES 6145 Vs) gg gjgj gg/ffjydT The OPERABILITY of the main steam line code safety valves ensures that the secondary system pressure will be limited to within its design pressure of 1085 psig during the most severe anticipated system operational transient. Tha maximum relieving capacity is associated with a turbine trip from 100% RATED THERMAL POWER f coincident with an assumed loss of condenser heat sink (i.e., no steam bypass to the condenser). f The specified valve lift settings and relieving capacities are in accordance with the requirements of Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Code, 1971 Edition. The total relieging capacity for all valves on all of the steam lines is 12.8 x 10 lbs/hr ghich is f 110 percent of the total secondary steam flow of 11.7 x 10 lbs/hr at 100% RATED THERMAL POWER. A minimum of 2 OPERABLE safety valves per' operable steam generator ensures that sufficient relieving capacity is available for the allowable THERMAL POWER restriction in Table 3.7-2,.

STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION is allowable with safety valves inoperable within the limitations of the ACTION requirements on the basis of the reduction in secondary system steam flow and THERMAL POWER required by the reduced reactor trip settings of the Power

Range Neutron riux channels. The reactor trip setpoint reductions ~l are derived on the following bases: -

For N loop operation SP = (X) - (Y)(V) =

x (109)

X -

For N-1 loop operation i

SP = (X) -

(Y)(U) =

x (W)

X f' I Where:

1

SP = reduced reactor trip setpoint in percent of RATED THERMAL POWER V = maximum number of inoperable safety valves per steam )

line _ ,/

l l

[

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-1 I (lt"0lWecllL' set)r<

j

, .. DPR-66 ~

PLANT SYSTEMS. ,

.. )

BASES Mgig .STE M g SAFETY VALVES (Continued) gg f g/g y gy y

[U. = maximum number of inoperable safety valves w

per operating steam line (109) = Power Range Neutron Flux-High Trip Setpoint for (N)

?

loop operation (W) = 71 percent of RATED THERMAL POWER permissible by P Setpoint for 2 loop operation with stop valves open -

(W) = 66 percent of RATED THERMAL POWER permissible by P-8 Setpoint for 2 loop operation with

+ stop valves _

closed X =

Total relieving capacity ~ of .all safety valves per stean:line in lbs/ hour- (4,261,666)_

Y =

Maximum. relieving- capacity- of one safety. valve in -

lbs/ hour (873,600)

~

3/4.7.1.2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM (AFW)-

BACKGROUND The AFW System aut'omatically supplies feedwater to the- steam-generators to remove decay heat from the Reactor Coolant System' upon the loss of normal feedwater supply. The AFW system consists of two motor driven pumps and one steam turbine driven pump. The pumps are equipped with independent recirculation lines to prevent pump operation against a closed system. Each. motor driven AFW pump is powered from an independent Class 1E power supply and each' pump' feeds all three steam! generators. The steam turbine driven' AFW pump receives steam from two of the three main steam lines upstream-of the main steam isolation valves. Each of the steam feed lines will supply 100 percent of the steam requirements for the turbine driven AFW pump. The steam feed lines from each of the main steam lines combine to form one main header. The main header then splits-into two parallel paths with one Train "A" operated and one Train' "B" operated ~ isolation valve on each pathway.

These two parallel paths then combine into one header which supplies the turbine driven AFW pump.

The flow path from the demineralized water storage tank (WT-TK-10) to-the steam' generators consists of individual supply lines to each of the three AFW pumps. Each motor driven AFW pump has an '

individual line that connects to its train related supply header.

[ In addition, each motor driven AFW pump has the ability to be -

aligned to the opposite train header. The turbine driven pump has .

J ,

BEAVER' VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-2 Amendment No. -206-

INSERT 4 BACKGROUND The primary purpose of the main steam safety valves (MSSVs) is to provide overpressure protection for the secondary system. The MSSVs also provide protection against overpressurizing the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) by providing a heat sink for the removal of energy from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) if the preferred heat sink, provided by the Condenser and Circulating Water System, is not available.

Five MSSVs are located on each main steam header, outside containment, upstream of the main steam isolation valves, as described in the UFSAR, Section 10.3.1. The specified valve lift settings and relieving capacities are in accordance with the requirements of Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Code, 1971 Edition. The total relieging capacity for all valves on all of the steam lines is 12.8 x 10 lbs/hr which is 110 percent of the total secondary steam flow of 11.7 x 106 lbs/hr at 100% RATED THERMAL POWER. The MSSV design includes staggered setpoints, according to Table 3.7-2 in the accompanying limiting condition for operation (LCO), so that only the needed valves will actuate. Staggered setpoints reduce the potential for valve chattering that is due to steam pressure insufficient to fully open all valves following a turbine reactor trip.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The design basis for the MSSVs comes from the ASME Code,Section III and its purpose is to limit the secondary system pressure to less than or equal to 110 percent of design pressure when passing 100 percent of design steam flow. This design basis is sufficient to cope with any anticipated operational occurrence (AOO) or accident considered in the Design Basis Accident (DBA) and transient analysis.

The events that challenge the relieving capacity of the MSSVs, and thus RCS pressure, are those characterized as decreased heat removal events, which are presented in UFSAR, Section 14.1. Of these, the full power turbine trip without steam dump is the limiting AOO. This event also terminates normal feedwater flow to the steam generators.

The transient response for turbine trip without a direct reactor trip presents no hazard to the integrity of the RCS or the Main Steam System. If a minimum reactivity feedback is assumed, the reactor is tripped on high pressurizer pressure. In this case, the pressurizer.

safety valves open, and RCS pressure remains below 110 percent of the design value. The MSSVs also open to limit the secondary steam pressure.

If maximum reactivity feedback is assumed, the reactor is tripped on overtemperature AT. The departure from nucleate boiling ratio increases throughout the transient, and never drops below its initial value. Pressurizer relief valves and MSSVs are activated and prevent l overpressurization in the primary and secondary systems. The MSSVs are assumed to have two active and one passive failure modes. The f active failure modes are spurious opening, and failure to reclose l

once opened. The passive failure mode is failure to open upon demand.

l l

L___-__________________________.

1 l

1 JNSERT 4 (Continued)

M l l

The accident analysis requires four MSSVs per steam generator to provide overpressure protection for design basis transients occurring at 102 percent RATED THERMAL POWER (RTP). An MSSV will be considered inoperable if it fails to open on demand. The LCO requires that five MSSVs be OPERABLE in compliance with the ASME Code,Section III, even though this is not a requirement of the DBA analysis. This is !

because operation with less than the full number of MSSVs requires l limitations on allowable THERMAL POWER (to meet ASME Code requirements). These limitations are according to Table 3.7-1 in the accompanying LCO and associated ACTION.

The OPERABILITY of the MSSVs is defined as the ability to open within the setpoint tolerances, relieve steam generator overpressure, and reseat when pressure has been reduced. The OPERABILITY of the MSSVs is determined by periodic surveillance testing in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.

The lift settings, according to Table 3.7-2 in the acco- Enying LCO, correspond to ambient conditions of the valve at nr.ina; operating temperature and pressure, as identified by a note.

This LCO provides assurance that the MSSVs will perform their designed safety functions to mitigate the consequences of accidents ;

that could result in a challenge to the RCPB.

l APPLICABILITY l In MODE 1 above 22% RTP, the number of MSSVs per steam generator required to be OPERABLE must be according to Table 3.7-1 in the ;

accompanying LCO. In Mode 1 below 22% RTP and in Modes 2 and 3 only '

two MSSVs per steam generator are required to be OPERABLE.

In MODES 4 and 5, there are no credible transients requiring the MSSVs. The steam generators are not normally used for heat removal in MODES 5 and 6, and thus cannot be overpressurized; there is no requirement for the MSSVs to be OPERABLE in these MODES.

ACTION The ACTIONS are modified by a General Note indicating that separate condition entry is allowed for each MSSV.

a. With one or more MSSVs inoperable, reduce power so that the available MSSV relieving capacity meets the ASME Code,Section III requirements for the applicable THERMAL POWER.

Operation with less than all five MSSVs OPERABLE for each steam generator is permissible, if THERMAL POWER is proportionally limited to the relief capacity of the remaining MSSVs. This is accomplished by restricting THERMAL POWER so that the energy transfer to the most limiting steam generator is not greater than the available relief capacity in that steam generator.

.- i INSERT 4 fContinued) l The THERMAL POWER is limited by the governing equation in the l relationship q = mAh, where q is the heat input from the primary side, a is the steam flow rate and Ah is the heat of !

vaporization at the steam relief pressure (assuming no subcooled l l

feedwater). For'each steam generator, at a specified pressure, ;

the' fractional power level (FPL) is determined as follows: l l

-(w. hrg N) ,

FPL = 100/Q -

9 i K !

where:

FPL a Fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER equivalent to the safety analysis limit minus 9 percent (to account for typical instrument and channel

+

uncertainties). The uncertainty ensures the maximum plant operating power level will then be lower than the safety analysis limit by an appropriate operating margin.

