|
---|
Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20217G0191999-10-15015 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Licensee Followed Analytical Methods Provided in GL 90-05.Grants Relief Until Next Refueling Outage,Scheduled to Start on 991001.Temporary non-Code Repair Must Then Be Replaced with Code Repair ML20212L0881999-10-0404 October 1999 SER Accepting Licensee Requests for Relief 98-012 to 98-018 Related to Implementation of Subsections IWE & Iwl of ASME Section XI for Containment Insp for Crystal River Unit 3 ML20212J8631999-10-0101 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Licensee Proposed Alternatives to Provide Reasonable Assurance of Structural Integrity of Subject Welds & Provide Acceptable Level of Quality & Safety.Relief Granted Per 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(i) ML20212E6911999-09-21021 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Proposed EALs Changes for Plant Unit 3.Changes Meet Requirements of 10CFR50.47(b)(4) & App E to 10CFR50 ML20210P1111999-08-0505 August 1999 SER Accepting Evaluation of Third 10-year Interval Inservice Insp Program Requests for Relief for Plant,Unit 3 ML20203A4381999-02-0303 February 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting EAL Changes for License DPR-72, Per 10CFR50.47(b)(4) & App E to 10CFR50 ML20236Q4611998-06-30030 June 1998 SER for Crystal River Power Station,Unit 3,individual Plant Exam (Ipe).Concludes That Plant IPE Complete Re Info Requested by GL 88-20 & IPE Results Reasonable Given Plant Design,Operation & History ML20216G8091998-04-10010 April 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Resolution of Crystal River Restart Issues Related to USI A-46 Program ML20199A1441998-01-0909 January 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Relief Request for Delayed Implementation of 10CFR50.55a,until 971231 or Plant Restart, Whichever Occurs First ML20199D0561997-11-14014 November 1997 Safety Evaluation Approving Ampacity Derating Test Results for Crystal River,Unit 3 Related to GL 92-08, Thermo-Lag 330-1 Fire Barriers ML20212C3751997-10-16016 October 1997 SER Accepting Licensee Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves ML20217D7561997-10-0101 October 1997 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Testing of Ingersoll-Dresser Pump Model 8HN194 at Test Facility Demonstrates That Crystal River Decay Heat Pumps of Same Model Can Operate at Flows of 100 Gpm for 30 Days ML20138J0151997-05-0505 May 1997 Safety Evaluation Approving Request for Relief 95-050,Rev 1, for Plant,Unit 3 ML20138E4411997-04-30030 April 1997 Safety Evaluation on ASME Code Case N-509 for Crystal River Nuclear Plant,Unit 3 ML20140F3771997-04-28028 April 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Staff Evaluation of Plant, Unit 3 Nuclear Generating Plant IPE ML20134B7091997-01-29029 January 1997 SER Accepting Fire Barrier Sys Relied by Licensee to Meet NRC Fire Protection Requirements for Following Raceway Types & Sizes ML20133N6511997-01-22022 January 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Request to Use Code Case N-524 as Alternative to ASME Code Section XI for Plant ML20149M6801997-01-17017 January 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee 960807 Results of Analyses Re Operability Evaluation of Main Steam Sys W/Bent Rod Hangers at Plant ML20133D3471997-01-0606 January 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 155 to License DPR-72 ML20058P1981993-12-16016 December 1993 Safety Evaluation Accepting Ground Response Spectra Utilized & Approaches Used in Development of Floor Response Spectra for Resolution of USI A-46 ML20138D5941993-02-0909 February 1993 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief from Repair Requirements of ASME Code Section XI in Order to Perform Temporary Noncode Repair to 18 Inch Portion of Nuclear Closed Cycle Cooling Sys ML20126F7811992-12-22022 December 1992 Safety Evaluation to Confirm Granting of Request for Relief from ASME Code Repair Requirements Nuclear Closed Cycle Cooling Sys ML20056B5341990-08-23023 August 1990 Safety Evaluation Re Station Blackout.Recommends That Util Reevaluate Areas of Nonconformance W/Station Blackout Guidance Identified in Evaluation.Subj to Acceptable Resolution of NRC Recommendations,Issue Remains Open ML20055E5141990-07-0202 July 