ML20237E231

Proposed Revised Tech Specs Re Fire Protection

ML20237E231
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	12/17/1987
From:	BOSTON EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20237E226	List: BECO-87-200, Application for Amend to License DPR-35,consisting of Revised Proposed Change 87-05,modifying Tech Specs Re Fire Protection ML20237E231
References
NUDOCS 8712280224
Download: ML20237E231 (4)

Text

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LIMITVG_ CONDITION FOR OPERATION StJRVEILLAE E RE0DIREMENTS

'B. Fire Water SuDoly System B. Fire Water SuDDiv System The Fire Hater Supply System 1. The Fire Water Supply System shall be operable with: shall be tested and verified to be OPERABLE:

1. Two (2) 2000 gpm/125 psig fire pumps which are arranged a. by checking the volume of to start automatically, water in each fire water tank at least once every 7

2. Two (2) water supplies with a days.

minimum storage quantity of 240,000 gallons of water in b. by automatically starting each. each fire pump at least once every month and running each

3. Two (2) independent water pump for thirty minutes at flow paths from Item Nos.1 & that time.

2 above to each fire water suppression system. (3.12.C c. by visually checking every and 3.12.E) shutoff valve on the fire water supply system at least APPLICABILITY once every month for proper position.

At all times when any safety related equipment is required to be OPERABLE. d. by cycling each fire water supply system shutoff valve ACTION: through its full operation at least once per cycle.

a. With less than the above required equipment, restore the e. by verifying at least once inoperable equipment to OPERABLE per cycle that each pump status within 7 days or prepare starts and delivers at least and submit a report to the 2000 gpm while maintaining a Commission within the next 30 system pressure of at least days outlining the plans and 125 psig.

procedures to be used to provide for the loss of redundancy in f. by performing a water flow this system. jnt on the fire water yard loop at least once every

b. With no FIRE SUPPRESSION HATER year.

SYSTEM OPERABLE:

g. by verifying at least once

1. Establish the backup Fire every month that the diesel Hater Supply System within 24 fire pump fuel storage tank hrs. contains a minimum of 175 gallons of fuel oil.

2. If the requirement of b.1 above cannot be met, an h. at least once per orderly shutdown of the operating cycle by reactor shall be initiated subjecting the diesel to an and the reactor shall be in inspection in accordance the cold shutdown condition with procedures prepared in within 24 hrs. conjunction with the g22bbN $ 293 e e a s for the P PDR class of service.

Amendment No. 206a l i

LXMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS B. Fire Hater Sucolv System (cont'd)

1. by verifying at least once per 3 months that a sample I of diesel fuel from the )

fuel storage tank, j obtained in accordance  ;

with ASTM 04057-81 or D4177-82, is within the acceptable limits specified in Table 1 of ASTM 0975-81 with respect l to viscosity, water content, and sediment.

j. by desnonstrating that the diesel starting 24-volt battery bank and charger I

l are OPERABLE as follows:

1. at least once per week by verifying that the electrolyte level of each battery is above the plates and battery voltage is at least 24 volts.

2. at least once per 3 months by verifying that the specific gravity is appropriate for continued service l of the battery.

1 1 3. at least once per operating cycle by verifying that the batteries, all plates and battery racks show no visual indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration and the battery-to-battery and terminal connection are clean, tight, free of corrosion, and l coated with anti-corrosion material 1

s Amendment No. 206b

ILASLS

• ' 3/4.12.G Alternate Shutdown Panels The alternate shutdown system, independent of cabling and equipment in the Cable Spreading Room is provided to effect safe shutdown of Pilgrim in the event of a fire in the Cable Spreading Room. This is accomplished by installing isolation switches for safety-related equipment that will provide the capability for the plant operators to reach a safe shutdown condition.

These switches will isolate their associated equipment from the CSR cables, thus transfer control from the Control Room to the local emergency shutdown statior.s outside the CSR. These isolation switches are located in alternate shutdown panels and are located as close as practical to the equipment or switchgear they serve.