Q = Nominal NSSS power rating of the plant (including reactor coolant pump heat), Mwt (Btu /sec)

K = Conversion factor, 947.82 Mwt

=

w. . Minimum-total steam-flow rate capability of the

, operable MSSVs on any one steam generator at the highest MSSV opening pressure including tolerance and accumulation, as appropriate, in lb/sec. For example, if the maximum number of inoperable MSSVs on any one steam generator is one, then w, should ~ be a summation of the capacity of the operable MSSVs at the highest operable .MSSV operating pressure, excluding the highest capacity MSSV. If the maximum number of inoperable MSSVs per steam generator is three then w, should be a summation of the capacity of the operable MSSVs at the highest operable MSSV-operating pressure, excluding the three highest capacity MSSVs.

hfg = heat of vaporization for steam at the highest MSSV opening pressure including tolerance and accumulation, as appropriate, Btu /lbm N = Number of loops in plant i

l 1

1

I INSERT 4 (Continued)

. b.- If.the MSSVs cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated completion' time, or if one or more steam generators have less than two MSSVs OPERABLE, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and in MODE 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . The allowed completion times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions.from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

c. An exception to. Specification 3.0.4 is.provided since the above ACTION statements require a shutdown if they are not met within a specified period of time.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (SR)

,SR 3.7.1.1 This SR verifies the OPERABILITY of the MSSVs by the verification of each 1 MSSV lift setpoint in accordance with the Inservice Testing

-Program. The ASME Code,Section XI, requires that safety and relief

. valve tests be performed in accordance with ANSI /ASME OM-1-1987.

According to ANSI /ASME OM-1-1987, the.following tests are required:

a. Visual examination; b '.. Seat tightness determination;

c. Jetpoint pressure determination (lift setting); and

d. Compliance with. owner's seat tightness criteria.

The ANSI /ASME Standard requires that all valves be tested every 5 years. The ASME Code specifies the activities and frequencies necessary to satisfy the requirements. Table 3.7-2 allows a

+1 percent -3 percent setpoint tolerance for OPERABILITY; however, the valves are reset to 1 percent during the Surveillance to allow for drift.. ,

.This SR is modified by a Note that allows entry into and operation in l MODE 3 prior to. performing the SR. The MSSVs may be either bench l tested or tested in situ at hot conditions'using an assist device to ;

simulate lift pressure. If the MSSVs are not tested at hot ;

l : conditions, the lift setting pressure shall be corrected to ambient i

! conditions of the valve at operating temperature and pressure.

l !

j f

-(:

o_ - - - - - - - - - - -

1.

I

+

ATTACHMENT A-2 Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 81 l The following is a list of the affected pages:

Affected Pages: VII 3/4 7-1 3/4 7-2 3/4 7-3 l B 3/4 7-1 B 3/4 7-2 l

t l

1 4

C NPF-73 INDEX LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION pAGE

- 3/4. 6. 4 - COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL 3/4.6.4.1 Hydrogen Analyzers. . ........... ,3/4 6-31

.3/4.6.4.2 Electric Hydrogen Recombiners . ...... 3/4 6-32

'3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE Maa Sieam ASafetyValvesf.lisst{d l 3/4.7.1.1 . . . ........... 3/4 7-1 3/4.7.1.2 Auxiliary Feedwater System. ........ 3/4 7-4 3/4.7.1.3 Primary Plant Demineralized Water (PPDW). . 3/4 7-6 3/4.I.1.4 Activity . . . . . . ........... 3/4 7'-7 3/4.7.1.5 Main Steam Line Isolation Valves . . . . . 3/4 7-9 3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATION. . . . . . ........... 3/4 7-10 3/4.7.3 PRIMARY COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM. . . 3/4 7-11 3/4.7.4 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM (SWS). ........ 3/4 7-12 3/4.7.5 ULTIMATE' HEAT SINK - OHIO RIVER . . . . . . 3/4 7-13

.3/4.7.6 FLOOD PROTECTION. . . ........... 3/4 7-14 3/4.7.7 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY AIR CLEANUP AND 3/4 7-15 PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM ..........

l l 3/4.7.8 SUPPLEMENTAL LEAK COLLECTION AND RELEASE 3/4 7-18 l

SYSTEM (SLCRS). . . . ...........

l 3/4.7.9 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION ........ 3/4 7-20 3/4.7.12 SNUBBERS. . . . . . ............ 3/4 7-24 3/4.7.13 STANDBY SERVICE WATER SYSTEM (SWE) . . . . . 3/4 7-30 l

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 VIJ '

Amendment No. 49- l

, (ff>fd39{ ido/tlt j

. .- NPF-73 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE 948tN ST4A/1 A SAFETY VALVES dT5f Vs)

R&tLACE WITH INSEkr )

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION /

/

.7.1.1 All main steam line code safety valves associated with each steam generator shall be OPERABLE with lift settings within + 1% - 3% of the value D

specified in Table 3.7-2.**

' APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

a. With 3 reactor coolant loops and associated steam generators in operation and with one'or more main steam line code safety valves inoperable, operation in MODES 1, 2 and 3 may proceed provided, that within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months , either the inoperable valve is restored to.

OPERABLE status or the Power Range Neutron Flux High Setpoint trip is reduced per Table 3.7-1; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . ,

b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.1.1 No additional surveillance requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5.

- Within i 1% of the value specified in Table 3.7-2 following main steamline code safety valve testing. J BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 7-1 Amendment No. 5 (fNpe.rtd WHSg)

. ' INSERT 1

' 3.7.1.1 The MSSVs shall be OPERABLE as specified in Table 3.7-1 and Table 3.7-2.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION *

- - - - - - - - - - - - - GENERAL NOTE --------------- 4 Separate ACTION entry is allowed for each MSSV.

(

a. With one or more required MSSVs inoperable, within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months reduce power to less than or equal to the applicable percent RATED THERMAL POWER listed in Table 3.7-1; otherwise, be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in i HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . l

b. With one or more steam generators with less than two MSSys OPERABLE within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months be in HOT STANDBY and' in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

. l

c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

f SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.1.1 Verify W each required MSSV lift setpoint per Table 3.7-2 in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. Following testing, lift settings shall be within i i percent.

(1) Required to be performed only in MODES 1 and 2.

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e. INSERT 2 OPERABLE Main Steam Safety Valves versus Applicable Power in Percent of RATED THERMAL POWER (RTP)

MINIMUM NUMB 5R OF MSSVs PER STEAM GENERATOR APPLICABLE POWER REQUIRED OPERABLE (% RTP) 5 5 100 4 5 58 3 $ 41 2 5 24

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- ' INSERT 3 Main Steam Safety Valve Lift Settings VALVE NUMBER LIFT SETTING (2)

STEAM GENERATOR (Psig +14-3%)

1 p2 g3 2 MSS-SV101A 2 MSS-SV101B 2 MSS-SV101C 1075 2 MSS-SV102A 2 MSS-SV102B 2 MSS-SV102C 1085 2 MSS-SV103A 2 MSS-SV103B 2 MSS-SV103C 1095 2 MSS-SV104A 2 MSS-SV104B 2 MSS-SV104C 1110 2 MSS-SV105A 2 MSS-SV105B 2 MSS-SV105C 1125 (2) The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valve at nominal operating temperature and pressure.

I l

. 1 i

f

r INSERT 4 BACKGROUND The primary purpose of the main steam safety valves (MSSVs) is to provide overpressure protection for the secondary system. The MSSVs also provide protection against overpressurizing the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) by providing a heat sink for the removal of energy from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) if the preferred heat sink, provided by the Condenser and circulating Water System, is not available.

i Five MSSVs are located on each main steam header, outside i containment, upstream of the main steam isolation valves, as I described in the UFSAR, Section 10.3.2. The specified valve lift settings and relieving capacities are in accordance with the requirements of Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Code, 1971 Edition and Winter 1972 Addenda. The total religving capacity for all olves on all of the steam lines is 12.7 x 10 lbs/gr which is 110 percent of the total secondary steam flow of 11.6 x 10 lbs/hr at 100% RATED THERMAL POWER. The MSSV design includes staggered setpoints, acct.rding to Table 3.7-2 in the accompanying limiting condition for operation (LCO), so that only the needed valves will actuate. Staggered setpoints reduce the potential for valve chattering that is due to steam pressure insufficient to fully open all valves following a turbine reactor trip.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The design basis for the MSSVs comes from the ASME Code,Section III and its purpose is to limit the secondary system pressure to less than or equal to 110 percent of design pressure when passing 100 percent of design steam flow. This design basis is sufficient to cope with any anticipated operational occurrence (AOO) or accident

! considered in the Design Basis Accident (DBA) and transient analysis.

The events that challenge the relieving capacity of the MSSVs, and thus RCS pressure, are those characterized as decreased heat removal events, which are presented in UFSAR, Section 15.2. Of these, the

full power turbine trip without steam dump is the limiting AOO. This I

event also terminates normal feedwater flow to the steam generators.

l The transient response for turbine trip without a direct reactor trip presents no hazard to the integrity of the RCS or the Main Steam System. If a minimum reactivity feedback is assumed, the reactor is tripped on high pressurizer pressure. In this case, the pressurizer safety valves open, and RCS pressure remains below 110 percent of the design value. The MSSVs also open to limit the secondary steam pressure.