1990 Safety Evaluation Re Util 831104 & 840731 Responses to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 2.2.1 Re Equipment Classification Programs for All safety-related Components ML20245F6561989-06-22022 June 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 118 to License DPR-72 ML20245D3001989-06-14014 June 1989 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Licensee Meets NRC Position on Item 4.5.2 of Generic Ltr 83-28,based on Finding That Facility Will Be Designed to Permit on-line Functional Testing of Reactor Trip Sys,Including Stated Testing ML20247D4951989-05-19019 May 1989 Safety Evaluation Re TMI Action Item II.K.3.31 Concerning plant-specific Calculations to Show Compliance w/10CFR50.46 ML20245A6161989-04-19019 April 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util 890210 Final ATWS Design Description ML20155F2641988-10-0606 October 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Relief from Inservice Testing Program ML20154A7421988-04-29029 April 1988 Evaluation of Auxiliary Feedwater Sys Reliability (Generic Issue 124).Licensee Should Consider Listed Addl Recommendations for Improved Plant Performance & Auxiliary Feedwater Sys Challenge Rate Reduction ML20234D5221987-06-16016 June 1987 Safety Evaluation Re Conformance to Reg Guide 1.97 ML20214Q7731987-05-29029 May 1987 Ser:Pump & Valve Inservice Testing Program,Crystal River Nuclear Power Station,Unit 3,for Remainder of First 10-Yr Interval ML20214M1781987-05-26026 May 1987 Safety Evaluation Granting Util 860324 & 870114 Requests for Relief from Certain Requirements of ASME Code Section XI & to Use ANSI N45.2.6-1978 in Lieu of ASME Code Requirement of ANSI N45.2.6-1973 ML20211N2661987-02-19019 February 1987 Evaluation of Licensee Response to Insp Rept 50-302/86-12. Procedure AI-401 Found to Be Inadequate & Resulted in Restatement of Violation 2.Design Error Could Cause Loss of RHR Ability ML20211Q2971987-02-18018 February 1987 Safety Evaluation Re Auxiliary Feedwater Sys Reliability (Generic Issue 124) for Prairie Island Units 1 & 2 ML20211B5521987-02-0909 February 1987 Safety Evaluation Re Rev 7 to Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) & Rev 0 to Process Control Program (Pcp).Odcm & PCP Acceptable Refs for Use W/Tech Specs for Assuring Compliance w/10CFR20 & 50,App a & I ML20209H7051987-01-16016 January 1987 Safety Evaluation of Util 831104,840116 & 0731 Responses to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 4.4 Re safety-related Maint & Test Procedures for Diverse Reactor Trip Feature.Responses Acceptable ML20207Q6451987-01-0909 January 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util 831104,840116 & 0731 Responses to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 4.4 Re Maint & Test Procedures for Silicon Controlled Rectifiers ML20214N1941986-09-0404 September 1986 Safety Evaluation Supporting Licensee 860117 Response to 10CFR50.61 Re Projected Values of Matl Properties for Fracture Toughness Requirements for Protection Against Pressurized Thermal Shock Events ML20205T5301986-06-0909 June 1986 SER Supporting Responses to Generic Ltr 83-28,Items 4.2.1 & 4.2.2 Re Reactor Trip Sys Reliability ML20211D6251986-06-0909 June 1986 SER Supporting Responses to Generic Ltr 81-21 Re Natural Circulation Cooldown ML20210R9531986-05-0202 May 1986 SER Supporting Util Response to IE Bulletin 80-11 Re Masonry Wall design.Safety-related Masonry Walls Will Withstand Specified Design Load Conditions W/O Impairment of Wall Integrity.Technical Evaluation Rept Encl ML20133Q1271985-10-24024 October 1985 SER Re Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 1.1 Post-Trip Review Program Description & Procedure. Util 831104 Response to Generic Ltr 83-28 Does Not Meet Guidelines for post-trip Review. Acceptable Responses Required ML20135F8871985-09-11011 September 1985 SER Re Control Complex Dedicated Cooling Sys for post-fire Alternate Shutdown Capability.Design of Control Complex Dedicated Cooling Sys Meets Requirements of Section III.G.3 & Iii.L of 10CFR50 App R & Acceptable ML20135G1051985-09-0909 September 1985 SER Supporting Licensee Response to Items 3.1.1,3.1.2,3.2.1, 3.2.2,4.1 & 4.5.1 of Generic Ltr 83-28, Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events ML20135E6131985-09-0606 September 1985 SER Re Licensee Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 1.2 Re post-trip Review (Data & Info Capability).Licensee Program for Data Retention Conforms to Guidelines of Section Ii.D & Acceptable ML20214J2911979-12-20020 December 1979 Safety Evaluation Re Preliminary Design for safety-grade Anticipatory Reactor Trips on Loss of Main Feedwater &/Or Turbine Trip 1999-09-21
