ML20237A246
| ML20237A246 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 08/12/1983 |
| From: | Lieberman J NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD) |
| To: | Deyoung R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| References | |
| CON-#487-5013 2.206, NUDOCS 8712140356 | |
| Download: ML20237A246 (16) | |
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MEMORA'iDUM FOR: Richard C. DeYoung Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement ,
4 FROM: James Lieberman Director and Chief Counsel ,
Regional Operations & Enforcement Division, OELD I l
SUBJECT:
PETITION OF MASSPIRG FOR EMERGENCY AND REMEDIAL ACTION l WITH RESPECT TO THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANS FOR THE !
PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION In our memorandum to you of August 5,1983 transmitting the MASSPIRG 2.206 petiticn, it was noted that the CHAOS II report was not attached to the oriainal p gqef}ted. A_ cog is enclosed, as is a copy of the 9 {Uas$RWule,e.t[11.on.y rn tts. Alf6EnW3eneraUiRQdini?tti regarding the state of emergency planning at Pilgrim.
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James Lieberman Director and Chief Counsel Regional Operations & Enforcement Division
Enclosures:
a/s cc: (w/ enclosure) i H. Denton, NRR E. Christenbury, OELD '
T.Murley, Reg.I/ I CONTACT:
Richard ;'. Hoefling, OELD x27013 8712140356 830812 g' 3 3' f6 hDR ADOCK 05000293 PDR
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMLNT AGENCY PILGRIM NUCLEAR )
POWER STATION, )
PLYMOUTH' MASSACHUSETTS -- )
OFF-SITE SMERGENCY )
PLANNING
) .
COMMENTS OF ATTORNEY. GENERAL FRANCIS X. BELLOTTI RELATIVE'TO OFF-SITE EMERGENCY PLANNING FOR THE PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION The emergency planning regulations of the Nuclear RegulatoryL eommission require it to determine, with the assistance of FEMA, whether there is " reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures.can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency. . . " at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power 10 C.F.R. 550.54(s)(2). Those regulations further Station.
require that emergency plans be prepared within Emergency 1
Planning zones whose size and shape have been determined on the basis of " local emergency response needs and capabilities as they are affected by such conditions as demography, topography, .
land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries." 10 C.F.R. S50.54(s)(1). On the basis of the I
evidence which currently exists, there is not yet " reasonable in fact, be.
assurance" that adequate protective measures can, taken in the event of an emergency at the Pilgrim plant.
Moreover, the Emergency Planning Zones as drawn to date are too small, given local conditions.
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l This office has been aided in its review of the state of emergency preparedness. for the Pilgrim f acility by MHB Technical Associates of San Jose, California. A copy of a i
study prepared for'the Attorney General by MHB for purposes of After reviewing this review is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
certain preliminary CRAC (Calculation of Reactor Accident Consequences) results obtained by the NRC Staff for the Pilgrim site, an NRC study entitl'ed "The Consequences From Liquid Pathways After a Reactor Meltdown Accident," and other related materials, MHD found as follows:
- 1. Wind speed in the Pilgrim area is about 10 MPH, regardless of direction, so that the plume will likely be beyond a 10-mile evacuation zone within an hour after release. See Exhibit A, at 2-8.
- 2. If atmospheric stability is relatively high, plume radiation will remain very high out to distances of forty to fifty miles, according to the NRC Staff's CRAC study.
And, regardless of atmospheric conditions, potential doses remain high within 30 miles of the plant, according to that study. See Exhibit A, at 2-8.
- 3. According to the Staff's CRAC study, the Protective Action Guidelines warranting evacuation or other protective action are exceeded at 50 miles for thyroid, and 40 miles f or whole body, in the event of a Major Containment Failure (SST1) accident. Indeed, populations 20 miles downwind f rom Pilgrim in the SST1 accident scenario exceed not only i
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-3 tiel PAG for the general public, but the thyroid dose limit for emergency workers as well_. See Exhibit A, at 2 2-14 Table 2.