If maximum reactivity feedback is assumed, the reactor is tripped on l overtemperature AT. The departure from nucleate boiling ratio increases throughout the transient, and never drops below its initial value. Pressurizer relief valves and MSSVs are activated and prevent overpressurization in the primary and secondary systems. The MSSVs are assumed to have two active and one passive failure modes. The active failure modes are spurious opening, and failure to reclose once opened. The passive failure mode is failure to open upon demand.

l l

l L__________________

r INSERT 4 (Continued)

LC.Q The accident analysis requires four MSSVs per steam generator to provide overpressure protection for design basis transients occurring at 102 percent RATED THERMAL POWER (RTP). An MSSV will be considered inoperable if it fails to open on demand. The LCO requires that five MSSVs be OPERABLE in compliance with the ASME Code,Section III, even though this is not a requirement of the DBA analysis. This is because operation with less than the full number of MSSVs requires limitations on allowable THERMAL POWER (to meet ASME Code requirements). These limitations are according to Table 3.7-1 in the accompanying LCO and associated ACTION.

The OPERABILITY of the MSSVs is defined as the ability to open within the setpoint tolerances, relieve steam generator overpressure, and reseat when pressure has been reduced. The OPERABILITY of the MSSVs is determined by periodic surveillance testing in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.

The lift settings, according to Table 3.7-2 in the accompanying LCO, correspond to ambient conditions of the valve at nominal operating temperature and pressure, as identified by a note.

This LCO provides assurance that the MSSVs will perform their designed safety functions to mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in a challenge to the RCPB.

APPLICABILITY In MODE 1 above 24% RTP, the number of MSSVs per steam generator required to be OPERABLE must be according to Table 3.7-1 in the accompanying LCO. In Mode 1 below 24% RTP and in Modes 2 and 3 only two MSSVs per steam generator are required to be OPERABLE.

In MODES 4 and 5, there are no credible transients requiring the I MSSVs. The steam generators are not normally used for heat removal in MODES 5 and 6, and thus cannot be overpressurized; there is no requirement for the MSSVs to be OPERABLE in these MODES.

ACTION 1

The ACTIONS are modified by a General Note indicating that separate condition entry is allowed for each MSSV.

a. With one or more MSSVs inoperable, reduce power so that the available MSSV relieving capacity meets the ASME Code,Section III requirements for the applicable THERMAL POWER.

Operation with less than all five MSSVs OPERABLE for each steam generator is permissible, if THERMAL POWER is proportionally limited to the relief capacity of the remaining MSSVs. This is accomplished by restricting THERMAL POWER so that the energy transfer to the most limiting steam generator is not greater than the available relief capacity in that steam generator.

w____-___-____ __

7 l .

.. INSERT 4 (Continued)

, The THERMAL POWER is limited by the governing equation in the i relationship q = mAh, where q is the heat input from the i primary side, m is the steam flow rate and Ah is the heat of vaporization at the steam relief pressure (assuming no subcooled-feedwater). For each steam generator, at a specified pressure, the fractional power level (FPL) is determined as follows:

l (w. hfg N) l FPL = 100/Q -

9 l K where:

FPL = Fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER equivalent to the l safety analysie limit minus 9 percent (to account j for typical instrument and channel uncertainties). The uncertainty ensures the j , maximum plant operating power level will then be l lower than the safety analysis limit by an

appropriate operating margin.

l Q = Nominal NSSS power rating of the plant (including l reactor coolant pump heat), Mwt (Btu /sec) i K = Conversion factor, 947.82 Mwt l w. = Minimum total steam flow rate capability of the l

operable MSSVs on any one steam generator at the highest MSSV opening pressure including tolerance and accumulation, as appropriate, in lb/sec. For example, if the maximum number of inoperable

MSSVs on any one steam generator is one, then w.

should be a summation of the capacity of the operable MSSVs at the highest operable MSSV

! operating pressure, excluding the highest l l capacity MSSV. If the maximum number of

( inoperable MSSVs per steam generator is three then w e should be a summation of the capacity of l the operable MSSVs at the highest operable MSSV j operating pressure, excluding the three highest capacity MSSVs.

hfg = heat of vaporization for steam at the highest MSSV opening pressure including tolerance and l accumulation, as appropriate, Btu /lbm j I N = Number of loops in plant 4

t_____________________________________-__. - - - - - - - - - - - - _ _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

.- INSERT 4 (Continued)

b. If the MSSVs cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated completion time, or if one or more steam generators i have less than two MSSVs OPERABLE, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, j the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and '

in MODE 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . The allowed completion times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner i and without challenging unit systems. '

c. An exception to Specification 3.0.4 is provided since the above ACTION statements require a shutdown if they are not met within a specified period of time.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (SR) l SR 3.7.1.1 This SR verifies the OPERABILITY of the MSSVs by the verification of each MSSV lift setpoint in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. The ASME Code,Section XI, requires that safety and relief valve tests be performed in accordance with ANSI /ASME OM-1-1987.

According to ANSI /ASME OM-1-1987, the following tests are required:

a. Visual examination;

b. Seat tightness determination; i'

c. Setpoint pressure determination (lift setting); and

d. Compliance with owner's seat tightness criteria.

The ANSI /ASME Standard requires that all valves be tested every 5 i years. The ASME Code specifies the activities and frequencies '

necessary to satisfy the requirements. Table 3.7-2 allows a

+1 percent -3 percent setpoint tolerance for OPERABILITY; however, the valves are reset to i i percent during the Surveillance to allow for drift.

This SR is modified by a Note that allows entry into and operation in 4 MODE 3 prior to performing the SR. The MSSVs may be either bench tested or tested in situ at hot conditions using an assist device to simulate lift pressure. If the MSSVs are not tested at hot conditions, the lift setting pressure shall be corrected to ambient conditions of the valve at operating temperature and pressure.

4

_-.- _____.__-.-.-.-__.-._--__..-a

1 ATTACHMENT B Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Proposed Technical Specification Amendment Nos. 214 and 81 MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVE REQUIREMENTS l

A. DESCRIPTION OF AMENDMENT REQUEST l The proposed license amendment would modify Specification 3.7.1.1, " Safety Valves" and associated Bases for Unit 1 and Unit 2 to incorporate the Improved Standard Technical Specification (ISTS) guidance of NUREG-1431 and Westinghouse's Nuclear Safety Advisory Letter (NSAL) 94-01.

B. DESIGN BASES l

+ Specification 3.7.1.1 provides operability requirements for the main steam safety valves (MSSVs). The action statements require restoring inoperable valves to operable status or reducing the I power range high neutron flux trip setpoint. Reducing the trip i setpoint introduces the potential of an inadvertent plant trip.

The ISTS does not include this requirement. The ISTS provides an acceptable alternative by specifying plant power reduction based on the number of operable MSSVs. This license amendment was initiated to incorporate the ISTS requirements and the recommendations of NSAL 94-01.

C. JUSTIFICATION j Table 3.7-1 currently allows Unit 1 and Unit 2 to operate at a reduced power level, as determined by the high neutron flux trip setpoint. The UFSAR loss of load / turbine trip (LOL/TT) analysis from full power described in Unit 1 UFSAR Section 14.1.7 and Unit 2 UFSAR Section 15.2.3 bounds the case where all MSSVs are operable. The UFSAR (LOL/TT) event may not be bounding for the allowable operating configurations of Table 3.7-1 since the high neutron flux trip setpoint, identified in Table 3.7-1 for a corresponding number of inoperable MSSVs, may not be low enough to preclude over-pressurizing the secondary side. As a result, the basis for Table 3.7-1 may not be sufficient to preclude over-pressurizing the secondary side of the steam generator. The proposed license amendment was initiated to adjust the MSSV limitations to ensure adequate overpressurization protection was available.

NSAL 94-01 dated January 20, 1994, indicated the anomaly above I was attributed to a potential non-conservatism with existing l setpoints contained in Table 3.7-1 for the BV Units and other three loop Westinghouse power plants. The non-conservatism in these setpoints was based on a simplified assumption that the maximum allowable initial power level is a linear function of the available MSSV relief capacity. This assumption was subsequently determined to be invalid.

B-1 L______ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _

, 1 E 4 *~ ATTACHMENT B, continusd.

Proposed Technical Specification Change Nos. 214 and 81 j

-Page 2 L Following the issuance of NSAL 94-01, DLC performed a design-l analysis using the new methodology recommended by the NSAL to establish conservative values for the high neutron flux trip setpoints. As recommended by the new Westinghouse methodology, the revised setpoints included an allowance for instrument and channel uncertainties. DLC subsequently implemented conservative administrative limits for both Units that included the revised setpoints. The administrative limits impose requirements more restrictive than those presently contained in Table 3.7-1.