The operability of the fire suppression and detection system in the Cable Spreading Room in conjunction with the passive element of cable coating ensures that adequate fire protection / detection / suppression capability is available to quickly detect, confine and extinguish fires occurring in any portion of the room where safety-related equipment is located. The fire detection / suppression system consists of an independent smoke detection system, an automatic Halon 1301 Fire Suppression system and fire hose stations available outside the doorways to the Cable Spreading Room. The collective capability of passive protection and detection with either manual or automatic suppression is adequate to minimize potential damage to safety-related equipment and is a major element in the facility fire protection program.

An emergency shutdown procedure, which is compatible with the design modifications and plant operator availability, provides step-by-step actions to initiate safe shutdown operation. Operator actions to isolate safety-related cables passing through the CSR is initiated as soon as a fire which is not immediately extinguishable is detected and confirmed in the CSR.

Alternate shutdown panels are provided for the following systems:

l

a. Core Spray

b. RHR

c. RBCCW

d. Salt Service Water

e. HPCI

f. RCIC

g. Automatic Depressurization System

h. Diesel Generators Inoperability of the above listed systems does not require entry into LC0 action statements for the alternate shutdown panels.

A surveillance frequency of once per cycle is considered prudent and more frequent testing not warranted. The frequency of once per refueling outage for testing the diesel generators prevents unnecessarily rendering them inoperable during normal power operation. The frequency of once per refueling outage for the Automatic Depressurization System is consistent with the existing surveillance frequency for this system. Requiring this surveillance l to be performed during a refueling outage will also assure that plant conditions will allow for safe access to the ADS solenoids.

Amendment No. 206j-1

ATTACHMENT 2 to BECoJ7-200 ADDITIONAL JUSTIFICATION RE: PROPOSED SECTION 4.12.G.7 ON PAGE 206e-2 0F THF MAY 22. 1987 SUBMITTAL Section 4.9.A.1.a on page 194 of our current Technical Specifications addresses a functional check of the alternate shutdown panel for the diesel generator (DG). Language in that section contains the words "...and loaded",

which refers to manually loading the DG once it has started. Loading the DG is not, nor has ever been, required to functionally check the operation of the alternate shutdown panel. The only requirement relating to the functional check of the panel is that the DG be shown capable of starting.

BECo installed a new upgraded alternate shutdown panel during the current RF0

1. 7. The old alternate shutdown panel design necessitated isolating DC control power to the DG in order to perform the functional check. As part of the upgrade, a dedicated DC control power cable was installed directly from the switchgear room to the DG. This action obviated tne old method of isolating DC power to isolate control of the DG from the control room when performing the functional check. The upgrade also included adding four switches to the new alternate shutdown panel which provide the capability to isolate startup and control of the DG from the controi room and cable spreading room without affecting the dedicated DC control cable from the switchgear room to the DG.

Using the new alternate shutdown panel, operators can isolate startup and control of the DG from the control room and cable spreading room to perform the functional check without incurring the disadvantages of starting the DG without DC control power. While one operator starts the DG from the alternate shutdown panel in the DG room, another operator goes to the switchgear room, isolates the DC control power to the switchgear, and manually loads the DG by energizing the breakers at the switchgear, as required. The starting of the DG is independent of the loading. Loading is not a necessary condition to demonstrate successful starting of the DG from the alternate shutdown panel.

Loading is only intended to verify operation of the components the DG serves, nat to functionally check the alternate shutdown panel (old or new).

BECo's May 22, 1987 submittal proposed language for Section 4.12.G.7 on page 206e-2 which duplicated the language of the current Section 4.9.A.l.a except for deleting the words". . .and loaded". Loading the DG, once it is shown capable of starting, need not be, and should not be imposed as a requirement for functionally checking the alternate shutdown panel.

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