ML20245F656

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Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 118 to License DPR-72
ML20245F656
Person / Time
Site: Crystal River Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 06/22/1989
From:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20245F636 List:
References
NUDOCS 8906280205
Download: ML20245F656 (2)


Text

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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO.118 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-72 FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION. ET AL.

CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT NO. 3 NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT

-DOCKET NO.-50-302 INTRODUCTION

. By letter dated November 28, 1988, Florida Power Corporation (FPC or the

.-licensee) requested an. amendment to the Technical Specifications (TS) appended

' to Facility Operating License No. DPR-72 for_ the Crystal River Unit..No. 3

, Nuclear Generating Plant (CR-3). The proposed amendment would increase the containment : leakage test pressure from 49.6 psig to 53.3 psig. This change would reflect the at.tual maximum peak containment internal pressure and would

provide consistency between the safety analysis and the TS. Addi ti onally . ... _

- surveillance 4.6.1.2.d.3 and 4.6.1.2.f. both of which refer to a' seal system which is not used by CR-3, would be deleted. j EVALUATION Containment Test Pressure q

During a review that was being conducted to upgrade the TS Bases, a discrepancy  ;

between the containment leakage test pressure and the maximum containment accident pressure was identified. A discrepancy between the containment design j bases analysis temperature assumption and the temperature limit of TS 3.6.1.5 (Containment Air Temperature) was also identified.

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Appendix J of 10 CFR Part 50 requires containment leakage testing to be performed q at the calculated peak containment internal pressure related to the design basis event, in this' case a loss of coolant accident. The initial containment pressure and temperature assumed were 14.7 psia (0 psig) and 110 degrees Fahrenheit. '

These values respited in a calculated peak containment pressure of 49.6 psig.

This peak pressure is low since the values assumed for initial temperature and pressure are below their allowable limits. TS 3.6.1.5 places a limit of 130 degrees F on containment air temperature. The peak pressure value calculation was performed assuming this higher initial temperature, and a value of 50.3 psig t was obtained. Furthermore, TS 3.6.1.4 allows containment pressure to rise to 1 17.7 psia (3 psig), instead of the 14.7 psia (0 psig) value assumed in the safety analysis. The initial containment pressure of 3 psig adds directly to the )

calculated post accident presrure increase resulting in a totti internal pressure i of 53.3 psig. This is less than the containment design pressure of 55 psig.  !

I 8906280205 890622 j PDR. ADOCK 05000302 P PDC

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i k Changing the containment leakage test pressure to 53.3 psig will provide consis-tency between the TS and the safety analysis. Testing at not less than this maximum peak containment internal pressure provides assurance that containment leakage will not exceed the value assumed in the safety analysis; therefore, the staff finds the proposed changes acceptable.

Surve111ances Surveillance 4.6.1.2.d.3 and 4.6.1.2.f are being deleted since the CR-3 containment design does not use a seal system for containment isolation. Thus, the surveil-lances are not applicable and the proposed changes are acceptable.

SUMMARY

Based on our review, the changes proposed in this request are adequate and acceptable.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION This amendment involves a change in the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes to surveillance requirements. We have determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in -

the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. >

The Comission has previously issued a proposed. finding that this amendment l involves no significant' hazards consideration and there has been no public coment on such finding. Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility.  !

criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant '

to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impcct statement or environmental assess-ment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this' amendment.

CONCLUSION We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:

(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) suchpublic activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public. j Dated: June 22, 1989 i I

Principal Contributor:

G. Wunder i

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