The ISTS was used as a guide for the proposed revision which j

, includes an improvement over current requirements. The plants l can safely comply with the proposed actions by reducing power '

without reducing the power range high neutron flux trip setpoint.

D. SAFETY ANALYSIS The title of Specification 3.7.1.1 has been changed from " Safety

' Valves" to " Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs)" for consistency

with the ISTS and the content of this specification. The current limiting condition for operation (LCO) requires all main steam line code safety valves operable and specifies the tolerance applied to the valves listed in Unit 1 Table 3.7-3 and for Unit 2 l ' Table 3.7-2. These tablas provide reduced power range neutron flux high setpoints based on the number of inoperable MSSVs on I any steam generator. Unit 1 Table 3.7-2 currently provides similar limitations for two loop operation; however, this page is being deleted since two loop operation is not a licensed condition for this plant. The proposed LCO incorporates the ISTS L wording and requires MSSV operability in accordance with Tables 3.7-1 and 3.7-2. Proposed Table 3.7-1 specifies the maximum power level based on the number of operable MSSVs for any steam I generator and maintains a minimum of 2 operable MSSVs per steam 1 generator for continued plant operation. Proposed Table 3.7-2 ;

specifies the MSSV lift setting and tolerance for each valve.

( The valve lift setting remains unchanged along with the current tolerance of +1 percent -3 percent. The current LCO also l l includes a condition denoted by a double asterisk (**) that 1 requires setting each MSSV within il percent of the value specified in the table after each valve is tested. The I requirements of this-note are addressed in proposed surveillance requirement 4.7.1.1. The Applicability statement remains unchanged.since it is consistent with the ISTS requirements.

The current actions have been replaced with new actions "a", "b" i- and "c" along with a general note which allows separate action l entry for each inoperable MSSV. The current Action "a" addresses 3 loop operation with one or more MSSVs inoperable and requires that within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months the inoperable valve is restored to operable status or the power range high neutron flux trip setpoint is reduced to the value specified in Table 3.7-1; otherwise, shut down. The proposed action statements only address 3 loop B-2 l

L-- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . :

e ATTACHMENT B, continur.d Proposed Technical Specification Change Nos. 214 and 81 Page 3 operation since 2 loop operation is not a licensed condition for these plants. Proposed Action "a" applies with one or more MSSV inoperable and requires that within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months power is reduced to less than or equal to the value specified in Table 3.7-1; otherwise, shut down. This action is more consistent with the design of the plants since there is no longer a requirement to reduce the power range high neutron flux trip setpoint as stated in the current action statement. The proposed action is consistent with the current action in satisfying the same goal, which is to restrict thermal power so that the energy transfer to the most limiting steam generator is not greater than the available relief capacity it: chat steam generator.

The current Action "b" for Unit 1 addresses 2 loop operation with

. one or more MSSVs inoperable. This action is not included in the Unit 2 specification' or the proposed actions since 2 loop operation is not a licensed condition for these plants. Proposed Action "b" is not addressed in the current actions, but is in the ISTS and included here to ensure a minimum of 2 MSSVs are operable per steam generator. This is more conservative than the current . requirements and provides additional assurance that adequate overpressure protection is available during all applicable modes of operation.

The current Action "c" for Unit 1 and Action "b" for Unit 2 provides an_ exception to specification 3.0.4. This exception is not included ~in the ISTS; however, both Units' specification 3.0.4 does not allow entry into a mode where the LCO is not' met and' actions. require a shutdown. Therefore, proposed Action "c"

-includes an exception to Specification 3.0.4 to allow entry into a Mode where the - LCO applies in conformance with the action statements.

The Unit 1- Surveillance Requirement 4.7.1 number has been renumbered to 4.7.1.1 for consistency with Unit 2. The current surveillance requirement specifies testing in accordance with ASME by reference to Specification 4.0.5. The proposed surveillance requirement is similar and requires verification of each MSSV lift setpoint as specified in Table 3.7-2 in accordance with the Inservice Test program. The word " verify" is modified by note (1) which requires the lift setpoint test only in Modes 1 and'2 so that Modes 2 and 3 can be entered prior to performing the surveillance test. The MSSVs can be bench tested or tested

-in place at hot conditions using an assist device to simulate the lif t pressure. If the MSSVs are not tested at hot conditions, the lift setting' pressure must be corrected to ambient conditions

-at the operating temperature and pressure. This is included in the. note applicable to the lift setting listed in current Table l 3.7-2 and addressed in a similar note (2) applicable to the lift setting provided in the proposed Table 3.7-2. This note is not addressed in the ISTS table; however, it provides a clear B-3

m.

-*- ' ATTACHMENT B, continusd Proposed Technical Specification Change Nos. 214 and 81 Page 4 reminder to test personnel of the required test conditions and is consistent with the ISTS Bases which include similar criteria.

-Bases 3/4.7.1.1, " Safety valves", has been revised by changing

, the' title to " Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs)" and generally l incorporating the ISTS Bases with an exception to the criteria used in ' determining the applicable power levels stated- in proposed Table 3 . ~1-1 for a reduced number of operable MSSys.

Westinghouse notified DLC of a correction to the methodology used

-for determining the power range high neutron flux setpoint trip

-which is the current method for limiting reactor power with inoperable MSSVs. .The new methodology provided by Westinghouse has been modified to include the recommended 9 percent allowance

[ to account. for instrument and channel uncertainties. This new

! + methodology significantly reduces the maximum allowable reactor i power level when operating with inoperable MSSVs. Changing from l a power range high neutron flux setpoint methodology to a power

( reduction methodology is consistent with the evaluation provided to the.NRC by the Westinghouse Owners Group (reference OG-90-54 to Jose A. Calvo). This evaluation concluded that there is no single event that can raise . the core power level to the trip setpoint and at the same time cause overpressurization of the secondary' side that would require the MSSV to relieve the produced steam. These limitations are significantly more

,. conservative than the current restrictions and will continue to j ensure the required main steam relief capability is available to f adequately protect the plant.

The Index has also been revised to address the applicable changes to the main steam safety valve specification and Bases. These changes are consistent with the UFSAR design description and analyses assumptions concerning MSSV operability. The proposed !

changes will ensure adequate overpressure protection is available for the secondary system; therefore, the proposed changes are considered safe and will not reduce the safety of the plant.

l E. NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATION The no significant hazard considerations involved with the proposed amendment have been evaluated, focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) as quoted below:

The Commission may make a final determination, pursuant to the procedures in paragraph 50.91, that a proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility licensed under paragraph 50.21(b) or paragraph 50.22 or for a testing

. facility involves no significant hazards consideration, if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:

(1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or B-4

{. i l J

F. .

ll' '.

L.

p. ' + ATTACHMENT D, continusd

( Propct.ed Technical Specification Change Nos. 214 and 81 Page 5 t

l l

I

'(2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

l The following evaluation is provided for the no significant hazards consideration standards.

L 1. Does_ the change involve a significant increase in the l probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

The proposed change will generally incorporate the Improved 'l Standard Technical Specification' (ISTS) main steam safety

. valve (MSSV) requirements of NUREG-1431 into Specification j 3.7.1.1 and associated Bases. The Unit 1 specification I currently includes reference to 2 loop operating requiretaents in Action "b" and Table 3.7-2. Reference to 2 loop operation is being deleted since it is not addressed in the ISTS and is not a licensed condition for these plants. The limiting condition for operation has been modified to incorporate the ISTS wording and requires MSSV operability in accordance with Tables 3. 7-1. and 3.7-2. Table 3.7-1 lists the maximum allowable power level as a function of the number of operable MSSVs per steam ~ generator and continues to require a minimum

~

of 2 operable MSSVs per steam generator for continued plant operation. . Tab 1M 3.7-2 specifies the MSSV lift setting and tolerance for ' sach MSSV. The valve lift setting remains unchanged along with the current tolerance .of +1 percent

-3 percent. The Applicability statement has not been changed since it is consistent with the ISTS requirements.

Proposed Action "a" applies with one or more inoperable MSSVs and requires that within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months power must be reduced in accordance. with the value specified in Table 3.7-1; otherwise, shut down. This action satisfies the same goal as the current action by restricting thermal power so that the energy transfer to the most limiting steam generator is not greater than the available relief capacity for that steam generator. Proposed Action. "b" incorporates additional conservatism ~ by specifically requiring at least 2 operable MSSVs per steam generator. This ensures that .a minimum overpressure protection is available during all applicable modes of ' operation. . Proposed Action. c" provides an exception' to Specification 3.0.4 which does not allow entry

'into a mode where the Limiting condition for Operation (LCO) is not met and actions require a shutdown. This exception is not addressed in the ISTS requirements; however, an exception to Specification 3.0.4 allows entry into a mode where the LCO applies in conformance with the action statements.

B-5 l

+ ATTACHMENT B, continurd Proposed Technical Specification Change Nos. 214 and 81

.Page 6 Proposed Surveillance Requirement 4.7.1.1 requires verification ' of the lift setpoint for each MSSV listed in Table 3.7-2 in accordance with the Inservice Test Program.

