ML20245G871
| ML20245G871 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 08/02/1989 |
| From: | Sieber J DUQUESNE LIGHT CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-1342 GL-89-06, NUDOCS 8908160236 | |
| Download: ML20245G871 (15) | |
Text
.
f Be Valley Power Station
, ' Shippingport. PA 15077aX)4
. #vcNESwo,.. ma mm August 2, 1989 U. S.. Nuclear. Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
Reference:
Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 and No. 2 BV-l' Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 BV-2 Docket No. 50-412, License No. NPF-73 Response to Generic Letter No. 89-06 Safety Parameter Display System Gentlemen:
By a letter dated April 12, 1989, the'NRC issued Generic Letter 89-06 (received by DLC on May 9, 1989) requiring licensees to establish- the-' implementation status of the Safety Parameter Display System and to furnish certification of that status to the NRC. Attachments 1 and 2 provide the requested information for Beaver Valley Units 1 and 2 respectively.
Additionally, for your information we expended approximately 270 person-hours searching data sources, gathering and analyzing the data and preparing this response.
If you have any questions or comments regarding this submittal, please contact me or members of my staff.
Very truly yours, J. D. Sieber
/ Vice President Nuclear Group cc: Mr. J. Beall, Sr. Resident Inspector Mr. W. T. Russell, NRC Region I Administrator Mr. P. Tam, Sr. Project Manager Director, Safety Evaluation & Control (VEPCO) 8908160236 890802 3 foo.3 PDR ADOCK 05000334 3 i P PNU { , g j
'e lV COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA)
. -) SS:
COUNTY OFLBEAVER' )
l:
I On this. (I- -day of , /uIl , 1989,.
before me, e/ -
/h , %a Notary ublic in'and for'said
. Commonwealth $ and County, personally appeared J'. D. Sieber,.'who'being duly; sworn,. deposed, and said that (1) 'he .is Vice= President of-Duquesne ' Light, -(2) he. is' duly authorized to execute and file-the foregoing . Submittal on behalf of said company, and (3) the' statements set 'forth in the Submittal are true and correct to'the best'of his knowledae, information and belief.
Q LJ ds k, Y Netana' Seat Sheila M. Fattore Notary Pub 6e ShippingportBoro, Beam County My Commosen Expires Oct 23,1989 '
Member,Pennsylvare Assooatenof Notaries
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J' ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Generic Letter 89-06 BVPS-1,SPDS Page 1 An assessment of the SPDS design implementation as it supports the functional guidelines of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 must be done in context with the overall philosophy of operation and use of the SPDS in the BV-1 control room. Therefore, the discussion of the BV-1 SPDS philosophy of operation and use is provided to supplement and clarify DLC's application of the functional guidelines. (Reference. DLC letter to NRC dated July 18, 1988 -
BVPS-1 SPDS Safety Analysis Report).
SPDS Philosoohv of ODeration and Use The Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) provides personnel in the Technical Support Center (TSC), and Emergency Operating Facility (EOF) with immediate access to critical plant indications. Additionally, the SPDS provides the same concise display of critical plant variables to the control room operators, Shift Technical Advisors (STAS), and plant personnel to aid them in rapidly and reliably verifying the safety status of the plant.
The SPDS, by virtue of its installation in the TSC and EOF, reduces the number of staff personnel in the control room, thereby reducing the potential for confusion in the control room during a plant transient or emergency condition. The principal purpose and function of the SPDS is to aid the control room personnel during an abnormal or emergency condition in determining the plant safety status and to assess whether the abnormal condition (s) warrant corrective actions by the operators to avoid a degraded core condition. The licensed operators, STAS, and selected plant personnel are trained on SPDS operations, cognizant of the available SPDS information, and able to interpret the information provided by the SPDS to understand the plant safety status.