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217G0191999-10-15015 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Licensee Followed Analytical Methods Provided in GL 90-05.Grants Relief Until Next Refueling Outage,Scheduled to Start on 991001.Temporary non-Code Repair Must Then Be Replaced with Code Repair 3F1099-19, Part 21 Rept Re Damage on safety-grade Cable Provided to FPC by Bicc Brand-Rex Co.Damage Was Created During Cabling Process While Combining Three Conducters.Corrective Action Program Precursor Card PC99-2868 Was Initiated1999-10-13013 October 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Damage on safety-grade Cable Provided to FPC by Bicc Brand-Rex Co.Damage Was Created During Cabling Process While Combining Three Conducters.Corrective Action Program Precursor Card PC99-2868 Was Initiated ML20217B0931999-10-0606 October 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Damaged Safety Grade Electrical Cabling Found in Supply on 990831.Damage Created During Cabling Process While Combining Three Conductors Just Prior to Closing.Vendor Notified of Reporting of Issue ML20212L0881999-10-0404 October 1999 SER Accepting Licensee Requests for Relief 98-012 to 98-018 Related to Implementation of Subsections IWE & Iwl of ASME Section XI for Containment Insp for Crystal River Unit 3 ML20212J8631999-10-0101 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Licensee Proposed Alternatives to Provide Reasonable Assurance of Structural Integrity of Subject Welds & Provide Acceptable Level of Quality & Safety.Relief Granted Per 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(i) ML20212E9031999-09-30030 September 1999 FPC Crystal River Unit 3 Plant Reference Simulator Four Year Simulator Certification Rept Sept 1995-Sept 1999 3F1099-02, Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Crystal River,Unit 3.With1999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Crystal River,Unit 3.With ML20212E6911999-09-21021 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Proposed EALs Changes for Plant Unit 3.Changes Meet Requirements of 10CFR50.47(b)(4) & App E to 10CFR50 ML20211L1321999-08-31031 August 1999 EAL Basis Document 3F0999-02, Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Crystal River,Unit 3.With1999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Crystal River,Unit 3.With ML20212C1501999-08-31031 August 1999 Non-proprietary Version of Rev 0 to Crystal River Unit 3 Enhanced Spent Fuel Storage Engineering Input to LAR Number 239 ML20211B7291999-08-16016 August 1999 Rev 2 to Cycle 11 Colr ML20210P1111999-08-0505 August 1999 SER Accepting Evaluation of Third 10-year Interval Inservice Insp Program Requests for Relief for Plant,Unit 3 ML20210U5341999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Crystal River,Unit 3 ML20209F5601999-07-31031 July 1999 EAL Basis Document, for Jul 1999 3F0799-01, Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Crystal River,Unit 3.With1999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Crystal River,Unit 3.With ML20210U5411999-06-30030 June 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Crystal River,Unit 3 3F0699-07, Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Crystal River,Unit 3.With1999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Crystal River,Unit 3.With ML20210U5601999-05-31031 May 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Crystal River,Unit 3 ML20195C6271999-05-28028 May 1999 Non-proprietary Rev 0 to Addendum to Topical Rept BAW-2346P, CR-3 Plant Specific MSLB Leak Rates ML20196L2031999-05-19019 May 1999 Non-proprietary Rev 0 to BAW-2346NP, Alternate Repair Criteria for Tube End Cracking in Tube-to-Tubesheet Roll Joint of Once-Through Sgs 3F0599-04, Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Crystal River Unit 3.With1999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Crystal River Unit 3.With ML20210U5631999-04-30030 April 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Crystal River,Unit 3 