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- 4. While tiie d'ose/ distance relationships calculated by the NRC Staff may be accepted as accurate, the human consequence results may not, for they depend in significant part on a' questionable evacuation model. See Exhibit A, at 2'2 6; 2-11.
Further, the Staff's CRAC therefore, study weighted peak and normal populations and, provides no information regarding the consequences to human i.e.,
health of an accident at a time of peak population --
on a summer weekend - - even though the estimated peak population ' represents a significant increase over the normal population." Exhibit A, at 2-10.
- 5. The Staff's CRAC study indicates that, given its assumptions (including weighted population and an unrealistic evacuatic7 model), the mean consequences of an SST1 accident at Pilgrim I will be 71 acute fatalities, 1460 latent cancer fatalities, and 298 acute injuries, and peak consequences of an SST1 accident will be 5,170 acute and 72,800 fatalities, 30,600 latent cancer fatalities, acute injuries.
- 6. For SST2 and SST3 accidents, the major radiation Pilgrim core concern at Pilgrim would be liquid pathways. i surface wat.erbody materials would travel to the nearest (Cape Cod Bay) in about 29 days -- a short time compared to other reactors. Many of the medium and long-lived nuclides
f would survive to reach the Bay. And it would be extremely difficult to organize mitigation efforts in this amount of time. , Radio, active materials released to Cape Cod Bay would be dispersed.within approximately one year due to flushing See Exhibit A, at 3-2, 3-6. There are no effects.
existing mitigation measures at Pilgrim or plans for such measures. Id, at 3-7.
Certain conclusions necessarily follow from these findings. First of all, the CRAC results reviewed suggest that current Emergency Planning Zones "are not suf ficiently large to assure that Protective Action Guide (PAG) doses will not be exceeded outside them," given local demography and Exhibit A, at 4-1.
Further, since wind speed in meteorology.
the plume can be the Pilgrim area is consistently about 10 MPH, expected to travel beyond the 10-mile zene within which evacuation is currently planned within one hour after release.
That hour would not provide sufficient time for ad hoc Thus, there is evacuation planning outside the ten-mile zone.
no logical basis for limiting evacuation planning to a 10-mile radius in the case of this particular site.
take While it is clear, then, that evacuation planning must place outside the current 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ, how much larger it cannot be known without further study just a further CRAC that EPZ should be. MHB has recommended that study be conducted to " investigate more appropriate Emergency ce Planning Zones, outside of which PAG cose levels would not Exhibit A, at 4-2.
exceeceo in the event of a nuclear accident."
l Further study is also needed before the NRC and FEMA can l
l conclude that there<1s " reasonable assurance that adequate i
protective measdres can ana will be taken in the event of a i
I L radiological em'e'rgency. . . " at the Pilgrim Station.10 C.F.R. .
550.54(s)(2). The preliminary results of the Staff's CRAC study do not support such a finding. That study provides no evidence of the health. effects which will result to the- ,
evacuating population and, thus, no measure of the level of protection provided by'that protective action or, alternatively, the level of risk which remains for the public in the Pilgrim area even assuming successful implementation of evacuation plans. As MHB concludes in its report, the Staff's ,
CRAC results further fail to provide sufficient evidence of the consequences to human health of an accident at this reactor because'they are based on an unrealistic evacuation model and 4
do not reflect peak population densities or atmospheric f See Exhibit A, at ,
stability in the vicinity of this site. I 2-14, 2-15.
The preliminary results of the Staff's CRAC study do demonstrate that evacuation reduces the adverse consequences to human health in the event of a severe accident at this site.