The primary sources of indication for the operation of the plant are the control room indications, including post accident monitoring indication, and plant equipment. The control room indication provides the Operators with the necessary information for safe reactor operations of the plant under normal, transient, and accident conditions. The SPDS is used as an aid to enhance the control room indications. If the SPDS is not available, the control room operators are trained to mitigate the transient or emergency condition by using their control room indications and the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs). The control room operators are trained to respond to the transient or accident condition (s) with and without the SPDS.
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Generic Letter 89-06 BVPS-1,SPDS Page 2 The EOPs are written to mitigate the consequences of various accidents. The operation of the plant is maintained and controlled using the EOPs until the plant conditions are stabilized. With this EOP philosophy in mind, the SPDS philosophy and SPDS procedure guideline are written as an aid and an enhancement to the Emergency Operating Procedures during abnormal, transient, or accident conditions. The SPDS is also used during normal plant evolutions as an aid to the control room staff, but the SPDS and the SPDS procedure guidelines are not considered primary information for the operation of the plant during accident conditions.
The primary operators of the SPDS are the STAS. The STAS have the available use of the SPDS to monitor the plant safety status at several terminals. SPDS terminals are located in the Unit 1 Control Room, Technical Support Center and at the Emergency Operating Facility (EOF). In addition to the STAS, all licensed operators and selected plant personnel are trained to be able to operate, understand, and interpret the information from these SPDS terminals. SPDS users are capable of interpreting the color coding and status flags associated with the SPDS parameters. The SPDS users are trained to the level where the users are cognizant on how to use the SPDS terminals as an available reference tool to enhance existing indications. The SPDS is and will be considered an enhancement to operation of the plant and a secondary source of plant safety status information. The SPDS will provide diagnostic information during normal and accident conditions. A trained SPDS operator, at the various locations, can aid the control room staff by monitoring plant status changes for the plant transient or emergency conditions and provide plant safety status information to personnel outside the control room.
The SPDS operator has the ability to call up the Top Level, Map Menu, Trends, or history displays by dedicated SPDS pushbuttons.
In addition to the dedicated display pushbuttons, the SPDS can call up a display by locating the cursor in any display predefined poke field area and executing the Display Page pushbutton. This action will display on the SPDS terminal screen the associated screen display related to the poke field area. All displays except history trends can be called upon by sequential paging, display poke fields, or entry of a specific screen page number.
History trend displays can only be replayed following a reactor trip.
The SPDS screen displays are divided into six distinct categories. The initial group consists of the SPDS Map and its associated Menu screens. The Menu screens identify the first, second, third and fourth level displays. By visual observations of the SPDS menu screens, the fourth level displays can be 1
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ATTACHMENT.1 Response to Generic Letter 89-06 BVPS-1 SPDS Page 3 associated with the third level displays. The fourth level displays are tabular listings of all the analog sensor inputs used I
in the third level displays. The last SPDS display group available is the individual sensor input computer points called the Point Detail Displays. These point detail displays are all the computer points used by the higher level displays in the SPDS.
There are 29 SPDS displays installed in SPDS display levels one, two and three. Level one (also known as Top Level) contains two abstract iconic displays. These two displays represent plant conditions referenced to the optimum operating points and operating limits. The. two screens have eight spokes directed outward from the center of the screen. Each spoke represents a normalized plant parameter to provide an octagonal geometric shape. The symmetric octagonal diagram occurs when the active parameters are at or near the optimum operating level. As the plant parameters deviate from the optimum operating limits, the octagonal shape will distort informing the SPDS operator of the parameter deviation.
Top level display 1TL1 Narrow Range Display (NAR RNG) is structured for normal plant operation without a reactor trip condition. Top level display 1TL2 Wide Range Display (WID RNG)' is used to show plant operations from full power to plant shutdown after a reactor trip. If the Narrow Range display is on the screen prior to a reactor trip, the Wide Range display will automatically be substituted for the narrow range display after initiation of the reactor trip. Both Top Level displays 1TL1 and
'1TL2 are useful to display plant parameter conditions before and soon after a reactor trip. However, the iconic displays in the third and fourth Level provide more useful detail information to analyze / diagnose a plant transient or emergency conditions.