Note (1) is applied . to Surveillance Requirement 4.7.1.1 to provide clarification of the testing requirements, such that this testing is required only in Modes 1 and 2 so that the plant can enter Modes 2 and 3 where this specification applies without first . performing. the test. A note (2) has been applied to the lift setting in Table 3.7-2 that requires

a. setting ' corresponding to the ambient conditions of the valve at the nominal operating temperature and pressure. The ISTS does not include this note but it has been included for

~

consistency with the current note and provides a clear i reminder to test personnel of the required test conditions. !

. )

The safety _ valve Bases have been revised to generally incorporate the ISTS Bases which significantly improve the content and understanding of the MSSV requirements. These changes are consistent.with the UFSAR design description and analysis assumptions where the MSSVs provide the required overpressure protection. The proposed changes are consistent with the regulations and provide additional assurance that the secondary side pressure remains within the bounds of the safety analyses; therefore, the proposed changes will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

.The proposed changes generally incorporate the ISTS MSSV requirements to ensure adequate secondary side overpressure protection is available and properly maintained. The revised Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) limits plant power level based on the number of operable MSSVs as stated in Table _ 3.7-1 and provides the valve lift settings and tolerances as shown in Table 3.7-2. The actions require - a reduction in power when the number of valves is less than the full. complement for each steam generator and also require at least- 2 operable MSSVs per steam generator. When these l- requirements cannot be met a plant shutdown is required. An action also provides an exception to specification 3.0.4 and i

is consistent with the exception currently provided. These actions are more conservative than the current requirements and provide additional assurance that . Specification 3.7.1.1 will continue to govern the MSSV limitations in a manner-consistent with the accidant analyses assumptions. The revised surveillance requirement provides clearly understandable testing requirements to ensure the MSSVs are l adequately monitored and will perform in accordance with the accident analysis assumptions. The proposed change does not introduce any new mode of operation or require any physical modification to .the plant; therefore, this change will not 1 B-6 L_____________________-_-______

--y .

l l* ATTACHMENT B,' continusd l ' Proposed Technical Specification Change Nos. 214 and 81 Page 7 I

create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Does the change involve a significant reduction in a margin of. safety?

The MSSVs ensure the ASME Code,Section III requirements are maintained to limit the secondary system pressure to within 110 percent of' the design pressure when passing the design steam flow. This ensures that the overpressure protection l system can cope with all operational and transient events.

l Operation s4.th less than the full number of MSSVs is permitted as long as thermal power is restricted to meet the ASME Code requirements. This limitation is provided in the

, proposed technical specifications along with operability and

, surveillance = requirements to ensure the level of overpressure t

protection is maintained. MSSV operability is defined as the l ability to open within the setpoint tolerances, relieve steam generator overpressure, and resent when pressure has been reduced. MSSV operability is determined by surveillance testing in accordance with the Inservice Test program which provides assurance that the MSSVs will perform their designed safety ' functions to mitigate the consequences of accidents

i. that could - result in a challenge ' to the reactor coolant l pressure boundary. The proposed change continues to ensure j that the required components are properly maintained and that' the assumed parameters are ' verified during the applicable conditions and on a consistent basis; therefore, this change-t will_not reduce the margin of safety.

F. NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS-CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION l Based on the considerations expressed above, it is concluded that l

the activities _ associated with this license amendment request i satisfy the no significant hazards consideration standards of l 10 CFR 50.92(c) .and, accordingly, a no significant hazards i consideration finding is justified.

-G. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION The proposed amendment changes a requirement with-respect to the installation or use of a' facility component located within the-restricted area as defined' in 10 CFR Part 20. It has been determined - that the proposed 'amendrent . involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types of.

any effluents'that may be released offsite, and that there is no l significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational i radiation exposure. Accordingly, the proposed amendment meets the eligibility criteria for. categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR

51. 22 (c) (9) . Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact ,

statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in- l connection with the issuance of this proposed amendment.

l B-7 L

L __ __ ---_-___--- -____ _---- _ _ _ _ _ o

, j

-+ ~ ATTACHMENT D, centinucd ;

Proposed Technical Specification Change Nos. 214 and 81 '

Page 8

~H. UFSAR CHANGES No UFSAR changes required.

I l

l l

l B-8 l

o _z___ --_ - _ - -

ATTACHMENT C-1 Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 214 a 2 Applicable Typed Pages e

l

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-66 DOCKET NO. 50-334

.s

't Replace the following pages of Appendix A, Technical Specifications, with the enclosed pages as indicated. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Insert

VII- VII XII XII XVII . XVII 3/4 7-1 3/4 7-1 3/4 7-2 3/4 7-2 3/4 7-3 ---

3/4 7-4 ---

B 3/4 7-1 ---

B 3/4 7-1 B 3/4 7-la B 3/4 7-1b B 3/4 7-ic B 3/4 7-1d B 3/4 7-2 B 3/4 7-2 l

.(Proposed Wording) i

- - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ ._ _ _ _ _ . _ _ - = _ .

t 4

- DPR-66 INDEX

-LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE.

3/4.7.1.1 Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs) ........ 3/4 7-1 l 3/4.7.1.2 Auxiliary Feedwater System.............. 3/4 7-5 3/4.7.1.3 Primary Plant Demineralized Water (PPDW) 3/4 7-7 3/4.7.1.4 Activity................................ 3/4 7-8 3/4.7.1.5 Main Steam Line Isolation Valves........ 3/4 7-10 3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATION.............................. 3/4 7-11 3/4.7.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM.......... 3/4 7-12

-3/4.7.4 REACTOR PLANT RIVER WATER SYSTEM........ 3/4 7-13 3/4.7.5 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK - OHIO RIVER......... 3/4 7-14 3/4.7.6 FLOOD PROTECTION........................ 3/4 7-15' 3/4.7.7 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY HABITABILITY SYSTEMS................................. 3/4 7-16 3/4.7.8 SUPPLEMENTAL LEAK COLLECTION AND RELEASE SYSTEM.......................... 3/4 7-19 3/4.7.9 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION............. 3/4 7-22 3/4.7.12 SNUBBERS................................ 3/4 7-26 3/4.7.13 AUXILIARY RIVER' WATER SYSTEM............ 3/4 7-34

- 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

3/4.8.1 A.C. SOURCES l

3/4.8.1.1- Operating............................... 3/4 8-1 3/4.8.1.2 Shutdown................................ 3/4 8-5 BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 VII Amendment No.

(Proposed Wording)

+

-DPR-66 INDEX BASES SECTION PAGE 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE 3/4.7.1.1 Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs) ........ B 3/4 7-1 l

.3/4.7.1.2 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps............... B 3/4 7-2 3/4.7.1.3 Primary Plant Demineralized Water....... B 3/4 7-2 3/4.7.1.4 Activity................................ B 3/4 7-3 3/4.7.1.5 Main Steam Line Isolation VP.lves........ B 3/4 7-3

-3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATION.............................. B 3/4 7-4 3/4.7.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM.......... B 3/4' 7-4 3/4.7.4 RIVER WATER SYSTEM...................... B 3/4 7-4 3/4.7.5 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK...................... B 3/4 7-4 3/4.7.6 FILOD PROTECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 7-4 3/4.7.7 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY HABITABILITY SYSTEM.................................. B 3/4 7-5 3/4.7'.8 SUPPLEMENTAL LEAK COLLECTION AND I RELEASE SYSTEM.......................... B 3/4 7-5 3/4.7.9' SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION............. B 3/4 7-5

3/4.7.12 SNUBBERS................................ B 3/4 7-6 3/4.7.13 AUXILIARY RIVER WATER SYSTEM............ B 3/4 7-7 l 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.1 AND 3/4.8.2 A.C. SOURCES,_D.C. SOURCES AND ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS....... B 3/4 8-1 l

1 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS l 3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION..................... B 3/4 9-1 l i

3/4.0.2 INSTRUMENTATION......................... B 3/4 9-1 l BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 XII Amendment No.

(Proposed Wording) !

l i

DPR-66 Table Index (cont.)

TABLE TITLE PAGE 3.3-11 Accident Monitoring Instrumentation 3/4 3-51 4.3-7 Accident Monitoring Instrumentation 3/4 3-52 Surveillance Requirements 3.3-13 Explosive Gas Monitoring Instrumentation 3/4 3-55 4.3-13 Explosive Gas Monitoring Instrumentation 3/4 3-57 Surveillance Requirements 4.4-1. Minimum Number of Steam Generators to be 3/4 4-10e Inspected During Inservice Inspection j 4t4-2 Steam Generator Tube Inspection 3/4 4-10f 4.4-3 Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation 3/4 4-14b Valves 3.4-1 Reactor Coolant System Chemistry Limits 3/4 4-16 4.4-10 Reactor Coolant System Chemistry Limits 3/4 4-17 Surveillance Requirements 4.4-12 Primary Coolant Specific Activity Sample 3/4 4-20 i and Analysis Program l l

3.7-1 Main Steam Safety Valve Lift Settings 3/4 7-2 l 3.7-2 OPERABLE Main Steam Safety Valves versus 3/4 7-3 Applicable Power in Percent of RATED THERMAL POWER (RTP) 4.7-1 Snubber Visual Inspection Interval 3/4 7-31 4.7-2 Secondary Coolant System Specific Activity 3/4 7-9 Sample and Analysis Program 3.8-1 Battery Surveillance Requirements 3/4 8-9a 3.9-1 Beaver Valley Fuel Assembly Minimum Burnup 3/4 9-15 vs. Initial U235 Enrichment For Storage in Region 2 Spent Fuel Racks BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 XVII Amendment No.