Thus, MHB has advised this office on the basis of its review of l
those preliminary results that, when no evacuation is assumed, the risk of fatality or injury is roughly doubled over that which exists when evacuation is assumed within a ten-mile !
radius. 1/ Thus, there is clear evidentiary basis for further consideration of evacation as a protective measure in the event of.an accident at this site.
l MHB has furth'er' informed this office, in discussions since submission of its written report, that the CRAC model can be employed so as to estimate the health effects which will be experienced by the evacuated population, It is that analysis which must take place before FEMA or the NRC can ascer'cain whether the protective action of evacuation will, in f act, adequately protect the public in the event of an accident at ,
this site. It is only through such an analysis that one can learn the degree of protection actually accorded by evacuation and the degree of risk which the citizens of Massachusetts must accept if this plant is to continue to operate without additional safeguards. By running the CRAC model assuming different evacuation zones, one can further determine the areas within which evacuation provides the greatest dose savings and the distances at which those dose savings become minimal.
Thus, preliminary results of a CRAC study performed by the NRC demonstrate that further studies must be conducted by Boston Edison Company ("BE Co.') and/or by f ederal authorities before the of f-site emergency plans for the Pilgrim vicinity 1/ The Staf f's CRAC model assumed that evacuation within This10 miles would have no effect on latent cancer fatalities.
would seem to reflect a judgment that evacuation must take place within a larger area if there is to be anE protection afforded thereby against the risk of cancer.
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may be found in comp 'ance with NRC regulations. Materials received by this of.fice in the course of discovery in the Pilgrim co.nstruotion permit proceeding before the NRC provide further support for this conclusion. The Staff's preliminary CRAC results were based on an assumed average evacuation time of 3.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> (delay time plus travel time), which is well below the 260-315 minutes estimated by BE Co. in its own revised evacuation time estimates for 10-mile sectors in the year 1990. See Evacuation Time Estimates Supplement, Pilgrim Station, 1990, Draft, Prepared by HMM Associates, Waltham, Massachusetts, dated August 19, 1981.2/ Hence, the health cffects figures resulting from the Staff's study are understated.3/
This office reviewed HMM's revised evacuation time estimates at the time of their preparation with the assistance of Phillip B. Herr of Phillip B. Herr & Associates, Boston, Massachusetts, a city planner and professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Mr. Herr advised us that the estimates, even as revised, still fail to reflect the time actually required to evacuate persons within ten miles of the plant. Specifically, the revised estimates still fail to:
- 1. Account for the full public-transportation dependent population; 2/ We understand that FEMA has a copy of this study. If that is not the case, we will supply a copy for your review.
3/ The Staff's CRAC results are futher understated because q they do not account for the heightened sensitivity to l radiation (over that of the healthy adult male) of the large !
I numbers of children and pregnant women who are in the Town of Plymouth and on Cape Cod during summer months.
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- 2. Account properly for population growth prior to the J l
commencement of, operation and over the life of the plant;
- 3. Account properly for the effect on evacuation times of i- 1 ~
adverse weather' conditions; I 4. Account for other than home-based evacuation traffic;
- 5. Account for the possibility that multiple-car families will evacuate in more than one car;
- 6. Use realistic ass'umptions with respect to the information available to evacuees when choosing evacuation 1
. routes; or
- 7. Account for any of the following possibilities:
- a. vehicles breaking down or running out of fuel;
- b. traffic accidents';
- c. abandoned vehicles;
- d. disregard of traffic control devices; and
- e. evacuees using inbound traffic lanes for outbound travel.
HMM's evacuation time estimates for the 10-mile EPZ, even as revised, also assume no evacuation of the Cape population.
In light of the experience of spontaneous evacuation at TMI, and given the likelihood that persons on Cape Cod will feel L " trapped" should an accident occur at the Pilgrim Station, see Exhibit A, at 2-6, evacuation estimates which fail to account I for evacuation off the Cape (and the resulting bottlenecks for persons within the 10-mile zone) are understated.