Therefore, after a reactor trip, normal operations of the SPDS would be in the third and fourth levels. Additional information can be acquired using the point detail displays if more specific information is required for the computer point in the SPDS.
In addition to the normal iconic display, Level Two contains the history trend graphs and history iconics. The history trend graphs and history iconics can be called upon using the dedicated SPDS history pushbutton. The Iconic trends (both iconic replay and values and references vs. time) are available at all times and are not trip dependent. The Iconic histories (both iconic replay and values and references vs. time) are available after a trip.
The history iconics and trend graphs provide a recorded history replay before and after the reactor trip breakers are opened of 30 minutes at 1 minute intervals and 5 minutes at 10 second intervals. The SPDS stores the data on memory disks for the respective trend graphs or iconic history.
ATTACEMENT 1 Response to Generic Letter 89-06 BVPS-1 SPDS Page 4 The SPDS procedure guideline is a reference procedure for the SPDS operator. .The- procedure will be written in three parts. The first section is a reference section of the SPDS terminal operational controls, parameter color codings and parameter statnr, flags for the SPDS operator. The second section is a. grouping of SPDS parameters that are helpful in analyzing and diagnosing plant conditions which may be used with the EOP procedural steps. A table is provided listing all the SPDS parameter groupings in the second section for quick reference to operate the SPDS following the EOPs. The last section of the SPDS procedure guideline provides information that is not available in the first two sections that may be useful to the SPDS operator.
The procedure guideline allows the SPDS operator to manipulate the SPDS to gather information as required to diagnose or analyze plant safety status conditions. The procedure guideline provides instructions for the SPDS operator to call up any SPDS screen displays available in the SPDS. The guideline allows the operator to follow plant conditions as specified by the EOP procedural steps and determine plant performance by viewing plant safety status as the EOP steps are accomplished.
When the SPDS is used with the EOP procedure, the EOP procedure is the driving force in controlling the SPDS. The SPDS operator will normally use the SPDS to follow plant conditions identified in the EOP steps. In addition, the SPDS operator may observe other plant status to determine the changes influenced by the EOP procedural steps. Operating the SPDS as described will provide plant j personnel with information to determine plant conditions to aid the operating staff in determining the conditions the EOPs were entered.
To ensure the procedure guideline and SPDS philosophy objectives are accomplished, a procedure validation and verification program has been -incorporated into the SPDS philosophy. The procedure validation and verification program ensures the procedure guideline and SPDS philosophy are implemented correctly and fulfills the requirements for which they were developed. The procedure validation and verification are the last phase in the development process before the SPDS philosophy and procedure guideline are approved and recommended for use in the plant.
Procedure guideline verification and validation and user training are scheduled to be completed prior to start-up following the ;
seventh BV-1 refueling outage.
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ATTACHMENT 1 1
Response to Generic Letter 89-06 BVPS-1 SPDS Page 5 The following is a discussion of SPDS checklist questions for which DLC's response indicates the level of compliance with the NRC's interpretation of the SPDS requirements (Supplement 1 to NUREG 0737) as addressed in NUREG 1342. DLC's response includes a schedule of activities required to achieve compliance. Those !
questions for which DLC's response indicates current compliance with Supplement 1 to NUREG 0737 are not addressed below. j l
SPDS Checklist Ouestion Responses In response to question 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 of the SPDS checklist, containment isolation valve position status is not currently available on the SPDS for all CIA and CIB valves. The CNMT ISOL PH-A and PH-B indication on SPDS display 2PS1 provides CIA.and CIB signal actuation status only. Isolation valve position status is required to be verified on the control boards per EOP FR.I-3. The CIA and CIB isolation valves are identified on the control boards by an orange or a blue demarcation " top hat" respectively which is placed around the appropriate status indication light.