(Proposed Wording)

- ~

DPR-66 3 / 4 '. 7 ' PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1' TURBINE CYCLE,

' MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVES'(MSSVs) l-I LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.1 The MSSVs shall'be OPERABLE as specified in Table 3.7-1 and Table 3.7-2.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2.and 3.

ACTION:

- --- - - - - - - - - - - GENERAL NOTE -----------.- -

Shparate ACTION entry is allowed for each MSSV.

La. hours

'With onepower reduce or more

~to. required MSSVs less than inoperable, or equal to the within appl4,icable

. percent RATED THERMAL POWER listed in Table 3.7-1; otherwise, be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6. hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ,

b. With one or more steam generators with'less than two MSSVs OPERABLE within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months be in HOT STANDBY and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next'6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS !

4.7.1.1 Verify W each required MSSV lift setpoint per Table 3.7-2 in accordance'with.the Inservice Testing Program. Following testing,

. lift settings shall be within i i percent.

I l

1 (1) Required.to be performed only in-MODES 1 and 2.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 .

3/4 7-1 Amendment No.

(Proposed Wording)

i DPR-66 TABLE 3.7-1 )

1 1

OPERABLE Main Steam Safety Valves versus l Applicable Power in Percent of RATED THERMAL POWER (RTP) i MINIMUM NUMBER OF MSSVs PER STEAM GENERATOR APPLICABLE POWER REQUIRED OPERABLE (% RTP) 5 5 100 l

4 5 57 3 5 39 2 1 22 TABLE 3.7-2 Main Steam Safety Valve Lift Settings i

VALVE NUMBER LIFT SETTINGII (Psig +1%-3%)

l STEAM GENERATO2 i

1 #2 #3 SV-MS-101A SV-MS-101B SV-MS-101C 1075 i SV-MS-102B SV-MS-102A SV-MS-102C 1085 SV-MS-103A SV-MS-103B SV-MS-103C 1095 SV-MS-104A SV-MS-104B SV-MS-104C 1110 SV-MS-105A SV-MS-105B SV-MS-105C 1125 l

(2) The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valve at nominal operating temperature and pressure.

1.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 7-2 Amendment No.

(next page is 3/4 7-5)

(Proposed Wording)

DPR-66 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 1

3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE 3/4.7.1.1 MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVES (MSSVs)

BACKGROUND I

, The primary purpose of the Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs) is to provide overpressure protection for the secondary system. The MSSVs also provide protection against overpressurizing the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) by providing a heat sink for the removal of '

energy from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) if the preferred heat sink, provided by the Condenser and Circulating Water System, is not J available. f Five MSSVs are located on each main steam header, outside containment, upstream of the main steam isolation valves, as {'

described in the UFSAR, Section 10.3.1. The specified valve lift settings and relieving capacities are in accordance with the requirements of Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Code, 1971~ Edition. The total relieging capacity for all valves on all of the steam lines is 12.8 x 10 lbs/hr which is 110 percent of the l total secondary steam flow of 11.7 x 106 lbs/hr at 100% RATED THERMAL POWER. The MSSV design includes staggered setpoints, according to Table 3.7-2 in the accompanying limiting condition for operation (LCO), so that only the needed valves will actuate. Staggered setpoints reduce the potential for valve chattering that is due to steam pressure insufficient to fully open all valves following a turbine reactor trip.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES i

! The design basis for the MSSVs comes from the ASME Code,Section III

! and its purpose is to limit the secondary system pressure to less l than or equal to 110 percent of design pressure when passing 100 i percent of design steam flow. This design basis is sufficient to cope with any anticipated operational occurrence (Aco) or accident considered in the Design Basis Accident (DBA) and transient analysis.

l The events that challenge the relieving capacity of the MSSVs, and thus RCS pressure, are those characterized as decreased heat removal events, which are presented in UFSAR, Section 14.1. Of these, the full power turbine trip without steam dump is the limiting AOO. This event also terminates normal feedwater flow to the steam generators.

The transient response for turbine trip without a direct reactor trip presents no hazard to the integrity of the RCS or the Main Steam System. If a minimum reactivity feedback is assumed, the reactor is

( BEAVER. VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-1 Amendment No.

(Proposed Wording)

E- - - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _

... DPR-66 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVES (MSSVs) (Continued)

' APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES-(Continued) tripped'on high' pressurizer pressure.-

~

In this case, the pressurizer

~ safety valves open, and RCS pressure remains below 110 percent of the design value. The MSSVs also open to limit the secondary steam pressure. J LIf maximum reactivity feedback is' assumed, the reactor is tripped on overtemperature AT. The departure from nucleate boiling ratio increases throughout the transient, and never drops below its initial

value. Pressurizer relief valves and MSSVs are activated and prevent overpressurization in the primary and: secondary systems. The MSSVs are assumed to have two active and one' passive failure modes. The active failure modes are spurious opening, and failure to reclose once . opened. The passive failure. mode is failure to open upon demand.

LGLQ

.The ' accident analysis requires four MSSVs per steam generator to

_ provide overpressure protection for design basis transients occurring at 102. percent RATED THERMAL-POWER (RTP). An MSSV will be considered

-inoperable if it fails to open on demand. The LCO requires that five MSSVs be OPERABLE in compliance with the ASME Code,Section III, even though this is not a requirement of .the DBA analysis. This is because operation with less-than the full number of. MSSVs requires limitations on allowable THERMAL POWER' -(to meet ASME Code requirements). These-limitations are according to Table 3.7-1 in the

. accompanying LCO and associated ACTION.

-The OPERABILITY of the MSSVs is defined as the ability to open within the setpoint tolerances, relieve steam generator overpressure, and reseat-when pressure has been reduced. The OPERABILITY of the MSSVs is determined by. periodic surveillance testing in accordance with.the Inservice Testing Program.

The lift. settings, according to Table'3.7-2 in the accompanying LCO, correspond.to ambient conditions of the valve at nominal operating temperature and. pressure,.as identified by a note.

This' LCO provides_ assurance that the MSSVs will perform their designed safety functions to mitigate.the consequences of accidents that could result in a challenge to the RCPB.

' BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4_7-la Amendment No.

(Proposed Wording)

... DPR-66 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVES (MSSVs) (Continued)

APPLICABILITY In MODE 1 above 22% RTP, the number of MSSVs per steam generator required to be OPERABLE must be according to Table 3.7-1 in the accompanying LCO. In Mode 1 below 22% RTP and in Modes 2 and 3 only two MSSVs per steam generator are required to be OPERABLE.

In MODES 4 and 5, there are no credible transients requiring the MSSVs. The steam generators are not normally used for heat removal in MODES 5 and 6, and thus cannot be overpressurized; there is no requirement for the MSSVs to be OPERABLE in these MODES.

ACTION The ACTIONS are modified by a General Note indicating that separate condition entry is allowed for each MSSV.

a. With one or more MSSVs inoperable, reduce power so that the available MSSV relieving capacity meets the ASME Code,Section III requirements for the applicable THERMAL POWER.

Operation with less than all five MSSVs OPERABLE for each steam generator is permissible, if THERMAL POWER is proportionally limited to the relief capacity of the remaining MSSV'. This is accomplished by restricting THERMAL POWER so that :he energy transfer to the most limiting steam generator is not greater than the available relief capacity in that steam generator.

The THERMAL POWER is limited by the governing equation in the relationship q = mAh, where q is the heat input from the primary side, m is the steam flow rate and Ah is the heat of vaporization at the steam relief pressure (assuming no subcooled feedwater). For each steam generator, at a specified pressure, the fractional power level (FPL) is determined as follows:

FPL = 100/Q -

9 K

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-lb Amendment No.

(Proposed Wording)

.- DPR-66 PLANT SYSTEMS l BASES MAIN' STEAM SAFETY' VALVES (MSSVs) (Continued) l ACTION-(Continued) where:

FPL = Fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER equivalent to the j

, safety analysis limit minus 9 percent (to account. 'l for typical instrument and . channel uncertainties). The uncertainty ensures the ,

maximum plant operating power level will then be j lower than the safety analysis limit by an appropriate operating margin.