Hence, there still do not exist accurate evacuation time l
estimates which can be used in evaluating the consequences to 1 . _ _ _ - _ - _ _ . _ - - - - _ _
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, a human health of an accident at this site. Such estimates as do l exist are higher than.that assumed in the Staff's consequence study, suggesting that adverse health ef fects will be even I
greater t'han th6se reflected by the Staff's analysis. -
In the course of the Pilgrim II construction permit proceeding, HMM Associates of Waltham, Massachusetts also prepared f or Boston Edison Company evacuation time estimates for Cape Cod.1/ The 3-1/2 hour evacuation time assumed in the NRC Staff's CRAC study bears no resemblance to the 5 hr. 46 minutes - 102 tr. 51 minutes estimated for evacuating various sectors of the Cape on a summer weekend, even assuming 1980 population figures and no notification / preparation / mobilization time. See " Evacuation Time Es'timates for Cape Cod," HMM Associates, Waltham, Massachusetts, Draft, dated, May, 1981, Table 6, at 44. As BEco.'s consultants themselves note, these.
high estimates reflect unusual constraints to evacuating persons off the Cape -- namely, the " presence of only two possible exit routes of f the Cape and associated traf fic bottlenecks at rotaries and along roadway sections . . . . Id.,
at 17. And, as MHB observes in its report, the situation is even further complicated by the fact that the two available exit routes head in the direction of the Pilgrim Station. See Exhibit A, at 2-6.
In its study of Cape Cod, HMM Associates reviewed various traf fic management alternatives for their effect on evacuation 4/ Again, we understand that PEMA has a copy of this study.
If not, we will supply a copy upon request.
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times. .HMM concluded that there were traffic management scenarios which significantly. reduced evacuation times, but warned that.the alternative which results in the fastest times I
would be impractical in the case of an accident requiring westerly. evacuation outside of the study area and that the next most effective alternative would require an increased level of traffic management. I d,, , at 49-50. See also " Evacuation Traffic Management Plan for Sagamore / Buzzards Bay," HMM Associates, Waltham, Mass., Draft, dated, August, 1981 (attached
' hereto as " Exhibit B"), in which HMM describes in detail alternative traffic management plans and (at p. 62) identifies l locations requiring traffic control management.
In light of these studies, conducted by BE Co.'s own consultants, it is unacceptable that the Plume Exposure Pathway EPZ for this site has been drawn so as to exclude cape Cod and the critical roadways and intersections between the current i
10-mile border and the Cape. The company's own consultants j refer to evacuation of that portion of the Cape lying within 20 miles of the plant as a " reasonable . . . evacuation" and ]
indicate that evacuation of the entire Cape may be necessary, l
though it reflects a " worst-case condition." See " Evacuation I Time Estimates f or Cape Cod'l HMM Associates, Draft, dated May, 1981, at 6. HMM's studies clearly indicate that there are unusual constraints to evacuation of the Cape and that alternative traffic management plans must be in place. Such plans cannot be developed on an ad hoc basis after an accident i
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l has commenced, since the plume may reach Cape Cod one hour after release.5/
The alfer' native traffic management plans developed by HMM l Associates have not been incorporated into state or local -
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emergency plans, since those plans have been limited to a 10-mile area.5/ State plans provide for closure of Routes 3 and 3A North to traffic from the Cape and diversion of that
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traffic to the Bourne Bridge. See Mass. Radiological Emergency Plan, Appendix 3, Section C1, at C-134, C-137. And yet HMM's Cape Cod evacuation study indicates that, in the event of an accident requiring evacuation of any part of the Cape, it is far preferable to evacuate over both the Sagamore and Bourne Bridges and to coute vehicles evacuating over the former to Route 3 Northbound. See " Evacuation Time Estimates f or Cape Cod," HMM Associates, Waltham, Mass., Draft, dated May, 19 81, at 4 9-50.
Emergency plans must, then, address the possible need for evacuation of some or all of the Cape population. Further, evidence must be developed as to the level of protection which can be provided the cape population by evacuation, since the is also important to note that there is approximately e.
5/ Itchance T0% that the winds will be blowing in the direction See of some portion of Cape Cod at the time of an accident.
Exhibit A, Table 1.
6/ HMH's study management is not complete, for it provides no traffic plan for simultaneous evacuation of mainland and Cape populations. See Exhibit B, at 24.
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l entire length of the Cape is within the zone of danger in the event of a severe accident and since there exist unusual constraints on prompt evacuation.