DLC has determined that the valve position inputs for all containment isolation phase A and phase B valves are available on the Plant Variable Computer (PVC) system in the control room. DLC will develop the appropriate software on the PVC to generate a display which will provide CIA and CIB isolation Valve Position Status. This design change is scheduled to be implemented prior to start-up following the eighth BV-1 refueling outage. This change, when implemented, will change the response to SPDS checklist questions 1.7, 1.8 and 1.9. Appropriate training will be provided to the SPDS operators.
In response to SPDS checklist question 3.3, DLC has determined that the BVPS-1 SPDS has not met the continuous display requirement by a means considered satisfactory to the NRC as addressed in NUREG-1342. The BVPS-1 SPDS Safety Analysis Report (submitted to the NRC by DLC letter dated July 18, 1988) indicates that access to lower level displays, particularly the overall plant status display (level 2) and the reactor coolant system flow diagram (level 3) have proven to be very useful to the operators when displayed on the SPDS vertical board CRT. ;
i Additionally, the SPDS produces 29 displays that provide control room personnel with graphic representations of plant system conditions during normal and emergency plant operations. These displays provide the SPDS user with optional means of obtaining information necessary to assess the plant safety status. Prior to start-up following the eighth BV-1 refueling outage the top level iconic will be continuously displayed in the control Room on a
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ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Generic Letter 89-06 BVPS-1 SPDS Page 6 l
1 dedicated CRT. Prior to dedication of the CRT, any one of the 29 l graphic displays will continue to be administratively maintained on the control room displays while the SPDS is in service.
In response to checklist question 4.3, the availability monitoring program has been implemented, however, a sufficient quantity of 4 data has not yet been collected to provide meaningful availability results. A 12-month sample of availability results is scheduled to be completed by July 30, 1990 In response to checklist question 4.4, a periodic SPDS input validation program will be implemented which will compare SPDS displayed information to other qualified plant indication prior to start-up following the seventh BV-1 refueling outage.
In response to questions 5.7 and 5.8, verification and validation of the SPDS procedure guideline will verify a consistent application of parameter units of measure and nomenclature applied to the SPDS and the emergency operating procedures (EOPs).
Procedure guideline verification and validation is scheduled for completion prior to start-up following the seventh BV-1 refueling outage.
In response to SPDS checklist question 5.10, a program to verify consistency of high and low-level SPDS setpoints with the hardwired instrumentation and the reactor protection system setpoints is scheduled to be complete by December 31, 1989 In response to question 5.13, the SPDS procedure guideline verification and validation will establish consistency of parameter units of measure between the EOPs and the SPDS. The detailed Control Room Design Review established consistency between the EOPs and the hard wired instrumentation, therefore, consistency between the SPDS displayed information and the hardwired instrumentation will be established by the SPDS procedure guideline verification and validation, which is scheduled to be complete prior to start-up following the seventh BV-1 refueling outage. Any SPDS parameters not included in the EOPs will be separately verified for consistency with hard wired instrumentation.
The BVPS-1 SPDS color code application is currently being changed in response to a human engineering discrepancy generated during the detailed control room design review. Design Change Package j (DCP) 1007 is scheduled to be complete prior to start-up following the seventh BV-1 refueling outage.
. ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Generic Letter 89-06' :{
BVPS-1 SPDS '
Page 7 4 In summary, successful completion of-the following activities for the. BVPS-1 -SPDS will establish compliance with the guidelines'of Supplement 1 to NUREG 0737.
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- 1. Procedure guideline verification and validation
- 2. User Training
- 3. Implementation of the periodic SPDS input validation program.
- 4. Verification of high and low level set point consistency between SPDS and hard wired instrumentation and the reactor protection system.
- 5. DCP-1007 SPDS Color Code Changes.
- 6. Dedication of CRT terminal to continuously display the top level iconic.
- 7. Software changes to include closed /not closed containment isolation valve status on the Plant Variable Computer System.
ATTACHMENT 2 Response to GL-89-06 BVPS-2 SPDS An assessment of the SPDS design implementation as it supports the functional guidelines of Supplement 1 to NUREG 0737 must be done in context with the overall philosophy of operation and use in the BV-2 control room. Therefore, the following discussion of the BV-2 SPDS philosophy of operation and use is provided to supplement and clarify DLC's application of the functional guidelines (BV-2 SPDS philosophy previously provided to NRC via DLC submittal dated June 8, 1988. Response to NRC concerns addressed in SSER-6.)