+

Q = Nominal NSSS power rating of the plant (including reactor coolant pump heat), Mwt (Btu /sec)

K = Conversion factor, 947.82 Mwt

w. = Minimum total steam flow rate capability of the operable MSSVs on any one steam generator at the highest MSSV opening pressure including tolerance and. accumulation, as appropriate, in lb/sec. For example, if the, maximum number of inoperable 4 MSSVs on any one steam generator is one, then w, I should be a summation of the capacity of the

. operable MSSVs at the highest operable MSSV operating pressure, ' excluding the highest capacity MSSV. If the maximum number of inoperable MSSVs per steam generator is three then w should be a summation of the capacity of the operable MSSVs.at the highest operable MSSV operating pressure, excluding the three ' highest capacity MSSVs.

hgg = heat of vaporization for steam at the highest MSSV opening pressure including tolerance and accumulation, as appropriate, Btu /lbm

-N = Number of loops in plant 1

i BEAVER' VALLEY . UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-ic Amendment No.

(Proposed Wording)

_-- - - _ . _ ~ _ - _ _ - . - . - - -- - _ . - - _ _ . _ _ - _ _ - - - _ _ - - . _ _. _-._..______ _ - _ ____-.____ -_. . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ . _ - _ . . . , - - _ - . _ _ - - _ _ _ . - - - _ - . - _ - - ~

.. DPR-66 PLANT SYSTEMS l*

BASES MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVES (MSSVs) (Continued)

AQTION (Continued) b.

If the MSSVs cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated completion time, or if one or more steam generators have less than two MSSVs OPERABLE, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this. status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and in MODE 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . The allowed completion times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

c. An exception to Specification 3.0.4 is provided since the above ACTION statements. require a shutdown if they are not met within a specified period of time.

i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (SR)

SR 3.7.1.1 This SR verifies the OPERABILITY of the MSSVs by the verification of each MSSV lift setpoint in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. The ASME Code,Section XI, requires that safety and relief valve tests be performed in accordance with ANSI /ASME OM-1-1987.

According to ANSI /ASME OM-1-1987, the following tests are required:

a. Visual examination;

b. Seat tightness determination; !

c. Setpoint pressure determination (lift setting); and

d. Compliance with owner's seat tightness criteria.

The ANSI /ASME Standard requires that all valves be tested every 5 years. The ASME Code specifies the activities and frequencies necessary to satisfy the requirements. Table 3.7-2 allows a

+1 percent -3 percent setpoint tolerance for OPERABILITY; however, the valves are reset to i i percent during the Surveillance to allow for drift.

L BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1. B 3/4 7-1d Amendment No.

(Proposed Wording)

DPR-66 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES This SR is modified by a Note that allows entry into and operation in MODE 3 prior to performing the SR.

The MSSVs may be either bench tested or tested in situ at hot conditions using an assist device to simulate lift pressure. If the MSSVs are not tested at hot conditions, the lift setting pressure shall.be corrected to ambient conditions of the valve at operating temperature and pressure.

3/4.7.1.2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS The OPERABILITY of the auxiliary feedwater pumps ensures that the Reactor Coolant System can be cooled down to less than 350*F from normal operating conditions in the event of a total loss of off-site power.

'The capacity of each auxiliary feedwater pump is sufficient to ensure that adequate feedwater flow is available to remove decay heat and reduce the Reactor Coolant System temperature to less than 350*F when the Residual Heat Removal System may be placed into operation.

3/4.7.1.3 PRIMARY PLANT DEMINERALIZED WATER The OPERABILITY of the PPDW storage tank with the minimum water volume ensures that sufficient water is available for cooldown of the Reactor Coolant System to less than 350*F in the event of a total loss of off-site power. The minimum water volume is sufficient to maintain the RCS at HOT discharge to atmosphere.

STANDBY conditions for 9 hours1.041667e-4 days 0.0025 hours 1.488095e-5 weeks 3.4245e-6 months with steam BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-2 Amendment No.

(Proposed Wording)

.- ATTACHMENT C-2 Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 81 Applicable Typed Pages l

t

ATTACHMENT TO' LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-73 DOCKET NO. 50-412 Replace the following pages of Appendix A, Technical Specifications, with- the enclosed pages as indicated. The revised pages are identified by amendment the areas of change.

number and contain vertical lines indicating Remove Insert VII VII 3/4 7-1 3/4 7-1 3/4 7-2 3/4 7-2 3/4 7-3 ---

B 3/4 7-1 B 3/4 7-1 ..

B 3/4 7-la B 3/4 7-lb B 3/4 7-Ic

.B 3/4 7-2 B 3/4 7-id B 3/4 7-2 i

'(Proposed Wording)

L_ <

NPF-73 INDEX LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE 3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL 3/4.6.4.1 Hydrogen Analyzers......................

3/4 6-31

.3/4.6.4.2 Electric Hydrogen Recombiners........... 3/4 6-32 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE 3/4.7.1.1 Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs) ........ 3/4 7-1 l 3/4.7.1.2 Auxiliary Feedwater System..............

3/4 7-4 '

3/4.7.1.3 Primary Plant Demineralized Water (PPDW) 3/4 7-6 3/4.7.1.4 Activity................... 4........... 3/4'7-7 3/4.7.1.5 Main Steam Line Isolation Valves........ 3/4 7-9 3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATION.............................. 3/4 7-10 3/4.7.3- . PRIMARY COMPONENT COOLING WATER' SYSTEM.. 3/4 7-11 3/4.7.4 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM (SWS) .............. 3/4 7-12 3/4.7.5 . ULTIMATE HEAT SINK - OHIO RIVER......... 3/4 7-13 3/4.7.6 FLOOD PROTECTION........................ 3/4 7-14 3/4.7.7 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY AIR CLEANUP AND I PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM................... 3/4 7-15 i 3/4.7.8 SUPPLEMENTAL LEAK-COLLECTION AND RELEASE S Y STEM ( SLCRS ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-18 !

3/4.7.9 SEALED SOURCE' CONTAMINATION............. 3/4 7-20 3/4.7.12 SNUBBERS................................ 3/4 7-24 l 3/4.7.13- STANDBY SERVICE WATER SYSTEM (SWE) . . . . . . 3/4 7-30 I

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 VII Amendment No.

(Proposed Wording)

NPF-73 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVES (MSSVs) l LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.1 The MSSVs shall be OPERABLE as specified in Table 3.7-1 and Table 3.7-2.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

l

~ ACTION:

- - - - - - - - - - - - - GENERAL NOTE ---------------

Separate ACTION entry is allowed for each MSSV.

a. With one or more required MSSVs inoperable, within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months reduce power to less than or equal percent to the applicable {

RATED THERMAL POWER listed in Table 3.7-1; otherwise, be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in J HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

b. With one or more steam generators with less than two MSSVs OPERABLE within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months be in HOT STANDBY and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

c. - The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

. 4.7'.1.1 Verify bU each required MSSV lift setpoint per Table 3.7-2 in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. Following testing, lift settings'shall be within i i percent.

(1) Required to be performed only in MODES 1 and 2.

l l BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 7-1 Amendment No.

(Proposed U4rding) l l

u-- - - - _ - - _ - - _ _ _ - - - - - . _ -

1 NPF-73 s.

TABLE'3.7-1 OPERABLE Main Steam Safety Valves versus Applicable Power in Percent of RATED THERMAL POWER (RTP)

MINIMUM NUMBER OF MSSVs PER STEAM GENERATOR !

REQUIRED OPERABLE APPLICABLE POWER

(% RTP) 5 5 100 4

5 58 3

< 41 2

S 24 TABLE 3.7-2 Main Steam Safety Valve Lift Settings VALVE NUMBER LIFT SETTING (2)

STEAM GENERATOR (Psig +1%-3%)

1 #2 #3 l

' 2 MSS-SV101A 2 MSS-SV101B 2 MSS-SV102A 2 MSS-SV101C 1075 2 MSS-SV102B 2 MSS-SV102C 2 MSS-SV103A 2 MSS-SV103B 1085 !

2 MSS-SV104A 2 MSS-SV103C 1095 2 MSS-SV104B 2 MSS-SV104C -!

2 MSS-SV105A 2 MSS-SV105B 1110 '

2 MSS-SV105C 1125 (2). The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valve at nominal operating temperature and pressure.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 7-2 Amendment No.

(next page is 3/4 7-4)

(Proposed Wording)

p. -

t Q'

NPF-73 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS f-l- BASES l.

3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE 3/4.7.1.1 MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVES (MSSVS)

BACKGROUND l' .The primary purpose of the Main Steam Safecy. Valves (MSSVs) is to provide overpressure, protection for the secondary system. The MSSVs also provide protection against overpressurizing the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB)~ by providing. a heat sink for the removal of energy from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) if the preferred heat-sink, provided by the Condenser and Circulating Water System, is not available.

