ML20059A732
| ML20059A732 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 12/20/1993 |
| From: | COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059A726 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9401030103 | |
| Download: ML20059A732 (6) | |
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p ATTACHMENT B PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE LICENSE / TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
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QUAD CITIES DPR-29 1.1/2.1 FUEL CLADDING INTEGRITY SAFETY LIMIT LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTING Applicability:
Applicability:
The safety limits established to preserve The limiting safety. system settings apply the fuel cladding integrity apply to to trip settings of the instruments and those variables which monitor the fuel thermal behavior.
devices which are provided to prevent the-fuel cladding integrity safety limits from-being exceeded.-
Objective:
Objective:
The objective of the safety limits is to The objective of the limiting safety sys-establish limits below which the integ-tem settings is'to define the level of rity of the fuel cladding is preserved.
the process variables at which automatic-protective action is initiated to pre-vent the fuel cladding integrity safety _
limits from being exceeded.
SPECIFICATIONS A.
Reactor Pressure > 800 psig and Core A.
Neutron Flux Trip Settings Flow > 10% of Rated The existence of a minimum critical The limiting safety system trip set-power ratio (MCPR) less than'hM.I.07 l tings shall be as specified below:
shall constitute violation of the fuel cladding integrity safety limit.
1.
APRM Flux Scram Trip Setting (Run Mode)
When the reactor-mode switch is in the Run position, the APRM flux scram setting shall be as shown in Figure 2.1-1 and shall be:
S < (.S8WD + 62) with'a maximum setpoint of 120%-
for core flow equal to 98 x 108 lb/hr and greater.
where S = setting in percent of rated power 1.1/2.1-1 Amendment No.127
C'J WtW DPt-20 1.1/2.5 FUEL CLAD 0!NG 2NTEGRITY SAFETY LIMIT LIMIT 2NG SAFETY SYSTEM SETTING Applibbtitty:
applicability:
4 The safety Itmits established to preserve The limiting safety system settings apply the fuel cladding. integrity apply to to trip settings of the instruments and those variables which monitor the fuel devices which are provided to prevent the thermal behavior.
fuel cladding integrity safety limits from being exceeded.
Objective:
Objective:
The objective of the safety limits is to The objective of the limiting safety sys-establish limits below which the integ-tem settings is to define the level of rity of the fuel cladding is preserved, the process variables at which automatic protective action ts initiated to pre.,
vent the fuel cladding integrity safety limits from being exceeded.
SPECIFICATIONS A.
Reactor Pressure > 800 psig and Core A.
Neutron Flux Trip Settings Flow > 10% of Rated The existence of a minimum critical The limiting safety system trip set-power ratio (MCPR) less than h04 f.07 l tings shall be as specified below:
shall constitute violation of the a
fuel cladding integrity safety limit.
1.
APRM Flux Scram Trip Setting (Run Model 8.
Core Thermal Power Limit (Reactor Pressure 1 800 psig)
When the reactor mode switch is in the Run position, the APRM-When the reactor pressure is 1 800 flux scram setting shall be as psig or core flow is less than 10% of shown in Figure 2.1.1 and shall rated, the cora thermal power shall be:
not exceed 25% of rated thermal power.
C.
Power Transient with a maximum setpoint of 1201 1.
The neutron flux shall not fogcoreflowequalto98x exceed the scram setting estab-10 lt/hr and greater.
lished in Specification 2.1A for longer than 1.5 seconds as indi-where cated by the process computer.
$ = setting in percent of rated 2.
When the process computer is out power of service. this safety limit shall ee assumed to be exceeded WD = percent of drive flow if the neutron flux exceeds the required to produce a rated core scram setting estabitshed by flow of 98 million 1b/hr. In Specification 2.1. A and a con-the event of operation with a trol rod scram does not occur.
maximum fraction of limiting power density (MFLPD) greater than the fraction of rated power (FRP), the setting shall be modified as follows:EM Si (.58WD + 62 [ MFLPD ]
0925B/0398Z 1.1/2.1-1 Amenoment No.120
ATTACHMENT C EVALUATION OF SIBNIFI_ CANT IIAZARDS CONSIDERATION The proposed change to Facility Operating Licenses DPR-29 and DPR-30 Appendix A (Technical Specifications and Bases),1.1/2.1, is to raise the safety limit Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) from 1.06 to 1.07. This value has been previously reviewed and approved generically by the NRC (GESTAR II NEDE-24011-P-A-10) for GE8X8NB-3 (GE10) fuel.
Commonwealth Edison Compan proposes an amendment to Facility Operating Licenses DPR-29 and DPR-30 which would change the Technical Specifications to support operation during Cycle 14 for Units 1 and 2. Commonwealth Edison has evaluated this proposed amendment and determined that it involves no significant hazards considerations. According to 10 CFR 50.92 (c), a proposed amendment to an operating license involves no significant hazards unaiderations if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:
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Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or 2.
Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or 3.
Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The_ proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the_ probability or consequences of an accident previg_usly evaluated because:
The change is based on GE's generic fuel licensing document GESTAR II (NEDE-24011-P-A-10) which has conservatively addressed the use of GE10 fuelin D-lattice cores with NRC approved methods and therefore does not adversely affect the consequences of previously evaluated accidents. The Safety Limit MCPR change does not affect the probability of analyzed accidents because it does not adversely impact any equipment important to safety. Increasing the Safety Limit MCPR from 1.06 to 1.07 upon implementation of GE10 fuel for Cycle 14 operation of Quad Cities Units 1 and 2 therefbre does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated in the FSAR.
The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of nr.fElenLfrom any accident previously evaluated because; The Safety Limit MCPR change results from the use of NRC approved methods in GESTAR II NEDE-24011-P-A-10 for application to GE10 fuel fbr Cycle 14 for Quad Cities ' Units 1 and 2. The Safety Limit MCPR change does not result in any new Une;ruaMasalle\\simepr.wpf(6)
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4 interaction with equipment related to the safe shutdown of the plant. The change does not adversely impact equipment important to safety and, therefore does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident scenario. Therefore, the Safety Limit MCPR change from 1.06 to 1.07 in no way creates the possibility of a new or different -
i kind of accident scenario from any accident previously evaluated.
The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety-because:
Since the GE10 design in a D-lattice core has a geometry between C-lattice and D-lat--
tice designs and the C-lattice design has a higher, more restrictive safety limit MCPR -
than the D-lattice design, the use of C-lattice safety limit MCPR for the GE10 design is a conservative approach. The GE10 fuel design has been generically analyzed with ap-proved methods per GESTAR II NEDE-24011-P-A-10 and the use of the 1.07 Safety Limit MCPR value has been previously approved as conservative for application to '
j GE10 fuel in D-lattice plants such as Quad Cities. Therefore, the proposed change to j
increase the Safety Limit MCPR from 1.06 to 1.07 maintains the margin to safety relative to the current level.
CONCLUSION Guidance has been provided in the " Final Procedures and Standards on No Significant Hazards Considerations," Final Rule,51 FR 7744, for the application of standards to license change requests for determination of the existence of significant hazards.
considerations. This document provides examples of amendments which are and are-not considered likely to involve significant hazards considerations. These proposed amendments most closely fit the example of a change resulting from a nuclear reactor core reloading, if no fuel assemblies are significantly~ different from those found -
previously acceptable to the NRC for a previous core at the facility in question are involved. This assumes that no significant changes are made to the acceptance criteria.
fe-the Technical Specifications, that the' analytical methods used to demonstrate l
conformance with the Technical Specifications and regulations are not significantly changed, and the NRC has previously found such methods acceptable.
This proposed amendment does not involve a significant relaxation of the criteria used
- to establish safety limits, a significant relaxatio.n of the bases for the limiting safety' system settings or a significant relaxation of the bases for the limiting conditions for.-
1 operations. Therefore, based on the guidance provided in the Federal Register and the
- above three criteria established in 10 CFR 50.92 (c), the proposed change does not constitute a eignificant hazards consideration.
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.l ATTACHMENT D ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT STATEMENT AP. PLICABILITY REVIEW Commonwealth Edison has evaluated the proposed amendment against the criteria for identification oflicensing and regulatory actions requiring environmental assessment in accordance with 10 CFR 51.21. It has been determined that the proposed change meets the criteria for a categorical exclusion as provided under 10 CFR 51.22 (c)(9).
This conclusion has been determined because the changes requested do not pose significant hazards considerations or do not involve a significant increase in the amounts, and no significant changes in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite. Additionally, this request does not involve a significant increase in individual ors cumulative occupational radiation exposure.
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