SPDS Philosochv of Operation and Use The Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) provides personnel in the Technical Support Center (TSC), and Emergency Operating Facility (EOF) with immediate access to critical plant indications. The SPDS system provides a concise display of critical plant variables to the control room operators, Shift Technical Advisors (STAS), and plant personnel to aid them in rapidly and reliably determining the safety status of the plant.
The SPDS system, by virtue of its installation in the TSC and EOF, reduces the number of staff personnel in the control room, thereby reducing the potential for confusion in the control room during a plant transient or emergency condition. The principal purpose and function of the SPDS system is to aid the control room personnel during an abnormal or emergency condition in determining the plant safety status and to assess whether the abnormal condition (s) warrant corrective actions by the operators to avoid a degraded I core condition. The licensed operators, STAS, and selected plant personnel are trained on SPDS operations, cognizant of the available SPDS information, and able to interpret the information provided by the SPDS system to understand the plant safety status.
The primary sources of indication for the operation of the plant are the control room indications, including Post Accident Monitoring System (PAM), and plant equipment. The control room indication provides the Operators with the necessary information for safe reactor operations of the plant under normal, transient, and accident conditions. The SPDS system is used as an aid to enhance the control room indications. If the SPDS system is not available, the control room operators are trained to mitigate the transient or emergency condition by using their control room indications and the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs). The control room operators are trained to respond to the transient or accident condition (s) with and without the SPDS system.
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'R:sponsa to GL-89-06 BVPS-2 SPDS ATTACHMENT 2 The EOPs are written to mitigate the consequences of various accidents when the EOPs are entered. The operation of the plant is maintained and controlled using the EOPs until the plant conditions are stabilized. With this EOP philosophy in mind, the SPDS philosophy and SPDS procedure guideline are written as an aid and an enhancement to the Emergency Operating Procedures during an abnormal, transient, or accident conditions. The SPDS system is also used during normal plant evolutions as an aid to the control room staff, but the SPDS system and the SPDS procedure guidelines are not considered primary information for the operation of the plant during accident conditions.
The primary operators of the SPDS system are the STAS. The STAS have the available use of the SPDS system to monitor the plant safety status at several Emergency Response Facility Computer System (ERFCS) terminals. The SPDS system for BVPS Unit 2 is a part of the ERFCS computer and is accessible at the ERFCS terminals. There are ERFCS terminals located at the following locations: Unit 2 Control Room, Technical Support Center and at the Emergency Operating Facility (EOF) . In addition to the STAS, all licensed operators and selected plant personnel are trained to be able to operate, understand, and interpret the information from these ERFCS terminals for the SPDS. SPDS users are capable of interpreting the color coding and status flags associated with the SPDS parameters. The SPDS users are trained to the level where the users are cognizant on how to use the ERFCS terminals as an available reference tool to enhance existing indications. The SPDS system is and will be considered an enhancement to operation of the plant and a secondary source of plant safety status information. The SPDS system will provide diagnostic information during normal and accident conditions. A trained SPDS operator, at the various locations, can aid the control room staff by monitoring plant status changes for the plant transient or emergency conditions and provide plant safety status information to personnel outside the control room.
The SPDS operator has the ability to call up the Top Level, Map Menu, Trends, or history displays by dedicated SPDS pushbuttons.
In addition to the dedicated display pushbuttons, the SPDS system can call up a display by locating the cursor in any display predefined poke field area and executing the Display Page pushbutton. This action will display on the SPDS terminal screen, the associated screen display related to the poke field area. All displays can be called upon by sequential paging, display poke fields, or entry of a specific screen page number.