FAve MSSVs are located on each main steam header, containment, outside upstream of the main steam isolation valves, described ~in the UFSAR, Section 10.3.2. as The specified valve lift l' -settings. and relieving capacities are in accordance with the requirements of Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Code, i

1971' Edition and Winter 1972 Addenda. .The total religving capacity for all valves on all of the steam lines is 12.7 x 10 lbs/gr which )

is 110 percent of the. total secondary steam flow of 11.6 x 10 lbs/hr at .100% . RATED THERMAL POWER. The MSSV design includes staggered setpoints, a 'ccording to Table 3.7 in the accompanying limiting l

condition for operation '(LCO), so that only the needed valves will ;

~~ actuate.- . Staggered setpoints reduce the potential for valve-chattering that is due to steam pressure insufficient to fully open l all_ valves following a turbine reactor trip. -3 i

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES l The design basis for.'the MSSVs comes from the ASME Code,Section III and its purpose is to limit the secondary ; system pressure to less than .or equal to 110 percent of design pressure when passing 100

. percent of design steam flow. This design basis is -sufficient to cope: with any anticipated operational occurrence -(AOO) or accident considered in the Design Basis Accident (DBA) and transient analysis.

i-The : events . that. . challenge the relieving capacity of the MSSVs, and' thus'RCS pressure, are those characterized as decreased heat removal l ,.- events, which are presented in UFSAR, Section 15. 2. Of these, the

' full-power turbine trip without steam dump is the limiting AOO. This evant also. terminates normal feedwater flow to the steam generators.

The. transient response for turbine trip without a direct reactor trip presents no hazard to the' integrity of the RCS or the Main Steam !

System. If a minimum reactivity feedback is assumed, the reactor is '

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-1 Amendment No. l (Proposed Wording) j i

l l'

NPF-73 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVES (MSSVS) (Continued)

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (Continued) tripped on high pressurizer pressure. In this case, the pressurizer safety valves open, and RCS pressure remains below 110 percent of the design value.

pressure.

The MSSVs also open to limit the secondary steam If maximum reactivity feedback is assumed, the reactor is tripped on overtemperature AT. The departure from nucleate boiling ratio, increases throughout the transient, and never drops below its initial value. Pressurizer relief valves and MSSVs are activated and prevent overpressurization in the primary and secondary systems. The MSSVs are assumed to have two active and one passive failure modes. The active failure modes are spurious opening, and failure to reclose once opened.

demand.

The passive failure mode is failure to open upon IEC.O The accident analysis requires four MSSVs per steam generator to provide overpressure protection for design basis transients occurring at 102 percent RATED THERMAL POWER (RTP). An MSSV will be considered inoperable if it fails to open on demand. The LCO requires that five MSSVs be OPERABLE in compliance with the ASME Code,Section III, even though this is not a requirement of the DBA analysis. This is because limitations operation on with less than the full number of MSSVs requires allowable THERMAL POWER (to meet ASME Code requirements). These limitations are according to Table 3.7-1 in the accompanying LCO and associated ACTION.

The OPERABILITY of the MSSVs is defined us the ability to open within the setpoint tolerances, relieve steam generator overpressure, and reseat when pressure has been reduced. The OPERABILITY of the MSSVs is determined by periodic surveillance testing in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.

The lift settings, according to Table 3.7-2 in the accompanying LCO, correspond to ambient conditions of the valve at nominal operating temperature and pressure, as identified by a note.

This LCO provides assurance that the MSSVs will perform their designed safety functions to mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in a challenge to the RCPB.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-la Amendment No.

(Proposed Wording)

4

,,' NPF-73 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVES (MSSVS) (Continued)

APPLICABILITY In MODE 1 above 24% RTP, the number of MSSVs per steam generator required to be OPERABLE must be according to Table 3.7-1 in the accompanying LCO. In Mode 1 below 24% RTP and in Modes 2 and 3 only two MSSVs per steam generator are required to be OPERABLE.

In MODES 4 and 5, there are no credible transients requiring the MSSVs. The steam generators are not normally used for heat removal in MODES 5 and 6, and thus cannot be overpressurized; there is no requirement for the MSSVs to be OPERABLE in these MODES.

ACTION The ACTIONS are modified by a General Note indicating that separate condition entry is allowed for,each MSSV.

a. With one or more MSSVs inoperable, reduce power so that the available MSSV relieving capacity meets the ASME Code,Section III requirements for the applicable THERMAL POWER.

Operation with less than all five MSSVs OPERABLE for each steam generator is permissible, if THERMAL POWER is proportionally limited to the relief capacity of the remaining MSSVs. This is accomplished by restricting THERMAL POWER so that the energy transfer to the most limiting steam generator is not greater than the available relief capacity in that steam generator.

The THERMAL POWER is limited by the governing equation in the relationship q = mAh, where q is the heat input from the primary side, m is the steam flow ra'te and Ah is the heat of vaporization at the steam relief pressure (assuming no subcooled feedwater). For each steam generator, at a specified pressure, the fractional power level (FPL) is determined as follows:

FPL = 100/Q -

9 K

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-lb Amendment No.

(Proposed Wording)

Lo' NPF-73 PLANT SYSTEMS I

l BASES MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVES (MSSVS) (Continued)

ACTION (Continued) where:

'FPL = Fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER equivalent to the L safety analysis limit minus 9 percent (to account for typical instrument and channel uncertainties). The uncertainty ensures the maximum plant operating power level will then be lower than the safety analysis limit by an l

appropriate operating margin.

L Q = Nominal'NSSS power rating of the plant (including reactor coolant pump heat), Mwt (Btu /sec)

K = Conversion factor, 947.82 Mwt

w. = Minimum total steam flow rate capability.of the operable MSSVs on any one steam generator at the highest MSSV opening pressure including tolerance and accumulation, as appropriate, in lb/sec. For i example, if the maximum number of inoperable MSSVs on any one steam generator is one, then w.

should be a summation of the capacity of the operable MSSVs at the highest operable MSSV operating pressure, excluding the highest capacity MSSV. If the maximum number of inoperable MSSVs per - steam generator is three then w. should be a summation of the capacity of the operable MSSVs at the highest operable MSSV operating pressure, excluding the three highest capacity MSSVs.

hrg. = heat of vaporization for steam at the highest MSSV opening pressure including tolerance and accumulation, as appropriate, Btu /lba N = Number of loops in plant l

l -BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-Ic Amendment No.

(Proposed Wording)

.' 1 o.' NPF-73 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES i

l MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVES (MSSVS) (Continued)

ACTION (Continued)

b. If the MSSVs cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated completion time, or if one or more steam generators have less than two MSSVs OPERABLE, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and j in MODE 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . The allowed completion times are l reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required )

unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner I and without challenging unit systems.

I

c. An exception to Specification 3.0.4 is provided since the above l ACTION statements require a shutdown if they are not met within

, a specified period of time.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (SR)

SR 3.7.1.1 This SR verifies the OPERABILITY of the MSSVs by the verification of each MSSV lift setpoint in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. The ASME Code,Section XI, requires that safety and relief valve tests be performed in accordance with ANSI /ASME OM-1-1987.

According to ANSI /ASME OM-1-1987, the following tests are required:

a. Visual examination;

b. Seat tightness determination;

c. Setpoint pressure determination (lift setting); and

d. Compliance with owner's seat tightness criteria.

The ANSI /ASME Standard requires that all valves be tested every 5 years. The ASME Code specifies the activities and frequencies necessary to satisfy the requirements. Table 3.7-2 allows a i

+1 percent -3 percent setpoint tolerance for OPERABILITY; however, the valves are reset to i i percent during the Surveillance to allow for drift.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-id Amendment No.

(Proposed Wording) j

e e

. NPF-73 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES This.SR is modified by a Note that allows entry into and operation in MODE 3 prior to performing. the SR. The MSSVs may be either bench tested or tested in situ at hot conditions using an assist device to simulate lift pressure. If the MSSVs are not tested at hot conditions, the lift setting pressure shall be corrected to ambient conditions of the valve at operating temperature and pressure.

l' 3/4.7.1.2 @) CILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Auxiliary Feedwater System ensures that the Reactor Coolant System can be cooled down to less than 350 F from normal operating conditions in the event of a total loss of offsite l power.

Each electric driven auxiliary I feedwater pump is capable of q l delivering a total feedwater flow of 350 gpm at a pressure of l 1133 psig to the entrance of the steam generators. The steam driven

! auxi'liary feedwater pump is capable of delivering a total fee'dwater

! flow of 700 gpm at a pressure of 1133 psig to the entrance of the j steam' generators. This capacity is sufficient to ensure that I

adequate feedwater flow is available to remove decay heat and reduce the Reactor Coolant System temperature to less than 350'F when the Residual Heat Removal System may be placed into operation.

3/4.7.1.3 PRIMARY PLANT DEMINERALIZED WATER (PPDW) l The OPERABILITY of the PPDW storage tank with the minimum water volume ensures that sufficient water is available to maintain the RCS at HOT STANDBY conditions for 9 hours with steam discharge to atmosphere.

3/4.7.1.4 ACTIVITY The' limitations on secondary system specific activity ensure that the resultant offsite radiation dose will be limited to a small fraction of 10 CFR Part 100 limits in the event of a steam line rupture. This dose also includes the effects of a coincident 0.35 gpm primary-to-secondary tube leak in the steam generator of the affected steam line. These values are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-2 Amendment No.

-(Proposed Wording)

ML20236P805

Text

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