3F0499-04, Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Crystal River Unit 3.With1999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Crystal River Unit 3.With ML20204D9661999-03-31031 March 1999 Non-proprietary Rev 1,Addendum a to BAW-2342, OTSG Repair Roll Qualification Rept 3F0399-04, Special Rept 99-01:on 990310,discovered Containment Tendons That Required Grease Addition in Excess of Prescribed Limits During Recent Insp Activites.Six Tendons Were Refilled with Appropriate Amount of Grease1999-03-10010 March 1999 Special Rept 99-01:on 990310,discovered Containment Tendons That Required Grease Addition in Excess of Prescribed Limits During Recent Insp Activites.Six Tendons Were Refilled with Appropriate Amount of Grease 3F0399-03, Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Crystal River Unit 3.With1999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Crystal River Unit 3.With ML20203A4381999-02-0303 February 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting EAL Changes for License DPR-72, Per 10CFR50.47(b)(4) & App E to 10CFR50 ML20206E9891998-12-31031 December 1998 Kissimmee Utility Authority 1998 Annual Rept ML20206E9021998-12-31031 December 1998 Florida Progress Corp 1998 Annual Rept ML20206E9701998-12-31031 December 1998 Ouc 1998 Annual Rept. with Financial Statements from Seminole Electric Cooperative,Inc 3F0199-05, Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Crystal River Unit 3.With1998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Crystal River Unit 3.With ML20206E9261998-12-31031 December 1998 Gainesville Regional Utilities 1998 Annual Rept 3F1298-13, Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for Crystal River,Unit 3.With1998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for Crystal River,Unit 3.With 3F1198-05, Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for Crystal River,Unit 3.With1998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for Crystal River,Unit 3.With ML20155F4071998-10-31031 October 1998 Rev 2 to Pressure/Temp Limits Rept ML20155J2701998-10-28028 October 1998 Second Ten-Year Insp Interval Closeout Summary Rept 3F1098-06, Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for Crystal River Unit 3.With1998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for Crystal River Unit 3.With ML20206E9461998-09-30030 September 1998 Utilities Commission City of New Smyrna Beach,Fl Comprehensive Annual Financial Rept Sept 30,1998 & 1997 ML20206E9561998-09-30030 September 1998 City of Ocala Comprehensive Annual Financial Rept for Yr Ended 980930 ML20206E9101998-09-30030 September 1998 City of Bushnell Fl Comprehensive Annual Financial Rept for Fiscal Yr Ended 980930 ML20206E9811998-09-30030 September 1998 City of Tallahassee,Fl Comprehensive Annual Financial Rept for Yr Ended 980930 ML20195E3121998-09-30030 September 1998 Comprehensive Annual Financial Rept for City of Leesburg,Fl Fiscal Yr Ended 980930 3F0998-07, Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for Crystal River Unit 3.With1998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for Crystal River Unit 3.With ML20236W6501998-07-31031 July 1998 Emergency Action Level Basis Document 3F0898-02, Monthly Operating Rept for Jul 1998 for Crystal River,Unit 11998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Jul 1998 for Crystal River,Unit 1 ML20236V8801998-07-30030 July 1998 Control Room Habitability Rept 3F0798-01, Monthly Operating Rept for June 1998 for Crystal River Unit 31998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1998 for Crystal River Unit 3 ML20236Q4611998-06-30030 June 1998 SER for Crystal River Power Station,Unit 3,individual Plant Exam (Ipe).Concludes That Plant IPE Complete Re Info Requested by GL 88-20 & IPE Results Reasonable Given Plant Design,Operation & History 3F0698-02, Monthly Operating Rept for May 1998 for Crystal River Unit 31998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1998 for Crystal River Unit 3 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
____
p ""'Go p k UNITED STATES j
%t j t
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001
\, ...../
SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH SUPPORTING STAFF EVALUATION OF CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT INDIVIDUAL PLANT EXAMINATION FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION. ET AL.