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ATTACHMENT 2 Response t.o GL-89-06 BVPS-2 SPDS The SPDS screen displays are divided into six distinct categories. The initial group consists of the SPDS Map and its associated Menu screens. The Menu screens identify the first, second, third and fourth level displays. By visual observations of the SPDS menu screens, the fourth level displays can be associated with the third level displays. The fourth level display is a tabulator listing of all the computer points used in the third level displays. The last SPDS display group available is. the individual sensor input computer points called the Point Detail Displays. These point detail displays are all the computer points used by the higher level displays in the SPDS system.
There are 29 SPDS displays installed in SPDS display levels one, two and three. Level one (also known as Top Level) contains two abstract iconic displays. These two displays represent plant conditions referenced to the optimum operating points and operating limits. The two screens have eight spokes directed outward from the center of the screen. Each spoke represents a normalized plant parameter to provide an octagonal geometric shape. The symmetric octagonal diagram occurs when the active parameters are at or near the optimum operating level. As the plant parameters deviate from the optimum operating limits, the octagonal shape will distort informing the SPDS operator of the parameter deviation.
Top level display 1TL1 Narrow Range Display (NAR RNG) is structured for normal plant operation without a reactor trip condition. Top level display 1TL2 Wide Range Display (WID RNG) is used to show plant operations from full power to plant shutdown after a reactor trip. If the narrow Range display is on the screen prior to a reactor trip, the Wide Range display will automatically be substituted for the narrow range display after initiation of the rector trip. Both Top Level displays 1TL1 and 1TL2 are useful to display plant parameter conditions before and soon after a reactor trip. However, the iconic displays in the third and fourth Level provide more useful detail information to analyze / diagnose any plant transient or emergency conditions.
Therefore, after a reactor trip, normal operations of the SPDS system would be in the third and fourth levels. Additional information can be acquired using the point detail displays if more specific information is required for the computer point in the SPDS system.
'Rasponsa to GL-89-06
'BVPS-2 SPDS
, ATTACHMENT 2 In addition to the normal iconic display Level Two contains the history trend graphs and history iconics. The history trend graphs and history iconics can be called upon using the dedicated SPDS history pushbutton once the reactor trip breakers are opened. The history iconics and trend graphs provide a recorded history replay before and after the reactor trip breakers are opened of. 30 minutes at 1 minute intervals and 5 minutes at 10 second intervals. The SPDS system stores the data on memory disks for the respective trend graphs or iconic history.
The SPDS procedure guideline is a reference procedure for the SPDS operator. The procedure is written in three parts. The first section is a reference section of the SPDS terminal operational controls, parameter color codings and parameter status flags for the SPDS operator. The second section is a grouping of SPDS parameters that are helpful in analyzing and diagnosing plant conditions which may be used with the EOP procedural steps. A table is provided listing all the SPDS parameter groupings in section two for quick reference to operate the SPDS system on the ERFCS terminal following the EOPs. The last section section of the SPDS procedure guideline is the attachment section. The attachment section provides information that is not available in section one or two that may be useful to the SPDS operator.
The procedure guideline allows the SPDS operator to manipulate the ERFCS terminal controls for the SPDS system to gather information as required to diagnose or analyze plant safety status conditions. The procedure guideline provides instructions for the SPDS operator to call up any SPDS screen displays available in the SPDS system. The guideline allows the operator to follow plant conditions as specified by the EOP procedural steps and determine plant performance by viewing plant safety status as the EOP steps are accomplished.
When the SPDS system is used with the EOP procedure, the EOP procedure is the driving force in controlling the SPDS system.
The SPDS operator will normally use the SPDS system at the ERFCS terminal to follow plant conditions identified in the EOP steps.
In addition, the SPDS operator may observe other plant status to determine the changes influenced by the EOP procedural steps.
Operating the SPDS system as described will provide plant personnel with information to determine plant conditions to aid the operating staff in determining the conditions the EOPs were entered.
To ensure the procedure guideline and SPDS philosophy objectives are accomplished, a procedure validation and verification program has been incorporated into the SPDS philosophy. The procedure validation and verification program ensures that the procedure guideline and SPDS philosophy are implemented correctly and fulfill the requirements for which they were developed. The procedure validation and verification are the last phase in the development process before the SPDS philosophy and procedure guideline are approved and recommended for use in the plant.
ATTACHMENT 2 l' . Response to GL-89-06 ,
BVPS-2 SPDS j
.The following is a discussion of SPDS checklist questions for which DLC's response indicates the level of compliance with the NRC's interpretation -of the SPDS requirements (Supplement 1 to NUREG 0737) as addressed in NUREG 1342. DLC's response includes a schedulo of activities required to achieve compliance. Those checklist questions for. which DLC's response indicates' current compliance with Supplement 1 to NUREG 0737 are not addressed below.
SPDS Checklist Ouestion Resoonses In response to checklist question 2.3.2 of the SPDS questionnaire regarding the use of actual containment isolation valve position as an input to monitor successful isolation, DLC indicated that four (4) fire protection system valve inputs are not currently provided. (Reference DLC letter to NRC dated April 20, 1989) A design change is scheduled to be completed prior to start-up following the second BV-2 refueling outage to include the correct signal. The SPDS users have been instructed to verify closure of the four (4) fire protection valves at the Building Service Panel when monitoring CIA isolation on the SPDS. l In response to checklist question 3.3, DLC indicated that the ,
BVPS-2 SPDS' satisfies the continuous display requirement of I supplement 1 to NUREG 0737 by providing an alarm to the TLA function pushbutton which flashes when any of the 8 spokes on the top . level iconic go into alarm. (Reference DLC letter to NRC dated June 8, 1988) The user is trained to return to the top level display to investigate the plant condition causing the alarm. Also, the SPDS users have been instructed during training courses to display the top level iconic when not accessing information contained on lower level displays.
In response to question 4.3, DLC has implemented an availability monitoring program, however, a sufficient quantity of data has not been collected to provide meaningful availability results. A 12-month sample of availability results is scheduled to be completed by May 1, 1990.
In response to checklist question 4.5, DLC indicr:ed that the software verification and validation was 90% complete. Software verification and validation is scheduled to be complete prior to start-up following the second BV-2 refueling outage.
-Response to GL-89 BVPS-2 SPDS
. ATTACHMENT-2 In response to checklist questions 4.7 and 4.8, DLC indicated that due to a problem with information processing between the Digital Radiation Monitoring System (DRMS)- and the SPDS, that the DRMS Effluent Monitor frequently provides invalid and erroneous information and frequently cause a false alarm ' condition to display on the top level iconic display. This problem is scheduled to be resolved by a design change (DCP 1237) prior to start-up following the second BV-2 refueling outage. In the interim, the radiation monitor information is readily available on the DRMS monitor located close to the SPDS terminal.
In response to SPDS checklist question 5.6, radiation monitoring data is data linked from the Digital Radiation Monitoring System computer at one minute frequencies. Because the SPDS is capable.
of displaying trends (as a standard feature for several data points) at 5 seconds and 1 minute intervals, the user will be trained to display DRMS data only at 1 minute intervals.
In response to SPDS checklist question 5.10, a program to verify consistency of high- and low-level SPDS setpoints with hardwired
' instrumentation and reactor protection system setpoints is scheduled to be complete prior to start-up following the second BV-2. refueling outage.
In response. to SPDS checklist question 5.15, a program to verify high and low-level setpoints and plant specific data will be completed prior to start-up following the second BV-2 refueling outage.
In summary, successful completion of the following activities for the BVPS-2 SPDS will establish compliance with the guidelines of Supplement 1 to NUREG 0737.
I 1. Completion of design change to provide the correct fire l protection valve position status signal.
- 2. Complete the software verification and validation program.
- 3. Implement design change (DCP-1237) to resolve information i processing problems between the SPDS and the DRMS.
i 4 .. Complete verification of high and low-level SPDS setpoints with hardwired instrumentation and reactor protection system setpoints.
- 5. Complete program to verify the software specifications with plant specific data.
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