1 In short, there is to date insufficient evidence of the feasibility of safely evacuating the persons at risk in the event of an accident at the Pilgrim Station, both within and outside the current 10-mile EPZ. The boundaries of that EPZ have been improperly drawn so as to exclude from the planning risk and for process communities whose citizens are clearly at whom pre-planning is necessary -- in particular, communities on Cape Cod. Further studies must be undertaken to assess whether evacuation will, in fact, adequately protect the public in the if so, to event of a serious accident at this site and, determine the appropriate area within which evacuation plans c.hould be prepared. The consequences to human health from an accident at Pilgrim as estimated by the NRC Staff's CRAC analysis are sufficiently great to necessitate a thorough evaluation of the health effects which can actually be expected at this site, given peak populations and realistic evacuation times.
On the basis of the Staff's consequence analysis alone, there needs to be an in-depth review of possible design modifications and other preventive and mitigative iaeasures f or this site which would raise the degree of protection available to the public to an acceptable level. Possible remedial actions include roadway improvements, provision of additional to BE Co.'s or improved sheltering facilities, and an amendment
operating license ordering operation at reduced power, or even !
prohibiting operation, during summer months or on summer weekends. - And, as we have said, emergency plans must certainly I
be preparbd for'a l'arger area than the current 10-mile EPZ.
The Commonwealth's emergency plans provide for sheltering as an alternative protective action to evacuation. See Massachusetts Radiological Emergency Response Plan, Appendix 3, Section C-1, at C-38. Ag'ain, BE Co. has developed no evidence of the feasibility of safely sheltering the public in the vicinity of the Pilgrim site. Before sheltering may be accepted as a feasible alternative to evacuation, there must be evidence that the level of protection to be afforded thereby, given the availability of sheltering f acilities and the shielding factors associated therewith, is acceptable. And, again, this analysis must be performed for the full population at risk, including transients and others on Cape Cod during the summer months.
In its report, MHB identifies another area of concern with respect to off-site emergency planning for the Pigrim site -- .
l that of responding to an accidental release to the liquid pathway. After reviewing the NRC's study /NUREG/CR-1596, "The Consequences From Liquid Pathways Af ter a Reactor !!eltdown i Accident," (a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit C) and existing evidence as to the liquid pathway situation at l
l Pilgrim, MHB concluded that this area was one of particular l
concern in the case of the Pilgrim site and one requiring m-_-__. _.__ . _ _ . __
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further study and planning. See Exhibit A, Section 3. On the l
I basis of its review, MHB concluded that "[t]he lack of existing liquid pat,hway mitigation or planning at Pilgrim provides no basis for! confidence in successful mitigation in the event of f an accident." Id., at 3-7. MHB has advised, and we recommend, that Boston Edison or federal officials conduct a study to investigate the feasibility of various liquid pathway mitigation options, including possible construction of-permanent liquid pathway barriers. Id., at 4-2. l Finally, we submit that BE Co.'s on-site emergency plans fail to comply with HRC regulations which seek to assure prompt notification of off-site authorities and prompt protective action decision-making. See " Detailed Statement of the Commonwealth's Emergency Planning Contentions," attached to our original submission to FEMA dated June 16, 1982, Sections II.M,
-and IV.B. In the absence of such prompt notification and decision-making, evacuation is entirely infeasible given the average wind speed in the Pilgrim vicinity.
To summarize, there is at present no assurance that the ,
public can be protected in the event of an accident at the Pilgrim Station. The studies discussed herein must commence immediately so that additional plans can be prepared and necessary design or operational modifications can be 1
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implemented.' If these studies are not undertaken in the very near future, . the . operating license for the Pilgrim facility ' \
will'be= subject to poss'ible suspension fut fcilure to comply. '
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with NRC retjulations.
Respectfully submitted,
. ATTORNEY GENERAL FRANCIS'X. BELLOTTI
. By:
JO ANN SHOTWELL, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Environmental Protection Division Department of . the Attorney General One Ashburton Place Boston, Massachusetts 02108 (617) 727-2265 1
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