DOCKET NO. 50-302
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Un March 9,1993, Florida Power Corporation (licensee) submitted the Crystal River Unit 3 (CR3), Nuclear Power Plant Individual Plant Evaluation (IPE) in response to Generic Letter (GL) 88-20 and associated supplements. By letter dated September 19, 1995, the staff issued a request additional information (RAI). The licensee responded in a letter dated November 22, 1995. Also, in July 1996, the NRC staff and its consultant, Brookhaven National Laboratory, had telephone discussions with the licensee.
A " Step 1" review of the CR3 IPE submittal was performed and involved the efforts of Brookhaven National Laboratory in the three review areas: front-end, human reliability analysis (HRA), and back-end. The Step 1 review focused on whether the licensee's method was capable of identifying vulnerabilities. Therefore, the review considered: (1) the completeness of the information, and (2) the reasonableness of the results given the CR3 design, operation, and history. A more detailed review, a " Step 2" review, has not been performed for this IPE submittal. A summary of staff's findings is provided below. Details of the contractors' findings are contained in a technical evaluation report appended to this staff evaluation (SE).
The submittal states that the licensee intends to maintain a "living" probabilistic risk assessment (PRA).
2.0 EVALUATION CR3 is a Babcox & Wilcox Pressurized Water Reactor with a large, dry containment. The CR3 IPE has estimated a core damage frequency (CDF) of 1.4E-05 per reactor-year from internally initiated events, not including the contribution from internal floods, anticipated transients without scram (ATWS), or interfacing systems loss-of-coolant accidents (ISLOCAs). Small loss-of-coolant accidents (LOCAs) contributed 51 percent to plant CDF, station blackout (SBO) contributed 24 percent, medium LOCAs contributed 12 percent, transients contributed 5 percent to the CDF, and steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) contributed 4 percent.
The total flood CDF is approximately 1.3E-06 per reactor-year (in addition to the reported CDF), resulting from two scenarios, service water pipe break in 9705020274 970428 PDR ADOCK 05000302 9 PDR VOc
l the auxiliary building, and overflow from.the decay heat pit onto the auxiliary building floor. ISLOCAs. (and reactor vessel rupture) were considered separately and found not to be significant contributors, on the l order of IE-07 per reactor-year. Similarly, a scoping study was performed for
! ATWS and it was described as only a minor contributor to CDF. .
The staff notes that the CR3 CDF is the lowest of the Babcox & Wilcox plants.
l The low CDF in of itself, is not necessarily indicative of an adequate PRA
! process. It is important to address the weaknesses identified below to understand their role and contribution to the CDF and the overall IPE process.
Neither the front-end, HRA, nor back-end portion of the IPE submittal (including related licensee responses to the RAI) were complete to the extent necessary for the staff to complete its assessment of adequacy with respect to '
the intent of GL 88-20. ,
i The following list provides a summary of the apparent front-end weaknesses: i
- 1. Two initiating events; loss of de pcwer and loss of non-nuclear ;
instr'imentation, which have the potential to result in dominant accident sequences, were not included in the CR3 IPE analysis and l their omission requires justification. LOCAs are dominant I contributors to core damage at CR3, as reported by the licensee, i However, the small and large break LOCA frequencies are about an :
order of magnitude lower, and the medium LOCA about half the l l frequencies described in NUREG/CR-4550. These frequency values l
require justification. The staff believes that these values may be sufficiently low as to erroneously impact the importance of these initiators.
- 2. ISLOCAs were not found to be significant contributors to CDF at CR3.
