ML20235V985
| ML20235V985 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 10/06/1987 |
| From: | COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20235V954 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8710150443 | |
| Download: ML20235V985 (6) | |
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, . ATTACHPDDIT 2-J PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES 1
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!DPR-29 Page.3.5/4.5-8 LCO Section 3.5.G .;
Page 3.5/4.5 Bases Section 4.5-P_P_R , 3Q '
.Page 3.5/4.5 LCO.Section 3.5.G Page 3.5/4.5 Bases Section 4.5 0150443 871006 '"
I p ADOCK 05000254 '
PDR 3669K
QUAD-CITIES i DPR-29
- 2. The discharge pipe pressure for 2. Following any period where HPCI, Core Spray and LPCI mode of RHR l RCIC, LPCI node of the RHR or shall be maintained at greater core spray have been out of
.than 40 psig and less than 90' service and drained for main-psig, if pressure in any of tenance, the discharge piping of these systems is less than 40 the Inoperable system shall be psig or greater than 90 psig, vented from the high point prior this condition shall be alarmed to the return of the system to in the control room and service.
Imediate corrective action taken, if the discharge pipe 3. Whenever the HPCI or RCIC system pressure is not within these Is' lined up to take suction from limits in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after the the torus, the discharge piping occurrence, an orderly shutdown of the HPCI and RCIC shall be shall be initiated, and the re- vented from the high point of actor shall be in a cold shut- the system and water flow ob-down condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> ' served on a monthly basis.
after initiation.
4.- The pressure swltches which mon-
- 3. Filled discharge piping for HPCl Itor the discharge lines and the and RCIC systems is ensured by discharge of the fill system maintaining the level in the pump to ensure that they are Contaminated Condensate Sterage full shall be functionally Tanks (CCST's) at or above 9.5 tested every month and call-feet. if the CCST lesel falls brated every 3 months. The below 9.5 feet, restore lhe pressure switches shall be set level within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> or lin6 up to alarm at a decreasing pres-both HPCI and RCIC to take a sure of 1 40 psig and an in-suction from the torus per creasing pressure of < 90 psig.
4.5.G.3.
H. Condensate Pump Room Flood Protection H. Condensate Punp Room Flood Protection
- 1. The following surveillance re-
- 1. The systems installed to prevent quirements shall be observed to or mitigste the consequences of assure that the condensate pump flooding of the condensate pump room flood protection is oper-room shall be operable prior to able.
startup of the reactor.
- a. The piping and electrical
- 2. The condenser pit water level penetrations, bulkhead switches shall trip the condon- doors, and submarine doors ser circulating water pumps and for the vaults containing alenn in the control room if wa- the RHR service water pumps ter level in the condenser pit and diesel generator cooling exceeds a level of 5 feet above pumps shall be checked the pit floor, if a failure oc- during each operating cycle l curs in one of these trip and by pressurizing to 15 + 2 alarm circuits, the failed cir- psig and checking for Teoks cult shall be imediately placed using a soap bubble in a trip condition and reactor solution. The criteria for operation shall be permissible acceptance shall be no for the following 7 days unless visible leakage through the the circult is sooner made oper- soap bubble solution.
able, ,
3669K 3.5/4.5-8 Amendnent No. l 1
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. ' QUAD-CITIES
- DPR-29
' 4.5' SURVEILLANCE REQUIREME r S BASES Thetes'tIngIntervalforthecoreandcont3fnmentcoolingsy'stemsisbasedonaquantitative (reliability analysis, Judgment, and practicality. The core cooling systems have not been designed to be fully testable dur bg operation. For example, the core spray final admission valves do not -
-open until-reactor presssre has fallen to 350 prb:. Thus, during operation, even.if high drywell 3 l
pressure were simulated, h final valves wod d not.open. In the case of the HPCI,' automatic initiation during power cperation would resu r in pumping cold water into the reactor vessel which ]
- Is not desirable.
. h systems can be automatically actuated during a refueling outage and this will.be done. To increase the availability of the Individual components of the core and containment cooling systems, the components which make up the system, i.e., instrumentation, pumps, valve operators, etc., are tested more frequently. 'The Instrumentation is functionally tested each month. Likewise
'the pumps and motor-operated valves are also tested each month to assure W ir operability. N combination of a yearly simulated automatic actuation test and monthly tests of W pumps and valve
-operators is deemed to be adequate testing of these systems.
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With components or subsystems out of service, overall core and containment cooling reliability is
- maintained by demonstrating h operability of the remaining cooling equipment. The. degree of operability to be 6emon-strated depends on the nature of the reason for the out-of-service equipment. For routine out-of-service periods caused by preventative maintenance, etc., the pump (nd valve operability checks will be performed to demonstrate operability of the remaining components. However, if a failure, design deficiency, etc., causes the out-of-service period, W n the demonstration of operability should be thorough enough to assure that a similar problem does not exist on the remaining components. For example, if an out-of-service period caused by
' failure of a pump to deliver rated capacity due to a design deficiency, the other pumps of this type might be subjected to a flow rate test in addition to the operability checks.
The verification of h main steam relief valve operability during manual actuation survelliance
' testing must be made independent of temperatures indicated by W rmocouples downstream of the
' relief valves, It has been found that a temperature Increase may result with the valve still closed. .This is due to steam being vented through the pilot valves during h survelflance test.
By first opening a turbine bypass valve, and h n observing its closure response during relief valve actuation, positive verification can be made for the relief valve opening and passing steam flow. Closure response of the turbine control valves during relief valve manual actuation would likewise serve as an adequate verification for the relief valve opening. This test method may be performed over a wide range of reactor pressures greater than 150 psig. Valve operation below 150 psig is limited by W spring tension exhibited by the relief valves.
The surveillance requirements to ensure that W discharge piping of the core spray, LPCI mode of
' W RHR, HPCI and RCIC systems is filled provides for a visual observation that water flows from a high point vent, This ensures that the line is In's full condition.
instrumentation has been provided on core spray and LPCI mode of RHR to monitor the pressure of water in h discharge piping between the monthly Intervals at which h lines are vented and alarm the control room if the pressure.ls inadequate. .This instrumentation will be callbrated on the same frequency as the safety system instrumentation and the alarm system tested monthly. This testing ensures that, during h interval between the monthly venting checks, the status of W discharge piping is monitored on a continuous basis. An alarm point of 40 psig for h low pressure of the fill system has been chosen because, due to elevations of piping within the plant,
- 39 psig is required to keep h lines full. The shutoff head of the fill system pumps is less than 90 psig and therefore will not defeat the low-pressure cooling pump discharge pressure Interlock 100 psig as shown in Table 3.2-2. A margin of.10 psig is provided by N high pressure alarm point of 90 psig.
HPCI and RCIC systems normally take a suction from the Contaminated Condensate Storage Tanks (CCST's). The level in the CCST's is maintained at or above 9.5 feet. This level corresponds to an elevation which is creater than the elevation of the last check valves in the discharge pipes of el W r the HPCI or RCIC systems. Therefore, filled discharge piping.of HPCI or RCIC systems is
. ensured when lined up to the CCST and tank level is at or above 9.5 feet.
3669K 3.5/4.5-16 Amendnent No.
QUAD-CITIES !
' 2. The discharge pipe pressure for 2. Following any period where HPCI, Core Spray and LPCI mode of RHR RCIC, LPCI mode of the RHR or shall be udntained at greater. core spray have been out of ser-than 40 psig and less than 90 vice and drained for main psig. If pressure in any of tenance, the discharge pl ing of
.these systems is less than 40 the Inoperable system she i be L
psig or greater than 90 psig, vented from the high point prior this condition shall be alarmed to the return of the system to in the control room and service, imediate corrective action taken. If the discharge pipe 3. Whenever the HPCI or RCIC system pressure is not within these is lined up to take suction from limits in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after the the torus, the discharge piping occurrence, an orderly shutdown of the HPCI and RCIC shall be shall be initiated, and the re- vented from the high point of actor shall be in a cold shut- the system and water flow ob-down condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> served on a monthly basis.
after initlation.
- 4. The pressure switches which mon-
- 3. Filled discharge piping for HPCl itor the discharge lines and the and RCIC systems is ensured by discharge of the fill system maintaining the level in the pump to ensure that they are Contaminated Condensate Storage full shall be functionally Tanks (CCST's) at or above 9.5 tested every month and call-feet, if the CCST level falls brated every 3 months. The below 9.5 feet, restore the pressure switches shall be set level within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> or line up to alarm at a decreasing pres-both HPCI and RCIC to take a sure of > 40 psig and an in-suction from the torus per creasing pressure of $ 90 psig.
4.5 G.3.
H. Condensate Pump Room Flood Protection H. Condensate Pump Room Flood Protection 1, The systems Installed to prevent 1. The following surveillance re-or mitigate the consequences of quirements shall be observed to flooding of the condensate pump assure that the condensate pump room shall be operable prior to room flood protection is oper-startup of the reactor. able.
- 2. The condenser pit water level a. The piping and electrical switches shall trip the conden- penetrations, bulkhead ser circulating water pumps and doors, and submarine doors alarm in the control roca if wa- for the vaults containing ter level in the condenser pit the RHR service water pumps exceeds a level of 5 feet above and diesel generator cooling the pit floor, if a failure oc- pumps shall be checked curs in one of these trip and during each operating cycle alarm circuits, the failed cir- by pressurizing to 15 + 2 cult shall be imediately placed psig and checking for Teaks in a trip condition and reactor using a soap bubble operation shall be permissible solution. The criteria for for the following 7 days unless acceptance shall be no the circuit is sooner made oper- visible leakage through the able. soap bubble solution.
3669K 3.5/4.5-8 Amendnent No.
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, QUAD 4t TIES DPR-30 4.5 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS BASES l The testing interval for the core and containment cooling systems is based on a quantitative
. reliability analysis, judgment, and practlcality. The core cooling systems have not been designed to be fully testable during operation. For example, the cc.e spray final adalssion valves do not open until reactor pressure has fallen to 350 psig. Thus, during operation, even if high drywell pressure were simulated, the final valves would not open. In the case of the HPCI, automatic initiation during power operation would result in pumping cold water into the reactor vessel which is not desirable.
The systems can be automatically actuated during a refueling outage and this will be done. To increase the availability of the Individual components of the core and containment cooling systems, the components which make up the system, i.e., instrumentation, pumps, valve operators, etc., are tested more frequently. The instrumentation is functionally tested each month.
Likewise the pumps and motor-operated valves are also tested each month to assure their operability. The combination of a yearly simulated outcrnatic actuation test and monthly tests of .
the pumps and valve operators is deemed to be adequate testing of these systems.
With components or subsystems out of service, overall core and containment cooling reliability is a maintained by demonstrating the operability of the remaining cooling equipment. The degree of ]
operability to be demonstrated depends on the nature of the reason for the out-of-service .
equipment. For routine out-of-service periods caused by preventative maintenance, etc., the pump and valve operability checks will be performed to demonstrate operability of the remaining components. However, if a failure, design deficiency, etc., causes the out-of-service period, then the demonstration of operability should be thorough enough to assure that a simitar problem does not exist on the remaining components. For example, if an out-of-service period caused by failure of a pump to dellvor rated capacity due to a design deficiency, the other purr.ps of this type might be subjected to a flow rate test in addition to the operability checks.
The verification of the main steam relief valve operability during inanual actuation surveillance testing must be mado independent of temperatures indicated by thermocouple downstream of the relief valves, it has been found that a temperature increase n- result with the valve still closed. This is due to steam being vented through the pilot 6 es during the surveillance test.
By first opening a turbine bypass valve, and then observing 11 ;losure response during relief valve actuation, positive verification can be made for the rel of valve opening and passing steam flow. Closure rosponse of the turbine control valves during relief valve manual actuation would likewise serve as an adequate verification for the relief valve opening. This test method may be performed over a wide range of reactor pressures greater than f50 psig. Valve operation below 150 psig is limited by the spring tension exhibited by the relief valves.
The surveillance requirements to ensure that the discharge piping of the core spray, LPCI mode of the RHR, HPCI, and RCIC systems is filled provides for a visual observation that water flows from a high point vent. This ensures that the line is in s full condition.
Instrumentation has been provided on Core Spray and LPCI mode of RHR to monitor the pressure of j water in the discharge piping between the monthly intervals at which the lines are vented and i alarm the control room if the pressure is inadequate. This instrumentation will be calibrated on l the same frequency as the safety system instrumentation and the alarm system tested monthly. This I testing ensures that, during the Interval between the monthly venting checks, the status of the i discharge piping is monitored on a continuous basis. An alarm point of > 40 psig for the low I pressure of the fill system has been chosen because, due to elevations oT piping within the plant, 39 psig is required to keep the lines full. The shutoff head of the fill system pumps is less than 90 psig and therefore will not defeat the low-pressure cooling pump discharge press Interlock 100 psig as shown in Table 3.2-2. A margin of 10 psig is provided by the high pressure alarm point of 90 psig.
HPCI and RCIC systems normally take a suction frorn the Contaminated Condensate Storage Tanks j (CCST's). The level in the CCST's is maintained at or above 9.5 feet. This level corresponds to I an elevation which is greater than the elevation of the last check valves in the discharge pipes l of either the HPCI or RCIC systems. Therefore, filled discharge piping of HPCI or RCIC systems is j ensured when lined up to the CCST and tank level is at or above 9.5 feet. j l
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l 3669K 3.5/4.5-15 Amendnent No.
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, i SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS' CONSIDERATIONS'
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[Cwaonwealth Edison has evaluated the proposed Technical '
. Specifications and determined that they do not represent a significant hazards consideration. Based on the criteria for defining a significant hazards
- consideration established in 10 CFR 50.92L(c), operation of Quad. Cities'in
.accordance with'the' proposed changes:
1). Will not; involve'a significant increase in the probability or. consequences of an accident previously evaluated because the change'.is in the conserva-tive dire'ction and therefore has lessened the probability or consequences.
of an: accident as previously evaluated. Conservatism has been added by
, 'specifying.a passive method for maintaining filled discharge lines in the= '
-high pressure: cooling systems which is more reliable.than an active method
- that is dependent on:a single fil1~ pump.
- 2) Will not' create the possibility of a new or different kind'of accident-
'from any accident previously evaluated because the change'does not affect-Lthe requirement for maintaining filled discharge piping but only clarifies
-the actual method of ensuring filled discharge piping for RCIC and HPCI-systems.. The method utilized does not change the HPCI or RCIC system piping configurations or normal source of coolant.nor does it change
. system setpoints or flow capacities. The'only change relative to the method indicated by'the, current Technica1' Specifications is the. valving out of an active component-(ECCS fill pump) since a. Passive method provides the same function of maintaining filled discharge lines.
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- 3) .Will not involve a significant reduction in the margin-.of safety since the proposed amendment does not affect the operation of-the HPCI or RCIC ,
systems. System setpoints and flow capacities remain the same. !
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3669K
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