The ISLOCA analysis, although detailed, appears to have arbitrarily j assumed that only 10 percent of valve ruptures occur in the critical parts of the valve, and the rest occurring in the valve bonnet. This assumption may have significantly influenced the ISLOCA result that they are not significant contributors to CDF at CR3. Since ISLOCAs themselves, can be a large component of the risk of offsite radionuclide release, the assumption regarding valve rupture locations require justification.
, 3. Certain aspects of the flooding analysis, for example, treatment of drains and maintenance induced floods, do not appear to have been included. Inclusion of these aspects may increase flood CDF. Their exclusion may mask potential procedure-based vulnerabilities.
l 4. The staff frequently uses NUREG/CR-4550 as a basis for comparison with
, IPE submittal data. For CR3, the plant-specific turbine driven i emergency feedwater pump failure-to-run probability appears to be two i
i
\
i 1
orders of magnitude lower than NUREG-4550. This is an important plant feature for dealing with SB0 situations and may contribute to an ,
understated contribution to CDF from an SB0. :
- 5. As the licensee has indicated, common cause failures play a significant role in the CR3 IPE. While somewhat comparable to NUREG/CR-4550 values, the CR3 common cause beta factors are consistently lower, without adequate justification. In addition, common cause effects between the l turbine driven and motor driven emergency feedwater pumps are not currently in the IPE model. Use of low values may skew the ranking of predominant accident sequences and mask potential vulnerabilities.
The licensee performed an HRA to document and quantify potential failures in I human-system interactions and to quantify human-initiated recovery of failed systems. The licensee identified the following operator actions as important in the estimate of the.CDF (since no human action importance ranking was performed these are not necessarily listed in order of importance): >
- 1. Failure to transfer to high pressure recirculation during a small break LOCA or SGTR,
- 2. Failure to refill the borated water storage tank during an SGTR or failure to isolate borated water storage tank transfer to the containment sump.
- 3. Failure tc transfer to the startup transformer after loss of offsite ;
power transformer, i
Failure to cross-tie decay heat pump trains, 4.
- 5. Failure to switch to spare battery chargers.
Despite the fact that a generally viable HRA approach was used in the CR3 IPE submittal, several weaknesses, listed below, have been identified regarding how the analysis was conducted, or at least in the licensee's documentation thereof: l l
- 1. Post initiator human actions included recovery actions which typically ;
are not covered by procedures. No justification was provided, however, ,
for any of the modeled non-proceduralized actions and without such t justification there does not appear to be an adequate basis for the human error probabilities (HEPs) assigned to the events.
- 2. Limited consideration of plant-specific performance shaping factors and dependencies and inadequate treatment of these factors can result in :
HEPs which are more generic in nature than plant-specific. Thus, an <
opportunity is lost to gain insights into operator performance. Also, ,
the resulting HEPs may be either optimistic or pessimistic, especially '
when dependencies are involved which, if ignored, could lead to low HEPs. i 1
- - - . ~ _ - . . ~ ~ . - - ~ . . . - .-_ . . .-
1 1
_4
- 3. Documentation was inadequate on the process used to determine the time available for operators to diagnose needed actions and on the time needed to conduct the actions (particularly outside the control room).
In general, because of the sparse documentation, it is not clear that time was appropriately considered in the quantification of operator actions.
The. licensee evaluated and quantified the results of .the severe accident progression through the use of a containment event tree but did not consider uncertainties in containment response through, for example, the use of sensitivity analyses or other methods, as requested in GL 88-20. Table A.5,
" Parameters for sensitivity study," of Appendix A, " Approach to Back-end Portion of IPE," to NUREG-1335 provides a list of suggested in-vessel and ex-vessel phenomena which are likely to have a large effect on containment performance and are, consequently, good candidates for sensitivity studies.
According to the licensee, the CR3 conditional containment failure probabilities are as follows: early containment failure is 3 percent with direct containment heating and hydrogen burns the primary contributors; late containment failures is 63 percent, with gradual overpressurization from loss l of containment heat removal and basemat meltthrough being the primary contributors; and bypass is 5 percent, with SGTR the primary contributor.
According to the licensee, the containment remains intact 29 percent of the time. Early radiological releases are dominated by SB0 sequences and late releases are dominated by LOCA sequences. J The staff noted the following weaknesses in the back-end portion of the IPE:
- 1. Because a sensitivity study, as recommended in NUREG-1335, was not performed, the IPE did not provide any quantitative insights on how containment failure probabilities would change if uncertainties in containment phenomena were considered.
- 2. A relatively low source term (i.e., a release fraction less than 2E-06 for iodine and cesium), resulting from the late containment failure mode with no containment systems available, was reported by CR3, without adequate justification.
- 3. The discussion of plant-specific seal materials and their properties at elevated temperatures is not adequate. The licensee has stated that their gross containment failure pressure is slightly lower than many other similar large, dry containments. Since this failure pressure is approximately the same as the typical failure pressure for seal material
' failure under harsh conditions, they stated that it was not necessary to investigate seal behavior, since either the containment or the seals would fail at about the same time. The staff disagrees since it may be determined that the existing seal material may, itself, have lower performance characteristics than the norm as did the containment structure, and consequently, may fail at a lower failure pressure than the containment.
1
- 4. Containment isolation failure was not discussed in enough detail for the staff to determine whether the analysis addressed the areas identified
, in GL 88-20.
- 5. There was virtually no discussion of the containment performance improvements program issue concerning the important phenomenology of hydrogen pocketing and detonation during accident progression following
, a core melt.
I' The licensee reviewed core damage cutsets "for sequences with unusually high ;
frequencies, sequences hinting of some heretofore unknown dependency, and risk significant sequences which can easily be reduced to risk insignificant via a procedure change or a minor hardware change." Based on this concept, the '
4 licensee did not identify any vulnerabilities. Similarly, no plant 2
improvements were identified. As discussed below, the staff is concerned, however, that the CR3 IPE process, as described in the submittal, including 3 the qualitative definition of a vulnerability, may not be adequate to uncover 1
vulnerabilities or point to appropriate plant improvements.
3.0 CONCLUSION
In addition to the staff concerns raised about the front-end, HRA, and back-
- end portions of the IPE, the staff also notes some general issues of concern.
i The sections of the IPE submittal on plant improvements is very brief since none emerged from the analysis. Similarly, there was no discussion of '
insights. This suggests that one of the benefits of GL 88-20 may not have been gained (i.e., "the. maximum benefit from the IPE would be realized if the licensee's staff were involved in all aspects of the examination to the degree that the knowledge gained from the examination becomes an integral part of plant procedures and training programs."). To date, we do not have assurance
- that IPE-based knowledge has been incorporated into the plant operations.
In summary, given the information contained in the CR3 IPE submittal, the associated licensee teleconference responses, and their written responses to the staff's Request for Additional Information, the staff is unable to l conclude that: (1) the licensee's IPE is complete with regard to the information requested by GL 88-20 (and associated NUREG-1335), and (2) the IPE results are reasonable given the CR3 design, operation, and history. Areas of
. staff concern have been documented in the three review areas, front-end d analysis, HRA, and back-end analysis, which, taken together, represent
< sufficient weakness in the licensee's approach that we cannot conclude that the four general objectives of the IPE program, listed below, were met by the .
licensee for CR3: 1
- 1. To develop an appreciation for severe accident behavior,
- 2. To understand the most likely severe accident sequences that could occur at the plant,
- 3. To gain a more quantitative understanding of the overall probabilities of core damage and fission product releases, and
l j
- 4. If necessary, to reduce the overall probabilities of core damage and fission product releases by modifying, where appropriate, hardware and 1 procedures that would help prevent or mitigate severe accidents. l Consequently, the staff cannot conclude that the licensee's IPE process was capable of identifying vulnerabilities that could be fixed with low-cost imprcvements. Therefore, the staff cannot conclude that the CR3 IPE has met the intent of GL 88-20. ,
i Appendix: Technical Evaluation Report Principal Contributor: J. Lane Date: April 28, 1997 l
l l
1 1
I l
I J
4 APPENDIX CONTRACTOR TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT